Barack Obama & American Racial Politics

Challenging History: Barack Obama & American Racial Politics

Rogers M. Smith, Desmond S. King & Philip A. Klinkner Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021

When the American Academy of Arts and Sci- ences devoted two issues of its journal Dædalus to the topic of “The Negro American” in 1965 and 1966, the United States had reached the triumphant end of the second of three eras of racial politics that characterize the American national experience thus far. The election of Barack Obama to the presidency in 2008 raised hopes that the end of the third era was near, after which racial inequalities and conflicts would no longer be central to national life. Although the demographics of the 2008 electorate signaled the impact of historic racial trans- formations and the possibility of even greater changes, the campaign offered at best a glimpse of how the central issues of the third racial era in U.S. history might be resolved. As long as the ROGERS M. SMITH, a Fellow of debate over managing race-based discrimination the American Academy since 2004, and inequities persists, the current era cannot be is the Christopher H. Browne Dis- said to have ended. tinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Penn- We view the three eras of American racial poli- sylvania. tics in terms of rival racial policy alliances: that is, DESMOND S. KING is the Andrew durable coalitions of political actors, activist groups, W. Mellon Professor of American and governing institutions united by their stances Government at the University of on the central racial policy issues in the eras of Oxford. American politics their conflicts help de½ne.1 In PHILIP A. KLINKNER is the James the slavery era of 1790 to 1865, pro-slavery and anti- S. Sherman Professor of Govern- slavery alliances fought over whether slavery should ment at Hamilton College. be maintained and extended. Next, after a period (*See endnotes for complete contributor of transition, the Jim Crow era emerged in the mid- biographies.) 1890s and endured (for practical purposes) until

121 Barack the mid-1960s, while pro-segregation and both of the major parties of their day, Obama & anti-segregation alliances contested the albeit in unequal proportions, creating American Racial maintenance and extension of de jure ra- pressures and possibilities for racial com- Politics cial segregation and effective black dis- promises. Today, partisan divisions and enfranchisement. After another period of racial alliance divisions are almost co- transition lasting from roughly 1965 to extensive: the Republicans regularly en- 1978, the modern era of race-conscious con- dorse color-blind policies, while Demo- troversies has witnessed struggles between crats support race-conscious ones. Even opposed “color-blind” and “race-con- though the issues that de½ne our current scious” alliances over race-targeted poli- racial era seem more amenable to rea- cies and programs. sonable compromises than those that

The central racial issues of the slavery de½ned previous eras, this structural re- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 and Jim Crow eras resolved only when inforcement of racial/partisan positions extraordinary forces combined to enable has contributed decisively to a polarized one alliance to win decisively over the politics in which resolving racial issues other. In each case, change came under is a mammoth task. the pressure of major wars (the Civil War Few scholars have appreciated the dis- in the former and World War II, com- tinctiveness and signi½cance of this par- bined with the ensuing Cold War, in the tisan structure of modern racial politics. latter) that compelled U.S. leaders to re- During most of the slavery era, there were ly on the economic and military contri- pro-slavery and anti-slavery components butions of African Americans and to jus- to both major parties: ½rst among the tify the nation’s cause in terms of inclu- Jeffersonian Republicans and the Feder- sive democratic principles. In turn, do- alists, and later the Jacksonian Demo- mestic political forces impelled the Unit- crats and the Whigs, although the Jeffer- ed States to live up to those principles sonians and Jacksonians tended to lean more fully.2 Nonetheless, despite those more strongly toward the pro-slavery successes, deep racial inequalities and side. This cross-cutting–rather than re- sharp disagreements over how to address inforcing–structure of racial and party them remained, even among the mem- positions explains why leaders of the bers of the triumphant anti-slavery, then two parties repeatedly, and especially in anti-segregation, alliances. The persis- 1820 and 1850, managed to forge com- tence of material race inequities and con- promises that left the future of slavery flicts explains why, after periods of tran- unclear. But as Abraham Lincoln argued, sition, new racial alliances emerge on slavery was not an issue that could be opposite sides of new racial issues. compromised on forever. The nation In all three eras, racial alliances have could not endure half-slave and half-free. sought political power either to resist In the 1850s, when the evenly divided or to advance the measures promoting Whigs broke apart over the slavery is- greater material racial equality that they sue, a new partisan alignment arose that have deemed the most consequential, overlapped more closely with the era’s even if those measures have fallen short racial alliances. It pitted thoroughly pro- of addressing all racial concerns. The slavery Democrats against Republicans alliances have also sought to influence drawn from former Whigs and Free Soil the positions of major political parties. Democrats who uniformly opposed the During much of the ½rst two eras, the extension of slavery. The new Republi- opposed racial coalitions had allies in can Party’s moderate but ½rm anti-slav-

122 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences ery position was made still more threat- the modern civil rights movement and Rogers M. ening to the South by the presence of a the migration of African Americans to Smith, Desmond S. small but influential abolitionist move- Northern cities where they formed a piv- King & ment. As a result, Southern Democrats otal potential voting bloc, to make change Philip A. viewed further compromises on slavery possible. Domestic and international Klinkner as suicidal and refused to accept the rise developments enhanced the power of of the Republican Party to national pow- policy-makers who opposed segregation, er. The Civil War erupted soon after. especially in the northern Democratic In the wake of the Union’s Civil War Party after 1932. Along with more mo- victory, the anti-slavery alliance embed- bilized African Americans, increasing ded into the Constitution the position numbers of white citizens and leaders,

on which they all agreed. As af½rmed in particularly outside the South, came to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 the Thirteenth Amendment, there would regard segregation as lacking any per- be no involuntary servitude in the Unit- suasive moral or even political justi½ca- ed States. But slavery’s opponents, who tions. Jim Crow segregation, too, was ranged from former Democrat Andrew no longer viewed as a matter for com- Johnson to Radical Republican Charles promise. Eventually, the Democratic Sumner, disagreed passionately about Party became predominantly anti-segre- the extent to which the United States gationist. Thus, after 1960, when Demo- should pursue racial equality beyond the crats gained control of all three branches end of slavery. Thus, the nation entered of the federal government and added a transition period, during which South- crucial anti-segregation support from ern Democrats rebuilt their strength by Republicans, they enacted major new persuading most Northern Democrats civil rights laws and won favorable con- and many white Republicans that nation- stitutional rulings that toppled the Jim al harmony could be restored through the Crow system of de jure segregation and establishment of a new form of white su- disenfranchisement. premacy: the putatively equal Jim Crow Again, however, those victories left in system of local, state, and national seg- place entrenched forms of racial inequal- regation policies. ity and considerable white resistance to By the late 1890s, most–though not all further egalitarian change. In this regard, –Republicans had ceased to oppose mea- President Lyndon Johnson, the former sures to enforce African American disen- Southern segregationist who led the leg- franchisement and segregation. Through- islative triumphs of the mid-1960s, is out the ensuing Jim Crow era, there were said to have remarked when he signed critics as well as supporters of segrega- the 1964 Civil Rights Act that the Dem- tion in both the Democratic and Repub- ocratic Party had “lost the south for a lican parties; the Democrats, however, generation.” He meant, of course, that were the primary architects of segrega- Democrats had lost the white South, tion, while most Republicans simply ac- along with many other white voters, and quiesced. Over time, in the face of inter- therefore many elections. He was more national pressures including World War right than he knew. According to exit II and the Cold War struggles with Com- polls, no Democratic presidential can- munism, segregation practices became didate has won more white votes than political, economic, and military liabili- the Republican candidate in any nation- ties. These problems combined with do- al election since 1964, not even Jimmy mestic pressures, particularly the rise of Carter or Bill Clinton, both Southern

140 (2) Spring 2011 123 Barack Democrats who nonetheless won the nationally among white voters than John Obama & White House.3 Kerry did in 2004, he fared worse among American Racial Yet if it is true that the civil rights laws Southern whites and whites with high Politics of the 1960s set the stage for an era of racial-resentment scores than a white Republican predominance in national Democrat likely would have done under elections, it is also true, as political sci- the circumstances of the 2008 election.6 entists Philip Klinkner and Thomas Although Obama’s race was a plus for Schaller argue, that Great Society laws some liberal white as well as many non- transformed the American electorate white voters, most of those voters prob- over time in ways that, by 2008, made ably would have voted Democratic any- Barack Obama’s victory possible. The way. In contrast, racial resentment ap-

1964 Civil Rights Act and, particularly, pears to have cost Obama votes that a Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 the 1965 Voting Rights Act spurred en- white Democrat would have won if the franchisement and expanded political voting had been based primarily on eco- opportunities for millions of African nomic views–enough to diminish his American and, eventually, Latino voters. net national vote by about 5 percentage Without these measures, the Obama points, according to political scientists campaign would have been inconceiv- Michael Lewis-Beck, Charles Tien, and able. The 1965 Immigration and Nation- Richard Nadeau.7 ality Act, ending the race-based national It seems clear, then, that the legislative origins quota system and leading to ex- and judicial triumphs of anti-segregation panded Latino and Asian immigration forces in the 1950s and 1960s transformed over the several decades following en- the American electorate–and therefore actment, also transformed the Ameri- American politics–in racially inclusive can electorate: in 1964, more than 90 directions. Nevertheless, these forces percent of voters were non-Hispanic failed to eliminate the political conse- whites; in 2008, that number had fallen quences stemming from white racial to under 75 percent. The 1965 Higher resentment.8 Education Act, providing funding for low- and middle-income students, in- The victories of the civil rights era had creased the number of voters with col- a further impact on the national political lege degrees from 13 percent in 1964 to landscape. Taking one set of racial issues 46 percent in 2008. Notably, Obama’s off the table transformed the nation’s popularity with college-educated voters policy debates over how to respond to was an asset in his primary campaign the reality of continuing racial inequali- against Hillary Clinton and in the gen- ties and tensions. New alliances formed eral election.4 around new issues that emerged as piv- Even so, exit polls indicate that in No- otal. Proponents of greater material ra- vember 2008, Obama lost among white cial equality were faced with the fact voters by 55 to 43 percent. He won 95 that even though non-whites now had percent of the black vote, 67 percent of voting rights and formally equal econom- the Latino vote, and 62 percent of the ic rights, they continued to trail whites Asian American vote–supermajorities signi½cantly in every area of American that, combined with increased turnout life, including employment, income, among these groups, secured his victory.5 wealth, education, housing, health and A number of analysts have concluded mortality, incarceration, and political rep- that although Obama did slightly better resentation. Veterans of the civil rights

124 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences struggles, such as Julian Bond and Jesse perpetuate racial discord. By contrast, Rogers M. Jackson, came to believe that further members of the race-conscious alliance Smith, Desmond S. progress could not be achieved without believe that the central aim of the civil King & direct, race-targeted measures such as rights movement was to reduce embed- Philip A. af½rmative action programs in educa- ded material racial inequalities. They Klinkner tion admissions and employment; race- see the color-blind alliance’s rejection conscious pupil assignment policies in of race-targeted policies as operating to the public schools; housing and job pro- perpetuate and even exacerbate perva- grams aimed at areas with high percent- sive inherited white advantages, whether ages of poor, non-white residents; race- or not that outcome is intended. conscious lending and fellowship pro- The two modern alliances emerged on 9 grams; and majority-minority districts. either side of the debate over af½rmative Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 But to many Americans, even many who, action in employment, but they can be like Supreme Court Justice William O. found largely intact in legislative and ju- Douglas and Harvard sociologist Nathan dicial struggles over a remarkably wide Glazer, had opposed segregation laws, range of other issues. Their basic struc- these measures seemed unjust–even ture is laid out in Table 1. a form of reverse racism.10 By the mid- Some members of the color-blind al- 1970s, the modern structure of Ameri- liance, such as white supremacists, sup- can racial politics had formed, with a port color-blind policies tactically, as a coalition of political actors and institu- potent means to preserve white advan- tions promoting race-conscious policies tages. Others do so sincerely. The prob- and a rival coalition insisting that pub- lem of disentangling racial aversions, lic measures and institutions should be perceptions of racial threats, and ideo- “color-blind.” logical commitments to race-neutral With the emergence of each new struc- policies is intractable. Though there is ture of rival racial alliances, members of evidence that at least some members of both alliances have professed allegiance the color-blind alliance seek to preserve to the resolution of the previous era’s existing white advantages over non- disputes. Not even the proponents of whites, we presume that most propo- Jim Crow sought to restore chattel slav- nents of color-blind policies believe ery, which they conceded to be inef½- these measures are best for racial prog- cient and immoral. Today no one calls ress and justice. for a return to the Jim Crow system. These modern coalitions cannot be Instead, both advocates of color-blind adequately grasped in class terms: the policies and proponents of race-con- business sector is divided on race-conscious policies present themselves as the scious measures, while most unions– true heirs to the anti-segregation civil formerly frequent opponents of civil rights movement. Both criticize their rights reforms–now support them. The opponents for betraying its aims. For most distinctive feature of the structure members of the color-blind alliance, the of modern racial politics is, again, their civil rights movement centered on Mar- division along major political party lines. tin Luther King, Jr.’s hope that persons Since at least the end of the Nixon ad- would be judged not by the color of their ministration, Republicans have favored skin but by the content of their charac- color-blind policies, even if some do so ter. They believe that race-conscious more ardently and consistently than measures violate that aspiration and others; the great majority of Democrats,

140 (2) Spring 2011 125 Barack Table 1 Obama & Rival Racial Alliances, 1976 to 2008 American Racial Politics Color-Blind Alliance Most Republican Party of½ceholders and members after 1976 President, 1980–1992, 2001–2008 Some conservative and neoconservative Democrats Majority of Supreme Court after 1980 Most lower federal court judges, many state judges after 1980 Some white-owned businesses and business lobbyists (e.g., Equal Employment Advisory Council) Some labor unions, particularly traditional union locals Conservative media (e.g., Rush Limbaugh, Charles Krauthammer)

Conservative think tanks/advocacy groups Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 (e.g., Center for Individual Rights, Cato Institute) Fringe white supremacist groups Christian Right groups (e.g., Family Research Council) Conservative foundations (e.g., The Lynne and Harry Bradley Foundation) Race-Conscious Alliance Most Democratic Party of½ceholders and members President (mixed support), 1993–2000 Some liberal and pro-corporate Republicans Some federal and state judges Many civil service members of executive agencies Many large businesses, minority-owned businesses Most labor unions Military leadership Liberal media (e.g., The New York Times) Liberal advocacy groups (e.g., American Civil Liberties Union) Most non-white advocacy groups (e.g., National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, La Raza, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund) Liberal religious groups (e.g., National Council of Churches) Liberal foundations (e.g., Soros Foundation, Ford Foundation) Liberal blogs and Internet groups after 2004

Source: This table is documented in Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, Still a House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama’s America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011).

meanwhile, have of½cially supported pudiation of white supremacist attitudes race-conscious measures, even if some in national politics, this polarization on do so half-heartedly. Of½cial party plat- appropriate racial policies is consistent forms since 1972 have stated these dis- with, and may be an insuf½ciently appre- tinct positions explicitly, though the ciated contributor to, the modern parti- Republican commitment to color blind- san polarization documented by many ness became more full-throated after political scientists.12 Primarily because 1980, while Democrats have less force- most American voters are white and most fully defended race-conscious measures whites oppose race-conscious policies, since the “Reagan Revolution.”11 Even the nearly full fusion of the modern ra- so, in contrast to the near-universal re- cial alliances with the two major parties

126 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences has contributed to the gop’s predomi- promise. Today, when the need for ul- Rogers M. nance in national elections since the timate victory by one side or the other Smith, Desmond S. mid-1970s. is far less clear, compromise seems far King & This fusion, combined with the mate- more unlikely. Philip A. rially inegalitarian historical legacies of Klinkner the nation’s two previous eras of racial Barack Obama’s writings, his strategy politics, has had further signi½cance. Ra- as a presidential candidate, and his ac- cial politics today is shaped by passionate tions during the ½rst year of his adminis- beliefs that what the nation found to be tration all show that he understands the true in the past remains true for current chief implication of the modern struc- racial conflicts: that policy approaches ture of partisan-allied racial alliances:

can brook no compromise. American a Democratic president cannot hope to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 public policies, many believe, must be satisfy the substantial portion of his con- either altogether color-blind or consis- stituents who adhere to the race-con- tently race conscious; there can be no scious alliance if he openly repudiates principled middle ground. In one sense all race-targeted measures, nor can he this is logically indisputable. If the na- be con½dent in making progress toward tion has any race-conscious measures alleviating material racial inequalities if at all, then it has not achieved pure col- he does so. Yet in the (still) predominant- or blindness (if we make the question- ly white national electorate, most voters able assumption that pure color blind- favor color-blind policies, and any can- ness is possible). didate who is strongly identi½ed with Yet if the basic precept common to race-conscious measures is likely to lose. both modern racial alliances is to make Aided by exceptional circumstances, extensive opportunities available to all Obama negotiated adroitly the electoral regardless of race, then it is almost cer- challenges the structure of modern ra- tainly true that the public policies most cial politics posed for him in his run for conducive to that goal involve some the presidency. How far his strategy will combination of race-“neutral” and race- permit him to govern successfully, partic- “conscious” measures, whatever the ularly on racial issues, remains to be seen. correct relative proportions may be. But Indeed, both major party campaigns because compromise on racial issues in the 2008 presidential election showed seems immoral to many on both sides, awareness of the constraints as well as because some on each side suspect their the opportunities modern circumstances opponents of racism or “reverse racism,” afforded them. The racial alliances frame- and because the positions of both sides work helps clarify why neither campaign have also come to be identi½ed with the stressed race and why, as the voting pat- political fortunes of the rival parties, terns discussed above show, racial con- the structure of American racial politics cerns were nonetheless at work.14 Sena- stands in the way of policy-makers and tor John McCain, the candidate of the institutions openly devising and imple- color-blind alliance’s party, knew he menting such hybrid measures without could not openly comment on the race being paralyzed by controversy.13 Ironi- of his opponent; after all, his coalition’s cally, the American party system was ideology held that race should be treated better able to work toward compromises as politically irrelevant. At the same time, during eras when the issues, in the end, because Barack Obama appears black to were not truly subject to legitimate com- most Americans and identi½es himself

140 (2) Spring 2011 127 Barack as African American, his candidacy raised port for race-conscious measures such as Obama & worries among many in the color-blind af½rmative action. American Racial alliance that, as president, Obama would In The Audacity of Hope, his book of pol- Politics expand pro-black racial preferences in icy and campaign positions, Obama ex- many ways.15 But unless Obama openly plained his support for this strategy. In urged such policies–which he was care- his chapter “Race,” he offered “a word ful not to do–the McCain campaign had of caution” not to assume that “we have to make those concerns salient to voters arrived at a ‘postracial’ politics” or “al- without explicitly speaking of race. This ready live in a color-blind society,”19 rhetorical dilemma may account for citing stark statistics on persistent mate- the McCain ads asking, “Who is the real rial racial inequalities and invoking his

Barack Obama?” and declaring that Mc- own experiences of racism. Obama then Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 Cain, in contrast, was “the American argued, in accord with race-conscious President Americans have been waiting proponents, “Af½rmative action pro- for.”16 The appeals were efforts to stir grams, when properly structured, can fears about Obama, and for at least some open up opportunities otherwise closed proponents of color-blind policies, those to quali½ed minorities without dimin- fears must have included concerns that ishing opportunities for white students.” he would champion racial preferences.17 He added, “[W]here there’s strong evi- Obama faced still greater strategic chal- dence of prolonged and systematic dis- lenges in his presidential campaign: as a crimination by large corporations, trade black American, he had to win the sup- unions, or branches of municipal gov- port of an electorate that predominantly ernment, goals and timetables for mi- favors color-blind policies. Press cover- nority hiring may be the only meaning- age based on interviews with white work- ful remedy available.”20 But Obama ing-class voters suggests that it would also stressed his understanding of argu- have been enormously dif½cult for him ments for color-blind measures. He ad- to speak extensively about race and racial vocated for an “emphasis on universal, issues without exacerbating concerns that as opposed to race-speci½c programs” as he would indeed support more expansive not only “good policy” but also “good race-targeted programs–fears that could politics.”21 He concluded that “propos- have sealed his defeat.18 At the same time, als that solely bene½t minorities and dis- his racial identity and his background as sect Americans into ‘us’ and ‘them’ may a civil rights lawyer meant that Obama generate a few short-term concessions did not have to articulate a speci½c racial when the costs to whites aren’t too high, agenda for many proponents of race- but they can’t serve as the basis for the conscious measures to presume that he kinds of sustained, broad-based polit- would be far more sympathetic to their ical coalitions needed to transform positions than his opponent. Even so, America.”22 Obama would have alienated important In making this argument, Obama segments of his core supporters if he had sought in his book and in his campaign unequivocally repudiated race-conscious to build a racial alliance that joined those programs and policies. Hence, his best Americans who predominantly favored option was to foreground largely “race- color-blind policies, but could tolerate neutral” policies in his campaign, while some race-conscious measures to allevi- retaining–in the background–indica- ate material racial inequities, with those tions of constrained but continuing sup- who thought substantial race-conscious

128 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences measures were needed but were willing consciousness), reinforced by this re- Rogers M. to make concessions if progress was be- markable conjunction of favorable ex- Smith, Desmond S. ing achieved through other means. The ternal circumstances, helped him over- King & only alliance that viably could have op- come the factors that long precluded a Philip A. posed this “mixed-strategy” coalition black candidate’s election as president Klinkner would have consisted primarily of vot- of the United States. ers openly opposed to further progress toward material racial equality altogether Obama’s campaign theme–½nding –a group that Obama could have reason- common ground by emphasizing unity ably expected to be small in twenty-½rst- and mutual service, even while respect- century America. He pursued his strate- ing diversity–and the attendant strat-

gy, for the most part, simply by not talk- egy of stressing universal measures Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 ing about race and by minimizing its like- while not rejecting all race-conscious ly impact on the election. Thus, he pre- ones raise the question: can the presi- sented his rhetorical emphasis on unity dent govern in ways that will sustain a and change in terms congenial to propo- coalition broad and deep enough to pre- nents of color-blind and race-conscious dominate in American politics for years measures alike.23 Though he did not to come? Will his “middle way” coa- eliminate the impact of racial resent- lition end America’s third racial era of ment, it is likely that he reduced it. contestation over color-blind versus In negotiating color-blind and race- race-conscious policies? As of this writ- conscious policies, Obama skillfully ing, in Winter 2010, it is too soon to tell. pursued the central theme of his cam- President Obama has reduced U.S. troop paign–indeed, of his entire political deployments in Iraq but increased them career. It is a theme embodied in his in Afghanistan, and although the econo- own life-story: America must strive to my has ceased its precipitous fall, aided achieve the promise of e pluribus unum, by Obama’s American Recovery and “that out of many, we are truly one.”24 Reinvestment Act, unemployment and He also bene½ted, however, from the economic hardships remain high, and extraordinary pressures for change that the rising public debt is a daunting poli- have abetted racial progress in the past. cy constraint. He has won other signi½- Obama was the candidate of the “out” cant domestic and foreign policy victo- party at a time when the nation, drained ries, including the Affordable Health by warfare in two countries and wracked Care for America Act, the Dodd-Frank by the most severe economic collapse Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro- since the Great Depression, was poised tection Act, the repeal of “Don’t Ask, for a Democratic landslide, at least ac- Don’t Tell,” the New start Treaty, and cording to many political scientists.25 the Food Safety Modernization Act. But The Republicans ran a strategically dubi- his party also endured major losses in ous campaign, with McCain’s choice of the 2010 midterm elections. These cir- an undeniably inexperienced vice presi- cumstances leave Obama with little ½- dential candidate, former Alaska Gover- nancial or political capital to spend on nor Sarah Palin, undercutting his argu- a speci½cally racial reform agenda. And ment that Obama was not ready for the despite his exceptional political skills, presidency. Obama’s deft presentation his administration and the United States of his theme of shared commitments to still face major additional obstacles to fellow Americans (rather than of race- progress on racial issues.

140 (2) Spring 2011 129 Barack First, by stressing color-blind or race- openness to race-conscious public poli- Obama & neutral approaches without rejecting all cies faced strong judicial and political American Racial race-conscious policies, Obama continu- opposition. Politics ously walks a tightrope. His administra- New Haven had wished to turn to ob- tion was buffeted by controversies over servational “assessment center” tests for the race-conscious remarks of his ½rst promotion, tests that probably would Supreme Court nominee, Sonia Soto- have assessed merit at least equally as mayor, who suggested that at least in well and that likely would have produced some cases, a “wise Latina” might be able a more racially diverse workforce and to reach better decisions than a white department leadership. If municipalities man.26 It also saw a bare majority of the henceforth choose to avoid litigation by

Supreme Court, but probably a larger adopting such tests in advance (the gen- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 segment of the public, reject the posi- eral strategy preferred by the Obama tion of its amicus brief in the Ricci v. De- administration), race-neutral means Stefano case.27 Consonant with Obama’s chosen on race-conscious grounds might approach to race, the Justice Department prove more acceptable. In other words, argued that in order for public employ- a policy adopted as a quietly routine ers (in this case, the Fire Department in practice may provoke less controversy New Haven, Connecticut) to avoid law- than one held up to judicial and politi- suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil cal scrutiny. Furthermore, despite her Rights Act, it should be permissible to comments, Sonia Sotomayor was con- abandon one race-neutral test for pro- ½rmed, though in the hearings she backed motion in favor of another race-neutral away from, rather than defended, her test that is preferable on race-conscious earlier endorsement of race-conscious grounds–that is, one likely to produce a judging.31 These experiences suggest more diverse workforce and leadership.28 that Obama’s approach to racial issues The city maintained that it would be may sometimes embroil him and his vulnerable to lawsuits if its ½re depart- coalition in controversies he wishes to ment used its original written test for avoid; but the strategy may nonetheless promotion. The Supreme Court, whose form part of his endeavors that, on Republican-appointed majority has balance, succeed both politically moved the institution ever more ½rmly and as policy. into the ranks of the color-blind alliance, A more fundamental question is adopted a daunting “strong-basis-in- whether Obama’s approach to race, evidence” standard to judge the city’s and his more general strategy of seeking legal vulnerability that the city was un- “e pluribus unum” solutions, can success- able to meet.29 In dissent, Justice Ruth fully reduce the nation’s material racial Ginsburg criticized this novel standard inequalities, as well as alleviate econom- and insisted that the city could use a test ic problems more generally, in a period that produced a racially disparate pat- of severe recession and polarized poli- tern of promotions only if that test was tics. As Obama recognizes, the persis- a business necessity. The record present- tence of severe racial disparities in most ed indicated that other tests that better spheres of life makes it a virtual certain- identi½ed merit would also be more ra- ty that racial divisions will be visible in cially inclusive.30 Both the Court’s rul- American politics as well. If toward the ing and public discussions of the case end of Obama’s ½rst term the nation’s showed that even this limited degree of economy appears to be moving in the

130 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences right direction–a prospect that is now diversity of Americans and yet to ½nd Rogers M. very uncertain–he may be able to sus- ways to “bridge our differences and unite Smith, Desmond S. tain and even broaden his electorate, in common effort–black, white, Latino, King & making a second term and further change Asian, Native American; Democrat and Philip A. possible. But he probably will have to do Republican, young and old, rich and poor, Klinkner so almost entirely through “universal,” gay and straight, disabled or not.” All “race-neutral” measures. Both history Americans are to come to feel and act and logic indicate that such programs politically as “one nation, and one peo- often fail to reduce material racial dis- ple” who will together “once more choose parities substantially. Frequently, they our better history.”34 reduce some material suffering but leave But Americans do not agree on what

racial gaps intact. Given the depth of the constitutes their “better history” or what Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 nation’s current economic and racial constitutes “bridging,” as opposed to “ef- hardships, the possibility that “univer- facing,” their differences. Some see the sal” programs will suf½ciently diminish spread of religious diversity and greater racial inequalities to quiet calls for race- secularity, for example, as advances for conscious measures from the Left, or to unity-despite-diversity. Others see those limit concerns about black favoritism developments as moral decline, a retreat from the Right, is zero. from America’s calling to be a “Chris- Also questionable is whether Obama tian nation.” Some believe their coun- can persuade many white Americans try’s “best history” centers on the real- that his “universal” policies really are ization of ideals arising in historically race-neutral. Political scientists Michael Anglo-American cultural traditions. Tesler and David O. Sears ½nd, for exam- Others see those cultural traditions as ple, that racial resentment scores among responsible for the repression of valued whites continue to correlate strongly with communities and identities. Put more assessments of Obama and with policy broadly, it may well be impossible to positions on a range of issues, such as give any speci½c content to the putative health and tax policy, more so than with unifying values of Americans, without previous presidents.32 Prominent conser- appearing to fail to recognize and accom- vative commentators such as Rush Lim- modate the diversity of values Americans baugh and Glenn Beck regularly describe in fact exhibit. For many more multicul- Obama’s policy proposals as “repara- turally minded Americans, that diversity tions,” even suggesting that Obama is a of values and identities should be not “racist” with a “deep-seated hatred of only tolerated but actively assisted in white people.”33 Those perceptions lead group-conscious public systems of polit- to the dismissal of Obama’s efforts not ical representation, public aid programs, to stress race-conscious measures. educational curriculum, legally recog- There are also two other, somewhat nized rights, and other measures. Even less-apparent reasons that the third era if severe racial inequalities were miracu- of American racial politics is unlikely lously alleviated during an Obama ad- to be at an end. The ½rst is that the race- ministration, race-conscious controver- conscious politics of the modern era sies over policies would remain. Nor is have generated what might be termed it clear that these disputes should be re- “the multicultural challenge.” It is a chal- solved one-sidedly: multicultural ideals lenge that goes to the heart of Obama’s have force in part because there are good core campaign promise: to embrace the reasons to doubt the propriety of a uni-

140 (2) Spring 2011 131 Barack ½ed sense of American national identity In response to all these challenges, Obama & and purpose in which differences in ra- Obama has defended in principle, and American Racial cial experiences and identities are sub- to all appearances he is pursuing in prac- Politics merged or denied. Yet the need for some tice, a path expressive of the philosophic forms of unity is real. and political pragmatism historically Related to this multicultural challenge associated with the University of Chica- is another dif½culty: the “cosmopolitan” go, where he taught.37 In The Audacity of challenge. Obama presents his own iden- Hope, Obama interpreted the U.S. Con- tity as a preeminent example of how stitution as “one that sees our democra- unity can be forged from a background cy, not as a house to be built, but as a encompassing a broad mix of races, re- conversation to be had”–a conversation

ligions, nationalities, geographic resi- that rests on “a rejection of . . . the infalli- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 dences, educational systems, and eco- bility of any idea or ideology or theology nomic statuses. But his identity has or ‘ism’” that might stand in the way of arguably been forged most of all by his ½nding practical means to meet as many choices to embrace much of what char- partly conflicting, partly common aspi- acterizes dominant but contested forms rations as possible.38 Obama recognized of American identity, including Chris- that the politics of “democratic delibera- tianity over Islam or secularity, American tion” he applauded “seems to champion patriotism over cosmopolitanism or for- compromise, modesty, and muddling eign allegiances, and an emphasis on through; to justify logrolling, deal-mak- unity across the races over racial sepa- ing, self-interest, pork barrels, paralysis, ratism. He has contended, “coming to- and inef½ciency”–practices he would gether, all of us” to “do the work that soon be accused of indulging in as pres- must be done in this country” is “the ident. But he insisted it involved pro- very de½nition of being American.”35 cesses of “information gathering, analy- But among the domestic coalition that sis, and argument” that allowed Amer- is Obama’s political base, as well as icans “to make better, if not perfect, among the international leaders and choices, not only about the means to movements with which he seeks to our ends but also about the ends forge alliances, there are many who themselves.”39 see Obama’s stress on the primacy of Yet Obama then went on to recognize national identity as retrograde, archaic the limits of deliberation and the need in an age of globalization, a barrier to not just for “the pragmatist, the voice desirable multilateral and internation- of reason, or the force of compromise,” al arrangements, and a rhetoric capable but also the “unbinding idealist” who of being deployed on behalf of chauvin- demands true “justice,” like William ism. In this regard, too, Obama’s vision Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass, or requires him to walk a tightrope between Harriet Tubman. He lamented, “I am those who see his conception of Ameri- robbed even of the certainty of uncer- canism as insuf½ciently celebratory of tainty–for sometimes absolute truths national greatness and too open to sur- may well be absolute.”40 renders of national sovereignty, and Obama did not, however, identify his those who see his stance as a refusal to own “absolutes”–though his writings accept that the era of sovereign nation- and speeches leave little doubt that they states, much less U.S. hegemony, is and are de½ned in large part by the social ought to be coming to an end.36 justice traditions of America’s black

132 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences churches.41 His failure to articulate the found. Obama must hope instead that Rogers M. absolutes of this moral vision is another his politics and policies of pragmatic Smith, Desmond S. consequence of the structure of modern accommodation can achieve enough of King & racial politics. Although the preferred what most Americans desire with regard Philip A. policies of the two rival racial alliances to education, health care, employment, Klinkner are not, in fact, utterly resistant to rea- energy supplies, a clean environment, sonable compromises, the leaders of greater international peace, and freedom today’s racial alliances and political from invidious discrimination at home, parties treat them as if they are, at least so that tensions over racial principles and rhetorically. Therefore, it is dif½cult for practices recede into the background. But Obama or anyone else to de½ne a moral much has to go right if that indirect ap-

principle or policy that indicates how proach to alleviating the nation’s racial Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 those differences can be resolved. Stat- inequalities is to work. If it does not, ing an “absolute” racial principle might Americans will remain enmeshed in reinforce the prevailing sense that no the third era of U.S. racial politics for common ground on racial issues can be many years to come. endnotes *Contributor Biographies: ROGERS M. SMITH, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2004, is the Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Chair of the Executive Committee for the Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism. His publications include The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (with Philip A. Klinkner, 1999), Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (2003), and Still a House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama’s America (with Desmond S. King, 2011). DESMOND S. KING is the Andrew W. Mellon Professor of American Government at the Uni- versity of Oxford and a Fellow of Nuf½eld College. He is a Fellow of the British Academy. His publications include Separate and Unequal: Black Americans and the US Federal Government, rev. ed. (2007), The Unsustainable American State (coedited with Lawrence R. Jacobs, 2009), Democratization in America (coedited with Robert Lieberman, Gretchen Ritter, and Laurence Whitehead, 2009), and Still a House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama’s America (with Rogers M. Smith, 2011). PHILIP A. KLINKNER is the James S. Sherman Professor of Government at Hamilton Col- lege. His publications include The Losing Parties: Out-Party National Committees, 1956–1993 (1994), Midterm: The 1994 Elections in Perspective (1996), and The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (with Rogers M. Smith, 1999). 1 These arguments are developed chiefly in Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, “Racial Orders in American Political Development,” American Political Science Review 99 (2005): 75–92; Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, “Strange Bedfellows? Polarized Politics? The Quest for Racial Equality in Contemporary America,” Political Research Quarterly 61 (2008): 686–703; Rogers M. Smith and Desmond S. King, “Barack Obama and the Future of American Racial Politics,” Du Bois Review 6 (2009): 25–35; Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith, Still a House Divided: Race and Politics in Obama’s America (Princeton, N.J.: Prince- ton University Press, 2011). In these and the present essay, the order of authors’ names indicates merely which author initiated the project. Here, we replace our earlier term “racial orders” with the more accessible term “racial policy alliances.” 2 This case is elaborated in Philip A. Klinkner with Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 3 “National Exit Polls Table,” The New York Times, November 5, 2008, http://elections .nytimes.com/2008/results/president/national-exit-polls.html. See also Stephen Ansola-

140 (2) Spring 2011 133 Barack behere, Nathaniel Persily, and Charles Stewart III, “Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the Obama & 2008 Elections: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act,” Harvard Law Review American 123 (2009): 16; http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462363. Racial Politics 4 Philip A. Klinkner and Thomas Schaller, “lbj’s Revenge: The 2008 Election and the Rise of the Great Society Coalition,” The Forum 6 (2009): 1, 3; http://www.bepress.com/ forum/vol6/iss4/art9. 5 “National Exit Polls Table.” 6 See, for example, Ansolabehere, Persily, and Stewart, “Race, Region, and Vote Choice,” 3, 22–28; Philip A. Klinkner, “Obama and the Politics of Race,” paper presented at the West- ern Political Science Association Meeting, Vancouver, British Columbia, March 19–21, 2009; Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Charles Tien, Richard Nadeau, “Obama’s Missed Landslide: A Racial Cost?” PS: Political Science & Politics 43 (2010): 69–75; Michael Tesler and David

O. Sears, Obama’s Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America (Chicago: Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 University of Chicago Press, 2010). 7 Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau, “Obama’s Missed Landslide,” 75. They also ½nd racial resentment to be signi½cantly independent, rather than a component, of political ideology more generally. Klinkner and Schaller similarly estimate the “racial cost” of Obama’s 2008 vote total as 4 percent. 8 For overviews of these continuing disparities, see, for example, Michael B. Katz, Mark J. Stern, and Jamie J. Fader, “The New African American Inequality,” Journal of American History 91 (2005): 75–108; Smith and King, “Barack Obama and the Future of American Racial Politics,” 26–28. 9 Julian Bond, “Civil Rights: Then and Now,” Race, Poverty, and the Environment, 2008, http://www.urbanhabitat.org/node/2806; Jesse L. Jackson, “Appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to Extend Af½rmative Action, Not End It,” In Motion Magazine, April 7, 2003, http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/opin/supreme.html. 10 See, for example, J. Douglas, dissenting, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 344 (1974); Nathan Glazer, Af½rmative Discrimination (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). 11 King and Smith, “Strange Bedfellows? Polarized Politics?” 691. 12 See, especially, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, 2006); Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Support: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 13 Many argue persuasively that policy-makers often do so covertly. See, for example, J. David Souter, dissenting, in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 297–298 (2003) (Court is encouraging “deliberate obfuscation” in admission policies); Daniel Sabbagh, Equality and Transparency: A Strategic Perspective on Af½rmative Action in American Law (New York: Palgrave, 2007). 14 For elaboration on this topic, see Smith and King, “Barack Obama and the Future of American Racial Politics.” 15 Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau report polls indicating that 56 percent of respondents nationally “said yes, Obama would favor blacks,” and of these “only 32% said they would support Obama,” in contrast to 80 percent among those who said Obama would not favor blacks; Lewis-Beck, Tien, and Nadeau, “Obama’s Missed Landslide,” 74. 16 Howard Kurtz, “McCain Spot Asks: ‘Who is Barack Obama?’” http://voices.washingtonpost .com/the-trail/2008/10/06; Chuck Raasch, “McCain’s ‘American’ Claim Sparks Critics,” http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/raasch/2008-04-03-raasch_N.htm. 17 Cf. Tali Mendelberg, The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

134 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences 18 See, for example, Peter Wallsten, “For Obama, an Uphill Climb in Appalachia,” Los Angeles Rogers M. Times, October 5, 2008; Chris Simkins, “us Voters Offer Opinions about Barack Obama, Smith, His Race, and Its Impact on the Upcoming Election,” Voice of America News, October 14, Desmond S. 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-10-14-voa36-66791107.html. King & Philip A. 19 Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream Klinkner (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), 232. 20Ibid., 244. 21 Ibid., 247. 22 Ibid., 248. 23 Obama did, of course, feel compelled to discuss race by the controversy over the views of his pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright. For discussion of Obama’s response in relation

to the racial alliances framework, see Smith and King, “Barack Obama and the Future of Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/2/121/1829987/daed_a_00082.pdf by guest on 26 September 2021 American Racial Politics,” 30 –31. 24 Ibid. 25 Lewis-Beck, Tien, Nadeau, “Obama’s Missed Landslide.” 26 Dana Bash and Emily Sherman, “Sotomayor’s ‘Wise Latina’ Comment a Staple of Her Speeches,” http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/05/sotomayor.speeches/#cnnSTCTest. 27 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 28 “Ricci v. DeStefano, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand,” 2009, 22–32, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/ 08-328_VacaturandRemandAmCuUSA.pdf. 29 J. Kennedy, opinion of the Court, Ricci v. DeStefano at 2681. 30 J. Ginsburg, dissenting, Ricci v. DeStefano at 2700–2707. 31 Amy Goldstein, Robert Barnes, and Paul Kane, “Sotomayor Emphasizes Objectivity: Nomi- nee Explains ‘Wise Latina’ Remark,” The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost .com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/14/AR2009071400992_pf.html. 32 Tesler and Sears, Obama’s Race, 149–158. 33 “Limbaugh Agrees with Sessions: Obama’s ‘objective is unemployment,’” ThinkProgress.org, May 11, 2009, http://thinkprogress.org/2009/05/11/sessions-limbaugh-unemployment; “Fox Host Glenn Beck, Obama is a ‘racist,’” The Huf½ngton Post, July 28, 2009, http:// www.huf½ngtonpost.com/2009/07/28/fox-host-glenn-beck-obama_n_246310.html. 34 “Obama Closing Statement,” http://www.clipsandcomment.com/2008/10/27. 35 “Obama’s Electrifying Lincoln 200th Birthday Speech in Spring½eld, Illinois,” http://www.buzzflash.com/articles/node/7708. 36 Several likely 2012 gop presidential candidates have criticized Obama for not endors- ing the idea that America is “exceptional” and superior to other nations; http://www .washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/28/AR2010112804139.html. 37 For overviews of Obama’s pragmatism, see James T. Kloppenberg, Reading Obama: Dreams, Hopes, and the American Political Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010); Thomas J. Sugrue, Not Even Past: Barack Obama and the Burden of Race (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), 56–80. 38 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 92–93. 39 Ibid., 94. 40Ibid., 97. 41 Ibid., 207–208.

140 (2) Spring 2011 135