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Home , Alois Mertes, Fritz Erler (politician), Heinrich Krone, Heinrich von Brentano, Herbert Wehner, Kurt Birrenbach

Notes

1 Introduction

1. What belongs together will now grow together (JK). 2. The well-known statement from Brandt is often wrongly attributed to the speech he gave one day after the fall of the Wall at the City Hall, Rathaus Schöneberg. This error is understandable since it was added later to the publicized version of the speech with the consent of Brandt himself (Rother, 2001, p. 43). By that time it was already a well known phrase since it featured prominently on a SPD poster with a picture of Brandt in front of the partying masses at the . The original statement was made by Brandt during a radio interview on 10 November for SFP-Mittagecho where he stated: ‘Jetzt sind wir in einer Situation, in der wieder zusammenwächst, was zusammengehört’ (‘Now we are in a situation in which again will grow together what belongs together’). 3. The with , signed 11 December 1973, finalized the Eastern Treaties. 4. By doing this, I aim to contribute to both theory formation concerning inter- national politics and foreign policy and add to the historiography of the German question and reunification policy. Not only is it important to com- pare theoretical assumptions against empirical data, by making the theoretical assumptions that guide the historical research explicit, other scholars are enabled to better judge the quality of the research. In the words of King et al. (1994, p. 8): ‘If the method and logic of a researcher’s observations and infer- ences are left implicit, the scholarly community has no way of judging the validity of what was done.’ This does not mean that the historical research itself only serves theory formation. In fact, the theoretical framework helps to focus on certain historical sources that may have remained underexposed and contribute to a larger historiography. By using an explicit theoretical framework for historical research, it becomes possible to investigate general assumptions that should not only answer the research question but also have a broader external validity. At the same time, the historical research also pro- vides an in-depth description of the case study and supplements the more general theoretical framework with idiosyncratic explanations. 5. Those appointed to advise the are in a special position to influence decision-making. Even though the chancellor is in no way dependent on or bound by their advice, a close personal relationship can make advisors very influential. In this book, their role will be extensively analysed as well. 6. The original 1982 edition is a reaction to the publication of the conference proceedings of the Rhöndorfer Gespräche, a yearly conference organized by the Stiftung-Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, on the ‘myth of the lost opportunity- debate’ (Schwarz, 1982, p. 5).

170 Notes 171

7. For example, the well-known Adenauer biographer Hans-Peter Schwarz is a member of the StBKAH advisory board as well as other historians who focus mainly on Adenauer’s work. In order to write his biography on Adenauer, Schwarz was given exclusive permission to access the files of the federal chancellery. The same permission was later also given to Henning Köhler, a relative outsider, who then began work not only on Adenauer, but also on an extensive critical evaluation of Schwarz’s biography (Granieri, 2000, pp. 593–596; Granieri 2003 for specific examples). In fact, Köhler’s book contains more references to Schwarz than to important Adenauer contem- poraries such as De Gaulle or (Köhler, 1994, p. 1323). When the publication of Köhler’s biography was anticipated as the ‘anti- Schwarz’, the remark, made during one of the Rhöndorfer Gespräche of the StBKAH, was probably made only half in jest (Schwabe, 1994, p. 124). The situation with the Social Democrats is no different (cf. Gray, 2007, p. 1008). was known for surrounding himself with histori- ans, writers and journalists. As a consequence, a large volume of historical work on Brandt and his political legacy is produced by people who knew him personally, such as Klaus Harpprecht or Peter Bender, an old friend and classmate of Bahr (Bender, 1995; Harpprecht, 2000). His second wife, Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt recently published a biography as well (Seebacher- Brandt, 2004). Brandt’s eldest son, Peter Brandt, is a history professor in Hagen and one of the trustees of the BWBS. Gregor Schöllgen, who was affiliated with the BWBS and co-editor of the edited publication of doc- uments from the archive of Willy Brandt, published a Brandt biography (Schöllgen, 2001). Christoph Meyer gained exclusive access to parts of the archive of prominent Social Democrat for his biogra- phy (Meyer, 2006). Meyer is affiliated with the Herbert-und-Greta-Wehner- Stiftung.

2 Between Continuity and Change: and the Constructivist Approach Revisited

1. There are several denominations here that make more or less the same distinction. Some speak of ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ research programmes. 2. Even though constitutive theory makes it impossible to distinguish variation between independent and dependent variables, Finnemore, for example, states that it is still possible empirically to ‘bracket’ agent and structure and to provide at least a descriptive analysis of both sides of the rela- tionship. Finnemore states that this approach may be regarded by some as something to be avoided, but could also serve ‘as a useful first step in causal analysis’. Constructivist empirical research then is not so much about theory testing, but about theory generation. For more on ‘constructivist’ methodology, see Klotz and Lynch (2007). 3. In response to constructivist criticism of traditional IR theory, one of the central arguments is that constructivists may point out that neo-realists and neo-liberals take actors and interests as givens instead of focusing on social interaction and the way norms influence the actor’s preferences and the definition of interests; but that constructivists only seem to push the 172 Notes

problem further back by taking the influence of unspecified norms as a given (cf. Zehfuss, 2002, p. 254). 4. Here, the continuity in German foreign policy following reunification is intensively dealt with in studies that may not be constructivist per se, but do stress the impact of ideas, culture, (European) identity or historical memory (Katzenstein, 1996; Banchoff, 1999b; Rittberger, 2001; Maull, 2006). 5. In addition to ‘peace’ and ‘reconciliation’ as the prevailing social norms that guided Ostpolitik, Cordell and Wolff (2007, p. 263) also mention ‘regime change’. They do not explain why they choose these three norms as essential to Ostpolitik. Even though ‘peace’ and ‘reconciliation’ seem obvious, ‘regime change’ is less so. 6. March and Olson use ‘norms’ and ‘identities’ more or less interchangeably, as do most constructivists. 7. Initially, the had insisted that the European borders should be deemed ‘unchangeable’. 8. In his book Realist Constructivism: Rethinking Theory (Cambridge, 2010), Samuel Barkin provides an in depth theoretical discus- sion concerning the problematic use of the distinction between the ‘logic of consequence’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness’. My concern here is limited to providing an analytical model that provides an explanation for Ostpolitik. 9. It is important to notice here that ideas not only play a role in explaining continuity by acting as a persistent norm that in the end will always give way to political interests. The more an existing norm becomes less successful over time, the more alternative coalitions are encouraged to create new ones and challenge the dominant coalition. 10. Here, it does not matter whether the members of the dominant coalition are to blame or whether external factors have contributed to the failure of a certain foreign policy.

3 Westbindung Instead of Wiedervereinigung

1. Adenauer (1983, pp. 129–131). 2. Ibid., p. 130. 3. Grotewohl played an important role during the founding of the SED and went on to become the prime minister of the GDR from 1949 to 1960. 4. Schumacher (1985, pp. 620–622). 5. Ibid., pp. 623–624. 6. Schwartz (1991, pp. 109–110) points out that the special position of ‘federal Minister for special assignments’ (Bundesminister für Besondere Aufgaben)cre- ated by Adenauer should be viewed in this respect. There were even four of these positions in Adenauer’s second government. 7. Adenauer (1987, p. 65). 8. Baring (1969, p. 16) quotes Adenauer saying that: ‘I had to negotiate with the High Commission by myself. The gentlemen did not want so many (!) present and it would not have been right’ (exclamation mark in the original). 9. Schumacher (1985, pp. 714–731, pp. 702–703). This goes for Adenauer’s clos- est aides such Blankenhorn, Globke and . When in 1953 Notes 173

Adenauer decided to include Representatives and Theodor Overländer of the expellees’ GB/BHE party, he did so even while describing them as ‘brown, even deep brown’ (quoted in Schwartz, 1991, p.117). 10. Schumacher (1985, p. 725). 11. Adenauer (1975, p. 167). 12. Adenauer (1965, pp. 355–359). 13. Heinemann resigned as Minister for domestic affairs on 11 October 1950 in against West German rearmament and Adenauer’s style of leadership (Lehmann, 2000, p. 88). He founded his own party, the Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei (GVP), which was unsuccessful. Eventually, Heinemann joined the SPD. 14. Foreign Relations of the , 1952–1954, Volume VII, part I, p. 72. 15. Van Ooijen et al. (1996, p. 39). 16. Time Magazine, 9 June 1952. 17. Van Ooijen et al. (1996, pp. 38–39). 18. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume III, p. 1297. 19. NARA, Office Memorandum. Secret. 1 October 1951, General File 59, 662A.00/10-151. 20. NARA, Policy Statement , 1 February 1951, General File 59, 662A.00/10-151. 21. Ibid. 22. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume III, p. 1582. 23. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, II. Reihe, Band 4, pp. 161–162. 24. Ibid., pp. 235–248. 25. Van Ooijen et al. (1996, p. 41). 26. Ibid. 27. According to Adenauer, the Bindungsklausel was necessary in order to ensure that the western powers would agree with renewed German sovereignty, but he was unable to convince Brentano and others who were sceptical (Kosthorst, 1993, p. 27; Granieri, 2003, p. 57). When the other Christian Democrats failed to pressure Adenauer directly, a delegation headed by Brentano even went to Acheson the day before the signing of the ‘Con- vention’. Eventually, Acheson approached Adenauer in order to reach a compromise so that the text of the treaty was changed and stated that alliance of a reunified Germany to the West would not be automatic, but that a change in the arrangements of the ‘Convention’ required the consent of the western powers. 28. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954 Volume VII, p. 433. 29. New York Times, 4 September 1953. Dulles made his remarks without consulting with President Eisenhower. 30. After the elections, the West German government proclaimed 17 June Tag der deutschen Einheit (with a small ‘d’). This Day of German Unity became the Tag der Deutschen Einheit (with a capital ‘D’) on 3 October after German reunification took place in 1990. 31. During an earlier introduction meeting with Ollenhauer, Dulles had reso- lutely rejected the idea (Rupieper, 1991, p. 309). 32. To Adenauer’s satisfaction, the western powers used the conference to stand united behind the Eden Plan which was in line with the West German conditions for reunification (cf. Lehmann, 2000, p. 95). According to the 174 Notes

Eden Plan, free elections for the whole of Germany should be followed by the installation of a national convention responsible for setting up a con- stitution and presenting a plan for a final peace agreement with the four allied powers. The Soviet Foreign Affairs, Vjatsjeslav Molotov, however, the opposite order, first a peace treaty, then a national convention consisting of representatives from the FRG and GDR followed by general elections for a reunified (and neutral) Germany (Lehmann, 2000, p. 95). 33. On 26 February 1954, the West German parliament voted by a two-thirds majority in favour of rearmament (Lehmann, 2000, p. 90).

4 Reunification Policy under Pressure: Taking the Offensive

1. Cf. Baring (1974, p. 173). 2. After Stalin’s death, it was Lavrenti Beria who first seized power. However, Nikolai Bulganin, Georgi Malenkov and Vjatsjeslav Molotov then united under the leadership of to rid themselves of Beria. Beria was executed in December 1953 and Malenkov became chairman of the Council of Ministers. Bulganin subsequently succeeded Malenkov at the beginning of 1955. From that moment on, he and Khrushchev dictated the politics of the Soviet Union with party secretary Khrushchev dominat- ing foreign policy and eventually settling the struggle for power in his favor (cf. Besson, 1970, p. 92). In 1958, he succeeded Bulganin and became the most powerful man in the Kremlin. 3. According to Dulles, the Europeans had false hope regarding a summit meeting. He stated that the Europeans seemed to believe that ‘[...] this would produce some kind of miracle’. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, p. 174). 4. Documents for the Study of American History. http://www.vlib.us/amdocs. 5. Adenauer (1966, p. 472). 6. Trachtenberg (1999, pp. 136–137) points out that in autumn 1955 Dulles was also thinking about ways to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union about a neutral and (partly) demilitarized Germany. Adenauer’s wor- ries about America’s willingness to contemplate German neutrality therefore seem justified. (cf. Schwartz, 1991, pp. 184–185; Köhler, 1994, p. 857). 7. Schwartz (1991, pp. 184–185). 8. Adenauer (1966, p. 444). 9. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Reihe III, Band 1,p.46. 10. Quoted in Schwartz (1991, p. 184). 11. Ibid., p. 188. 12. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume V, p. 225. 13. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, p. 85. 14. Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Volume V, p. 134 en pp. 233–234; Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III Reihe, Band 1, p. 66. 15. Grewe (1979, p. 225). 16. Ibid. Notes 175

17. Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume V, pp. 232–238. For the opening statements of Eisenhower, Eden and Faure, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band1, pp. 151–166. 18. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 213–219. 19. Ibid., pp. 232–236. 20. Grewe (1979, p. 228). This also meant that the Heusinger Plan disappeared into a drawer and was never heard of again and the general public never came to know of its existence. 21. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 76–80. 22. Quoted in Kilian (2005, p. 25). 23. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 288–289. 24. Ibib., p. 215. 25. Ibid., pp. 288–289. 26. Blankenhorn was appointed Permanent Representative at the West German mission to NATO in May 1955. His position as head of the Political Department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry was taken up by Wilhelm Grewe. 27. Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume V, p. 224. 28. Adenauer (1966, pp. 461–462). Foreign Relations of the United States,Volume V, pp. 232–238. 29. For the exchange of notes, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 262–263. 30. Adenauer (1966, pp. 509–512); cf. Schwartz (1991, pp. 212–213). 31. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 309–312. 32. Ibid., pp. 313–314. 33. Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume V, pp. 579–581. 34. Cf. Adenauer (1966, p. 545). 35. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, p. 337. 36. Adenauer (1967, p. 546). 37. Cf. Grewe (1979, p. 252). 38. Formally, Berlin was still under four-power rule. The three western powers did not agree to making Berlin another West German state, but allowed the West German government to represent Berlin abroad (cf. Kilian, 2005, pp. 216–217). 39. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitk, III. Reihe, Band 1, p. 387. 40. Cf. Schwartz (1991, p. 217). 41. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitk, III. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 392–393. 42. Ibid., p. 403. 43. Ibid., pp. 401–402. 44. Support for Adenauer’s policies increased by 13–59 per cent after the negotiations. For poll results and satisfaction with Adenauer as leader of the CDU/CSU, see Buchstab (1986, p. 599). 45. Poll results from the Allensbach-Institut from 1967 to 1975, quoted in Schwartz (1991, p. 207). 46. Brentano had insisted with the western powers that the Federal Republic would not be invited as a full participant to the conference so that would not do the same (cf. Kosthorst, 1993, p. 83). As a result, the were present only as observers. 47. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, p. 745. 176 Notes

48. Kabinetsprotokolle 1955, 30 November 1955. 49. Adenauer (1967, p. 196). 50. Since March 1951, when the ‘small revision’ (see Section 3.2) took effect, Adenauer had not only served as chancellor but also as minister of foreign affairs. 51. Baring (1974, p. 151). 52. Ibid., p. 153. 53. Cf. Grewe (1979, p. 252); Booz (1995, p. 27). 54. On the subcommittee, the United States, the Soviet Union, , Britain and Canada represented the West. 55. For the press release about Adenauer’s memorandum to the western delega- tions, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 2, Erster Halbband p. 187. 56. Cf. Kosthorst (1993, p. 97). 57. For the relevant parts of the French government’s declaration, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 2, Erster Halbband,p.72 58. Cf. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1,p.71. 59. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 2/1, p. 176. Baring (1974, p. 418) points out that Adenauer was less attached to the link between disar- mament and reunification but was still very much aware of the importance of the link between reunification and European security in general. Whereas according to Adenauer substantial agreements on disarmament could bring reunification closer, Brentano saw no such possibilities. In any case, however, Adenauer had few illusions about the success of international negotiations on disarmament. 60. Cf. Baring (1974, pp. 181–189). 61. PA AA, B2, 99. For the Mollet interview, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 2, Erster Halbband, p. 231. 62. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XXVI, p. 93. 63. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 2, Zweiter Halbband, pp. 510–511. 64. Cf. Time Magazine, 3 September 1956, ‘: The Old man’s Anger’. 65. The conflict centred on the Suez Canal, which had been nationalized by the Egyptian President Nasser. France and the Britain, with the help of Israel, tried to regain control. Generally the Suez Crisis is recognized as the turning point at which it became clear that France and Britain could no longer act as global powers without the support of (one of the) superpowers. 66. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe Band 3, Erster Drittelband, pp. 577–579. Even though Adenauer only spoke of tactical nuclear weapons as ‘modern artillery [...] almost normal weapons’, the press conference led to great anxiety within the media. A week later followed the so-called Göttinger Declaration (Göttinger Erklärung) by some prominent West German nuclear experts who spoke out against nuclear armament. 67. Blankenhorn (1980, pp. 262–266). Adenauer spoke of ‘limited withdrawal’ whereby, just as under the Heusinger Plan, Central Europe would be disarmed to comparable levels in East and West. 68. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 3, pp. 1066–1072. (cf. Drummond, 1982, pp. 203–211). 69. Printed in Drummond (1982, p. 210). Notes 177

70. According to Williams (2003, p. 570) the Russians were hardly impressed and considered both the Ollenhauer Plan and the SPD under his leadership to be a continuation of the anticommunist sentiments of the Schumacher-era. 71. Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Volume XXVI, p. 137. 72. Ibid., p. 59. 73. Ibid., p. 208. 74. Ibid., p. 212. 75. Cf. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 1, p. 59. Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Volume XXVI, p. 219. 76. Cf. Baring (1974, pp. 213–214). 77. Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Volume XXVI, pp. 259–261. Earlier, the West Germans had already indicated that they would like to issue the declaration just before the elections and hoped it could become known as the ‘Berlin Declaration’ (cf. Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Volume XXVI, p. 251). 78. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 3, Zweiter Halbband p. 1084. Specific text proposals from the West German side were rejected by the Americans. See also Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Volume XXVI, p. 281ff. 79. The declaration was prepared by the Four-Power Working Group. 80. Documents on Germany 1944–1961, pp. 244–246. 81. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 3, pp. 1305–1306. 82. For the SPD press release, see Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 3, pp. 1316–1317. The FDP was also disappointed about the Declaration of Berlin and its use as a campaign tool (cf. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 3, pp. 1319–1320). 83. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 3, pp. 1592–1596.

5 The Christian Democrats Stick, the Social Democrats Swing

1. Baring (1974, pp. 217–221). 2. In 1955 the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was founded under the lead- ership of Yugoslavia, India (under President Nehru), Egypt (under President Nasser) and Indonesia (under President Soekarno) Even though the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement presented themselves as neutral states in the between East and West they came to represent themselves more as an anti-Western bloc (Gray, 2003, pp. 28–29). 3. Kabinettsprotokolle 1957, 10: 395–396. 4. Ibid. 5. PA AA, B2, Bd 142, 18 June 1962, Alleinvertretungs-Politik der Bundesregierung: Neue Maβnahmen zu ihrer Durchsetzung. 6. In the 1960s, the budget for development aid grew to about 875 million Deutschmark, about 1 per cent of the West German GDP. The Federal Republic also provided loans through the World Bank and the IMF. 7. In my opinion, the should be seen as an attempt to defend West Germany’s reunification policy. I do not agree with Gray (2003, p. 17) who states that it was ‘an unforeseen side effect of West German sovereignty 178 Notes

[and] hardening of the competition between the Federal Republic and ’. In fact, the hardening of relations between the FRG and the GDR in this context seemed to be the result of ’s policy of non-recognition more than anything else. 8. Cf. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 3, Dritter Halbband, p. 2030ff. 9. Ibid., p. 2047. 10. Ibid., p. 2110ff. 11. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, pp. 341–342. 12. Baring (1974, pp. 223–224). The discussion about the reliability of American nuclear guarantees to the Western alliance emerged again in the early 1960s when French President De Gaulle introduced the French ambition to station nuclear weapons of her own, the so called force de frappe. Adenauer, together with Franz-Joseph Strauß, who became his minister for atomic issues in 1956 and minister for defense in 1956, also explored the possibility of acquir- ing West German nuclear weapons but failed. Even though the Americans tried to meet European and West German concerns about their willing- ness to deploy nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe by proposing the so-called Multilateral Force (MLF) and better integrate nuclear weapons into NATO, Washington would always keep full control (Trachtenberg, 1999, pp. 314–315). 13. The next day, the Soviet ambassador was taken to task by Brentano because the aide-mémoire he had presented to Adenauer was leaked to both the opposition and the press on the same day (Schwartz, 1991, p. 425). 14. Adenauer himself made the proposal public with the presentation of the third volume of his autobiography (Adenauer, 1967, p. 378; Buchheim, 1984, p. 100). 15. Baring (1974, p. 431). 16. Ibid., p. 232. 17. It should be noticed that Adenauer did not start to use this argument vis-a-vis the Americans until the beginning of the 1960s, while the potential politi- cal problems with the expellees only played a role at the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. The large number of refugees coming from the former German territories in was considered a potential threat to stability and prone to communist manipulation. For this reason, the Americans provided financial support to fight unemployment among the expellees and integrate them into West German society (Schwartz, 1991, pp. 90–91). The expellees’ political organizations had relatively little influ- ence even though they attracted considerable media attention (Stickler, 2004, p. 433). The Americans never took Adenauer’s argument that West German nationalists and expellees posed a significant domestic political problem very seriously (Hillenbrand, 1998, p. 201). 18. Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Volume XXVI, p. 59. 19. Baring (1974, p. 232). 20. Foreign Relations of the United States 1958–1960, Volume XXVI, p. 636ff. 21. Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume IX, Berlin Crisis 1959–1960, p. 636. 22. Baring (1974, p. 238). 23. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume VIII, p. 182. Notes 179

24. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik Reihe IV, Band 1, p. 3ff. 25. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume VIII, p.76ff. 26. Ibid. 27. Cf. Adenauer (1967, pp. 34–35). 28. Brentano had already made the same proposal earlier to alone, during a press conference in September 1956 (Baring, 1974, p. 269). 29. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 1, Zweiter Halbband, p. 1268. 30. Next to the East German Foreign Affairs Minister Dr. , ambas- sador Grewe, and not his West German counterpart Brentano participate in the negotiations. The French Foreign Affairs Minister Couve de Mourville seemed fed up with German sensibilities and addressed Bolz the same way the Western delegations addressed the so-called GDR by calling him the so-called Dr. Bolz (Grewe, 1979, pp. 402–403). 31. Baring (1974, pp. 243–245). 32. Ibid., pp. 270–272. 33. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band I, p. 102. 34. Different versions of the Globke-plan may be found in Morsey (1974, p. 202f). 35. Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XV, pp. 436–437. 36. Adenauer proposed the moratorium to the Soviet Union in June 1962. A few weeks later the Soviet Union responded negatively (Buchheim, 1984, pp. 102–103). In November 1962 Adenauer referred to this so-called Burgfriedenplan to Kennedy and called his ideas ‘a sort of daydream’ (For- eign Relations of the United States, Volume XV, pp. 438–441). Kennedy replied that the Soviet Union would never agree. According to Bach (1976, p. 184) the renewed interest of Adenauer in more specific proposal concerning the German question were induced by his attempts to consolidate his policies for as long as possible. 37. Baring (1974, p. 281). 38. Entschuldigen Sie, Herr von Eckardt, wenn ich jetzt kölnischen Dialekt spreche. Wir haben nochmals fies Jlück jehabt! Quoted in Eckardt (1970, p. 419). 39. In the 1950s there was a recurring tension between the SPD party leadership which realized that total opposition against rearmament would hurt the pos- sibilities of the SPD to take any influence over the new armed forces on the one hand and the very strong opposition of the rank and file members to any rearmament at all. In order to confront this situation the party leadership followed a double strategy of more moderate opposition in parliament and supporting the grass roots movement outside the (Paterson,1976, pp. 227–228). 40. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, III. Reihe, Band 4, p. 1141. 41. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 1207–1222. 42. The Social Democrats emphasized that this did not mean the recognition of East Germany or bilateral negotiations. A Parliamentary Council could only be formed after the four powers had agreed on a European security system (Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 1, p.1154). 43. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 1100–1101. 44. Adenauer (1988, p. 30). 45. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 1187–1188. 46. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 3, p. 627. 180 Notes

47. Wehner (1976, p. 213). 48. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 4, pp. 1100–1102. 49. Wehner (1976, p. 240). Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 3, pp. 1284–1285. 50. Wehner (1976, p. 247).

6 A Tale of Three Cities: Bonn, Berlin and Washington

1. NARA, Policy Statement Germany, 1 February 1951, General File 59, 662A.00/10-151. 2. Adenauer’s less than enthusiastic stance on Berlin was well known to the Americans (Hillenbrand, 1998, p. 142). 3. NARA, General File 59, 611.621/7-2050. After the founding of the Fed- eral Republic it was mostly the Americans who, under Eisenhower and Dulles, supported the inclusion of West Berlin as part of West Germany. This changed after the Berlin Crisis under Kennedy. NARA, General File 59, 611.621/7-2050. 4. BAK, NL Carstens, Grewe an Carstens, 24 August 1961. 5. Interview Nelson Ledsky. 6. Trachtenberg (1991, pp. 226–227). 7. Khrushchev was not seriously speculating on an armed conflict with the West. When his son asked what he would do if the West would not meet his demands he answered: ‘We’ll try something else. Something will always turn up’ (Taylor, 2006 p. 105). 8. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1961 (1962, pp. 533–540). 9. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 9, Erster Halbband, p. 12. 10. O’Donnell (1972, p. 302). 11. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 7, Erster Halbband, pp. 48–49. Two days later, the letter was also published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 12. Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XIV, Berlin Crisis 1961–1962, pp. 345–346. 13. Ibid. 14. According to Trachtenberg, the fact that the corresponding documents have not yet been declassified shows the extent to which Kennedy may have been willing to seriously compromise regarding the Western position towards the German question (1991, p. 222). 15. Cf. Schwartz (1991, pp. 703–709); Mayer (1996, p. 65). Foreign Relations of the United States, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Volume XIV, p. 605ff. 16. Foreign Relations of the United States, Berlin Crisis 1962–1963, Volume XV, p. 12. 17. Foreign Relations of the United States, Berlin Crisis 1961–1962, Volume XIV, p. 830f. 18. Foreign Relations of the United States, Berlin Crisis 1962–1963, Volume XV,p.1. 19. Mayer (1994, p. 93). 20. Foreign Relations of the United States, Berlin Crisis 1962–1963, Volume XV, p. 110, 111. Notes 181

21. Ibid., p. 112. 22. Ibid., pp. 110, 113. 23. Only later would Kennedy have admitted to one of his main advisers Theodore Sorensen that he had been wrong by stating that ‘our error [...] was in trying to push the Germans to accept ideas in which [Kennedy] could not interest Khrushchev anyway’ (Mayer, 1996, p. 73). 24. Foreign Relations of the United States, Berlin Crisis 1961–1962, Volume XV, p. 144 25. Foreign Relations of the United States, Berlin Crisis 1962–1963, Volume XV, p. 63. 26. Brandt (1989, p. 167). 27. Münkel (2000, p. 200). 28. ACDP, NL Globke, 01-70, 015/1. From the personal archive of Globke, it becomes clear that Adenauer’s right hand has an informant with or close to the SPD party executive. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Adenauer’s attempt to accompany Johnson – who landed in Bonn first – to Berlin failed because the Vice President replied that he did not want to get involved in the election campaign (Schwarz, 1991, p. 667). 32. In the polls, the CDU/CSU fell from 49 per cent to 35 per cent of the votes on 19 August. By mid-September, a few days before the federal election, the Christian Democrats were back on 47 per cent (Schwarz, 1991, pp. 666, 670). 33. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe Band 8, pp. 20–29. 34. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe Band 7, p. 1032. 35. Ibid., p. 486. 36. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe Band 8, pp. 1151–1155. 37. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe Band 9, p. 567. 38. Ibid. 39. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe Band 9,Ibid., p. 568. 40. Ibid., p. 565. 41. Ibid., pp. 572–575. 42. Bahr (1996, pp. 154–155). 43. Ibid., p. 157. See also Section 10.2. 44. Public Papers of the President 1961 (1962, pp. 459–461). 45. Bahr (1996, p. 166).

7 Adenauer’s Long Shadow

1. Krone (2003, p. 65). 2. Blankenhorn (1980, p. 351). 3. New Partner?, Time Magazine, 27 March 1950. 4. Allemagne – Histoire d’une ambition, Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2011. 5. Osterheld (1986, p. 111). For Adenauer’s remark to Debré, see Adenauer (1968, p. 75). 6. Birrenbach (1984, p. 172). 7. When was sent to Washington at the end of January to reas- sure the Americans he also presented the option and added that ‘[it] was his personal idea to ask the Bundestag to pass a resolution reaffirming 182 Notes

Germany’s commitment to the West’ (Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, Vol. XIII, p. 186). Although it is unclear where the idea orig- inated it was suggested directly after the treaty was signed on different occasions. 8. Influential weekly magazine had published a story about the sup- posedly bad condition of the West German army. Strauß, Defence Minister at the time, subsequently accused the author of the story, Conrad Ahlers, as well as the Publisher, , of high treason. Strauß’s reaction led to a wave of disapproval in the press and among politicians. Adenauer how- ever reiterated Strauß’s accusation. When a judicial investigation concluded that there was no question of high treason, Adenauer refused to let Strauß go after which the FDP forced him to do so by threatening to leave the coalition (Williams, 2003, pp. 507–510). 9. NL Schröder I-483, 287/1. 10. Oppelland (2002, pp. 533–534) points out that the Catholic background of most Gaullists was not imperative and that Liberals such as Dehler and Mende were also Catholics but in favour of a more flexible policy. Conze (2003, p. 216) also put the protestant Gerstenmaier in the Gaullist camp. 11. Krone (2003, p. 130). 12. When later that month Adenauer met with De Gaulle, it became clear that the general was already working on a proactive policy towards the Soviet Union by mentioning the possibility of export loans for French indus- tries willing to work with the Russians (Williams, 2003, p. 530). From that point onwards, the possibility of Franco-Russian became Adenauer’s the most important argument when emphasizing the importance of Franco–German cooperation. As he later stated to McCloy: ‘The great danger, which the US did not comprehend, was that De Gaulle might be forced to go to the Soviets’ (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, p.173). When, during a press conference on 4 February 1965, De Gaulle repeated his recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and suggested a ‘Europeanization of the German question’ a process which would involve all Germany’s neighbouring countries, it became clear that De Gaulle was willing to improve relations with Moscow at the expense of West German interests (Schwartz, 1991, pp. 897–899). 13. The Bundestag agreed on the so-called Jaksch-Bericht, with which the SPD spokesperson for expellees called for a more proactive approach towards the East (Lehmann, 2000, p. 179). 14. According to Eible (2001, p. 257), this argument should be seen as a means to ensure that not the Ministry for Economic Affairs but his own Ministry for Foreign Affairs would lead the negotiations with the East European countries. 15. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik, 1963, p. 1573. 16. Booz (1995, pp. 93–94, 99) considers Schröder’s policy a more ‘offensive’ take on the Hallstein Doctrine since it actively sought to isolate the GDR. See also Eibl (2001, p. 415) and Gray (2003, pp. 243–244). 17. Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XV, 1961–1963, p. 140 en pp. 200–201. 18. Ibid., pp. 523–529. 19. Ibid. 20. Jahrbuch der Öffentliche Meinung 1965–1967, p.198. Quoted in Schwartz (1991, p. 901). Notes 183

21. An inventarization of the diplomatic responses to the memorandum and impressions from West German embassies may be found in: PA AA Berlin, B2, 99. 22. In December 1960, when the American balance of payment deterio- rated while the West German economy continued to show growth, the United States requested a yearly contribution starting with the First Off- set Agreement in 1961 (Zimmermann, 2002, pp. 245–253; Schwartz, 2003, pp. 240–241). 23. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, p. 671. See also Osterheld (1992, pp. 46–47). 24. Ibid. 25. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, pp. 675–677. 26. The signing of the Soviet-East German Friendship Treaty on 12 June 1964 had failed to lead to any diplomatic reactions in the West and was a sign that Khrushchev had failed to get any results from his policies towards Berlin and the German question. 27. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, pp. 82–85. 28. To the Americans, Schröder denied that the initiative was taken in the context of the approaching elections (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV,p.56). 29. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, p. 59. 30. Ibid., p. 67. 31. Ibid., p.101. 32. Ibid., p. 171. According to McGhee, Adenauer was still a very powerful figure in the media and, according to his calculations, could count on the support of about 60 Christian Democratic parliamentary party members (McGhee, 1989, pp. 157–159). 33. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, p. 587. After being the head of the Intergovernmental Task Berlin Task Force, Hillenbrand was appointed deputy ambassador in Bonn under McGhee. 34. Cf. Hillenbrand (1998, pp. 51, 62, 134). 35. The economic problems of the Federal Republic were relatively small, but were a departure from the years of growth during the Wirtschaftswunder, whichhadgivenErhardsomuchcredit. 36. According to McGhee (1999, p. 185), who was present, Johnson bent over the diminutive Erhard and said ‘Now we’re going to find out who our friends are.’ 37. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, pp. 408–409. Erhard feared that the Americans would, alternatively, withdraw some of their troops from West Germany. That the Chancellor had reason to worry becomes clear from Defence secretary McNamara’s suggestions to Johnson to do so if necessary (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, pp. 413–416). 38. In July 1966, only 30 per cent of voters still supported Erhard. In June 1965, 70 per cent had still said that they believed that West German interests coincided with American interests, but this percentage had dropped to barely 16 per cent by the end of 1966 (Schwartz, 2003, pp. 114,116). 39. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, pp. 408–409. See also McGhee (1999, pp. 190–194, 199–200). 184 Notes

40. Der Spiegel, 17 January 1966, p. 22. 41. NL Barzel N1371/61. See also Sommer (1966, p. 32). 42. Barzel (1978, p. 83). 43. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV Reihe, Band 12, p. 904. 44. Kiesinger had left Bonn in 1958 disappointedly. After the 1957 elections, Adenauer had offered him the position of Minister of Justice but Kiesinger later had to hear through the media that the post was going to someone else (Gassert, 2006, p. 498).

8 Ostpolitik on Hold

1. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe Band 9, p. 982. 2. The applications were collected and brought back to West Berlin by 236 East German postal workers who were not recognized by the FRG as offi- cial representatives of the state. This did not stop the commentator on East German state television from describing them as ‘consular representatives who represent the GDR on foreign soil’ (Buchheim, 1984, p. 119). 3. Brandt and his advisers sought to avoid all judicial pitfalls. For example, the protocol does not mention any agreement between the West Berlin Senate and the GDR, but only refers to ‘both parties involved’. Other legal issues are covered by ambiguous phrasing that ‘agreement about shared acknowl- edgement of places, administrations and agencies could not be reached’ (Bahr, 1996, p. 162; Merseburger, 2002, p. 454). 4. Brandt (1976, p. 106). Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe Band 10, p.62. 5. Quoted in Merseburger (2002, p. 455). 6. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, p. 329. 7. Ibid., p. 333. 8. A year later, during Kennedy’s visit to Berlin, Brandt impresses the American delegation by the way he is able to control the crowds: ‘He gave a stirring demonstration of his rapport with and control of Berlin populace by stilling huge, enthusiastic crowd before City Hall into respectful, moving silence while President signed Golden Book [...]’ (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, p. 537). 9. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik 1963: 1670. During Erhard’s visit to Washington in December 1963, the West German delegation complained about Brandt’s dealings in West Berlin. However, Kennedy replied that he found the ini- tiatives to be an example of ‘flexibility and imagination in dealing with a difficult problem’ (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, pp. 665–669). 10. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, pp. 532–534. 11. AdsD, HWA, p. 576. 12. PA AA Berlin, Ministerbüro, 1365/60. 13. StBKAH, III, 17. 14. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIV, pp. 27–30. 15. Ibid., pp. 665–669. 16. Ibid. 17. ‘Große Pläne mit Willy Brandt’, Berliner Morgenpost, 19 September 1959. 18. Brandt (1989, p. 327). Notes 185

19. Ibid. 20. ACDP, NL Kiesinger, 01-226/01. 21. Ibid. 22. Since Guttenberg’s position within the CSU was unfavourable at the time and the Bavarian Christian Democrats preferred Leo Wagner for the posi- tion in the Chancellery, Adenauer’s recommendation may well have secured the post for Guttenberg (Gassert, 2006, p. 532). Schröder tried to block Guttenberg’s appointed but only succeeded in delaying it for a few months (Gassert, 2006, pp. 532–533). 23. Wehner and Guttenberg also backed each other. After a speech made by Wehner in October 1967 that had caused some controversy in the media, Guttenberg sent a memo to Kiesinger stating that ‘Wehner’s speech is, over- all, actually proof of his loyalty towards both his own party as well as the ‘” (NL Guttenberg N397/70). 24. After Kiesinger was slapped in the face and called a Nazi by left-wing jour- nalist during a CDU press conference on 7 , Kiesinger’s National Socialist past and the trial against Klarsfeld for perjury continued to receive media coverage for a very long time (Gassert, 2006, pp. 648–659). 25. Both men were ambitious politicians and disappointed not to have been assigned a position in the new government, but decided to take their role in parliament seriously. When tensions in the cabinet rose and Kiesinger tried to make amends with the ‘Kresbronner Kreis’ at his holiday address, both parliamentarians objected to ‘back-room politics’ (AdsD, Helmut-Schmidt- Archiv, pp. 5058–5072). 26. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, V. Reihe, Band 1,p.60. 27. Ibid. 28. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, V. Reihe, Band 1, p. 1281. 29. Ibid., p. 61ff. 30. Ibid., p.1115, 1277, 1733. 31. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, V. Reihe, Band 2, pp.1277–1278. 32. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, IV. Reihe, Band 12, p. 1506. 33. Quoted in Bange (1999, pp. 459–460). The Bayernkurier was founded at the end of the 1950s by, among others, Strauss, who was also one of the first editors-in-chief. The newspaper was known to be the unofficial CSU party newspaper. 34. Brandt (1976, p. 229). 35. ACDP, NL Osterheld 01-226/006. For the relationship with Lilienfeld, see Gassert (2006, p. 110). 36. ACDP, NL Osterheld 01-226/006. 37. Bahr (1996, p. 234). 38. Brandt (1989, p. 164). 39. Schmidt (1987, pp. 25–27); Brandt (1978, p. 256). 40. ACDP, NL Kiesinger 01-226/008-1. 41. In an interview with Der Spiegel in the fall of 1969, Brandt claimed to have had more contact with Adenauer than Kiesinger during the time of the ‘Grand Coalition’ and that Adenauer had heavily criticized the way his fel- low party members failed to deal successfully with Moscow: ‘Herr Brandt, they are doing it all wrong’ (Williams, 2003, p. 536). 42. ACDP, NL Kiesinger 01-226/10. 186 Notes

43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. There were still some reformers, however, that did favour a resolution that called for the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and of East Germany under international law so as to differentiate the party as the ‘party of recog- nition’ (Anerkennungspartei), in contrast to the CDU/CSU and SPD (Niedhart, 1995, p. 110). 46. Baring and Görtemaker (1982, p. 125).

9 Crossing the Rubicon: Brandt’s Ostpolitik

1. Baring and Görtemaker (1982, pp. 102–121). 2. Not only was Wehner of the opinion that Kiesinger would be better off with- out the SPD: the chancellor himself also claimed to long for “the good old days” and, during the CDU party conference in Berlin in autumn 1968, referred to the ‘Grand Coalition’ as an “exception to the rule” (Hofmann, 2002, p. 517). 3. Bahr (1996, p. 193). 4. Ibid., p. 243. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik 1969, pp. 1030–1041. 5. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik 1969, pp. 1047–1057. 6. Ibid., p. 1054. 7. Ibid., pp. 1054–1057. 8. In a conversation with the East German Minister for State Security , the chair of the KGB made it clear that Brandt’s gov- ernment policy statement set a different tone but that the intentions of the new government in Bonn were not to be trusted. Like previous governments, the goal of the West Germans would continue to be the undermining of the position of East Germany. The Soviet approach to the German question should therefore remain unchanged (Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 6. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 58–61). The fear of a more aggressive Ostpolitik that sought to undermine the communist regimes in Eastern Europe was not completely without foundation and was felt particularly keenly in East Germany. Brandt and most notably Bahr considered not only how to improve relations with the East but also how, in the longer term, improved cooperation could be used to undermine the communist regimes by exposing those under their rule to western values and liberties. For more on this subject see Bange and Niedhart (2004) ‘Die “Relikte der Nachkriegszeit” beseitigen. Ostpolitik der in zweiten außenpolitischen Formationsphase der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und ihren internationalen Rahmenbedingungen 1969–1971’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 44, pp. 415–448. 9. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik,1970, pp. 22–23. 10. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 6. Reihe, Band 1, pp. 167–168. Bahr (1996, p. 282). 11. Bahr (1996, p. 317). 12. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik, 1970, pp. 1393–1397. 13. The conclusion of the treaty was followed by the immediate relaxation of extensive West German import restrictions that had previously been imposed on Soviet goods (Spaulding, 1997, p. 492). The West German Notes 187

government wanted to take care not to be seen to be exploiting trade for Ostpolitik, but at the same time it was well aware of the strong Soviet inter- est in this area (Dannenberg, 2008, pp. 211–213). During Brandt’s visit to Moscow for the signing of the treaty, he met with Brezhnev and was sur- prised about the extent to which the Kremlin seemed to be Westfremd and to overestimate the economic power of the Federal Repubic (Fischer, 2005, pp. 51–52). 14. The letter was not a part of the treaty, as the West Germans had wanted, and differed from the letter handed over by the Adenauer government after the negotiations about bilateral diplomatic relations in 1955 (see Section 4.2). The letter that was handed over to the Soviets by the Adenauer govern- ment included West Germany’s claim to sole representation of the entire German people whereas the letter from the Brandt government did not and referred to German unity only as a legitimate political interest (Buchheim, 1984, p. 147). 15. Fischer (2005, p. 52); Ash (1993, p. 73). 16. Ibid. 17. Before coalition negotiations in Bonn for the new social-liberal govern- ment had been completely finalized, Kissinger had offered Bahr a diplomatic backchannel so that both could communicate directly and leave their respective bureaucracies out of the loop (Bahr, 1996, pp. 270–271). 18. Time Magazine, On the Road to a New Reality, 4 January 1971. 19. Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XL, pp. 654–656, pp. 964–966. 20. Time Magazine, 31 . 21. Bahr (1996, pp. 352–371). In his memoires, Bahr emphasizes the West German role in the negotiations at length. 22. This, however, did not mean that West Berlin was considered a part of the Federal Republic. 23. Brandt (1976, p.525). 24. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik, 1970, pp. 1863–1865. 25. Cf. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Die Bahr-Kohl Gespräche (2004). Cf. Bahr (1996, pp. 371–380). 26. Later it became known that at least one of the two Christian Democrats who voted against the proposal to replace Brandt, Julius Steiner, was ‘bought’ by the GDR secret service, who had called the effort to bribe members of parliament ‘Operation Brandtschutz’ (cf. Potthoff, 1999, p. 105). 27. Bahr (1996, p. 397). 28. Brandt (1976, p. 519). 29. Bahr (1996, pp. 401–405). The extent to which Honecker did so on the encouragement of Moscow remains unclear (Potthoff, 1999, p. 110). 30. Bundespresseamt, Bulletin, vol. 20, n. 38. English translation from the German Historical Institute (www.ghi-dc.org). Sources and Literature

Archives

Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Stiftung, Bonn (AsD) SPD-PV (Parteivorstand) Depositum Willy Brandt Archiv (WBA) Depositum NL Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Sankt Augustin (ACDP) CDU Bundesvorstand, 07–001 CDU/CSU Fraktion, 08–001 CDU/CSU Fraktion, Arbeitskreis V, 08–006

– NL , 01–433 – NL Felix von Eckardt, 01–010 – NL Hans Globke, 01–070 – NL Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 01–226 – NL , 01–028 – NL Werner Marx, 01–256 – NL , 01–403 – NL Gerhard Schröder, 01–483

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz (BAK) Depositum , N 1371 Herbert Blankenhorn, N 351NL NL , N 239 NL Karl Carstens, N 1337 NL Karl-Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, N 397 National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA) Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PAAA) B1 Ministerbüro B2 Büro Staatssekretär B3 Büro Parlamentarischer Staatssekretär B9 Planungsstab B38 Berlin und Deutschland als Ganzes Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf (StBKAH) NL

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Background interviews on German–American relations concerning reunification Egon Bahr, Berlin, 9 March 2004. Nelson Ledsky (former US Minister in Berlin and negotiator in two plus four negotiations on German reunification) Washington DC, 5 October 2007. Gerry Livingston (former US Foreign Service Officer in , Berlin and Bonn, member of the National Security Council from 1972 to 1973 and for- mer President of the ) Washington DC, 10 October 2007.

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Note: The letter – n following the locator refers to the notes. abandonment, 7 Beria, Lavrenti, 174n Acheson, Dean, 35–7, 110, 153, Berlin Wall, 2, 10, 90, 94–5, 101–4, 173n 124, 126, 134, 142, 161 Adenauer, Konrad, 1–3, 8–11, 16, Berzarin, Nikolai, 90 18–19, 21, 26, 28–45, 46, 48–68, Bindungsklausel, 59, 143, 173n 70–85, 87, 89–93, 96–105, Birrenbach, Kurt, 110–112, 157 107–15, 119, 121, 125–9, 132, Blankenhorn, Norbert, 31, 33, 49, 134, 140, 144, 152, 160–4, 166–9, 50–3, 55, 65, 68, 71, 75, 110 171n, 172n, 173n, 174n, 175n, Bohlen, Charles, 55 176n, 178n, 179n, 180n, 181n, Böll, Heinrich, 141 182n, 183n, 184n, 185n, 187n Brandt, Willy, 1–4, 8–12, 13, 15–17, Adzubei, Aleksei, 118 19–21, 56, 88, 89, 90, 94, 95, agent theory (Dulles’), 78, 125 98–105, 123–32, 134–40, 144–8, Albertz, Heinrich, 99, 102, 125, 132 151–9, 161–6, 168–9, 170n, 171n, Allardt, Helmut, 138, 147, 149, 150 180n, 184n, 185n, 186n, Alleinvertretungsanspruch (principle of 187n non-recognition), 46, 71, 73, 134, Brentano, Heinrich von, 31, 43, 46, 140, 152, 161 53, 56, 59–62, 66–8, 71–2, 76, Allied Control Council, 154 79–80, 97, 105, 110–114, 123, Allison, Graham, 22, 23 127, 134–40, 161, 173n, 176n, American Council on Germany, 178n, 179n 121 Britain, 33, 37, 39, 40, 64, 69, 109–11, Andropov, Yuri, 186n 118, 147 Atlanticists, 107, 111, 113, 115, 118, Bruce, David, 76, 78 121, 152, 163 Bulganin, Nikolai, 47–8, 50–1, 55–7, Attlee, Clement, 29 73, 174n Augstein, Rudolf, 142 Bundes Nachrichtendienst (BND), Austrian Treaty, 48 94 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 10 Bad Godesberg Conference (SPD), , 63, 65 86–7 Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, Bahr, Egon, 2–3, 10, 99, 102–4, 123, 10 126–31, 136–8, 146, 149–53, Bundy, McGeorge, 92, 126, 128 158–9 Balken, Siegfried, 111 Cambodia, 139 Ball, George, 114 Campaign against Atomic Death Barzel, Rainer, 112, 115, 121–2, 133, (Kampf dem Atomtod), 84 143, 147, 151–3, 157, 164 Carstens, Karl, 91, 116 Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 1, 6, 10, 28, CDU/CSU, see Christian-Democrats 30, 33, 40, 45, 90 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 94

198 Index 199

Change through Rapprochement Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand, 154 (Wandel durch Annäherung), 2, 6, Dulles, John Foster, 44, 49, 50, 54, 60, 9, 18, 21, 90, 103, 123, 128, 130, 63, 64, 66, 67, 74, 77, 78, 79, 92, 140, 161, 165, 168 98, 107, 125, 171n, 173n, 174n, Christian-Democrats -6, 9–11, 12, 19, 180n 20, 21, 26–8, 30, 31, 32, 34, 43–5, 59, 61, 63, 66, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, Eastern Treaties (Ostverträge), 3, 16, 19, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 91, 100–2, 104, 144, 156, 157, 158, 159, 170n 105, 107, 110–115, 119, 121–3, Eckardt, Felix von, 65, 71, 72, 81, 125, 127–33, 135, 136–41, 144, 179n 145, 147, 151–3, 155, 156, 157, Eden Anthony, 39, 40, 50, 51, 173n, 160, 162–4, 166, 167, 173n, 181n, 174n, 175n, 179n 183n, 185n, 187n Eichler, Willi, 84, 86 christmas passes, 125, 126, 128, 129, Eisenhower, Dwight D., 48, 49, 50, 51, 134 55, 63, 64, 80, 81, 89, 92, 95, 98, Cold War, 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 17, 26, 34, 35, 107, 152, 173n, 175n, 180n 39, 47, 108, 169, 177n entrapment, 7 Conference on Security and Erhard, Ludwig, 31, 64, 97, 107, Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 111–22, 123–5, 128, 130, 132, 154 140, 145, 161, 163, 183n, 184n constructivist approach, 4, 5, 13–18, Erler, Fritz, 63, 83–8, 99, 129–31, 165 20–4, 167, 168 European Defence Community (EDC), Cuba, 72, 98, 104 36–9, 42 Czechoslovakia, 41, 79, 80, 114, 137, European Economic Community, 109 138, 159, 170n European security system, 47–8, 51, 52, 66, 121–2, 136, 138, 179n Day of German Unity (Tag der Deutschen Einheit), 121, 173n Declaration of Berlin (Berliner Falin, Valentin, 9, 148 Erklärung), 68, 69, 177n Faure, Edgar, 50, 175n De Gaulle, Charles, 79, 81, 85, FDP, see Liberals 107–13, 122, 132, 163, 164, 171n, Fechter, Peter, 101, 126 178n, 182n, 191n, 197n flexible response, 134 Dehler, Thomas, 10, 24, 31, 43, 57, 70, Fouchet, Cristian, 109 82, 105, 166, 182n Four-Power Working Group, 67, Deutsche Partei (DP, ), 28 79–80, 92, 177n Deutschlandplan, 85, 86, 99, 105 France, 16, 27, 33, 39, 40, 60, 64, 69, Deutschlandvertrag (Convention on 86, 107–13, 118, 132, 147, 157, Relations between the Three 176n Powers and the Federal Republic Franco-German Treaty, 110–113 of Germany), 36–8, 39–42, 43, 44, 98, 173n Gaullists, 107, 111–13, 115, 116, 119, disarmament, 46–8, 51, 58, 60–2, 65, 121, 124, 163, 182n 67, 68, 72–6, 80, 85, 99, 103, 161, Gemeinsamkeitsstrategie, 129, 131, 144, 176n 152, 166 dominant coalition, 21, 22, 23, 24, Geneva Conference, 50–3, 57, 58, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 60–1, 68, 79–81, 85, 97, 117 172n Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 140, 145, Dubcek, Alexander, 137 148 200 Index

German – German Basic Treaty, 3, 34, Honecker, Erich, 156, 158, 187n 156, 158–9 Hoppe, Hans-Günther, 124 German question, 1–3, 5–12, 18, 24, Hupka, Herbert, 157 26, 34, 39, 46, 47, 50, 51–8, 61, 66, 68, 70, 72, 77, 82, 84, 86, 90, International Access Authority, 95–6, 91–9, 101, 103, 105, 108, 109, 104 112, 114–18, 122, 123, 127, 128, International Authority for the Ruhr 132, 134, 136, 137, 140, 142, 144, (IAR), 33–4 147, 155, 161–9, 170n, 179n, 180n, 182n, 183n, 186n Jahn, Gerhard, 132 Gerstenmaier, Eugen, 56, 71, 182n Johnson, Lyndon, 94–5, 117–20, 128, Gesamtdeutsche Block/Bund der 152, 164, 181n, 183n Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (GB/BHE), 32, 45, Kaiser, Karl, 28, 31, 36, 43 57, 80, 173n Kanzlerdemokratie (Chancellor’s Globke, Hans, 31, 65, 81, 128, 172n, ), 30 179n, 181n Kennedy, John F., 89, 92–8, 104, 109, Godesberg Conference, 86–7, 165 113–14, 117, 119, 126–8, 136, Gomulka, Wladislaw, 67, 71 161, 165, 171n, 180n, 181n, 184n Gorbachev, Mikhail, 9 Kennedy, Robert, 136 Göttinger Declaration (Göttinger Erklärung), 176n KGB (Soviet Committee for State Gradl, Johann Baptist, 112, 121 Security), 186n Grand Coalition, 3, 105, 115, 122, Khrushchev, Nikita, 47, 51, 52, 70, 72, 123, 129–40, 144–7, 152, 162, 77, 78–81, 85, 89, 93, 95, 98, 99, 164, 166, 185n, 186n 104, 109, 117, 118, 126, 164, Grewe, Wilhelm, 56, 57, 60, 67, 78, 174n, 180n, 181n, 183n 80, 91, 96, 97, 116, 175n, 179n Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, 3, 122, 123, Grotewohl, Otto, 29, 172n 131–9, 145, 164, 172n, 184n, Guttenberg, Karl-Theodor von, 112, 185n, 186n 113, 115, 129–33, 157, 163, 185n Kissinger, Henry, 3, 154–5, 187 Knappstein, Heinrich, 127 Hallstein doctrine, 2, 46, 70, 72–3, Knoeringen, Wehner von, 83, 88, 105, 116, 135, 139, 142, 146, 150, 130 159, 161, 162, 164, 177n, 182n Kommunistische Partei Deutschland Hallstein, Walter, 53, 56, 60, 71, 110 (KPD), 82 Harmel, Pierre, 134 Korber, Horst, 124 Harpprecht, Klaus, 171n Korea, 26, 35, 40 Hassel, Kai Uwe von, 110–111, Kosygin, Aleksei, 148, 150–1 120 Kraft, Waldemar, 32, 173n Hearst, William Jr, 76 Krekeler, Heinz, 49 Heck, Bruno, 136, 163 Kreuzer, Hermann, 136 Heinemann, Gustav, 10, 31, 36, 82, Krone, Heinrich, 28, 75, 82, 108, 111, 133, 142, 145, 158, 173n 112, 116, 128, 163 Heusinger, Adolf, 49–50, 175n, Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland, 176n 141 Heuss, Theodor, 59 Historiography, 5, 9–12, 170n Lednev, Valerij, 149 Hitler, Adolf, 29, 155 Lenz, Otto, 28 Index 201

Letter of German Unity (Brief der Nichtanerkennungspolitik (policy of Deutschen Einheit), 20, 151, 159 non-recognition), 2, 46, 60, 62, Liberals, 4–6, 24, 69, 105, 106, 108, 71–3, 77–8, 102–4, 107, 114, 116, 121, 127, 129, 131, 139–42, 145, 128, 134, 139–40, 152, 161, 178n 148, 152, 157, 159, 162, 166, 169, Nixon, Richard, 3, 80, 152–4 182n Non-Aligned Movement, 71–3, Lilienfeld, Georg, 136, 185n 177n logic of appropriateness, 18, 19, 21, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 120, 22, 167 147–8 logic of consequence, 18, 19, 20, 22, Norms, 4, 5, 14–18, 20–4, 160, 167, 172n 167–9 Lübke, Heinrich, 145 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Lücke, Paul, 112 (NATO), 36, 39, 43, 47, 62, 64, 68, Luns, Joseph, 109 72–4, 82, 84, 88, 93, 95, 96, 97, 100, 110, 124, 134, 136, 154, Macmillan, Harold, 50, 54, 81 175n, 178n magnet theory (Magnettheorie), 29 NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Majonica, Ernst, 110, 112, 157 Deutsche Arbeiterpartei), 10, Malenkov, Georgi, 174n 133 Mann, Golo, 141 massive retaliation, 134 Oberländer, Theodor, 32, 80 Mattick, Kurt, 125 Oder-Neisse border, 39, 67, 79, 116, Mauriac, François, 108 134, 137, 140–2, 147, 150–1, 154, McCloy, John J., 32, 40, 41, 90, 110, 182n, 186n 182n O’Donnell, Kenneth, 94 McCormack, John, 127 Offset agreements, 117, 120, McGhee, George, 119, 183n 183n McNamara, Robert, 120, 134, Ollenhauer, Erich, 35, 44, 50, 57, 66, 183n 82–5, 88, 100, 129, 139, 164–5, Mende, Erich, 105, 112, 124, 125, 140, 173n, 177n 157, 182n Osterheld, Horst, 109, 110, 112 Mißtrauensvotum (vote of no Ostgebiete (German Eastern confidence), 157, 162 Territories), 35, 121, 140, 152 Mielke, Erich, 186n Ostpolitik, 2–7, 10, 12, 13, 15–21, 23, Mischnick, Wolfgang, 148 24, 104, 136, 137, 139, 141, Mollet, Guy, 61, 62 142–3, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153–9, Molotov, Vjatsjeslav, 174n 161, 162, 166, 168–9 Multilateral Force (MLF), 119, 178n Paris Agreements, 46, 47 Parliamentary Council Nannen, Henry, 142 (Parlamentarischer Ra)t, 28, 30, 33, Nasser, Gamal Abder, 176n, 177n 85, 179n National Security Council, 77, Paulskirche movement, 84, 165 128 Peace Memorandum (Friedensnote), National , 29, 55, 155 116, 131–5 neoliberalism, 13 Pell, Claiborne, 136 neorealism, 13–14 Pentagon, 49, 63 Neumann, Franz, 98 Pinay. Antoine, 50, 54 New Look, 63 Pineau, Christian, 61 202 Index

Pleven Plan, 36 126–30, 133–41, 145, 148, 152, Poland, 2, 3, 35, 41, 67, 71, 79, 80, 159, 161, 162–6, 168, 169 114, 134, 144, 147–50, 154, 158, Soviet Union, 1–4, 7–9, 19, 20, 30, 161, 167 35–7, 39, 42–4, 46, 48–54, 56–8, Policy of Movement (Politik der 61, 63–4, 66–7, 74–6, 78, 81, 85, Bewegung), 114, 118, 140, 162, 90–3, 96–101, 103, 105, 108–9, 163 114, 116, 120, 122, 132, 135, 137, Policy of Strength (Politik der Stärke), 1, 141, 146–51, 154, 156–8, 163, 2, 6–9, 18, 21, 39, 46, 48, 50, 52, 165, 174n, 179n, 182n 55, 57–8, 65, 66, 70, 75, 83, 90, Sozialistische Einheitspartei 103, 105, 107, 112–13, 137, Deutschlands (SED), 29 140–2, 161, 164, 167 SPD, see Social Democrats Ponçet , François, 91 Sputnik, 72, 74 Potsdam Agreement, 35, 39, 47, 64, Stalin, Joseph, 10, 36–7, 40, 43, 47, 77, 78, 151 90, 117, 174n Powers, Gary, 81 Starke, Heinz, 157 Principles Paper, 96–8 Steiniger, Rolf, 9–10 Stoph, Willi, 135, 155–7 rationalist approach, 4, 14–15, 18, strategic powers, 9, 160, 169 167 Strategy of Peace, 104, 161 Richtlinienkompetenz, 6, 30, 60, Strauß, Franz-Joseph, 111–13, 119, 137 128, 133–4, 146, 157, 163, Risse, Thomas, 14, 18–21 178n Rubin, Hans-Wolfgang, 140 Suez Crisis, 64, 66, 176n Rusk, Dean, 92, 94, 97, 98, 114, 118, 126 Tito, Jozip Broz, 8, 28, 47, 70–1, 135, 159 Schauf, Johannes, 131 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 119 Scheel, Walter, 140, 143–6, 148, 150, Traffic Treaty, 156 151, 166 Transit Treaty, 156 Schmid, Carlo, 35, 57, 83, 85 , 3, 151, 154–6 Schmidt, Helmut, 10, 83, 131, 148, Treaty of , 154–5, 157–9 185n Treuhandstelle, 124 Schollwer, Wolfgang, 105, 140 Schröder, Gerhard, 97, 105, 111–18, 120–2, 128, 132, 137, 140, 161, Ulbricht, Walter, 104, 135, 149, 198 156 Schumacher, Kurt, 1–2, 19, 28–30, United States, 1–, 4, 7–9, 12, 26, 33–5, 32–5, 43–4, 83, 86, 93, 127, 153, 37–40, 43, 46, 48–50, 60, 63, 64, 164, 165, 172n, 177n 68, 69, 72, 73, 78, 80, 81, 82, Schütz, Klaus, 99 90–3, 95–9, 104, 107, 108, 110, Schütz, Wilhelm Wolfgang, 113–15, 118–20, 127, 147, 152, 141 153, 157, 160 Smirnov, Andrej, 74–5 UN subcommittee on disarmament, Snyder, Glenn, 7 48, 61, 63, 67, 68 Social Democrats, 1–6, 9–10, 12, 19, 20, 27, 29–30, 34, 35, 40, 43, 53, Wagner, Leo, 185n 63, 65, 68–9, 76, 82–7, 89, Warsaw Pact, 43, 46, 74, 95, 97, 135, 98–100, 105, 112, 115, 121, 124, 138 Index 203

Wehner, Herbert, –88, 11, 19, 34, 70, Westrick, Rudiger, 125 82–4, 86, 99–100, 123, 127–33, Wirtschaftswunder, 183n 137–8, 144–5, 152, 162, 165–6 Westbindung, 1, 16, 17, 19, 21, 26, 34, Yugoslavia, 8, 47, 49, 71–2, 135, 139, 37, 39, 42–4, 54, 59, 70, 75, 87, 177n 103, 104, 160–5, 169 Western Treaties (Westverträge), 2, 39, 42–3, 47, 53, 59, 66, 75, 79, 96, Zarapkin, Semjon, 147, 148 151–2, 160 Zoglmann, Siegfried, 157