58 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN NEW EVIDENCE ON THE

USING KGB DOCUMENTS: negotiations. The famous proposal for end- superpower intelligence services sponsored THE SCALI-FEKLISOV CHANNEL ing the crisis, which Robert Kennedy later by Crown Publishers, Inc.4 IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS recalled as having made his brother “for the To understand better what can be learned first time hopeful that our efforts might pos- from these documents, it is helpful to revisit by Alexander Fursenko sibly be successful,” had not come from him, the standard account of the role of the Scali- and Timothy Naftali but rather had come out of the blue from Feklisov channel in the resolution of the Scali. Scali, who was also present in Mos- Cuban Missile Crisis. From the time that former State Depart- cow, vigorously disputed Feklisov’s ac- According to the traditional version, ment official Roger Hilsman revealed in count.2 Scali received a call at his Washington office 1964 that ABC News television correspon- Feklisov’s surprising assertion3 and from Feklisov on Friday, October 26. Scali dent John Scali had served as an intermedi- Scali’s immediate rejection of this revision- had been meeting off and on with this Soviet ary between the U.S. and Soviet govern- ist history posed three questions for students Embassy official for over a year. From the ments at the height of the Cuban Missile of the crisis: FBI, which Scali had alerted from the outset Crisis, scholars have had to consider the role a) Did the Soviet government use the about his meetings with Feklisov, the jour- that Scali and his contact, Aleksandr Feklisov KGB to find a way out of the crisis on 26 nalist learned that this man was no ordinary (alias Fomin), played in the resolution of the October 1962? diplomat. Aleksandr Feklisov (“Fomin”) was conflict.1 Until 1989, it was generally as- b) Did Feklisov act on his own or did the KGB Resident, or chief of station, in sumed that the Kremlin had used Feklisov, Scali suggest a settlement for his own gov- Washington. On this particular Friday, with a KGB officer based at the Soviet Embassy ernment to consider? the likelihood of US military action against in Washington, to float a trial balloon at the c) What effect, if any, did the Scali- Cuba seemingly mounting, Feklisov asked most dangerous moment of the Cuban Mis- Feklisov meetings have on the endgame of for an urgent meeting with Scali. Scali sug- sile Crisis because meaningful communica- the Cuban Missile Crisis? gested the Occidental Restaurant near the tion between the two governments had Materials consulted in the archives of Willard Hotel. The lunch was set for 1:30 ground to a halt. the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service, the p.m. But at a conference of scholars and new name for the First Chief Directorate of “When I arrived he was already sitting former officials in Moscow in January 1989, the KGB), resolve some, though not all, of at the table as usual, facing the door. He Feklisov argued that Western historians had these questions. Documents on the Scali- seemed tired, haggard and alarmed in con- gotten his role in the crisis all wrong. The Feklisov meetings have been opened as part trast to the usual calm, low-key appearance Kremlin, he said, had not injected him into of a multi-book project on the history of the continued on page 60

Russian Foreign Ministry Documents previously published but were of lesser import substantial addition to our documentary base and On the Cuban Missile Crisis than those already obtained.] some contribution to our understanding of the The 21 documents initially released com- crisis. Introduction by Raymond L. Garthoff prise selections from six categories of material. These materials expand on the earlier re- First are three cables from, and one message to, leased messages between President Kennedy and Among the new archival materials on the Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev in Ha- Prime Minister Khrushchev. There are, however, Cuban Missile Crisis recently made available by vana sent shortly prior to or during the crisis; no materials on Foreign Ministry evaluations or the Russian government are the first batch of second are seven cables sent from Ambassador other interagency deliberations in Moscow, in diplomatic documents, a selection of 21 docu- Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington and one to him, contrast to the extensive releases of comparable ments totaling 147 pages; extensive translations also all prior to or during the crisis, and one from materials by the United States. of these materials (as well as of two other docu- Soviet official Georgii Zhukov, also sent from Some of the Foreign Ministry documents ments released from the former CPSU Central Washington; third are one message from Ambas- have been lightly sanitized, and a number of them Committee archives) follow this introduction. sador Valerian Zorin, Soviet representative to the are only excerpts, but excisions are not noted While certainly welcome, this represents only United Nations in New York, and one to him (and except where there is an internal blank space in a about twenty percent of a file of 734 pages of to Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov) paragraph. Documents are not identified by their Foreign Ministry (MID) documents declassified from Moscow; fourth are two messages from original designators (such as telegram numbers), in the fall of 1991 and in early 1992. Moreover, Foreign Minister Gromyko to Moscow just before nor by their Foreign Ministry archive file loca- many documents remain classified. Still, it is an the crisis broke; fifth are three messages from tions. important step forward. Havana to Moscow reporting on First Deputy The precrisis reports of Ambassadors The documents were acquired through the Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan’s negotiations Alekseev and Dobrynin help to set the stage, but efforts of the author and of the National Security with Prime Minister Fidel Castro and other Cuban they do not add much to what has been known. Archive (NSA), a non-governmental, privately- leaders as the crisis was being ended; and finally, Gromyko’s cabled report of his meeting with funded research institute based at George Wash- the sixth is a single message from Deputy Foreign President Kennedy (detailed in his memoir) is not ington University in Washington, D.C. [Ed. Minister Kuznetsov after his meeting with Presi- included, but his account of the discussion of note: Shortly before presstime, a second group of dent Kennedy on 9 January 1963, in effect closing Cuba in his meeting that same evening with declassified Foreign Ministry documents reached the post-crisis diplomatic negotiations. A few of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and a message NSA; however, these consisted mostly of previ- these have been released earlier, in particular one giving Gromyko’s evaluation of the situation on ously-published Kennedy-Khrushchev corre- on Mikoyan’s talks with Castro. Nonetheless, October 19, are included. Both are quite reveal- spondence and other materials that were not they are all of interest and together they make a continued on page 63 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 59

“DISMAYED BY THE ACTIONS OF communist leader from 1953 to 1971, was requirements of Soviet domestic constitu- THE SOVIET UNION”: not merely a Soviet puppet, but, since the ents and forces (elites, bureaucratic services, Mikoyan’s talks with Fidel Castro and late 1950s, made his needs and agendas propaganda and ideology, latent public opin- the Cuban leadership, November 1962 increasingly present in the minds of the ion). In the events leading to the Cuban Kremlin policy-makers. As Hope Harrison missile crisis, the considerations stemming by Vladislav M. Zubok has convincingly shown, there are substan- from this axis had a part at least as important tial reasons to analyze Soviet-GDR ties not as the interests and concerns flowing from The talks between Anastas I. Mikoyan, only as a relationship of submission and the dynamic of U.S.-Soviet relations.3 member of the CC CPSU Presidium, and the subservience, but also as a relationship in The Historic-Documentary Department revolutionary leadership of Cuba in Havana which at times “the tail wagged the dog far of the Foreign Ministry had declassified on 3-12 November 1962, were a lesser more than the West realized.”1 Similarly, documents on the Soviet-Cuban talks, like known, but nonetheless dramatic episode in new Russian archival documents presented many others related to the Cuban missile the story of the Cuban missile crisis, and also by Kathryn Weathersby have disclosed in crisis, in late 1991. But officials of the marked a watershed in the history of rela- new detail how North Korean leader Kim Il Department withheld them (in a manner that tions between the Soviet superpower and Sung was also able to press his militant unfortunately has become a recent pattern), one of its closest non-European allies. agenda on an even stronger Soviet leader, allowing only a few to have a peek at them at Thanks to declassified documents from Joseph Stalin, with disastrous consequences, their discretion. One of them, Sergei U.S. archives, researchers have begun to in the run-up to the Korean War.2 Khrushchev, gives a dramatic, albeit short appreciate the significance and nuances of The documents on the Mikoyan-Castro description of Mikoyan’s visit in his Rus- U.S.-West German, U.S.-Iranian, and other talks from the Archive of Foreign Policy of sian-language book, Nikita Khrushchev: key patron-client relationships that were vi- the Russian Federation (AVPRF) in Mos- Crises and Missiles.4 Some were also made tal to American conduct during the Cold cow, published in this issue of the CWIHP available to the makers of television docu- War. But until very recently, the existence Bulletin, reveal that for Nikita Khrushchev mentaries, or published in Russian. Now and importance of parallel commitments and his colleagues in the CC CPSU Pre- they have become available to scholars, with and influences on Soviet foreign policy were sidium (Politburo), the Soviet-Cuban “axis” copies available for research at the National often grossly underestimated. New East- also acquired a life of its own, beyond the Security Archive in Washington, D.C., and bloc archival evidence, however, has cor- bipolar dimensions of the Cold War. This translations of the minutes of the post-crisis roborated suspicions that, to take one key alliance influenced Kremlin decision-mak- Soviet-Cuban talks follow this article. example, Walter Ulbricht, the East German ing processes far more than the needs and continued on page 89

THE “LESSONS” OF THE CUBAN blockade of Cuba was lifted).3 So peripheral Warsaw Pact during the crisis, the events of MISSILE CRISIS FOR WARSAW was the alliance to the Soviet Union’s han- October 1962 did have important effects on PACT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS dling of the crisis that it was not until long the alliance, particularly on the nuclear com- after the matter had been resolved that the mand-and-control arrangements that were by Mark Kramer Soviet Prime Minister, Anastas Mikoyan, established in the mid-1960s. This article bothered to inform the East European gov- will draw on recent disclosures from the The role of the Warsaw Pact in the ernments about the Soviet Union’s motives East German, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Cuban Missile Crisis was negligible. All for deploying and withdrawing the missiles.4 Hungarian archives to show how the Cuban evidence suggests that the Soviet Union That the Warsaw Pact was of only mar- missile crisis influenced Warsaw Pact nuclear neither consulted nor even informed its East ginal significance during the Cuban Missile operations. No definitive judgments about European allies about the installation of Crisis hardly comes as a great surprise. In this matter are yet possible because the most medium-range and tactical nuclear missiles 1962 the Pact was still little more than a crucial documents are all in Moscow, and in Cuba before the deployments were re- paper organization and had not yet acquired the archival situation in Russia is still highly vealed by the U.S. government.1 Nor did the a meaningful role in Soviet military strat- unsatisfactory.7 Nevertheless, enough evi- Soviet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact egy.5 Moreover, the crisis was far outside dence has emerged from East-Central Eu- allies about the removal of the missiles. the European theater, and East European rope to permit several tentative conclusions. Although the Pact declared a joint military leaders had resisted Soviet efforts to extend The article will begin by briefly re- alert on 23 October 1962 (the day after the alliance’s purview beyond the continent. viewing the “lessons” that the Cuban Mis- President John F. Kennedy’s televised rev- Despite fears that the showdown over Cuba sile Crisis offered for Soviet nuclear weap- elation of the Soviet missile deployments), might spark a NATO-Warsaw Pact confron- ons deployments abroad. It will then delin- the alert had no more than a symbolic impact tation in Berlin, the situation in Germany eate the command-and-control arrangements and was carried out solely at Moscow’s remained calm throughout the crisis.6 Hence, that were set up in the mid-1960s for War- behest.2 The joint alert was formally can- the standoff in the Caribbean was a matter saw Pact nuclear operations, and examine celled on 21 November 1962, the same day for the Soviet Union to handle on its own, the East European states’ unsuccessful ef- that the Soviet Union ended its own unilat- not a matter for the Warsaw Pact. forts to alter those arrangements. The article eral alert (and a day after the U.S. naval Despite the near-irrelevance of the continued on page 110 60 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

KGB DOCUMENTS ships bound for Cuba are not carrying dent remained hopeful that the Kremlin continued from page 58 any armaments. You will declare that would ultimately accept the October 26 pro- that he presented.” Thus Scali described in the United States will not invade Cuba posal as the basis for a resolution of the a 1964 television broadcast how this meet- with its troops and will not support crisis. Indeed, Kennedy’s response to ing opened. Scali said that Feklisov feared any other forces which might intend to Khrushchev offered to accept the implicit that war would begin soon, and was so invade Cuba. Then the necessity for terms of October 26 and ignored the Turkish concerned that he volunteered a way out of the presence of our military special- issue raised in Khrushchev’s letter of the the stalemate.5 ists will be obviated.10 27th. The crisis ended the next morning, He asked, according to Scali’s notes, Sunday, October 28, with the Kremlin’s what Scali “thought” of a three-point propo- By itself the Khrushchev letter did not public announcement of a deal—a with- sition: promise anything except that future Soviet drawal of Soviet missiles in exchange for a a) The Soviet missiles bases would be ships would carry non-military cargoes. But U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba—that dismantled under United Nations supervi- when the letter was coupled with what Scali seemed to incorporate much of what John sion. had relayed from Feklisov, the Kennedy ad- Scali and Aleksandr Feklisov had discussed. b) Fidel Castro would promise never to ministration believed it had received an ac- Both men were proud of their accomplish- accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever. ceptable offer from the Kremlin. Rusk in- ment. c) In return for the above, the United structed Scali to contact Feklisov to make KGB records suggest that neither the States would pledge not to invade Cuba.6 clear that the U.S. found a basis for agree- traditional version nor Feklisov’s revision is Feklisov was confident that if U.S. Am- ment in his offer. entirely accurate. Feklisov’s cables to Mos- bassador to the United Nations Adlai Sometime between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m. cow from October 26 and October 27 and Stevenson “pursued this line,” Soviet UN on Friday evening, Scali and Feklisov met at evidence of how the KGB handled them ambassador Valerian Zorin “would be in- the Statler Hotel, near the Soviet Embassy. In suggest strongly that the Soviet government terested.” As if to give some weight to his a very brief meeting Scali conveyed his mes- did not initiate the proposals that Scali pre- proposal, Feklisov noted that the Cuban sage: He was authorized by the highest au- sented to Rusk on the afternoon of October delegate to the UN had already made a thority to say that there were “real possibili- 26. similar proposal in a session of the Security ties in this [proposal]” and that “the represen- Feklisov’s cables, moreover, paint a Council but that it had been met with si- tatives of the USSR and the United States in different picture of his relationship with the lence. Feklisov asked that Scali run this New York can work this matter out with [UN American journalist. The KGB Resident con- proposal by his contacts at the State Depart- Secretary General] U Thant and with each sidered him an intelligence contact, with ment and then gave the journalist his home other.” Feklisov listened carefully, then re- whom he could exchange political informa- telephone number, to be sure he could be peated the proposal to be sure that he under- tion. In his cable to Moscow on October 26, reached at any time.7 stood the White House’s offer correctly. Feklisov felt he had to introduce Scali to the Scali rushed this proposal to the State Unsure of Scali, he asked repeatedly for KGB. “We have been meeting for over a Department. Roger Hilsman, State’s direc- confirmation that Scali spoke for the White year,” he wrote. This statement, of course, tor of Intelligence and Research, and Secre- House. Finally, Feklisov added that it was would not have been necessary had Moscow tary of State Dean Rusk were extremely not enough for there to be inspection of the already considered Scali a channel to the interested in it. Rusk considered this to be dismantling of Soviet missiles, it would be U.S. government. In previous cables Feklisov the first concrete offer from the Soviet lead- necessary for UN observers to observe the had referred to Scali only using a codename. ership for ending the crisis. The letters al- withdrawal of U.S. forces from the southern This was the first time he introduced him and ready exchanged by Khrushchev and United States. This idea went beyond Scali’s mentioned his position with ABC News. Kennedy had only brought about a harden- instructions, so he demurred. Feklisov’s cable describing his first ing of each side’s position. So long as the The situation changed the next day, meeting with Scali on October 26 is almost Soviets refused to discuss removing the October 27, which U.S. veterans of the Mis- a mirror image of the account that Scali gave missiles, there seemed to be no peaceful sile Crisis describe as “Black Saturday.” Just Rusk. In Feklisov’s version, Scali is the one way out of the deepening crisis.8 as the ExComm was discussing a formal who is fearful of war. After assuring Feklisov Transcripts of the ExComm [Executive response to the Khrushchev letter and the that the U.S. was planning air strikes and an Committee of the National Security Coun- Feklisov proposal, a second message arrived amphibious landing on Cuba in the next 48 cil] meeting of October 279 confirm that the from Moscow, which this time immediately hours, Scali asked if the United States at- Kennedy administration interpreted the “of- publicized the communication. Khrushchev tacked Cuba, “would West Berlin be occu- fer” from the KGB representative as an had upped the ante. Now he demanded that pied?” Feklisov reported that he had replied elaboration of a more general proposal con- the U.S. dismantle its Jupiter missile bases in defiantly that all heaven and earth might fall tained in a private letter from Khrushchev Turkey before he went ahead with any deal upon NATO if the U.S. were to attack Cuba. that arrived late in the afternoon of October that would strip Cuba of Soviet missiles. “At the very least,” he said, “the Soviet 26, in which the Soviet leader had written: Scali was sent to see Feklisov to register the Union would occupy West Berlin.” Feklisov U.S. government’s strong disapproval of the added that given the size of Soviet conven- We, for our part, will declare that our new terms. Although Feklisov defended his tional forces on the line dividing East and government’s new position, the KGB Resi- West Germany, the situation would be very COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 61 difficult for the West. And to make matters whatever reason, forgotten the balance of In following the course taken by this worse, he expected the crisis to unify the his historic conversation with Scali.13 important telegram, we see that it could not entire Socialist bloc, including China. Per- The SVR record on the second Scali- have played any role in shaping Khrushchev’s haps for dramatic effect, Feklisov assured Feklisov meeting of October 26 is less con- letter of October 26, which proposed a U.S. his American interlocutor that the Cubans, troversial. The account that Feklisov cabled guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and especially Castro, were ready to die like to Moscow differs little from what the Ameri- as a means of resolving the crisis, or even in heroes.11 can journalist reported to the State Depart- influencing the letter of October 27 that Feklisov’s report to the KGB Center ment. Feklisov reported that Scali, who had asserted a parallel between U.S. bases in creates the impression that the direction taken initiated the meeting, laid out a formula that Turkey and the Soviet missile installations by the discussion depressed Scali even fur- could be the basis for negotiations between in Cuba. ther. “A horrible conflict lies ahead,” Scali Stevenson and Zorin at the UN. The only Feklisov’s telegram arrived in Moscow said after hearing what the Soviet response difference between the Feklisov and Scali well after (nearly a full day) Khrushchev had would be to the use of American military accounts is that whereas Feklisov described sent his letter of October 26 to Kennedy. force against Cuba. According to Feklisov, this as a new American proposal, Scali re- Because it was not expected that Feklisov Scali fell into such a state of anxiety that he layed to the State Department that Feklisov would act as a channel for resolving the began to muse about possible ways out of the had responded energetically to word of for- crisis, this telegram was not given priority conflict. “Why couldn’t Fidel Castro give a mal U.S. interest in the Soviet proposal first treatment. After deciphering and summariz- speech saying that he was prepared to dis- mentioned at the Occidental Restaurant.14 ing the telegram, which took the usual hour, mantle and to remove the missile installa- After this second meeting with Scali, the FCD sent the telegram to the Secretariat tions if President Kennedy gave a guarantee Feklisov sent a long cable to Moscow, de- of the KGB, which was the headquarters not to attack Cuba?” Scali is reported to have tailing both of his conversations with Scali. staff of the Chairman, Semichastny. Inex- asked.12 In retrospect, it seems odd that at a time plicably, the telegram sat in Semichastny’s What is most significant about the ver- when the Kremlin was hungry for any news office for another four hours before the Chair- sion that Feklisov cabled to Moscow is that about U.S. intentions, Feklisov would have man decided to send it to Foreign Minister the KGB resident did not take Scali’s musings waited so long to inform Moscow as to what Andrei Gromyko. This delay was so long as a formal U.S. offer. Instead of grasping John Scali was telling him. Feklisov was that by the time the Ministry of Foreign this as a proposal, Feklisov told Scali that accustomed to cabling his superiors at all Affairs received a copy of the Feklisov cable, what he was saying sounded a lot like some- hours. And he had approximately five hours Khrushchev had already sent his second, thing already proposed by the Cubans in the between the end of the lunch and his next October 27 letter to Kennedy referring to the Security Council, which had been ignored discussion with Scali to tell KGB Center that Jupiters in Turkey.17 by U.S. Ambassador Stevenson. Although something was going on. In his memoirs, The Scali-Feklisov meeting on October Scali responded that he could not recall any Feklisov has explained this gap by saying 27 looms even less significant in Russian American rejection of a similar Cuban pro- that he did not expect anything to come of his records. Again Khrushchev could not have posal, he said he was convinced that such a discussion with Scali. Indeed, he writes that seen it in time to affect his strategy toward demarche at this time by Castro would meet he did not even bother to mention the meet- the Americans. Feklisov sent a short report with a positive reaction from U.S. civilian ing to the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoli after Scali scolded him for Khrushchev’s and military circles. Dobrynin, until 4 p.m. Then, just as he was new position on resolving the missile crisis. Scali’s confidence surprised Feklisov, in the midst of giving this report to Dobrynin, This cable did not reach the Chairman of the who began to wonder whether indeed Scali Feklisov received Scali’s request for a sec- KGB until 4:40 p.m. on October 28. might know something about the White ond meeting. Not only did Feklisov have to Semichastny’s reaction was to forward the House’s negotiating strategy. When Feklisov leave the embassy before completing his letter to the Foreign Ministry, where it ar- inquired as to exactly who might be inter- briefing for Dobrynin but he had to put off rived at 7 p.m. Moscow time, an hour after ested in this kind of proposal, Scali avoided cabling Moscow until returning from the Khrushchev had publicly accepted the giving any names. This was as far as he Statler Hotel.15 Kennedy administration’s terms for ending would go. As Scali and Feklisov parted, the There was soon to be as much confusion the crisis.18 KGB officer concluded that despite having in Moscow over what Feklisov was doing as The KGB materials substantiate claims taken an interesting turn, the meeting itself in Dobrynin’s embassy. The KGB had no that for the Kremlin the Scali-Feklisov meet- had been inconclusive. warning that its representative in Washing- ings were a sideshow that played no part in It is also significant that in his memoirs, ton had established, albeit unwittingly, a the U.S.-Soviet endgame of October 26-28. Feklisov does not mention anything about channel to the Kennedys. When Feklisov’s Although of less consequence in light of this having discussed a political solution with long cable arrived in Moscow at 2:20 p.m., information, it is nevertheless interesting to Scali at the first October 26 meeting. In fact, Saturday, October 27 (Moscow time was consider the contradiction between the con- Feklisov categorically denies that he or Scali eight hours ahead of EST), the chief of the temporaneous accounts by Feklisov and Scali made any attempts to formulate a way out of First Chief Directorate (FCD), the foreign of their meetings on October 26. Did Feklisov the crisis at that time. Here the evidence intelligence division of the KGB, forwarded violate KGB procedure and present a com- from the SVR archives contradicts Feklisov’s this telegram directly to the chairman of the pletely unauthorized settlement formula? Or, memoirs and suggests that Feklisov has, for KGB, Vladimir Semichastny.16 at the other extreme, did Scali use the KGB 62 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN resident to test some ideas that had occurred made after each of his meetings with the KGB officer. and Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 185-88. to him as perhaps the best way of averting 2. The Moscow conference was one of a series of five 11. Feklisov to KGB Center, 26 October 1962, Delo conferences between 1987 and 1992 involving, at first, 116, T.1, SVR Archives, Moscow. nuclear disaster? U.S. scholars and former officials, who were later joined 12. Ibid. The KGB documents suggest that in by Soviet and then Cuban counterparts. The confer- 13. Feklisov, Za Okeanom u Na Ostrovye, 223-25. the heat of discussion, with the fear of war ences were organized by James G. Blight, initially at 14. Feklisov to KGB Center, 27 October 1962, Delo hanging over their heads, Scali and Feklisov Harvard University’s Center for Science and Interna- 116, T.1., SVR Archives; John Scali, Report of 27 tional Affairs and later at Brown University’s Center for October 1962 Meeting, Cuban Missile Crisis Collec- fastened on a revival of a formula for ending Foreign Policy Development. For the Feklisov-Scali tion, National Security Archive. the crisis that, among others, UN Secretary exchange, see Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and 15. Feklisov, Za Okeanom u Na Octrove, 225. There is General U Thant had been suggesting since David A. Welch, eds., Back to the Brink: Proceedings of a problem with Feklisov’s chronology. Scali’s call October 24.19 Because of the possibility the Moscow Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, actually came later than 4 or 5 p.m.. Unless his meeting January 27-28, 1989 (Lantham, MD: University Press with Dobrynin actually occurred three hours later than that Feklisov and/or Scali mischaracterized of America, 1992), 112-14; 117-18. Feklisov elaborated he said, Feklisov should have had enough time to brief their first meeting on October 26, it may on his testimony in his memoirs, Za Okeanom i Na the Soviet ambassador and to send a cable to Moscow. never be possible to resolve the central Ostrovye (Moscow: DEM, 1994), 222-40. After returning from the second meeting, Feklisov contradiction between their respective 3. It appears that Feklisov first made this assertion to a continued to wait before sending Moscow any word on Russian scholar in 1987. A year later, Georgi Kornienko, his meetings with Scali. The long cable was not sent claims. However, the determination of who had been the Counsellor in the Soviet Embassy at until approximately midnight, four hours after Feklisov which man actually proposed this plan is the time of the Missile Crisis, told Raymond Garthoff and Scali parted. At a September 1994 conference in less important than the fact that, although that on 26 October 1962 the Embassy had been confused Moscow, entitled “The Caribbean Crisis in the Ar- the Kremlin was completely in the dark, by Feklisov’s account of his first meeting with Scali. chives of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Cuba Neither Kornienko nor the ambassador, Anatoli and the United States,” Dobrynin and Feklisov argued John F. Kennedy was convinced that Dobrynin, was sure whether it had been Scali or Feklisov over the reasons for the delays in sending a KGB cable Feklisov spoke for the Soviet government, who had made the proposal. See Garthoff’s revised on the Scali meetings. Feklisov alleged that he waited and indeed for Khrushchev personally. edition of Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis to give Dobrynin the opportunity to sign the cable; but As we now know, President Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1989), 80-81. A 1988 when the latter stubbornly refused to do so, he sent it article by Garthoff was the first published account of the anyway. The former Soviet ambassador rejected this decided not to use the Scali-Feklisov chan- Scali-Feklisov channel to raise doubts as to whether account, saying that Feklisov had not needed his signa- nel to settle the crisis. On the night of Feklisov had been authorized by the Kremlin to make ture to send a KGB cable. October 27, JFK sent his brother Robert to his proposal. See Raymond L. Garthoff, “Cuban Mis- 16. Spravka on Feklisov’s October 26 telegram on Dobrynin to offer a face-saving deal to sile Crisis: The Soviet Story,” Foreign Policy 72 (Fall Scali, Delo 116, T. 1., SVR Archives. 1988). 17. Ibid. Khrushchev. In addition to pledging not to 4. Thus far, Crown has four books under contract. Each 18. Spravka on Delivery of Scali report of 27 October invade Cuba, Kennedy offered a secret un- book will be written by a team. The Fursenko/Naftali 1962, ibid. dertaking to remove Jupiter missiles from study of the superpowers and Cuba, 1958-1963, will be 19. U Thant, “Statement in the Security Council,” 24 Turkey. Nevertheless, the story of the Scali- the first book in the series. It will be followed by a October 1962, in Andrew W. Cordier and Max history of Soviet intelligence penetration of the British Harrelson, eds., Public Papers of the Secretaries-Gen- Feklisov backchannel remains significant government by John Costello and Oleg Tsarev; a study eral of the United Nations, VI: U Thant, 1961-1964 as a prime example of how governments can of KGB-CIA operations in Berlin by George Bailey, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 237- misinterpret each other, especially in the Sergei Kondrashev, and David Murphy; and a history of 240. grip of a crisis. Soviet intelligence operations in the United States by Alexander Vassiliev and Allen Weinstein. Alexandr A. Fursenko is the Vice President of the St. 5. ABC news special of 13 August 1964. Transcript, Petersburg branch of the Russian Academy of Sci- 1. The New York Times broke the story of John Scali’s Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National Security ences; Timothy J. Naftali is Assistant Professor of role in the Cuban missile crisis on 4 August 1964. It Archive. History, University of Hawaii at Manoa. was reported that Look magazine was about to publish 6. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York: J. B. an excerpt from Roger Hilsman’s forthcoming book on Lippincott Company, 1966), 177-79. In their first public foreign policymaking in the Kennedy years that named accounts, both Scali and Hilsman misremembered the Scali as an intermediary between the U.S. and Soviet details of the proposal. They had Khrushchev giving the governments at the climax of the missile crisis. Just as pledge to keep Cuba free of offensive weapons, not Hilsman’s piece was to appear in print, John Scali Fidel Castro. This flawed version of the “Soviet” pro- discussed his meetings with the Soviet KGB official, posal gained wide currency when Graham T. Allison “Mr. X,” on an ABC news special of 13 August 1964. featured it in his influential Essence of Decision: Ex- Transcript, Cuban Missile Crisis Collection, National plaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, Security Archive, Washington, D.C. U.S. News & 1971), 260, 263. For Scali’s confidential description on World Report carried an article about Hilsman’s rev- 26 October 1962 of what he had just heard from Feklisov, elation in its 17 August 1964 issue. Hilsman’s excerpt which confirms Abel’s and Salinger’s accounts, see finally appeared in the 25 August 1964 issue of Look. “John Scali’s notes of first meeting with Soviet embassy A few months later, in its 25 October 1964 edition, counselor and KGB officer Alexandr Fomin, October Family Weekly published Scali’s “I Was the Secret Go- 26, 1962,” Document 43 in Laurence Chang and Peter Between in the Cuban Crisis.” Pierre Salinger, Hilsman Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A and Robert Kennedy all attested to the importance of National Security Archive Documents Reader, (New the Scali channel in autobiographical books: With York: New Press, 1992), 184. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), 274- 7. Ibid. 280; To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy 8. Hilsman, To Move A Nation, 217-19. in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: 9. Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, Doubleday & Co., 1967), 217-223; and Thirteen Days: President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Cu- A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: ban Missile Crisis Meetings, 27 October 1962, John F. W.W. Norton & Co., 1969), 90-91. Salinger’s With Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. Kennedy quoted directly from notes that John Scali had 10. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 26 October 1962, in Chang COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 63

FOREIGN MINISTRY DOCUMENTS not, however, include the reports on Dobrynin’s to 7 January 1963, by contrast, is completely continued from page 58 delivery to Robert Kennedy on October 29 of a omitted, apart from Kuznetsov’s subsequent fi- ing. Gromyko not only had obtained no hint of draft written agreement, and its sharp rejection in nal meeting with the president on 9 January 1963. the American discovery of the missiles, he re- another meeting on October 30. This negotiation settled the issues of dismantling ported that from all available information, in- The reporting on Mikoyan’s talks in Cuba, and withdrawal of the missiles, bombers, and cluding Soviet intelligence (referred to by the while not complete, does give the main discus- warheads, and verification of the withdrawal of usual circumlocation as information received sions in considerable detail. Incidentally, apart missiles and bombers by cooperative measures, “through unofficial channels”) and from other from Mikoyan’s efforts to persuade Castro to but was unable to formulate agreed terms for countries (which would include Cuba), “the acute- agree to the withdrawal of Soviet IL-28 bombers assurances against a U.S. invasion of Cuba and ness of the anti-Cuban campaign in the United from Cuba and his reassurances on Soviet sup- eventually left it to rest on the presidential state- States has somewhat abated,” and that under port on other matters, both Mikoyan and Castro ments. Kuznetsov’s account of his meeting with prevailing conditions “a military adventure against discussed aspects of the crisis itself that shed light Kennedy not only deals with Cuba (including the Cuba is almost inconceivable.” Notwithstanding on earlier Soviet and Cuban thinking and actions. question of the Soviet military presence remain- his own knowledge of the secret missile deploy- Both, for example, had clearly concluded by ing there, a diplomatic dialogue on which contin- ment underway, he even said, “Everything that October 27 that an American attack on Cuba was ued into April 1963) but also with the subject of we know about the position of the USA govern- imminent—although they drew different conclu- a nuclear test ban. A test ban was then being ment on the Cuban question permits the conclu- sions on what the Soviet Union should do about discussed in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchanges, sion that the situation in general is completely it. While not all statements made in that exchange some of which (those messages in November and satisfactory.” How did he think the United States were necessarily accurate, it is of interest to note December 1962 that also dealt with the Cuban would react when it found out about the missiles? that Mikoyan said, in answer to a Cuban question, crisis) have been declassified and released by the And this evaluation followed his meetings with “speaking frankly, we [the Soviet leaders] had two governments. Kennedy and Rusk. not thought at all about the bases in Turkey” as a It is not my purpose here to try to summarize Dobrynin’s cables on his meetings with tradeoff until the Americans, specifically Walter or even note the many interesting matters on Robert Kennedy on October 23, 27, and 28—or, Lippmann in a newspaper column on October 25, which these documents throw light. The specific rather, the excerpts that have been released— had raised the matter. He also did not disclose to points I have raised, as well as my references to help to clarify these important exchanges. Among Castro—who had found the idea of a tradeoff some aspects of the subject not dealt with, are other things, they make clear that there was not repugnant—the secret understanding reached with only illustrative. These documents, and others merely a statement by Kennedy, but “an under- Kennedy on the withdrawal of the missiles from that should follow, will undoubtedly add to our standing” on withdrawing the American Jupiter Turkey. understanding. So, too, will the long overdue missiles in Turkey, but also that it had to be kept The reporting on the extensive U.S.-Soviet forthcoming two volumes of the Foreign Rela- in “strict secrecy.” The material released does negotiations in New York from 29 October 1962 tions of the United States series dealing with Cuba in 1962-63.

Telegram of Soviet Ambassador to Cuba that this carries a great danger for Cuba, since it other public figures demand of the Kennedy A.I. Alekseev to the USSR Ministry of gives the most reactionary anti-Cuban authorities administration the revival of the Monroe Doc- Foreign Affairs (MFA), 7 September 1962 in the USA an opening at any moment to organize trine, establishment of a sea and air blockade of a provocation and unleash aggressive actions Cuba, the bringing into force of the Treaty of Rio Recently, the ruling circles of the USA have against Cuba. de Janeiro, and the military occupation of Cuba. noticeably activated a policy of provocation In regard to the above two last actions under- Following the signing in Moscow of the against Cuba; military preparations and its politi- taken by the USA, the government of Cuba came Soviet-Cuban communique in which the agree- cal isolation. Nearly every day, the air space and forward with corresponding official declarations ment of the Soviet government to provide assis- territorial waters of Cuba are violated by Ameri- signed by Fidel Castro. Both of these declara- tance in strengthening its armed forces is noted, can airplanes, submarines and ships trying to tions were circulated as official documents to the Kennedy in a public statement on September 4 establish permanent control over the territory of UN. The goal of these declarations is to attract the pointed to the defensive nature of Cuba’s military Cuba and diverting passenger and transport ships attention of the appropriate international organi- preparations and noted that Soviet military spe- bound for Cuba. The landing of counter-revolu- zations and all of world public opinion to the cialists are in Cuba to teach the Cubans how to use tionary bands of spies and arms has been in- provocational and far-reaching acts of the USA, defensive equipment presented by the Soviet creased. to unmask the aggressive schemes of the United Union. Several USA press agencies, comment- The constant acts of provocation are carried States in relation to Cuba, and to ward them off. ing on that part of Kennedy’s statement, under- out from the territory of the USA base at In these declarations the government of Cuba line the evidence of that the fact the president of Guantanamo, most often in the form of shooting precisely makes the point that the anti-Cuban the USA obviously preferred an attempt to calm at Cuban patrols. Especially noteworthy among actions and schemes of the USA presents a threat down those circles in the USA which are support- all these provocations are far reaching acts like not only to Cuba, but to the whole world. ing quick, decisive actions against Cuba. Along the August 24 shelling of the hotel in which The series of provocations is now accompa- with this, in Kennedy’s statement there are con- mainly live Soviet specialists, and also the lies nied by a whipped up, broad anti-Cuba campaign tained insinuations of purported aggressive Cu- published by the Kennedy Administration about in the USA press, striving with all its might to ban schemes regarding influence on the Ameri- the alleged August 30 attack, in international convince the population of the United States of can continent and a threat to use “all necessary waters, on an American airplane from two small the alleged presence in Cuba of large contingents means” to “defend” the continent. Cuban ships. In the USA government’s an- of Soviet troops and of the fact that Cuba has According to certain information, the USA nouncement, it is noted that in the event of a turned into a military base of “world Commu- State Department through its ambassadors noti- repeat of “an incident of this type,” the armed nism” which presents a grave threat to the USA fied the governments of Latin American coun- forces of the United States “will take all neces- and all Latin American countries. Under this tries that they can expect changes in the situationiin sary retaliatory measures. It is entirely evident pretext, the press, certain American senators and continued on next page 64 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

FOREIGN MINISTRY DOCUMENTS tic reaction. The realization of Kennedy’s visit to to take part in any international forums at which continued from previous page Mexico, following which he was to have quickly there is a possibility to expose the aggressive visited Brazil too (this visit was put off to the last character of American imperialism; they are in the Caribbean basin “if Castro’s government months of the year), served the goals of determin- strengthening Cuba’s ties with African and Asian does not come to its senses.” More probably, in ing the likelihood of attracting these two countries countries, etc. the near future the USA, using the pretext of an to the anti-Cuban plans of the USA. The Cuban leadership believes, however, allegedly growing threat to the Western hemi- Until now none of the attempts of the USA to that the main guarantee of the development of the sphere, will embark on a long process of increas- attract Brazil and Mexico to its anti-Cuban adven- Cuban Revolution under conditions of possible ing the pressure on governments of the Latin- tures has had any success. direct American aggression is the readiness of the American countries and will probably convene a Under pressure from the USA, in a majority Soviet government to provide military assistance meeting of foreign ministers of the member- of Latin American countries the local authorities to Cuba and simultaneously to warn the USA of countries of the OAS to work out supplementary are applying the harshest measures aimed at for- that fact. From this position, the joint Soviet- sanctions against Cuba. One can also assume bidding or tightly limiting visits of any groups or Cuban communique about [Ernesto “Che”] that the most wildly aggressive powers in the individuals to Cuba, and also their contacts with Guevara’s visit to Moscow was greeted by the USA (the Pentagon, the Cuban external counter- Cuban delegations in third countries. People who Cuban leaders and the vast majority of the Cuban revolution, and others) will continue to exert visit Cuba or make contact with Cuban delega- people with great enthusiasm and gratitude. The pressure on Kennedy in order to realize the most tions in third countries are subject to arrest, re- Cuban leadership and Fidel Castro himself sug- decisive actions against Cuba. pression, investigations upon return to their home- gest that these warnings will help to prevail those The campaign of anti-Cuban hysteria has land. The USA does not lack means for organiz- forces in the USA which are warning of the been conveyed via American propaganda to Latin ing broad and loud provocations against Cuban outbreak now of a world conflict, and are staving American countries too. There the publication of delegations taking part in international quorums, off a direct attack American attack on Cuba in the articles and transmissions of radio programs of as took place recently in Finland and Jamaica. near future. anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet content is constantly Referring to the decision taken at the meet- In our opinion, in the near future the ruling encouraged, while the external Cuban counter- ing at Punta-del-Este about the exclusion of Cuba circles of the USA will continue to expand the revolution and local reaction put constant pres- from the OAS, the USA is undertaking all mea- attacks on Cuba by all the above-mentioned sure on the governments of those countries, con- sures to deny Cuba participation in any organiza- means: provocations, the propaganda campaign, duct loud demonstrations and terrorize individu- tions connected with the inter-American system. military preparations, actions of the domestic als and organizations which speak out in defense In particular, they recently undertook an attempt counter-revolution, political isolation, and so of the Cuban revolution, and by means of bribery to secure the exclusion of Cuba from the Pan forth. Their success in drawing the Latin Ameri- and blackmail get a range of people who have American Health Organization (PAHO). The can countries into their aggressive actions will visited Cuba to make anti-Cuban statements, and unlawful denial of Cuba’s application to join the most depend on the positions of the governments so forth. so-called Latin American Free Trade Association of Mexico and Brazil. Simultaneously, the USA continues actively is another example. In response to the American We also suggest that the question of direct to conduct purely military preparations, aimed at policy towards Cuba of provocation, military American actions against Cuba will be decided repressing possible centers of the national-lib- threats, and political isolation, the Cuban govern- by the correlation of forces in American ruling eration movement in Latin American, and, given ment is intensifying its efforts on strengthening its circles which have differing approaches to ques- the appropriate circumstances, the Cuban revo- own armed forces, struggling with the internal tions of war and peace in the present period, and lution itself. This is shown by such facts as the counter-revolution, unmasking before world pub- the struggle between them on these issues. organization by the United States of schools for lic opinion the aggressive designs of the USA, and The mood of the overwhelming majority of instruction in methods of street-fighting and anti- broadening its anti-American propaganda in Latin the Cuban people is defiant, and regardless of the partisan struggle in many Latin American coun- America. At the end of August, taking into reality of the threat of intervention, no panic or tries (in Panama, Peru, Colombia, Equador, Bo- account the activization of provocative actions by fear before the threat which is hanging over Cuba livia, and others); continuing intensive instruc- the USA and the possible increase in the unleash- is observed in the masses of the people. The tion of Cuban counter-revolutionaries in camps ing of counter-revolutionary bands and manifes- American provocations make possible an ever- located on the territory of the USA, in Puerto tations of domestic counter-revolution, preven- tighter unity of the Cuban workers and raise the Rico and in several Central American countries; tive arrests were carried out in the country and political consciousness of the masses. many inspection trips to these bases, schools, strengthened control was established over many Regarding the provocations, the influence and camps by responsible American military registered [known] counter-revolutionary ele- of the Soviet Union in Cuba has grown as never officials and the heads of the Cuban counter- ments and the places where they gather. before, and our cooperation with the Cuban lead- revolution, including Miro Cardon; unflagging The Cuban leaders are paying serious atten- ers has been strengthened even more. efforts of the USA aimed at strengthening the tion to the question of strengthening the devotion In the interest of future productive work unity of the external Cuban counterrevolution to the revolution of the cadres of its diplomatic with our Cuban friends it would be desirable to and unity in the action of counter-revolutionary missions, particularly in Latin American coun- receive from you for dispatch to the Cuban lead- organizations active in Cuba itself, etc. tries; they are taking every opportunity, as was the ers information which we have about the plans of At the same time, the USA is actively con- case with their presentation at the Latin American the USA government toward Cuba. tinuing to conduct its efforts towards the political Free Trade Association, to widen the sphere of isolation of Cuba, particularly in Latin America. their activity in Latin America; they are strength- 7.IX.62 ALEKSEEV The USA is concentrating on putting pressure on ening their connections with the Latin American the governments of Mexico and Brazil, which peoples by inviting to Cuba society delegations [Source: Archive of Foreign Policy of the Rus- continue to express their support for the principle and individual Latin American officials; in timely sian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow, copy cour- of non-interference and self-determination of fashion and aggressively, they speak at interna- tesy of National Security Archive (NSA), Wash- peoples. This pressure is applied through eco- tional organizations, unmasking the aggressive ington, D.C.; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] nomic means, and also by exploiting the domes- schemes and actions of the USA; they are striving COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 65

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba According to a dispatch by the Chairman of countries of Latin America and [Secretary of Alekseev to the USSR MFA, 11 September the Institute for Agricultural Reform C.R. [Carlos State Dean] Rusk which concluded yesterday 1962 Rafael] Rodriguez, the crews of Japanese fishing proceeded, according to information which we boats who are now in Cuba, citing the danger, received, amidst sharp disagreements. A particu- TOP SECRET posed the question of leaving for their homeland larly big conflict arose around the text of the Making Copies Prohibited right after the first attack on Havana. communique. The reception which was sched- Copy No. 1 C.R. Rodriguez announced that he had just uled for 6 p.m. yesterday in honor of the partici- spoken with Fidel Castro, who optimistically pants in the meeting ended in confusion—most of CIPHERED TELEGRAM evaluates the developing situation and asserts the guests had left, when at 11 p.m. the ministers that the Americans, following N.S. Khrushchev’s finally appeared, having been unable to agree on In a conversation with me on September 11 conversation with Udall and the publication of the text of the communique. of this year, [Cuban Defense Minister] Raoul the TASS dispatch, will have to reject attempts to The draft of the communique which Rusk Castro, noting the publication in the Soviet press organize direct aggression against Cuba. proposed was subjected to significant changes, of the TASS report, announced that it had been F. Castro, according to Rodriguez, with great primarily as a result of the criticism from the met with great enthusiasm by the Cuban leader- enthusiasm greeted these acts as a manifestation Mexican, Brazilian and Chilean representatives. ship as timely and well-argued. Castro said that of genuine friendship for Cuba from the Soviet There were changes along three main lines, de- this report will be regarded by the whole Cuban government and personally from N.S. spite the fact that the USA got the “tough mea- people and supporters of the Cuban Revolution in Khrushchev, and expressed for this his sincere sures” it was after. other countries as a reliable shield against the thanks. First, on trade—the USA did not manage to aggressive intrigues of the American imperial- Rodriguez recounted that the TASS decla- secure recommendations for a total cut-off of ists. ration had been received with great enthusiasm in trade with Cuba. The three countries mentioned Castro also asserts that the thesis put forth in the factories, in peoples’ estates, establishments above put up strong resistance to that recommen- the report allows opponents of direct intervention and military units, where demonstrations and dation, warning, by way of objection, that this in the United States itself—including Kennedy— meetings are spontaneously conducted as a sign would create a precedent which could be used in to put up more decisive resistance to pressure of gratitude to the Soviet Union. the future by the USA—in particular against from the aggressive forces. Regarding this, he, Rodriguez believes that the publication of those countries’ trade with the Soviet Union and nonetheless, is allowing a sharp increase in anti- the TASS dispatch increases the authority of the other Socialist countries. Chile, which has the Soviet propaganda in the USA and in countries Soviet Union in the eyes of the Cuban and other most intensive trade with Cuba, was noteworthy under its influence. Latin American peoples and helps those not in- for its insistence on its right to trade with Cuba. Raoul Castro believes that N.S. significant elements which are attracted to the Second, regarding so-called measures of Khrushchev’s conversation with [U.S. Secretary unruliness of the revolutionism of our Chinese security. The USA tried in the communique to of the Interior Stewart] Udall on the Cuban ques- friends understand the difference between a truly single out the Caribbean Basin region as the most tion, during which the government of the USA revolutionary policy and a policy of revolution- “threatened” by Cuba and in need therefore of its was warned without any hint of propaganda about ary phrases. own separate organizational measures. As is all the consequences which could result from its In Rodriguez’ opinion, in Cuba for a long known, even on the eve of the meeting plans were treacherous actions towards Cuba, is even more time already Chinese representatives have had no put forth for the creation inside the OAS of an important. In Castro’s opinion, the public an- opportunities to cultivate any Cuban leaders, but independent regional organization for the Carib- nouncement, as a consequence of this warning, the publication of the Soviet-Cuban communi- bean Basin with a membership of 10 countries. will force the USA ruling circles to search for que and the TASS dispatch once and for all However, at the meeting Colombia and Venezu- new means of strangling the Cuban revolution. undermines the ground beneath their feet and ela, in particular, came out against such an orga- Castro considers as very important the part guarantees the unshakability of Cuban-Soviet nization, even though they were mentioned among of the announcement which deals with the Ameri- friendship. the members of such an organization; seeing the can bases around the USSR, and also the USA’s opposition to the idea from Brazil, Chile, and Sixth and Seventh fleets in foreign waters and its 11.IX.62 ALEKSEEV Bolivia, [they] feared being isolated from the rest effort to convince public opinion that this is the of the countries of South America if they had inalienable right of the USA. [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- agreed to be included in an organization of the The use of this line of argument to explain tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] countries of Central America, the governments of Soviet assistance to Cuba will be very easy for which had long before recommended themselves ordinary Latin Americans and for the people of * * * * * as lackeys of the USA. For the same reason the USA itself to understand. Mexico refused to participate in such an organi- Raoul Castro asserts that in the course of the Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the zation. For a general understanding of Mexico’s developing situation the Americans are trying to USA Anatoly F. Dobrynin to the USSR position, we should note that precisely at her isolate Cuba from the Latin American countries MFA, 4 October 1962 insistence the phrase (the end of the second para- and to intensify the small-scale provocations graph of the communique, as transmitted by against Cuba allegedly carried out by irrespon- TOP SECRET TASS) about recognition of the principle of non- sible elements of the Cuban counter-revolution, Making Copies Prohibited interference in relations between Latin American the apparent shelling of populated areas and for- Copy No. 1 countries. eign ships bound for Cuban ports from the sea. Third, the USA attempt to formulate a point Today’s pirate attack on Cuban and English CIPHERED TELEGRAM expressing a hope for a quick establishment of a ships in the Caribbean area, in Castro’s opinion, Cuban government in exile also did not receive is aimed at frightening certain capitalist countries the necessary support from the biggest Latin and to give the governments of NATO a pretext The meeting in Washington on the question American countries. to forbid its ships to visit Cuban ports. of Cuba between the Foreign Ministers of the According to information received from sev- 66 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN eral participants in the meeting, Rusk put much 4.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN among the population of Cuba itself; in the same pressure on the meeting. The point of the com- way the recognition of an exile government by munique about trade with Cuba, which elicited [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- the United States “would confuse” the issue of the the most disagreement, was accepted only after tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] American base at Guantanamo, depriving the Rusk, referring to the mood in the USA Con- USA of the formal right to demand of Castro’s gress, threatened to cut off all American assis- * * * * * government recognition of Cuba’s obligations tance to countries which would refuse to accept re: the agreement about that base. that point. In addition to this, Rusk and Kennedy Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the 4. In spite of all the importance of the Cuba informed the participants in the meeting about USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, 18 issue, it is not the main issue for the USA. The the unilateral measures which the government of October 1962 West Berlin issue at present remains sharpest and the USA itself is now considering regarding a most fraught with dangers. maximum limitation on the use of ships of vari- TOP SECRET ous countries in trade with Cuba. Making Copies Prohibited 18/X-62 A.DOBRYNIN As indicated by certain information which Copy No. 1 we are now reconfirming, the following mea- [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; sures were named: CIPHERED TELEGRAM translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] 1. American ports will be closed to ships of those countries of which even a single ship On October 15-16 a closed briefing (i.e. * * * * * would bring arms to Cuba. In essence, this is “instructional meeting”) for editors and leading directed entirely against the USSR and socialist observers of American newspapers, radio, and Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. countries. television was held at the State Department. Ac- Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 19 October 1962 2. Ships of all countries will not be allowed cording to information which we received, the into ports of the USA and will not be allowed to USA policy toward Cuba occupied a major place TOP SECRET take on any cargo for the return voyage, if in the in the work of the meeting. The essence of the Making Copies Prohibited past they carried goods to Cuba from the coun- statements of Kennedy, Rusk, Taylor, and Martin Copy No. 1 tries of the “Soviet-Chinese” bloc. This refers (aide to the Secretary of State) on this topic is equally to cargos of military supplies and those summarized as follows: CIPHERED TELEGRAM of consumer goods. I. “Don’t joke about the idea of American 3. No cargo belonging to the government of intervention in Cuba,” because such intervention the USA (for example, big shipments for “assis- would unavoidably prompt serious counter-mea- To the CC CPSU tance programs) may be carried on foreign ships, sures from the USSR, if not directly aimed at the Everything which we know about the posi- if ships of the same owners are used for the USA, then in other regions of the world, particu- tion of the USA government on the Cuban ques- shipment of goods to Cuba. This point is directed larly in West Berlin; for many years [interven- tion allows us to conclude that the overall situa- against “non-communist” countries and allies of tion] would complicate the mutual relations of the tion is completely satisfactory. This is confirmed the USA, many of whom have now reluctantly USA with the countries of Latin America, Asia, by official announcements of American officials, given in to American pressure. and Africa, and overall would create more prob- including Kennedy, in his discussion with us on 4. No American-flag ships or ships the lems than it solved. October 18, and all information which reaches us owners of which are American citizens (although 2. At present Cuba is a political problem, and via unofficial channels and from representatives ships may sail under a different flag, as is often not a problem of security of the USA; thus, politi- of other countries. done) are allowed to ship goods to or from Cuba. cal, economic and other means are needed to solve There is reason to believe that the USA is not Overall, this is a continuation of the prior it, rather than military. preparing an intervention in Cuba and has put its unyielding line of the Kennedy Administration Proceeding from this, the USA intends to money on obstructing Cuba’s economic relations towards the tightening up of the economic block- achieve the greatest possible political, economic, with the USSR and other countries, so as to ade of Cuba, which is viewed here as one of the and moral isolation of Cuba from other Latin destroy its economy and to cause hunger in the most effective means in the struggle with the American countries and other countries of the country, and in this way creating dissatisfaction Castro government and the increase in assistance “free world,” and also hinder the provision of among the population and prompting an uprising to him from the Soviet Union. assistance to Cuba from Socialist countries in all against the regime. This is based on a belief that The first reaction to the meeting in Wash- possible ways (short of, however, a sea blockade). the Soviet Union will not over a long period be ington diplomatic circles is summarized as fol- All this, in the calculations of the USA able to provide Cuba with everything it needs. lows: although the USA didn’t get everything it government, should cause serious economic and The main reason for this American position wanted, the decisions of the meeting will be used political complications for Cuba and ultimately is that the Administration and the overall Ameri- by the Kennedy Administration to the maximum (not in the coming weeks and months but in the can ruling circles are amazed by the Soviet Union’s degree for the long-term isolation of Cuba from next year or two) lead to the outbreak there of courage in assisting Cuba. Their reasoning is the countries of Latin America; for the strength- mass dissatisfaction and to huge anti-government thus: The Soviet government recognizes the great ening of all aspects of the struggle against the demonstrations. The USA’s concrete course in importance which the Americans place on Cuba Castro government. It is revealing that Kennedy this case will depend on the situation. and its situation, and how painful that issue is to today signed a declaration, accepted by the Ameri- 3. At the present time the USA has no plans the USA. But the fact that the USSR, even can Congress, to the effect that the USA can use to create “a provisional Cuban government in knowing all that, still provides such aid to Cuba, troops in order to “prevent the spread of Cuban exile,” since in view of the mixed nature of the means that it is fully committed to repulsing any Communism to the American continent.” At the Cuban emigration it would be hardly possible to American intervention in Cuba. There is no same time he signed a Congressional bill, giving form a sufficiently authoritative government and single opinion as to how and where that rebuff him the right to call up 150,000 reserves. in any case such a government, created on foreign will be given, but that it will be given—they do territory, could not count on broad popularity not doubt. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 67

In these last days the sharpness of the anti- Rusk said that he does not agree that Cuba Cuban campaign in the USA has subsided some- On October 18 a conversation with Rusk cannot present a threat to the USA. Cuba without what, while the sharpness of the West Berlin took place. the Soviet Union, he declared, is one thing; a question has stood out all the more. Newspapers Rusk, continuing my conversation with Cuba where “Soviet operators” run things is bleat about the approaching crisis vis a vis West Kennedy, touched on the Cuba issue. He said, something different. Berlin, the impending in the very near future that President Kennedy considers that issue very The USA government and he, Rusk, are signing of the agreement with the GDR, and so important, that it carries great significance for the baselessly scaring the American people with “So- on. The goal of such a change in the work of the USA, since it concerns the security of the West- viet operators,” I answered. The Soviet Union is propaganda machine is to divert somewhat pub- ern hemisphere. As the President said, the USA providing assistance to Cuba in only a few areas, lic attention from the Cuba issue. All this is not has no intention of intervening with its own including whatever we can do to strengthen its without the participation of the White House. armed forces in Cuba. But the USA proceeds defensive capability. The Cuban themselves are Even the rumor to the effect that the Soviet from the fact that everything that is happening in running everything on Cuba, and the USA knows Union has made it known that it can soften its Cuba is of a defensive nature and will not turn that perfectly well. position on the Cuban issue if the West will soften Cuba into an attack platform against the USA and The situation has rapidly worsened, declared its own position in West Berlin was basically the countries of Latin America. Rusk, since July of this year. Before July the intended to mollify the public vis a vis Cuba. Besides this, Rusk announced, the USA, in situation caused no alarm. But from July, Soviet The wide publication of the results of an defining its position on the Cuban issue, as an- weapons have flowed into Cuba. So far it seems, election survey conducted here by the Gallup nounced by the President in his conversation with according to U.S. Government data, that these are (sic) Institute showing that the vast majority of us, proceeds also from the fact that Cuba will not defensive weapons. But it is unclear how the Americans are against an American intervention undertake actions aimed at foisting its system and situation will develop in the future. in Cuba serves this same goal. In this regard, we regime on the other countries of Latin America. Besides this, declared Rusk, according to have to note that the leadership of the institute in The government of the USA places ex- precise data in American possession, the Cuban the past traditionally were more sympathetic to tremely high significance on these two condi- regime continues to actively carry out subversive Republicans. Therefore, its publication in this tions. It would be hoped that neither the first, nor work against a number of Latin American coun- case deserves special attention. This was not the second, would take place. tries. done without the encouragement of the White As far as the domestic regime on Cuba is I said that the Cubans should have come to House either; in this way a nudge was given to the concerned, the USA decisively views it as a conclusions about their own defense from the extremist groups in Congress which support ex- regime which contradicts the interests of security intervention on Cuba by the immigrant riff-raff treme measures. in the Western hemisphere. organized by the Americans and financed by Also deserving of attention is the fact that Having heard Rusk out, I said that the Cuban them. They came to such a conclusion, deciding Congress has now “gone on recess.” This sug- issue had been caused by the hostile policy of the to strengthen their own defense capability. July gests that the pressure on Kennedy from the USA towards Cuba. The USA for some reason has no significance here. Cuba represented no extreme groups in Congress will be less during believes that it must dictate to the Cubans the sort threat to the USA either before July, or after July. the recess. of domestic regime that should exist in Cuba, and As far as the declarations regarding subver- The position of the USA allies, particularly the social structure under which the Cubans should sive work by the Cubans is concerned, I can only the British, also played a role. They did not live. But on what basis is the USA trying to say that these declarations are in contradiction support calls for the unleashing of aggression appropriate for itself the right to dictate to the with the information which we possess. against Cuba, although they equally approved of Cubans how to conduct their internal affairs? All the same, declared Rusk, in July some other anti-Cuban steps of the USA. There is no such basis, and such a basis cannot be. kind of sudden change took place. And that It is not possible, of course, to be completely Cuba belongs to the Cubans, not to Americans. sudden change significantly complicated the situ- insured against USA surprises and adventures, Perhaps, I declared, Rusk can tell me, whither ation. even in the Cuba issue; all the same, taking into the principles of the UN Charter in American Regarding the issue of the Cubans’ subver- account the undeniable objective facts and the policy towards Cuba? They’re not there. The sive activities, said Rusk, the USA government corresponding official public statements, and also actions of the USA are in flagrant contradiction has irrefutable proof of the assistance provided the assurances given to us that the USA has no with these principles. The USA is undertaking by them to various subversive groups in Latin plans for intervention in Cuba (which undeniably steps to cause hunger in Cuba. The actions which America, up until the present day. For the gov- commits them in many respects), it is possible to it is undertaking towards this end unmask the ernment of the USA there is nothing to discuss. It say that in these conditions a USA military ad- USA policy even more clearly. The Cubans, with knows for sure that the Cubans provide such help venture against Cuba is almost impossible to ever more decisiveness, are speaking out and will and are carrying out subversive work against a imagine. continue to speak out in defense of their country number of Latin American countries. and will strengthen its defenses. Rusk expansively spoke of the “community 19/X-62 A. GROMYKO The Soviet Union is helping Cuba. It is of interests” of the countries of the Western trying to provide the Cubans with grain, and help Hemisphere. Not mentioning the “Monroe Doc- to put its economy on a sound footing. This can trine,” he essentially tried to defend it, stressing [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- not present any danger to the USA. Soviet the solidarity of the countries of the Western tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] specialists are helping Cuban soldiers to master Hemisphere and the community of interests of certain types of defensive weapons. This can’t their security. * * * * * present any threat to the USA either. Overall, so I said that in the policy of the USA and in far as the declaration that Cuba may present a Rusk’s considerations regarding Cuba the coun- Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister threat to the security of the USA and countries of tries somehow get lost, while the discussion is Gromyko to the CC CPSU, 20 October 1962 Latin America is concerned, such declarations about the hemisphere. But in this hemisphere are evidently intended for naive people. Even there are sovereign countries. Each one of them Americans themselves don’t believe it. has a right to decide its own internal affairs upon 68 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN consideration by its people. Cuba is one of these every day American generals and several minis- in 1956. sovereign states. ters speak about it. I deflected this effort to introduce an anal- Besides that, I declared, if Rusk’s reasoning Regarding Iran, I said to Rusk that we posi- ogy and I briefly pointed out the groundlessness and the entire conception which the USA gov- tively view the agreement between the Soviet of such an analogy. ernment defends were to be applied to Europe Union and Iran that foreign missile bases will not Rusk said that he did not agree with our and to Asia, then no doubt the conclusions which be built on Iranian territory. But Rusk will not, interpretation of the question and rejection of the would flow from that would not please the USA. apparently, deny that the Iranian Army is led by analogy. It comes out that the Americans consider them- American military advisers, that Turkey has had He then began to speak on the subject of the selves to have a right to be in a number of such bases for a long time, that the territory of policy of the Soviet Union after the Second World countries of Europe, Asia, and other regions of Japan has become an American military base, the War, partly trying to tie these musings with the the world, if sometimes they don’t even ask them territory of England and a number of other coun- Cuban issue and partly with the issue of Ameri- about this, while certain others can not even tries have been military springboards of the USA can foreign military bases. respond to an appeal for assistance in providing for a long time. About the same could be said He said that “in the Stalinist period” the its own people with bread and strengthening its about many other countries. Soviet Union conducted a foreign policy which security in the face of a threat of intervention. Rusk declared that—whether I believe him forced the USA to create its bases overseas and to With such a conception the Soviet Union cannot or not—that’s something else, but he categori- deploy its forces there. He gave an alleged agree. It is hoped that the USA government too cally asserts that besides the territory of the USA example—Korea and the Korean peninsula. He will more soberly approach the entire Cuban itself, American missiles and atomic weapons are said, that before the events in Korea the USA in issue and will reject a hostile policy toward in only three countries. fact did not have a single division up to strength. Cuba. Here I said: without a doubt, of course, At that time the USA practically did not have a If the USA government has some sort of England is among those countries? battleworthy army available. But the situation claims toward Cuba, for instance, financial, then Yes, declared Rusk, England is one of them. changed because of the Korean War. Before this it can bring them up with the Cubans at negotia- He didn’t name the others. there was such a thing as the Berlin Blockade, tions aimed at settling them, and the Cubans, as As far as Japan is concerned, declared Rusk, which also played a definite role in the change in is known, are prepared for this. I categorically assert that neither missiles, nor the American policy. All this is reflected, said Yes, declared Rusk, but nonetheless Cuba nuclear weapons of the USA are in Japan. They Rusk, in the armament program. has violated the peace on the continent, nonethe- don’t have any of those weapons in South Korea He again began to speak about the influence less, beginning in July, the situation has taken a either, if, of course, the actions of North Korea of the “Stalinist policy” on the policy and actions dangerous turn. The Soviet Union appeared in will not make it necessary to change that situation. of the Western powers. The Western powers, Cuba. A large quantity of Soviet weapons ap- In general, declared Rusk, the significance including the USA, cannot but take that into peared in Cuba. All this has complicated the of American foreign military bases is greatly account even now. situation. exaggerated, and they don’t deserve it. In several Responding to these statements of Rusk, I No matter how often Rusk repeats, I de- countries, in actual fact there are not such bases, stressed that the Secretary of State of the USA clared, the assertion about some sort of turn of while you, Rusk said, believe that there are. In had drawn an extremely depressing and one- events in July, about the danger allegedly ema- particular, the Scandinavian countries are among sided picture of the foreign policy of the USSR in nating from Cuba, in actuality, the situation those countries. the postwar period, including during the Stalin remains simpler. The Cubans want Cuba to Responding to that, I said, that in certain period. No doubt Rusk, like other U.S. officials, belong to them, and not to the USA. countries maybe there are not today, physically, will not deny a great historical fact: besides the Maybe Rusk will reject the presence of the those or other types of weapons. You, Americans, fact that the army of the Soviet Union routed the USA, the presence of American military bases know better. But the USA has military agree- Hitlerite army and as a powerful avalanche moved and numerous military advisers in such countries ments with those countries which include an ob- into Western Europe, it was not used contrary to like Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, not even speaking ligation to let these types of American weapons the alliance agreements and had stopped follow- about such countries as England, Italy, and a into the country at any time. This is hardly ing the defeat of Hitler’s Germany. And in that number of other countries of Western Europe, different from the practical existence of American situation, if the Soviet Union, the Soviet govern- and also Asia and Africa. It appears that the USA military bases in such countries, especially con- ment, had had expansionist intentions, it could can have military bases in these countries, con- sidering that certain types of weapons may at the have occupied all of Western Europe. But the clude with them military agreements, while the present time be delivered very quickly. Soviet Union had not done that and had not Soviet Union can not even provide assistance in Rusk did not respond to that statement, and started to do it. That already by itself is an support of the Cuban economy and for the overall it was evident that precisely that is the eloquent answer to the attempt to cast doubt on strengthening of the defense capability of Cuba. situation in several of the participants in the mili- the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and on its Rusk said that the Soviet Union is exagger- tary blocs of the Western powers. actions in the postwar period. ating the significance of American foreign mili- And so, I declared, the Americans have no You know, I declared to Rusk, that our CC tary bases, believing that the USA has bases even grounds to reproach Cuba and the Cubans for and the Soviet government, at the initiative of in Pakistan, and practically in Iran. In many steps of a purely defensive character, and, more- N.S. Khrushchev, have taken a number of foreign countries, on the territory of which, in your over, to conduct toward Cuba a hostile and ag- policy steps which earlier had not been taken. opinion, there are American military bases, in gressive policy. Cuba simply wants to be inde- You are familiar, no doubt, with that which has actuality there are none. Iran, for example, pendent. That which the Cubans do to strengthen been done in the foreign policy of the USSR recently took a big step forward towards the their country and its independence—that doesn’t regarding the condemnation of Stalin’s Cult of Soviet Union. Overall, the significance of our present a danger to anyone, all the more to such a Personality. You know, in particular, about the bases is inflated. great power like the USA. Any assertions about signing of the Austrian State Treaty, which was To this statement I answered in such a way, the existence of such a danger are just absurd. evaluated positively throughout the world and that the USA foreign military bases—this is a Rusk said that the USA is interested in Cuba which helped to make possible an improvement subject which is pretty well known, practically just as the Soviet Union was interested in Hungary of the situation in central Europe. But we cat- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 69 egorically reject any attempts to generalize or to Cuba, and that that greatly alarms the USA gov- passing touched on Kennedy’s declaration, made draw conclusions about Soviet foreign policy in ernment and Americans. in the conversation with us, about the fact that the the postwar period, which USA government offi- Rusk further said, wouldn’t it be possible to USA has no intentions to intervene in Cuba (with cials make with the intent, apparently, of white- consider the issue of increasing the number of a reservation regarding the threat to the security washing its own policy, in this case towards Security Council member-countries from 11 to of the USA and the countries of Latin America). Cuba. 13, that is, in other words, increasing the number Rusk’s reasoning revolved mostly around a circle Rusk did not challenge the declaration re- of non-permanent members from six to eight. of questions related to Soviet assistance to Cuba, garding the capability of the Soviet army to From his comments it was clear that he was primarily arms. occupy all of Europe, if the Soviet Union had talking about a change in the membership of the By Rusk’s behavior it was possible to ob- striven for that after the rout of Hitler’s Germany. UN and introducing into the membership corre- serve how painfully the American leaders are Nor did he challenge the significance of the sponding changes. suffering the fact that the Soviet Union decisively foreign policy steps of the Soviet Union intro- I said that the step Rusk had mentioned was has stood on the side of Cuba, and that the Cubans duced after the condemnation of the cult of per- impossible to implement, simply because the are conducting themselves bravely and confi- sonality of Stalin. More to the point, he let it be PRC—one of the permanent members of the dently. Kennedy managed to hide his feelings understood that in general he shares these thoughts, Security Council—is not participating in the work better. But he too, when he spoke about Cuba, although he did not make any direct comments. of the UN because of the policy of the U.S. formulated his ideas with emphasis, slowly, ob- However, he at this point started to talk Government. Without the PRC, I declared, we viously weighing every word. It is characteristic about the fact that the USA, at the end of the war, will not agree even to consider that issue. that Rusk, during our entire conversation with and also in the first postwar period to the greatest Rusk in fact did not challenge our declara- Kennedy, sat absolutely silently, and red “like a extent conducted itself well. It, declared Rusk, tion, understanding that the step he had recom- crab.” In the conversation with him later he had not tried to use the advantage which it had at mended was not realistic in view of our objec- couldn’t hide his feelings very well. that time vis a vis its monopoly possession of the tions. Here he noted that China, evidently has atomic bomb. more than a few problems, including internal, 20.X.62 A. GROMYKO I let him know that that, apparently, had not economic ones. been so much because the United States had In response I said that they have certain [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- wanted to conduct itself well, as that the atomic difficulties, but the food situation had now sig- tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] bomb at that time could not play a decisive role in nificantly improved and was not as difficult as it the serious standoff of the leading powers. was portrayed by certain organs of the American * * * * * Rusk did not challenge this declaration, but press. all the same expressed the thought that the USA Rusk touched on the question of the Chi- Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the had had an advantage at that time in its possession nese-Indian border conflict. He asked what is USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, of the atomic bomb and that it had not even tried going on there and why did the argument arise? 22 October 1962 to use it politically. I said, that the argument, as is well known to In this connection he brought up the Baruch Rusk, was caused by mutual territorial claims in Plan, saying that he was wondering why the the border region. The Soviet government be- TOP SECRET Soviet Union had not associated itself with the lieves that the sooner the sides come to an agree- Making Copies Prohibited Baruch Plan. ment on a mutually acceptable basis, the better. I Copy No. 1 I gave an appropriate answer and briefly set let Rusk know that our discussion of this issue CIPHERED TELEGRAM forth our position. I stressed the point that the apparently would hardly help the matter. Baruch Plan was a one-sided plan, advantageous Rusk agreed that yes, of course, this was an TOP PRIORITY only to the USA, that it had not even envisioned issue between the two countries—the PRC and the destruction of nuclear weapons, rather, under India—but that nonetheless there is some old a screen of allegedly international control had left agreed boundary, which, considering everything, At 6 in the evening Washington time Secre- this weapon at the practical disposal of the USA, is the correct border line. tary of State Rusk invited me to his place. and even on the territory of the USA. Evidently, Rusk’s own goal was to let us Rusk said that he had a commission from the Rusk did not go into details and limited know that the government of the USA looks president to send via me a personal presidential himself to the above comments about the Baruch favorably on the Indian position. But he spoke message to N.S. Khrushchev /to be sent sepa- Plan. about that as if offhandedly, obviously not want- rately/, and also to provide for information the Suddenly Rusk jumped to the issue of the ing to create the impression that the USA was text of the president’s address to the American Communist ideology and the influence of the greatly interested in that issue. He also jokingly people, which he intends to deliver at 7 this Soviet Union on other countries. He tried to observed that the Chinese-Indian border conflict evening on radio and television /transmitted by assert that the main reason of all the complica- is, excuse me, the only issue on which the posi- TASS/. tions in international affairs is that the Soviet tions of the PRC and Taiwan correspond. Rusk warned then that at this time he has Union by some or other means influences the With this, the conversation, which had con- instructions not to answer any questions on the situation in other countries, inspires dissatisfac- tinued with some difficulty for about two hours, text of both documents and not to comment on tion with the existing regimes and so on. He also ended. Further there was a conversation on the them. complained because the USA does not assert German Question, the contents of which are “These documents, he added, speak for them- such influence and cannot assert it, since it does submitted separately. selves.” not enter into its political plans. Vis a vis this A short general evaluation of this conversa- Rusk was told that the actions of the USA reasoning he again returned to Cuba, but basi- tion with Rusk: Rusk tried again to stress, obvi- government cannot be justified by the absolutely cally repeated what he had said earlier. He ended ously at Kennedy’s behest, that the USA gives unconvincing motives which are not grounded in his argument by commenting again that July had great importance to the Cuban issue and consid- the factual situation and to which the president brought a change for the worse to the events in ers it the most painful for the USA. He only in refers, and that these actions have a downright 70 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN provocative character, and that all responsibility [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; thrown down by the Soviet Union to the USA in for possible grave consequences of the afore- translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] the form of military deliveries to Cuba. Regard- mentioned actions of the United States will be ing this, insofar as up to now a direct military entirely on the American administration. * * * * * attack by the USA on Cuba is not on the table (the I also expressed surprise that neither the President, as is known, also persistently stressed president nor Rusk found it necessary to have an Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the this during the meeting with A.A. Gromyko), open talk on all the questions raised in the ad- USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, Kennedy evidently is counting on the Soviet dress, with A.A. Gromyko, with whom they met 23 October 1962 Union in this case not responding with military only a few days ago, while now the USA admin- actions directly against the USA itself or by istration is seeking with artificial means to create delivering a blow to their positions in West Ber- a grave crisis. The Soviet Union fears no threats TOP SECRET lin. As a result, in Kennedy’s thinking, the United and is prepared to meet them in an appropriate Making Copies Prohibited States will succeed in establishing at least in part way, if the voice of reason would not triumph in Copy No. 1 the correlation of forces which existed in the the governing circles of the USA. world before July, that is before the announce- Rusk did not respond. He was clearly in a CIPHERED TELEGRAM ment of our military deliveries to Cuba, which nervous and agitated mood, even though he tried delivered a serious blow to the USA’s positions to conceal it. At that the meeting came to an end. as the leader of the capitalist world and even more Then almost all ambassadors /except socialist/ Following Kennedy’s speech on the Cuban constrained their freedom of action on issues like were summoned to the State Department, and issue yesterday, a broad campaign was deployed the one in West Berlin. they have been given, by groups, the text of the here, called forth in order to impart to the devel- Kennedy apparently believes that a further president’s address with corresponding com- oping situation even more extraordinariness and demonstration by the United States of indecisive- mentaries by the senior officials of the State seriousness than was done in Kennedy’s speech ness and lack of will to risk a war with the Soviet Department. itself. Union for the sake of its positions would unavoid- Before I left, Rusk noted that there is no In a briefing conducted by the USA Ministry ably lead to an even quicker and more serious plan, so far, to publish the personal letter of of Defense yesterday evening, [Secretary of De- undermining of their positions around the globe. Kennedy to N.S. Khrushchev, but overall this fense Robert S.] McNamara categorically de- 2. That which Kennedy said yesterday in his cannot be excluded. clared that the USA will not stop short of sinking appeal to the American people and the complex Soviet ships which are bringing “offensive types” of measures which were announced in this con- 22.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN of weapons to Cuba, if those ships will refuse to nection by the USA government in fact touch not obey the demands of American warships. only upon Cuba alone or our deliveries of weap- [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; It is reported that the President’s official ons to it, or even our missiles for Cuba. More to translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.] proclamation about the introduction into force of the point, it is a decision connected with a certain measures to assert a quarantine on the delivery to risk and determined by a whiff of adventurism, to * * * * * Cuba of offensive types of weapons will be pub- try to bring to a stop now the development of lished before the end of the day today or tomorrow events in the whole world, which are generally Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba morning after the formal agreement with other disadvantageous to the USA. Alekseev to the USSR MFA, 22 October 1962 members of the Organization of American States. In this regard, some information which we For the practical implementation of the quaran- have just received by confidential means and tine in the area of Cuba, there has been assembled, which we are now reconfirming, may be interest- TOP SECRET according to the reports of military observers, ing. According to this information, prior to the Making Copies Prohibited around 450 military ships, more than 1,200 air- President’s decision a hot discussion was con- Copy No. 1 planes and around 200 thousand soldiers. ducted recently in the government regarding the Almost without interruption, the commen- future foreign policy course of the USA follow- CIPHERED TELEGRAM taries which are broadcast on radio and televi- ing the appearance of information about the de- sion—and also the commentaries which appeared liveries of Soviet missiles to Cuba. [Attorney in today’s morning newspapers—are directed to- General] R. Kennedy, McNamara, Rusk, Chief Regarding the threats of the USA toward wards supercharging the atmosphere and predic- of the CIA [John] McCone, and the Chairman of Cuba, we remain in constant contact with Fidel tions of an early “test of force,” as soon as the first the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that since Vienna Castro and Raoul Castro. Soviet ship approaches Cuba (we broadcast simi- the status quo in the world had changed, and had The Cuban command gave an order for full lar commentaries via TASS). changed not to the benefit of the USA, as a result mobilization of the army and occupation of de- An analysis of the public statements which of the well-known development of the Cuban fensive positions. Besides telegraphic dispatches Kennedy has made, his message to N.S. events, in particular the open deliveries of Soviet of information agencies and Kennedy’s speeches, Khrushchev, and also the statements of officials weapons to Cuba. The issue is not the weapons our friends have no other information. who are close to the White House and the State themselves, insofar as they do not have much We will quickly inform you of all new facts. allow us to make, as it is presented to us, a significance from a purely military point of view, We are taking steps to ensure security and preliminary conclusion that the measures which rather it is that great political loss which the the organization of a duty roster in Soviet insti- have been undertaken by the Kennedy Adminis- Kennedy government suffered in the eyes of the tutions. tration in regard to Cuba are the product of a range whole world and particularly of its American Please issue an order to the radio center to of domestic and foreign policy considerations, the allies and neighbors when it (the USA govern- listen to us around the clock. most important of which, apparently, are the fol- ment) turned out to be not in a position—for the lowing. first time in the history of the USA—to prevent 22.X.62 ALEKSEEV I. To try to “take up the gauntlet” of that “the penetration and establishment of influence” challenge which Kennedy believes has been by another great power, the USSR, in the Western COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 71

Hemisphere itself. What then of the obligations time. Brazil and Mexico are also departing from Besides this, taking into account the future of the USA in other parts of the world? And all their previous positions after having been subject development of events and as a means of putting this is happening at a moment—as asserted by to strong pressure from the USA, which is assert- extra pressure on the USA government, it is representatives of the military brass—when ing that the Soviet missiles now threaten the Latin possible that it would make sense to undertake America for the time being still has an advantage American countries too. The decision of the such measures as, for instance, calling back from over the Soviet Union in nuclear missiles, an Organization of American States which was just the USA Soviet theatrical collectives and Soviet advantage which is gradually being liquidated by accepted (transmitted via TASS) in fact in sup- students (sending for them a special airplane), the successes of Soviet weapons, and now also by port of the course of action of the USA shows that which should show to the Americans the serious- the creation of a missile base in Cuba in direct the Kennedy administration is succeeding in bind- ness of our intentions in regard to the events in proximity with the USA. This means, the Ameri- ing the governments of these countries to its will Cuba. can chiefs of staff maintain, that time is not under conditions of the prewar psychosis which However, in our opinion it is not necessary waiting, if the Kennedy government really in- has now been created in the USA. We should, it’s to hurry on all the above measures, since an tends to prevent a further disadvantageous devel- true, note that Brazil, Mexico and Bolivia ab- extreme aggravation of the situation, it goes with- opment of events. stained from the vote on the paragraph which out saying, would not be in our interests. It would In Berlin also, the USA is constantly on the envisaged the application of force. make sense to use also the desire of neutral states, defensive, which does not add to the 4. On the domestic political plane, Kennedy and not only them, to find a way to settle the Administration’s prestige. The latest meetings obviously is counting on his last step to pull the current conflict. Such moods are clearly felt not with A.A. Gromyko (this argument was attrib- rug out from under the legs of the Republicans, only at the UN, but also among the diplomatic uted to Rusk) strengthened the President’s and whose leadership in recent days officially an- corps here. Rusk’s belief that the Soviet Union seriously nounced that they consider the Cuban issue a Overall, here in Washington the tension intends to sign a peace treaty with the GDR, with fundamental issue of the election campaign, hav- around this situation continues to grow. It seems all the consequences that will flow from that for ing in essence accused the administration of inac- as if the Americans themselves are beginning to the USA. This, almost unavoidably will bring tivity on that issue. worry a lot, anticipating the arrival in Cuba of the about a crisis at the end of the year, since the USA However, it is necessary to stress that the first Soviet ship (many people are expressing this will not withdraw its forces from West Berlin. events connected with Kennedy’s announcement question directly to the Embassy) and how this Wouldn’t it be better then to try to force the Soviet yesterday obviously have overtaken the signifi- first “test of strength” will end. This atmosphere Union to retreat by “striking a blow on the Cuban cance of electoral considerations and that these of tense waiting entered a new phase with the issue [“—no close quotation mark—ed.], which considerations now are moving to the background. publication just now of the President’s official gives more benefits to the USA than the Berlin Overall, the impression is being created proclamation which announces the entering into question, if the moods of public opinion and that, reserving a certain possibility not to let the force of the ban on delivering “offensive weap- geographic and military-strategic factors are taken matter lead to an open military confrontation— ons” to Cuba as of 14 hours [2 p.m.] (Greenwich into account[?] Precisely on the Cuban issue it is this can be seen in his proclamation in general Mean Time) on 24 October. best for President Kennedy to take a firm position form by the readiness which he expressed to and to “demonstrate his character.” This ap- continue “peace negotiations” with the Soviet 23.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN proximately was the basic argument of those side on settling controversial issues, including government representatives who support a more the Cuban issue and several other questions— [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- hard-line course of action (several of them specu- Kennedy at the same time consciously and suffi- tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] lated also that the President maintains the opinion ciently provocatively is aiming towards an abrupt that the Soviet government apparently does not aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union in * * * * * particularly believe in the President’s steadfast- accord with the above-mentioned considerations. ness following the failure of last year’s incursion In this regard it is as if this time he is ready Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the in Cuba). It follows, evidently, to recognize that to go pretty far in a test of strength with the Soviet USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, the supporters of this course for the time being Union, hoping that in the location of the conflict 24 October 1962 have taken the upper hand in the USA govern- (Cuba) which was chosen by him, the President, ment. the USA has a greater chance than the USSR, and TOP SECRET 3. Having created the extraordinary situa- that in the final analysis the Soviet government Making Copies Prohibited tion around Cuba, the Kennedy administration is will refuse to increase the military power of Copy No. 1 hoping that in that situation it will be able quickly Cuba, not wishing to let a major war break out. to get from its NATO allies and from the Latin Under these conditions it is seen as expedient, CIPHERED TELEGRAM American countries support for its course to- while observing the necessary precautions, to at wards the full isolation of Cuba from the “free the same time review certain steps which would Late in the evening of October 23, R. world,” and the ultimate overthrow of the current demonstrate the resolve of the USSR to give an Kennedy came to visit me. He was in an obvi- government of Cuba. In this regard it should be appropriate rebuff to the USA and which would ously excited condition and his speech was rich in noted that although the West European and Latin make the USA vulnerable to the possibility of repetitions and digressions. R. Kennedy said American diplomats express alarm about the pos- actions which we may take in response. In approximately the following. sible consequences of realizing in practice the particular, as it seems to us, it would be possible I came on my own personal initiative with- announced “quarantine” of Cuba, they express, to review the question of hinting to Kennedy in no out any assignment from the President. I consid- as a rule, confidence that their governments un- uncertain terms about the possibility of repres- ered it necessary to do this in order to clarify what der current conditions will not be able to deviate sions against the Western powers in West Berlin exactly led to the current, extremely serious de- from support for the USA. In particular, it be- (as a first step, the organization of a blockade of velopment of events. Most important is the fact came known to us that the Chilean representative ground routes, leaving out for the time being air that the personal relations between the President in the Organization of American States received routes so as not to give grounds for a quick and the Soviet premier have suffered heavy dam- an instruction to support the USA proposals this confrontation). age. President Kennedy feels deceived and these 72 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN feelings found their own reflection in his appeal or, speaking directly, a heavy blow to everything contacting you via the confidential channel, if, as to the American people. in which he had believed and which he had strived it appears, even the Ambassador, who has, as far From the very beginning, continued R. to preserve in personal relations with the head of as we know, the full trust of his government, does Kennedy, the Soviet side—N.S. Khrushchev, the Soviet government: mutual trust in each other’s not know that long-range missiles which can the Soviet government in its pronouncements personal assurances. As a result, the reaction strike the USA, rather than defensive missiles and the Soviet ambassador during confidential which had found its reflection in the President’s which are capable of defending Cuba from any meetings - have stressed the defensive nature of declaration and the extremely serious current sort of attack on the approaches to it, have already the weapons which are being delivered to Cuba. events which are connected with it and which can been provided to Cuba[?] It comes out that when You, for instance, said R. Kennedy to me, told still lead no one knows where. you and I spoke earlier, you also did not have me about the exclusively defensive goals of the Stressing with great determination that I reliable information, although the conversation delivery of Soviet weapons, in particular, the reject his assertions about some sort of “decep- was about the defensive character of those weap- missile weapons, during our meeting at the be- tion” as entirely not corresponding to reality and ons deliveries, including the future deliveries to ginning of September. I understood you then as as presenting the actions and motives of the Soviet Cuba, and everything about this was passed on to saying that we were talking only about /and in the side in a perverted light, I asked R. Kennedy why the President. future, too/ missiles of a relatively small range of the President - if he had some sort of doubts - had I categorically responded to R. Kennedy’s action for the defense of Cuba itself and the not negotiated directly and openly with A. A. thoughts about the information which I had re- approaches to it, but not about long range mis- Gromyko, with whom there had been a meeting ceived from the government, stressing that this siles which could strike practically the entire just a few days ago, but rather had begun actions, was exclusively within the competence of the territory of the USA. I told this to the President, the seriousness of the consequences of which for Soviet government. Simultaneously, his thoughts who accepted it with satisfaction as the position the entire world are entirely unforeseeable. Be- of “deception” were rejected again. Further, in of the Soviet government. There was a TASS fore setting off on that dangerous path, fraught calm but firm tones I set forth in detail our declaration in the name of the Soviet government with a direct military confrontation between our position on the Cuban issue, taking into account in which it was clearly stated that all military countries, why not use, for instance, the confiden- the Soviet government’s latest announcement on deliveries to Cuba are intended exclusively for tial channels which we have and appeal directly to Cuba, N.S. Khrushchev’s letter in response to the defensive goals. The President and the govern- the head of the Soviet government. President, and also other speeches and conversa- ment of the USA understood this as the true R. Kennedy said the President had decided tions of N.S. Khrushchev. position of the USSR. not to address A. A. Gromyko about this for the I particularly stressed the circumstance that, With even greater feelings of trust we took following two reasons: first, everything which the as far as is known to me, the head of the Soviet the corresponding declarations /public and con- Soviet minister had set forth had, evidently ac- government values the warm relations with the fidential/ of the head of the Soviet government, cording to the instructions of the Soviet govern- President. N.S. Khrushchev recently spoke about who, despite the big disagreements and frequent ment, been expressed in very harsh tones, so a that in particular in a conversation with [U.S.] aggravations in relations between our countries, discussion with him hardly could have been of Ambassador [to Moscow Foy] Kohler. I hope the President has always trusted on a personal much use; second, he had once again asserted the that the President also maintains the same point of level. The message which had been sent by N.S. defensive character of the deliveries of Soviet view, - I added. On the relationships between the Khrushchev via the Soviet ambassador and weapons, although the President at that moment heads of our governments, on which history has [Kennedy adviser Theodore] Sorensen, about knew that this is not so, that they had deceived him placed special responsibility for the fate of the the fact that during the election campaign in the again. As far as the confidential channel is con- world, a lot really does depend; in particular, USA the Soviet side would not do anything to cerned, what sense would that have made, if on the whether there will be peace or war. The Soviet complicate the international situation and worsen highest level - the level of the Minister of Foreign government acts only in the interests of preserv- relations between our countries, had made a Affairs - precisely the same is said, although the ing and strengthening peace and calls on the great impression on the President. facts are directly contradictory[?] To that same United States government to act this way too. All this led to the fact that the President point, added R. Kennedy, long ago I myself in fact Stressing again the basic principles of our policy believed everything which was said from the received the same sort of assurances from the on which we will insist without any compromises Soviet side, and in essence staked on that card his Soviet ambassador, however, all that subsequently (in the spirit of our declaration and N.S. own political fate, having publicly announced to turned out to be entirely not so. Khrushchev’s response letter), I simultaneously the USA, that the arms deliveries to Cuba carry - Tell me, - R. Kennedy said to me further - expressed the hope that the USA government a purely defensive character, although a number [do] you, as the Soviet ambassador, have from show prudence and refrain from taking any ac- of Republicans have asserted to the contrary. your government information about the presence tions which can lead to catastrophic consequences And then the President suddenly receives trust- now in Cuba of around half a dozen (here he for peace in the whole world. worthy information to the effect that in Cuba, corrected himself, saying that that number may R. Kennedy, after repeating what he had contrary to everything which had been said by not be entirely accurate, but the fact remains a already said about the President’s moods (around the Soviet representatives, including the latest fact) missiles, capable of reaching almost any this time he cooled down a bit and spoke in calmer assurances, made very recently by A. A. Gromyko point in the United States? tones), said that the President also values his during his meeting with the President, there had In my turn I asked R. Kennedy why I should relations with N.S. Khrushchev. As far as the appeared Soviet missiles with a range of action believe his information, when he himself does not future course of actions is concerned, then he, R. which cover almost the entire territory of the want to recognize or respect that which the other Kennedy, can not add anything to that which had USA. Is this weapon really for the defensive side is saying to him. To that same point, even the been said by the President himself, who stressed purposes about which you, Mr. Ambassador, A. President himself in his speech in fact had spoken all the seriousness of the situation and under- A. Gromyko, the Soviet government and N.S. only about some emplacements for missiles, which stands with what sort of dangerous consequences Khrushchev had spoken? they allegedly had “observed,” but not about the all this may be connected, but he can not act in any The President felt himself deceived, and missiles themselves. other way. deceived intentionally. He is convinced of that - There, you see - R. Kennedy quickly put I once again set forth to him our position in even now. It was for him a great disappointment, forth, - what would have been the point of us the above-mentioned spirit. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 73

Saying goodbye, already at the door of the the-clock broadcasts to Cuba—24 hours in Span- Armed Forces at the highest state of military Embassy, R. Kennedy as if by the way asked what ish and 12 hours in Russian. readiness. Commanders and military councils of sorts of orders the captains of the Soviet ships We support the suggestion of the State Com- military regions, groups of troops, Air Defense bound for Cuba have, in light of President mittee for Radio and Television Broadcasting of districts and fleets are ordered to delay the dis- Kennedy’s speech yesterday and the declaration the Council of Ministers about increasing the charge of soldiers, sailors and sergeants in the last which he had just signed about the inadmissabil- radio transmissions from Moscow to Cuba. year of service, troops of the strategic rocket ity of bringing offensive weapons to Cuba. It is possible to increase Soviet radio trans- forces, Air Defense forces, and the submarine I answered R. Kennedy with what I knew mission to Cuba partly on the basis of a redistri- fleet; to cancel all leaves, and to increase military about the instructions which had been given ear- bution of radio transmitters, which relay pro- readiness and vigilance in all units and on every lier to the captains: not to obey any unlawful grams from Moscow to foreign countries, and ship. demands to stop or be searched on the open sea, also by using certain radio stations, which work At the present time commanders of the as a violation of international norms of freedom on the jamming of foreign radio transmissions. Armed Forces together with local party organs of navigation. This order, as far as I know, has not At the present time, one third of the entire Soviet work on explaining to military men the Declara- been changed. radio transmitting capability is used to jam for- tion of the Soviet government. In detachments, R. Kennedy, having waved his hand, said: I eign broadcasts to the USSR. The Ministry of on ships, in military schools and in military don’t know how all this will end, for we intend to Communications of the USSR has no reserve institutions the Declaration of the USSR govern- stop your ships. He left right after this. radio stations. ment was listened to collectively on the radio, Overall, his visit left a somewhat strange We request agreement. talks, meetings and gatherings are taking place, impression. He had not spoken about the future where members of military councils, command- and paths toward a settlement of the conflict, Deputy Head, Department of Agitation and Pro- ers and heads of political organs speak. In the making instead a “psychological” excursion, as if paganda for Allied Republics, CC CPSU country’s Air Defense units, Secretaries of the he was trying to justify the actions of his brother, Sakhalin regional CPSU committee (comrade the President, and put the responsibility for his (signed) (A. Egorov) Evstratov), the Khabarovsk provincial commit- hasty decision, in the correctness of which they tee (comrade comrade Klepikov), Berezovsk City and he, evidently, are not entirely confident, on Instructor of the Department Party Committee (comrade Uglov) spoke. In the us. military regions special leaflets with the text of We think that in the interests of the affair it (signed) (V. Murav’ev) the Declaration of the Soviet government were would be useful, using this opportunity to pass on published and transfered by air to far-away de- to the President, through R. Kennedy, with whom 24 October 1962 tachments and garrisons. I could meet again, in confidential form N.S. All servicemen passionately approve of the Khrushchev’s thoughts on this matter, concern- Handwritten at bottom of page: policies of the USSR government, support addi- ing not only the issues which R. Kennedy had tional measures which it has undertaken and touched on, but a wider circle of issues in light of I report to the State Committee for Radio which are aimed at maintaining the troops in the the events which are going on now. and Television Broadcasting (Comrade state of maximum military readiness. At the Kharlamov) Nov. 24 that from Nov. 25 the amount same time Soviet soldiers express readiness to 24.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN of radio broadcasts to Cuba will be increased. fulfill without delay every order of the Mother- land aimed at the crushing defeat of the American [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- (signed) A. Egorov aggressors. tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] (signed) Murav’ev Captain Padalko and Captain Sorkov, pilots of the Second Independent Air Defense Army, * * * * * [Source:F. 5, Op. 33, D. 206, L. 133, Center for and senior technical lieutenants Aziamov and the Storage of Contemporary Documentation Ovcharov declared: “At this alarming hour we Report to CPSU Central Committee From (TsKhSD), the former CPSU CC archives, Mos- are at the highest state of military readiness. If the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, cow; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] American adventurists unleash a war, they will 24 October 1962 be dealt the most powerful crippling blow. In * * * * * response to the ugly provcation of the warmon- CC CPSU ger, we will strengthen even more our vigilence Report to CPSU Central Committee From and military preparedness, we will fulfill without The State Committee for Radio and Televi- Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii delay any order of the Soviet government.” sion Broadcasting of the Council of Ministers of and A. Epishev, 24 October 1962 The announcement of the Soviet Govern- the USSR asks permission, in light of the aggres- ment received broad support among soldiers, sive American actions against Cuba, to increase Secret sergeants and sailors due to be discharged from from October 25 of this year the amount of radio Copy No. 1 the Armed Forces. They all declare that they will broadcasts from Moscow to Cuba up to 10 hours serve as much as required in the interests of the per day. At the present time these transmissions CC CPSU strengthening of the preparedness of the troops. are conducted every day for two hours. Private Kovalenko (415th Air Force Com- On questions relating to the strengthening of We report on work undertaken in connec- bat Air Wing), prematurely released into the radio broadcasting to Cuba, the State Committee tion with the announcement of the Soviet govern- reserves, returned to his base, gave back his consulted with Comrade Puerta, the leader of ment about the aggressive actions of American documents and announced, “At such a troubling Cuban Radio, who is now present in Moscow. imperialism against the Cuban republic. time, my responsibility is to be at my military The State Committee for Radio and Televi- The Ministry of Defense, fulfilling the Coun- post, and to defend the interests of the Mother- sion Broadcasting also reports that the USA, cil of Ministers decision of 23 October 1962, has land with a weapon in my hands.” starting October 23 of this year, organized round- taken supplementary measures to support the Many senior soldiers, striving with all their 74 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN strength and knowledge to the increase in mili- Making Copies Prohibited of “irrefutable” evidence of the presence in Cuba tary readiness, declare their willingness to re- Copy No. 1 of nuclear-missile arms. We classified this ma- main for additional service. After a meeting of neuver as an attempt to deflect the Security Coun- the 15th Division of the Moscow District Air CIPHERED TELEGRAM cil away from the essence of the case, particularly Defense Forces 20 soldiers reported with a re- from the aggressive actions of the USA, which quest to enlist for addional service. Following On 25 October in the Security Council, had violated the UN Charter and which had the example of Communists Sergeant Kaplin and Stevenson, speaking first, read out Kennedy’s created a threat to peace. Junior Sergeant Afanas’ev, 18 soldiers who had answer to U Thant’s appeal, in which Kennedy In response to Stevenson’s attempts to pose been discharged from the 345th anti-aircraft de- welcomes U Thant’s initiative and directs to us questions about whether we are placing tachment of the Bakinsk District Air Defense Stevenson quickly to consider with U Thant the nuclear weapons in Cuba we referred to the Forces requested permission to remain in the issue of conducting negotiations towards a settle- corresponding situation in the TASS announce- army. ment to the situation which has been created in the ment of 11 September /the texts of our speeches After the declaration of the Soviet govern- Caribbean Sea region /the text of Kennedy’s re- were transmitted by teletype/. ment, at the bases and on the ships there was a sponse was transmitted via teletype/. The attempts of the USA representative to strengthened desire of individual soldiers to de- From our side we made public Comr. N.S. turn the Council into a tribune for base propa- fend Cuba as volunteers. On just one day in the Khrushchev’s response to U Thant on his appeal, ganda met no support from other members of the 78th motorized infantry training division of the which was transmitted to U Thant before the Council. Ural Military District, 1240 requests to be sent to opening of the session. The representative of the UAR, [Gen. the Cuban Republic were received. At a meeting During the meeting and after it, representa- Mahmoud] Riad, and the representative of Ghana, of the 300 and 302nd detachment (sic) of the tives of many African and Asian countries ap- [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, noted the important sig- Second Independent Air Defense Army of the proached us, noting the exceedingly important nificance of U Thant’s appeal and the responses Air Defense Forces the decision was made about significance for the preservation of peace in the of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, the readiness of the entire unit to leave for Cuba. Caribbean Sea region and in the whole world of stressing that as a result of that exchange of In response to the directions of the Soviet the message from the head of the Soviet govern- messages a new situation had been created in the government relating to the aggressive actions of ment. Council. Riad and Quaison-Sackey proposed the American government, military personnel Stevenson’s speech at today’s session, re- suspending the session so as to allow all the heighten their vigilence and increase their per- gardless of his attempts to assert once again that interested sides, with the participation of U Thant, sonal responsibility for the maintenance of mili- Cuba has at its disposal an offensive weapon, and to conduct the necessary negotiations, having in tary readiness. In the 3rd Corps of the Air that this creates a danger for the Western hemi- mind that the Council sessions will be resumed Defense Forces of the Moscow Military District, sphere, had in essence a defensive character. He depending on the result and process of the nego- soldiers work at night in fulfillment of daytime made a declaration as if the USA had not sought tiations. norms. In the 201st anti-aircraft detachment of a pretext to raise the Cuban issue, that the USA did That proposal was supported by the Chilean the Ural Military District there has been a signifi- not object to deliveries to Cuba of a defensive representative, [Daniel] Schweitzer. cant reduction in the time required for mainte- weapon, and that everything which they are trying The proposal of the UAR and Ghana was nance work on military equipment. so hard to do is to implement “limited” actions. accepted without objections by the Security Coun- As an expression of the unprecedented trust Being in no position to disprove our accusations cil. When the adopted decision was announced, of the individuals of the Armed Forces in the of a violation by the USA of the UN Charter, I, as the Chairman of the Council, stressed that the CPSU there is a strengthened desire among front- Stevenson declared that the USA could not slow Security Council could be convened by the Chair- line soldiers to join the ranks of the Party and the down implementation of the planned measures in man of the Council depending on the course of Komsomol. Following the declaration of the expectation of a Soviet veto in the Security Coun- the negotiations. In this way, no votes were taken Government of the USSR, the number of appli- cil. He said further that the USA had come to the on any of the proposed resolutions /ours, the cations to join the Party and the Komsomol grew. Security Council even before the Organization of American proposal, and the neutral one/, and they During the explanation of the declaration of the American States had started to work and had remained in the Security Council file. x/ the Soviet Government, no sorts of negative given its approval for the “quarantine” measures. We received your [word deleted—ed.] manifestations were noted. Stevenson tried to present the matter as if he was after it had already basically been decided that in We are reporting for your information. talking not about unilateral measures of the USA, relation to the start of negotiations between the but about the agreed actions of the Organization interested sides consideration of the issue in the (signed) R. MALINOVSKII of American States. Security Council is not ending, and that the issue (signed) A. EPISHEV In our speech we showed the lack of founda- remains on the Security Council agenda, more- tion of all of these assertions by Stevenson, stress- over, the Council sessions may be resume at any 24 October 1962 ing that, as the discussion in the Security Council time depending on the course of the negotiations had confirmed, the USA had no sort of justifica- between the interested sides. At the present time, [Source: F. 5, Op. 47, D. 400, Ll. 69-71, TsKhSD; tions for the aggressive actions which it had as we understand it, it would be premature to raise translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] undertaken, which had created a threat of thermo- the issue at the XVIIth session of the General nuclear war. We pointed out that the aggressive Assembly, insofar as the issue as before is on the * * * * * path down which the USA had set had met a rebuff Security Council agenda and we will always have from the side of the peoples and the majority of the possibility to demand that it be raised in the Telegram from the Soviet representative to UN members. Precisely this has now prompted Assembly if the possible new consideration by the United Nations, Valerian Zorin, to the the USA to give its agreement to enter into nego- the Security Council will end without result. USSR MFA, 25 October 1962 tiations. We ridiculed the maneuver which After the session U Thant informed us that Stevenson had made at the session in showing the he intends to begin negotiations with us, the photographs which had been fabricated by Ameri- Cubans, and the Americans tomorrow, 26 Octo- Top Secret can intelligence which had been assigned the role ber. He will meet with each delegation individu- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 75 ally. We will report our thoughts about this An analogous declaration was made in the name At the same time it is not possible to exclude meeting in supplementary fashion. of the Organization of American States, which, that the general American plan of actions really evidently, is aimed at giving that fact extra “legal may include the implementation of such an over- 25.X.62 V. ZORIN force”/. In their declarations there is made a flight, especially if the adventurist moods of pretty clear hint to the effect that the mentioned certain members of the circle which is close to the ———————— “fact” gives the USA government “a foundation” President are taken into account. In this regard x/ Having in mind “Your telegram” to take further, more serious measures against we should note that judging by certain informa- Cuba. tion, disagreements about participation in the [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; At the same time, among journalists who are negotiations in the UN are now growing in the translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] close to the White House, State Department and USA government, since this is connected with Pentagon conversations about the possibility of dragging out the time and a weakening of the * * * * * implementing at the earliest possible time a mass acuteness of the moment, and means that the overflight of American aviation in the area where difficulty of taking “decisive measures” against Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the the missile platforms are deployed, with a pos- Cuba unavoidably would grow. USA Dobrynin to the USSR MFA, sible commando raid, have received wide circu- 27 October 1962 lation. Several of them in this regard express the opinion that an ultimatum to the Cuban govern- 27.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN ment itself to disassemble the missile platforms TOP SECRET in a very short time might precede such an over- [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- Making Copies Prohibited flight. As before, the real possibility of an immi- tion by Mark H. Doctoroff] Copy No. 1 nent incursion in Cuba is being asserted, but the theme of a bombardment of the missile bases has * * * * * CIPHERED TELEGRAM now moved to the fore. The wide circulation and the certain orienta- For Dobyrnin’s 27 October 1962 Cable tion of similar conversations under conditions of His Meeting with Robert F. Kennedy, During the entire day of 26 October in broad- when, practically speaking, censorship has been see accompanying box casts of American radio, television, and in press introduced on reports concerning Cuba, and when reports, in accord with instructions from above, it constant instruction of journalists is going on, * * * * * is being ever more firmly asserted that in Cuba leads to the thought that these conversations are the construction of missile bases is being contin- inspired by the government itself. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s ued under a forced tempo, and that the missiles Facilitating the circulation of these types of Instructions to the USSR Ambassador to the themselves are being brought to operational readi- moods and rumors, the USA government, evi- USA, 28 October 1962 ness. dently, is trying to show its determination to Toward the end of the day, the State Depart- achieve at any price the liquidation of the missile Making Copies Prohibited ment representative White and the Secretary to emplacements in Cuba with the aim of putting on the President for questions of the press, [Pierre] that issue the maximum pressure on us and on CIPHERED TELEGRAM Salinger, made official declarations about that. / Cuba.

ANATOMY OF A CONTROVERSY: leader Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived Saturday blackmail. The U.S. president elected to transmit morning demanding that the United States agree this sensitive message through his brother, Attor- Anatoly F. Dobrynin’s Meeting to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in ney General Robert F. Kennedy, who met in his With Robert F. Kennedy, exchange for a Soviet removal of missiles from office at the Justice Department with Soviet am- Cuba. The letter struck U.S. officials as an bassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Saturday, 27 October 1962 ominous hardening of the Soviet position from That meeting has long been recognized as a the previous day’s letter from Khrushchev, which turning point in the crisis, but several aspects of by Jim Hershberg had omitted any mention of American missiles in it have been shrouded in mystery and confusion. Turkey but had instead implied that Washington’s One concerned the issue of the Jupiter missiles in If the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most pledge not to invade Cuba would be sufficient to Turkey: U.S. officials maintained that neither dangerous passage of the Cold War, the most obviate the need for Soviet nuclear protection of John nor Robert Kennedy promised to withdraw dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis Castro’s revolution. the Jupiters as a quid pro quo, or concession, in was the evening of Saturday, 27 October 1962, On Saturday evening, after a day of tense exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles when the resolution of the crisis—war or peace— discussions within the “ExComm” or Executive from Cuba, or as part of an explicit agreement, appeared to hang in the balance. While Soviet Committee of senior advisers, President Kennedy deal, or pledge, but had merely informed Dobrynin ships had not attempted to break the U.S. naval decided on a dual strategy—a formal letter to that Kennedy had planned to take out the Ameri- blockade of Cuba, Soviet nuclear missile bases Khrushchev accepting the implicit terms of his can missiles in any event. This was the version of remained on the island and were rapidly becom- October 26 letter (a U.S. non-invasion pledge in events depicted in the first published account of ing operational, and pressure on President exchange for the verifiable departure of Soviet the RFK-Dobrynin meeting by one of the partici- Kennedy to order an air strike or invasion was nuclear missiles), coupled with private assur- pants, in Robert F. Kennedy’s Thirteen Days: A mounting, especially after an American U-2 re- ances to Khrushchev that the United States would Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, posthu- connaissance plane was shot down over Cuba speedily take out its missiles from Turkey, but mously published in 1969, a year after he was that Saturday afternoon and its pilot killed. Hopes only on the basis of a secret understanding, not as assassinated while seeking the Democratic nomi- that a satisfactory resolution to the crisis could be an open agreement that would appear to the nation for president. While Thirteen Days de- reached between Washington and Moscow had public, and to NATO allies, as a concession to picted RFK as rejecting any firm agreement to dimmed, moreover, when a letter from Soviet continued on page 77 76 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

EXTRAORDINARY necessary to mention his name, but he did it). the answer should be given by the Government of I responded that in the Embassy no one Cuba. WASHINGTON besides me knows about the conversation with Tell U Thant that in our opinion, his journey him yesterday. R. Kennedy said that in addition to Cuba with a group of accompanying officials SOVIET AMBASSADOR to the current correspondence and future exchange would have a positive significance. of opinions via diplomatic channels, on important Telegraph upon implementation. Quickly get in touch with R. Kennedy and questions he will maintain contact with me di- tell him that you passed on to N.S. Khrushchev rectly, avoiding any intermediaries. [handwritten] the contents of your conversation with him. N.S. Before departing, R. Kennedy once again 28. X [illegible initials, presumably Khrushchev sent the following urgent response. gave thanks for N.S. Khrushchev’s quick and Gromyko’s] The thoughts which R. Kennedy expressed effective response. at the instruction of the President finds under- Your instructions arrived here 1.5 hours af- [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- standing in Moscow. Today, an answer will be ter the announcement via radio about the essence tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] given by radio to the President’s message of of N.S. Khrushchev’s response. I explained to R. October 27, and that response will be the most Kennedy that the tardiness was caused by a delay * * * * * favorable. The main thing which disturbs the of telegrams at the telegraph station. President, precisely the issue of the dismantling Coded telegram from Soviet official Georgy under international control of the rocket bases in 28.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN Zhukov, 1 November 1962 Cuba—meets no objection and will be explained in detail in N.S. Khrushchev’s message. [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; TOP SECRET Telegraph upon implementation. translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.] Making Copies Prohibited Copy No. 1 * * * * * [handwritten] CIPHERED TELEGRAM (A. Gromyko) Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s Instructions to the USSR representative at I am reporting about a meeting with [White [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; trans- the United Nations, 28 October 1962 House press secretary Pierre] Salinger on 31 lation by Mark H. Doctoroff] October. I. Salinger requested that I pass on to N.S. * * * * * In relation to the information which you Khrushchev that Kennedy is thankful to him for received about U Thant’s conversations with the the decision which he made to dismantle and Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the Cuban representative [Garcia] Inchaustegi, you remove the missiles, and expresses his confi- USA Dobrynin to USSR MFA, must be guided by the following: dence that the agreement which was reached, 28 October 1962 First. You must declare to U Thant that built on mutual trust, will open the way to the orders have been given to the Soviet officers in resolution of other ripe problems. “The President Cuba to take down the emplacements which the does not want to portray the matter as if we won TOP SECRET Americans characterize as offensive weapons. a victory over the USSR,” said Salinger. His Making Copies Prohibited Declare also that by itself, it goes without saying version for the press is exactly reflected in [New Copy No. 1 that any type of work related to the creation of York Times correspondent James] Reston’s ar- such emplacements has already ceased. ticle of 29 October. Kennedy declared to the CIPHERED TELEGRAM Second. Also inform U Thant about the members of the government that it makes no Soviet government’s agreement to his proposal sense to try to use the situation that developed to R. Kennedy, with whom I met, listened very that representatives of the International Red Cross Khrushchev’s detriment. In this spirit, Rusk attentively to N.S. Khrushchev’s response. Ex- be allowed to visit the Soviet ships bound for conducted talks with 50 of the most prominent pressing thanks for the report, he said that he Cuba in order to confirm that on them there are and trusted observers in the USA and allied would quickly return to the White House in order none of the types of weapons about which the countries. to inform the President about the “important President and government of the USA show con- 2. Kennedy, in Salinger’s words, is now response” of the head of the Soviet government. cern, calling them offensive weapons. In this extremely preoccupied with somehow disarming “This is a great relief,” R. Kennedy added fur- regard it is intended that the stated representatives his adversaries, who are asserting that he has once ther, and it was evident that he expressed his will be conveyed to both Soviet ships and to the again “fallen into a trap...” “We must, he said, no words somehow involuntarily. “I,” said R. ships of neutral countries. You must inform U matter what, publish evidence that the missiles Kennedy, “today will finally be able to see my Thant, for his personal information, that on those have been dismantled and taken away. Let it be kids, for I have been entirely absent from home.” Soviet ships which at the present time are bound representatives of the UN or of the Red Cross, let According to everything it was evident that for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. it be observation photos taken from the air, it is all R. Kennedy with satisfaction, it is necessary to Stress that the Soviet government has taken the same to us. In this regard we are not demand- say, really with great relief met the report about all these steps so as not to step on the negotiations, ing access to the missiles themselves, they really N.S. Khrushchev’s response. which have begun on U Thant’s initiative, be- are secret. We must publish evidence that they In parting, R. Kennedy once again requested tween him and the representatives of the USSR, are no longer on the launching pads and that they that strict secrecy be maintained about the agree- USA, and Cuba, aimed at liquidating the danger- have been taken away. ment with Turkey. “Especially so that the corre- ous situation which has developed. 3. Kennedy, in Salinger’s words, as in the spondents don’t find out. At our place for the As far as the issue of the possibility of U past is under strong pressure from the “right- time being even Salinger does not know about it” Thant’s journey to Cuba with a group of aides and wingers,” who are condemning him for the fact (It was not entirely clear why he considered it experts is concerned, it goes without saying that that he, for the first time in the history of the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 77

Western hemisphere has given a guarantee for the CONTROVERSY permanent preservation of a “Communist pre- continued from page 75 serve” by the shores of the USA. In order to withdraw the Jupiters, this was also the first deflect these attacks, Kennedy must receive evi- public indication that the issue had even been dence to the effect that Castro has no “offensive” privately discussed. weapons. With Dobrynin obviously unable to publish 4. Kennedy, as Salinger asserts, believes his own version—he remained Moscow’s am- that achieving a resolution to the Cuban crisis bassador in Washington until 1986, and Soviet “will open a completely new epoch in Soviet- diplomats were not in the habit of publishing tell- American relations,” when mutual trust will be- NEW RUSSIAN LAW all exposés prior to glasnost—the first important come the “basis of everything.” One of the first AND THE Soviet account of the event to emerge was con- issues to be resolved can and must be the issue of ARCHIVAL SITUATION tained in the tape-recorded memoirs of deposed a test ban. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, which were 5. Regarding a meeting between Kennedy On 25 January 1995 the Russian parlia- smuggled to the West and published in 1970 and Khrushchev, before the Cuban crisis a major- ment passed a “Federal Law on Information, (after Khrushchev’s death, additional installments ity of members of the government spoke out Information Systems, and the Protection of saw print in the West in 1974 and 1990). The against such a contact, although it had been Information.” It was signed into law by account of the RFK-Dobrynin meeting in publicly stated that Kennedy will meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 20 February Khrushchev Remembers, in the form of a para- Khrushchev if he comes to the General Assem- 1995 and was published in Sobranie phrase from memory of Dobrynin’s report, did bly. Kennedy himself had doubted that this Zakonodatel’stva Rossiskoi Federatsii 8 (20 not directly touch upon the secret discussions meeting will bring any sort of positive results. February 1995), pp. 1213-1225. concerning the Jupiters, but did raise eyebrows “Now, - said Salinger - the situation has The lengthy, 25-article law covers a wide with its claim that Robert F. Kennedy had fretted changed. The Cuban crisis showed that the issues range of topics, and much of it has no direct to Dobrynin that if his brother did not approve an on which the improvement of Soviet-American bearing on the archives. In a few places, attack on Cuba soon, the American military might relations depends must be resolved urgently. however, especially Article 13 (“Guarantees of “overthrow him and seize power.” The second Therefore, it is will be necessary to review the the Provision of Information”), the law does volume of Khrushchev’s memoirs (Khrushchev position in relation to a meeting in light of the have a direct--and, unfortunately, highly Remembers: The Last Testament), published post- results of the settlement of the crisis. We were too negative--bearing on the archives. Points 1 and humously in 1974, touched only briefly on the close to war for it to be possible to forget about 2 of Article 13, which entitle “organs of state Robert Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, but included this and to allow ourselves to delay even longer in authority” to restrict access to “information the flat statement (on p. 512) that “President reaching a resolution to the problems which have resources pertaining to the activities of these Kennedy said that in exchange for the withdrawl become urgent. However, the President still does organs,” effectively leave the individual state of our missiles, he would remove American mis- not have a prepared decision about the expedi- ministries and agencies with full discretion siles from Turkey and Italy,” although he de- ency of a meeting and about the issues which over their own archives. scribed this “pledge” as “symbolic” since the should be considered. We still have to think This provision may be consistent with rockets “were already obsolete.” about that.” legislation passed in the spring of 1994, but it Over the years, many scholars of the Cuban 6. Salinger, like other interlocutors in Wash- runs counter to suggestions that the archival Missile Crisis came strongly to suspect that Rob- ington, avoided touching on the German ques- holdings of the various ministries and state ert Kennedy had, in fact, relayed a pledge from tion. He mentioned in passing only that “even in agencies be gradually transferred to the his brother to take out the Jupiters from Turkey in respect to Berlin we have always stressed our auspices of the State Archival Service of exchange for the Soviet removal of nuclear mis- respect for the opposing point of view.” Russia (Rosarkhiv). It also seems to run siles from Cuba, so long as Moscow kept the 7. Salinger stressed that even with all the counter to the decree that Yeltsin issued last swap secret; yet senior former Kennedy Admin- “shortcomings” of Kennedy and Khrushchev’s September, which was published in the istration officials, such as then-National Security Vienna meeting, it had given a positive result, at previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (Fall Advisor McGeorge Bundy and then-Secretary of least insofar as on the basis of the agreement that 1994, pp. 89, 100). State Dean Rusk, continued to insist that RFK had been achieved there the Laos problem had It is difficult to say how strictly the law had passed on no more than an informal assur- been settled, which prompted confidence that it is will be enforced, but it seems to be one further ance rather than an explicit promise or agree- possible to develop our relations on the basis of indication that the proponents of archival ment. trust. For precisely this reason Kennedy had openness are losing ground, at least for now. The first authoritative admission on the U.S. withdrawn the forces from Thailand. side that the Jupiters had actually been part of a “The Cuban crisis undermined this develop- --Mark Kramer “deal” came at a conference in Moscow in Janu- ment of relations, but Khrushchev’s wise deci- ary 1989, after glasnost had led Soviet (and then sion may put the development of Soviet-Ameri- Cuban) former officials to participate in interna- can relations onto a basis of mutual trust,” said tional scholarly efforts to reconstruct and assess Salinger. the history of the crisis. At that meeting, former 8. Salinger asked me to pass on to N.S. Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen (and Khrushchev his personal thanks for the hospital- the uncredited editor of Thirteen Days) admitted, ity which had been given to him in Moscow. after prodding from Dobrynin, that he had taken it upon himself to edit out a “very explicit” XI.I.62 G. ZHUKOV reference to the inclusion of the Jupiters in the final deal to settle the crisis. [Source: AVP RF, copy courtesy of NSA; transla- Now Dobrynin’s original, contemporane- tion by Mark H. Doctoroff.] ous, and dramatic cable of the meeting, alluded to 78 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN in some accounts by Soviets (such as Anatoly He asked me what offer the United States power. The American army could get out of Gromyko, son of the late foreign minister) with was making, and I told him of the letter that control.’” special access, has been declassified and is avail- President Kennedy had just transmitted to able at the archives of the Russian Foreign Min- Khrushchev. He raised the question of our remov- [Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, istry. It is reprinted in translation below, along ing the missiles from Turkey. I said that there and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. with relevant excerpts from the other publica- could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; tions mentioned above. The Dobrynin cable’s made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that citation from paperback edition, New York: Ban- first publication in English, a copy obtained by in the last analysis this was a decision that would tam, 1971), pp. 551-52] the Japanese television network NHK, came last have to be made by NATO. However, I said, year in an appendix to We All Lost the Cold War, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove * * * * * a study by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Stein, those missiles from Italy and Turkey for a long whose commentary is also excerpted. period of time. He had ordered their removal Sorensen’s “Confession”: some time ago, and it was our judgment that, * * * * * within a short time after this crisis was over, those ...the president [Kennedy] recognized that, missiles would be gone. for Chairman Khrushchev to withdraw the mis- Robert F. Kennedy’s (edited) Description I said President Kennedy wished to have siles from Cuba, it would be undoubtedly helpful peaceful relations between our two countries. He to him if he could say at the same time to his I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin about wished to resolve the problems that confronted us colleagues on the Presidium, “And we have been 7:15 P.M. and asked him to come to the Depart- in Europe and Southeast Asia. He wished to move assured that the missiles will be coming out of ment of Justice. We met in my office at 7:45. I forward on the control of nuclear weapons. How- Turkey.” And so, after the ExComm meeting [on told him first that we knew that work was con- ever, we could make progress on these matters the evening of 27 October 1962], as I’m sure tinuing on the missile bases in Cuba and that in only when the crisis was behind us. Time was almost all of you know, a small group met in the last few days it had been expedited. I said that running out. We had only a few more hours—we President Kennedy’s office, and he instructed in the last few hours we had learned that our needed an answer immediately from the Soviet Robert Kennedy—at the suggestion of Secretary reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been Union. I said we must have it the next day. of State [Dean] Rusk—to deliver the letter to fired upon and that one of our U-2s had been shot I returned to the White House.... Ambassador Dobrynin for referral to Chairman down and the pilot killed. That for us was a most Khrushchev, but to add orally what was not in the serious turn of events. [Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of letter: that the missiles would come out of Tur- President Kennedy did not want a military the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: New Ameri- key. conflict. He had done everything possible to can Library, 1969), 107-109.] avoid a military engagement with Cuba and with Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert the Soviet Union, but now they had forced our * * * * * Kennedy’s book did not adequately express that hand. Because of the deception of the Soviet the “deal” on the Turkish missiles was part of the Union, our photographic reconnaissance planes Khrushchev’s Description resolution of the crisis. And here I have a confes- would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and if sion to make to my colleagues on the American the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then The climax came after five or six days, when side, as well as to others who are present. I was we would have to shoot back. This would our ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, the editor of Robert Kennedy’s book. It was, in inevitably lead to further incidents and to escala- reported that the President’s brother, Robert fact, a diary of those thirteen days. And his diary tion of the conflict, the implications of which Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial was very explicit that this was part of the deal; but were very grave indeed. visit. Dobrynin’s report went something like this: at that time it was still a secret even on the He said the Cubans resented the fact that we “Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One American side, except for the six of us who had were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if could see from his eyes that he had not slept for been present at that meeting. So I took it upon we had not violated Cuban air space, we would days. He himself said that he had not been home myself to edit that out of his diaries, and that is still be believing what Khrushchev had said— for six days and nights. ‘The President is in a why the Ambassador is somewhat justified in that there would be no missiles placed in Cuba. grave situation,’ Robert Kennedy said, ‘and does saying that the diaries are not as explicit as his In any case, I said, this matter was far more not know how to get out of it. We are under very conversation. serious than the air space of Cuba—it involved severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from the peoples of both of our countries and, in fact, our military to use force against Cuba. Probably [Sorensen comments, in Bruce J. Allyn, James G. people all over the globe. at this very moment the President is sitting down Blight, and David A. Welch, eds., Back to the The Soviet Union had secretly established to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference missile bases in Cuba while at the same time want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, proclaiming privately and publicly that this would Kennedy’s message to Chairman Khrushchev 1989 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, never be done. We had to have a commitment by through unofficial channels. President Kennedy 1992), pp. 92-93] tomorrow that those bases would be removed. I implores Chairman Khrushchev to accept his of- was not giving them an ultimatum but a state- fer and to take into consideration the peculiarities * * * * * ment of fact. He should understand that if they of the American system. Even though the Presi- did not remove those bases, we would remove dent himself is very much against starting a war Accounts of Former U.S. Officials: them. President Kennedy had great respect for over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could the Ambassador’s country and the courage of its occur against his will. That is why the President McGeorge Bundy: people. Perhaps his country might feel it neces- is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for sary to take retaliatory action; but before that was his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation ... Later [on Saturday], accepting a proposal from over, there would be not only dead Americans continues much longer, the President is not sure Dean Rusk, [John F.] Kennedy instructed his but dead Russians as well. that the military will not overthrow him and seize brother to tell Ambassador Dobrynin that while COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 79 there could be no bargain over the missiles that a pistol to Khrushchev’s head and say, “Mr. people themselves established and maintained had been supplied to Turkey, the president him- Chairman, launch those missiles or we’ll blow [their system]. “The OAS resolution is a direct self was determined to have them removed and your head off!” violation of the UN Charter,” I added, “and you, would attend to the matter once the present crisis ...In framing a response [to Khrushchev’s as the Attorney General of the USA, the highest was resolved—as long as no one in Moscow second letter of Saturday, October 27], the presi- American legal entity, should certainly know called that action part of a bargain. [p. 406] dent, Bundy, McNamara, Bobby Kennedy, and I that.” met in the Oval Office, where after some discus- R. Kennedy said that he realized that we had ...The other part of the oral message [to Dobrynin] sion I suggested that since the Jupiters in Turkey different approaches to these problems and it was was proposed by Dean Rusk; that we should tell were coming out in any event, we should inform not likely that we could convince each other. But Khrushchev that while there could be no deal the Russians of this so that this irrelevant question now the matter is not in these differences, since over the Turkish missiles, the president was de- would not complicate the solution of the missile time is of the essence. “I want,” R. Kennedy termined to get them out and would do so once the sites in Cuba. We agreed that Bobby should stressed, “to lay out the current alarming situation Cuban crisis was resolved. The proposal was inform Ambassador Dobrynin orally. Shortly the way the president sees it. He wants N.S. quickly supported by the rest of us [in addition to after we returned to our offices, I telephoned Khrushchev to know this. This is the thrust of the Bundy and Rusk, those present included Presi- Bobby to underline that he should pass this along situation now.” dent Kennedy, McNamara, RFK, George Ball, to Dobrynin only as information, not a public “Because of the plane that was shot down, Roswell Gilpatrick, Llewellyn Thompson, and pledge. Bobby told me that he was then sitting there is now strong pressure on the president to Theodore Sorensen]. Concerned as we all were with Dobrynin and had already talked with him. give an order to respond with fire if fired upon by the cost of a public bargain struck under Bobby later told me that Dobrynin called this when American reconnaissance planes are flying pressure at the apparent expense of the Turks, and message “very important information.” over Cuba. The USA can’t stop these flights, aware as we were from the day’s discussion that because this is the only way we can quickly get for some, even in our own closest councils, even [Dean Rusk as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It information about the state of construction of the this unilateral private assurance might appear to (New York: Norton & Co., 1990), pp. 238-240] missile bases in Cuba, which we believe pose a betray an ally, we agreed without hesitation that very serious threat to our national security. But if no one not in the room was to be informed of this * * * * * we start to fire in response—a chain reaction will additional message. Robert Kennedy was in- quickly start that will be very hard to stop. The structed to make it plain to Dobrynin that the Dobrynin’s Cable to the Soviet Foreign same thing in regard to the essence of the issue of same secrecy must be observed on the other side, Ministry, the missile bases in Cuba. The USA government and that any Soviet reference to our assurance 27 October 1962: is determined to get rid of those bases—up to, in would simply make it null and void. [pp. 432-44] the extreme case, of bombing them, since, I ...There was no leak. As far as as I know, repeat, they pose a great threat to the security of none of the nine of us told anyone else what had TOP SECRET the USA. But in response to the bombing of these happened. We denied in every forum that there Making Copies Prohibited bases, in the course of which Soviet specialists was any deal, and in the narrowest sense what we Copy No. 1 might suffer, the Soviet government will un- said was usually true, as far as it went. When the doubtedly respond with the same against us, orders were passed that the Jupiters must come CIPHERED TELEGRAM somewhere in Europe. A real war will begin, in out, we gave the plausible and accurate—if in- which millions of Americans and Russians will complete—explanation that the missile crisis had die. We want to avoid that any way we can, I’m convinced the president once and for all that he Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come sure that the government of the USSR has the did not want those missiles there.... [p. 434] see him. We talked alone. same wish. However, taking time to find a way The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began, con- out [of the situation] is very risky (here R. Kennedy [from McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: tinues to quickly worsen. We have just received mentioned as if in passing that there are many Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years a report that an unarmed American plane was shot unreasonable heads among the generals, and not (New York: Random House, 1988] down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight only among the generals, who are ‘itching for a over Cuba. The military is demanding that the fight’). The situation might get out of control, President arm such planes and respond to fire with irreversible consequences.” Dean Rusk: with fire. The USA government will have to do “In this regard,” R. Kennedy said, “the presi- this. dent considers that a suitable basis for regulating Even though Soviet ships had turned around, I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him, the entire Cuban conflict might be the letter N.S. time was running out. We made this very clear to what right American planes had to fly over Cuba Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in Khrushchev. Earlier in the week Bobby Kennedy at all, crudely violating its sovereignty and ac- response from the President, which was sent off told Ambassador Dobrynin that if the missile cepted international norms? How would the today to N.S. Khrushchev through the US Em- were not withdrawn immediately, the crisis would USA have reacted if foreign planes appeared over bassy in Moscow. The most important thing for move into a different and dangerous military its territory? us,” R. Kennedy stressed, “is to get as soon as phase. In his book Khrushchev Remembers, “We have a resolution of the Organization possible the agreement of the Soviet government Khrushchev states that Robert Kennedy told of American states that gives us the right to such to halt further work on the construction of the Dobrynin that the military might take over. overflights,” R. Kennedy quickly replied. missile bases in Cuba and take measures under Khrushchev either genuinely misunderstood or I told him that the Soviet Union, like all international control that would make it impos- deliberately misused Bobby’s statement. Obvi- peace-loving countries, resolutely rejects such a sible to use these weapons. In exchange the ously there was never any threat of a military “right” or, to be more exact, this kind of true government of the USA is ready, in addition to takeover in this country. We wondered about lawlessness, when people who don’t like the repealing all measures on the “quarantine,” to Khrushchev’s situation, even whether some So- social-political situation in a country try to im- give the assurances that there will not be any viet general or member of the Politburo would put pose their will on it—a small state where the invasion of Cuba and that other countries of the 80 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Western Hemisphere are ready to give the same ing this question. Then I told R. Kennedy that the very least, Kennedy suggested that he thought assurances—the US government is certain of president’s thoughts would be brought to the that Soviet retaliation was likely. Such an admis- this.” attention of the head of the Soviet government. I sion was still damaging to compellence. It seems “And what about Turkey?” I asked R. also said that I would contact him as soon as there likely that Kennedy was trying to establish the Kennedy. was a reply. In this regard, R. Kennedy gave me basis for a more cooperative approach to crisis “If that is the only obstacle to achieving the a number of a direct telephone line to the White resolution. His brother, he made clear, was under regulation I mentioned earlier, then the president House. enormous pressure from a coterie of generals and doesn’t see any unsurmountable difficulties in In the course of the conversation, R. Kennedy civilian officials who were “itching for a fight.” resolving this issue,” replied R. Kennedy. “The noted that he knew about the conversation that This also was a remarkable admission for the greatest difficulty for the president is the public television commentator Scali had yesterday with attorney general to make. The pressure on the discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the an Embassy adviser on possible ways to regulate president to attack Cuba, as Kennedy explained deployment of missile bases in Turkey was done the Cuban conflict [one-and-a-half lines whited at the beginning of the meeting, had been greatly by a special decision of the NATO Council. To out] intensified by the destruction of an unarmed announce now a unilateral decision by the presi- I should say that during our meeting R. American reconnaissance plane. The president dent of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I’ve never did not want to use force, in part because he Turkey—this would damage the entire structure seen him like this before. True, about twice he recognized the terrible consequences of escala- of NATO and the US position as the leader of tried to return to the topic of “deception,” (that he tion, and was therefore requesting Soviet assis- NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows talked about so persistently during our previous tance to make it unnecessary. very well, there are many arguments. In short, if meeting), but he did so in passing and without any This interpretation is supported by the such a decision were announced now it would edge to it. He didn’t even try to get into fights on president’s willingness to remove the Jupiter seriously tear apart NATO.” various subjects, as he usually does, and only missiles as a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of “However, President Kennedy is ready to persistently returned to one topic: time is of the missiles in Cuba, and his brother’s frank confes- come to agree on that question with N.S. essence and we shouldn’t miss the chance. sion that the only obstacle to dismantling the Khrushchev, too. I think that in order to with- After meeting with me he immediately went Jupiters were political. “Public discussion” of a draw these bases from Turkey,” R. Kennedy to see the president, with whom, as R. Kennedy missile exchange would damage the United States’ said, “we need 4-5 months. This is the minimal said, he spends almost all his time now. position in NATO. For this reason, Kennedy amount of time necessary for the US government revealed, “besides himself and his brother, only to do this, taking into account the procedures that 27/X-62 A. DOBRYNIN 2-3 people know about it in Washington.” exist within the NATO framework. On the Khrushchev would have to cooperate with the whole Turkey issue,” R. Kennedy added, “if [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, trans- administration to keep the American concession Premier N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I’ve lation from copy provided by NHK, in Richard a secret. said, we can continue to exchange opinions be- Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost Most extraordinary of all is the apparent tween him and the president, using him, R. the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- agreement between Dobrynin and Kennedy to Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. “However, sity Press, 1994), appendix, pp. 523-526, with treat Kennedy’s de facto ultimatum as “a request, the president can’t say anything public in this minor revisions.] and not an ultimatum.” This was a deliberate regard about Turkey,” R. Kennedy said again. R. attempt to defuse as much as possible the hostility Kennedy then warned that his comments about * * * * * that Kennedy’s request for an answer by the next Turkey are extremely confidential; besides him day was likely to provoke in Moscow. So too was and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Lebow and Stein comment, Dobrynin’s next sentence: “I noted that it went Washington. We All Lost the Cold War (excerpt): without saying that the Soviet government would “That’s all that he asked me to pass on to not accept any ultimatum and it was good that the N.S. Khrushchev,” R. Kennedy said in conclu- The cable testifies to the concern of John and American government realized that.” sion. “The president also asked N.S. Khrushchev Robert Kennedy that military action would trig- Prior meetings between Dobrynin and to give him an answer (through the Soviet am- ger runaway escalation. Robert Kennedy told Kennedy had sometimes degenerated into shout- bassador and R. Kennedy) if possible within the Dobrynin of his government’s determination to ing matches. On this occasion, Dobrynin indi- next day (Sunday) on these thoughts in order to ensure the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, cates, the attorney general kept his emotions in have a business-like, clear answer in principle. and his belief that the Soviet Union “will undoubt- check and took the ambassador into his confi- [He asked him] not to get into a wordy discus- edly respond with the same against us, some- dence in an attempt to cooperate on the resolution sion, which might drag things out. The current where in Europe.” Such an admission seems of the crisis. This two-pronged strategy suc- serious situation, unfortunately, is such that there illogical if the administration was using the threat ceeded where compellence alone might have is very little time to resolve this whole issue. of force to compel the Soviet Union to withdraw failed. It gave Khrushchev positive incentives to Unfortunately, events are developing too quickly. its missiles from Cuba. It significantly raised the remove the Soviet missiles and reduced the emo- The request for a reply tomorrow,” stressed R. expected cost to the United States of an attack tional cost to him of the withdrawal. He re- Kennedy, “is just that—a request, and not an against the missiles, thereby weakening the cred- sponded as Kennedy and Dobrynin had hoped. ultimatum. The president hopes that the head of ibility of the American threat. To maintain or the Soviet government will understand him cor- enhance that credibility, Kennedy would have rectly.” had to discount the probability of Soviet retalia- I noted that it went without saying that the tion to Dobrynin. That nobody in the government Soviet government would not accept any ultima- was certain of Khrushchev’s reponse makes tums and it was good that the American govern- Kennedy’s statement all the more remarkable. ment realized that. I also reminded him of N.S. It is possible that Dobrynin misquoted Rob- Khrushchev’s appeal in his last letter to the ert Kennedy. However, the Soviet ambassador president to demonstrate state wisdom in resolv- was a careful and responsible diplomat. At the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 81

CASTRO’S SPEECH munity be prepared to go to war to be the Soviet’s sophisticated knowledge of continued from page 1 defend any socialist country, then we military matters. Still, he quarreled with the a portion of the speech, and made it avail- had absolutely no right to raise any Soviet leaders over the political aspects of able to us for publication.1 That portion questions about something that could Operation Anadyr (the Soviet code name for concerns the Missile Crisis, which Cubans represent a potential danger. the missile emplacement). He sought a call the October Crisis. The statement not public announcement of the decision prior to only constitutes President Castro’s most Subsequently (and earlier, in his meetings the completed installation of missiles for extensive remarks about the 1962 confron- with Mikoyan), the Cuban leader has said two reasons. First, he judged that such a tation, but also provides his reflection on the that he understood the missiles also could be statement would itself have a deterrent ef- episode only five years after it occurred.2 an immediate deterrent to a U.S. invasion. fect against a U.S. invasion, by effectively This document is usefully read in conjunc- But here he presented the idea that Cuba committing the Soviet Union to Cuba’s de- tion with notes taken by the Soviet ambassa- would be on the front line of the struggle fense. Second, publication of the Cuban- dor to Cuba, Aleksandr Alekseev, during between East and West.4 Soviet agreement would strengthen Cuba’s meetings immediately after the crisis be- Prior to 1962, Cuba had sought admis- “moral” defense in the United Nations and tween Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas sion to the Warsaw Pact, but had been re- in the forum of international public opinion. Mikoyan and Cuba’s principal leaders. buffed. Castro’s rationale for accepting the Keeping the operation secret, he argued in Translated excerpts from both documents missiles provided a formulation that would 1968, required are printed below. Taken together, the docu- enable Cuba to claim de facto membership ments provide a deeper understanding of the in the Pact. It was placing itself in harm’s the resort to lies which in effect meant to nature and roots of the Cuban-Soviet rela- way for the benefit of socialist countries, and waive a basic right and a principle.... tionship between the crisis and the August so it had the right to expect reciprocal pro- Cuba is a sovereign, independent coun- 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. tection from the Pact in the event of an try, and has a right to own the weapons Those six years were the defining mo- attack. that it deems necessary, and the USSR ments of both the Cuban revolution and the By May 1962, Cuba expected and feared to send them there, in the same light that remaining 23 years of the Cuban-Soviet a U.S. military invasion. Cuban leaders rea- the United States has felt that it has the relationship. It is notable, then, that just soned first that the Kennedy Administration right to make agreements with dozens of eight months prior to the 1968 invasion, would not be content to accept blithely the countries and to send them weapons that Castro provided his party’s leadership with outcome of the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs they see fit, without the Soviet Union such an extensive review of Cuban-Soviet invasion. They viewed Cuba’s January 1962 ever considering that it had a right to ties, starting with the Missile Crisis. To suspension from the Organization of Ameri- intercede. From the very outset it was a appreciate the significance of this speech, it can States as a justification for and prelude capitulation, an erosion of our sover- is necessary first to review Cuba’s perspec- to an invasion.5 Importantly, their fears eignty....9 tive on the Missile Crisis. were reinforced by the development of a major U.S. covert action, codenamed Op- While the world breathed a sigh of relief Cuba’s Perspective on the Crisis eration Mongoose, and other American mili- when Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced tary preparations.6 Approved by President on 28 October 1962 that the Soviets would Until recent years, Cuba had been John Kennedy at the end of November 1961, dismantle and remove the missiles in ex- largely excluded from or marginalized in Operation Mongoose became the largest CIA change for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba, analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was operation until Afghanistan. Though the Castro was enraged. “We were profoundly seen as no more than the stage on which the program was never fully implemented, the incensed,” he reported to the Central Com- U.S.-Soviet confrontation brought the world United States did train and support thou- mittee in 1968. The basis and acuteness of to the brink of nuclear war. But new infor- sands of Cuban exiles, many of whom en- Cuba’s anger are evident in the conversa- mation about Cuba’s role indicates that a gaged in repeated acts of sabotage on the tions Castro had with Mikoyan in early No- full appreciation of the event can only be island, including the destruction of facto- vember 1962, immediately after gained by examining Cuba’s goals and fears ries, the burning of fields, the contamination Khrushchev’s decision. prior to the crisis and its actions during the of sugar exports, and the re-supply of counter- First, there was the matter of consulta- crisis.3 revolutionaries in the Escambray Moun- tion. Cuba learned about the Soviet decision Early in his speech, Castro asserted that tains.7 Cuban intelligence had infiltrated the at the same moment the United States did, by when a Soviet delegation (headed by the exile groups and had captured several of the hearing Khrushchev’s announcement on Ra- Uzbek party chief Sharif Rashidov) pro- saboteurs. While Cuba was not privy to the dio Moscow on the morning of October 28. posed the installation of ballistic missiles in closely held Mongoose planning documents, Mikoyan argued to Castro on November 3 Cuba in May 1962, it had a reasonably accurate picture of the that there had been no time to consult with extent of the operation.8 the Cuban leader, especially in light of a We saw it as a means of strengthening This was the context in which the Cu- letter Castro had sent to Khrushchev on the socialist community...and if we were ban leaders accepted the Soviet proposal to October 27 (it was written on October 26, proposing that the entire socialist com- install missiles. Castro acknowledged that completed in the early hours of October 27, he placed great faith in what he perceived to and was received in the Kremlin very late on 82 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the 27th). In that letter, the Cuban leader and an even greater number in militias. But predicted that U.S. military strikes, and con- Cuban leaders did want to retain other weap- Finally, Cuba perceived it was nothing ceivably an invasion, were likely to occur in onry that the United States was demanding more than a pawn in Soviet calculations. the next 24 to 72 hours (that is, possibly 10- the Soviet Union withdraw. Most important Castro’s comments to Mikoyan about this 12 hours after the Kremlin received the were IL-28 bombers, which were obsolete confuse the sequence of events, but the source letter). In order to protect Cuba, Mikoyan but capable of carrying a nuclear payload. of the anger and disillusionment is clear. He contended, the Soviet Union had to act Castro explained in 1968 that said on November 3: swiftly, without consulting Cuba. But, Castro retorted, the formula worked out between they were useful planes; it is possible And suddenly came the report of Kennedy and Khrushchev seemed to be based that had we possessed IL-28s, the Cen- the American agency UPI that “the So- on a secret letter the Soviet leader had sent to tral American bases [from which Cuban viet premier has given orders to Soviet the U.S. president on October 26, prior to exiles were launching Mongoose at- personnel to dismantle missile launch- receiving the Cuban leader’s assessment.10 tacks] might not have been organized, ers and return them to the USSR.” Our Cuba thus felt aggrieved at being ignored. not because we would have bombed the people could not believe that report. It Second, Castro was angry over the bases, but because of their fear that we caused deep confusion. People didn’t Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement itself. might. understand the way that the issue was Why, he demanded of Mikoyan, did the structured—the possibility of removing Soviets not extract anything more substan- Mikoyan recognized their importance. missile armaments from Cuba if the tial from the United States that would in- On November 5, Mikoyan told the Cuban U.S. liquidated its bases in Turkey. crease Cuban security and defend Cuba’s leadership that “Americans are trying to honor? On October 28, the Cuban leader had make broader the list of weapons for evacu- In 1992, the Cuban leader intimated that this articulated five points that he stated should ation. Such attempts have already been initial confusion hardened into anger during have been the basis of an agreement, includ- made, but we’ll not allow them to do so.”13 his six-week trip to the Soviet Union, in ing a cessation of U.S. overflights and a “To hell with the imperialists!” Castro early 1963, after Khrushchev inadvertently withdrawal from Guantanamo Naval Base.11 approvingly recalled Mikoyan saying, if they informed Castro that there had been a secret At a minimum he expected that the Soviets added more demands. Nevertheless, Castro understanding between the United States could have forced the United States to meet lamented in 1968, “some 24, or at most 48 and Soviet Union for the removal of U.S. with Cuba to discuss the five points face to hours later...Mikoyan arrived bearing the missiles from Turkey. This seemed to con- face. That would have at least recognized sad news that the IL-28 planes would also firm his suspicion that the protection of Cuban sovereignty. Instead, the Soviets have to be returned.”14 (Castro’s memory Cuba was merely a pretext for the Soviet seemed oblivious to Cuban sovereignty, even may be in error here: according to the declas- goal of enhancing its own security.16 Here agreeing to an internationally sponsored in- sified Soviet records of the Mikoyan-Castro were the seeds of true discontent. spection of the dismantling of the missiles conversations, Mikoyan conveyed The lessons were clear to Castro, and on Cuban soil without first asking Cuba’s Moscow’s decision to withdraw the these were what he attempted to convey to permission. bomber’s, to Castro’s evident fury, in a the Central Committee in 1968. The Soviet Third, there was the issue of Cuba’s meeting on November 12.15) From the Cu- Union, which casually trampled on Cuban vulnerability, which had several elements. ban perspective, Cuba was even more vul- sovereignty and negotiated away Cuba’s The Cuban leadership interpreted the agree- nerable than before the Missile Crisis be- security, could not be trusted to look after ment as a Soviet capitulation to U.S. threats, cause the hollowness of Soviet protection Cuba’s “national interests.” Consequently, and correctly understood at the time what was exposed and key weaponry was being Cuba had to be vigilant in protecting itself was made explicit only twenty years later: taken away. and in maintaining its independence. that the Soviet Union was unwilling ulti- Castro also was concerned that the U.S.- mately to put itself at risk to protect Cuba.12 Soviet accord would weaken Cuba inter- Significance of the January 1968 Speech “We realized,” Castro said to the Central nally and encourage counter-revolution and Committee, “how alone we would be in the perhaps challenges to his leadership. He Castro’s 12-hour speech came at the event of a war.” In the same vein, he de- remarked to Mikoyan on 3 November 1962: conclusion of the first meeting of the Central scribed the Soviet decision to remove all but Committee since the Cuban Communist 3,000 of its 42,000 military personnel from All of this seemed to our people to Party was founded in October 1965. The Cuba as “a freely granted concession to top be a step backward, a retreat. It turns out main purpose of the session was to conduct off the concession of the withdrawal of the that we must accept inspections, accept a “trial” of 37 members of the party, who strategic missiles.” the U.S. right to determine what kinds of were labelled the “micro-faction.” Though The Cubans saw the Soviet soldiers weapons we can use....Cuba is a young the designation “micro” was intended to more as a deterrent to potential U.S. aggres- developing country. Our people are diminish their importance, there was little sion—a kind of tripwire that would involve very impulsive. The moral factor has a doubt that the attack against them was filled the Soviet Union in a Cuban-U.S. conflict— special significance in our country. We with high drama and potentially high stakes than as a necessary military support. Cuba were afraid that these decisions could for the Cuban revolution. had more than 100,000 soldiers under arms provoke a breach in the people’s unity.... The meeting began on January 23, and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 83 was presided over by Raoul Castro, the on the history of Cuban-Soviet relations, the artistic community.18 This was also a Minister of the Armed Forces and the party’s which was quite critical of the Soviet Union, period when Havana was awash in graffiti second secretary. All of the proceedings, be kept secret when the micro-faction trial and juvenile vandalism, which leaders asso- except Fidel Castro’s speech, were promi- itself had been made so public? (Indeed, ciated with a growing “hippie” movement. nently reprinted in the Cuban Communist despite our repeated requests, the bulk of the On the other hand, Castro apparently Party newspaper Granma.17 speech is still secret, and the only portion believed he had to “educate” the Central Most prominent among the 37 was that has been declassified is the portion Committee about the errors of the micro- Anibal Escalante, who was well known in pertaining to the missile crisis.) Recent faction, and demonstrate to party leaders Cuba. The leader of the Popular Socialist interviews we conducted in Havana with that the purge was warranted. He could not Party (which was the communist party) be- former officials make clear that there were be certain how popular Escalante was with fore 1959, he also headed the Integrated three motives for keeping the speech from the members of the Central Committee, be- Revolutionary Organizations in 1961, which the public. cause it was such a nascent and diverse was the party created to mesh Castro’s July First, there was a concern that the United group. He thus sought to avoid party dis- 26th Movement, the Revolutionary Direc- States would interpret such direct Cuban unity by convincing the leaders that the torate, and the Popular Socialist Party into criticism of the Soviet Union as a visible purge was necessary to protect Cuban na- one unit. What made the attack on Escalante sign of rupture between Cuba and its bene- tionalism, which was the ultimate source of and his cohorts especially dramatic was that factor. Cuban leaders, quite mindful of the legitimacy. Castro did this, one former they were charged with adhering to criti- 1965 Dominican Republic invasion, did not official remarked, by explaining that “the cisms of the Cuban Communist Party that want to encourage U.S. hawks to attempt platform of the micro-faction would in fact had been voiced by Moscow-oriented com- military attacks against the island. The mi- turn us into a Soviet satellite.” This not only munist parties in Latin America. Moreover, cro-faction trial, after all, focused on alleg- would have subverted Cuban national iden- they were accused of meeting with officials edly errant individuals and avoided impli- tity, but would have been a grave error, of the Soviet embassy in Havana, of provid- cating the Soviet Union directly. because—as he argues in the section of the ing these officials (one of whom was alleg- Cuban leaders were also worried about speech on the Missile Crisis—the Soviet edly the KGB station chief) with false infor- internal disunity. On the one hand, they did Union was untrustworthy. mation about Cuba, and of encouraging the not want to encourage the Cuban public to Third, by keeping the speech secret, Soviet Union to apply economic sanctions seize on the speech as a sign that Cuba Castro sent a message to the Soviet Union against Cuba. In effect, their purge could be disavowed all aspects of Soviet socialism. that while Cuba profoundly disagreed with it interpreted as a direct rebuff to the Soviet There was considerable cultural ferment in over several issues, there was still the possi- Union. Cuba at the time, and Cuban leaders were bility of accommodation. Had the Cuban Why, then, would Fidel Castro’s speech feeling besieged by increasing criticism from head of state made his criticisms public, it

FIDEL CASTRO, GLASNOST, S. Khrushchev, E. Primakov and many other During our meetings, I told him about our AND THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS people who were involved in the events of discussions with the Americans, and asked 1962 to attend the conference. him if he thought it would be a good idea for by Georgy Shakhnazarov The Moscow conference turned out to the Cubans to join the process in order to be particularly interesting thanks to the par- present the maximum amount of reliable In October 1987, Harvard University ticipation of an authoritative Cuban delega- information about this dramatic episode in hosted a symposium on the Caribbean Cri- tion led by Sergio del Valle, a member of the Cuban and world history. sis (or Cuban Missile Crisis) in which Rob- Cuban government who in 1962 had been the Fidel thought for a moment, stroking ert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Theodore Cuban army chief of staff. This article de- his beard with a familiar gesture. Then he Sorensen, and other prominent veterans of scribes how this unprecedented Cuban in- said: “It is not only a good idea, but it is a the Kennedy Administration took part; I volvement in an East-West historical inves- necessity. There are so many myths and was one of three Soviets who also partici- tigation became possible, and Fidel Castro’s puzzles about those events. We would be pated, along with Fyodor Burlatsky and personal role in that decision. On 7 Novem- able to help, to give information about the Sergo Mikoyan. At the conclusion of that ber 1987, only a few weeks after the Harvard events in which we were immediate partici- interesting discussion it was agreed to ad- discussions, the Soviet Union celebrated the pants. But nobody has invited us.” vance a step further the historical study that 70th anniversary of the October Socialist Then I requested an invitation for the had been jointly launched.1 Revolution. Foreign delegations were led by Cubans to the Moscow conference. Fidel The next “round” of this study was held the “first persons,” and Fidel Castro was promised to send a delegation and he deliv- in Moscow in January 1989.2 The Soviet among them. At that time I was a deputy ered on his word. More than that. He Political Science Association and the Insti- chairman of the CPSU Central Committee positively responded to the idea to hold a tute of World Economy and International department responsible for relations with “third round” in Cuba, and indeed a confer- Relations invited U.S. former officials and Cuba, and I had an opportunity to talk with ence was held, with Fidel’s active participa- scholars, and on the Soviet side A. Gromyko, the Cuban leader several times in his resi- tion, in Havana in January 1992.3 A. Dobrynin, A. Alexeev, O. Troyanovsky, dence, the mansion at the Leninskie Gory. continued on page 87 84 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN would have been far more difficult to over- challenge because it claimed to be the model quent months, in speeches critical of the come the tensions with the Soviet Union. for developing socialism in Latin America, Soviet model of socialism and world revolu- These tensions were reaching their peak and the Cuban proletariat was less advanced tion, and supporting Ché Guevara’s Novem- in January 1968. In a public speech on than that in some other countries. Moreover, ber 1966 expedition to Bolivia, which was January 2, the Cuban leader blamed the the Cuban revolution had succeeded largely opposed by the Bolivian Communist Party.24 Soviet Union for an inadequate delivery of without the support of the Popular Socialist Guevara had left Cuba in 1965, but he sent a fuel that he asserted would require a stricter Party. To some extent the ideological prob- message to the Tricontinental Conference in rationing of gasoline.19 What the Soviets lem could be obscured by treating Cuba as which he declared that through “liberation had done was to increase supplies only mod- an exception, especially during the period struggles” in Latin America, “the Cuban estly from the previous year, and well below that it was not ruled by a communist party. Revolution will today have a task of much what the Cubans needed to pursue their But the issue became more critical after greater relevance: creating a Second or a ambitious plan of producing a ten million October 1965, when the Cuban Communist Third Vietnam....”25 In August 1967, at the ton sugar harvest by 1970. This plan was an Party was formally established as the ruling first meeting of the Organization for Latin element in their goal of achieving some party. American Solidarity—which was created independence from the Soviet Union. That came three months before a major by the Tricontinental Conference—Cuba ar- The Soviet action came after Premier international meeting of revolutionaries in ranged for nearly all of the delegations to be Alexsei Kosygin visited Cuba in July 1967, Havana, the Tricontinental Conference. Until dominated by non-communist revolution- on his way back to Moscow from a summit then, Soviets believed they had papered over ary movements. Later in the year, it point- meeting in New Jersey with President its differences with Cuba on the matter of edly chose to absent itself from a Soviet- Lyndon Johnson. The Castro-Kosygin meet- armed struggle by resolving at a December organized preparatory meeting of world com- ing reportedly was quite tense, in part be- 1964 meeting of Latin American communist munist parties in Budapest.26 cause Cuba disagreed with Soviet aspira- parties that while armed struggle was a valid The trial of the micro-faction thus came tions for a detente with the United States. It means of achieving socialism, the appropri- at what seemed to be a critical juncture for is likely, also, that Kosygin approvingly ate means were to be assessed by each com- Cuba in its relationship with the Soviet Union. conveyed a U.S. message that Cuba should munist party. Cuba, moreover, agreed to In March 1968, Castro focused his revolu- desist from supporting revolutionary guer- deal only with the established communist tionary fervor on Cuba itself, and asserted rilla movements in Latin America.20 parties in Latin America.21 that the masses had become complacent, Cuba’s support for these movements Then the Tricontinental Conference up- believing “that we were defended.” But “the had been a source of friction between the set the fragile peace. While it was fully only truly revolutionary attitude,” he ex- two countries for most of the period after the endorsed by the Soviet Union, which hoped horted, “was always to depend on ourselves.” Missile Crisis. It raised several problems for the conference would undermine China’s He then announced that he was eliminating the Soviet Union. One was ideological, and influence with revolutionary movements the private ownership of small businesses: in this context it is worth noting that Cuban (and which it apparently did), the Soviets “we did not make a Revolution here to affairs in the CPSU Central Committee were were taken aback by the barely veiled criti- establish the right to trade.”27 handled in part by the department respon- cisms of its allegedly weak support for North Was this a prelude to a fundamental sible for ideology. The Soviet Union be- Vietnam. The conference also created a new break with the Soviet Union? In fact, by lieved that socialism could evolve peace- organization, headquartered in Havana, to May 1968 Cuba had actually begun a rap- fully in Latin America, and would come support armed revolutionary activity prochement with the Soviet Union, which about through united front alliances spear- throughout the world, and the organization’s was evident in a softer tone in Castro’s headed by the established communist par- executive secretariat had only three repre- speeches about international affairs. Then ties. It was critical in their view to appreciate sentatives from communist parties—Cuba, in August, Cuba refused to condemn the that Latin America was not ripe for revolu- North Vietnam and North Korea, all of whom Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. While tion, because it had an underdeveloped pro- were critical of the Soviet Union.22 In a call communist parties in many countries roundly letariat. To be sure, there were some differ- for armed struggle in every Latin American criticized the Soviet Union, Castro excori- ences within the Soviet leadership about country, Castro concluded the conference ated the Czech Communist Party for moving whether any support should be given to by fervently criticizing the Latin American its country “toward a counterrevolutionary guerrilla movements, and there were differ- communist parties: situation, toward capitalism and into the ences even among the Latin American com- arms of imperialism.”28 Though it came munist parties about the support that should if there is less of resolutions and possi- several days after the invasion, and carefully be granted to movements within their re- bilities and dilemmas and it is under- avoided endorsing the invasion, Castro’s spective countries. In the mid-1960s, for stood once and for all that sooner or later speech was viewed in Moscow as a welcome example, the Venezuelan Communist Party all or almost all people will have to take contrast to the widespread reproach the So- developed a close alliance with the main up arms to liberate themselves, then the viet Union was receiving. In 1969, Soviet guerrilla movement there. The Argentine hour of liberation for this continent will trade with Cuba began to increase dramati- Party, in contrast, was firmly opposed to be advanced.23 cally, and within four years Cuba became a support for any guerrilla movements. member of the Council of Mutual Economic Still, Cuba posed a frontal ideological Castro reinforced these views in subse- Assistance (Comecon), the Soviet-domi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 85 nated trading bloc of socialist countries. Cuba. Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge: The January 1968 speech, then, ap- 3. Much of the information has been derived from two Harvard University Press, 1989), 108; Cole Blasier, major conferences—held in Moscow in 1989 and in The Giant’s Rival: The USSR and Latin America (Pitts- pears to have given the Cuban leadership Havana in 1992—which brought together former burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983), 126. the freedom to choose a closer relationship policymakers and scholars from the United States, 13. See record of Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 5 with the Soviet Union. By asserting Cuban Soviet Union and Cuba, and included President Castro, November 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry archives. independence, Castro could accept the kind as well as from documents declassified through the 14. The correspondence between Kennedy and efforts of the National Security Archive. See James G. Khrushchev over the removal of the IL-28s is reprinted of ties that would have appeared to make Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans in Problems of Communism, Special Edition, Spring Cuba less independent. and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2d ed. 1992, 77-96. Also in this issue see: Philip Brenner, It is impossible to know whether this (New York: Noonday Press of Farrar Straus and Giroux, “Kennedy and Khrushchev on Cuba: Two Stages, Three sort of calculation prompted his speech. In 1990). James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Parties.” Welch, Cuba on the Brink (New York: Pantheon, 15. For an English translation of the November 12 January 1968, the Cuban leadership may 1993); Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow minutes, and of Mikoyan’s ciphered telegram to Mos- not have had a clear sense of where they Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27- cow summarizing it, see Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and were taking their country. The internal 28, 1989, eds., Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and Gen. William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and debate during the following two or three David A. Welch, CSIA Occasional Paper No. 9 (Lanham, Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis MD: University Press of America, 1992); Philip Brenner, (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 189-99. months—which undoubtedly engendered “Thirteen Days: Cuba’s Perspective on the Missile 16. Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 224- the March closure of small businesses— Crisis,” in James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile 225. proved to be critical for the future direction Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); 17. Granma, International Edition (English), 4 and 11 of the Cuban revolution. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban February 1968. Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Docu- 18. Lourdes Casal, “Cultural Policy and Writers in With hindsight, it seems that Cuba had ments Reader (New York: The New Press, 1992). Cuba,” in Philip Brenner, William M. LeoGrande, few options left. It had experienced a major 4. This formulation was the same he provided in an Donna Rich, and Daniel Siegel, eds., The Cuba Reader: rift with China by 1966. The October 1967 interview five months after the crisis. See Claude The Making of a Revolutionary Society, (New York: death of Guevara in Bolivia convinced sev- Julien, “Sept Heures avec M. Fidel Castro,” Le Monde, Grove Press, 1989), 508-509. 22 and 23 March 1963. 19. Granma, International Edition (English), 7 January eral Cuban leaders that armed struggle was 5. Indeed, the Soviets similarly assessed the suspen- 1968, 2-3. not going to be a viable means of building sion. See Blight and Welch, On the Brink (2d ed.), 238. 20. Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance: 1959-1991 revolutionary alliances in Latin America. 6. On pre-crisis U.S. military planning and covert (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), While the Soviet Union continued to trade actions against Cuba, see James G. Hershberg, “Before 88. ‘The Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military 21. D. Bruce Jackson, Castro, the Kremlin and Com- with Cuba despite its fierce independence, Strike Against Cuba?” in Nathan, ed., The Cuban munism in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Kosygin’s visit may have been a warning to Missile Crisis Revisited, 237-80. Notably, former Sec- Press, 1969), 28-29; Jacques Lévesque, The USSR and Castro that the Soviet Union would not give retary of Defense Robert McNamara observed in 1989 the Cuban Revolution: Soviet Ideological and Strategi- Cuba any more rope with which to wander that were he a Cuban leader in 1962, he would likely cal Perspectives, 1959-77, trans. Deanna Drendel have assessed that U.S. actions portended an invasion. Leboeuf (New York: Praeger, 1978), 102-104. away from the fold. Indeed, Soviet techni- See Allyn, Blight, and Welch, Back to the Brink, 7. 22. Lévesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution, cians were recalled during the spring of McNamara argued, though, that despite Cuba’s reason- 119-121. 1968.29 able conclusion, the United States never intended a 23. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, These factors thus impelled Cuba to- military invasion. “The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian and 7. Operation Mongoose was devised as a total plan for Latin American Peoples,” A Staff Study, 89th Cong., ward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, low intensity conflict. It also included propaganda 2nd Sess., 7 June 1966, p. 93. and the decision to do so coincided with the operations through an off-shore radio station and eco- 24. For exemplary speeches, see Martin Kenner and micro-faction trial and Castro’s speech. In nomic pressure that was implemented through the for- James Petras, eds. Fidel Castro Speaks (New York: choosing to join the fold, Cuba would try to mal establishment of the U.S. embargo in February Grove Press, 1969), 171-213. On Guevara’s problems 1962. Gen. Edward Lansdale, the operational chief of with the Bolivian Communist Party, see El Diario del do it on its own terms, determined to protect the project, had proposed a very detailed plan of action Ché en Bolivia (Havana: Editora Politica, 1987), esp. its sovereignty and to be the principal guard- that foresaw U.S. pressure leading to a general uprising the introduction by Fidel Castro, xvii-xviii, and 47, 51, ian of its national interest. That determina- that would ultimately require a direct U.S. military 53, 337. tion clearly grew out of its experiences invasion. See Chang and Kornbluh, eds., The Cuban 25. John Gerassi, ed., Venceremos! The Speeches and Missile Crisis, 1962, Documents 5 and 7. Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara (New York: Simon during the Missile Crisis and in the prior 8. Fabian Escalante Font, Cuba: la guerra secreta de la and Schuster, 1968), 420. five years of tense relations with the Soviet CIA (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993). 26. Lévesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution, Union. It is in understanding these terms 9. Castro made a similar case in 1992. See Blight, Allyn 130-131. with which Cuba established its ties to the and Welch, Cuba on the Brink, 205-210. Notably, 27. Kenner and Petras, eds., Fidel Castro Speaks, 233, President Kennedy understood the matter of secrecy in 277. Soviet Union that the January 1968 speech the same light, asserting that whoever revealed the 28. Granma International Edition (English), 25 August makes an important contribution to the his- missiles first would be able to set the terms of debate. 1968. tory of the Cold War. See Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of 29. Domínguez, To Make the World Safe for Revolu- Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 382. Also tion, 75. 1. The full text of the Missile Crisis portion of the see McGeorge Bundy and Theodore Sorensen’s com- speech will be published in James G. Blight and Philip ments in Allyn, Blight and Welch, Back to the Brink, James G. Blight is Senior Research Fellow at the Brenner, The October Crisis: Fidel Castro, Nuclear 20-21. Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown Uni- Missiles, and Cuban-Soviet Relations (Lanham, MD: 10. The Castro-Khrushchev correspondence was re- versity, and has organized several conferences and co- Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming). printed in Problems of Communism, Special Edition, authored several books on the Cuban Missile Crisis; 2. At the time, Castro was First Secretary of the Spring 1992, 37-45, and in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Philip Brenner chairs the Department of International Communist Party of Cuba and Commander-in-Chief Cuba on the Brink, 474-491. Politics, School of International Studies, American of the Cuban Armed Forces. He was referred to as 11. Revolucion, 29 October 1962. University, and has written several studies on Cuban Commander Castro. Today he is also President of 12. Jorge I. Domínguez, To Make the World Safe for affairs. 86 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

The October Crisis: concession. remember exactly? Was it the Red Cross thing? Excerpts of a Speech by Fidel Castro We recall perfectly well how we assumed CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ: He went [Translated from Spanish by the Cuban the always unpleasant initiative of making a state- to the extreme of proposing that the international Council of State] ment—at my suggestion—that would create the vessel be brought to Mariel, saying that because right atmosphere, trying to justify the action by it was an international vessel it would no longer MEETING OF THE saying that the planes were obsolete, etc. All of be Cuban territory, and the UN supervisors could CENTRAL COMMITTEE which was done in consideration for public opin- be on board the vessel and could supervise the OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA ion, to protect the people from the trauma of operation. It was then that Raul woke up and said, PALACE OF THE REVOLUTION another blow of that nature, since we were seri- “Look, why don’t you dress them up in sailor HAVANA ously concerned—and, in our view, rightly so suits?” (LAUGHTER), referring to the interna- JANUARY 26, 1968 given those circumstances—over the pernicious tional supervisors. YEAR OF THE HEROIC GUERRILLA effects of a chain of such blows on the confidence COMMANDER RAUL CASTRO: These and the consciousness of the people. And, I people think that I said that because I had been MORNING SESSION repeat, given that under the circumstances we dozing; I actually woke up at that point and came were profoundly incensed, we saw that action as out with that, have them bring those people on COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: In the a mistake, in our opinion there had been a series their vessel, dressed up as Soviet sailors, but early hours of [this] morning we stopped while on of mistakes, but the extent of our overall confi- leaving us out of the whole mess. It is true that I the topic of the reply sent to the Soviet Govern- dence, and that deposited in the Soviet Union and was falling asleep, but I was not that far gone. ment in response to their letter attempting to find its policies, was still considerable. COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: That justifications in alleged alarms, and purporting So the planes went too. Together with the was it. insinuations of a nuclear strike in the sense that planes—and that is something that they had re- ———— we had advised the USSR to attack the United quested, the issue of the missiles—they requested COMMANDER FIDEL CASTRO: We had States.1 the withdrawal of the Soviet mechanized infantry problems with the translators and there were These issues were made perfectly clear in brigades stationed in Cuba. Let me add here, in occasions when some of the things we said were that letter. Later there was another long letter case anyone is unaware of it, that at the time of the badly translated and there was even one point containing the same points of view, and though missile issue, there were over 40,000 Soviet troops when poor Mikoyan got furious. It was over some couched in more diplomatic terms, so to speak, stationed in Cuba. The imperialists must also phrase or other. answering each of the items in Khrushchev’s have known that, but they never declared the Anyway, those deliberations—as well as letter one by one.2 amount, they limited themselves to speculative some of the others—were characterized by total At that time, we also received Mikoyan’s figures, which revealed their interest in reducing and complete disagreement. Needless to say, we visit. Mikoyan’s visit was also taken down....No, the amount, perhaps due to possible effects on have the highest opinion of Mikoyan as an indi- Mikoyan’s visit was not taken down in short- public opinion. vidual, as a person, and he was always favorably hand; there were notes on Mikoyan’s visit. U In fact, anyone who reads Kennedy’s state- inclined toward Cuba, he was Cuba’s friend, and Thant’s visit was the one that was taken down in ments, his demands, will notice that he did not I think he still is a friend of Cuba; I mean, he did shorthand. It is a real pity that the discussions include those divisions, which were not offensive quite a bit for us. That is why he always received with Mikoyan were not taken down in shorthand, or strategic weapons, or anything of the sort. We from us a certain deferential treatment. because they were bitter; some of the incidents in must note that the withdrawal of the mechanized It was during those days that it gradually the meeting were anecdotal. brigades was a freely granted concession to top became evident that we were totally correct—as Initially, after we explained to him our stand- off the concession of the withdrawal of the stra- was, unfortunately, so often the case throughout points, we had him clarify what was going to tegic missiles. that whole process—about the imperialists’ atti- happen with the IL-28 planes, and he vouched We argued heatedly, firmly, were against tude vis-a-vis the concessions. This could be that no, the IL-28s would not leave Cuba. Then, this. He said that it would not be carried out seen as low-flying aircraft increased their con- if I remember correctly, I asked him, “But what if immediately but gradually, and we reiterated that stant and unnecessary daily flights over our bases, they demand their withdrawal, what will you we were against it and insisted on our opposition. military facilities, airports, anti-aircraft batteries, do?” He answered, “then to hell with the imperi- I am explaining all this for the sake of subsequent more and more frequently; they harbored the alists, to hell with the imperialists!” issues, so that you can understand how all this fits hope, after the October [Cuban Missile] Crisis, of Then some 24, or at most 48 hours later, he into the history of our relations with the Soviet demoralizing the Revolution and they fell on us, arrived at the meeting—those famous meetings Union. We flatly rejected the inspection issue. hammer and tongs, with all their arsenal of propa- at the Palace of the Revolution—Mikoyan ar- That was something we would never agree to. ganda and with everything that might demoralize rived bearing the sad news that the IL-28 planes We told him what we thought about that gross, our people and our army. would also have to be returned.3 insolent arbitrary measure, contrary to all prin- We had agreed not to shoot; we agreed to That was really unpleasant, but the situation ciples, of taking upon themselves the faculty of revoke the order to fire on the planes while the was such that, with the missiles withdrawn, we deciding on matters under our jurisdiction. And talks were under way; but made it clear that we were on the verge of another problem over the when it was remarked that the agreement would did not consider those talks conclusive at all. I planes. It would have made sense to have had it fall flat—an agreement that we were completely believe we were totally right on that; had we acted out over the missiles, but not over the IL-28 at odds with—we said that we could not care less differently, we would still have their aircraft planes—they were useful planes: it is possible and that there would simply be no inspection. flying low over us and—as we would sometimes that had we possessed IL-28s, the Central Ameri- That gave rise to endless arguing and counter- say—we would not even be able to play baseball can bases might not have been organized, not arguing, and they actually found themselves in a here. because we would have bombed the bases, but of very difficult situation. I think that at this point The demoralizing effect began to manifest their fear that we might. What we were most Raul made a joke that caused quite a commotion itself in the fact that the anti-aircraft gunners and concerned about then was avoiding a new impact in the atmosphere of that meeting. I think it was the crews at the air bases had begun to draw on public opinion as regards a new blow, a new when we were discussing expedients. Do you caricatures reflecting their mood and their situa- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 87 tion, in which they depicted the planes flying 6. In 1968, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez had ministerial CASTRO AND GLASNOST above them, the Yanquis sticking their tongues rank and was involved in foreign commerce. He had continued from page 83 out at them, and their planes and guns covered been an official of the Cuban communist party (which with cobwebs. And we realized once again to was called the Popular Socialist Party) before the 1959 After discussing all the logistical and revolution, and had served in the government of what extent the men who were supposed to be organizational problems related to the Fulgencio Batista (as part of a popular front) in 1944, project, the Cuban leader began to recall very experienced in struggling against the impe- and headed the Institute for Agrarian Reform from rialists were actually totally oblivious to imperi- 1962-64. In the 1970s he became a Vice President of those troubled days of October 1962 when alist mentality, revolutionary mentality, our Cuba and a member of the Political Bureau of the Cuban the fate of the humanity was played out in the people’s mentality, and the ultra-demoralizing Communist Party. game between Moscow, Washington, and effects of such a passive—more than passive, Havana. And even though Castro repeat- cowardly—attitude. edly spoke on this topic later, that conversa- So we warned Mikoyan that we were going tion contained a series of statements and to open fire on the low-flying planes. We even did him that favor, since they still had the ground- judgments that shed some light on the devel- opment and outcome of the 1962 crisis, and to-air missiles and we were interested in preserv- CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS ing them. We visited some emplacements and on Fidel Castro’s perspective on it: asked that they be moved given that they were The Cold War International His- not going to shoot and we did not want them “I Know Something About The Caribbean destroyed, because we were planning to open fire tory Project offers a limited number of Crisis” on the planes. fellowships to junior scholars from the We recall those days because of the bitter former Communist bloc to conduct (Notes from a conversation with Fidel Castro, decisions that had to be made. from three months to one year of archi- 5 November 1987) val research in the United States on 1. [Ed. note: Castro is here alluding to his exchange of topics related to the history of the Cold Some Details and Specifics of the correspondence with Khrushchev of 26-31 October Crisis Situation. 1962 (esp. Castro’s letters of October 26 and 31 and War. Recipients are based at the Insti- Khrushchev’s letter of October 30), first released by tute for European, Russian and Eur- In October [1962] the American planes be- the Cuban government and published in the Cuban asian Studies at George Washington gan low flights above the Soviet launching sites Communist Party newspaper Granma on 23 Novem- University in Washington, D.C. Ap- ber 1990, and published as an appendix to James G. for the nuclear intermediate range missiles and Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba On plicants should submit a CV, a state- the anti-aircraft launchers. At that time the anti- the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet ment of proposed research, a letter of aircraft missiles had the range of more than 1,000 Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993, 474-91.] nomination, and three letters of recom- meters. Paired ground-to-air launchers were used 2. [Ed. note: It is not clear what lengthy letter Castro mendation; writing samples (particu- for protection of those anti-aircraft launchers, but is referring to here, or whether it has been made they could not provide effective protection. We available to researchers: a lengthy letter reviewing the larly in English) are welcomed, though gave an order to add hundreds of additional anti- crisis and its impact on Soviet-Cuban relations, dated not required. Applicants should have a 31 January 1963, from Khrushchev to Castro was working ability in English. Preference aircraft launchers to protect those launchers. Ad- ditional launchers were in the Cuban hands. That released at the 1992 Havana conference.] will be given to scholars who have not 3. Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan arrived in way we wanted to protect the Soviet nuclear and Havana on 2 November 1962. The first meeting with previously had an opportunity to do anti-aircraft missiles that were deployed in Cuba. the Cuban leader was on November 3. By the account research in the United States. Low overflights by the American planes repre- here, Mikoyan notified the Cubans on about November sented a real threat of an unexpected attack on 5 or 6 that the IL-28s would be removed. Declassified Send applications to: those objects. At my meeting with the Com- contemporary documents, however, including mander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in Cuba Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and Castro- Mikoyan conversation minutes, suggest that Mikoyan Jim Hershberg [Gen. I. A. Pliyev] I raised the question of the informed Castro about Moscow’s acquiescence to Director serious danger that the American overflights rep- Kennedy’s demand to remove the IL-28s only on Cold War International History resented. That meeting occurred on the 25th or November 12. the 26th. I told him that the Cuban side could not Project (CWIHP) 4. It is not clear to what Castro is referring. Central allow the American planes to fly at such low American bases were used for training Cuban exiles in Woodrow Wilson International altitudes over the Cuban territory any more. I 1960 and 1961, and for launching the Bay of Pigs Center for Scholars even sent a letter [dated October 26] to Khrushchev invasion. There is evidence that plans also were made 1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W. about that. In that letter I told the Soviet leader for creating a Nicaraguan and Costa Rican base, but there is not clear evidence on whether they were used. Washington, D.C. 20560 about my concern with the situation that had See Fabian Escalante Font, Cuba: la guerra secreta de FAX: (202) 357-4439 developed. I said that we should not allow the la CIA (Havana: Editorial Capitán San Luis, 1993), Americans to deliver a first strike at the Soviet 180; Warren Hinckle and William Turner, Deadly objects in the Cuban territory, we should not Secrets (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), allow the repetition of the events that led to the 165-166. World War II. At that time the crisis situation 5. In fact, U.S. estimates were never more than half of already existed. that number. See Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: On the day when the American planes ap- The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1991), 308. Also see “‘Soviet peared again, we gave orders to all Cuban anti- Military Buildup in Cuba,’ 21 October, 1962,” in Mary aircraft batteries to fire. The planes were driven S. McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Mis- off by the defensive fire. However, not a single sile Crisis, 1962 (Washington: Central Intelligence plane had been shot down. Later on the same day Agency, 1992; HRP 92-9), 258. 88 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

[October 27] a spying plane, U-2, appeared in the The American leaders, Kennedy in particu- happen if the Americans demanded a withdrawal air above the island. We don’t know any details, lar, reacted to the Soviet statements very nega- of the planes and the Soviet troops. He told me but it happened so that the plane was shot down tively. They thought they were deceived. then: “To hell with Americans!” by a Soviet anti-aircraft missile over the eastern We, however, never denied the presence of However, in 24 hours the Soviet planes and part of the country. the Soviet missiles in Cuba. In all their public the majority of the troops were withdrawn from I don’t know in what manner they reported statements Cuban representatives stated that the Cuba. We asked why that had been done. The that to Khrushchev and to the General Staff of the question of presence of weapons in Cuba was a troops had been withdrawn without any compen- Soviet armed forces, however, I doubt that the sovereign business of the Cuban people, that we sation from the American side! If the Soviet order to shoot down the plane was given by the had the right to use any kind of weapons for the Union was willing to give us assistance in our Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in Cuba defense of the revolution. We believed that those defense, why did they agree to withdraw the [Pliyev]; that decision was most probably made statements of the Soviet leaders did harm to the troops, we were asking. At that time there were by the commander of the anti-aircraft missiles, or prestige of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the six regiments with 42,000 military personnel in even by a commander of one of the batteries. general public, since at the same time you al- Cuba. Khrushchev had withdrawn the troops Khrushchev, however, accused us of shooting lowed U-2 flights over the Cuban territory that from Cuba even though it was not required by the down that plane in his letter. took pictures of the missiles stationed there. Soviet-American agreement. We disagreed with To be sincere, it was possible that we were At that time the question of the withdrawal such a decision. In the end, as a concession to us to blame since we opened fire at the American of the Soviet missiles had not been raised yet. the decision was made to keep one brigade in planes first, because we were so decisively against However, the aggravation of the situation forced Cuba. The Americans knew about that brigade the American overflights. But the biggest mis- Khrushchev to make that decision. We, on our from the very beginning, but they did not discuss take probably was that you, having installed part, thought that Khrushchev had rushed, having it. those missiles, still allowed the Americans to fly made that decision without any consultation with Many years later, in 1979, before the Non- over the launching sites. Those overflights were us. We believe that the inclusion of the Cuban aligned Conference [in Havana in September nothing else but preparation for a sudden Ameri- side in the negotiations would have made it pos- 1979] American Senator [Frank] Church an- can invasion of Cuba. I cannot blame the Soviet sible to get bigger concessions from the Ameri- nounced that a Soviet brigade was deployed in comrade who shot the U-2 for what he did be- cans, possibly including the issue of the Ameri- Cuba. Then our Soviet comrades suggested that cause I understand his psychological condition can base in Guantanamo. Such rush resulted in we rename it into a training center. We were very well. He saw that the Cubans opened fire at the fact that we found out about the Soviet- against it. However, before we had a chance to the American planes, and he decided to fire a American agreement from the radio. Moreover, send our response, a [Soviet] statement had been missile at the U-2. I heard that many years later the first statement said that American missiles made that denied the American Senator’s claim he was decorated for that act. would be withdrawn only from Turkey; in the and said that there was a Soviet military training It is interesting that the former Soviet Am- second the mentioning of Turkey was dropped. center in Cuba. bassador in Cuba, [Aleksandr] Alekseev, wrote When I visited the Soviet Union in 1963, At the time of the crisis President Kennedy in his memoirs that I was trying to avoid the Khrushchev read several letters to me. The was under a great pressure, but he defended the collision. For the sake of historical objectivity I American letters were signed by Thompson, but official Soviet position. However, when he was must say that that was not so. In my letter to the real author was Robert Kennedy. In shown the photos of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev after we had deployed the anti-air- Khrushchev’s response he spoke about the mis- he had to agree that the Soviets lied to him. craft batteries and mobilized our people to repel siles in Turkey and Italy. There were certain On the question of nuclear warheads in the aggression I expressed my hope that we threats in Kennedy’s letter. In particular, he Cuba I can tell you that one day during the crisis would be able to preserve peace. I wanted to wrote that if the Russians did not accept their I was invited to a meeting at the quarters of the show Khrushchev that I was not in an aggressive proposals, something would have happened. In Soviet Commander-in-Chief in Cuba at which all mood. At the same time I wanted to inform him response to that Khrushchev stated that some- the commanders of different units reported on about my concern with the possibility of an Ameri- thing would have happened indeed if the Ameri- their readiness. Among them was the com- can first strike, not even excluding a possibility of cans undertook any actions against Cuba in disre- mander of the missile forces, who reported that a nuclear strike against Cuba. gard of the agreement, and that that something the missiles had been in full combat readiness. At the same time I suggested to the Soviet would have been incredible in its scale. That Soon after the Reagan administration came Commander-in-Chief in Cuba [Pliyev] to dis- meant that if the Americans had dared to violate to power an American emissary, Vernon Walters, perse the nuclear warheads, so that they would the agreement, a war would have begun. came to Cuba. We talked extensively about all not have been completely destroyed in case of an Probably Khrushchev did not anticipate that aspects of our relations, and in particular, he American attack. And he agreed with me. the interpreter who read the originals would have raised the question of the October crisis. Trying One more question concerned the public mentioned Italy, but the original letter mentioned to show how informed he was, he said that, statements made by the Soviet leadership and the the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey and Italy. according to his sources, nuclear warheads had coverage of the events in the organs of mass Later I asked the Soviet side to give explanations not yet reached Cuba by the time of the crisis. I media. I sent two emissaries to Moscow [on 27 of that issue, but they told me that the agreement don’t know why he said that, but according to the August-2 September 1962—ed.]—I think they mentioned only Turkey. Soviet military, the nuclear missiles were ready were Che Gevara and [Emilio] Aragones—who We couldn’t help being disappointed by the for a fight. had to propose that Khrushchev make public the fact that even though the Soviet part of the agree- I don’t know what Khrushchev was striving military agreement between the USSR and Cuba. ment talked only about the missiles in Cuba and for, but it seems to me that his assurances about Publicly the Soviet leaders claimed that there did not mention other types of weapons, particu- the defense of Cuba being his main goal notwith- were no offensive weapons in Cuba. I insisted larly IL-28 planes, subsequently they had been standing, Khrushchev was setting strategic goals that we should not allow the Americans to specu- withdrawn on the American demand. When for himself. I asked Soviet comrades about that late with the public opinion, that we should make Mikoyan came to Cuba, he confirmed to us that many times, but nobody could give me an answer. the agreement public. However, Khrushchev the agreement only provided for the withdrawal Personally, I believe that along with his love for declined. of the Soviet missiles. I asked him what would Cuba Khrushchev wanted to fix the strategic COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 89 parity in the cheapest way. When the Soviet amine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and was in progress between Cuba and the comrades proposed to us to deploy the nuclear Wang, 1989; Noonday Press of Farrar Straus and Giroux, People’s Republic of China.10 The continu- 1990). missiles in Cuba I did not like the idea, but not ing pressure of the United States for more because of the military risk; because from the 2. On the 1989 Moscow conference, see Blight and Welch, On the Brink (1990 ed.). Soviet concessions indeed corroborated this political point of view we would have been seen 3. On the 1992 Havana conference, see James G. impression. as a Soviet military base in Latin America. We Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on Mikoyan was Khrushchev’s closest were ready to accept the risk of an American the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet military invasion of Cuba in order to avoid the Collapse (New York: Pantheon, 1993). friend and most loyal ally. As had his political harm to the prestige of the Cuban revo- predecessor—Stalin dispatched Mikoyan on lution. But at the same time we understood that Georgy K. Shakhnazarov was formerly a senior official a delicate mission to Mao in January 1949— the Soviet Union needed that measure to ensure in the International Department of the Central Commit- Khrushchev frequently used Mikoyan as a their own security. We knew that we had suf- tee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and an adviser to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. troubleshooter and personal diplomatic em- fered a big political damage at the very time issary: to Hungary (October 1956), to West when we were dreaming about a revolution in all Germany (March 1958), to the United States Latin America, but we were ready to make sac- MIKOYAN’S TALKS (January 1959), and to talk to the anti- rifices for the Soviet Union. continued from page 59 I cannot take the credit for the resolution of Khrushchev demonstrators during the The documents lend credence to the Novocherkassk riots in south Russia (June the crisis. More likely, I believe, the major role reminiscences of the historic participants— belongs to Khrushchev who caused that crisis by 1962). Important from the Cuban viewpoint, Nikita Khrushchev, Fidel Castro, former his stubbornness, and then resolved it. I did not Mikoyan had been the last in the Soviet know what was the real correlation of forces at Soviet Ambassador in Cuba Aleksandr leadership who belonged to the “old guard” 5 that time, how many missiles did Khrushchev Alekseev. They reveal that the fraternity of the Bolshevik revolutionaries. He had have. Khrushchev told me that after the missiles between Cuba and the USSR was badly known all great revolutionaries of the cen- would have been deployed in Cuba, Kennedy fractured. While the Kremlin leadership, tury, from Lenin to Mao Zedong. And he would have to swallow it, and that later the faced with a severe danger, preferred was the first to embrace the Cuban revolu- Soviet leader was going to introduce the Fleet in geostrategic pragmatism to ideological com- the Baltic Sea (probably a mistake in the notes— tion after his trip to Cuba in February 1960, mitments, the Cuban revolutionaries sprung at a time when the Kremlin still felt ambigu- should say “introduce the Baltic Sea Fleet”). I up in fierce defense of their national sover- thought that Khrushchev’s actions were too risky. ous about the Cuban revolution and its young, eignty and revolutionary “legitimacy.” From I believe that it was possible to achieve the same non-Marxist leaders. Castro, for all his goals without deploying the missiles in Cuba. To the Soviet perspective, that of a superpower, anger, let Mikoyan know on November 3 defend Cuba it would have been sufficient to the most important fact was that Castro had, that he remembered his role. Khrushchev send six regiments of Soviet troops there, be- in his letter to Khrushchev of October 26, sometimes said, Castro joked, that “there is cause the Americans would have never dared to advocated a preemptive nuclear strike against a Cuban in the CC CPSU. And that this open military activities against the Soviet troops. 6 the United States if it invaded Cuba. This Cuban is Mikoyan.” Now I understand that the actions under- notion, considered dangerous and irrespon- taken by Khrushchev were risky, if not to say What both sides felt and understood sible in Moscow, became an excuse com- during the talks was no less important than irresponsible. Khrushchev should have carried pletely to exclude Cuba from the U.S.-So- out a policy like the one Gorbachev is carrying their “formal” written content. For the third viet secret talks to resolve the crisis. Some out now. However, we understand that at that time, since the Stalin-Tito split (1948) and time the Soviet Union did not reach the parity of the Soviet leaders, gathered at the height the Sino-Soviet quarrel (since October 1959), which it has now. I am not criticizing Khrushchev of the crisis on 27 October 1962 at Novo- there was an open conflict of perspectives for pursuing strategic goals, but the choice of the Ogarevo governmental dacha near Moscow, and interests between the USSR and another timing and the means for achieving the goals was may even have feared that the Cubans, like communist regime. And both sides were not good. 7 Ulbricht, could push them all over the brink. fully aware of this. Fidel Castro said (as When I [Shakhnazarov] said that Ameri- John J. McCloy, a representative of the cans had to and did abide by the agreement quoted to Mikoyan by Ernesto “Che” Kennedy Administration, told Mikoyan, in Guevara): “The United States wanted to reached during the Caribbean crisis throughout New York on November 1, that “he was the whole period after the crisis, Castro responded: destroy us physically, but the Soviet Union reassured by the presence of Russian offic- yes, indeed, it was so. That is why I don’t think has destroyed us de jure [iuridicheskii; ju- I have a right to criticize Khrushchev. He had his ers [in Cuba during the crisis]. The Cubans ridically, legally] with Khrushchev’s let- own considerations. And it really doesn’t make could open fire without thinking ... But the ter”11 it is not clear whether this comment 8 much sense to replay the history guessing what Russians would think first.” Khrushchev referred to Khrushchev’s letter of October could have happened if... himself was forced to explain to Kennedy 27, with its offer to swap Soviet missiles in Fidel Castro supported the idea of publish- that the Cuban leaders were “young, expan- Cuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey, or his ing memoirs of the participants of those events sive people—in a word, Spaniards.”9 and added that he would be willing to take part in letter to Kennedy of October 28, agreeing Mikoyan’s trip was triggered by without consulting Castro beforehand to the discussions of the subject himself. “I know Alekseev’s cables from Havana. The Soviet something about the Cuban crisis,” he said with withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba ambassador alerted the Soviet leadership a smile. under UN inspection. But in any case, both that Moscow’s actions had endangered So- actions enraged and offended Castro, who 1. The organization and results of the 1987 Cambridge viet-Cuban friendship. Khrushchev was reminded Mikoyan, on November 4, that conference are described in James G. Blight and David particularly upset to learn that a rapprochment A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reex- after the Spanish-American war (1898), when 90 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the United States “liberated” Cuba from Soviet Union’s help. “Come what may,” he heroes, before a revolutionary situation in colonial rule, Washington also did not invite concluded. “We have the right to defend our Latin America became ripe, and the camp of Cubans to a peace conference and Congress dignity.” Mikoyan could only plead plain- socialism has not yet grown to full capabili- passed the Platt Amendment (1901), which tively that he didn’t “understand such a ties to come to your rescue.” [November 5] denied Cuba an independent foreign policy.12 sharp reaction,” and failed to convince Castro In spite of the U.S. geostrategic prepon- On November 3, in a one-to-one meet- or his colleagues to soften their adamant derance, Mikoyan said that Kennedy “took a ing with Fidel (Alekseev interpreted), rejection of inspection then or in a second step in our direction,” because his pledge of Mikoyan absorbed Castro’s first angry as- meeting that evening which Castro skipped, non-intervention against Cuba “is a conces- sault and lived up to his thankless mission. leaving others in the leadership, notably sion on their part.”17 Until this episode, the When he left Moscow, Ashkhen Tumanian, Ché, to denounce bitterly the Soviet stand. Kennedy Administration had argued that his wife of forty years, was dying in the Still another tense moment in the talks Cuba for the United States was analagous to Kremlin hospital. He learned about her came on November 12 after Khrushchev, Hungary for the USSR—part of its security death during the first, tensest conversation yielding to Kennedy’s pressure, made a new zone.18 Mikoyan’s words make one think with Castro.13 concession to the United States—agreeing that this comparison had also been important Only on the second day of talks, No- to withdraw from Cuba Soviet-made IL-28 in Kremlin thinking: while the USSR crushed vember 4, did Mikoyan fully present the medium-range bombers in exchange for the the Hungarian revolt in 1956, defending its Soviet side’s arguments. He defended lifting of the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba. zone, the United States had not yet managed Khrushchev’s claim that the outcome of the Unlike the missiles, the bombers had been to do the same to the Cuban revolution. Cuban Missile Crisis was not a surrender to transferred into Cuban ownership, and Mikoyan’s next argument revealed Washington’s demands, but a Soviet-Cuban Khrushchev took pains to “clear” this new Moscow’s fervent desire to preserve its cre- “victory,” because a military attack against deal with Castro before expessing his “great dentials as the center of the world revolu- Cuba was prevented without slipping into a satisfaction” to Kennedy.14 For Mikoyan, tionary movement, particularly in the face of nuclear war. To win over the furious Castro, this second mission was no less difficult the challenge from Beijing. Mikoyan pressed Moscow’s messenger was ready to stay in than the previous one. Castro interrupted the the analogy between Khrushchev’s settle- Cuba for an indefinite time. “If my argu- Soviet interlocutor with questions full of ment of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Lenin’s ments would seem insufficiently convinc- scorn and skepticism or just stopped listen- defense of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918), ing for you,” he said, “tell me about it, I will ing altogether. At one point, after hearing “an infamous peace” between revolutionary think how to get my point across to you, I Mikoyan’s lengthy defense of the IL-28 Russia and Kaiser Germany aimed at saving will try to bring new arguments.” Mikoyan’s concession, he agitatedly cut off his visitor’s the Bolshevik regime at all costs. In fact, the lengthy arguments and explanations on No- speech with the words: “Why are these argu- dialogue between Mikoyan and the Cuban vember 4 and the afternoon of November 5 ments being cited? You should say outright leaders revealed two starkly different per- finally elicited an expression of gratitude what the Soviet government wants.”15 spectives: between the Kremlin’s unwill- from Castro and an emotional, if grudging, The sequence of Mikoyan’s arguments ingness to challenge frontally American he- declaration of “unshakeable” respect for and allows us to look into mentality of the Krem- gemony in the Western hemisphere, and “complete trust” in the Soviet Union. lin leaders. Beneath the veneer of ideologi- Havana’s determination to blow this hege- But the Cuban leader and his comrades cal phraseology lay the hard core pragma- mony to pieces through a revolutionary of- were soon infuriated anew when, only min- tism of superpower statesmen who had tested fensive. utes later, Mikoyan tried to convince them to the waters of globalism and reached its lim- Castro and particularly Ché Guevara accept a United Nations inspection of the its. Argument number one was that the linked the future of the Cuban revolution to dismantling of the strategic missiles based in survival of the Cuban regime in an area the growth of the international revolutionary Cuba—or at least their loading onto Soviet where the correlation of forces was so ad- movement in Latin America. In a passionate ships in Cuban ports—arguing that such a verse constituted “a great success of Marx- outburst on November 5, with Fidel Castro process would strengthen the sympathetic ist-Leninist theory.”16 Mikoyan stopped absent, Ché told Mikoyan that Latin Ameri- position of UN Secretary-General U Thant short of telling the Cubans that understand- can communists and revolutionaries were and remove any pretext to continue the ing between Kennedy and Khrushchev was “baffled by the actions of the Soviet Union.” American blockade. Castro, acutely aware the sine qua non for the survival of the The developments especially frustrated Ché, that Khrushchev had accepted the principle Cuban revolution. But he admitted that the he explained, because, “We are deeply con- of a UN inspection without informing him, American proximity to Cuba and the U.S. vinced in the possibility of seizing power in bought none of it. “A unilateral inspection,” Navy’s huge preponderance otherwise would a number of Latin American countries, and he told Mikoyan, “would affect monstrously have ensured Cuba’s subservient place within practice shows that it is possible not only to the moral spirit of our people.” Saying he Washington’s sphere of influence. “Com- seize, but to maintain power in a number of spoke for the whole Cuban people, Castro munications between us and Cuba are over- countries, given specific [Cuban] experi- firmly rejected any international inspection extended. We cannot use our Air Force and ence and the assistance of socialist coun- of Cuba—unless a comparable inspection Navy in case of [a U.S.] blockade of Cuba.” tries, first of all the Soviet Union.” But, he took place in the United States—and told [November 4] “If Cuba were located in lamented, the Soviet “bargaining” with the Mikoyan that if such a position endangered place of Greece, we would have shown United States and its “open retreat” before peace, Cuba could defend itself without the them.” [November 5] “You were born like American demands had led to de facto rec- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 91 ognition of all Latin America as a U.S. tion of Latin American revolutionary move- which made people in the Kremlin think sphere of influence, and discouraged na- ment could be stemmed by generous Soviet “that he spoke not all that he knew.” “Until tionalistic “petit bourgeoisie” from allying assistance. the end of [mid-term] Congressional elec- with radical forces against the omnipotent For historians of the Cuban Missile Cri- tions,” on November 6, asserted the Soviet Gringos from El Norte. “It seems to me,” sis, the most interesting parts of the docu- messenger, “Kennedy did not want to speak concluded Che, “... that one should expect a ments are where Mikoyan gave the Cubans about the Soviet missiles in Cuba. He did not decline of the revolutionary movement in his version of the recent dramatic events. want to aggravate [U.S.-Soviet relations]. Latin America.” He also stressed that in the Though this version was obviously tailored But two senators from the Republican Soviet handling of the missile crisis had to Cuban sentiments and to Mikoyan’s spe- party”—clearly alluding to Kenneth Keating already produced “a crack” in the “unity of cific tasks, there is considerable overlap, of New York and Everett Dirksen of Illi- the socialist camp.” Both he and Mikoyan sometimes almost verbatim, between nois—“learned about the fact of deployment knew that this meant factional splits in many Mikoyan’s story and the story later told by of strategic missiles in Cuba, therefore radical groupings in Latin America and a Khrushchev in his memoirs.22 So all the Kennedy hastened to take initiative in his shift of some of them to the PRC’s wing. more intriguing and credible are details that hands...We did not have information with In response, Mikoyan reminded the are missing in the Khrushchev’s version. respect to how he was going to act.” Cubans of Nikolai Bukharin, a young Bol- First, the documents hint at what possible A book on the hidden intelligence as- shevik (“although he was repressed, I think countermeasures the Kremlin contemplated pects of the Cuban Missile Crisis is being co- he was a good person”) who in 1918 also against the U.S. attack against Cuba. The authored now by American and Russian preferred to promote world revolution even conclusions must have been bleak, as he historians, and I hope they will comment on at a risk of sacrificing Soviet power in explained to Castro on November 4. “We Mikoyan’s assertions.23 It has become Russia. “We practically had no armed forces, could not retaliate by a blockade of an Ameri- known that CIA Director John McCone had but those comrades [like Bukharin] wanted can base, for instance, in Turkey, since we do concluded by the late summer of 1962 that to die heroically, reject Soviet power.” not have another outlet into the Mediterra- Soviets had decided to transport nuclear- “Study Lenin,” he lectured the Cubans. “One nean. We could not undertake similar steps capable missiles to Cuba, though most CIA cannot live in shame, but one should not in Norway, nor in England, nor in Japan. We analysts discounted the likelihood of this allow the enemy to destroy oneself. There is do not have sufficient capabilities for a possibility.24 Yet, the Kremlin almost cer- an outcome in the art of diplomacy.” Krem- counter-blockade.” tainly erred in conflating the suspicions of lin apparatchiks would repeat this same Mikoyan and Khrushchev (in his letters some U.S. intelligence officials with litany of prudence time and again, when to Castro before and after the visit) sang the Kennedy’s awareness of the missiles. In this they had to deal with radical regimes in the same tune when they explained to the Cu- case, it seems, Khrushchev’s belief that the Third World later in the 1960s and 1970s. bans the reasons for Soviet secrecy and their U.S. president knew about the Soviet instal- Mikoyan reminded the Cubans that misplaced hopes to camouflage the missiles. lation of nuclear missiles in Cuba but for since 1961, Soviet-Cuban economic rela- The most eyebrow-raising aspect of domestic tactical reasons preferred to wait tions were trade in name only: the Cubans Mikoyan’s explanation deals with the ques- until after the elections to deal with them were getting everything, including weap- tion of what the Kremlin believed Kennedy stands out as one of the most remarkable ons, free of charge. “We do not pursue any knew and was about to do before the breakout example of wishful thinking in the entire commercial or national interests in Cuba,” of the crisis. Of course, the standard version history of the Cold War. he told Castro. “We are guided exclusively of events in most accounts has it that Kennedy In another interesting sidelight, the tran- by the interests of internationalism.”19 He and his advisers did not obtain hard evidence scripts of the Mikoyan-Cuban talks indicate pointed out to Castro that the Kremlin, aware of the missile deployment until a U.S. U-2 that the issue of Berlin was not the main of the American “plan to strangle Cuba reconnaissance plane photographed sites in cause for the Soviet gamble in Cuba, but a economically,” had “without any requests Cuba under construction on 14 October sideshow. Berlin was also the most serious from your side” decided “to supply to you 1962—but Mikoyan told a different story. bargaining chip the Soviets had, but they armaments, and in part military equipment U.S. intelligence, said Mikoyan, “worked hesitated to use it during the brinkmanship for free.” The Soviets had also covered the badly,” but “in mid-September [1962] the and bargaining in late October. Mikoyan Cuban balance of payment ($100 million) Americans seemed to receive information mentioned only in passing to the Cubans on “in order to foil the Kennedy plan, designed about the transfer of Soviet troops and strate- November 4 that “countermeasures were to detonate Cuba from within.”20 If the gic missiles to Cuba.” In Mikoyan’s version, possible in Berlin,” adding that the Soviets American blockade of Cuba continued, presented on November 4, the initial source used the Berlin asset in a disinformation Mikoyan warned, “then the Soviet Union of this scoop was not the U-2 flights but West campaign in September-October, to distract would not have enough strength to render German intelligence [Bundes- American attention from Cuba. In fact, one assistance, and the Cuban government would nachrichtendienst]. Only then, he said, “the passage from that conversation suggests that fall.”21 American government sent planes to the air this disinformation backfired, making the Mikoyan and Khrushchev evidently ex- space of Cuba to carry out the aerial-photo- Kremlin believe that the Kennedy adminis- pected that these pragmatic arguments would reconnaissance and establish the sites of tration was interested to postpone not only carry the day with the Cuban leadership, and missile deployment.” Kennedy, said the discussion on Berlin, but also secret talks that the danger of a pro-Beijing reorienta- Mikoyan, spoke nothing about Soviet troops on the Soviet strategic buildup in Cuba, until 92 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN after the Congressional elections. As program, including food, equipment, con- 12. The U.S. Congress passed the Platt Amendment in Mikoyan related to the Cubans, “Through sumer goods, and weapons. Castro, when March 1901, as an attachment to the Army Appropria- tions Bill. It authorized the U.S. President to occupy confidential channels Kennedy addressed a his dreams of Latin American revolutions Cuba until a Cuban constitution would provide guaran- request to N.S. Khrushchev that he would were shattered, sought to fulfill his “interna- tees that no “foreign power” would be ever permitted to not aggravate the situation until after the tionalist duty” in other lands, and found gain a foothold on Cuban soil. Castro referred to this Congressional elections and would not set pretexts to restore the revolutionary dignity particular clause of the Platt Amendment as a constraint on Cuban sovereignty. He referred to it at the confer- out [immediately] then to solve the Berlin of Cuba, tarnished during the Cuban Missile ence in Havana in January 1992: “We were told: either issue. We responded that we were ready to Crisis, in Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1977- you accept the Platt Amendment, or there is no indepen- wait until the end of the elections, but right 78). Even then the Brezhnev leadership, dence. No country in the world would accept that kind afterwards would proceed to the solution of who remembered Castro’s outbursts in 1962, of amendment in its constitution, because it gives the right to another country to intervene to establish peace...” the Berlin quesion. When the Americans was reluctant to make full use of the Soviet Cuba on the Brink, 331, 341. learned about the transportation of strategic leverage on the Cuban regime. 13. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev, 378-79. weapons into Cuba, they themselves began 14. The text of Khrushchev-Kennedy correspondence to get loud about Berlin. Both sides were 1 See Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete regarding this thorny issue on 6, 11, 12, and 13 Novem- ber 1962 is in Problems of Communism 42 (Spring talking about the Berlin crisis, but simulta- ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1992), 77-92. neously believed that the crux of their policy 1958-1961,” Cold War International History Project 15. Transcript of conversation between A.I. Mikoyan in the present moment was in Cuba.” Working Paper No. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow and Fidel Castro, 12 November 1962, translation in Did Mikoyan’s mission prevent a So- Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Re- viet-Cuban split? There is no categorical passim, quotation on 4. 2. For illustrations, see Weathersby’s article in the count the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition q, answer to this question. Castro had accepted current CWIHP Bulletin as well as her CWIHP Work- 1994), 191-99; see also ciphered telegram, A. Mikoyan Soviet assistance, but not Soviet arguments. ing Paper and article in CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), to CC CPSU, 12 November 1962, in ibid., 189-90. The Cuban leader and his comrades thought as well as her documentary essay, “The Soviet Role in 16. Castro-Mikoyan talks, 4 November 1962. 17. Mikoyan-Castro talks, November 4 and 5. primarily of the revolutionary “legitimacy” the Early Phase in the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence,” The Journal of American-East Asian Rela- 18. See, e.g., the Rusk-Gromyko meeting of 18 October of their regime in Latin America. After the tions 2:4 (Winter 1993), 425-58. 1962 published elsewhere in this issue. Cuban missile crisis, the “honeymoon” in 3. This factor has begun to impress even those scholars 19. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 12 November 1962. Soviet-Cuban relations ended and was trans- who had previously analyzed the origins of the Cuban 20. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 4 November 1962. 21. Castro-Mikoyan conversation, 12 November 1962. formed into a marriage of convenience. This Missile Crisis through the prism of the bipolar confron- tation and the dynamics of the balance of strategic 22. For Khrushchev’s recollections of the crisis, in had both immediate and long-term conse- forces, and who firmly believed that “the factor of the English, see Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., Khrushchev quences. For instance, Mikoyan’s trip had a Cuban revolution” was of no importance in Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), direct impact on Khrushchev’s ongoing cor- Khrushchev’s decision to deploy Soviet medium-range 488-505; Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, respondence with Kennedy. In his letter of missiles in Cuba. 4. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisi i and Co., 1974), 509-514; Khrushchev Remembers: The November 22, the Chairman admonished raketi. Vzgliad iznutri, vol. 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1994), Glastnost Tapes, 170-83. the U.S. president to put himself into Castro’s 388-90. 23. Timothy Naftali from the University of Hawaii and shoes, “to assess and understand correctly 5. “Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Khruscheva: Karibskii Alexander Fursenko from the Russian Academy of Sciences are on a contract of Crown publishers to write the situation, and if you like psychological Krizis,” Voprosii Istorii 7 (1993), 89-110; Castro and Alekseev comments quoted in James G Blight, Bruce J. this story. Fursenko has a first-time access to the mate- state, of the leaders of Cuba... and this striv- Allyn and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, rials from the Archive of the President of Russian ing [for independence] must be respected.”25 the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Federation and the archives of the KGB [not Federal In all probability, Khrushchev addressed Pantheon, 1993), 88-99. Counterintelligence Service or FSK] that are being declassified specifically for this project. these words not so much to Kennedy (who 6. See Castro to Khrushchev, 26 October 1962, in Granma (Havana), 23 November 1990, English trans- 24. McCone’s predictions are documented in Mary S. had not the slightest desire to heed them), but lation reprinted in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, Cuba on McAuliffe, ed., CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile to Castro, who on November 3 received the Brink, 481-82. Crisis (Washington, D.C.: CIA History Staff, 1992), copies of all previous Khrushchev-Kennedy 7. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisi i esp. 51-52, 59-60, 67-68, 77-79, reproducing McCone cables of 7, 10, 13, and 16 September 1962; see also correspondence on the settlement of the cri- raketi, vol. 2, 355-357, 360-362, 364; Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. and ed., Khrushchev comments of Ray Cline, Cuba on the Brink, 125-26. sis. From then on the Soviet leadership, in Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little. Brown, 25. Problems of Communism 42 (Spring 1992), 108 order to placate their “friends,” had to for- and Co., 1990), 170-183; “Memuari Nikiti give and overlook much in Castro’s interna- Sergeevicha...,” 108; Brezhnev, according to his aide, Vladislav M. Zubok is a research fellow at the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. His book Inside tional behavior, and also had to carry the Andrei M. Alexandrov-Agentov, was “trembling” at the thought of a nuclear exchange, A.M. Alexandrov- the Kremlin’s Cold War, co-authored with Constantine burden of this behavior. In immediate impli- Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva [From Kollontai Pleshakov, will be published by Harvard University cation, because the Cubans rejected inspec- to Gorbachev] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodniie otnosheniia, Press. tions in any form on their territory, Soviet 1994), 174. military and naval personnel had to comply 8. Quoted by Mikoyan in his meeting with Cuban leaders, 5 November 1962. with humiliating procedures of aerial in- 9. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 22 November 1962, pub- spection imposed on them by the Ameri- lished in Problems of Communism 42 (Spring 1992), cans, something for which they could not 108. forgive Khrushchev even decades later. For 10. See Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev, 378. 11. Castro was quoted to this effect by Ernesto “Ché” the next three decades, the Soviet economy Guevara during Mikoyan’s meeting with Cuban lead- was burdened with a multi-billion Cuban aid ers on 5 November 1962. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 93

Mikoyan’s Mission to Havana: Cuban-Soviet Negotiations, November 1962

[Ed. note: To preserve the flavor of the Russian that in those days when a serious danger arose, defense...[Ellipsis in original.] documents, the original grammar and punctua- our whole people sensed a great responsibility for And suddenly—concessions...[Ellipsis in tion have been retained in some cases where they the fate of the motherland. Every nerve of the original.] conflict with normal English practice.] people was strained. There was a feeling that the Concessions on the part of the Soviet Union people were united in their resolve to defend produced a sense of oppressiveness. Psychologi- Cuba. Every Cuban was ready to repel the cally our people were not prepared for that. A Document I: aggressors with arms in hand, and ready to devote feeling of deep disappointment, bitterness and “And suddenly — concessions....” — their lives to the defense of their country. The pain has appeared, as if we were deprived of not The First Castro-Mikoyan Conversation, whole country was united by a deep hatred of only the missiles, but of the very symbol of 3 November 1962 USA imperialism. In those days we did not even solidarity. Reports of missile launchers being arrest anyone, because the unity of the people was dismantled and returned to the USSR at first so staggering. That unity was the result of consid- seemed to our people to be an insolent lie. You NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN erable ideological work carried out by us in order know, the Cuban people were not aware of the A.I. MIKOYAN and FIDEL CASTRO to explain the importance of Soviet aid to Cuba, agreement, were not aware that the missiles still to explain the purity of the principles in the policy belonged to the Soviet side. The Cuban people This morning a two-hour conversation took of the USSR. did not conceive of the juridical status of these place between comrade A.I. Mikoyan and Fidel We spoke with the people about the high weapons. They had become accustomed to the Castro, where I [Soviet Ambassador to Cuba patriotic objectives we were pursuing in obtain- fact that the Soviet Union gave us weapons and Aleksandr Alekseev] was also present. ing arms to defend the country from aggression. that they became our property. We said that the strategic weapons were a guaran- And suddenly came the report of the Ameri- 3 November 1962 tee of firmness for our defense. We did not can [news] agency UPI that “the Soviet premier ... classify the arms as defensive and offensive, has given orders to Soviet personnel to dismantle Unfortunately, A.I. Mikoyan said, some dif- insofar as everything depends on the objectives missile launchers and return them to the USSR.” ferences of opinion have arisen between the lead- for which they are used... [Ellipsis in original.] Our people could not believe that report. It ership of the Republic of Cuba and our leader- Speaking of psychological questions, we caused deep confusion. People didn’t understand ship. Ambassador Alekseev has informed us would like to underline that the Cuban people did the way that the issue was structured—the possi- about these differences, and about the speech by understand us. They understood that we had bility of removing missile armaments from Cuba Fidel Castro on 1 November 1962, in which the received Soviet weapons, that Cuban defense if the USA liquidated its bases in Turkey. latter explained to the Cuban people the position capacities had increased immeasurably. Thus, I was saying, Fidel Castro continued, that in of the revolutionary government. when Kennedy attempted to frighten us, the Cu- the post-revolutionary years we have carried out The CC CPSU, Mikoyan emphasized, had ban people reacted very resolutely, very patrioti- much ideological work to prepare people for sent me to Cuba to discuss in the most frank way cally. It is hard to imagine the enthusiasm, the understanding socialist ideas, marxist ideas. These all the unclear questions with the Cuban com- belief in victory with which the Cubans voluntar- ideas today are deeply rooted. Our people admire rades. Judging by the welcome at the airport, the ily enlisted themselves into the army. The people the policies of the Soviet government, learn from Cuban leaders consider this a useful meeting. I sensed enormous forces inside themselves. Aware the Soviet people to whom they are deeply thank- came here to speak to you sincerely and openly. of the real solidarity of the Soviet government ful for invaluable help and support. But at that And now it seems to me that it would be useful if and people, Cubans psychologically felt them- difficult moment our people felt as if they had lost you, comrade Fidel Castro, tell me frankly what selves to be strong. The Soviet Union’s solidarity their way. Reports on 28 October that N.S. the questions are that worry you. Only by speak- found its material embodiment, became the ban- Khrushchev had given orders to dismantle mis- ing frankly is it possible to assure complete con- ner around which the forces and courage of our sile launchers, that such instructions had been fidence and mutual understanding. As we agreed people closely united. given to Soviet officers and there was not a word before, after this conversation a meeting will be In observing Soviet strategic arms on their in the message about the consent of the Cuban organized with the secretaries of the National territory, the people of Cuba sensed an enormous government, that report shocked people. CDR [Committees for the Defense of the Revo- responsibility to the countries of the socialist Cubans were consumed by a sense of disap- lution] leadership in order to discuss all the issues camp. They were conscious that these mighty pointment, confusion and bitterness. In walking in detail. weapons had to be preserved in the interests of the along the street, driving to armed units, I ob- In response Fidel Castro said that the Cuban whole socialist camp. Therefore, regardless of served that people did not understand that deci- leadership was glad to see A.I. Mikoyan in Cuba the fact that USA planes were continuously vio- sion. once again, and to speak with him about ques- lating our air space, we decided to weaken the Why was that decision made unilaterally, tions that are important for both sides. We are anti-aircraft defense of Havana, but at the same why are the missiles being taken away from us? aware, joked Fidel Castro, that N.S. Khrushchev time strengthen the defense of the missile loca- And will all the weapons be taken back? — these once said: “there is a Cuban in the CC CPSU and tions. Our people proudly sensed their role as a were the questions disturbing all the people. this Cuban is A.I. Mikoyan.” We can speak to defender of the socialist countries’ interests. Anti- In some 48 hours that feeling of bitterness you, Fidel Castro continued, very frankly. We aircraft gunners and the soldiers protecting the and pain spread among all the people. Events profoundly trust the Soviet Union. missile locations were full of enthusiasm, and were rapidly following one another. The offer to Regarding the questions that caused some ready to defend these at the price of their own withdraw weapons from Cuba under the condi- differences, as we explained it to our people, I lives. tion of liquidating bases in Turkey was advanced [Castro] would like to say the following. The tension of the situation was growing, on 27 October. On 28 October there came the These questions are motivated, first of all, and the psychological tension was growing also. order to dismantle the missiles and the consent to by psychological factors. I would like to stress The whole of Cuba was ready for an inspection. 94 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

We were very worried by the fact that the tion that the threat of aggression was so critical, the leadership held a meeting. For the question of moral spirit of our people had declined sharply. that there was no time for consultations. Cuba worries us a lot. We felt it necessary to re- That affected their fighting spirit too. At the ... establish mutual trust because trust is the basis of same time the insolent flights of American planes Then for half an hour A.I. Mikoyan dis- everything, the basis of really fraternal relations. into Cuban airspace became more frequent, and cussed the issues about which Fidel Castro had We understood that no correspondence can suf- we were asked not to open fire on them. All of talked, but these explanations were interrupted by fice to explain completely the misunderstanding this generated a strong demoralizing influence. an incoming report about the death of Mikoyan’s of those days. Therefore the CC CPSU decided The feeling of disappointment, pain and bitter- wife. The transcript of this part of the conversa- to send me to Cuba in order to explain to our ness that enveloped people could have been used tion will be transmitted with the notes of the next friends the Soviet position and to inform them on by counter-revolutionaries to instigate anti-so- conversation. other subjects that may be of interest to them. We viet elements. Enemies could have profitted know, - Mikoyan continued, - that if we explain because the legal rules about which we had been 3.XI.62 ALEKSEEV everything frankly then you, our brothers, will speaking with the people were being forgotten. understand us. Comrade Mikoyan made the The decision was made without consultation, [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, ob- observation that he, naturally, had no intention to without coordinating it with our government. tained and translated by NHK television, copy put pressure [on Cuba], that his task was to Nobody had the slightest wish to believe it, provided by Philip Brenner; translation by explain our position. Being acquainted with the everyone thought it was a lie. Vladimir Zaemsky.] Cuban comrades, - A.I. Mikoyan said, - I’m ... confident that they will agree with it. It is cer- Since then our people began to address very * * * * * tainly possible that even after our explanations sensitively the matter of sovereignty. Besides, there will remain some issues about which we after the current crisis the situation remained Document II: shall still have different points of view. Our task juridically constant, as the “status quo” did not “It was necessary to use the art of diplomacy” is to preserve mutual trust which is needed for change: — The Second Castro-Mikoyan Conversation, really friendly relations with Cuba, for the future 1. The blockade organized by the USA 4 November 1962 of Cuba and the USSR and the whole world administration is still in place. The USA contin- revolutionary movement. ues to violate the freedom of the sea. Yesterday comrade Fidel Castro explained 2. The Americans seek to determine what MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION very frankly and in detail that the Cuban people weapons we can possess. Verification is being had not understood everything regarding the most organized. The situation is developing in the A.I. MIKOYAN with Fidel CASTRO, [Cuban recent actions of the Soviet government. Com- same direction as it is or was in Morocco, Guinea, President] Oswaldo DORTICOS TORRADO, rade Fidel Castro also spoke on the issues which Ghana, Ceylon and Yemen. [Defense Minister] Raul CASTRO, Ernesto worry the Cuban leadership. He underlined the 3. The USA continues to violate Cuban GUEVARA, Emilio ARAGONES and Carlos role of the psychological factor which has special airspace and we must bear it. And moreover, the Rafael RODRIGUEZ significance in Cuba. Several particularities of consent for inspections has been given without the psychological mold of Cubans have formed asking us. 4 November 1962 as a result of the historical development of the All of this seemed to our people to be a step country. And, as comrade Fidel Castro was backward, a retreat. It turns out that we must A.I. MIKOYAN transmitted to the Cuban saying, it is very important to take this into accept inspections, accept the right of the USA to leaders cordial fraternal regards on behalf of the account. determine what kinds of weapons we can use. Presidium of the CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev. In New York, said Mikoyan, I learned the Our revolution rests firmly on the people. A He said that the Central Committee of the CPSU substance of the speech by comrade Fidel Castro drop in moral spirit can be dangerous for the feels admiration and respect toward Cuban lead- on 1 November. Certainly I could not perceive cause of revolution. ers, who from the very beginning of their struggle completely the speech insofar as the American The Soviet Union consolidated itself as a demonstrated courage and fearlessness, confi- press frequently distorts the substance of the state a long time ago and it can carry out a flexible dence in revolutionary victory in Cuba, readiness statements made by Cuban leaders. But even on policy, it can afford maneuvering. The Soviet to devote all their forces to the struggle. We are the basis of the American press interpretation I people readily understand their government, trust proud of the victory achieved by the Cuban revo- understood that it was a friendly speech pro- it wholeheartedly. lution against interventionists on Playa Giron nounced by comrade Fidel Castro underlining the Cuba is a young developing country. Our [Giron Beach, Bay of Pigs]. Cuban revolutionar- great significance of friendship between the So- people are very impulsive. The moral factor has ies demonstrated such a potent spirit of resistance viet Union and Cuba, mentioning the broad aid a special significance in our country. that it inspires admiration and proves that the rendered by the Soviet Union to Revolutionary We were afraid that these decisions could Cubans are always ready to fight until victory is Cuba. He also said that there were some differ- provoke a breach in the people’s unity, under- achieved. Cuban leaders have shown great cour- ences in views between us, but those differences mine the prestige of the revolution in the eyes of age, intrepidity, and firmness in dangerous days. had to be discussed on the level of parties and Latin American peoples, in the eyes of the whole The CC CPSU admires the readiness of the Cuban governments, not massive rallies. Those words world. people to stand up. We trust Cuban leaders as we of Fidel Castro, testifying sentiments of friend- ... do ourselves. ship and trust toward our country, were reaf- It was very difficult for us to explain the In the course of the Cuban events our party firmed by the welcome reception on my arrival to situation to the people. If the decisions had been and government were acting having in mind to do Havana. The very tone of the conversation with taken in another way, it would have been easier. whatever was necessary to make [the situation] comrade Fidel Castro was imbued with a sense of If a truce were suggested first and then the issues better for Cuba. When Ambassador Alekseev fellowship and trust. were coordinated, we would have been in a better informed [us] about the opinion of comrade Fidel I’m confident, continued Mikoyan, that the position. Castro, that there are some differences between existing mutual trust between us will always be Comrade A.I. Mikoyan made an observa- our parties, we were very pained. Immediately all there notwithstanding some differences of opin- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 95 ion. The American press spreads a lot of conjec- consultations on diplomatic forms of struggle in possibilities for maneuvering, for flexibility in tures regarding the aim of my trip to Cuba. They order to determine how to act in common. foreign policy. The Soviet people easily under- are writing that I went to Havana allegedly in Comrades, I would like to begin by asking stands similar decisions of its government. order to apply pressure on Cuban leaders, in order you to say, what steps of the Soviet government The mentioned facts represent a danger for to “pacify” them, as [U.S. negotiator John] have caused misunderstanding and differences, the revolutionary process, for the Cuban revolu- McCloy had stated to the American newspapers. in order to give you the necessary explanations. tion itself. About my conversation with McCloy I can tell True, yesterday comrade Fidel Castro already Here is the summary of the questions eluci- you in detail afterward, but first of all I would like narrated much about this. But I would like to ask dated by me in the conversation yesterday with to answer the main questions. both comrade Fidel Castro and all of you to raise comrade Mikoyan. We didn’t touch on the issue As I have already stated before my departure all those questions that you are interested in. of the assessment of the international situation. I from New York, the Soviet government was made the observation that at the most critical supporting the five points put forward by com- F.CASTRO. My colleagues are aware of the moment it had appeared that we had no under- rade Fidel Castro. The demand on liquidation of substance of our conversation yesterday, but in standing of preceding steps. For example, the the US Guantanamo base is a just and correct order to summarize the questions which are im- objective of placing strategic armaments in Cuba demand. I had no plans to speak publicly in New portant for us let me repeat them briefly. As was not clear enough for us. We could not York, but when I read in the American press the comrade Mikoyan has already said, recent events understand where is the exit from that compli- speculation about the objectives of my trip, I have considerably influenced the moral spirit of cated situation. By no means were we thinking decided to voice that statement in order to make our people. They were regarded as a retreat at the that the result could be a withdrawal of strategic my position completely clear. Using radio, Ameri- very moment when every nerve of our country armaments from Cuban territory. can propaganda is trying to embroil Cuba [in had been strained. Our people is brought up in the Yesterday comrade Mikoyan partly ex- conflict] with the Soviet Union, is trying to sting spirit of trust in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, plained some issues but the conversation was Cubans to the quick. It’s natural. Because the many people do not understand the linkage be- interrupted by the tragic news of the spouse of enemy can’t behave differently. He always acts tween the Cuban events and the issue of the A.I. Mikoyan. like this. But the enemy must be repulsed. liquidation of American bases in Turkey. The By decision of the CC CPSU, my task in- unexpected withdrawal of Soviet missiles with- A.I. MIKOYAN asks: Perhaps the Cuban cludes explaining our position to Cuban leaders out consultations with the Cuban government has comrades want some other questions to be an- within my abilities and capacities, so that no produced a negative impression upon our people. swered? doubts are left. We also want to discuss new The Soviet Union gave its consent for inspections problems that arise in front of our two countries. also without sending a notification to the Cuban DORTICOS makes the observation that in It is not a part of my task at all to put pressure on leadership. It is necessary to take into account the the summary offered by Fidel Castro there have Cuban leaders. That is an impudent conjecture of special delicacy of our people which has been been generalized all the questions that have caused American propaganda. Our interests are united. created as a result of several historic develop- differences, but he asks [Mikoyan] to explain, We are marxist-leninists and we are trying to ments. The “Platt amendment,” imposed by the why N.S. Khrushchev has accepted Kennedy’s achieve common objectives. We discussed the Americans upon Cuba, played a particular role in offer to make a statement of nonaggression against current situation at the CC CPSU and came to a this regard. Using the Platt amendment the United Cuba under the condition of removing Soviet decision that there was no complete relaxation of States of America prohibited the Cuban govern- missiles from Cuba, though the Cuban govern- tensions yet. ment from deciding by itself questions of foreign ment had not yet given its view in this regard. On the military side we can observe a con- policy. The decisions were made by the Ameri- siderable decrease in danger. I can add for myself cans behind the back of the Cuban people. Dur- A.I. MIKOYAN asks if there are more ques- that in essence currently the danger has abated. ing the current crisis there was also an impression tions. But the diplomatic tension still exists. Plans for that important issues, concerning all of us, were military assault have been frustrated. discussed and resolved in the absence of Cuban C.R. RODRIGUEZ says that his question is A victory was gained regarding prevention representatives, without consultations with the related to that formulated by Dorticos. It is not of a military assault. But still we are facing even Cuban government. The USA imperialists un- clear what does the Soviet Union regard as a larger tasks on the diplomatic field. We must dertook a series of aggressive measures against victory, whether its substance consists in the achieve a victory over the diplomatic tension, the Republic of Cuba. They set up a naval military success or the diplomatic one. We were too. blockade of our country, they try to determine considering that for the time being it is impossible What does that victory mean? How do we what kind of armament we can have and use. to speak about victory insofar as the guarantees understand it? I’ll explain later. Systematically they violate Cuban air space and on the part of the USA are ephemeral. I would like to do whatever is necessary to elevate these violations of the sovereignty of the ensure that you understand us correctly. I’m not Cuban Republic into a prerogative of the USA A.I. MIKOYAN says that he will give the in a hurry and if you don’t object, I’ll stay in Cuba administration. most detailed answer to all the questions raised by as long as necessary to explain all the aspects of There is the question of inspections. True, comrade Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders in our position. I think, first of all, we must consider inspections are a sore subject for us. We cannot order to make the Cuban comrades understand us those issues where some differences have ap- take that step. If we agree to an inspection, then completely. Therefore I will have to speak for a peared. I’ll do my best to help you understand us. it is as if we permit the United States of America long time. Later, when you bring forward your We must consider all these questions and decide to determine what we can or cannot do in foreign opinions and perhaps ask some other questions, I what can be done jointly to ensure the success of policy. That hurts our sovereignty. would like to say some more words. If my the further development and future of the Cuban In conclusion I said that we are a young arguments seem to you not convincing, please revolution. country, where a revolution has recently tri- notify me, I will think over what to do in order to At the moment of critical military danger we umphed, so we can’t carry out such a flexible make you understand me, I will try to put forward had no opportunity for mutual consultations, but policy as does the Soviet Union because they are new arguments. now we have good possibilities for thorough a consolidated state and on that ground they have The main issue, the issue of prime impor- 96 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tance, is why have we decided to withdraw the had worsened. This deterioration was caused by Cuban leadership. strategic missiles from the Cuban territory. Ap- pressure on the part of the Americans and large The main condition for the success of this parently you agree that this is the main question. expenses for defensive needs. We were afraid that plan was to carry it out secretly. In this case the If there is no understanding over this issue, it is the worsening of the situation could be the result Americans would find themselves in a very diffi- difficult to comprehend other questions. of the implementation of the [American] plan for cult position. Our military people said that four Being in Moscow I did not realize that this the economic suffocation of Cuba. The CC CPSU months were necessary to implement that plan. question would be asked. Previously it had not discussed the situation in Cuba and decided, with- We foresaw that the delivery of armaments and arisen. out your request—you are very modest and try not Soviet troops to Cuban territory would take a half The fate of the Cuban revolution has always to disturb us by requests—to undertake some of the preparatory period. Measures were also been important for us, especially beginning from measures in order to strengthen our help to Cuba. thought out in order to prevent the unleashing of the moment when Fidel Castro declared the If before you were receiving part of the weapons global nuclear war. We decided to work through objective of constructing socialism in Cuba. So- on credit and only a portion of armaments free of the UN, to mobilize international public opinion, cialist revolution in Latin America should de- charge, now we decided to supply you gratis with to do everything in order to avoid a world colli- velop and strengthen. When we received the weapons and partly with military uniforms—100 sion. We understood that the Americans could news that had defeated the counter-revolution- thousand sets in two years—and equipment. We use a blockade. It appeared to be the most ary landing on Playa Giron it naturally made us saw that the Cuban trade representatives, who dangerous thing if the USA imperialists block- happy, but to some extent it worried us, too. were participating in the negotiations, were feel- aded the supplies of fuel to Cuba. They could Certainly, it was foolish on the part of the Ameri- ing themselves somewhat uneasy. They were abstain from limiting food deliveries to Cuba, cans to organize such an invasion. But that fact short of more than 100 million dollars to some- while demagogically declaring that they do not indicated that they would try again to organize an how balance the budget. Therefore we accepted want to doom the Cuban people to famine, and at aggression against Cuba, that they would not all their proposals in order to frustrate the plan of the same time prevent supplies of weapons and tolerate the further development and strengthen- Kennedy designed for [causing] an internal ex- fuel to Cuba. And Cuba, who doesn’t have her ing of socialist Cuba. It is difficult for them to plosion in Cuba. own energy resources, can’t survive without fuel. reconcile with the existence of Cuba which is The same thing can be said regarding food Our communications with Cuba are very stretched. constructing socialism in the immediate proxim- and manufactured goods. In order to alleviate the We are separated by enormous distances. There- ity of their borders. economic situation in Cuba we sent there articles fore transportation to Cuba is very difficult. We This event worries us, as we were realizing and food worth 198 million rubles. Speaking very can’t use our Air Force or Navy forces in case of that the Americans would not give up their at- frankly, we have been giving to you everything a blockade of Cuba. Therefore we had to use such tempts to suffocate the Cuban revolution. And without counting. means as political maneuvering, diplomacy, we indeed, the American imperialists began elabo- According to my point of view, we have had to utilize the UN. For example, we could not rating two parallel plans. The first one consisted entered a new stage of relations which nowadays blockade American bases in Turkey in response of an attempt at the economic suffocation of the has a different character. Indeed, during the first because we have no other exit to the Mediterra- Republic of Cuba in order to provoke discontent stage there was some semblance of mutually nean. We could not undertake such steps neither inside the country, to provoke famine and to beneficial trade. Currently those supplies are part in Norway, nor in England, nor in Japan. We do achieve the collapse of the new regime due to of clearly fraternal aid. not have enough possibilities for counter-block- pressure from within, without military interven- I recall, that after his trip to trip to Bulgaria ade. Counter-measures could be undertaken in tion. The second plan foresaw preparation of an [14-20 May 1962—ed.], that, N.S. Khrushchev Berlin. intervention with the participation of told us that while staying in that country he was Our plans did not include creation of our Latinamerican mercenaries and with the support thinking all the time of Cuba, he was worried that base here, on the American continent. In general, of the United States of America. This plan the Americans would organize an intervention in the policy of constructing bases on foreign terri- envisaged invasion as the means to deal the final Cuba with the aid of reactionary governments of tories is not a correct one. Such a policy was blow and to kill the revolutionary regime, if the Latin America or would carry out a direct aggres- carried out in the time of Stalin. There was our economic hardships weaken it from inside. After sion. They do not want to permit the strengthen- base in Germany which was created on the ground the defeat on Playa Giron the American imperi- ing of Cuba, and the defeat of Cuba, N.S. of our right as conqueror. Currently our troops in alists proceeded to the execution of those plans. Khrushchev said to us, would deliver a very Germany are quartered there according to the The victory of the revolution in Cuba is a powerful blow upon the whole world revolution- Warsaw Pact. Under treaty there was our naval great success of marxist-leninist theory, and a ary movement. We must frustrate the plans of the base in Finland. We also had a base in Port Arthur defeat of the Cuban revolution would mean a two American imperialists. in order to defend our eastern borders from Japan. or three times larger defeat of the whole socialist It was at that time when there appeared a plan All these bases were liquidated. Right now we camp. Such a defeat would throw back the that carried great risk. This plan placed huge don’t have any bases on foreign territories. Nev- revolutionary movement in many countries. Such responsibility on the Soviet government insofar ertheless there are our troops in Poland in order to a defeat would bear witness to the supremacy of as it contained within it the risk of a war which the ensure communications with our forces in Ger- imperialist forces in the entire world. That would imperialists could unleash against the Soviet many, and Soviet troops are quartered in Hun- be an incredible blow which would change the Union. But we decided that it was necessary to gary in order to protect us from the side of correlation of forces between the two systems, save Cuba. At one time N.S. Khrushchev related Austria. We do not need bases in Cuba for the would hamper the development of the interna- that plan to us and asked us to think it through very destruction of the United States of America. We tional revolutionary movement. We were and seriously in order to make a decision in three days. have long-range missiles which can be used di- are considering to be our duty, a duty of commu- We had to think over both the consequences of its rectly from our territory. We do not have plans to nists, to do everything necessary to defend the implementation, what to do during different stages conquer the territory of the USA. The working Cuban revolution, to frustrate the imperialist of its execution, and how to achieve Cuba’s salva- class of that country is stupefied by capitalist plans. tion without unleashing a nuclear war. It was propaganda. Besides, such a plan would contra- Some time ago our comrades informed us decided to entrust our military with elaborating dict our theory. We can use the long-range that the economic situation in the country [Cuba] their considerations and to discuss it with the missiles only to deliver a retaliatory blow, with- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 97 out landing troops on USA territory. Nevertheless, the Americans managed to take a tion of what to do in the created situation we The objective of bringing Soviet troops and photo of the missiles in the firing position. received the communication from comrade Castro, strategic weapons to Cuba consisted only in Kennedy didn’t want to speak about Soviet mis- it was on Sunday, that an aggression against Cuba strengthening your defense potential. It was a siles in Cuba until the end of the Congressional would be unleashed in the next 24 hours. From deterrence plan, a plan designed to stop the impe- elections. He did not want to strain relations. But other sources we were in possession of informa- rialist play with fire regarding Cuba. If the two Republican senators [a clear reference to tion that the USA aggression would begin in 10- strategic armaments were deployed under condi- Sens. Kenneth Keating of New York and Everett 12 hours. Despite the fact that these were sepa- tions of secrecy and if the Americans were not Dirksen of Illinois—ed.] learned about the fact of rate sources, the information corresponded. Un- aware of their presence in Cuba, then it would the strategic missiles placed in Cuba and there- til the moment of the start of the USA aggression have been a powerful means of deterrence. We fore Kennedy hastened to take the initiative into against Cuba remained 10-12 hours. It was proceeded from that assumption. Our military his hands, or else he would be hardpressed. We necessary to use the art of diplomacy. Had we not specialists informed us that strategic missiles can had no information on how he intended to act. been successful in this regard there would have be reliably camouflaged in the palm forests of The United States of America organized been unleashed a war. We had to use diplomatic Cuba. maneuvers in the area of Vieques Island [in the means. We were following very intently the trans- Caribbean], naming them “Ortsac,” i.e., Castro, Kennedy was making statements that he had portation of troops and strategic weapons to Cuba. if you read it backwards. But those maneuvers nothing against the stationing in Cuba of Soviet Those sea shipments were successful in July and could appear to be not an exercise, but a sea cover weapons, even troops, but that placing strategic August. And only in September the Americans for a strong blow against Cuba. At that moment, weapons in Cuba was evidence of preparations learned about the transport of those forces and when Kennedy made a statement and announced for an assault against the USA. Therefore the means. The USA intelligence worked badly. We [on October 22—ed.] the decision of declaring a USA would defend itself. Considering that the were surprised that Kennedy in his speeches was blockade against Cuba, we didn’t know if the missiles had been discovered and were no longer speaking only about Soviet military specialists, Americans were really carrying out maneuvers or a means of deterrence we decided that for the sake but not Soviet troops. At the very beginning he were preparing for a direct attack upon Cuba. of saving Cuba it was necessary to give an order really was thinking so. Then we understood that On 28 October in the morning [presumably to dismantle and return the strategic missiles to he was not saying everything he knew, and that he this refers to Moscow time, which would mean the Soviet Union and to inform Kennedy of this. was holding back in order not to complicate the the evening of 27 October in Washington—ed.] You agreed with the withdrawal of strategic mis- [Congressional—ed.] election campaign for him- we received reliable reports of preparations for an siles from Cuba while leaving there all the other self. We let the Americans know that we wanted attack against Cuba. Indeed we were aware of the kinds of armaments. We managed to preserve all to solve the question of Berlin in the nearest fact that the Americans had interrupted their the forces and means which are necessary for the future. This was done in order to distract their maneuvers because of a hurricane. The maneu- defense of the Cuban revolution even without attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diver- vers did not resume when the hurricane went strategic missiles which had been a means of sionary maneuver. In reality we had no intention away but the American combatant ships remained deterrence, but they were discovered and there- of resolving the Berlin question at that time. If, in the same area in direct proximity to Cuba. N.S. fore lost their significance. We have enough comrades, the question of Berlin is of interest to Khrushchev rebuked Kennedy for declaring a powerful missiles that can be used from our you, I can give you the necessary information. blockade around Cuba. We strongly opposed the territory. Since Kennedy agreed with the retain- Kennedy addressed N.S. Khrushchev American attempts to assume the right to deter- ing of Soviet troops in Cuba, the Cubans kept through confidential channels and made a request mine what weapons Cuba can use and what powerful armaments and anti-aircraft missiles, not to aggravate the situation until the end of the armaments it may not possess. And then the so we consider that he [Kennedy] also made a elections to Congress [on 6 November 1962— Americans decided to carry out a direct aggres- concession. ed.], and not to proceed to the Berlin issue. We sion. Their plan consisted of two parts. Wishing The statement of Kennedy about non-ag- responded that we could wait until the end of the to free themselves from the threat of a blow from gression against Cuba on the part of the USA and elections [campaign], but immediately after them the strategic missiles, they decided to liquidate latinamerican countries also represents a conces- we should proceed to the Berlin issue. When the the launchers in Cuba with the help of conven- sion. If we take into account these reciprocal Americans learned about the transport of strate- tional warhead missiles and immediately after concessions and all other factors, we will see that gic weapons to Cuba they themselves began that land troops on Cuban territory in order to a big victory has been gained. Never before have crying a lot about Berlin. Both sides were talking liquidate centers of resistance as soon as possible. the Americans made such a statement. That is about the Berlin crisis, but simultaneously be- It would have been impossible for us in these why we decided that the main objective—salva- lieved that at that given moment the essence of circumstances not to repulse the aggression of the tion of Cuba—had been achieved. There would their policy was located in Cuba. USA. This assault would mean an assault upon not be an assault against Cuba. There would not By mid-September the Americans appar- you and us, as far as in Cuba there were situated be a war. We are gaining more favorable posi- ently received data regarding the transport to Soviet troops and strategic missiles. Inevitably, tions. Cuba of Soviet troops and strategic missiles. I nuclear war would be unleashed as a result of Indeed, it was necessary to send the draft of have already spoken about this fact with comrade such a collision. Certainly we would destroy our decision to Cuba in order to have consulta- Fidel Castro. The American intelligence was not America, our country would be strongly dam- tions with you, to receive your consent and only the first in obtaining that information, it was West aged too, but we have a larger territory. Cuba then announce it. It would have been done in this German intelligence who gave that information would have been destroyed first. Imperialists way if there were normal conditions. In his letter to the Americans. The American administration would do their best to liquidate Cuba. Fidel Castro informed us that an inevitable ag- sent planes to the air space of Cuba for aerial The objective of all the measures under- gression was expected in 24 hours. By the mo- photography and the ascertainment of the de- taken by the Soviet Union was the defense of ment when we received it and were discussing the ployment areas of the strategic missiles. N.S. Cuba. It was necessary to determine our line of situation, only 10-12 hours were left before ag- Khrushchev gave the order to place the missiles conduct. The loss of Cuba would mean a serious gression. If we had tried to send you our draft we into vertical position only at night, but to main- blow to the whole socialist camp. And exactly at would have had to encode the document, transmit tain them in a lying-down position in the daytime. the moment when we were pondering the ques- it by radio, decipher it, translate it into Spanish. 98 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

All of this could take more than 10 hours and such in case of war. True, they have certain political letter to Khrushchev, N.S. Khrushchev wrote to a consultation would not have made sense by that significance but we don’t pay them special im- Kennedy and simultaneously with my letter an time. It would be too late. It could happen in such portance, though we will seek their liquidation. answer from Kennedy to Khrushchev arrived. a way, that the answer would be received, but From your statements I see now that the After all, why is Kennedy already speaking about Cuba itself would have ceased to exist, a war Cubans were regarding this demand as if it was the Soviet proposal about dismantling, etc., in his would have been unleashed. It was a critical some sort of exchange. There are USA bases not response of 27 October to Khrushchev’s message moment. We thought our Cuban friends would only in Turkey, but also in England and other of 26 October, if it was not directly said in the understand us. Moreover we knew from the cable European countries. But nowadays these bases confidential message from Khrushchev of 26 from Fidel Castro that the Cuban leadership was do not have decisive importance insofar as the October? Negotiations began at night, after the aware of the direct threat of assault. At that long-range strategic missiles, aimed at Europe, message from Kennedy. Consequently, it was moment the main objective consisted of prevent- can quickly destroy them. not possible to consider inevitable an attack against ing an attack. We thought, the Cuban comrades us. When I was writing to N.S. Khrushchev I would understand us. Therefore, we made the F. CASTRO. There is a question, on which didn’t know that Khrushchev was writing to decision to act immediately, but without paying we are insufficiently informed. Kennedy and Kennedy—to Khrushchev. It seems due attention to the psychological factor, about On 26 October the Soviet government sent to me that on 27 October, at that time, there was which comrade Fidel Castro spoke here. Kennedy a letter without a word about Turkey. no unavoidable threat of attack. The principle of Regarding the possibility of a truce at that On 27 October we learned about Turkey from the agreement had already been found. It seems to moment, mentioned by the Cuban comrades, the broadcasts of Soviet radio. The American media me that there was available time for consulta- Americans would not take such a step in those expressed some surprise because this problem tions. conditions. There are a lot of revanchists in the had not been raised in the message of the 26th. Pentagon, and Kennedy is a deterrent element What is it, a false communication or were there A.I. MIKOYAN. In his answer of 27 Octo- with respect to them. The Americans would have two letters of 26 and 27 October? We have ber Kennedy was formally responding as if only burst into Cuba. We had no time. Certainly, it received one letter that coincided with the docu- to the confidential message of the 26th, but prac- was a decision that created some difficulties for ment transmitted by Moscow radio. tically he was answering both this one and chiefly you, the Cuban people. the message from Khrushchev of the 27th, openly Let us compare the situation at the present A.I. MIKOYAN. There were two letters. transmitted by radio, though there was no direct time and the situation before the crisis. Before the The letter of the 26th was not published. The reference in Kennedy’s message. All the mes- crisis the Americans were preparing an interven- letter of 27 October was published. But the sages between Khrushchev and Kennedy and tion against Cuba. Now they have committed content of the letter of 27 October covers the everything received from him confidentially were themselves not to attack Cuba. It is a great questions raised in the letter of the 26th. The given to comrade Fidel. I’m a participant of all success. Certainly, the events also had negative question of Turkey was not raised at the begin- the meetings, I’m aware of everything, but if you consequences, especially as American propa- ning. Later this issue was included. You have all want me to do it, I’ll check all the documents that ganda was trying suit their own ends by using the correspondence on this issue. If there is such I have with me and tomorrow I’ll complement my some facts and distorting them. But that is a necessity, we can check it. information. inevitable. These are the costs of events that have crucial importance. Our task is to eliminate the F. CASTRO. Here is the letter of 26 Octo- F. CASTRO. I agree with comrade negative consequences of the recent events. ber, whose text, as it seemed to me, is identical to Mikoyan’s suggestion. Comrade Dorticos is correct when he asks the other letter at my disposal, which was re- why did we give our consent to Kennedy’s mes- ceived from the transmission of radio Moscow A.I. MIKOYAN. So, let’s pass to the next sage on non-aggression against Cuba without the and TASS. It seemed to me that one letter has not question. concordance of the Cuban government. But it been published. To many Cubans it seems that instead of our was exactly our consent (and nothing else) that demand for the liquidation of American bases in ensured some truce for a certain time. A.I. MIKOYAN. If you want, we can check. Turkey it would be better to put the question of One cannot perceive nihilistically all agree- the liquidation of the base in Guantanamo. Such ments and commitments, although sometimes F. CASTRO. For all that, when did Kennedy a demand seems tempting from the Cuban politi- these agreements and commitments are impor- accept the proposal of N.S. Khrushchev and prom- cal and practical points of view. But from the tant only during a certain time, until conditions ise guarantees not to attack Cuba? Wasn’t it in point of view of military and practical interests of change. So they keep their importance until the response to the letter of 26 October? What did he Cuba we could not put the question in this way. If situation changes. say then? the question were raised about withdrawal from We were asked about our demand on the Cuba of all kinds of armaments, then the liquidation of American bases in Turkey. C.R. RODRIGUEZ. There were secret let- [Guantanamo] question would be raised. There Speaking frankly, we were not thinking about ters. are no nuclear weapons at Guantanamo. But we bases in Turkey at all. But during discussion of did not have intentions of taking away all the the dangerous situation we received information A.I. MIKOYAN. Comrades, all the docu- armaments from Cuba. The Guantanamo base from the United States of America, including an ments have been given to you. does not have a huge real significance insofar as article by [columnist Walter] Lippmann [in the the Americans can transfer their forces to Cuba Washington Post on October 25], where it was F. CASTRO. On 27 October Kennedy gave without difficulties due to the geographical situ- said that the Russians could raise the question of guarantees not to attack Cuba, if the Soviet gov- ation of the USA and Cuba. Indeed, it was not liquidating the USA bases in Turkey. They were ernment removed its offensive weapons. The possible to lose all our armaments in Cuba. If we speaking about the possibility of such a demand impression is growing that it was in response to were to raise the question of Guantanamo base inside American circles. This question was dis- [Khrushchev’s] letter of 26 October. That is an liquidation in exchange for withdrawal of Soviet cussed in the USA. Turkish bases do not have important question. It was decided urgently, weapons from Cuban territory in general, that great importance for us. They will be eliminated without consultations. Apparently, before my would undermine Cuba’s defense capability. We COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 99 can’t do that. You know that in the message from sovereignty. tries, the USA did not insist on this form of N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy there was said that Another example. An agreement to create an control and it was necessary to seek other mea- “we want to create confidence among Cubans, international verification commission was sures so that the Americans could be convinced confirming that we are with them and we do not achieved in Geneva [in 1954] during the discus- that it had been done. He said that they were relieve responsibility for rendering help to the sion of the Indochina issue. The proposal was aware of dismantling work, but they were afraid Cuban people.” made by representatives of the Soviet Union, that the missiles could be hidden in Cuban for- China, and other countries. The proposal was also ests. They need to be sure that those weapons are F. CASTRO. But we are speaking only supported by the leader of the Democratic Repub- removed from Cuban territory. I asked him about about strategic missiles. Such an act would have lic of Vietnam comrade Ho Chi Minh, who was other forms of verification that he had in mind. political rather than military significance. We directly concerned. Currently both Ho Chi Minh McCloy answered that, in their opinion, an aerial were looking for an exit from that situation. It and the king of Cambodia ask to preserve that inspection could be used for this aim, but that it seems to us that it was possible to create a more international verification commission. In this was necessary for Cuba to agree to verification difficult atmosphere for the Americans by rais- case there is no question of limiting the sovereign from airspace. I resolutely said in response that ing such a question as the liquidation of the rights neither of Vietnam nor Cambodia. such a method is out of the question because it Guantanamo base. Further. Between India and Pakistan in the was damaging Cuban sovereign rights. I added area of Kashmir is working an international veri- that it wasn’t worth going on with the discussion A.I. MIKOYAN. If the Americans had fication commission without infringing on their of that issue—we categorically rejected such a accepted such an offer, and they could do so, we sovereign rights. method and stressed our reluctance even to con- would have had to leave Cuba. We could not Several years ago we proposed [in May vey that proposal to the Cubans. afford it. 1955—ed.] to the Americans and English to cre- We knew that the American planes had been Now I’ll pass to the issue of inspections. If ate jointly international verification posts on rail- flying over the territory of Cuba and had carried we had made a statement declining inspections, way junctions, in large ports, and along highways. out air photography. I told McCloy that on the the Americans would have taken it for our desire In due time [in the 1957 Rapacki Plan—ed.] we basis of that aerial photography Americans could to swindle them and their intervention would also suggested to organize international verifica- be convinced of the fact that work on the disman- have become a reality. We declared that we tion in the zone covering 800 kilometers on both tling of the missiles had already begun. He agree to inspections. What we are speaking sides along the demarcation line in Germany. In answered me that air photography reflected the about is not a broad inspection, but a verification the event of the acceptance of this suggestion, a process of dismantling work, but that was not all, of the sites, known to the Americans due to aerial part of our territory, Poland, and Hungary would because in their view there were delays in dis- photography and which have been locations of have been controlled. And such an act, under the mantling. McCloy underlined that for Americans the strategic missile launchers. The objective condition of voluntary acceptance of the commit- it was very important to be sure of the removal of would have been to verify if the missiles had ments, would not have undermined the sovereign the missiles from Cuban territory. Then they really been dismantled and their embarkation rights of the states. would not have doubts of missiles being hidden in really accomplished; verification of the areas A similar example is the creation of an inter- the forests. He added that the information is where the missiles had been assembled could be national commission in Laos in order to verify needed to be convinced of the missiles’ with- carried out in one day and verification of load- compliance of the 1962 agreement, in particular, drawal. Meanwhile the Americans do not seek ing—in several days. It was not a question of any to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from any secret information, they are worried by the permanent or general inspection. It was said that Laos and a ban on the introduction of weapons. question of whether the missiles have been with- representatives of neutral countries would carry [Laotian Prince] Souvanna Phouma did not object drawn. out a verification only once. We were not decid- to such a verification. Communists of Laos and I could not, continued A.I. Mikoyan, go on ing this question instead of you. Cuban issues are Vietnam allowed international control, commu- discussing that issue with McCloy, but I was solved by the Cuban leadership only. But, being nists of India didn’t object to international verifi- aware that military consultants, a general and a owners of that kind of weapon, we stated our cation. Poland agreed to verify the withdrawal of colonel, had been sent from the Soviet Union to consent for verification of dismantling and load- American troops and the troops of Ho Chi Minh. [Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily] Kuznetsov. I ing. We believed that after coordinating with And it was done with the consent of comrade Ho hope, the issue will be further examined. you, you would accept this suggestion. But we Chi Minh and the Laotian communists. There is another method which I didn’t could not decide it instead of you. I’m giving you all these examples because mention to the Americans, but I can explain it to We were assuming that it was possible to when we, on the basis of the above mentioned you. The process of dismantling and loading of give consent to verification by representatives of experience, were thinking about you, we didn’t the strategic weapons can be photographed and neutral countries of the dismantling and with- pay due attention to that psychological factor, these documents can be used in order to achieve drawal of the missiles — doing all of this without about which we learned here from comrade Fidel the declared objective. hurting Cuba’s sovereignty. Certainly, no state Castro. In principle everything is correct, but not How is the verification at sea carried out? It would bear violation of its sovereignty. But in all that looks good in principle can be applied to a is done at a considerable distance from territorial particular cases sovereign governments also per- concrete situation. waters. Observers examine vessels and give their mit some limitation of their actions, owing to Everything I’m talking about I’m saying not consent for further travel. voluntary agreements. Now we are not speaking to gain a change of the international stand of On 1 November, during my conversation about those cases when foreign powers impose Cuba, but in order to explain to you the motives with McCloy, I said nothing to the Americans their will over other countries. which guided us. It is unthinkable that I might try regarding the fact that we were looking for ways I can give examples how our state and other to exercise any pressure. to keep our promise and give the Americans the countries voluntarily limit their actions while During the conversation with McCloy in opportunity to be certain that the dismantling and preserving their sovereign rights. For example, New York I touched on the question of verifica- carrying away of the missiles had really been sovereignty of a host-country does not apply to tion of the dismantling of our missiles. McCloy done. We are doing that in order not to contradict the territory of foreign embassies. In this case we said that insofar as Cuba was objecting to verifi- your statement objecting to control on Cuban see a limitation of actions without limitation of cation organized with the help of neutral coun- territory. During the conversation McCloy told 100 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN me that the Cubans could try to prevent the tion: in port and at sea. We didn’t want to hurt it was necessary to check it. I asked why the USA withdrawal from Cuba of the strategic missiles. your sentiments and therefore responded that we recruits Cuban counter-revolutionaries to their He added that the Cubans had 140 thousand agree to verification at sea, but not in port. This armed forces. He prevaricated for a long time soldiers and Soviet troops are only 10 thousand. issue, chiefly, has importance for you. But seek- trying to explain it by the necessity of teaching Regarding the first remark I told him that it was ing to make your situation easier, we agreed to those people English. He was cunning and eva- nonsense, because Fidel Castro himself had an- Red Cross verification at sea. sive. Then he declared that Cuba represents “a nounced that he was not objecting to the with- Having returned from Havana, U Thant told source of revolutionary infection.” Stevenson drawal of the Soviet strategic missiles. Certainly, me in New York that you do not agree to verifi- said that the USA would like to find a possibility I didn’t dispute his data on the numbers of the cation in port although, in his opinion, it was for settling the Cuban issue, but Cuba is afraid of troops. more comfortable to do it in port. U Thant is the USA and the USA is afraid of Cuba. We By the way, he said that the U-2 plane had ready to choose the corresponding staff. He has didn’t discuss this question any more. But there been shot down over Cuban territory [on 27 available two ships. On other details of this issue is an impression that a possibility exists to reach October —ed.] by Russian missiles, though anti- I lack information. Comrade Kuznetsov is in an agreement—in the form of a declaration or aircraft launchers, in his opinion, could be oper- charge of them. some other form—between Cuba and Central ated by the Cubans. I neither confirmed, nor It’s still necessary to dwell on the issue American countries pledging not to carry out disputed, this observation of McCloy. concerning U Thant’s plan and verification. subversive work and not to attack each other. During the crisis U Thant behaved himself Comrade Fidel Castro was right saying that F. CASTRO. These planes are flying at the decently, even well. It’s hard to demand anything it was necessary to maneuver on the issues of altitude of 22 thousand meters and the limit of our more from him. He treated both us and Cuba with international policy. It is easier for the Soviet artillery is lower. Therefore it’s understandable sympathy, but his situation is not easy at all. We Union than for Cuba to do so, especially when that in this case the anti-aircraft missiles were have received the “U Thant plan,” of guarantees, American propaganda complicates your possi- used. that had been sent to everybody. This plan bilities for maneuvers. Firmness should be com- seemed interesting to us and useful for Cuba. bined with flexibility while you carry out a policy. A.I. MIKOYAN. I didn’t engage in further What do we see positive in it? Nowadays it is a necessary thing for marxist- discussion with him of this issue. If the UN observation posts are created in diplomats. It is wrong to say that we are more We insist on immediate lifting of the quar- Cuba, the southern seacoast of the USA and in the liberal than others. We are firm, but we display antine. If you want us to finish the withdrawal of Central American countries then attempts of flexibility when it is necessary. strategic missiles from Cuba as soon as possible, preparation for aggression against Cuba would The revolution in Cuba has enormous im- I said to McCloy, then give the vessels access to be quickly unmasked. In this way it will be portance not only for the Cuban people, but for Cuba because there are not enough steamships in possible to suppress rapidly any aggression at- the countries of Latin America and the whole Cuba right now to withdraw the equipment and tempts against Cuba. I’m assessing this issue world. The revolution in Cuba must develop and personnel. It could be done before the official from the point of view of international law. It’s strengthen. Therefore it is necessary to use ma- agreement, in order to accelerate the evacuation. not excluded that a similar agreement can be neuvers, to display flexibility in order to ensure McCloy responded that he was ready to give violated, but it must not happen under normal victory. orders in practice not to carry out examination of conditions. Really, a victory has been gained over Ameri- the vessels. The verification will be completely This issue is also interesting from another cans and here is why. If we have a look at the formal, as happened during the encounter of the point of view. There is the Organization of whole thing retrospectively, the question is being tanker “Bucharest” with American ships. A American States (OAS). The Americans try to raised—if it has been a mistake to send strategic question was asked by radio about the character use the OAS as a cover in order not to allow a UN missiles to Cuba and to return them to the Soviet of the cargo and the “Bucharest” without exami- inspection. If the Americans had accepted UN Union. The CC CPSU considers that there was no nation continued its journey to Cuba. Nobody inspection it would mean that Latin American mistake. The strategic missiles have done their stopped the ship, nobody came on its deck. issues are resolved at the UN bypassing the OAS. part. Cuba found itself at the center of interna- I objected to this kind of verification also. Briefly, we positively assess U Thant’s plan. He tional politics and now when their job is done, Then we passed to other issues. [U.S. delegate to said that Fidel Castro also had a positive attitude when they have been discovered, they can’t serve the United Nations Adlai] Stevenson told me that toward his plan, but I don’t know if comrade Fidel any more as means of deterrence. They are the Americans had accepted [UN Secretary Gen- Castro really has such an opinion. withdrawn. But the Cuban people keep powerful eral] U Thant’s proposal. I reproached them and U Thant told me that representatives of arms in their hands. There is no other country in made the observation that U Thant was suggest- Latin-American countries, to whom he had spo- Latin America which is so strong militarily, which ing not to withdraw weapons and to lift the ken, took a favorable view of his plan. I asked has such a high defense potential as Cuba. If there blockade. We accepted U Thant’s suggestion what was the USA position and U Thant informed is no direct aggression on the part of the USA, no about verification on the part of the Red Cross. [me] that the Americans had called it an OAS group of Latinamerican countries has the possi- In general it is necessary to note that the issue without outlining their own attitude. But I bility to overpower Cuba. cargo transportation to Cuba represent an interest managed to clear up this question during the Let us try to understand, of what does our for you, not us. You are receiving the goods. We conversation with McCloy. At first McCloy and victory consist. Let’s compare situations in June incur considerable losses. Steamships are obliged Stevenson said that there was not a “U Thant and now, in November. The Americans have to wait at sea. We were forced to agree to the Red plan.” Then they admitted their knowledge of the virtually forgotten the Monroe doctrine. Kennedy Cross verification in order to reduce our losses. plan, but declared that the USA opposes any does not mention it any more and, you know, the Such a verification is better than the American verification procedures on their territory. Monroe doctrine has been the basis of American one. This organization does not have any politi- McCloy said they could pledge their word imperialism in Latin America. Previously Ameri- cal or state character. Vessels that can be used for that all the camps for mercenary training in Cen- cans were declaring that they would not tolerate such verification, are not American but neutral tral America had been liquidated or were in the a Marxist regime on the American continent. and Soviet. process of liquidation. I asked McCloy if it had Now they are committing themselves not to at- U Thant suggested two options for verifica- been done in all countries. McCloy answered that tack Cuba. They were saying that foreign powers COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 101 could not be present on the American continent tions including economic issues. messages from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy and in whatever form. They know about the Soviet It was decided to have another meeting in the I would like to say that Kennedy in his letter of 27 military in Cuba, but do not speak of the Monroe Presidential Palace at 14 hours [2 pm—ed.] on 5 October, which attracted your attention, formally doctrine. November. is answering the confidential message of N.S. Cuba found itself in the center of interna- Ambassador Alekseev was also present on Khrushchev of 26/X [26 October], but in essence tional political events. The United Nations Or- the Soviet side. he is simultaneously responding to Khrushchev’s ganization is engaged in the Cuban issue. U letter of 27/X [27 October], which had been Thant practically backs Cuba and comes out Recorded by V. Tikhmenev published even before the aforementioned re- against the USA policy. And you remember that sponse from Kennedy and in which we had raised previously it was not possible to obtain support [signature] the question of dismantling the ground launchers for Cuba at the UN. World public opinion has in Cuba under the condition of liquidating the been mobilized and even some nations who were [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, ob- American base in Turkey. You have been given previously against Cuba. tained and translated by NHK television, copy all the correspondence between N.S. Khrushchev In the USA there are hysterics, but in their provided by Philip Brenner; translation by and Kennedy except for one confidential mes- souls many people understand the fairness of the Aleksandr Zaemsky slightly revised.] sage from Kennedy of 25 October, which is not Cuban demands. connected to the issue of dismantling and only In the end, the prestige of the socialist camp * * * * * accuses us of denying the fact of the construction has strengthened. It defended peace, though the of ground launchers for special equipment in USA was rapidly sliding down toward war. Document III: Cuba. We can read it out and then give you the People have united in order to resist Ameri- “I don’t understand such a sharp reaction” translation. (The letter is read out.) can plans aimed at unleashing a war, and simul- —The Third Castro-Mikoyan Conversation, taneously the Soviet policy was carried out in the 5 November 1962 (afternoon) FIDEL CASTRO. Thank you. Now this framework of settling the issues by peaceful issue is clear to me. means. The immediate threat of military attack MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION A.I. MIKOYAN. I’ll continue. Having against Cuba is gone. I believe it is moved aside received that message we answered it on 26 for several years. A.I. MIKOYAN with Fidel CASTRO, Oswaldo October through confidential channels. In that It is necessary now to fix that success on the PORTICOS, Raul CASTRO, Ernesto letter there were no concrete proposals yet. We diplomatic field, so that Cuba—a beacon of GUEVARA and Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ were speaking only about the necessity to elimi- Latin American revolution—could develop more nate the threat of an assault against Cuba. The rapidly in every respect and give a decisive 5 November 1962 letter included only the idea of seeking an agree- example for mobilizing other peoples for struggle. ment. We didn’t receive an answer from Kennedy Our support becomes more and more ac- A conversation between A.I. Mikoyan and on the 26th. There was no answer on the morning tive. We are helping you as our brothers. More the same composition of the Cuban leadership, as of 27 October either. We came to the conclusion possibilities have been created. on the previous occasion, took place on 5 Novem- that the Americans were actively preparing for an Americans are obliged to take Cuba into ber, at the Presidential palace. The conversation attack, but were preferring not to disclose their account, to solve issues, regarding Cuba, with lasted 2 hours 30 minutes. plans before world public opinion. Therefore, in our participation. We are not speaking about During the previous meeting F. Castro asked order to tie the Americans’ hands, we decided to Russia [sic—ed.] as such, but as a country of comrade Mikoyan a question which showed his send Kennedy a new letter and publish it in the socialism. Socialism, which you are also merito- doubts as if we had not given him all the messages press. That was the letter of 27 October, known riously representing, became a decisive factor of from N.S. Khrushchev to president Kennedy. He to you, where the demand for the liquidation of international policy. American propaganda is asked how the statement of Kennedy of 27 Octo- the American bases in Turkey was advanced. We repeating over and over again about a diminish- ber could be explained, insofar as there was al- published this letter very quickly, even before the ing of Cuba’s prestige. Just to the contrary ready a reference to our consent to dismantle American ambassador received its text. Our Cuba’s prestige has been undoubtedly strength- ground launchers for special equipment. objective was to forestall the Americans and ened as a result of recent events. Comrade Mikoyan answered Castro that all frustrate their plans. Only then we received a In conclusion A.I. Mikoyan apologized to confidential letters from N.S. Khrushchev had message from Kennedy. It was sent on the the Cuban comrades for having tired them out. been given to the Cuban comrades and the open evening of 27 October. We received it on 28 Joking he adds that the only compensation is that messages are known to them from the media. No October toward the morning (the time difference he is worn out too. So there is complete equality. other letters have been sent from N.S. Khrushchev [between Washington and Moscow—ed.] must He suggests to set the time of the next to Kennedy, said Mikoyan. be taken into consideration). This letter by its meeting. In order to render the trend of developments form seemed to be an answer to the confidential more precisely, A.I. MIKOYAN suggested, to message from N.S. Khrushchev of 26 October, F. CASTRO asked, if it was possible, to answer that question during consecutive conver- but in effect it was the response to the letter of 27 discuss Soviet policy regarding the Berlin issue. sation, that is on 5 November, after looking through October. On 28 October in the morning, having the whole correspondence on this issue once more. received the letter from comrade Fidel Castro, A.I. MIKOYAN answered that he would do In the conversation [on 5 November], A.I. and having at our disposal other data about prepa- so, and also would discuss the exchange of letters MIKOYAN said that the correspondence between rations for an attack literally in the nearest hours, between the CPSU and communist parties of N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy had been looked N.S. Khrushchev made an open radio statement India and China on the issue of conflict between through again, and the motives, which had that the Soviet officers had received orders to India and China. He can explain our plans in the prompted Kennedy to refer to our consent about dismantle and evacuate the strategic missiles. As sphere of disarmament, on the ceasing of tests of the dismantling of the missiles, had been deter- you understand, there was no time for consulta- hydrogen weapons, and answer all other ques- mined. You are aware of the content of all the tions with the Cuban government. By publishing 102 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN the messages we had the possibility to send them tions in the USA. These decisions are testimony letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy of 27 quickly to Cuba, but we could not wait for an to the firm resolution of the Soviet Union to October. In those two documents there is the real answer because it would take a lot of time to defend Cuba. They help to understand correctly basis for the decision announced in the letter of 28 encode, decipher, translate, and transmit them. the policy of the Soviet Union. Therefore, I October. So, Kennedy’s letter of 27 October Acting in this way, we were proceeding repeat, an analysis of the USSR position can be meant acceptance of proposals by N.S. from our conviction that the most important ob- correct only with due regard for all the events and Khrushchev of 26 October consisting of his con- jective in that situation was to prevent an attack decisions both before and during the crisis. sent to evacuate from Cuba not only strategic against Cuba. I would like to underline that our We do not doubt that if all the works on the armaments, but all the weapons if the USA stops proposals to dismantle the strategic missiles and assembly of the strategic weapons had been com- threatening Cuba with an attack. Because the to liquidate the American bases in Turkey had pleted in conditions of secrecy then we would threat on the part of the USA had been the only been advanced before receiving the letter from have received a strong means of deterrence against reason that forced Cuba to arm itself. When comrade Fidel Castro of 27 October. The order American plans for attacking our country. In this Kennedy accepted this proposal (we didn’t know for the dismantling of the strategic missiles and way objectives would have been achieved which that he was accepting it), the conditions were their evacuation was given after we had received are pursued both by the Soviet government and created to develop the Soviet proposals and pre- the letter from Kennedy of 27 October and the the government of the Republic of Cuba. How- pare a declaration regarding the agreement of the letter from Fidel Castro. In our message of 28 ever, we consider that the installation of Soviet parties. The USA could have been told that the October, as you have noted, the demand for the missiles in Cuba was significant for the interests USSR was ready to dismantle the equipment but liquidation of bases in Turkey was no longer of the whole socialist camp. Even if we consider would like to discuss it with the Cuban govern- suggested. We did this because we were afraid it to be a military advantage, it was politically and ment. In our opinion the issue should have been that in spite of our proposal of 27 October the psychologically important in the struggle for the solved in this way instead of giving immediately American imperialists could assault Cuba. We deterrence of imperialism and the prevention of an order to evacuate the strategic weapons. Such had nothing else to do but to work on the main its aggressive plans. Thus, the installation of the a procedure would have lessened international task—to prevent an attack against Cuba, believ- strategic missiles in Cuba was carried out not tension and secured the possibility to discuss the ing that our Cuban friends would understand the only in the interests of the defense of Cuba, but of issue with the Americans in more favorable con- correctness of our actions, although the normal the whole socialist camp. It was done with our ditions. In this way it could have been possible procedure of coordination had not been observed. complete consent. not only to achieve a lessening of international The question was that there were 24 hours We understood perfectly well the signifi- tension and to discuss the issue in better condi- left before an assault against Cuba. It must be cance of this action and we considered it to be a tions, but also to achieve the signing of a declara- taken into consideration that we had only a few correct step. tion. [literally, “counted”—ed.] hours at our disposal We also completely agree that war must be It is only a simple analysis of previous and we could not act other than we did. And there prevented. We do not object that the measures events that does not have special importance right are results: an attack against Cuba is prevented, undertaken were in pursuit of two objectives, that now. the peace is preserved. However you are right is—to prevent an attack against Cuba and to Nowadays it is important for us to know that the procedure of consultations, which is avoid starting a world war. We completely agree what to do under the new conditions. In what way possible under normal circumstances, was not with these aims pursued by the Soviet Union. shall we seek to achieve our main goals and at the followed. Misunderstanding arose in connection with same time fight to prevent an aggression and the form of discussion of this issue. However, we preserve peace. Certainly, if in due course we F. CASTRO. I would like to respond to understand that the circumstances were demand- manage to secure a lasting peace, then we’ll have comrade Mikoyan. ing urgent actions and the situation was abnor- an opportunity to better assess the undertaken We have listened with great attention to the mal. Assessing past events, we come to the steps in light of new facts. Future results of our information and explanations offered by com- conclusion that the discussion of these sharp struggle will demonstrate the importance of rade Mikoyan. Undoubtedly all those explana- questions could be carried out in another form. today’s events. Certainly, only a little bit in this tions are very valuable because they help us to For example, the issue, which we have already struggle depends on us personally. understand better the course of events. We are discussed here, in regard to my letter in connec- We are very grateful for all the explanations thankful for the desire to explain everything to us, tion with the decision of the Soviet government given to us by comrade Mikoyan, for all the for the efforts undertaken in this regard. The and the publication of the Soviet government efforts undertaken by him in order to make us arguments, that the strategic missiles after being statement of 28 October. True, my letter bore no understand the recent events. We take into con- discovered by the enemy practically lost what- relation to issues mentioned in the messages of 26 sideration the special conditions under which it ever military significance or their significance and 27 October between the Soviet government was necessary to act. We have no doubts regard- becomes extremely small, also cause no doubts and the USA Administration. Such a letter [from ing the friendly character of our relations, based among us. Castro to Khrushchev—ed.] pursued one objec- on common principles. Our respect for the Soviet We are grateful for all these explanations tive—to inform the Soviet government about the Union is unshakeable. We know that it respects and do understand, that the intentions of the inevitability of an assault against Cuba. There our sovereignty and is ready to defend us from an Soviet government cannot be assessed only on was not a word about any minor hesitation on our aggression on the part of imperialism. Therefore, the grounds of an analysis of the most recent side. We clearly declared our resolve to fight. the most important thing now is to determine our developments, especially as the atmosphere is Besides, we didn’t say that we were expecting an joint steps. rapidly changing and new situations are created. invasion. We wrote that it was possible, but not I would like to assure you, comrade Mikoyan, The totality of adopted decisions, which became so likely. In our opinion, more probable was an of our complete trust. the basis for supplying strategic weapons and the air attack with the sole aim of destroying the signing of [the Soviet-Cuban—ed.] agreement, strategic weapons in Cuba. The basis of the A.I. MIKOYAN. I’m deeply satisfied by must be taken into consideration. It was sup- Soviet government decision of 28 October had the statement of comrade Fidel Castro. We have posed to publish that agreement after the installa- already been reflected in the message to Kennedy always been confident of our sincere friendship tion of the strategic missiles and after the elec- of 26 October and clearly manifested itself in the which nothing can disrupt. I’ll transmit word by COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 103 word your statement to the CC CPSU and I’m “Komar” [“Mosquito”] patrol boats. Stevenson international commissions or representatives of sure that it will produce gladness on the part of wrote that it would be necessary to discuss that foreign powers often operate at sea ports and that the Central Committee. issue. Immediately I told comrade Kuznetsov that fact does not limit the sovereignty of the host I would like to make a small explanation, this issue was not a subject for discussion. These country in the slightest measure. Such a possibil- very briefly. bombers have low speed and low altitude limits. ity would allow U Thant to consider accom- I agree completely with the assessment, Nor can the “Komar” patrol boats operate at great plished the decision to withdraw the strategic made by comrade Fidel Castro of his own letter. distance. Therefore those weapons are clearly missiles from Cuba. These observers would be He is interpreting it correctly. It’s a legitimate defensive. given the opportunity to visit Soviet ships, an- question raised by him—could we have made In the first Kennedy message [possibly an chored at the ports, to verify the fact of the another decision instead of [sending] instruc- allusion to Kennedy’s October 22 speech, which armaments’ removal. From my point of view that tions for dismantling the strategic weapons[?] included a reference to the bombers—ed.] the would not represent any infringement of national But we had been informed that an attack against American administration spoke about the bomb- sovereignty. Cuba would begin within the next few hours. ers, later this question fell away. Now they want Socialist countries, insofar as we are marxist- Perhaps it was really intended to deliver a blow to raise again this question. We have resolutely leninists, have to find a way of securing a unity of first of all against the strategic missile sites, but rejected such a discussion. Comrade Kuznetsov actions even in those cases when our opinions are it would be followed by a strike against Cuba. received corresponding instructions from Mos- somewhat different. Moreover, I believe, it would We had to act resolutely in order to frustrate the cow. This is nothing more than attempts to be taken into consideration that there are Soviet plan of attack on Cuba. We realize that by doing complicate the whole matter in order to create troops on Cuban territory. Therefore, our coop- this we had to sacrifice the necessity of consulta- once again a tense atmosphere and dangerous eration in the fight against imperialism must be tions with the Cuban government. situation. especially effective. You may respond to this Regarding comrade Fidel Castro’s opinion Let me specify the list sent by Stevenson. proposal [of mine] maybe not today, but tomor- that in the letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Kennedy Here it is. There are mentioned: bombers, “Komar” row; in general, it seems to me that it is a mini- of 26 October, there was a promise to withdraw patrol boats, “air-to-surface” bombs and missiles, mum concession which would allow U Thant to from Cuba all the weapons and all military spe- “sea-to-surface” and “surface-to-surface” pro- present a report to the Security Council about the cialists. The Americans did not demand from us jectiles [cruise missiles—ed.]. The Americans evacuation of the missiles. In the contrary case such a step. The issue was the offensive weap- are impertinently continuing their attempts to we will inevitably hear at the Security Council ons. Perhaps comrade Fidel Castro made such a complicate the situation. that the Cubans do not permit verification to be conclusion on the basis of the phrase where a It is very important to have a document of conducted, and that the Russians are only talking withdrawal of technical specialists was men- agreement, which one can use at the UN. It can be about control. But if the Security Council is given tioned. But this implied specialists who operate carried through the UN with the help of U Thant. the opportunity to establish compliance of the strategic missiles. The fact that it regarded only But for that it is necessary to have evidence promise of N.S. Khrushchev, then the quarantine them is confirmed by all the letters, by the totality proving the dismantling and evacuation of weap- may be lifted. The stage of diplomatic negotia- of their context. They were about offensive ons. Then the situation would improve. The tions will begin. Roughly such an appeal was put weapons only. earlier it is done, the more advantageous it will be forth by U Thant during his conversation with for us. me. I ask you to discuss this proposal. I believe FIDEL CASTRO confirms, that his under- For the Americans it is better to postpone the that the solution of this problem will help create standing was just the same. solution of this question. In this case they have the definite conditions to settle the crisis situation possibility to continue the quarantine and other which had developed in the Caribbean sea. A.I. MIKOYAN. It is no coincidence that aggressive actions. We would rather help U Thant The Americans would like to delay the solu- in his answer to this letter Kennedy does not raise in order to give him a chance to report to the UN tion of this issue. Dragging it out gives them the the question of removing from Cuba all the that the Soviet side has carried out the dismantling opportunity to prolong the term of the quarantine. weapons. If such a proposal had been present in and evacuation of offensive weapons from Cuba. We told the Americans that we would be able to our letter, Kennedy would undoubtedly have We should talk about it. evacuate the weapons in 10 days. They are not in taken advantage of it. Therefore the opinion, We have resolutely rejected the American a hurry and say that it could take even a month. It outlined by comrade Fidel Castro regarding this demand for aerial inspection. Nevertheless, with is advantageous for the USA to preserve tension part, is incorrect. There is nothing of the kind in the help of air photography the Americans col- in this area. And we are standing for a lessening the letters of 27 and 28 October. lected data that the dismantling of the strategic of tension, in order to solve this question at the I would like to mention, that the Americans weapons had concluded and published that infor- Security Council. In our view, it’s difficult for are trying to broaden the list of weapons for mation by themselves. U Thant could have in- the Security Council to discuss this issue until the evacuation. Such attempts have already been formed the UN, but he needs evidence, proving end of the USA elections. The elections will be made, but we will not allow them to do so. On our the evacuation of the weapons. UN representa- held tomorrow and so it would be appropriate to part, we gave our consent only to withdraw tives must see how the evacuation is carried out think about its solution. It’s very important to strategic weapons. When I was speaking to and inform U Thant on the results of their obser- keep U Thant on our side. It seemed to me that he McCloy he told me with a smile that it would be vation mission. Then the situation will become was very satisfied by his meeting with comrade good if we removed from Cuba the anti-aircraft significantly simpler. The issue will be sent to the Fidel Castro. But if we delay the solution, the missiles, too. But those are defensive weapons, Security Council where the decisions are taken Americans will seize the opportunity for their not offensive. not only by the USA representatives. benefit. Half an hour before my departure from New I’m not insisting that you answer this ques- York, those pilferers (now we are speaking about tion right now. Maybe you can do it tomorrow. If C.R. RODRIGUEZ. So, if I understand you Stevenson) sent a letter to comrade Kuznetsov, it would be acceptable for you, why, for example, correctly, the question is about verification of saying that they supposedly had forgotten to not give consent for U Thant’s representatives to loading at the Cuban ports as a minimum demand raise questions about some kinds of weapons. verify how the weapons’ loading onto Soviet and the Americans would consider such a control They were referring to the IL-28 bombers and ships is carried out. You know that different a sufficient guarantee? Won’t they later demand 104 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN an on-site verification, in the forests? I’m afraid tion necessary to declare the verification to be explain to comrade Mikoyan that what I’m say- if we go along such route we can even reach an carried out. ing reflects the decision of the whole Cuban inspection on site, where the strategic missiles people. We will not give our consent for inspec- previously have been located. F. CASTRO. Isn’t it possible to do the same tion. We don’t want to compromise Soviet troops on open sea? and endanger peace in the whole world. If our A.I. MIKOYAN. The imperialists are not position imperils peace in the whole world, then the point. Such a verification is necessary for us. A.I. MIKOYAN. The form of loading veri- we would rather consider the Soviet side to be If the imperialists protest we can send them to fication is more suitable for U Thant. It is not free of its commitments and we would defend hell. But it’s necessary to take into consideration hurting your sovereignty either, because the veri- ourselves. Come what may. We have the right to that the support of U Thant is very important for fication will be carried out not on your territory, defend our dignity. us, and the imperialists can say what they want. but aboard our ship. We’ll send them to hell, the more so as they have O. DORTICOS. The statement voiced by already been convinced of the dismantling of the F. CASTRO. I understand very well the comrade Fidel Castro reflects our common reso- missiles with the help of air photography. If we interest in keeping U Thant on our side. But such luteness and we consider that this issue does not manage to come to an agreement over verifica- an inspection will undoubtedly have a painful deserve further discussion. tions on ships, then the UN representatives will effect on the moral condition of our people. The be able to control the process of loading also. We Americans are insisting that the agreement on A.I. MIKOYAN. I don’t understand such a will not accept any more. Indeed, appetite comes verification has been achieved by the exchange of sharp reaction to my proposal. What we were with eating, but we will resolutely oppose such a messages. And, indeed, in the letter from speaking about was not an inspection of Cuban rise of appetite, we’ll do a step forward and that’s Khrushchev to Kennedy of 28 October, it is said: territory, but a verification procedure in the ports. enough for them. We rejected inspection, we “As I informed you in the letter of 27 October, we Foreign representatives can be found in any port. didn’t allow surface verification, we won’t per- are prepared to reach agreement to enable United It does not have anything to do with aerial or mit control over dismantling. But in order to Nations representatives to verify the dismantling surface inspection. I’m saying that not to call into strengthen our position at the UN, the representa- of these means.” question your statement, but in order to explain. tives of this organization should be given the Therefore it implies representatives of the Besides the issue we have just finished dis- facts. Otherwise it will be difficult to restrain Security Council for the mission of verification cussing, we were going—according to your pro- revanchists at the Security Council. But if the of dismantling on the site. posal—to talk over a plan of joint actions. We can evacuation of weapons would be carried out and In the message of N.S. Khrushchev it is said, have such a discussion not now, but at a time verified, then we’ll obtain the lifting of the quar- that consent would obviously be needed on the convenient for you. antine. I think, we should not put the sign of part of the governments of Cuba and Turkey in equality between the UN and the American impe- order to organize control of compliance of under- F. CASTRO. On the basis of yesterday’s rialists. The matter is that the UN cannot exceed taken commitments. That means that N.S. meeting we came to the conclusion that the Soviet the limits settled by the two messages. If we Khrushchev in his letter of 28 October, is making government understood the reasons for our reso- manage to receive support from the UN, then the reference to the message of the 27th. The neces- luteness not to allow a verification of Cuban Americans would go to hell. We promised to sity of obtaining consent on the part of Cuba is territory. That resoluteness is a starting-point for allow verification of the evacuation. That verifi- mentioned there, but that is not a responsibility of us. We proceeding from the same point regarding cation can be organized by means of the UN. We the Soviet Union, insofar as the USSR has al- joint actions as well. It’s difficult to talk about didn’t pledge anything else. But if we do not ready warned in the letter of 27 October, that the them, if we have not come to an agreement on the fulfill our promise, the situation may become permission of the Cuban government is needed. previous issue. considerably complicated. Perhaps you will dis- Comrade Mikoyan is saying that the imperi- That issue is the most important from Cuba cuss this issue without our presence and at the alists could be sent to hell. now from a political point of view. The guaran- same time consider the possibilities of our further On 23 October I received a very clear letter tees are very problematic. It is not peace that we joint actions. If you find the opportunity we can where the precise position of the Soviet govern- are speaking about. But inspection is a compo- meet today. However the meeting can be held ment is explained. Kennedy’s statement is char- nent of their strategy in the struggle against the tomorrow. acterized therein as an unprecedented interfer- Cuban revolution. The American position is ence into internal affairs, as a violation of interna- weaker. The journal “Time” wrote that the dis- F. CASTRO. And what will the inspection tional law and as a provocative act. The Republic mantling was proceeding rapidly. Verification in look like? of Cuba, like all sovereign states, has the right to the ports and at sea is just the same. But verifica- reject control and decide by itself what kinds of tion in the ports is very insulting for us from the A.I. MIKOYAN. Representatives of U Thant weapons it requires. No sovereign state must political point of view and we cannot fulfill this will arrive at the port of loading. Currently there give an account of such actions. These concepts demand of the USA administration. are 4-5 ships assigned for that purpose. Then of the letter of 23 October are very precise and they’ll climb on board. They will be shown the correctly reflected our position. A.I. MIKOYAN. My proposal was regard- cargo and given corresponding information. In One more question. The formula that fore- ing not the Cuban territory, but only the Soviet this way they will be convinced that we are sees UN observers in Cuba, in the USA, Guate- ships, vessels are considered to be territory of that fulfilling our promise and will go away. That is mala and other countries seems to me a more state, whom they belong to. Such a proposal I put my understanding of this form of verification. If reasonable verification. A unilateral inspection forward on my personal behalf. Moscow did not we come to an agreement regarding this proposal, would affect monstrously the moral spirit of our entrust me to suggest it. Speaking frankly, I I’ll inform our representative to the UN and then people. We made big concessions. The Ameri- considered that insofar as such a verification did we’ll have the opportunity to settle the technique can imperialists are carrying out aerial photogra- not regard Cuban territory, but Soviet ships, it and procedure of this work. phy freely and we do not impede them due to the could be accepted. I was saying that although we I would be able to inform Moscow that we appeal of the Soviet government. It is necessary understand the Cuban position, the verification agreed to give both U Thant and the UN informa- to look for some other formula. I would like to procedures were not dangerous. I don’t under- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 105 stand your reaction to my proposal. that Fidel Castro had not been able to come on the first point, especially since that has already Our Central Committee entrusted me to because he is feeling poorly. been loudly declared by the Cuban leadership. explain in detail the Soviet position on all the Second, the publication of separate declarations issues that are of interest to the Cuban comrades, A.I. MIKOYAN expressed his sympathy in would reveal the disagreements between us on entrusted me neither to impose our opinion, nor regard to the fact that F. Castro is feeling under the this question, and that would be disadvantageous pressure you in order to obtain consent for in- weather. for both sides. spection of the Cuban territory. When I spoke about the necessity of think- O. DORTICOS. We have analyzed Com- ing through our joint positions, I did not have F. CASTRO. But verification would be rade Mikoyan’s latest proposals regarding verifi- inspections in mind. We must think about the carried out from the Cuban territory. cation of the loading of the strategic missiles on entire complex of measures, both in the sphere of the decks of Soviet ships in Cuban ports. Our diplomacy and in all other spheres, so as to satisfy A.I. MIKOYAN. No, it could be carried out opinion is thus: keeping in mind chiefly the our common interests. Whether it will be in the only aboard the ships. For that purpose Soviet maintenance of the high moral spirit of our people form of a protocol or a declaration is not so and neutral country ships could be used. The UN and, besides that, wishing not to allow the out- important. The main thing is not the form, not the representatives could live and sleep aboard those break of legal arguments in relation to the issue of points, rather it is the position from which we can steamers. the extraterritoriality of the ships, we want to give speak to U Thant and the UN. It follows that we a conclusive answer to Comrade Mikoyan. We should come to an agreement on our position, so F. CASTRO. Such a verification in the believe that it is impossible to accept that pro- as to make possible unity of actions. Concerning ports does not differ from control on ships on posal. We must refuse it, since in principle we do disagreements on the control issue, I don’t see the open sea. not allow inspections, not on Cuban territory, nor point of making a declaration on that issue and in our airspace, nor in our ports. continuing its consideration after the speech of A.I. MIKOYAN. There is no doubt that a After we have finished our consideration of comrade Fidel Castro. However, I have already verification can be carried out on open sea too, the issues which concern us, we could move to a spoken about that. I think that we will not make but does not bear relation to Cuba. consideration of our tasks in the near future. We a declaration on that topic and we will respect would like for the new steps which stand before us each other’s position, maintaining our own opin- O. DORTICOS. It seems to me that now we to be agreed with the Soviet government. We ions on this issue. should interrupt our work. We can agree upon believe that after the elections in the USA it will Concerning the proposals about inspections further meetings through Ambassador Alekseev. be possible to make a joint statement of the Soviet in the USA and other countries of the Caribbean government and the government of Cuba or to Sea, this proposals accords with the plans of U Ambassador Alekseev was also present on make separate, but simultaneous statements. Thant, we support it, and we can envisage it in the the Soviet side. The Cuban government unilaterally will de- draft of the protocol which we will propose to the clare that it opposes any surveillance of its terri- Americans. To this point it is mentioned there in Recorded by V. Tikhmenev tory, airspace and ports aimed at inspection of the a somewhat general form. I spoke about it with U [signature] dismantling and removal of “offensive” weapons. Thant, since this question seemed interesting to However, we are ready to consider U Thant’s us. Although the Americans may support such a [Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, proposal about the possibility of inspection or proposal regarding to other countries, they will obtained and translated by NHK television, copy verification on Cuban territory under the condi- not allow observers at home. If you agree with provided by Philip Brenner; translation (by tion of a simultaneous inspection on the territory this point in the draft of the protocol, then it could Aleksandr Zaemsky) has been slightly revised.] of the USA, Guatemala and in other countries of occupy a place in our joint proposals. the Caribbean basin upon the coming into force of On the basis of a conversation with U Thant * * * * * an agreement on the liquidation of the conflict in I came to the conclusion that a coordinated dec- this region. Of course, we have no right to oppose laration will not satisfy the Americans and that Document IV: inspection on the open seas. That is not in our they will call for declarations from each of the “The USA wanted to destroy us physically, competence. We would like Comrade Mikoyan sides. However, form is not the main thing. It is but the Soviet Union with Khrushchev’s to understand why we oppose inspections in Cuba. necessary to coordinate our positions so that both letter destroyed us legally”— It is not just a matter of thoughts of legal proce- our and your representatives in New York could Mikoyan’s Meeting with Cuban Leaders, dure. The political side of the issue also has great act in a coordinated manner. 5 November 1962 (evening) significance. Such is our position. The draft of the document with which you The are other issues of concern to us, but we are familiar is not limited to U Thant’s plan, but Copy would not want to mix them up with the current it would still be possible to revise it. U Thant has Top Secret question. Therefore we would be glad to hear said that it would be possible to make more Comrade Mikoyan’s opinion. concrete the part of the document in which the MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION plan for the presence of the UN in the Caribbean A.I. MIKOYAN. The variant which in- Sea region is noted. U Thant, referring to such A.I. Mikoyan with Oswaldo Dorticos, Ernesto cludes inspection on ships which are being states like the USA, Cuba, and a range of other Guevara, and loaded—that is my initiative. I have already told states of Central America, believes it would be Carlos Rafael Rodriquez you that I had no authority to put forth that possible to do this. This could be done in the text. proposal. We understand your position. It seems This issue of coordinated observation by repre- to me that we have made our position clear to you. sentatives of the UN on the territory of the USA, Evening 5 November 1962 We are informing the CC CPSU and the Soviet Cuba, and other countries of Central America government about your position on this issue. As could be reflected in the protocol. In this case we far as a declaration is concerned, then I don’t see would be starting from a common position. How- After mutual greetings, Com. Dorticos said the point for either you or we to make a declaration ever, thus far we do not know your attitude to the 106 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN given document. the countries. And what is your opinion, Com- both from the territory of the USA and from the Comrade Kuznetsov, who is located in New rades? territory of the neighboring states of Cuba.” This York, asked me to find out the opinion of the type of formulation seems to give the USA the Cuban comrades. Not knowing your opinion, O. DORTICOS. I agree. Consequently we right to determine the actions of other states. Comrade Kuznetsov has been deprived of oppor- should strike article 13. tunities to speak with U Thant and the Americans. [Ed. note: Article 13 of the draft protocol A.I. MIKOYAN What are you going to do read: “The Government of the Republic of Cuba about that? They are satellites. Maybe another A.I. ALEKSEEV. This would give us the agrees to allow onto the territory of Cuba confi- editing will tie them even more. So far we have possibility to work out a common position in dential agents of the U.N. Security Council from no other version, but it is possible to think about regard to other articles of the protocol as well. the ranks of representatives of neutral states in it. The 5th article contains clauses which have a order so that they can attest to the fulfillment of similar nature. However, international law al- O. DORTICOS. We reviewed the text of the obligations vis-a-vis the dismantling and carry- lows similar formulations. protocol immediately after it was given to us, i.e., ing away of the weapons mentioned in article 9 of [Ed. note: Article 5 of the draft protocol even before the conversation with Comrade the present Protocol.” Draft Soviet-American- read: “The Government of the USA declares that Mikoyan. We have no fundamental objections. It Cuban protocol (unoffical translation), 31 Octo- the necessary measures will be taken to stop, both seems to me that in the protocol there is one ber 1962, Russian Foreign Ministry archives.] on the territory of the USA and on the territory of article about an inspection in Cuba. It would other countries of the Western hemisphere, any make sense to work out the issue of the conduct C.R. RODRIGUEZ. And change article 10. sort of underground activity against the Republic of a one-time observation both in Cuba and in the [Ed. note: Article 10 of the draft protocol of Cuba, [including] shipments of weapons and United States and in other countries of Central read: “The Government of the USSR, taking into explosive materials by air or sea, invasions by America. In view of the information which was account the agreement of the Government of the mercenaries, sending of spies and diversionists.” given by Com. Mikoyan yesterday, we believe Republic of Cuba, from its side agrees that con- Draft Soviet-American-Cuban protocol (unoffi- that we will not have any major objections to the fidential agents of the [UN] Security Council cial translation), 31 October 1962, Russian For- document. from the ranks of representatives of neutral states eign Ministry archives.] have attested to the fulfillment of obligations vis- C.R. RODRIGUEZ. I have doubts whether a-vis the dismantling and carrying away of the C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. That is so, if the proposed formula regarding the fact that the weapons mentioned in Article 9 of the present the governments of those countries will not ob- USA is obliged to secure inspections in Central Protocol.” Draft Soviet-American-Cuban proto- ject. However, Guatemala will oppose this pro- American countries is lawful. col (unofficial translation), 31 October 1962, posal. The situation will change, and the USA Russian Foreign Ministry archives.] will refuse its obligations. E. GUEVARA. That formula really causes doubts. A.I. MIKOYAN. In the 10th article some- A.I. MIKOYAN. In Kennedy’s message thing is said about Cuba? pretty much the same thought is expressed, but A.I. MIKOYAN. It is still possible to do the use of a phrase like “I am sure, that other some serious editing work. E. GUEVARA. Yes. I would like to add that countries of the Western Hemisphere will not Despite the fact that the Americans may not it seems to me that it makes sense to take into undertake aggressive actions...” Approximately accept the proposals contained in the document, account the points which we made about the in such a form. Comrade Carlos Rafael it will be advantageous for us to have a common form. The document signed by the representa- Rodriguez’s observation is just. But it is neces- position and to link it with U Thant’s plan. Even tives of three countries cannot determine the list sary to think up something. The Americans may if the Americans will be against it. The inspection of countries in which observers from the UN or say that this is an issue for each of these countries. will not be unilateral, it will be multilateral, so it the Security Council should be present. Let’s take a look at the formulation in Kennedy’s evidently doesn’t bother you. Whether or not the message. document will be accepted, it can still have great A.I. MIKOYAN. Maybe in this article significance. references should be limited to the USA and ALEKSEEV. In this message it is said that The idea belongs to U Thant. It is Cuba, and stipulate that other countries can be “I am sure that other countries of the Western possible to specify the list of countries which will included upon the agreement of their govern- Hemisphere will be ready to proceed in a similar be listed in this document. For example, Cuba, ments. So, for instance, from the direction of manner.” the USA, Guatemala and others. It seems to me Guatemala they constantly will be threatening that it makes sense to think over this issue. It aggression. It would be advisable to point out that C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would be would be an advantageous position. The Ameri- fact. It would be possible to ask the Security possible to propose approximately this formula- cans will be opponents of such a proposal, since Council to set the list of countries. It could do this tion: “The Security Council will undertake mea- they do not want to allow inspections on the in article 15, there where U Thant’s plan is sures so as not to allow aggression against Cuba territory of the USA. However, even our posing mentioned. We could leave the article without from the countries of the Caribbean, and also the of this issue will have great political significance. changes or note that the countries are to be deter- use of weapons and the territory of these coun- It is difficult to say how this will end, but the mined by the Security Council. It seems to me tries for the preparation of such aggression.” It struggle for acceptance of these proposals should that it is important to preserve the reference to U also would make sense to note that the “USA will bring us a victory. Thant’s plan. take upon itself the obligation that no prepara- In this way we see that the protocol does not tions will be conducted on its territory or with the prompt objections if does not speak about the C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would be assistance of its weapons...” It would be possible necessity of striking articles about inspections of possible to make many editorial changes here. to work out this variant. the dismantled weapons as applied to Cuba. There, So, for example, in the 3rd article it is said that where it speaks about multilateral inspection, it “the Government of the USA will restrain those A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes. This variant really is seems to me that it would be necessary to name who intend to undertake aggression against Cuba interesting. It is important to note that the USA COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 107 acts not only from its own territory. This is a very mise for them. We should use this compromise. are concerned, this inspection would refer to the important point for Cuba. It was not easy for the United States to make it. areas where camps for the training of counter- revolutionary mercenaries for aggression against DORTICOS. It is necessary to work on the ALEKSEEV. We should not miss this op- Cuba are set up. The inspection could be ex- editing of this document. We are not prepared portunity. tended to part of Florida, not touching, naturally, for this today. Here, it is necessary to think about Cape Canaveral. It is also necessary to organize the form, and also to work on the editing of this A.I. MIKOYAN. I am trying to evaluate the an inspection of camps in Puerto Rico, on the document, although we are essentially in agree- situation which flows from your positions. McCloy island of Vieques and in certain other territories, ment with this document and understand how said that he gives his word that the camps will be i.e., the inspection will touch not the entire terri- important it is to achieve success. We can work liquidated, that there will be no preparations for tory of the mentioned countries, but rather those a little bit together, significantly improving the aggression. This type of declaration has signifi- regions where these camps exist. formulation, but it makes sense to do it quicker. cance even in oral form. When the world knows, it will be uncomfortable for them not to fulfill A.I. MIKOYAN. It is immediately evident ERNESTO GUEVARA. In essence we are their promises I think, that it would be useful for that Carlos Rafael Rodriquez is a great specialist in agreement with this document. you, comrades, to think about issues of mutual on these issues. In this way we could drive the tactics. Let’s say that the USA will not agree to aggressors into a corner. It is important to find an DORTICOS. Naturally, we have to over- inspection on its territory. However, as it seems appropriate formulation. This variation repre- come certain language difficulties, too. A more to me, it would be important to organize observa- sents a big step forward. Maybe tomorrow [So- careful editing of the document evidently is tion on the territory of Guatemala, the Dominican viet officials] Bazykin and Alekseev will meet necessary in both languages. Republic, and certain other territories with the with some of you and confer on editorial issues. assistance of the UN representatives. It will be important to have this document imme- A.I. MIKOYAN. That is good. Our Min- It seems to me that it would be important to diately following the elections in the USA. We istry of Foreign Affairs is waiting for a commu- arrange for inspection in the countries of Central will take the initiative, and we will not allow the nication about your attitude towards this docu- America. Is Cuba interested in this? What are the Americans to capture it. Perhaps the Security ment. Com. Kuznetsov also requested a clarifi- positive and negative sides of this type of pro- Council can be convened on the 7th or 8th of cation of your position on this issue. Now we posal? I am in no way an authority on issues of November. could report about the principal agreement, ex- Central American policy, but it seems to me that cluding article 13, thoroughly editing article 5, it would be important to secure the presence of the ALEKSEEV. According to my information and bearing changes in article 3 regarding the UN there, in order to mitigate the significance in this will be done on the 6th. USA’s position in respect to the countries of this region of the OAS and the Organization of Central America. After our report about your Central American States. Comrades, have you DORTICOS objects. fundamental agreement, but the MFA and also thought about this issue? It will be easier for you our representative at the UN will be able to begin to decide, than for us. Could the following situa- GUEVARA objects. work. Maybe we could present our variant tion come to pass? They will say to us, that tomorrow. inspections of the Central American countries are A.I. MIKOYAN. U Thant told me that on 6 possible, but they cannot be realized on the terri- November the Security Council cannot be con- C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. The formula- tory of the United States of America. Would you vened: we will argue. There are protocol issues tion of article 5 bothers me. agree to that or, in your opinion, is that type of a here, and declarations, and procedures. We resolution not interesting to you, if it does not mustn’t underestimate the importance of the A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes. It encroaches on the extend to the USA? This would be important for struggle in the UN and the opinions of the mem- sovereignty of the countries of Central America, us to know in order to work out a joint tactic. It is ber states. but the governments of those countries are con- clear that the USA will figure on the list. Or ducting a very bad policy. perhaps an agreement can be reached on inspec- DORTICOS. We believe that it is possible tion in Central American countries, while the to act in the following way. Let us undertake a DORTICOS. We will try to prepare our USA will be limited only by the declaration. You thorough revision of the document, and we will variant by tomorrow. could give your answer to my questions not today, try to do it quicker. Right after we have prepared but tomorrow. it, Comrades Bazykin and Alekseev can meet A.I. MIKOYAN. Working out this docu- with our representatives in order to consider ment, we are thinking about providing for the DORTICOS. If inspections of the USA will editorial issues. security of Cuba. It seems to me that it is not be excluded, then in the same way inspections of There is information from Comrade [Carlos possible to limit the declaration about non-ag- Cuban territory will be excluded too. M.] Lechuga [Hevia], our new representative at gression to the United States only. The United the UN, regarding the fact that U Thant is inclined States of America can push other countries to- A.I. MIKOYAN. You could thoroughly to put off the convening of the Security Council. wards aggression and provide help to them in consider this issue, and then inform us of your It is possible that his session won’t even be this aggression, while remaining on the sidelines decision. week. U Thant is interested in holding bilateral itself. We have to oblige the United States to meetings before convening the Security Council. fulfill Kennedy’s promise. Com. Carlos Rafael C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. It would make Besides this, now we are entering a pretty compli- Rodriguez is entirely right. It is not of course a sense to specify the terms of the multilateral cated time: in the recent hours the USA has begun matter of these governments, rather, the impor- inspections as they apply to Cuba. It should spell to create even more tension, not only in relation tant thing is in the essence of this issue. Kennedy out the fulfillment of the obligation which the to the IL-28 bombers, but has also announced on this issue came to meet us. We demanded that Soviet Union has accepted on itself, i.e. verifica- unlimited airborne surveillence. not only the USA would give its word about non- tion of the dismantling and evacuation of the This is dangerous. We will consider what to aggression, but its allies too. This is a compro- Soviet missiles. As far as the rest of the countries do under conditions of a renewal of provocations 108 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN from the air. Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in E. GUEVARA. I think that the Soviet Turkey—ed.], and second, the open concession. policy had two weak sides. You didn’t under- A.I. MIKOYAN. You, Comrade Dorticos, It seems to me that this bears objective witness to stand the significance of the psychological factor possess trustworthy information. We told U the fact that we can now expect the decline of the for Cuban conditions. This thought was ex- Thant that it would be good if the Security Coun- revolutionary movement in Latin America, which pressed in an original way by Fidel Castro: “The cil were convened after the elections. I already in the recent period had been greatly strength- USA wanted to destroy us physically, but the said that when we withdraw the strategic missiles ened. I have expressed my personal opinion, but Soviet Union with Khrushchev’s letter destroyed and present evidence of that fact, we will be able I have spoken entirely sincerely. us legally [iuridicheskii].” to begin to speak about something else. Maybe tomorrow in the first half of the day A.I. MIKOYAN. Of course, it is necessary A.I. MIKOYAN. But we thought that you the comrades will work on editing the document, to speak sincerely. It is better to go to sleep than would be satisfied by our act. We did everything and after lunch we will organize an exchange of to hear insincere speeches. so that Cuba would not be destroyed. We see your opinions. readiness to die beautifully, but we believe that it I would also like to propose that we not E. GUEVARA. I also think so. Cuba is a isn’t work dying beautifully. publish a report about every meeting. It seems to country in which the interests of both camps meet me that there is no point in doing this today, and head on. Cuba is a peace-loving country. How- E. GUEVARA. To a certain extent you are in general it would make sense for us to come to ever, during the recent events the USA managed right. You offended our feelings by not consult- an agreement about this. to present itself in the eyes of public opinion as a ing us. But the main danger is in the second weak peace-loving country which was exposing ag- side of the Soviet policy. The thing is, you as if DORTICOS agrees with Comrade gression from the USSR, demonstrating courage recognized the right of the USA to violate inter- Mikoyan’s proposal. and achieving the liquidation of the Soviet base in national law. This is great damage done to your Cuba. The Americans managed to portray the policy. This fact really worries us. It may cause A.I. MIKOYAN. When we complete the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba as a manifes- difficulties for maintaining the unity of the so- evacuation of the missiles, many issues will be tation of aggressive intentions from the Soviet cialist countries. It seems to us that there already seen in a different light. While we still have not Union. The USA, by achieving the withdrawal of are cracks in the unity of the socialist camp. withdrawn them, we must maintain a different Soviet missiles from Cuba, in a way received the line. For that, 5-6 days are necessary. It is right to forbid other countries from making bases A.I. MIKOYAN. That issue worries us too. necessary to hold the line; otherwise they will available. Not only many revolutionaries think We are doing a lot to strengthen our unity, and accuse us of treachery. After we complete the this way, but also representatives of the Front of with you, comrades, we will always be with you evacuation, we will be able to adamantly oppose People’s Action in Chile and the representatives despite all the difficulties. overflights, the quarantine, verification by the of several democratic movements. Red Cross, violations of airspace. At that mo- In this, in my opinion, lies the crux of the E. GUEVARA. To the last day? ment the correlation of forces will change. recent events. Even in the context of all our It is necessary to get the UN on our side. We respect for the Soviet Union, we believe that the A.I. MIKOYAN. Yes, let our enemies die. must achieve more than was promised in decisions made by the Soviet Union were a mis- We must live and live. Live like communists. We Kennedy’s letter. We mustn’t underestimate the take. I am saying this not for discussion’s sake, are convinced of our victory. A maneuver is not value of diplomatic means of struggle. They are but so that you, Comrade Mikoyan, would be the same as a defeat. Compare the situation of a very important in periods when there is no war. It conversant with this point of view. year ago, and today. A year ago the presence of is important to know how to use the diplomatic Soviet soldiers in Cuba would have provoked an arts, displaying at the same time both firmness C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. Even before explosion of indignation. Now, it is as if the right and flexibility. your arrival, Comrade Mikoyan, immediately of Russians to be on this continent also is recog- after the famous decision of the Soviet govern- nized. That is good. McCloy even told me E. GUEVARA. I would like to tell you, ment was made, comrades from the editorial jokingly during a conversation that the presence Comrade Mikoyan, that, sincerely speaking, as a board of the newspaper “Popular” phoned me and of Russian officers [in Cuba—ed.] calms him consequence of the most recent events an ex- requested an interview. They wanted urgently to down. The Cubans could open fire without tremely complicated situation has been created in receive our declaration regarding the situation thinking, he observed. But Russians will think. Latin America. Many communists who represent which had developed, since the representatives of Of course, there could be objections to this re- other Latin American parties, and also revolu- the “third force” were actively opposing Soviet mark, but the psychological aspect is taken into tionary divisions like the Front for People’s Ac- policy. You know that group, it is deputy Trias. consideration. tion in Chile, are wavering. They are dismayed I gave an interview, not very long, since though I Sometimes, in order to take two steps for- [obeskurazheni] by the actions of the Soviet had been informed about the basic points in the ward, it is necessary to take a step back. I will not Union. A number of divisions have broken up. speech of Fidel Castro which should have taken in any way teach you, though I am older. You New groups are springing up, fractions are spring- place on November 1, I could not use them, and may say: it is time to consign it to the archive, ing up. The thing is, we are deeply convinced of in conclusion I observed that the development of request that we resign. the possibility of seizing power in a number of events in the coming days would show the signifi- Recently, I read Lenin. I want to tell you Latin American countries, and practice shows cance of the decisions that had been made. about this not for some sort of an analogy, but as that it is possible not only to seize it, but also to an example of Leninist logic. When the Brest hold power in a range of countries, taking into A.I. MIKOYAN. The meetings and conver- peace treaty was signed, Bukharin was working account practical experience. Unfortunately, sations with Comrade Fidel Castro had for me in the International Committee of the Party. Al- many Latin American groups believe that in the very great significance. They helped me to un- though he was repressed, I consider him a good political acts of the Soviet Union during the derstand more deeply the role of the psychologi- person. He tried, it happens, mistakenly, emo- recent events there are contained two serious cal factor for the peoples of these countries. tions had great significance for him. We were errors. First, the exchange [the proposal to swap friends (not in 1918, at that time I was working in COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 109 the Caucasus, but much later). And so the understand his reaction. Perhaps I let some ability to do that. Comrade Carlos Rafael International Committee accepted a resolution in clumsiness show, spoke in some kind of tone? Rodriguez pointed out the directions of the future which it was stated that the concession in Brest No, I, it seems, gave no grounds. I said that it is struggle. I like this way of framing the issue. Of was shameful. The point of Soviet power is lost. necessary to help U Thant. It is necessary to keep course, it is foolish simply to believe Kennedy, it The comrades accepted the resolution as if re- U Thant on our side. Comrade Fidel asked an is necessary to bind him with obligations. jecting Soviet power itself. Lenin wrote about appropriate question, why not conduct the verifi- this resolution: monstrous. How is it possible for cation on the open sea. But U Thant won’t gain C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. And with stra- such a thought even to occur to a communist? anything with the assistance of this type of veri- tegic missiles? But you know, at that time we practically had no fication. Today I became a victim of Fidel’s good armed forces, but those comrades wanted to die speech, evidently because I extemporaneously A.I. MIKOYAN. We cannot defend you heroically, rejecting Soviet power. put forth my idea. An old man, I have the with these missiles. I received the possibility to shortcomings of the young. visit you, while others could not do that. We had E. GUEVARA. Yes. I see that there is no to request the agreement of Canada, the USA to analogy here, but great similarities. E. GUEVARA. One day before that we said the overflight, and to overcome other difficulties. that there would be no inspections. Comrade They told us, for example, that we could not fly to A.I. MIKOYAN. There really is no anal- Mikoyan said that he had told McCloy that air- Canada without lead [escort?—ed.] planes. We ogy in this example. Imagine, Russia at that time borne inspections are inadmissible. had to receive visas. What could we do? That is was alone. We had no forces. There was some their right. Our Minister of Foreign Affairs sympathy from the working class of other coun- A.I. MIKOYAN. My proposal did not con- phoned the State Department and asked: Will tries, but sympathy alone doesn’t help much. cern even the shore. The subject was verification you give a visa to Mikoyan or not? Canada Cuba is powerful. You have no war. You have of our ships. Ships are sovereign territory. The delayed giving an answer, the Canadian minister the support of the socialist camp. It is true, your waters are yours, therefore we were trying to was absent, he was in New York. Other officials geographic situation is disadvantageous, com- elucidate your point of view. We didn’t touch the could not resolve that issue. Approval was granted munications are far extended. This is a weak land. We were talking about the waters. The land at 1:30 a.m., and at 3 a.m. we took off. But position. The Americans can disrupt communi- had nothing to do with it. Evidently I was naive. somehow we started talking about me. If Cuba cations and not allow the delivery of fuel to I thought that this variant was possible. Our was located in Greece’s place, we would have Cuba. We could have brought 200 million people ambassador, a young person, told me secretly: “I shown them. into the streets as a demonstration of protest. But think that the Cubans will accept this proposal.” I am satisfied by my meetings with you. The this would not have garnered any fuel for you. (To Alekseev): Don’t you speak for them. You business side is important. Basically, we have How can the blockade be disrupted? How are not a Cuban. come to an agreement on the protocol. Besides can it be broken? We have at our disposal global that, I must say that I thought that I understood the rockets. Using them would lead to nuclear war. C. RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. I have been Cubans, and then I listened to Comrade Ché and What do you say to this? Shall we die heroically? reading Lenin’s works for a long time. In the understood that no, I still don’t know them. That is romance. Why should revolutionaries present situation we need evaluations which cor- die[?] It is necessary to maneuver, develop the rectly reflect the situation. It is not a matter of ALEKSEEV: But Ché is an Argentinean. economy, culture, serve as an example of other feelings. These are the objective conditions in peoples of the countries of Latin America and Latin America. A.I. MIKOYAN, to Ché: Let’s meet and lead them to revolution. Lenin, in a complex In the first day of our conversations Com- talk a little. I would like to exchange some situation even agreed to the conduct of the con- rade Mikoyan spoke about two types of struggle. thoughts with you. It is not a matter of who will ference in the Prince Isles. Study Lenin. To die I think that in certain conditions the last word be victorious over whom. We must try to help heroically—that’s not enough. To live in shame belongs to the political struggle. In Latin America each other. I understood a lot. I understood how is not permitted, but nor is it permitted to give to after these events a feeling of demoralization important the psychological factor is in Latin the enemy your own destruction. It is necessary arose among the people. The nationalistic petit America. I am at your disposal. Every meeting to seek a way out in the art of diplomacy. bourgeoisie lost their faith in the possibility of is very useful for me. However you want it: one A barber comes to me in the residence with confronting imperialism. Diplomacy may change on one, two on each side, and so on. When I return a pistol, and I ask him: “You want to shave me the situation. Many people believe that if Kennedy to Moscow, I should have the right to say that I with a pistol? No, with a razor.” Or, a correspon- affirms his promises only orally, that will be understood the Cubans, but I am afraid that when dent from the newspaper “Oy” interviewed me, equivalent to a defeat. But if pressure will be I return I will say that I don’t know them, and in what a pleasant young man, also with a pistol. He applied by the Soviet Union, if Cuba will act fact I will not know them. has to take notes, but he lost his pencil. What can decisively, if we use U Thant and the neutral Our stake in Cuba is huge in both a material he write with a pistol? Do you understand me? If states to the necessary extent, if we insist on the and moral [sense], and also in a military regard. Kennedy maneuvers, dissimulates, conducts a acceptance of the demand re: verification of the Think about it, are we really helping you out of flexible policy, why don’t the Cuban comrades enemy’s territory, if we achieve acceptance of [our] overabundance? Do we have something use that weapon[?] You won’t manage to knock Fidel’s five points, we will gain a significant extra? We don’t have enough for ourselves. No, off the reaction with a pistol, the diplomatic art is victory. we want to preserve the base of socialism in Latin necessary too. An oral declaration of non-aggression defi- America. You were born as heroes, before a I was very satisfied by the conversation nitely will create a feeling of a defeat. revolutionary situation ripened in Latin America, with comrade Fidel Castro, but today I didn’t but the camp of socialism still has not grown into even know what to say regarding his reaction. A.I. MIKOYAN. I agree with Carlos Rafael its full capability to come to your assistance. We But I repeat that it was amazing. Maybe I spoke Rodriguez. Comrade Guevara evaluated the past give you ships, weapons, people, fruits and veg- foolishly, but before that I thought for a long events in a pessimistic tone. I respect his opinion, etables. China is big, but for the time being it is time. For me it has been morally difficult during but I do not agree with him. I will try during the these days. And today it was difficult for me to next meeting to convince him, though I doubt my continued on page 159 110 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

WARSAW PACT “LESSONS” Khrushchev decided not to give Castro any dural restrictions—at least for tactical mis- continued from page 59 direct jurisdiction over Soviet tactical nuclear siles—even after he received the two tele- will conclude with some observations about forces; indeed, the draft treaty on military grams “categorically” forbidding him to or- the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis for cooperation between the Soviet Union and der the issuance or use of nuclear weapons Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, a legacy Cuba, which was due to take effect once the without express authorization. On October that endured until the Pact itself collapsed in presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba was 26 he sent a cable to Moscow in which he 1990-91. publicly revealed at the end of October, would apparently mentioned that Castro wanted have left the “military units of the two states him to prepare for a nuclear strike and that, “Lessons” of the Cuban Missile Crisis under the command of their respective gov- as a result, he had decided it was time to Several features of the Cuban missile ernments.”11 Even so, the Cuban leader’s move nuclear warheads closer to the mis- crisis were of direct relevance to subsequent message on 26 October 1962 still struck a siles (though without actually issuing them Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Eu- raw nerve in Moscow.12 It was a vivid to the missile units). Pliev then requested rope. The “lessons” that Soviet officials reminder of the dangers that might have that his decision be approved and that he be derived from the crisis were of course not resulted if the Soviet Union had delegated given due authority to order the preparation the only factor (or even the most important any responsibility for nuclear operations. of tactical missiles for launch if, as appeared factor) shaping the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear A related lesson about the dangers posed imminent, U.S. troops invaded the island. command structure, but they seem to have by local actors pertained to the role of the Soviet leaders immediately turned down both been of considerable influence, at least im- commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, Army- of his requests and reemphasized that no plicitly. Although Soviet leaders had been General Issa Pliev, who was chosen for the actions involving nuclear weapons were to concerned well before the Cuban Missile post because of his long-standing and very be undertaken without direct authorization Crisis about the difficulty of retaining se- close friendship with both Khrushchev and from Moscow.16 cure control over nuclear weapons and about the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Still, the very fact that Pliev sought to the danger of unauthorized actions, the cri- Malinovskii.13 At no time during the crisis have the restrictions lifted, and his seeming sis put these risks into a whole new light.8 did Pliev have authority to order the use of willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons By underscoring how easily control could either medium-range or tactical nuclear mis- if necessary, provided a sobering indication be lost, the crisis inevitably bolstered siles, but it is now known that several weeks of the risks entailed in giving discretion to Moscow’s determination to ensure strict before the crisis—in the late summer of local commanders. The risks would have centralized command over all nuclear op- 1962—Malinovskii had considered the pos- been especially acute in this instance be- erations, including nuclear operations con- sibility of giving Pliev pre-delegated author- cause there were no technical safeguards on ducted by the Warsaw Pact. ity to order the use of tactical missiles against the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve as a One of the most disconcerting lessons invading U.S. troops if Pliev’s lines of com- fallback in case Pliev (or someone else) of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet munication with Moscow had been severed attempted to circumvent the procedural safe- perspective was the potential for nuclear and all other means of defense against an guards.17 This is not to say that it would have weapons to be misused if the aims of local invasion had proven insufficient. A written been easy for Pliev to evade the procedural actors were not identical to Soviet goals. It order to this effect was prepared on 8 Sep- limits—to do so he would have had to obtain is now known that at the height of the crisis tember 1962, but in the end Malinovskii cooperation from troops all along the chain Fidel Castro sent a top-secret cable to Mos- declined to sign it. Thus, at the time of the of command—but there was no technical cow urging the Soviet Union to launch a crisis Pliev had no independent authority to barrier per se to unauthorized actions. nuclear strike against the United States if order the use of nuclear weapons or even to Thus, one of the clear lessons of the U.S. forces invaded Cuba.9 Castro appar- order that nuclear warheads, which were crisis was the need not only to maintain ently had been led to believe that the Soviet stored separately from the missiles, be re- stringent procedural safeguards for all So- Union would be willing to go to war—and leased for possible employment. The limita- viet nuclear forces, but also to equip those risk its own destruction—in defense of Cuba. tions on Pliev’s scope of action during the forces with elaborate technical devices that Nikita Khrushchev’s response to Castro’s crisis were reinforced by two cables trans- would prevent unauthorized or accidental plea indicates that the Soviet leader had no mitted by Malinovskii on October 22 and 25, launches. This applied above all to nuclear intention of ordering the use of nuclear which “categorically” prohibited any use of weapons deployed abroad, where the lines weapons, regardless of what happened to nuclear weapons under any circumstances of communication were more vulnerable to Cuba. without explicit authorization from Mos- being severed or disrupted.18 For Khrushchev, this episode was es- cow.14 One further lesson from the Cuban Mis- pecially unnerving because he initially had The strictures imposed by the Soviet sile Crisis, which reinforced the perceived given serious consideration to providing leadership held up well during the crisis, as need for strict, centralized control over all Castro with direct command over Soviet the procedural safeguards for nuclear opera- nuclear operations, was the role that acci- forces in Cuba, including the nuclear-ca- tions proved sufficient to forestall any unto- dents played. The most conspicuous in- pable Frog (“Luna”) missiles and Il-28 air- ward incidents.15 For the most part, stance came on October 27 when an Ameri- craft.10 (Only the medium-range SS-4 and Khrushchev’s and Malinovskii’s faith in Pliev can U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot SS-5 missiles would have been left under was well-founded. Nevertheless, it is clear down over Cuba.19 The rules of engagement Moscow’s command.) As it turned out, that Pliev wanted to ease some of the proce- for Soviet troops in Cuba did not permit the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 111

WHEN AND WHY ROMANIA York for the opening of the UN General in Romania and offered the United States DISTANCED ITSELF FROM THE Assembly in the fall of 1963, a routine meet- any opportunity it wished to verify that fact. WARSAW PACT ing was arranged for October 4. Manescu (The absence of nuclear weapons accorded then arranged a private meeting with Rusk, with U.S. intelligence, and the United States by Raymond L. Garthoff attended only by an interpreter. It was the did not pursue the verification offer.) first opportunity after the crisis nearly a year In view of the sensitivity of the matter, In April 1964, the Romanian leadership earlier for the Romanian leadership to ap- any knowledge of this exchange was very issued a declaration in which it first ex- proach the United States government at this closely held in Washington, and no doubt in pressed public dissatisfaction with the War- level. Bucharest. It was not divulged to NATO saw Pact. Georghiu Dej, and after 1965 his Manescu told Rusk that Romania had governments. So far as is known, the Soviet successor Nicolae Ceausescu, increasingly not been consulted over the Soviet decision leadership did not learn of it—although that distanced themselves from the Pact and to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, and was remains to be determined from the Soviet Moscow’s leadership, although without chal- not therefore a party to the dispute. The archives. It did not “leak” in thirty years. I lenging the Soviet Union. Romania ceased Romanian government wanted the United do not know if there is today any written to participate actively in the military com- States to understand that Romania would account in either American or Romanian mand of the Warsaw Pact after 1969. All of remain neutral in any conflict generated by archives. this small slice of history has, of course, such actions as the Soviet deployment of I was told about the exchange by Dean been well known. It has not been known nuclear missiles in Cuba, and sought assur- Rusk soon after it occurred, and I recon- why Romania launched itself on that path at ances that in the event of hostilities arising firmed this account of it with him in 1990. It that particular time. Above all, seemed to me that with the col- it has not heretofore been known lapse of the Warsaw Pact, the that even earlier Romania es- overthrow of the Romanian gov- sentially repudiated its alle- ernment, and the reunification giance obligations in a secret of Europe, the matter is now approach to the United States safely history, and should be- government in October 1963, come a footnote to the historical promising neutrality in case of record. the outbreak of war. This was a It may be instructive, as stunning, unilateral breach of the well as interesting, history. For central obligation of Warsaw example, as far as I am aware no Pact alliance membership, which one has ever speculated on a Romania nominally maintained relationship between the Cuban until the very end, when the Pact Missile Crisis and the Roma- dissolved in 1991. nian actions in distancing them- What precisely happened, selves from the Warsaw Pact. It and why? The precipitating is also interesting to reflect that event was the Cuban Missile despite that crisis and other se- Crisis of October 1962. The vere trials, the two alliances did tensions generated by that crisis hold together throughout the had reverberations throughout Cold War, and with relatively Europe. No country wanted to be brought from such a situation, the Unites States would little evident concern over the risks involved, into a war over the issue of Soviet missiles in not strike Romania on the mistaken assump- even in other countries hosting nuclear weap- Cuba. But while members of NATO and the tion that it would be allied with the Soviet ons of the superpowers. Thus, remarkable Warsaw Pact dutifully gave public support Union in such a war. as was the Romanian case, it was the sole to the United States and the Soviet Union, Secretary Rusk in response indicated exception to alliance solidarity—assuming respectively, some did so with considerable that the United States would take into ac- the archives or informed officials do not trepidation. And in Bucharest, the leader- count any country that did not participate in have any other case, on one side or the other, ship decided after that crisis that it would or permit its territory to be used in military to reveal. seek to disengage itself from any automatic actions against the United States or its allies. involvement if their superpower alliance In this connection, he said that it would be Raymond L. Garthoff, a Senior Fellow at the leader, the Soviet Union, again assumed important for the United States to know Brookings Institution, is a retired Ambassa- such risks. whether there were nuclear weapons on Ro- dor and a diplomatic historian. He dis- Romanian-American relations at that manian soil, and that if the United States closed this episode from the history of the time were minimal. Nonetheless, when were given assurance that there were none, Cold War in remarks at the January 1993 Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu that fact would be taken into account in U.S. CWIHP Moscow Conference on New Evi- Manescu asked to meet with the Secretary of targeting. The Romanians subsequently re- dence on Cold War History. State Dean Rusk, when both were in New sponded that there were no nuclear weapons 112 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN downing of American planes except those even the Romanian military was eventually of an emergency.25 After the Cuban Missile carrying out an attack.20 When the U-2 was supplied with nuclear-capable Frog-7 and Crisis, those two agreements were supplanted shot down, no one in Moscow was quite sure Scud-B missiles. In all cases, the deploy- by a much more far-reaching “Treaty Be- what had happened—Khrushchev and most ment of these delivery vehicles was well tween the Governments of the USSR and others mistakenly thought that Castro had under way by the time of the Cuban Missile CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat ordered Soviet troops to fire at the plane— Crisis. Readiness of Missile Forces,” which was but everyone was certain that further inci- The new East European weapons were signed by Malinovskii and his Czechoslo- dents of this sort might cause the crisis to officially described as components of the vak counterpart, Army-General Bohumir spin out of control. The risks posed by “Warsaw Pact’s joint nuclear forces” and Lomsky, in December 1965.26 The treaty accidents would have been especially great were later used for simulated nuclear strikes provided for the permanent stationing of if the local commander (i.e., Pliev) had been during Pact exercises, but all nuclear war- Soviet nuclear warheads at three sites in given independent authority to order the use heads for the delivery systems remained un- western Czechoslovakia. of nuclear weapons. After all, Pliev and der exclusive Soviet control, and the deliv- This third agreement with Czechoslo- other officers based in Cuba, whose lives ery vehicles themselves would have come vakia was concluded just after the Soviet were directly at risk during the crisis, were under direct Soviet command if they had Union had worked out a similar arrangement naturally inclined to overreact to unintended ever been equipped with warheads during a with Hungary.27 The Soviet-Hungarian “provocations” from the opposing side. To crisis. Moreover, the thousands of tactical agreement was signed by Brezhnev and the the extent that such overreactions could not nuclear weapons deployed by Soviet forces Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, and was be avoided in future crises, it was essential on East European territory were not subject kept secret from almost all other Hungarian that the consequences be minimized and to any sort of “dual-key” arrangement along officials. Much the same was true of an that further escalation be prevented. Obvi- the lines that NATO established in the mid- agreement that the Soviet Union concluded ously, it would be vastly more difficult to 1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exercises with Poland in early 1967.28 Only a few top regain any semblance of control if local included combat techniques for nuclear war- Polish officials were permitted to find out actors “accidentally” resorted to the use of fare (as they routinely did from early 1962 about the document. The Soviet agreements nuclear weapons. on), the decision on when to “go nuclear” with all four countries covered nuclear war- Hence, the accidents that occurred dur- was left entirely to the Soviet High Com- heads slated for use on delivery vehicles ing the Cuban Missile Crisis underscored mand.23 In every respect, then, the East belonging to Soviet troops stationed in those the need for rigid safeguards, both proce- European governments had no say in the use countries. Some of the warheads were also dural and technical, to preclude the use of of the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal. intended for weapons deployed by the local Soviet nuclear weapons except in the most The exclusivity of Soviet command was armies, but in that case the delivery vehicles dire emergency. This lesson, like the others reinforced by secret agreements that the So- would have been transferred to direct Soviet that Khrushchev and his colleagues derived viet Union concluded in the early to mid- command. Under the new agreements East from the crisis, survived the change of lead- 1960s with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, European officials had no role in the use of ership in Moscow in October 1964. Al- Hungary, and Poland regarding the storage the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal, nor any though Leonid Brezhnev altered many as- of nuclear warheads in those countries. Al- control over the reinforced storage bunkers pects of Khrushchev’s military policies, he though all the agreements were bilateral, for nuclear warheads (or even the housing was just as determined as his predecessor to they were described as coming “within the for elite units assigned to guard the bunkers). retain stringent political control over Soviet framework of the Warsaw Pact.” The first A senior East European military official nuclear forces. such agreements were signed with East Ger- later confirmed that “the procedures for the many and Czechoslovakia before the Cuban defense and protection of these special-pur- Nuclear Operations and the Warsaw Missile Crisis. The Soviet-East German pose storage centers for nuclear warheads Pact agreements, signed at various intervals in the were such that no one from our side had Nuclear weapons first became an issue early 1960s, covered some 16 storage sites, permission to enter, and even Soviet offi- for the Warsaw Pact in mid-1958 when, all of which were controlled exclusively by cials who were not directly responsible for allegedly in response to deployments by special troops assigned to the Group of So- guarding and operating the buildings were NATO, Khrushchev warned that the Pact viet Forces in Germany.24 The East German not allowed in.”29 would be “compelled by force of circum- authorities had no say at all in the location or Thus, by the late 1960s the Soviet and stance to consider stationing [tactical maintenance of these facilities, not to men- East European governments had forged a nuclear] missiles in the German Democratic tion the use of the munitions stored there. nuclear command-and-control structure for Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.”21 Soviet agreements with Czechoslovakia were the Warsaw Pact that gave exclusive say to Shortly thereafter, the Czechoslovak, East somewhat more complicated because no the Soviet Union. Even before the Cuban German, and Polish armed forces began Soviet troops had been present on Czecho- Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders had been in- receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and sur- slovak territory since the end of 1945. Two clined to move in this direction, but the crisis face-to-surface missiles from the Soviet preliminary agreements were signed in Au- greatly accelerated the trend and effectively Union.22 The Bulgarian and Hungarian gust 1961 and February 1962 entitling the ruled out anything less than complete con- armies also soon obtained nuclear-capable Soviet Union to dispatch nuclear warheads trol in Moscow. aircraft and missiles from Moscow; and immediately to Czechoslovakia in the event COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 113

Intra-Pact Debate about Nuclear however, were averse to any steps that would officials from Romania, Czechoslovakia, and “Sharing” even marginally erode the Soviet Union’s Hungary renewed their bid for “greater rights The effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis exclusive authority to order nuclear strikes, of co-determination in planning and imple- could also be felt, if only implicitly, when and it soon became clear during the meeting menting common coalition matters,” includ- the Soviet Union had to deal with com- that Soviet views on such matters would ing (by implication) the use of nuclear weap- plaints from its allies about the Pact’s nuclear prevail. As a result, the PCC communiqué ons.40 arrangements. The lack of East European simply called for both German states to As on previous occasions, however, the input proved unsatisfactory to several of the forswear nuclear weapons, proposed the cre- Soviet Union resisted whatever pressure was allied governments, who urged that they be ation of a nuclear-free zone in central Eu- exerted for the sharing of nuclear-release given some kind of role in nuclear-release rope, and advocated a freeze on all nuclear authority. In September 1966, a few months authorization. Their concerns were prompted stockpiles.34 The implication was that ar- after the Bucharest conference, the Warsaw in part by changes in Soviet military doc- rangements within the Warsaw Pact were Pact conducted huge “Vltava” exercises, trine in the mid-1960s, which seemed to best left unchanged. which included simulated nuclear strikes open the way for a nuclear or conventional That stance was reaffirmed over the under exclusive Soviet control.41 The same war confined to Europe. Under Khrushchev, next few months in a series of conspicuous arrangement was preserved in all subse- Soviet military doctrine had long been predi- Soviet declarations that “the Warsaw Pact is quent Pact maneuvers involving simulated cated on the assumption that any war in dependent on the Soviet strategic missile nuclear exchanges. Thus, well before the Europe would rapidly escalate to an all-out forces” and that “the security of all socialist signing of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear exchange between the superpowers; countries is reliably guaranteed by the nuclear put a symbolic end to the whole nuclear- but by the time Khrushchev was ousted in missile strength of the Soviet Union.”35 The sharing debate, the Soviet Union had firmly October 1964, Soviet military theorists had same message was conveyed later in the year established its exclusive, centralized control already begun to imply that a European by the joint “October Storm” military exer- over the Warsaw Pact’s “joint” nuclear forces conflict need not escalate to the level of cises in East Germany, which featured simu- and operations. strategic nuclear war.30 Under Brezhnev, lated nuclear strikes authorized solely by the Soviet military analyses of limited warfare USSR.36 In the meantime, the Soviet mo- The Lessons of the Crisis and in Europe, including the selective use of nopoly over allied nuclear weapons proce- Allied Nuclear Arrangements tactical nuclear weapons, grew far more dures was being reinforced by the series of The legacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis explicit and elaborate.31 Although this doc- agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, helped ensure that the intra-Warsaw Pact trinal shift made sense from the Soviet per- East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, as debate in the mid-1960s did not bring about spective, it stirred unease among East Euro- discussed above. The codification of exclu- any change in the alliance’s nuclear com- pean leaders, who feared that their countries sive Soviet control over nuclear weapons mand-and-control structure. Had it not been might be used as tactical nuclear battle- deployed in the other Warsaw Pact countries for the dangers that were so clearly revealed grounds without their having the slightest all but eliminated any basis for the East by the events of October 1962, Soviet lead- say in it. European governments to seek a role in the ers might have been willing to consider an The issue became a source of conten- alliance’s nuclear command structure. arrangement for the Warsaw Pact similar to tion at the January 1965 meeting of the Yet even after the Soviet Union tried to the “dual-key” system that NATO adopted. Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Com- put the matter to rest, controversy persisted When Operation “Anadyr” was first being mittee, where the assembled leaders dis- within the Warsaw Pact about the allocation planned in the late spring of 1962, cussed NATO’s plans to create a Multi- of responsibility for tactical nuclear weap- Khrushchev had toyed with the idea of giv- Lateral Force (MLF) that would supposedly ons. At a closed meeting of Pact leaders in ing Fidel Castro broad command over So- give West Germany access to nuclear-armed East Berlin in February 1966, Romania again viet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba as well missiles. The PCC warned that if an MLF pressed for greater East European participa- as over all non-nuclear forces on the island. were formed and the West Germans were tion in all aspects of allied military planning, Ultimately, Khrushchev decided not to share included, the Warsaw Pact would have to and was again rebuffed.37 A few months or delegate any responsibility for the nuclear- resort to “defensive measures and corre- later, the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, capable weapons based in Cuba, but the very sponding steps.”32 The nature of these “cor- Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, publicly fact that the issue was considered at all responding steps” was never specified, but declared that the East European states should suggests that if the Cuban Missile Crisis had Romanian and Czechoslovak officials at the be given increased responsibility for the full not intervened, the Soviet Union might have meeting maintained that the obvious solu- range of issues confronting the Warsaw been receptive to some form of nuclear “shar- tion was for the Soviet Union to grant its Pact.38 That same week, a detailed Roma- ing” with its East European allies. Indeed, a Warsaw Pact allies a direct say in the use of nian proposal for modifications to the alli- “dual-key” arrangement for the Warsaw Pact, nuclear weapons stationed on East Euro- ance was leaked to the French Communist which would not have provided any inde- pean soil.33 The Romanians were especially newspaper, L’Humanite; the document called pendent authority to the East European coun- insistent on having responsibility shared for for, among other things, an East European tries, could easily have been justified as a all Warsaw Pact nuclear systems, including role in any decisions involving the potential response to NATO’s policy and as a useful those deployed with the various Groups of use of nuclear weapons.39 Subsequently, at means of strengthening allied cohesion. But Soviet Forces. Brezhnev and his colleagues, the July 1966 session of the PCC in Bucharest, after October 1962, when Soviet leaders 114 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN drew a number of lessons about the risks of tions by Fidel Castro—that this factor be- event that has traditionally been depicted as even sharing, much less delegating, nuclear came a paramount reason to deny any share a bilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Not authority, the prospects of adopting a “dual- of nuclear-release authorization to the East only must the Cuban Missile Crisis be thought key” system for the Warsaw Pact essentially European governments. Although East Eu- of as a “triangular” showdown; its repercus- vanished. ropean officials could not have ordered the sions can now be seen to have been at least Although Moscow’s willingness to use of nuclear weapons on their own, they as great for Soviet allies, notably Cuba and share control over the Warsaw Pact’s “joint” might have inadvertently (or deliberately) Eastern Europe, as for the Soviet Union nuclear arsenal would have been sharply taken steps in a crisis that would have caused itself. constrained even before October 1962 by NATO governments to believe that a War- the lack of permissive-action links (PALs) saw Pact nuclear strike was forthcoming 1. This statement is based on a perusal of documents from the East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish ar- and other use-denial mechanisms on Soviet (regardless of what actual Soviet intentions chives. See, e.g., “Odvolanie opatreni v zavislosti s nuclear weapons, that factor alone would were). That, in turn, might have triggered a usnesenim VKO UV KSC, 25.10.62 (Karibska krize),” not have been decisive if the Cuban Missile preemptive nuclear attack by NATO. Only 25 October 1962 (Top Secret), in Vojensky Historicky Crisis had not occurred. After all, when by excluding the East European states alto- Archiv (VHA) Praha, Fond (F.) Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany (MNO) CSSR, 1962, Operacni sprava Soviet officials seriously contemplated al- gether from the nuclear-release process could Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 8/25. lotting partial nuclear authority to Castro in the Soviet Union avoid the unintended esca- 2. “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh Vooruzhenykh Sil stran 1962, that was long before Soviet tactical lation of a crisis. Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Pravda (Moscow), 23 Oc- weapons were equipped with PALs. The The risks posed by a “dual-key” ar- tober 1962, p. 1. For the effects of the alert from 27 October through 23 November, see the series of top- physical separation of warheads from deliv- rangement could have been mitigated if the secret memoranda to the CPSU CC Presidium from ery vehicles, as had been planned for the Soviet Union had built in extra procedural Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii and the missiles based in Cuba, was regarded at the and technical safeguards, but this in turn Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Mikhail Zakharov, 5 time as a sufficient (if cumbersome) barrier would have created operational problems for November 1962, 17 November 1962, and 24 November 1962, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii against unauthorized actions. That approach Soviet troops who might one day have been (TsKhSD), F. 89, Opis’ (Op.) 28, Delo (D.) 14, Listy had long been used for tactical weapons ordered to use the weapons. If a future (Ll.) 1-8. deployed by Soviet forces in Eastern Eu- conflict had become so dire that Soviet lead- 3. “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh vooruzhenykh sil stran rope, and it would have been just as effica- ers had decided to authorize the employment Varshavskogo Dogovora,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 22 November 1962, p. 1. cious if a “dual-key” system had been of tactical nuclear weapons, they would have 4. See the account by the Hungarian charge d’affaires adopted—that is, if the East European armies wanted their orders to be carried out as fast as in Washington, D.C. in October 1962 (who later de- had been given control over the Pact’s possible, before the situation on the battle- fected), Janos Radvanyi, Hungary and the Superpow- nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. Not un- field had changed. By contrast, East Euro- ers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 137. til after the Cuban Missile Crisis was the pean political and military officials might 5. “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya option of relying solely on the physical have been hesitant about ordering the nuclear raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym separation of warheads and delivery ve- destruction of a site in Western Europe, not predstavleniyam,” Report No. 24762s (TOP SECRET) hicles deemed inadequate. In the latter half least because the launch of nuclear weapons from Col.-General P. Ivashutin, chief of the Soviet General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate, to Mar- of the 1960s, the Soviet Union began incor- against West European targets might well shal M. V. Zakharov, head of the General Staff Military porating electronic use-denial features into have provoked retaliatory strikes by NATO Academy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral’nyi arkhiv its strategic missiles, and the same was true against East European sites. The problem Ministerstva oborony (TsAMO), Delo (D.) 158, esp. of Soviet tactical weapons by the early to would have been especially salient in the Listy (L.) 352-353, 411-412, 423, and 400. I am grateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing me with mid-1970s. Concerns in Moscow about the case of East German officials who would a copy of this document. physical security of nuclear weapons were have been asked to go along with nuclear 6. This point is stressed in the top-secret cables adduced hardly negligible before October 1962—in strikes against targets in West Germany. in note 2 supra. part because of the possibility that requisite Thus, even though Soviet officials could 7. On the state of the Russian archives, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and procedures might not be followed—but it have developed a hedge against the risks that Pitfalls,” CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 1, 14-39. was not until after the Cuban Missile Crisis emerged during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 8. “Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya that Soviet leaders fully appreciated the the safeguards needed for this purpose would raketno-yadernoi voiny po sovremennym magnitude of this risk. have been extremely burdensome, depriving predstavleniyam,” pp. 332-333. 9. “Obmen poslaniyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym The Cuban Missile Crisis also height- the Pact of the ability to respond in a timely i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda,” ened Soviet concerns about the particular manner. From the Soviet perspective, it Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR (Moscow) dangers posed by crises. To be sure, Soviet made far more sense to circumvent the prob- 24 (31 December 1990), 67-80, esp. 71-73. leaders were hardly complacent before Oc- lem entirely by eschewing any form of shared 10. Ibid., 73-75. This point was reemphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyan during their conversations tober 1962 about the need to maintain tight authority. in November 1962. See “Zapis’ besedy A. I. Mikoyana political control over nuclear operations; It is ironic that the Cuban Missile Crisis, s prem’er-ministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitel’stva indeed, the stringent centralization of nuclear which barely involved the Warsaw Pact at Kuby F. Kastro,” 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and command was a consistent theme in Soviet all, would have had such an important long- “O besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro,” 20 November 1962 (Top Secret), both published in Mezhdunarodnaya military planning. Even so, it was not until term effect on the alliance. It is also ironic zhizn’ (Moscow) 11-12 (November-December 1992), after the Cuban Missile Crisis—and espe- that the actions of a third party, Fidel Castro, 143-147 and 147-150, respectively. See esp. 149. cially in light of the unexpected interven- posed one of the greatest dangers during an 11. It should be noted, however, that a decision to send COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 115

901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6 bombs to Cuba claim had already been contradicted by the Soviet Planungen des Warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: for the Frogs and Il-28s was not finalized until 8 officer who was in charge of the “central nuclear base” Eine Studie, February 1992, p. 5; for an English trans- September 1962, by which time Khrushchev may al- (i.e., the storage site for all nuclear warheads) in Cuba lation, see Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., “Warsaw ready have changed his mind about the command-and- during the crisis, Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations control arrangements. See “Nachal’niku 12 glavnogo testified in late 1992 that “nuclear weapons could have From the East German Archives,” CWIHP Bulletin 2 upravleniya Ministerstva oborony,” 8 September 1962 been used only if the missile officers had received (Fall 1992), 1, 13-19.. (Top Secret), Memorandum from Defense Minister R. orders via their own chain-of-command from the Gen- 28. Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (Potsdam), VA- Malinovskii and Chief of the General Staff M. Zakharov, eral Staff, and only if we, the officers responsible for Strausberg/29555/Box 155. in TsAMO, “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” storing and operating warheads, had received our own 29. “Dohoda CSSR-ZSSR o vzajemnych dodavkach F. 16, Op. 3753. It is eminently possible that the special codes. At no point did I receive any signals to vyzbroje a voj. techniky v rr. 1963-1965,” in VHA nuclear-capable weapons would not have been equipped issue warheads for either the medium-range missiles or Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 26/2. with nuclear warheads if they had been placed under the tactical weapons.” See Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi 30. “Dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvami SSSR i ChSSR Castro’s command. yadernyi kruiz,” 2. Beloborodov reemphasized this o merakh povysheniya boegotovnosti raketnykh voisk,” 12. “Dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvom Respubliki Kuby point several times during an interview with the author 15 December 1965, in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, i pravitel’stvom Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh in Moscow on 28 September 1994: “No nuclear muni- 1960-1962, OS/GS, 2/16. Respublik o voennom sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi tions of any type, whether for the medium-range or the 31. See the reports on “Hungary: USSR Nuclear oborone,” undated, Article 10. tactical weapons, were ever moved (byly dostavleny) Weapons Formerly Stored in Country,” translated in 13. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya (Mos- out of storage during the crisis. Nor could they have U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Nuclear Pro- cow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis,” been moved without my knowledge.” Beloborodov’s liferation, JPRS-TND-91-007, 20 May 1991, pp. 14- esp. p. 12. I am grateful to Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, account was endorsed by General Leonid Garbuz, the 16. for providing me with a copy of the 3,600-page tran- deputy commander of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962, in 32. “O przedsiewzieciu majacym na celu podwyzszenie script of his father’s memoirs. For an English transla- an interview that same day in Moscow. gotowsci bojowej wojska,” 25 February 1967, in tion of most of the account about the Cuban Missile 18. The exact contents of Pliev’s telegram on the 26th Centralny Archiwum Wojskowy, Paczka 6, Tom 234. Crisis, see Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost are unknown, but the numbering of telegrams that are 33. Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak General Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter and available makes clear that he sent at least two that day, Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, in Jan Bauer, “Jaderna Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and the second of which is the one in question. (His first munice: Asi tady byla,” Ceske a moravskoslezske Company, 1990), 170-183. telegram on the 26th, which was declassified in October zemedelske noviny (Prague), 4 July 1991, p. 1. 14. Maj.-General (ret.) V. Makarevskii, “O prem’ere N. 1992, pertained only to air defense operations against 34. See, for example, Col.-General I. Glebov, “Razvitie S. Khrushcheve, marshale G. K. Zhukove i generale I. possible U.S. air strikes.) The text of the Soviet operativnogo iskusstva,” Krasnaya zvezda, 2 April A. Plieve,” Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye leadership’s response to Pliev’s second cable is avail- 1964, pp. 2-3; and Col.-General S. M. Shtemenko, otnosheniya (Moscow) 8-9 (August-September 1994), able (see next note), and, combined with retrospective “Sukhoputnye voiska v sovremennoi voine i ikh boevaya 197. Makarevskii served for many years under Pliev’s comments by ex-Soviet officials, it suggests that Pliev podgotovka,” Krasnaya zvezda, 3 January 1963, 2-3. command. Pliev’s close friendship with Khrushchev referred to Castro’s efforts and requested authority to See also Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii et al., Voennaya and Malinovskii is overlooked in the jaundiced assess- move the warheads (though not yet authority for actual strategiya, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), 373- ment offered by General Anatolii Gribkov in Operation use). 374. This theme is also evident in “Razvitie voennogo ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cu- 19. “Trostnik—tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 76639 (Top iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voiny ban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 25-26. Secret), 27 October 1962, reproduced in Operation po sovremennym predstavleniyam,” passim. 15 . “Komanduyushchemu gruppoi sovetskikh voisk na ANADYR, 182. See also Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear 35. See, for example, Col.-General N. Lomov, “Vliyanie o. Kuba,” 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), in TsAMO, Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Sovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogo “Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” GSU GSh, Missile Crisis,” 46; and Pavlenko, “Bezymyannye iskusstva,” Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil 21 (Novem- F. 16, Op. 3753; reproduced in Operation ANADYR, motostrelki otpravlyalis’ na Kubu,” 4. ber 1965), 16-24. 183. For a discussion of this matter and relevant 20. Marshal V. F. Tolubko, “Glavnaya raketnaya sila 36. Cited in “Rech’ tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva,” citations, see Mark Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weap- strany,” Krasnaya zvezda, 19 November 1963, 1. Pravda, 25 September 1965, p. 2 (emphasis added). ons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Mis- 21. See Khrushchev’s comments on this point in 37. “Stenografische Niederschrift der Konferenz der sile Crisis,” CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 40-46, esp. Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, “Karibskii krizis,” p. 18. kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des 42-43, 46. 22. Army-General Yu. P. Maksimov et al., eds., Raketnye Warschauer Vertrages,” January 1965 (Top Secret), in 16. “Trostnik—tovarishchu Pavlovu,” No. 4/389 (Top voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya: Voenno- Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen Secret) from R. Malinovskii (Direktor), 22 October istoricheskii trud (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), 109-110. der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales 1962, reproduced in Operation ANADYR, 181. This Detailed first-hand accounts by high-ranking Soviet air Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, J IV, 2/202/130. directive was reaffirmed three days later after a request defense personnel who took part in the shootdown are 38. “O zasedanii Politicheskogo konsul’tativnogo for clarification from Pliev; see Lieut.-Col. Anatolii available in “Voina ozhidalas’s rassvetom,” Krasnaya komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” Krasnaya zvezda, 13 May 1993, 2. Dogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi zvezda, 6 November 1992, 2. See also Sergei Pavlenko, 23. The rules of engagement are spelled out briefly in pomoshchi,” Krasnaya zvezda, 21 January 1965, 1. See “Bezymyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis’ na Kubu the cable from Malinovskii to Pliev, as cited in also Colonel V. F. Samoilenko, Osnova boevogo soyuza: ‘stoyat’ nasmert’,” Krasnaya zvezda, 29 December Dokuchaev, “100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz,” 2. More Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoi moshchi 1994, p. 4. For further discussion and relevant citations, elaborate rules are specified in documents now stored in sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva (Moscow: Voenizdat, see Kramer, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Com- the Russian General Staff archive; see “Dokumenty po 1981), 259. mand Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 45-46. meropriyatiyu ‘Anadyr’,” in GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 39. See, for example, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, 17. In early 1994, General Anatolii Gribkov claimed 3753, D. 1, Korebka 3573. “Moguchii strazh bezopasnosti narodov,” Krasnaya that Pliev not only wanted to move several nuclear 24. Krushchev, Vospominaniya, Vol. IV, “Karibskii zvezda, 13 May 1965, 3; Marshal A. A. Grechko, warheads out of storage on 26 October 1962, but had krizis,” pp. 17-18. “Nadezhnyi shchit mira i bezopasnosti narodov,” actually issued orders to that effect without authoriza- 25. “Vystuplenie glavy Sovetskoi delegatsii Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil , No. 9 (May 1965), 13; tion from Moscow. See Operation ANADYR, 63, and Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. and Marshal A. A. Grechko, “Boevoi soyuz bratskikh Gribkov comments at a 5 April 1994 meeting at the Khrushcheva na Soveshchanii Politicheskogo narodov,” Pravda, 13 May 1965, 1. (emphases added) Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., orga- Konsul’tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov 40. “Informacna sprava o vysledkach cvicenia nized by the Cold War International History Project. Varshavskogo Dogovora 24 maya 1958 goda,” Pravda, ‘Oktobrova Burka’,” 16-22 October 1965 (Top Secret), However, Gribkov produced no evidence to back up his 27 May 1958, p. 3. in VHA Praha, F. Hlavna Politicka Sprava (HPS), 1965, assertion that warheads were actually moved out, and in 26. Thomas Wolfe, Soviet Power in Europe, 1945- HPS 1/2. a lengthy interview with the present author in Moscow 1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 41. “Konferenz der kommunistischen und on 29 September 1994 he said he could not be certain 1970), 150-151, 487-489. Arbeiterparteien die Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages: that Pliev had given such an order. Gribkov’s initial 27. Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Militarische continued on page 160