The Importance of Osthandel: West German-Soviet Trade and the End of the Cold War, 1969-1991
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Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USSR
asdf PMUNC 2015 Cuban Missile Crisis JCC: USSR Chair: Jacob Sackett-Sanders JCC PMUNC 2015 Contents Chair Letter…………………………………………………………………...3 Introduction……………….………………………………………………….4 Topics of Concern………………………...………………….………………6 The Space Race…...……………………………....………………….....6 The Third World...…………………………………………......………7 The Eastern Bloc………………………………………………………9 The Chinese Communists…………………………………………….10 De-Stalinization and Domestic Reform………………………………11 Committee Members….……………………………………………………..13 2 JCC PMUNC 2015 Chair’s Letter Dear Delegates, It is my great pleasure to give you an early welcome to PMUNC 2015. My name is Jacob, and I’ll be your chair, helping to guide you as you take on the role of the Soviet political elites circa 1961. Originally from Wilmington, Delaware, at Princeton I study Slavic Languages and Literature. The Eastern Bloc, as well as Yugoslavia, have long been interests of mine. Our history classes and national consciousness often paints them as communist enemies, but in their own ways, they too helped to shape the modern world that we know today. While ultimately failed states, they had successes throughout their history, contributing their own shares to world science and culture, and that’s something I’ve always tried to appreciate. Things are rarely as black and white as the paper and ink of our textbooks. During the conference, you will take on the role of members of the fictional Soviet Advisory Committee on Centralization and Global Communism, a new semi-secret body intended to advise the Politburo and other major state organs. You will be given unmatched power but also faced with a variety of unique challenges, such as unrest in the satellite states, an economy over-reliant on heavy industry, and a geopolitical sphere of influence being challenged by both the USA and an emerging Communist China. -
Judging the Past in Unified Germany A
Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-80208-6 - Judging the Past in Unified Germany A. James McAdams Index More information Index Bohl, Friedrich, 155 Bohley, Barbel, 7 Adenauer, Konrad, 4-5, 138, 165 border code, of the GDR: 23, 33, 197 n. Albania, 185 30 Albrecht, Hans, 35, 39-41, 45, 50, 53 border guards, of the GDR: 23-5, 27, 30, Alliance'90, 89, 112 32-5,43-8,168,171 "Alliance for Germany" coalition, 55 border trials: 26, 30-1, 33, 35, 38-9, 41-3, apartheid, 7, 173 45,51,53,55,57,71,113,126,147, Arendt, Hannah, 11, 176 160, 162, 167, 169, 173, 190. See also Argentina, 1,3, 12,46, 122-3 border guards Ascherson, Neal, 43 Bofi, Hans, 39-40, 44, 50 Brautigam, Hansgeorg, 38-39, 52, 198n. B 44 Bahr, Egon, 86 Brautigam, Hans-Otto, 76, 219 n. 12 Barbe, Angelika, 89 Brandenburg, 45, 73, 75-6, 80, 93, 100, BARoV. See Federal Office for the 115,159,175,182 Settlement of Open Property Questions Brandt, Willy, 105, 107, 120 Basic Law, 4, 29, 33, 37, 41, 51, 55, 59, 77, BStU. See "Gauck agency" 127, 130, 139, 142, 144-5, 149, 166 Bulgaria, 129, 184-5 Basic treaty, between the Germanys, 29, Bundestag: 157; elections to, 89, 115; 102 legislation, 60, 83, 139, 152-5, 163; Baumgarten, Klaus-Dieter, 47, 171 response to finance scandal, 159-60, Bavaria, 85 166, 180-2. See also Enquete Benda, Ernst, 45 commission Berlin: 5, 24, 35, 45, 48, 52, 115, 128, Bush, George, 158 133-4, 138, 140, 148, 157, 159, 162, Butterfield, Herbert, 161 170, 176, 178; Constitutional court of, 38; regional (or state) court of, 47, 50, 52, 168, 170, 189-90; screening for Stasi informants in, 58, 64, 67, 73, 75-77, 79 CDU. -
Variationist Linguistics Meets CONTACT Linguistics
Published in: Lenz, Alexandra N./Maselko, Mateusz (Eds.): VARIATIONist Linguistics meets CONTACT Linguistics. - Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2020. Pp. 25-49. (Wiener Arbeiten zur Linguistik 6) DOI: https://doi.org/10.14220/9783737011440.25 Katharina Dück Language Contact and Language Attitudes of Caucasian Germans in Today’sCaucasus and Germany Abstract: This article examines the language contact situation as well as the language attitudes of the Caucasian Germans, descendants of German-born inhabitants of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union who emigrated in 1816/ 17 to areas of Transcaucasia. After deportationsand migrations, the group of Caucasian Germans now consists of those who havesince emigrated to Germany and those who still liveinthe South Caucasus. It’sthe first time that socio- linguistic methodshavebeen used to record data from the generationwho ex- perienced living in the South Caucasusand in Germanyaswell as from two succeeding generations. Initial results will be presented below with afocus on the language contact constellations of German varieties as well as on consequences of language contact and language repression, which both affect language attitudes. Keywords: language contact, migration, variation, language attitudes, identity Abstract: Im Zentrum der nachstehendenBetrachtungen stehen die Sprachkon- taktsituation sowie die Spracheinstellungen der Kaukasiendeutschen, Nachfah- ren deutschstämmiger Einwohner des Russischen Reichs und der Sowjetunion, die 1816/17inGebiete Transkaukasiensausgewandert sind. Nach Deportationen -
Bulletin of the GHI Washington Supplement 1 (2004)
Bulletin of the GHI Washington Supplement 1 (2004) Copyright Das Digitalisat wird Ihnen von perspectivia.net, der Online-Publikationsplattform der Max Weber Stiftung – Stiftung Deutsche Geisteswissenschaftliche Institute im Ausland, zur Verfügung gestellt. Bitte beachten Sie, dass das Digitalisat urheberrechtlich geschützt ist. Erlaubt ist aber das Lesen, das Ausdrucken des Textes, das Herunterladen, das Speichern der Daten auf einem eigenen Datenträger soweit die vorgenannten Handlungen ausschließlich zu privaten und nicht-kommerziellen Zwecken erfolgen. Eine darüber hinausgehende unerlaubte Verwendung, Reproduktion oder Weitergabe einzelner Inhalte oder Bilder können sowohl zivil- als auch strafrechtlich verfolgt werden. “WASHINGTON AS A PLACE FOR THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN”: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THE CDU/CSU OPPOSITION, 1969–1972 Bernd Schaefer I. In October 1969, Bonn’s Christian Democrat-led “grand coalition” was replaced by an alliance of Social Democrats (SPD) and Free Democrats (FDP) led by Chancellor Willy Brandt that held a sixteen-seat majority in the West German parliament. Not only were the leaders of the CDU caught by surprise, but so, too, were many in the U.S. government. Presi- dent Richard Nixon had to take back the premature message of congratu- lations extended to Chancellor Kiesinger early on election night. “The worst tragedy,” Henry Kissinger concluded on June 16, 1971, in a con- versation with Nixon, “is that election in ’69. If this National Party, that extreme right wing party, had got three-tenths of one percent more, the Christian Democrats would be in office now.”1 American administrations and their embassy in Bonn had cultivated a close relationship with the leaders of the governing CDU/CSU for many years. -
Policy-Roundtable-1-5BG.Pdf
H-Diplo | ISSF POLICY Series America and the World—2017 and Beyond Stalin, Trump, and the Politics of Narcissism: A Response to Rose McDermott’s “The Nature of Narcissism.” Essay by Geoffrey Roberts, University College Cork, Emeritus, and Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2018-2019 Published on 29 June 2018 | issforum.org Editor: Diane Labrosse Web and Production Editor: George Fujii Shortlink: http://tiny.cc/PR-1-5BG Permalink: http://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-5BG-Stalin PDF URL: http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/Policy-Roundtable-1-5BG.pdf was intrigued by Rose McDermott’s piece on “The Nature of Narcissism”.1 As a narrative historian of international relations, I appreciated her call for analysis of the “influence of individual-level differences on international outcomes.” Central to narrative history is the reconstruction and analysis of the actions Iand interactions of individuals, as well as people’s goals, motivations, feelings, and experiences. However, I was startled by her characterisation of Joseph Stalin as a narcissist like Donald. Trump. It would be difficult to imagine two more different personalities; during decades of work in Stalin’s personal archives it never occurred to me he was a narcissist. Indeed, based on McDermott’s description of narcissism I would say that Stalin was the complete opposite (more on Trump below). While Stalin’s personality cult performed a political function, he displayed no personal need for such grandiosity. Nor did he seek validation and approval from others (except maybe Vladimir Lenin) or rely on external referents for his self-esteem. Stalin’s rejection and sometimes emotional response to criticism was based on strong beliefs, not a fragile ego. -
Soviet Domestic Politics and Collapse of the Outer Empire, 1989
Soviet Domestic Politics and Collapse of the Outer Empire, 1989 FREDO ARIAS-KING n this article, I explore the role of domestic politics in precluding the inter- I vention of the Soviet army in Eastern Europe in fall 1989. A close look at the USSR’s domestic political situation as early as summer 1989 suggests that there was little, if any, intention on the part of the legislators, government, or even the Communist Party to prop up the fast-disintegrating Communist regimes in the East bloc with force. Rather, there is substantial evidence that a revolution in Eastern Europe would be welcomed in Moscow. To my knowledge, this angle has not been examined in the scholarly literature. Many of the leading authori- ties on the collapse of Eastern Europe fail to connect internal policymaking— particularly relating to the creation of legislative power in the USSR and its con- sequences—to the historic collapse of the Soviet Union’s “outer empire.” I do not argue that Soviet democratization caused the collapse of the East European regimes in 1989, but that it was the main factor that precluded an armed inter- vention to save those regimes. Only one of six major books on the revolutions of 1989, for example, even mentions the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, and then only in passing.1 They focus instead on the USSR as a unitary player, with a reformer (Gorbachev) at the helm, surrounded by like-minded advisers advocating new political think- ing, who decided to “allow” the East Europeans to go their own way. -
6. Party Finance, Party Donations and Corruption the German Case 6.1
6. Party Finance, Party Donations and Corruption 1 The German Case Ulrich von Alemann 6.1. The Study of Corruption in Germany Some 30 years ago in Germany corruption was an almost unknown term in politics and political science referring only to the fall of old regimes in ancient times or to the rise of bizarre puppet governments in the postcolonial developing countries. “The Germans spoiled by an extremely honest public administration for more than a century and a half, are sensitive to charges of corruption even today”, Theodor Eschenburg, one of the leading senior scholars of German postwar political science declared in Heidenheimer’s first edition of his famous handbook on corruption (Eschenburg, 1970: 259). In the mid-eighties one of the first German political scientists publishing on corruption, Paul Noack, still maintained: “The Germans have always nurtured a faith that theirs is one of those nations that has proved to be most resistant to corruption” (Noack, 1985: 113). Those times are gone forever. During the eighties the Flick-scandal shocked German politics, but also a number of local and regional affairs exposed the myth of a civil service clear of corruption. Sociology, political science, history, law and economics started to discover the issue of corruption. A first big volume was by the Austrian researcher Christian Brünner (1981). The monograph of Paul Noack was followed by a reader of Christian Fleck and Helmut Kuzmics titled “Korruption. Zur Soziologie nicht immer abweichenden Verhaltens” (1985). At the end of the eighties I myself published my first short piece of corruption research in the second edition of Heidenheimer’s handbook on political corruption (von Alemann, 1989). -
The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies
1 The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies Vladimir Tismaneanu The revolutions of 1989 were, no matter how one judges their nature, a true world-historical event, in the Hegelian sense: they established a historical cleavage (only to some extent conventional) between the world before and after 89. During that year, what appeared to be an immutable, ostensibly indestructible system collapsed with breath-taking alacrity. And this happened not because of external blows (although external pressure did matter), as in the case of Nazi Germany, but as a consequence of the development of insuperable inner tensions. The Leninist systems were terminally sick, and the disease affected first and foremost their capacity for self-regeneration. After decades of toying with the ideas of intrasystemic reforms (“institutional amphibiousness”, as it were, to use X. L. Ding’s concept, as developed by Archie Brown in his writings on Gorbachev and Gorbachevism), it had become clear that communism did not have the resources for readjustment and that the solution lay not within but outside, and even against, the existing order.1 The importance of these revolutions cannot therefore be overestimated: they represent the triumph of civic dignity and political morality over ideological monism, bureaucratic cynicism and police dictatorship.2 Rooted in an individualistic concept of freedom, programmatically skeptical of all ideological blueprints for social engineering, these revolutions were, at least in their first stage, liberal and non-utopian.3 The fact that 1 See Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 157-189. In this paper I elaborate upon and revisit the main ideas I put them forward in my introduction to Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., The Revolutions of 1989 (London and New York: Routledge, 1999) as well as in my book Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel (New York: Free Press, 1992; revised and expanded paperback, with new afterword, Free Press, 1993). -
The Hazards of Half-Measures: Perestroika and the Failure of Post-Soviet Democratization
The Hazards of Half-measures: Perestroika and the Failure of Post-Soviet Democratization M. STEVEN FISH Abstract: Perestroika was the most dramatic chapter in the political history of the world in the late twentieth century. Yet, it did not fulfill what was arguably its lofti- est promise—to lay firm foundations for lasting popular rule in Russia. The failure of democratization in post-Soviet Russia may be traced in part to two fateful short- comings in perestroika: the tepidity of Gorbachev’s economic reforms and Gor- bachev’s failure to empower popularly elected legislatures. Key words: democracy, democratization, economic reform, liberalization, national legislature, perestroika erestroika was the most dramatic chapter in the political history of the world P in the late twentieth century. For citizens of the USSR, it brought both hope and trauma. For the rest of the world, it provided liberation from the scourge of the cold war’s apocalyptic endgame scenario, which had defined international relations for four decades. Despite its momentousness, however, perestroika did not fulfill what was arguably its loftiest promise: to lay firm foundations for lasting popular rule in Russia. Mikhail Gorbachev may not have intended his reforms to lead to democ- racy, but by the time the Soviet regime unraveled in late 1991, democratization is what perestroika had brought about. At the dawn of the post-Soviet era, the three Baltic states had already forged open polities. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova had experienced significant democ- ratization as well. Yet, in the ensuing decade, Russia, among other post-Soviet countries, underwent a powerful political reversal. -
The Ukrainian Weekly 1990
ublished by the Ukrainian National Association inc., a fraternal non-profit association rainian Weekly vol. LVIII No. 12 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, MARCH 25,1990 50 cents 1 million in Ukraine Democratic Bloc scores impressive victories in run-offs suffer in aftermath of Chernobyl by Dr. David Mar pies in mid-February, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR held an impor– tant meeting on the ecological situation in Ukraine. That the focus of this meeting was largely devoted to the effects of Chornobyl was hardly sur– prising given some of the recent revela– tions about the long-term effects of that disaster. Also, it followed closely upon the publication of a "Complex Program for the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Accident of Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukrainian SSR"one week earlier. At the Supreme Soviet meeting, there were comments from both the propo– nents of nuclear power and the op– ponents, with the latter constituting a clear majority. While much bitterness was exhibited, along with calls for retribution against certain individuals, there were at the same time several positive suggestions that reflected a Flags of various nationalities wave at pre-election rally in Kiev, more open debate on this topic. Preliminary results further impressive victories in the Ukrainian Helsinki Union and other The tone of the Supreme Soviet Sunday, March 18, run-off elections, independent groups) are reported to meeting was set by a remarkably candid give 25 percent to DB reported Radio Liberty's Ukrainian have won 15 out of the 21 contested speech by Yuriy Spizhenko, the Ukrai– in Ukrainian Parliament desk on Monday, March 19. -
The Vietnam War As China's Watershed
the vietNAM wAr As chiNA’s wAtershed China today is a rising superpower and a major challenger to American hegemony. Te industrialization and modernization that other nations achieved in centuries, China has compressed to a few decades. Indeed, all too ofen, we forget how meager were China’s origins before its recent rise. By the mid-20th Century, China remained extremely poor and militarily weakened, having sufered the Century of Humiliation and the Japanese Invasion. Tese trends would begin to change, however, during the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s. Tis paper tracks how the Chinese leadership used their involvement in Vietnam to work toward three goals: frst, to legitimize Mao’s military theories; second, to damage Soviet international prestige in the Communist movement; and third, to secure an advantageous post-war relationship with the United States. In achieving these goals, the Chinese used Vietnam as a springboard for future geopolitical relevance and development. By Christian Talley ‘16 Vanderbilt University ne of the most important trends in Vietnam War his- toriography has been the shif from a stale East ver- Osus West analysis and toward an examination of the competing intra-bloc interests of the Soviets, Chinese, and Vietnamese. Historians such as Lien-Hang Nguyen have re- cently reconstructed Hanoi’s perspective, demonstrating that North Vietnam’s leaders were torn between their commu- nist patrons in Beijing and Moscow as a result of the Sino- Soviet split. Just as important is the perspective of China in this seminal confict. At the beginning of the Vietnam War, China was an impoverished junior partner in the world communist movement. -
Television and Politics in the Soviet Union by Ellen Mickiewicz TELEVISION and AMERICA's CHILDREN a Crisis of Neglect by Edward L
SPLIT SIGNALS COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY edited by George Gerbner and Marsha Seifert IMAGE ETHICS The Moral Rights of Subjects in Photographs, Film, and Television Edited by Larry Gross, John Stuart Katz, and Jay Ruby CENSORSHIP The Knot That Binds Power and Knowledge By Sue Curry Jansen SPLIT SIGNALS Television and Politics in the Soviet Union By Ellen Mickiewicz TELEVISION AND AMERICA'S CHILDREN A Crisis of Neglect By Edward L. Palmer SPLIT SIGNALS Television and Politics in the Soviet Union ELLEN MICKIEWICZ New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1988 Oxford University Press Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1988 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission of Oxford University Press. Mickiewicz, Ellen Propper. Split signals : television and politics in the Soviet Union / Ellen Mickiewicz. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 0-19-505463-6 1. Television broadcasting of news—Soviet Union. 2. Television broadcasting—Social aspects—Soviet Union. 3. Television broadcasting—Political aspects—Soviet Union. 4. Soviet Union— Politics and government—1982- I. Title. PN5277.T4M53 1988 302.2'345'0947—dc!9 88-4200 CIP 1098 7654321 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Preface In television terminology, broadcast signals are split when they are divided and sent to two or more locations simultaneously.