The West German Ministry of Reunification
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Stefan Creuzberger. Kampf für die Einheit: Das gesamtdeutsche Ministerium und die politische Kultur des Kalten Krieges 1949-1969. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 2008. xii + 604 pp. $49.50, cloth, ISBN 978-3-7700-1625-9. Reviewed by Jost Dülffer Published on H-German (June, 2010) Commissioned by Benita Blessing (Oregon State University) The Ministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen ic Union) and later an unsuccessful candidate for (BMG, or Ministry for Pan-German Affairs) was an chancellor. Erich Mende from the Liberal Party institution in divided Germany that existed from became vice chancellor from 1963 to 1966 in the the very beginning of the Federal Republic to the Erhard government, followed by Herbert Wehner end of the partition in 1990, although it was re‐ (1966-19), who was a communist in the 1930s, a named the Ministerium für innerdeutsche Social Democrat (SPD) from the 1950s to the Beziehungen in 1969 (Ministry for Inner-German 1970s, and who became one of the proponents of Relations). In Kampf um die Einheit: Das gesamt‐ the SPD opening up to the existing Federal Repub‐ deutsche Ministerium und der Kampf um die poli‐ lic in the Godesberg program of 1959. tische Kultur des Kalten Krieges 1949-1969, Stefan The BMG's objective was to render itself su‐ Creuzberger presents an important part of the perfluous by helping bring about German reunifi‐ West German Cold War mindset. Indeed, the BMG cation through international diplomacy, and by was a key element of the West German political keeping this goal alive and desirable in West Ger‐ structure that had been headed by prominent many. Kaiser describes the BMG as a "lighthouse" politicians such as Jakob Kaiser, who had been whose "searchlights indefatigably and perma‐ chairman of the Christian Democrats in the Soviet nently should send rays of hope and confidence Zone and remained critical of Chancellor Konrad into the zone of silence on the other side of the Adenauer's priority of western integration, which Iron Curtain" (p. 53). Indeed, one of the ministry's might have precluded an early reunification; first tasks was to fnd a role for itself, including Ernst Lemmer, formerly a journalist and liberal addressing the issue of how to unite Germany in trade unionist--regarded as a rather weak leader-- the future. As time went on, however, the goal of from 1957 to 1962; and Rainer Barzel from 1962 to unification faded. With this change in focus, many 1963, a rising star in the CDU (Christian Democrat‐ policymakers and German citizens regarded it--at H-Net Reviews least in hindsight--as a ministry of brochures, an attempted to create an institution that would de‐ organization that produced numerous publica‐ fend West German democratic parties, which the tions that had almost no influence on actual poli‐ Social Democratic party blocked. The BMG carried cymaking. out this idea in part, supporting multiple West One reason that the BMG lacked the ability to German private propaganda organizations, such steer West German policy, as Creuzberger argues, as the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit (Associ‐ was a result of the political character of the min‐ ation for Peace and Freedom), the Büro Bonner istry's staff, which consisted largely of strongly Berichte (Office of Bonn Reports), and many oth‐ anticommunist personnel. Regrettably, Creuzberg‐ ers. Moreover, the BMG commanded large secret er only briefly touches on the historical events sums of the public budget that were absent from that shaped their ideologies. Thus, important ex‐ official fnancial records. In some cases, vague in‐ periences under the National Socialist regime that formation about funds from private sources ap‐ contributed to these individual and collective peared in official databases. The most prominent identities, including their persecution and even example was an index of known and suspected imprisonment, receive little mention. Instead, it is communists, used to fght, symbolically if not in a handful of influential people, such as the frst actuality, alleged communists or pacifists. secretary of state, Franz Thedieck, and one of the Creuzberger is careful not to be too specific in re‐ heads of department (Referatsleiter), Ewert von ferring to these "dubious" extra-legal activities, Dellingshausen, who drive Creuzberger's narra‐ writing instead about a "blind, sometimes tive, rather than the totality of the BMG's staff. overzealous anti-communist defensive front" (p. 156) that was part of the task of Verfassungss‐ The BMG aimed to reach the East German chutz (protecting the West German constitution). (GDR) population through all medias. The main Here, Creuzberger's careful language is itself in a objective was not to actually destabilize that state, gray area of meaning. but rather to instill and nurture a sense of a col‐ lective German national identity. Attempts to dele‐ To name one telling example of the unclear gitimize and even bring an end to the GDR fell un‐ jurisdiction of the BMG, after the June 17 uprising der the purview of other organizations, including in 1953, it helped facilitate U.S.-financed initia‐ the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Office for tives for food shipments to the GDR. The construc‐ the Protection of the Constitution, and even U.S. tion of the Berlin Wall in 1961, however, changed organizations in West Germany. Nonetheless, the the framework for BMG activities, with such overt BMG practiced a precarious balancing act of ad‐ actions suspended, while support for West Ger‐ hering to its stated mission without entering the man anticommunist education continued. Under territory of anti-GDR policies--leaving many of its Erich Mende, the BMG attempted another ap‐ activities in a very gray legal area. From its frst proach: he attempted to integrate some of the days, the BMG tried to support actions that weak‐ ideas of Wolfgang Schollwer, a liberal politician, ened communism without being involved in who worked towards cooperation with, instead of covert, anti-GDR operations. Although its actual isolation of, the GDR. This new course was fully contribution to creating a common German iden‐ implemented under Herbert Wehner in the Great tity still remains unclear, Creuzberger convincing‐ Coalition after 1966. Wehner, a politician who had ly refutes the GDR's claim that the BMG was a cen‐ been important in the Gesamtdeutsche Ausschuß ter for counterrevolution. (Pan-German Committee) of the Bundestag since the 1950s, was one of the frst West Germans to In the early 1950s, with the meaning and ex‐ use the ministry as a part of his own political ob‐ tent of German division unclear, many politicians jectives. Wehner's work became a major impetus 2 H-Net Reviews for the Ostpolitik after 1969. The old personnel of nipresent fear of communist subversion that de‐ West German politics had retired, either officially fined all policies and perceptions in West Ger‐ or unofficially. The exchange of political prisoners many and specifically in the BMG. Creuzberger, from the GDR had begun under Rainer Barzel, following a certain tradition of post-World War and under Wehner the secret communist index Two scholarship, defines the Cold War as a global was destroyed. A "breakthrough" and a "magic and total war just below the threshold of a "hot" moment-- Sternstunde" (p. 422) was reached in nuclear war. Even if this assessment is correct, 1968 after the Soviet occupation of Czechoslova‐ historians should place this judgment in historical kia, when "businesslike conventions" for coopera‐ context, instead of only repeating this widely ac‐ tion became the new guideline for West German cepted argument. To what extent did the BMG ac‐ policy. tively contribute to this total war as a historical Chapter 6, "Influence on Political Culture," is actor in its own right, instead of merely as one as‐ the most interesting chapter. Here, the daily work pect in a perfect storm of events? Of course, this of authors, publishing networks, and intellectuals, kind of micro-history of the Cold War exceeds the all furthering "state-political consciousness"--that scope of the cultural study of one institution as is, official support for research on the GDR and presented here. pan- German research--is a topic Creuzberger This problematic approach to a key institu‐ takes on with specificity. This analysis includes tion in the Cold War holds all the more true in the fascinating material. This chapter is all the more beginning of the book, when Creuzberger de‐ convincing because Creuzberger contexutalizes-- scribes, without much context, the BMG's actions. especially in the conclusion--his arguments. As This lack of true analysis is underlined when the Creuzberger insists, all of these undertakings hap‐ author uses the phrases "SED regime" or pened due to West German impressions that they Machthaber throughout the book, without any ex‐ were confronted with a massive communist planation of the extent to which those Cold War threat, although the perceived and actual dangers characteristics of the Soviet zone and its political had no mutual relation to each other ("in keiner‐ structure are still valid today. In the same chap‐ lei Relation zu einander standen") (p. 537). Some ters, the author follows an institutional approach, measures taken by the BMG and the West German one that he openly reifies as a model in political state, as Creuzberger states, were at best "dubi‐ science in which "institutions" include, without ous" in a free and democratic order. It was per‐ differentiation, the analysis of policy, polity, and haps therefore not surprising that agents repre‐ politics. senting the West German government, in whatev‐ Ultimately, Creuzberger's approach results in er capacity, reacted against dissidents without an exhaustive presentation of source materials, squeamishness (zimperlich). It seems clear that almost replicating its presentation as it originated much of these activities were illegal and could not in its bureaucratic model.