986 The Journal of American History
The flaws in this book, such as they are, are Many of the critical decisions of the last fifty those one would expect - a paucity ofverifiable years-from dropping the atomic bombs on]a source citations, particularly for many direct pan to developing thermonuclear weapons quotations, and a journalist's tendency to be could, as the author proves, have been decided more chatty than analytical. Even so, I found otherwise. But Bundy finds that less conven The Mastero/the Game enlightening, percep tional alternatives-such as detonating a demon tive, and highly gratifying for the long-overdue stration atomic bomb or proposing a hydrogen recognition it accords Nitze. bomb test ban in lieu of the bomb's deploy Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jah/article/76/3/986/760762 by guest on 25 September 2021 Steven 1. Rearden ment- were rarely given serious consideration. Washington, D.C. Bundy, for the most part, agrees with the im portant decisions but sees danger in the ten dency ofgovernment officials, in their quest for DangerandSurvival: Choices about the Bomb secrecy, to isolate themselves from differing in the First Fifty }Bars. By McGeorge Bundy. opinions. (New York: Random House, 1988. xvi + 735 Bundy convincingly challenges the widely pp. $24.95.) held notion that nuclear weapons can be in struments ofcompellence. Citing numerous ex McGeorge Bundy's Danger and Survival is so amples, from Eisenhower's threats against Chi important a book that no one with an interest na to Nikita Khrushchev's saber-rattling over in national security affairs can afford to pass it Berlin, Bundy expresses considerable skepticism up. about the utility of nuclear diplomacy. Bun The book covers familiar ground - the his dy's interpretation will find little favor among tory ofAmerican strategic policy in the nuclear conservatives who see nuclear superiority as a age-and the recitation of events surrounding source of political leverage. In his chapter on historic decisions and crises does not, except for the missile crisis, the author demonstrates bril the case ofthe Cuban missile crisis, break much liantly that nuclear superiority can hardly con new ground. But the insights are sensible and fer confidence on its possessor when the instru thought-provoking, the writing powerful, and ments ofretaliation are sufficient to obliterate the themes masterfully woven throughout. whoever strikes first. In Bundy's reasoned opin Bundy begins with a fascinating account of ion, no statesman, on either side ofthe nuclear President Franklin D. Roosevelt's closely held divide, has ever managed to escape this fun decision to build an atomic bomb, and he damental reality. parallels the American effort with those ofGreat A believer in the centrality ofnuclear deter Britain, France, Germany,]apan, and the Sovi rence and responsible arms control, McGeorge et Union. From there he proceeds to examine Bundy, with insights developed as a historian the critical issues and decisions of the nuclear and practitioner, has given us one of the best age: the bombings ofHiroshima and Nagasaki, available expositions on the realities ofnuclear the ill-fated Baruch Plan, the hydrogen bomb weapons. project ofthe United States, Dwight D. Eisen Bernard J. Firestone hower's massive retaliation strategy, thequaran Hofstra University tine ofCuba during the missile crisis, and the American response to the giant Soviet military buildup of the 1960s and 1970s. Explored as Foreign Relations 0/the United States: 1952 well are the nuclear programs of European al 1954. Ed. by William Z. Slany. (Washington: lies, along with those ofIsrael and China. The United States Government Printing Office, ambitious sweep of this volume might have 1988. Vol. VIII: Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; defeated a less skilled historian and author, but Eastern Medite"anean. xxx + 1463pp. $33.00.) in Bundy's hands the events join together to form a riveting story ofhuman initiative, fears, Like so many of its predecessors in the series, and missed opportunities. this volume provides much that is interesting Central to Bundy's thesis is the importance and illuminating with respect to American poli ofchoice in the formulation ofnuclear policy. cies and the manner in which they are devel-