ATO,Ml~ WEAPONS, 1946 . Ln L 946. the United States Enjoyed A

6. TltE BARUCH AND GROMYKO PLANS FOR CONTROL ()} ATO,Ml~ WEAPONS, 1946 .. ln l 946. the United States enjoyed a monopoly on saw it as a carefully concei ved p\(; ~ the production of atomic weapons, but no one the U.S. nuclear monopoly and •Jot~, _ believed it would last forever. Conscious that Soviet facilities to international in \ p~~ -- . ~.--__, -:· sooner or later the Soviet Union would develop its they could not simply reject it withou t. ~c!r- _.,~· o·wn nuclear capability, Washington sought to their standing in the eyes of world op1mvn ~: : devise a policy that would simultaneously 19 June 1946, Soviet delegate Andrei G~ - ...... ~ .._ internationalize atomic energy, forestall Soviet presented a draft treaty designed to prohl'.)r ·.:.: acquisition of atomic weapons, and prevent a manufacture and deployment of atomic "V. el ~\ G nuclear arms race. Bernard Baruch, a well-known All such weapons would be destroyed ::-:~:: consultant and advisor to American presidents, months after the conclusion of the con\ c:-.[ 0n. was selected by President Truman to present the punishment for violators would be fi\c J b~ American plan to the United Nations Atomic mutual agreement three months after thJL Energy Commission on 14 June 1946. Inspection of plants and stockp iles \\ JS 1101 On its face, the Baruch Plan appeared to be mentioned at all. As a result of the fun damental a generous proposal, with its unprecedented will­ differences between the American and So\ icl ingness to place an American technology under approaches, neither plan was approved. and efforts international control . The Russians, however, to prevent a nuclear arms race proved futile . I I I '' I I ,, / ij9 , , ,di h., lkrnunl B11r11d1 to I hi· I I N \ ~"'' \10111 1. I It I ' I l'' ( l ' 1 '" II II I I '•\ I"" l ,, I I I I II I ,H <, _ ,,, ,11,·1nh,-r, 1 1 tli,· l 1111t ·d N; ,111 1 . \ ,1,h 11 ' ll ,, 111 1111 1 l ' , ,11 1111\\lilll, .111d Ill\ h·ll1I\\ .,, I •l) IJ' ' " I ' I 1 , , , ,, I d, , I, 'I 1 , r t r ; ,, r I I I ,1,·r,i:' ' i , 1 1· 11 " iii tli1· 1 'I ,1 11 .1I I I I 1, ,; 1I 1 , , I ,, 1 , I 1 1, r 1, ,, ,, I ,ii,l \\·,, ,11\' lll'l'l' II 1 111 :1~,- :1 1' '11 lll'l' h 'I tl w /\1 11l1 1, 111 y Ill 1hr j, fl Ir 11 1 ,ti I I . . L Wl\' 11 tli r 1 • • d tilt' dc:1d . I ll :1( 1s 1H11 htis,,i L' s• k 11 1w li-d;•1· ;, rid 111 11 , tr, I 11;1i,I, · ,1 I )Iii •"'1 •111 . ' ,, , 'P ,, lkl1111 d till' bl:h·~ p1irtrnr ul' Ih r ,1 • . . lw11d it111I tlH'1 1'1 111t · 1, , rli-1•, 1 11 I ' . . L W .t lo1111 c . . ,, :i IH)j)C wh1l·h. se11cd upon wi tli ,·. .i to 1111 c <'IH' f/' Y 1 ,l!.'. ' 1 ' · . • c11t 1l . c; 111 • 1 , ti I IO 11 . W t 1 s a I \' :11 11 c ra i I hc 11 , I 11111"' WC 1<1 VC I olkr lh1 \ a<., a ha\1 , hr h(;;_!,rH, 11 · Jr . ,1 1ncd l,,·cI-y man to he th e sla ve or fe ·11· I 'I . 1l ,I < • ~C US di <.,c u1.,<., ion . YL' i\'l' ourselves: We must elect W'>t·l,1 n, 1( t il . ' u peace But f think th e r c.<11ild r1<1 ' .l1rld dcstruct1on . l )f \ \ hcli evc ... th at a trea ty. mere! :- outla·w1n:1 p11 , SL'ience has torn from nature a sec. t ' . . . · I e SO sess ion or use of th e atomic homh. cr 1n"-l11Ur t· .. . in its potcnt1allt1es th at our m· ct s ,.1 ~ 1 . 111 , cower effec ti ve fu lfil lment of th e tn \truct1on" ,.r th1, from tll ~ te1rnr 11 creates. Yet ~error is not enough Commi ss ion . Previouli fai lure.;, ha ve hecn rccunl ic, inhi bit the use of the atomic bomb. The terror ed in trying the meth od or 1.,imple renunc1at1rin . created by weapons has never stopped man from un supported by effecti \'e guarant ,e,; of ,ecunt1 empl oying them .. .. and arm ament lim itati on. No one would h:1\,1.' Science, which gave us this dread power, faith in that approach alone .... Ir I read the -; 1gn, shows that it can be made a giant help to humanity, aright, the peopl es want a program not rnmpn,ed but science does not show us how to prevent its merel y of pi ous th oughts but of en force able baleful use. So we have been appointed to obviate sanctions-an intern atio nal law with teeth in 1t that peril by finding a meeting of the minds and We of thi s nati on, desirou s of hclprn g. tu the hearts of our peoples. On1y in the will of bring peace to the world and realizing the hcav ) mankind lies the answer. obligations upon us, ari si ng from our po'.\~c~1.,10n It is to express this will and make it effec­ of the means for produci ng the bomb and from tive that we have been assembled. We must pro­ the fact that it is part of our armament, are pre ­ vide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy pared to make our full co ntribution Lowaru effec­ tive control of atomic energy. is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use When an adequate system for control of in war. To that end, we must provide immediate, atomic energy, includi ng the renunciation of the swift, and sure punishment of those who violate bomb as a weapon , has been agreed upon and put the agreements that are reached by the nations. into effective operation and condign punishment'.\ Penalization is essential if peace is to be more set up for violations of the rules of control whil'h than a feverish interlude between wars .... are to be sti gmatized as internati onal crime:--. "'~ The United States proposes the creation of propose that: an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted a1l phases of the (1) Manufacture or atomic bombs ~h all ~top: development and use of atomic energy, starting (2) Existing bombs shal I be dispn:--l'd or pur­ with the raw material and including- suant to the terms or the Lreat y. and (3) The Authorit y shall be in posscs'.\ inn t1 f full (!) Managerial control or ownership of all information as to the knl>W htl\\ l'tlr the r1\l­ atomic-energy activities potentia11y danger­ duction of atolllic energy .... ous to world security. Now as to vio lation,: in the agreement, (2) Power to control, inspect, and license all penalties of as se riuu s a nature as ti~~- nati_trns may other atomic activities. wish and as i111m ediatc and ct'rtam 111 their execu­ (3) The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of tion as possihlL· , should be fixrd for: atomic energy. (1) Ill egal p,,:-srss1,,1111r 11sc illl a111111iL' h,1111h ; l'lllllHilll' cl Ill 11, e ( 'li art n 1,l th e I ln 111 , j' ,,r d r (2 ) lllrgal 1,,,sscssi,111 , ,,r sq1arnti1111 , ul :tlll111ic lnr :1~ 11 1L· li11 e .., ' " 111 <.: l 1eld ,,1 ;, 1,,,,11, , ric ''i matrnal su11 :1bk r,,r \I SL' 111 an :11li111iL· h,1111h : ( 'h:1rl c r pcnn1 h pe r1 :il 11 :111 ,,r, ,,rd ;~,:/, ',r, •' fh,. {J) Sl·1 1urc ,,f any plant ,,r 11thL'r prnprrt y ul l':td1 <11 I he: Ii vc: !,! re :1 1 p, ,w,: r', I 11 , ,r , rir t 1 bcl11nfill!! 111 l'r liccnsl'd hy the Authorit y: Soci;dist Kc p11 hl1 c.., tl, e IJr11 tcd V. 11 1;., rl ·, 1 r ,'' " . JS I r 1 (4) \\'illful intt'rfrrence with the activiti es or France and I h e U n1t e( . late-. 'NM1t 1,, 1. ,., ., the Auth01it~ : lain th at I c:1 m concern ed here h H .• trJ P • 111 <:1, (5) Creation or operation of dangerous projects power only a" 1t affech th 11., part1 cul;.ir rw. t ,,~rri in a manner contrary to , or in the absence There mu st be no veto to pro1ee1 th, o~ ;. ri, r,. of. a license granted by the international late their solemn agreement c:, not tcJ de , f-[r r , J '1J ,r J' f' control body. atomic energy for destru ctive purpcJ\e c:, '- And now I end. I have submi tted on , 'Jtl It would be a deception, to which I am ' - Ir1f' for present dj scussion. Our consideratifm 'Jv ~ unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you 11 broadened by the critici sm of the United 5ta-te~ and to our peoples, that the matter of punishment proposals and by the plans of th e other natifm \ ljes at the very heart of our present security sys­ which, it is to be hoped, will be sub mitted at their tem. It might as well be admitted, here and now, early convenience .... that the subject goes straight to the veto power

B. Draft International Agreement to Forbid the Production and Use of Atomic Weapons, Proposed by Andrei Gromyko on 19 June 1946 Article I Article 3 The high contracting parties solemnly declare The high contracting parties, within six months that they will forbid the production and use of a of the entry into force of the present agreement. weapon based upon the use of atomic energy, and shall pass legislation providing severe punish­ with this in view take upon themselves the fol­ ment for the violation of the terms of this lowing obligations: agreement.

(a) Not to use, in any circumstance, an atomic Article 4 weapon; The present agreement shall be of indefinite (b) To forbid the production and keeping of a duration. weapon based upon the use of atorruc energy; (c) To destroy within a period of three months Article 5 from the entry into force of this agreement all The present agreement is open for signature to all stocks of atomic energy weapons, whether in states, whether or not they are members of the a finished or semi-finished condition. United Nations ....

Article 2 Article 7 The high contracting parties declare that any vio­ After the entry into force of the present agreement, lation of Article 1 of this agreement shall consti­ it shall be an obligation upon all states, whether tute a serious crime against humanity. members or not of the United Nations ....

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

I. What were the main differences between the 2. Why did Baruch insist that the veto rig~ts . . h UN Security American and Soviet approaches to control of enJoyed by great powers 111 t e nuclear weapons? Council. must not protect v10. 1ators 0 f nuclear