The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War

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Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War

LARRY G. GERBER

In April 1945, when Secretary of War Henry Stimson informed newly installed President Harry Truman of the existence of America’s secret project for the construction of an atomic bomb, he observed that the development of the atomic bomb entailed both great dangers and great opportunities for the United States and the world. Stimson warned that if the establishment of an effective international system for controlling atomic energy proved impossible after the Second World War, a “disaster to civilization” would likely follow. On the other hand, Stimson claimed that a successful resolution of the difficult and precedent-shattering problem of controlling atomic energy would create the “opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved.”’ In 1946 the United States offered the world a comprehensive plan for the international control of atomic energy. In June of that year Bernard Baruch presented to the recently created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) a proposal that called for bringing all forms of atomic energy under the control of an agency of the United Nations. The Baruch plan, however, was never adopted by the United Nations, and the terrible arms race in nuclear weapons that Stimson had feared became a reality that has persisted to the present day. The problem posed by the failure of the Baruch plan has been examined by a number of historians.2 Barton Bernstein states the

‘Henry L. Stimson, “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” Harper’s Magazine 194 (February 1947): 99-100. 2I would like to thank Martin J. Sherwin for suggesting that I study the Baruch plan and for sharing with me his copies of important manuscript sources. The official history of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 1939-1946, vol. 1, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, 1962), includes a very thorough and helpful narrative account of the origins and history of the Baruch plan. Other important works dealing directly with the Baruch plan include Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiationsfor Arms Control (Washington. 1961); Barton J. Bernstein, “The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and 69 70 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY widely held view that “neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was prepared in 1945 or 1946 to take the risks that the other power required for agreement.”’ In Joseph Lieberman’s opinion, long before Baruch ever presented the American proposals to the UNAEC, “irreplaceable opportunities” already had been lost for establishing the foundation upon which a successful control system might have been built.4 Most recently, Gregg Herken has argued that the Baruch plan was a product of the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 illusory belief that the atomic bomb could be used either diplomatically or militarily as America’s “winning weapon” in the emerging struggle with the Soviet Union. Bernstein expresses the generally shared conclusion that the breakdown in negotiations over the Baruch plan must be understood as a “symbol of the mutual mistrust in Soviet-American relations” and as both a “cause and consequence of the Cold War.”6 No one. however, has yet fully explained the way in which the attitudes and ideas of the man most responsible for developing the final American position on the international control of atomic energy, Bernard Baruch, affected the shaping of American policy in this crucial field. It is hoped that the analysis of Baruch’s thought presented here, including a careful examination of the significance of his concepts of national security and Wilsonian internationalism, will contribute to a fuller understanding not only of the Baruch plan but also of the larger question of how ideological considerations affected the emergence of the Cold War. First, it will be useful to review briefly the basic facts relating to the formulation of American policy on the international control of atomic

International Control of Atomic Energy. 1942-1 946.” Journal of American History 60 (March 1974): P. M. S. Blackett. Fear, War. and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (New York. 1949); Lloyd C. Gardner. Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970), esp. chap. 7. “Bernard M. Baruch: Atoms for Peace”; Gregg Herken. The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950 (New York. 1980); Joseph I. Lieberman. The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949 (Boston. 1970); Joseph L. Nogee. Soviet Policy Towards Control ofAtomic Energy (Notre Dame. IN. 196 1): and John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee. The Politics ofDisarmament: A Study in Soviet-Amencan Gamesmanship (New York. 1962). ’Bernstein. “Quest for Security.” p. 1044. ‘Lieberman. Scorpion and Taruntula. p. 126. Even before the United States finally came forth with a plan for the international control of atomic energy in 1946. previous actions by the United States already may have destroyed the possibility for a postwar agreement on this critical issue. America’s failure to keep Russia informed during the war about the development of the atomic bomb. the implied threat to Russia entailed in America’s use of the bomb against Japan. and the slowness with which the United States acted to initiate discussions after the war on the subject of international controls all lessened the chances for agreement on atomic energy by making the Soviets wary of American intentions. Martin Sherwin has argued persuasively that America’s “wartime atomic energy policies.’’ rather than ”promoting American postwar aims.” including the international control of atomic energy. actually “made them more difticult to achieve.” Martin J. Sherwin. A WorldDestroyed: TheAtomicBomband theGrandAlliance(New York. 1975). p. 238. JHerken. Winning Weapon. p. 5. “erstein. ”Quest for Security.” p. 1044. THE BARUCH PLAN 71 energy. Although developing an American plan for the postwar control of atomic energy was proposed by individuals both inside and outside of the government long before the first atomic bomb was successfully tested in July 1945, it was not until January 1946 that the first major step in the development of specific proposals took place.’ At that time Secretary of State James Byrnes appointed a committee headed by Undersecretary Dean Acheson to formulate an American plan that could be presented to Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 the UNAEC, which was about to be created. Acheson’s committee was assisted by a board of consultants that included David Lilienthal and J. Robert Oppenheimer.s The Acheson-Lilienthal report, which was produced as a result of the deliberations of these two groups, claimed that an effective control system could be established but that such a system had to go beyond a reliance on traditional concepts of international inspection. Instead, the report called for the creation of an Atomic Development Authority (ADA) that would take possession of all the earth’s uranium and thorium deposits, which then were the only known sources of atomic energy, and would own and operate all important facilities producing or utilizing atomic energy. The board of consultants, however, made a distinction between dangerous and nondangerous activities utilizing atomic energy, with the latter involving fissionable materials of insufficient quantity or quality for the construction of atomic weapons. According to the Acheson-Lilienthal pIan, no nation or private organization was to be permitted to engage in dangerous activities. Thus, no country would be allowed to operate atomic energy facilities that could be transformed into atomic weapons plants. Only the ADA would be able to operate such plants. Nondangerous activities, such as the medical use of small amounts of radioactive material, could be carried out by nations or organizations that received licenses from the ADA. The ADA, through a system of ownership, management, and licensing, would serve the dual function of preventing the clandestine construction of atomic weapons and fostering the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

‘Vannevar Bush and James Conant were the two most important men in the government to begin seriously thinking about the postwar problems of control and had an influence on Stimson’s taking up the issue. Stimson appointed an Interim Committee on 3 May 1945 to study and report on a number of problems relating to the atomic bomb. including “postwar research, development and controls.” This group, however, never made any investigation of or recommendations on the subject of international controls. Sherwin, World Destroyed, p. 169. 8The Acheson committee included General Leslie Groves, military chief of the Manhattan Project: John J. McCloy, former assistant secretary of war: Vannevar Bush, chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; and James Conant, president of Harvard. In addition to Lilienthal and Oppenheimer, the board of consultants included Chester Barnard, president of New Jersey Telephone; Charles Thomas, vice- president of Monsanto Chemical Corporation; and Harry Winne, vice-president of General Electric. 72 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The approach adopted in the Acheson-Lilienthal report was designed to provide the world with a definite, though limited, form of security. The ADA would distribute its atomic reactors strategically throughout the world, so that if any nation decided to seize the plants within its borders, it could not thereby gain a preponderance of atomic might. Furthermore, the board of consultants contended that the ADA would be capable of constructing its facilities in such a way that it would take at least one full Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 year to transform them into bomb-producing plants. This was the key to the Acheson-Lilienthal approach to the problem of safeguards. The world would be warned at least one year in advance of the possibility of any nation making atomic bombs. In that time the nations of the world could prepare to take appropriate action. At the insistence of the Acheson committee, the board of consultants added a section to their report that called for the implementation of their plan in stages. The ADA might begin by establishing the free interchange of certain types of scientific information or by conducting a worldwide geological survey of uranium deposits, thus building confidence in the feasibility of international control before proceeding to the actual ownership of raw materials and, finally, to the operation of atomic plants. Until the last stage of a fully effective control system was reached, the United States would have the right to retain its monopoly of atomic energy.9 At approximately the same time that the Acheson-Lilienthal report was being forwarded to Secretary Bymes, President Truman selected Bernard Baruch to be the U.S. representative to the new UNAEC. As his associates Baruch chose men who had no special competence in the field of atomic energy, but with whom he had worked when organizing the nation’s industrial mobilization efforts during the First and Second World Wars. His principal advisers were John Hancock and Ferdinand Eberstadt, both investment bankers; Herbert Bayard Swope, a journalist; and Fred Searls, a mining engineer. In the process of translating the Acheson-Lilienthal report into the final American proposal for controlling atomic energy, Baruch made three key changes. First, while the report had made a vague reference to the ultimate inclusion of some form of sanctions as part of a final control system, Baruch insisted on emphasizing at the outset of negotiations the necessity of establishing explicit provisions for sanctions, armed if needed, against any nation that violated the terms of an atomic energy treaty. Second. Baruch demanded that the imposition of sanctions not be subject to the veto power of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Finally, Baruch reduced the role of the ADA by qualifying the ADA’s authority over uranium and thorium deposits in the ground. Instead of

9The idea of implementing a control plan in stages was originally proposed by Bush in November 1945 when the United States. Great Britain. and Canada jointly called for the creation of a UNAEC. As a member of the Acheson committee. Bush remained in a key position to continue pressing for the adoption of such an approach. THE BARUCH PLAN 73 vesting the ADA with the power to own and operate all uranium and thorium- mines in the world, Baruch proposed that the ADA be restricted to exercising “control” or “dominion” over such mines through a system of inspection. Only after the critical sources of atomic energy were brought out of the ground would the ADA take legal possession of them. Baruch presented the American proposals to the first meeting of the UNAEC on 14 June 1946. Five days later Russian Ambassador to the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 UN Andrei Gromyko countered with a plan that virtually ignored the Baruch proposals. Gromyko called for a convention outlawing the use of atomic weapons and requiring the destruction of existing stockpiles three months after the ratification of such a treaty. Thus began the long and fruitless negotiations over the international control of atomic energy. Although a UNAEC subcommittee report affirming the technical feasibility of international control was unanimously adopted, the year’s negotiations ended in failure when the full UNAEC decided by a 10-0-2 vote (Russia and Poland abstained) to send the Baruch plan on to the Security Council for further debate. The failure to gain Soviet support in the UNAEC meant that Russia was certain to use its veto, if necessary, to block the implementation of the American plan for the international control of atomic energy. With the adoption of the UNAEC’s preliminary report, Baruch believed that his job had been completed. He submitted his resignation to President Truman at the beginning of 1947. Negotiations within the United Nations continued in subsequent years, but no agreement on atomic energy was ever reached. Instead, the world came to live with the continued insecurity and danger of an atomic arms race. The breakdown in negotiations over the international control of atomic energy was but part of the development of an all-encompassing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. A study focusing specifically on Bernard Baruch‘s role in the formulation of American policy in the field of atomic energy cannot yield a complete explanation of the causes of the Cold War. However, it can contribute to an understanding of this larger problem. Although Baruch enjoyed an unusual degree of independence as a policymaker and also exhibited what most observers agree was an inordinate sense of “inflexibility and vanity” in the handling of his job, Baruch’s personal shortcomings and idiosyncracies were not primarily responsible for the shaping of the ultimate American position on the international control of atomic energy.l0 Rather, the Baruch plan was a reflection of certain attitudes and assumptions that Baruch not only shared with other leading policymakers but also adversely affected the ability of these men to pursue policies that might have been

loBernstein. “Quest for Security,” p. 1044. Truman himself later complained that Baruch was primarily concerned with “whether he would receive public recognition.” Harry STruman, Memoirs: YearsofTrialandHope(GardenCity.NY,1956).p. 10. 74 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY more likely to result in a peaceful postwar accommodation with the Soviet Union. Bernard Baruch had a long and colorful career before being named by Truman to serve as U.S. representative to the UNAEC." Born in South Carolina in 1870 but raised in New York City, Baruch made a fortune on Wall Street while still a young man. He first rose to national prominence when Woodrow Wilson selected him to head the War In- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 dustries Board during the First World War. Baruch became one of Wilson's most trusted advisers and played an important role in the American Peace Delegation that helped draft the Versailles Treaty. During the twenties and thirties, Baruch returned to private life but spoke out publicly on many issues of national concern and regularly contributed large sums of money to the Democratic party and to individuals running for public office. With the outbreak of the Second World War, Baruch again served as an influential government adviser and troubleshooter who dealt with the problems of industrial mobilization. By the time of his appointment to the UNAEC. he had achieved a popular reputation as a wise, tough-minded. elder statesman as well as a degree of influence in Congress that was matched by only a few other individuals in the country. So great was Baruch's standing in Congress that his appointment was confirmed by the Senate without even a hearing. Truman, in fact, selected Baruch because he believed that Baruch's personal prestige would be helpful in gaining congressional support for administration initiatives relating to both the international control and domestic development of atomic energy.l*

"For background on Baruch. see Margaret Coit. Mr. Baruch (Boston. 1957): Bernard M. Baruch. Bancch: My Own Stay (New York. 1957): Bernard M. Baruch. Baruch: The Public Years (New York. 1960): and Lany Gerber. "The Limits of Liberalism: A Study of the Careers and Ideological Development of Josephus Daniels. Henry Stimson. Bernard Baruch. Donald Richberg. and Felix Frankfurter" (Ph.D. diss.. University of California. Berkeley. 1979). 121n his memoirs Truman recalled: "Bernard M. Baruch seemed to me to be the logical man. and for several reasons. Not the least important of these was that Baruch enjoyed considerable esteem in the Senate. His association with the administration's plan for the control of atomic energy might help remove some of the opposition to the McMahon bill in Congress [establishing domestic controls under civilian authority]. Baruch had also suc- ceeded. over the years. in forming many friendships abroad. including that of Winston Churchill. and during a long life he had acquired the prestige of an 'elder stateman.' I called on him in the expectation that he would also add weight to the proposal we were about to put before the world." Truman. Years of Trial. pp. 7-8. Commenting on Baruch's great influence in Congress. Franklin Roosevelt once observed that Baruch, in effect. "owned'' about sixty congressmen. R. G. Tugwell. The Brains Trusr(New York. 1968). p, xxviii. Not everyone greeted Baruch's appointment with enthusiasm. Both Lilienthal and Acheson opposed the selection of Baruch. and many of the atomic scientists reacted with shock because of Baruch's age. ignorance about the subject of atomic energy. and his "terrifying vanity." David E. Lilienthal. The Journals ofDavid E. Lilienthal. vol. 2. The Atomic Energy Years. 1945-1950 (New York. 1964). pp. 30, 39. 73; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York. 1969), p. 212. THE BARUCH PLAN 75

Baruch’s appointment won widespread approval because he was seen as being fully responsive to two general concerns that shaped the thinking of most American officials regarding the establishment of a new postwar world order. Baruch was thought of as both a hardheaded realist in his concern for the protection of America’s security interests and as a Wilsonian idealist in his faith in the possibility of creating a peaceful and stable international order based on American concepts of law and freedom. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 These two concerns proved crucial in determining Baruch’s final formulation of an American proposal for the international control of atomic energy.” Baruch’s approach to the problem of negotiating an agreement for controlling atomic energy was clearly affected by the sense of bargaining power that he and other top policymakers felt as a result of America’s atomic monopoly. Martin Sherwin has convincingly demonstrated that even before the end of the Second World War American foreign policy was based on the confident “assumption that the Soviet government would surrender important geographical, political and ideological objectives in exchange for the neutralization of the new weapon.”I4 Baruch, who incorrectly believed that America’s atomic monopoly was likely to last for many years, told Lilienthal as late as December 1946: “America can get what she wants if she insists on it. After all, we’ve got it and they haven’t and won’t for a long time to come.”15 The American insistence on implementing a control plan in stages so as to preserve America’s atomic monopoly for an indefinite period of time was predicated largely on the belief that the Russians would feel compelled to yield on this crucial point because of their weak bargaining position. Gregg Herken implies, moreover, that Baruch really may never have believed in the possibility of establishing an agreement with the Russians, and that Baruch, as well as Truman, probably found the “implicit threat of the atomic bomb” more appealing than the “promise” of creating a system of “mutual control” with the Russians.16 In Herken’s view, a sense of

‘)Baruch capsulized his own belief in the complementary nature of Wilsonian internationalism and national security mindedness when he remarked “To me, the cardinal lesson of Woodrow Wilson’s life is that idealism and realism are not in conflict.” Baruch, Public Years, p. 148. I4Martin J. Sherwin, “The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic-Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 194 1-1 945,” American Historical Review 78 (October 1973): 967-68. ”Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years, p. 123. I6Herken, Winning Weapon, p. 94. Herken shows that there was a definite hardening in Truman administration policy after January 1946. Immediately prior to that time, Bymes had tried to explore the possibility of adopting a conciliatory, bilateral approach toward the Soviets on the issue of atomic energy. Opposition to Byrnes’s policy from other members of the government and by Truman himself, however, led to the tougher stance adopted in early 1946. While Herken emphasizes the sense of bargaining power that Truman, Baruch. and other policymakers felt as a result of America’s atomic monopoly, perhaps the most important point of his study is his demonstration of the difficulty these men 16 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY aggressive overconfidence in the supposed military and diplomatic power of America’s “winning weapon” proved crucial in the shaping of America’s position on controlling atomic energy. While it is true, as Herken observes, that the “creators of the Baruch plan” sought. in effect, to establish international control of atomic energy “entirely on American terms-or not at all.” the hard-line American position cannot be fully understood fully if it is viewed solely as a product Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 of an overconfident sense of American power.” Certain fears and in- securities also played a role in shaping the Baruch plan. Prior to his easy Senate confirmation as U.S. representative to the UNAEC, Baruch privately reassured Arthur Vandenberg, the leading Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that he never would agree to “any atomic disclosures” or dismantling of existing bombs “without prior adequate and dependable safeguards and protection for [our] own national security at every stage” (emphasis added).lBThe way in which Baruch, Vandenberg, and ultimately Truman conceived of the nation’s security interests was vitally important. Daniel Yergin has argued persuasively that a new conception of “national security” became the “Commanding Idea” of American foreign policy after 1945. The new doctrine of national security adopted by the Truman administration entailed a fundamental expansion in the definition of America’s security interests so that “virtually every development in the world” came to be perceived as “potentially crucial” to the long-term survival of the United States. The doctrine gained its “full meaning,” according to Yergin, only when it “meshed” with a view of the Soviet Union as an unscrupulous and aggressive expansionist power bent on world domination. This was precisely the view of the Soviet Union that Baruch came to share with key policymakers in the administration like Soviet specialist George Kennan, White House adviser Clark Clifford, and President Truman himself. Consequently, in spite of the unprece- dented expansion of America’s economic and military power in the wake of the Second World War, American policymakers felt not “a greater sense of assuredness” but rather “an enlargement of the range of perceived threats” that had to be “urgently . . . c~nfronted.”’~The new concept of national security, in other words, was inherently anxiety producing and contributed to an underlying sense of insecurity which, paradoxically. went hand in hand with the actual increase of American power and responsibility in the world. had in effectively translating America’s atomic monopoly into actual diplomatic and political gains vis-a-vis the Soviets. In essence, the bomb was a dud in the field of diplomacy. I’Herken. Winning Weapon. p. 170. !*Arthur Vandenberg to Bernard Baruch. 19 March 1946. Baruch to Vandenburg, 21 March 1946. Papers of Bernard Baruch. Princeton University. Princeton, NJ (hereafter cited as BB MSS). I9Daniel Yergin. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Securiy State (Boston. 1977). pp. 193-96. THE BARUCH PLAN 77 The decision to insist on the preservation of America’s atomic monopoly until a complete control system had been established reflected not only a sense of bargaining power but also the view that American security in the postwar world had come to depend almost entirely on America’s atomic arsenal.Zo Administration officials believed that America’s rapid postwar demobilization of conventional forces meant that any premature unilateral atomic disarmament would leave the United Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 States in a dangerously weakened military position. Baruch certainly shared Truman’s belief that the United States ought not “under any circumstances throw away our gun until we are sure that the rest of the world can’t arm against US.''^' Baruch’s final formulation of the American position on controlling atomic energy also reflected certain deep-seated fears concerning America’s vulnerability if and when its monopoly of atomic weapons came to an end. Although Baruch and other top U.S. policymakers felt no immediate danger, they realized that the development of atomic weapons by other nations would destroy America’s long-standing immunity from foreign attack. The protection that had long been provided by America’s great ocean buffers would vanish once the Russians obtained atomic warheads and long-range bombers and missiles. The United States, in fact, would be particularly vulnerable to atomic attack because, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “atomic weapons’’ could be “most effectively used against highly developed nations having centralized industries,” such as the United States.zz Even if atomic warfare did not occur, the prospect of an atomic arms race in the future posed special problems for the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feared that the American people would be unwilling or unable to accept the “cost and disruption” resulting from the decentral- ization of industry that would become necessary as a measure of pre- paredness in the event other nations someday could threaten the United States with atomic weapons.z3 Chester Barnard, a member of the Acheson-Lilienthal board of consultants, echoed this view in a letter written to Walter Lippmann only a few days after Baruch first presented his proposals to the UNAEC. Barnard explained to Lippmann that “changes in American society of a radical character” would have to be made as soon as the United States learned that Russia had acquired its own atomic bomb. 20Herken presents a fascinating account of the confusion and lack of systematic planning that accompanied the growing reliance of American military planners on the atomic bomb. Few of these “planners” realized that as late as the spring of 1947 the United States had a stockpile of only about twelve atomic bombs. none of which was immediately ready for use. Herken, Win’ning Weapon, pp. 196-97. ”Harry Truman to Baruch, 10 July 1946. BB MSS. **Memorandumby the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 23 January 1946, U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, 1:739 (hereafter cited as FRUS. followed by appropriate year). 231bid..1:743. 78 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

There appears to me no defense against atomic weapons but the least vulnerable situation would be one in which populations and industries were widely dispersed and not concentrated as they are in this country and Great Britain. It is difficult to see how the requisite redistribution of our population and of our industries could be effected by anything less than a totalitarian type of control. . . . If the task were attempted

to be accomplished with speed instead of over a period of fifty or Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 seventy-five years. the destruction of real estate values and the losses of capital structures and goods involved would. I think, manifestly be so great as to overturn the entire economic system and to greatly lower the standard of living for a long time.24 Barnard thus feared that in a world faced with the threat of atomic war, American democracy would be unable to survive. The impact of the civil defense measures necessary to prepare for the possibility of atomic war would, he believed, “be almost as horrible as the effects of atomic bombing itself.” Barnard concluded that this prospect justified “the gamble that the American people have to take, to relinquish their present temporary superiority with respect to atomic weapons in return for agreements whose maintenance cannot be g~aranteed.”~~ A concern for American vulnerability led Barnard to argue that America had to make clear its willingness to surrender its atomic monopoly as part of a necessary “gamble” to win agreement on a plan for the international control of atomic energy. Similar fears led Bernard Baruch to a different conclusion. Rather than accept the need to take a calculated risk in order to reach an agreement with the Soviets, Baruch concluded that a system of ironclad protections had to be built into any treaty dealing with atomic energy because American vulnerability to atomic threats or attack would be so great if a control system requiring atomic disarmament by the United States ever broke down. Baruch’s perception of certain strengths within the Soviet system of totalitarian government and, perhaps even more importantly, his lack of confidence in the viability of American democracy in the atomic age, became crucial factors in his decision to demand that any control system include provisions for automatic sanctions that would not be subject to the veto of any nation in the United Nations. Baruch and other leading figures within the Truman administration feared that the Soviets actually might have certain advantages vis-a-vis the United States once they gained possession of atomic weapons. To begin with, the Soviet Union would be less vulnerable to the threat of atomic attack than the United States because its industries and population were more widely dispersed. Even more importantly, Baruch, like Byrnes, Clifford, Kennan, and others in the administration feared that the Soviet

’‘Chester Barnard to Walter Lippmann, 20 June 1946, Papers of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Library of Congress. ”Ibid. THE BARUCH PLAN 79 Union might be better able to handle the problems created by the develop ment of atomic weapons by virtue of the Soviet leaders’ total control over their own people, their ability to maintain extreme secrecy within their own country, and their lack of moral restraints in dealing with others. Kennan, in a memo written in July 1946 entitled “The Soviet Position with Respect to International Control of Atomic Energy,” argued that the Russians could hypocritically call for an immediate and total ban Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 on atomic weapons because they . . . are counting on the American conscience and on the merciless spotlight of free information and publicity in the United States, supplemented by the vigilance of the communist fifth-column, to guarantee the faithful fulfillments of such obligations on our part. At the same time, they are counting no less confidently on their own security controls to enable them to proceed undisturbed with the development of atomic weapons in secrecy within the Soviet Union. Not only did the Soviets’ “elaborate” system of “internal controls” give them the ability to develop a bomb in secret but also their lack of moral scruples meant, according to Kennan, that the “men in the Kremlin [would] never hesitate to use atomic energy as a means of extortion if they themselves had the exclusive possession of it.”26 By their very nature atomic weapons, according to the Joint Chiefs, increased “the incentive to aggression by enhancing the advantage of surprise” and, moreover, could “most easily be used in such fashion by authoritarian and totalitarian nations.”*’ Secretary of State Byrnes expressed the view held by Baruch, Kennan, and other administration figures: If the United States destroyed its bombs and agreed not to make any more and then desired later to violate our treaty obligations and make bombs, our alert and uncontrolled press would discover it and make public the violation of our pledge. But that is not possible in the Soviet Union. Should the Soviet Union . . . decide to build a plant and produce bombs, no one outside the Soviet Union would know it until the Red Army was ready to use them. That would be too late.28 Baruch’s insistence on the need for automatic sanctions and the elimination of the veto was a result not only of his fear of Russian duplicity but also of his concern that America would be unable to take the particular quick and decisive unilateral action that would be necessary if the United States were ever faced with the threat of a Soviet violation of an atomic energy agreement. Baruch later recalled that he considered the danger of

26Mernorandurnfor Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, 18 July 1946, FRUS, 1946.1:861-62. z7Mernorandum,23 January 1946, FRUS, 1946,1:743. Z8JamesF. Bymes, Speaking Frankly (New York. 1947), p. 274. 80 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

taking too much time to act as “the harshest single dilemma of a democratic society.” He noted that the need to gain majority support too often meant that democracies waited to act until a danger was already “on top of us or out of hand.”29 Baruch’s pessimism over the ability of American democracy to

respond quickly to crisis situations was an important factor in his op- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 position to relying solely on the protection provided by the warning system envisioned in the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Baruch and his associates believed that the authors of the report had put too much “faith” into the idea that the American people, on their own initiative, would “act quickly if some foreign nation [got] off the reservation” and violated an atomic energy treaty.30 Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower, in a letter to Baruch, also expressed the fear that there would be “practical difficulties in keying up the American people to accept even the necessity for immediate preventive military action with conventional weapons” in the event an “aggressor” chose to evade or interfere with the implementation of a control system for atomic energy. “Historically,” Eisenhower observed, the American people had been unwilling “to undertake decisive action” in the face of “threats of unmistakable import and seriousness,” and instead had tended “to indulge in wishful thinkir~g.”~’ Significantly, Baruch revised the Acheson-Lilienthal estimate that it would take at least one full year before any nation violating the proposed atomic energy treaty could begin producing bombs. Not only did he assert that the warning period would be only three to twelve months but he also claimed that such a brief warning period would be “almost zero . . . with our democratic proce~ses.”~~Therefore, Baruch thought that provisions for immediate and automatic punishment against any violator of an atomic energy pact were necessary, both as a deterrent to possible Soviet violations and as a means of protecting America from its own possible indecisiveness and lack of will. Baruch concluded that only a control system with automatic sanctions could ensure American security, because in the atomic age “while you debate you can be de~troyed.”’~

z9Baruch,My Own Story. pp. 105-6. In the aftermath of America’s rejection of the Versailles Treaty. Baruch had complained earlier to Woodrow Wilson: “To me it seems that no where is there any authority to say yes or no-Democracy does not give even a temporary authority to do what should be done in its own behalf. It must be made safe for itself.” Baruch to Wilson, 17 August 1923, BB MSS. JaMemorandumof discussion between Baruch, Hancock. Oppenheimer. and others, 5 April 1946. written by Hancock 19April 1946, FRUS, 1946, 1:119. ”Dwight Eisenhower to Baruch, 14 June 1946, FRUS, 1946, 1:856. While Herken claims that the Joint Chiefs were cool toward Baruch’s proposal for automatic sanctions, only Admiral Chester Nimitz expressly opposed the idea. Admirals William Leahy and Ernest King. on the other hand. both explicitly supported Baruch’s insistence on sanctions. Herkin. Winning Weapon, pp. 16667: Nimitz to Baruch, 11 June 1946; King to Baruch, 5 June 1946: Carl Spaatz to Baruch, undated Leahy to Baruch, 1 1 June 1946, BB MSS. ’*Memorandum of discussion between Baruch and Byrnes, 26 May 1946, BB MSS. ”Ibid. THE BARUCH PLAN 81

Baruch‘s position on the need for automatic sanctions and the elimination of the veto, as well as American foreign policy as a whole in the Cold War, cannot be fully understood if one ignores the extent to which a sense of insecurity and a feeling of competitive disadvantage vis- a-vis the Soviet system coexisted in the minds of American policymakers with a contrasting sense of aggressive overconfidence stemming from America’s great industrial power and monopoly of the atomic bomb. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 Clifford gave voice to the widely felt concern within the Truman administration that the Soviets might enjoy certain advantages in the emerging Cold War. In an influential memorandum on Soviet-American relations prepared directly at President Truman’s request in the summer of 1946, Clifford wrote: Because the Soviet Union is a highly-centralized state, whose leaders exercise rigid discipline and control of all government functions, its government acts with speed, consistency, and boldness. Democratic governments are usually loosely organized, with a high degree of autonomy in government departments and agencies. Government policies at times are confused, misunderstood, or disregarded by subordinate officials. The United States cannot afford to be uncertain of its policies towards the Soviet Union. There must be such effective coordination within the government that our military and civil policies concerning the U.S.S.R.,her satellites, and our Allies are consistent and forceful. Any uncertainty or discrepancy will be seized immediately by the Soviets and exploited at our Baruch later observed that the United States would “have to limit lots of freedoms” to survive in a cold war with Russia.35In 1946, however, he naturally did not choose to emphasize publicly that one reason for the American position on sanctions and the veto was a concern over the inherent weakness of a democratic system in times of crisis. Moreover, it is true that other important ideological considerations also helped to shape the final American position on these points. Still, Henry Wallace correctly perceived one of the underlying influences not only on the Baruch plan but also on American policy in general in the emerging Cold War, when he observed that “for the first time in our history defeatists among us have raised the fear of another system as a successful rival for democracy and free enterprise in other countries and perhaps even our

I4Clark Clifford, “American Relations with the Soviet Union,” 24 September 1946, in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York, 1978). pp. 69-70. For the importance of the Clifford memorandum, see Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 241-45. )’Baruch to Herbert Marks, 22 September 1948, BB MSS. 5ecretary of Commerce Henry Wallace had written to Truman on 23 July 1946 to express privately his displeasure at the course of American foreign policy in general and the implications of the Baruch plan in particular. On 12 September, in a speech at Madison Square Garden in New York, Wallace publicly aired his criticisms of American policy, accusing the Truman administration of taking too hard a line toward the Soviet Union and 82 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Baruch plan, however, should not be viewed solely as the product of Baruch’s fears over the viability of American democracy and his desire to protect the nation’s security in the atomic age. Baruch’s plan for the international control of atomic energy also reflected his hopeful belief in the possibility of instituting a new world order based on the principles of Wilsonian internationalism. Baruch once observed that next to his father Woodrow Wilson had Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 had “the greatest influence” on his life. He looked back on the First World War as a “great crusade” and believed that Wilson had then offered the people of the world a realistic blueprint for a lasting peace.37Like so many other influential Americans, Baruch was convinced that a durable peace could be established in the wake of the Second World War only if the United States and the world profited from the terrible lesson that had been learned by not following Wilson’s lead twenty-five years earlier. One contemporary observer, in fact, remarked that Baruch became thoroughly “obsessed with a parallel he saw between his work on atomic energy and the work he had done on the Versailles Treaty.”38 N. Gordon Levin has provided the most insightful analysis of the Wilsonian world view that significantly affected Baruch’s concept of international relations in general and the international control of atomic energy in particular. Basic to Wilsonianism was a “complete faith” in what Levin calls “America’s liberal-exceptionalism,” that is, a belief that America enjoyed a moral superiority over other nations by virtue of its unique historical commitment to liberal-capitalist values and institutions. Such a faith, moreover, entailed a belief in America’s “mission” to lead the rest of the world toward the adoption of similar values and institutions. Wilsonianism, Levin argues, was a crusading ideology that attempted to establish a middle road between the reactionary ideology and politics of the Old World and the newly developing radicalism of revolutionary socialism.39Baruch himself once claimed that in the wake of the wars and social upheavals of the twentieth century, the world would have to “decide between the constructive radicalism of Woodrow Wilson or the destruc- tive radicalism of Lenine [~ic].”~O The “ultimate Wilsonian goal,” according to Levin, “may be defined

thereby causing an unnecessary strain in Soviet-American relations. A heated public controversy immediately broke out, and after Wallace had unsuccessfully tried to reconcile his differences with the administration in meetings with Truman and Baruch, he was forced to leave the cabinet. The original letter to Truman, which is quoted in the text, was published in the newspaper. PM. 18 September 1946. ”Baruch. Public Yeurs. pp. 17.89. 134. I8John Hersey, “The Old Man. 111: National Kibbitzer.” New Yorker 23 (17 Jan- uary 1948): 3 1. ’9N. Gordon Levin. Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response lo War and Revolution (New York, 1968). pp. 1-2, vii. ‘OQuoted in E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries ofJosephus Daniels. 1913- I921 (Lincoln. NB. 1963), p. 528. THE BARUCH PLAN 83 as the attainment of a peaceful liberal capitalist world order under international law, safe both from traditional imperialism and revolutionary socialism within whose stable liberal confines a missionary America could find moral and economic ~reeminence.”~~Such a world order would be characterized not only by a worldwide acceptance of private property and free enterprise unfettered by national barriers to trade and commerce and by the universal establishment of the political institutions of liberal democracy Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 but also by the institution of a stable orderly international system in which all nation states would be committed to the observance of a recognized and enforceable international law. In Levin’s view, the Wilsonian vision of world order enabled Wilson and his successors to combine inextricably a defense of American national interests with an idealistic form of internationalism that had an appeal beyond America’s borders. Baruch’s Wilsonian world view affected his approach to the problem of controlling atomic energy in a number of ways. First, an assumption of American moral superiority helped to justify his insistence that America be allowed to retain its atomic monopoly for an indefinite period while a control plan was being implemented in stages. Baruch fully shared the belief expressed by Truman in October 1945: In our possession of this new weapon, as in our possession of other new weapons, there is no threat to any nation. The world, which has seen the United States in two great recent wars, knows that full well. The possession in our hands of this new power of destruction we regard as a sacred trust. Because of our love of peace, the thoughtful people of the world know that trust will not be violated, that it will be faithfully More broadly speaking, Baruch’s Wilsonianism led him to view the problem of controlling atomic energy as a first step in the establishment of an effective system of international law and order. Baruch looked forward to the day when relations between nations would be guided by the same concepts of law and contract that served as the foundation for America’s liberal-capitalist society, and he believed that the development of atomic energy provided a great potential impetus toward the realization of such a goal. Baruch’s associate, John Hancock, thus claimed: We want to build a system of law in this field. . . . Even if, in some cases, resort to war should prove necessary as a punishment, this action should not be a mere series of unilateral steps by nations who are free to take whatever action they feel is necessary, but should rather be united action pursuant to recognized international agreement.43

4’Levin, Wilson, p. vii. “Harry S Truman, Navy Day Address, 27 October 1945, reprinted in U.S., Department of State, International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy (Washington, 1946), p. 117. 43John Hancock, International Control of Atomic Energy and the Veto, undated (probably January 1947). BB MSS. Baruch, in fact, wanted to broaden the discussion of DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Even the Joint Chiefs spoke in the language of Wilsonianism when they called for the United States to “support, realistically and vigorously” a worldwide educational campaign “to push towards the establishment of the regime of world law and order” as the only way ultimately to remove the dangers inherent in the development of atomic weapons.44 In pursuing the objective of a stable and peaceful world order built on international law, Baruch insisted on the importance of establishing Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 international agreements -‘with teeth” in them.45 He believed that the lesson of previous failures to secure lasting peace through such “in- effectual” arrangements as the Washington naval agreement and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of the 1920s was that a “reign of law” was impossible “without the force to maintain it.”46 Shortly after his service on the UNAEC came to an end, Baruch looked back on his experience and concluded: If I were asked what I thought was the most important thing the American delegation brought into the international situation, I would say it was the idea that whatever agreement was entered into had to be one that was going to stick. . . . In other words, that once an agreement on atomic energy was made. and anyone sought to break it, he would be punished for the violation and not be able to escape by veto or otherwise. The idea of swift, certain and condign punishment for infringe- ment of a treaty entered into voluntarily is the only thing that will put life into the United Nations. . . . That is what Woodrow Wilson meant when he said that Article 10 was the heart of the League. Therein, as you will remember, each signatory agreed to respect and protect the territorial integrity ofevery other signatory.” Baruch’s Wilsonian conception of an international order based on a system of enforceable law did not win unanimous support within the Truman administration. Acheson offered the most significant opposition to Baruch’s position on sanctions and the elimination of the veto. Not only did Acheson continue to believe that the warning system envisioned in the original Acheson-Lilienthal report would provide adequate security for the United States but also he argued that Baruch’s emphasis on sanctions

atomic energy controls to include proposals for general disarmament and the eventual outlawing of war itself as part of the process of developing a recognized and enforceable system of international law. The State Department. however, insisted that Baruch limit his role to negotiations on the specific problem of atomic energy. Memorandum on outlawing war. 22 May 1946: memorandum on discussion between Baruch and Byrnes. 26 May 1946; Baruch to Norman Thomas. 18 October 1946. BB MSS. 44Mem~randumby Joint Chiefs, 23 January 1946. FRUS, 1946. 1:748-49. 4‘Baruch. statement to UNAEC. 14 June 1946. reprinted in US.,Department of State. Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959. vol. 1. 1945-1956 (Washington, 1960). p. 11. 46Baru~h,Public Years, pp. 265-66.145. “Baruch to Peter Kihss. 23 April 1947 (letter not sent), BB MSS. THE BARUCH PLAN 85

would virtually guarantee Russia’s rejection of the American proposals. In Acheson’s view, an American insistence on provisions for sanctions would appear to the Russians simply “as an attempt to turn the United Nations into an alliance to support a U.S. threat of war against the USSR unless it ceased its efforts” to develop its own atomic bomb.48Acheson

still felt in 1946 that the success of the United Nations and the estab- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 lishment of a peaceful postwar world depended on Soviet-American consensus and cooperation, and that the quest for any kind of binding international legal system or world government was bound to prove fruitless.49 Baruch’s position on sanctions and the veto, however, ultimately gained Truman’s personal approval. Herken observes that Truman’s support for Baruch’s approach was “in accord” with the “new hard line” toward the Soviets, which the Truman administration had adopted in early 1946.50Truman’s backing of Baruch was also a reflection of the president’s acceptance of Baruch’s view of the importance of creating international agreements with explicit provisions for enforcement. In the critical meeting in which Truman gave his final approval to Baruch’s position on sanctions, Baruch was able to clinch his case by arguing: “But of what use . . . is a Treaty, if there is no way of enforcing it?”51 Truman himself recalled the breakdown of the Kellogg-Briand and Nine Power agreements during the Manchurian crisis of the early 1930s and reached the same conclusion as Baruch regarding the necessity of establishing international agreements with teeth in them.52 As a Wilsonian, Baruch believed that the establishment of a peaceful world order depended not only on the creation of an effective system of international law but also on the adoption by all nations of America’s liberal conceptions of political and economic freedom. In Baruch’s view, only an “open” society in which the individual had both the opportunity to better himself through his own striving and the political right to express himself freely could be trusted to support the cause of peace and stability in the world. Underlying the Baruch plan, therefore, was a desire to “liberalize” the rest of the world, most particularly the Soviet Union. As noted previously, American policymakers feared that in the postatomic world the Russians’ closed totalitarian society afforded the Soviets certain competitive advantages vis-a-vis America’s open society.

48Acheson,Present at the Creation. p. 214. Herken argues that this was exactly Baruch’s intention, and that he essentially sought to establish an “atomic league” against Russia. While there was certainly an element of belligerence in Baruch’s position, this was not the only aspect of his approach to the problem of controlling atomic energy. 49For Acheson’s position see Hewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 548; and Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 2 14. ’“Herken, Winning Weapon, pp. 17475. ”Memorandum of meeting between Baruch, Byrnes, and Truman, 7 June 1946, BB MSS. ’lHewlett and Anderson, New World, p. 514. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY In Senator Vandenberg’s words, it would have been “unthinkable . . . for us to voluntarily permit Russia to take the secret of atomic energy behind its blackout curtain to do with it whatever Moscow pleases.”53This fear, however, was complemented by the hope that the liberalization of Soviet society would contribute to improved relations between the two great powers and to the chances of achieving a lasting peace. Even before Hiroshima, Stimson had foreseen a possible connection Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 between negotiations over the international control of atomic energy and a campaign to introduce greater freedom into the Soviet system. While attending the Potsdam Conference, Stimson wrote a memo stating: After careful reflection I am of the belief that no world organization containing as one of its dominant members a nation whose people are not possessed of free speech, but whose governmental action is con- trolled by the autocratic machinery of a secret political police, can give effective control of this new agency [atomic energy] with its devas- tating possibilities, I therefore believe that before we share our new discovery with Russia we should consider carefully whether we can do so safely under any system of control until Russia puts into effective action the proposed constitution which I have mentioned. If this is a necessary condition, we must go slowly in any disclosures or agreeing to any Russian participation whatsoever and constantly explore the question of how our headstart in [atomic energy] and the Russian desire to participate can be used to bring us nearer to the removal of the basic difficulties which I have emphasi~ed.~~

In 1945, Stimson himself wavered between two possible ways of using the atomic bomb to induce changes in the Soviet system of government. At Potsdam he momentarily concluded that America should maintain its atomic monopoly and use it as a thinly veiled threat against Russia to gain the concessions it wanted from the Soviets. A few months later, however, he advised Truman that a good faith show of trust on the issue of atomic energy would be more likely to effect the desired changes in Soviet society by virtue of the general easing of tensions that would result.55 The idea of“opening up” Russian society clearly had an influence on the formulation of the Baruch plan. Within the Acheson committee, Bush, Conant, Groves, and McCloy all had considered international control of atomic energy as at least an indirect means of bringing about a possible liberalization of Soviet society, although Acheson remained sceptical

”Arthur H. Vandenberg. Jr., ed.. The Pn’vate Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), p. 223. !‘Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York. 1948).pp.640-41. % his last important official act as secretary of war, Stimson presented his ideas regarding the advisability of a conciliatory, bilateral approach to the Soviets on the issue of atomic energy at a cabinet meeting in September 1945. Of those present at the meeting only Acheson (sitting in for Bymes) and Wallace favored Stimson’s recommendations. Yergin. Shattered Peace, pp. 132-33. THE BARUCH PLAN 87 about the chances of getting the Russians to change their ways in “one fell swoop” in response to any obvious pressure from the United States.56 The final Baruch plan fell somewhere in between the two extremes originally considered by Stimson. It did not seek to force Russian concessions through the blatant use of saber-rattling threats. On the other hand, neither did it include an unqualified offer by the United States to destroy its atomic bombs or share fully its atomic secrets with the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 Russians. Kennan, however, was accurate in describing the implications of the Baruch plan when he observed in July 1946: Our plan implies a breaching of the security controls which exist in Russia and which are anchored in the selfish interests of the all- powerful secret police. It further implies a certain derogation of the absolute and unlimited power which the Soviet leaders now exercise over economic processes and property relationships within the Soviet Union. Finally, it implies the participation of foreign elements in scientific work conducted within the Soviet Union, thus introducing foreign influence into Soviet science and providing opportunities for the satisfaction of foreign scientific cu~iosity.~’

The worldwide survey of potential uranium and thorium deposits and the study of the energy needs of participating nations, as well as the international operation and inspection of atomic energy facilities called for in the plan, all would have forced the Soviet Union to allow greater freedom of movement and communication within its borders. Vannevar Bush doubted that the Soviets would be willing to accept as a “first stage” in the implementation of a control system a geological survey of their resources that would have required them “to lift the iron curtain” in return for only limited information on American supplies that they probably already However, one of the members of the Baruch team, Franklin Lindsay, explicitly argued that it was the job of the American negotiators to convince the Russians that acceptance of a plan that “might result in serious changes” in the Soviets’ “internal social and political structure” would be preferable to no agreement at all with the United States.5g Baruch and his associates were not so much interested in the espionage possibilities that would have arisen if Russian security controls were eased as they were hopeful of bringing about long-term and fundamental changes in Soviet society that they believed would make the Soviet Union a more pacific and more cooperative power.6o

S6Hewlettand Anderson, New World,p. 548. ”Kennan’s memorandum, 18 July 1946, FRUS,1946,1:863. ’*Bushto Conant, 21 October 1946, Papers ofvannevar Bush, Library ofcongress. s9Memorandum of meeting between Eberstadt, Lindsay, and Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations Sobolev, 2 1 October 1946, BB MSS. 600nthis point Herken indicates his own scepticism about the intentions of Baruch and his associates when he cites Lilienthal’s supicions that at least one member of the Baruch team, Fred Searls, was primarily interested in using an initial raw materials survey as ameans 88 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The desire to open up Russia had economic as well as ideological and strategic dimensions. Baruch’s Wilsonian vision of peace and freedom had a crucial economic foundation that provided a basis for his approach to the problem of controlling atomic energy. In his initial speech to the UNAEC, Baruch had directly linked the preservation of peace to the maintenance of “economic stability” throughout the world.61 He had long held the view that a “just and continuing peace must include a just and equal access to the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 raw materials and manufacturing facilities of the world.”62 He claimed, moreover. that any attempt by individual countries to adopt preferential tariffs, to exert state controls over trade, or to nationalize industries would be a denial of the principle of “equal opportunity” and would lead to lowered standards of living and ultimately to war.63Baruch recognized that in a world of open doors, such as he contemplated, it would not be any “more possible to keep nations upon an equality than it is to keep individuals upon an equality except the equality of opport~nity.”~~Clearly, in the postwar world, America, with its unmatched productive capacity and capital resources, would benefit the most from the establishment of an international economy based on equal access to markets and raw materials. In other words, Baruch felt that peace and American prosperity both depended upon the maintenance of stable economic conditions in a world in which free enterprise would thrive on a global scale. In 1945, Baruch called for the development of “a positive American foreign policy that would bring tariffs, monetary arrangements, foreign credits, cartels, and all other economic matters into a coherent whole” to achieve the overriding goal of preserving “the American free enterprise system in a world drifting to cartelizations of various kinds-to statism-so we can provide jobs for Why. then, did Baruch support the creation of an international agency that seemingly would have undermined the principles of private ownership and the Open Door? To begin with, Baruch accepted the fundamental assumption of the Acheson-Lilienthal report that operational control of atomic power plants by an international agency would provide the world with far greater

of “espionage” rather than of “cooperation.” Herken. Winning Weapon, p. 165. Hancock. however, expressed in private meetings his belief that the ADA could and should be established so that ADA inspectors not engage in “espionage work.” Memorandum of meeting between Baruch. Hancock. Bymes. and Acheson. 30 May 1946. FRUS, 1946. I :805. Unquestionably. the United States would have gained valuable infomation regarding the Soviets’ economy and resources if a functioning ADA had been set up. but such information would have been obtainable without clandestine operations by American spies. 6’Baruch. statement to UNAEC. 14 June 1946. p. 9. 6’Baruchto Wilson, 23 October 191 8. BB MSS. 6’Baruch to Wilson. 7 May 1919. BB MSS: Baruch to Clare Boothe Luce. 23 June 1946. BB MSS. 64Baruchto Wilson, 23 October 191 8. BB MSS. 6’Baruch. testimony. U.S.,Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Elimination of German Resources for War. 79th Cong.. 1st sess., 22 June 1945. p. 6. THE BARUCH PLAN 89 security than any system relying solely on inspection by an international police force. Against the objections of Acheson, however, Baruch watered down the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal for outright ownership by the ADA of all uranium and thorium mines in the world. Baruch and his associates argued that they could not “conceive [of] Russia agreeing to turn over to an international sovereignty her own State property,” and that the Soviets would be “more likely” to consent to inspection of mining operations “if Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 we can set up some machinery which will keep espionage activities outside of the inspection activities.”66 Moreover, Baruch also had major reser- vations about “destroying or seriously limiting private enterprise in the capitalistic countries,” and did not believe such nations would accept a treaty establishing an international right of “eminent d~main.”~’In the final Baruch plan, therefore, the ADA was to license and inspect mining operations without actually running or owning these concerns. Still, Baruch realized that atomic energy presented certain special problems for the world and that even if agreement could not be reached in the UNAEC, atomic energy could not be developed strictly on a private enterprise basis. In addition, the approach that Baruch advocated was generally in keeping with the goal of furthering the development of an international economy unfettered by unilaterally determined autarchic economic policies. The free flow of information called for in the American proposal undoubtedly would have lessened the chances of the postwar world developing into closed economic blocs. Furthermore, the Baruch plan would have established a multilateral agency to control the development of atomic energy, a multilateral agency, it might be added, in which the Americans could have been expected to play a dominant role by virtue of the clear numerical majority held by nations friendly to the United States. In these two respects the Baruch plan in some ways paralleled both the international monetary agreements reached at the end of the Second World War and the Marshall Plan in that the United States, by its terms, might have gained a form of economic leverage over the nations participating in the plan. It should be recalled that the proposed ADA was to determine the distribution of atomic power plants on the basis of strategic considerations rather than simple economic need. Eberstadt privately explained to the

66Memorandum of meeting between Baruch, Hancock, and Bymes, 31 May 1946. FRUS, 1946, 1:821. Acheson objected on the grounds that an emphasis on the idea of inspection, as opposed to outright ADA ownership, would be less likely to win Russian support and less effective’ineliminating the possibility that crucial uranium might be secretly diverted for improper uses. Memorandum of meeting between Baruch, Bymes. Acheson, and Hancock, 30May 1946, FRUS,1946,1:814. 6?bid. Baruch later commented that within the UNAEC Australia, Brazil, Mexico, and Canada all opposed outright ADA ownership of uranium mines. Baruch to Conant, 24 December 1946, BB MSS. As early as May, Baruch‘s team met with representatives from Union Carbide who made it clear that they were “violently opposed to the Acheson Report in its emphasis bn the ownership of raw material in the ground.” Memorandum of meeting,8 May 1946. BB MSS. 90 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Russians that the initial division of plants might require “approval of the Security Council with the veto intact,” so that both the Americans and the Russians would have the power to veto the development of atomic power by the other. Thus, he claimed, “the American proposals would apply equally to both nations.”68 However, as P. M. S. Blackett has pointed out, the possible blocking of further atomic energy development most likely would have been more of a problem for the Russians than for the United Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 States. Russia faced enormous problems of reconstruction in the wake of the Second World War and may have looked forward to the development of atomic energy as a means of fueling economic recovery and industrial growth. On the other hand, the United States, with its already existing huge industrial plant and energy resources, might more easily have been able to forego the development of atomic energy. Hancock, in fact, questioned whether America already had not “oversold the possibilities of commercial power plants operating under private Thus, if a strategic distribution of atomic power facilities served to minimize the possible development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy in both the Soviet Union and the United States, Russia, rather than America, was likely to be the loser. In response to the Baruch plan, both publicly and privately the Russians made it clear that they were unwilling to “allow the fate of [their] national economy (to] be handed over” to an international “control organ. . . on whose benevolent attitude the Soviet Union and the Soviet people cannot co~nt.’’~~Byrnes claimed: It is unfortunate but apparently true that the Soviets think capitalist interference is more to be feared than atomic bombs. And protection of the Soviet economic system from that interference seems to be more important than the protection of humanity from the scourge of atomic warfare. This fear also explains the Soviet stand on the veto as applied to atomic energy. Mr. Gromyko has said that the Soviet Union is not willing to subject the fate of its internal economy to a majority vote. The veto, he contends, is necessary to protect the sovereign states.

68Memorandum of meeting between Eberstadt. Lindsay, and Sobolev, 21 October 1946, BB MSS. Eberstadt actually was going beyond officially sanctioned U.S. policy on the issue of a Security Council veto with regard to the construction of atomic power plants, since Truman had removed such a provision from the Baruch proposals when he gave his final approval to the Baruch plan in early June. Statement of U.S. policy, 7 June 1946, in memorandum from Truman to Baruch, FRUS, 1946. 1:848. However, the concept of a strategic distribution of plants itself would have been likely to act as an obstacle to Soviet development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. 69Memorandum,Hancock to Byrnes, I June 1946. FRUS 1946. 13325. ’OAndrei Gromyko, statement to the UN Security Council, 5 March 1947, reprinted in Documents on Disarmament. p. 74. The Russian concern also was expressed privately to the American delegation at the meeting between Eberstadt, Lindsay, and Sobolev, 21 October 1946. THE BARUCH PLAN 91

The Soviet leaders do not yet appreciate that civilization and not state sovereignty is at

Adam Ulam and Joseph Nogee, two of the leading students of Soviet policy, agree that the Wilsonian goals of establishing an international agency with operational control over the development of atomic energy and opening the Soviet Union to inspection, thereby allowing the free flow of Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 sensitive information, created insuperable obstacles to agreement. Not only did the Russians see the maintenance of secrecy regarding their own resources as important to their national security but also, in the words of Nogee, they feared that “if any segment of the Soviet economy were placed under non-communist control, communism in the Soviet Union would be threatened.”” In addition, the American insistence on implementing controls in stages so that the United States could maintain its atomic monopoly for an indefinite period was an obstacle to possible agreement with the Soviets. The chauvinistic claims of American moral superiority notwithstanding, the Russians hardly could have been expected to have had an unques- tioning faith in American benevolence, especially since the United States began conducting a series of atomic bomb tests on Bikini Island only two weeks after Baruch first presented his proposals to the UNAEC. The emphasis that Baruch placed on establishing automatic sanctions and eliminating the veto, especially at a time when the United States could have been expected to enjoy clear majority support in the United Nations for years to come, also must have appeared rather self-serving to the Russians. The Baruch plan, no matter how well intentioned it might have been, if implemented most likely would have had the effect of reinforcing America’s position of economic and military superiority in the postwar world. Baruch initially may have formulated his proposals for the control of atomic energy with the hope and expectation that the Russians would ultimately accept them as the basis for a final agreement. From the start, however, Baruch’s tactical approach to the negotiations, in part, was shaped by his desire to avoid appearing weak or vacillating, thereby subjecting himself to criticism at home and contributing to Russian mis- calculation of American intentions abroad. Thus, Baruch explained to his biographer that he decided his initial speech to the UNAEC could leave “no questions unanswered, no loopholes, no opening for uncertainty or confusion.” The “whole plan” had to be put on the table.73Baruch’s virtual

7‘Byme~,Speaking Frankly, p. 214. 72Nogee,Soviet Policy, pp. 233-34. Ulam observes: “Even if atomic energy had been entirely devoid of military significance, it still would have been impossible for the Soviets to agree to an international agency prying into their economy, maintaining or sending inspectors into the U.S.S.R.,etc.” Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The Hictory ofSovietForeign Policy. 1917-1967(New York, 1968),p.416. ”Coit. Mr. Baruch, p. 580. 92 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

refusal to negotiate or to consider any important changes in his plan reflected his feeling that “to retreat” from his original proposals would leave the American “people with the impression that the result was less than America wanted or required.” By adopting an essentially inflexible position, Baruch felt that he would protect himself from any possible charges of “appeasement” and at the same time convince the Russians of the strength of America’s res01ve.’~ Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 Moreover, as the negotiations dragged on Baruch and his associates came to minimize the chances of reaching agreement with the Soviets and to view the negotiations as a means of stiffening the will of the American people in what Swope may have been the first to call the “Cold War.”7J While Baruch obviously was aware of the dangers of a nuclear arms race, he was self-consciously careful to avoid contributing to a “fear campaign” that might have created such “emotional and irrational” feelings among the American people that they would have demanded “any kind of treaty” to outlaw the terrible new weapon.’6 By September 1946. Baruch had accepted the view of Swope and Eberstadt that it would be best to press for a vote in the UNAEC on the American proposals in order to make clear the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. By focusing attention on supposed Soviet intransigence rather than on the fear of the bomb itself, “the public would be aroused to the dangers that confront us and the world,” with the result that there would develop “widespread, popular support for military preparednes~.”’~ Byrnes later contended that the 10-0-2 vote in the UNAEC to send the Baruch plan to the Security Council for further discussion represented “a great victory for Baruch and his ass~ciates.”’~John Hersey observed that by resigning almost immediately after the vote Baruch showed the “same sense of timing” that always enabled him “to sell stock near the top

“Baruch to Harold Urey. 11 July 1946. BB MSS: notes of staff conference, 23 August 1946, BB MSS. ’sNotes on staff conference, 10 September 1946, BB MSS. Commenting on the firing of Wallace. Herbert Swope claimed: “We are. indeed. in the midst of a Cold War. We should do nothing the enemy wants us to do.” Swope to Eberstadt. 25 September 1946. BB MSS. Baruch later claimed credit for publicly introducing Swope’s phrase in a speech to the South Carolina legislature in April 1947, adding that he had been reluctant to use the phrase while still hoping to “establish amicable relations with the Russians.” Baruch, Public Years. p. 388. 76Hancock.memorahdum on educational project, 3 December 1946. BB MSS. ”Notes on conference, 10 September 1946. BB MSS. As early as May. one month before Baruch presented his plan to the UNAEC. Oppenheimer reported that the Baruch team already was minimizing the hope for agreement and talking about “preparing the American people for a refusal by Russia.” Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Years. p. 43. While Baruch was clear from the start about putting “the onus of any breach in negotiations on Russia.” if such a breakdown occurred. he was still expressing the view in August that the Russians might eventually “be brought around.” Notes-on staff conference, 1 Aigust 1946. BB MSS. ”James F. Bymes. All in One Lgetime (New York. 1958). p. 386. THE BARUCH PLAN 93

of the market.” Baruch removed himself from the scene while his proposals still seemed an expression of unselfish internationalism and “the only possible” way of controlling atomic energy.79Even one as critical of the Baruch plan as Blackett concludes: In the long run, the Baruch Plan, in spite of its rejection by the

U.S.S.R., must be considered historically as an astute move and a Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 very considerable victory for American diplomacy. For so great was the success with which this specious plan was put across in most countries as a wise and generous measure, that it became possible to brand the Soviet Union, by her rejection of it, as the sole obstacle to world peace.8o

Yet, in accomplishing their “great victory” both Baruch and the Truman administration opted, in essence, for a transitory propaganda victory at the expense of keeping alive any real hope of achieving an agreement with the Russians to control atomic energy. While Baruch maintained his reputation as both a Wilsonian idealist and a hardheaded realist intent on safeguarding American security, his inability to develop a proposal for controlling atomic energy that had a realistic chance of appealing to the Soviets ultimately contributed to the onset of the Cold War and to the sense of insecurity associated with the development of the nuclear arms race. In conclusion, the Baruch plan must be viewed as the product of a number of attitudes and assumptions that shaped American policy as a whole at the outset of the Cold War. The Truman administration’s approach to the problem of resolving differences with the Soviet Union certainly was affected by the sense of overwhelming power that leading American officials felt as a result of America’s atomic monopoly and generally dominant position in the postwar world. This sense of power undoubtedly contributed to a degree of inflexibility in America’s bargaining position on the issue of controlling atomic energy that helped lessen the chances for agreement with the Soviet Union on the subject. However, American policy in general and the Baruch plan in particular cannot be hlly understood if one does not recognize the way in which feelings of insecurity and idealism also contributed to the development of the Truman administration’s essentially unyielding hard-line position.

’9Hersey,“Old Man,” p. 3 1-32. *OBlackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb, p. 158. Nogee and Spanier conclude: “The Baruch Plan, in brief, was a superb tool of psychological warfare: If the Soviets agreed to it, they would place themselves in a position of permanent military-and, therefore, political- inferiority to the United States; and if they turned it down, they would be spuming America’s gesture of good will and assuming the responsibility for the Cold War. For the Russians, the Baruch Plan was a trap from which there was no escape, whatever the Kremlin said it was a simple proposition of ‘damned if they did, and damned if they didn’t.’ ” Politics of Disarmament, p. 58. 94 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

In spite of, and in some ways because of, the dramatic increase in American power in the aftermath of the Second World War, American policymakers developed a sense of insecurity as they pondered the problem of defending what they now defined as America’s global set of national interests. Viewing the postwar world as a global battlefield in which com-

petition and possible conflict with the Soviet Union and communism had Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 virtually no limits, Baruch and other leading members of the Truman administration came to worry about the potential advantages that the Soviets’ closed totalitarian system might afford them in such a struggle with the United States. Although these men viewed America’s development of atomic weapons as initially providing the United States with a great military and diplomatic asset, the very nature of atomic weapons raised serious questions in their minds as to the ultimate vulnerability of Ameri- can democracy in the atomic age. Baruch and his fellow policymakers feared that it was the Soviets, with their lack of moral scruples, their system of absolute internal controls, and their capacity for swift and ruthless action, who might in the long run be better able to exploit the potential power of atomic energy than the United States with its loosely structured, slow-reacting governmental machinery and questionable popular resolve. This combination of concern over the viability of democracy and fear of the advantages enjoyed by the Soviets in the atomic age remains one of the least understood aspects of Baruch’s insistence on the necessity of including provisions for automatic sanctions and the elimination of the great power veto in any treaty establishing a system of international controls for atomic energy. The fear and virtual envy that Baruch and other American leaders had of the Soviets led to other consequences. Shortly after resigning as U.S. representative to the UNAEC, Baruch warned that “in order to preserve our institutions, we have got to fight as fanatically for them as those who fight fanatically against them.”** Unfortunately, such an attitude not only contributed to a hardening of a sense of all-encompassing conflict with the Soviets but also soon helped to justify the McCarthyite per- version of the very institutions that Baruch supposedly wished to defend. Often despairing of the viability of democracy, too many responsible Americans eventually were willing to see traditional democratic liberties undermined in the fight to win the Cold War. The Baruch plan was shaped by a sense of idealism and hope as well as by ambivalent feelings of power and fear. The self-righteous style and tone that Baruch frequently adopted cannot be simply dismissed as conscious hypocrisy. Baruch sincerely believed that his plan for the international control of atomic energy represented a possible first step in an effort to create a world system based on Wilsonian concepts of law and order and political and economic freedom. Baruch and Truman both believed that the approach to the problem of controlling atomic energy, 81Baruchto John Vorys. 27 January 1947. BB MSS. THE BARUCH PLAN 95 which they advocated, was designed to avoid repeating the mistakes that had been made after the First World War when the world had failed to follow Wilson’s lead by establishing an effective and enforceable code of international conduct. The Baruch plan also reflected an assumption widely held among American policymakers that peace and stability could exist only in a world that was open to the free movement of ideas, people, and goods. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/6/1/69/428546 by guest on 25 September 2021 This study of the Baruch plan indicates that a new concept of national security, with its global dimensions, combined with an older tradition of Wilsonian internationalism to create an Americah plan for the control of atomic energy that, if adopted, would have had the effect of preserving the position of dominance that the United States had achieved at the end of the Second World War. Baruch and other American leaders accused the Soviets of being either insincere or paranoid when they refused to place their trust in the good intentions of the United States. These same men also accused the Soviets of trying to impose their ideology and system of government on the rest of the world. Whatever the motives of American policymakers might have been, however, almost identical charges could have been made fairly against the United States in relation to the Ameri- can plan for the international control of atomic energy. It is not the intention here to suggest that the United States must bear complete responsibility for either the failure to reach agreement on controlling atomic energy or the development of the Cold War as a whole. Without examining the various conflicts over specific strategic and geo- political objectives that arose between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War, it is impossible to gain a full understanding of the origins of the Cold War. It is possible that in 1946 the Russians may have been unwilling to accept any alternative to their own self-serving proposal to outlaw atomic warfare and have the United States immediately destroy its existing atomic stockpile. Perhaps even the most well-intentioned and most flexible American negotiators imaginable still would have been unable to work out with the Russians a mutually agreeable plan for effectively controlling the dangers of atomic energy. Tragically, however, we may never know whether there really was the possibility in 1946 of reaching an accommodation with the Russians on the issue of atomic energy through mutual compromise, for the hopes and fears of American policymakers prevented them from considering the possibility of agreement on anything but American terms.