1 Introduction
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Notes 1 Introduction 1. What belongs together will now grow together (JK). 2. The well-known statement from Brandt is often wrongly attributed to the speech he gave one day after the fall of the Berlin Wall at the West Berlin City Hall, Rathaus Schöneberg. This error is understandable since it was added later to the publicized version of the speech with the consent of Brandt himself (Rother, 2001, p. 43). By that time it was already a well known phrase since it featured prominently on a SPD poster with a picture of Brandt in front of the partying masses at the Berlin Wall. The original statement was made by Brandt during a radio interview on 10 November for SFP-Mittagecho where he stated: ‘Jetzt sind wir in einer Situation, in der wieder zusammenwächst, was zusammengehört’ (‘Now we are in a situation in which again will grow together what belongs together’). 3. The Treaty of Prague with Czechoslovakia, signed 11 December 1973, finalized the Eastern Treaties. 4. By doing this, I aim to contribute to both theory formation concerning inter- national politics and foreign policy and add to the historiography of the German question and reunification policy. Not only is it important to com- pare theoretical assumptions against empirical data, by making the theoretical assumptions that guide the historical research explicit, other scholars are enabled to better judge the quality of the research. In the words of King et al. (1994, p. 8): ‘If the method and logic of a researcher’s observations and infer- ences are left implicit, the scholarly community has no way of judging the validity of what was done.’ This does not mean that the historical research itself only serves theory formation. In fact, the theoretical framework helps to focus on certain historical sources that may have remained underexposed and contribute to a larger historiography. By using an explicit theoretical framework for historical research, it becomes possible to investigate general assumptions that should not only answer the research question but also have a broader external validity. At the same time, the historical research also pro- vides an in-depth description of the case study and supplements the more general theoretical framework with idiosyncratic explanations. 5. Those appointed to advise the chancellor are in a special position to influence decision-making. Even though the chancellor is in no way dependent on or bound by their advice, a close personal relationship can make advisors very influential. In this book, their role will be extensively analysed as well. 6. The original 1982 edition is a reaction to the publication of the conference proceedings of the Rhöndorfer Gespräche, a yearly conference organized by the Stiftung-Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, on the ‘myth of the lost opportunity- debate’ (Schwarz, 1982, p. 5). 170 Notes 171 7. For example, the well-known Adenauer biographer Hans-Peter Schwarz is a member of the StBKAH advisory board as well as other historians who focus mainly on Adenauer’s work. In order to write his biography on Adenauer, Schwarz was given exclusive permission to access the files of the federal chancellery. The same permission was later also given to Henning Köhler, a relative outsider, who then began work not only on Adenauer, but also on an extensive critical evaluation of Schwarz’s biography (Granieri, 2000, pp. 593–596; Granieri 2003 for specific examples). In fact, Köhler’s book contains more references to Schwarz than to important Adenauer contem- poraries such as De Gaulle or John Foster Dulles (Köhler, 1994, p. 1323). When the publication of Köhler’s biography was anticipated as the ‘anti- Schwarz’, the remark, made during one of the Rhöndorfer Gespräche of the StBKAH, was probably made only half in jest (Schwabe, 1994, p. 124). The situation with the Social Democrats is no different (cf. Gray, 2007, p. 1008). Willy Brandt was known for surrounding himself with histori- ans, writers and journalists. As a consequence, a large volume of historical work on Brandt and his political legacy is produced by people who knew him personally, such as Klaus Harpprecht or Peter Bender, an old friend and classmate of Bahr (Bender, 1995; Harpprecht, 2000). His second wife, Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt recently published a biography as well (Seebacher- Brandt, 2004). Brandt’s eldest son, Peter Brandt, is a history professor in Hagen and one of the trustees of the BWBS. Gregor Schöllgen, who was affiliated with the BWBS and co-editor of the edited publication of doc- uments from the archive of Willy Brandt, published a Brandt biography (Schöllgen, 2001). Christoph Meyer gained exclusive access to parts of the archive of prominent Social Democrat Herbert Wehner for his biogra- phy (Meyer, 2006). Meyer is affiliated with the Herbert-und-Greta-Wehner- Stiftung. 2 Between Continuity and Change: Ostpolitik and the Constructivist Approach Revisited 1. There are several denominations here that make more or less the same distinction. Some speak of ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ research programmes. 2. Even though constitutive theory makes it impossible to distinguish variation between independent and dependent variables, Finnemore, for example, states that it is still possible empirically to ‘bracket’ agent and structure and to provide at least a descriptive analysis of both sides of the rela- tionship. Finnemore states that this approach may be regarded by some as something to be avoided, but could also serve ‘as a useful first step in causal analysis’. Constructivist empirical research then is not so much about theory testing, but about theory generation. For more on ‘constructivist’ methodology, see Klotz and Lynch (2007). 3. In response to constructivist criticism of traditional IR theory, one of the central arguments is that constructivists may point out that neo-realists and neo-liberals take actors and interests as givens instead of focusing on social interaction and the way norms influence the actor’s preferences and the definition of interests; but that constructivists only seem to push the 172 Notes problem further back by taking the influence of unspecified norms as a given (cf. Zehfuss, 2002, p. 254). 4. Here, the continuity in German foreign policy following reunification is intensively dealt with in studies that may not be constructivist per se, but do stress the impact of ideas, culture, (European) identity or historical memory (Katzenstein, 1996; Banchoff, 1999b; Rittberger, 2001; Maull, 2006). 5. In addition to ‘peace’ and ‘reconciliation’ as the prevailing social norms that guided Ostpolitik, Cordell and Wolff (2007, p. 263) also mention ‘regime change’. They do not explain why they choose these three norms as essential to Ostpolitik. Even though ‘peace’ and ‘reconciliation’ seem obvious, ‘regime change’ is less so. 6. March and Olson use ‘norms’ and ‘identities’ more or less interchangeably, as do most constructivists. 7. Initially, the Soviet Union had insisted that the European borders should be deemed ‘unchangeable’. 8. In his book Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory (Cambridge, 2010), Samuel Barkin provides an in depth theoretical discus- sion concerning the problematic use of the distinction between the ‘logic of consequence’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness’. My concern here is limited to providing an analytical model that provides an explanation for Ostpolitik. 9. It is important to notice here that ideas not only play a role in explaining continuity by acting as a persistent norm that in the end will always give way to political interests. The more an existing norm becomes less successful over time, the more alternative coalitions are encouraged to create new ones and challenge the dominant coalition. 10. Here, it does not matter whether the members of the dominant coalition are to blame or whether external factors have contributed to the failure of a certain foreign policy. 3 Westbindung Instead of Wiedervereinigung 1. Adenauer (1983, pp. 129–131). 2. Ibid., p. 130. 3. Grotewohl played an important role during the founding of the SED and went on to become the prime minister of the GDR from 1949 to 1960. 4. Schumacher (1985, pp. 620–622). 5. Ibid., pp. 623–624. 6. Schwartz (1991, pp. 109–110) points out that the special position of ‘federal Minister for special assignments’ (Bundesminister für Besondere Aufgaben)cre- ated by Adenauer should be viewed in this respect. There were even four of these positions in Adenauer’s second government. 7. Adenauer (1987, p. 65). 8. Baring (1969, p. 16) quotes Adenauer saying that: ‘I had to negotiate with the High Commission by myself. The gentlemen did not want so many (!) present and it would not have been right’ (exclamation mark in the original). 9. Schumacher (1985, pp. 714–731, pp. 702–703). This goes for Adenauer’s clos- est aides such Blankenhorn, Globke and Kurt Georg Kiesinger. When in 1953 Notes 173 Adenauer decided to include Representatives Waldemar Kraft and Theodor Overländer of the expellees’ GB/BHE party, he did so even while describing them as ‘brown, even deep brown’ (quoted in Schwartz, 1991, p.117). 10. Schumacher (1985, p. 725). 11. Adenauer (1975, p. 167). 12. Adenauer (1965, pp. 355–359). 13. Heinemann resigned as Minister for domestic affairs on 11 October 1950 in protest against West German rearmament and Adenauer’s style of leadership (Lehmann, 2000, p. 88). He founded his own party, the Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei (GVP), which was unsuccessful. Eventually, Heinemann joined the SPD. 14. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Volume VII, part I, p. 72. 15. Van Ooijen et al. (1996, p. 39). 16. Time Magazine, 9 June 1952. 17. Van Ooijen et al. (1996, pp. 38–39). 18. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume III, p. 1297. 19. NARA, Office Memorandum. Secret. 1 October 1951, General File 59, 662A.00/10-151. 20. NARA, Policy Statement Germany, 1 February 1951, General File 59, 662A.00/10-151.