First of All, I Would Like to Extend My Warmest Thanks to Katarina

First of all, I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Katarina Areskough Mascarenhas for giving me the opportunity to come and say a few words about the development and future of European cooperation, what it means for Sweden, and the role I see our country playing within the EU. *** On the 31st of August 1961 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons that the UK would apply for membership of the European Economic Community, or the EEC, the predecessor of the modern EU. History – or rather Charles de Gaulle – stood in Macmillan’s way, however, and it would take the UK more than a decade to finally gain membership. The process saw several vetoes from the French President, and eventually his resignation and death, before the UK became a member. Some things have not changed; every time the UK moves to change its relationship with Europe, its actions have an affect on everyone else, including Sweden. It is the same story repeating itself. Within a few weeks, Sweden’s relationship with the EEC would also be determined in a way that would have a significant impact on the European politics debate in Sweden for the next thirty years. The business community, the Liberal People's Party, and not least my own party pushed for membership. In the 1962 elections, my predecessor Gunnar Hecksher appeared on election posters bearing the message ‘Yes to Europe – for freedom and security’. The Social Democratic government and the Centre Party pushed a different agenda. Eventually, Prime Minister Tage Erlander issued a decision on the matter at the congress of the Swedish Metalworkers’ Union in August 1961, three weeks after Macmillan’s announcement: Swedish membership was not appropriate. Primarily due to Sweden’s policy of neutrality. The policy could be called into question if we were to align ourselves with what some alleged was the economic pillar of western defence cooperation. In times of war or crisis, membership could force us to do trade that was not compatible with strict neutrality. Those late summer weeks were, without a doubt, influenced by the Cold War having reached one of its freezing points – the ongoing construction of the Berlin Wall. The economy provided another counter-argument. Sweden was, at the time, experiencing boom years. High levels of self-assurance prevailed amongst Swedish politicians, and the outside world did not seem to be able to offer us much in terms of economic growth and development. Erlander’s position was strong. In the 1962 elections the Social Democratic Party received an impressive 50.1 per cent, which could not feel further from the current parliamentary situation. Ulf Dinkelspiel – who devoted much of his working life to cooperation between Sweden and Europe, and whom my wife and I had the privilege of getting to know in the 1990s – writes in his book Den motvillige europén (‘The reluctant European’): ‘Many of the arguments were evocative of “the Swedish Model” and the opportunities to implement independent economic policy in Social Democratic packaging.’ Ulf also points out that Erlander’s speech was given from a position of great self-assurance. Or perhaps there was more than that: ‘The speech had an unmistakable air of self-importance. It was said that one reason for the UK applying for membership was the economic difficulties it was facing.’ The Metalworkers’ Union talk has since become a part of the mythology surrounding Sweden’s European politics. If Olof Palme later considered moving in the direction of membership, the entire spirit of the speech would prove to be an obstacle for him. This is particularly ironic, given he himself is said to have been involved in writing it. Another source of irony is that de Gaulle’s resignation, which eventually paved the way for the UK’s membership, made complicated matters regarding Swedish membership. In the post-de Gaulle years, the EEC moved towards an unmistakable deepening of cooperation. And in 1970 two key initiatives spearheading a move towards deeper cooperation were launched. The first was the so-called Davignon Plan, which recommended more in-depth foreign policy cooperation. The second was the Werner Report, which focused on a deepening of financial policy, and which heralded plans for an economic and monetary union with a single currency. This clashed with strong opinions within the social democratic sphere. Therefore, although there was interest from Sweden in EEC membership in the early 70s, the issue was never seriously considered at that stage, in contrast with the situation in the UK, Denmark and Norway. All of this took place before my time. The same can be said for most of you, too. However, I did experience the lasting effect of the European vision set out in the Metalworkers Union talk, well into the 1980s. I saw how the arguments it set out still characterised debate on Europe, before beginning to fade and ultimately disappear entirely. By the 1990s all that was left was the liturgy surrounding neutrality. However, it was strong. The Berlin Wall – which was built in 1961 and at the time emphasised the neutrality argument against Swedish membership – fell in 1989, emphasising why we too needed to break away from some of our previous ideas. And whilst in the 1961 economy could be seen, somewhat over-confidently, to be advocating Sweden taking its own path, by 1990 it was desperately crying out for a common path. In 1990, Sweden found itself in the same position the UK had, according to Tage Erlander, faced thirty years previously. Suddenly, things began moving quickly. On the 26th of October 1990, the then Minister for Finance Allan Larsson announced at a press conference that Sweden would be applying for membership of the EC. This apparent existential reorganisation of Sweden’s foreign policy was, more than anything, a footnote to an economic rescue package. For many of us, it came as a surprise. Perhaps not the decision itself, but rather its timing. And we were not alone. The Social Democratic ministers were only informed at a late stage. The President of Finland, Mauno Koivisto, was on a state visit to Portugal and in any case did not feel that he had been informed, much less consulted. This did not benefit our relations with Finland. What’s more, it was not a positive move in terms of the Swedish political process either. Under the leadership of Carl Bildt and Ulf Dinkelspiel, we would be guided through the complicated negotiations that would eventually lead to a historic day on Corfu, on the 23rd of June 1994, when Sweden signed its Treaty of Accession. ‘Without a doubt’, this was the most important international agreement of the century for Sweden, stated Carl Bildt. The signing of the Treaty was followed by a referendum in November of the same year. The final step; the people’s approval. The victory of the yes-vote by 53 per cent to 47 per cent in the 1994 referendum was a clear, if divided result. The leadership of the Social Democratic Party were clearly committed to the yes-side, however, many influential social democrats were opposed to membership. The Metalworkers’ Union speech was officially history, yet its arguments remained very much alive. It took the best part of a decade for Sweden’s EEC membership to be normalised and to become part of the everyday tapestry of Swedish politics. *** Today, Sweden is bound by the solidarity clause of the Lisbon Treaty; we will not be neutral if another EU country is attacked. And we are deeply integrated into the EU’s economic cooperation – if not in the single currency. However, the history of Sweden’s relationship with European cooperation was for a long time characterised by what we were against. Security policy and economic policy frequently proved to be obstacles. It was not until the early 1990s that an opportunity to create a positive agenda began to arise. The EU became a clear international priority for Sweden. The outside world remained important, however greater responsibilities were adopted in the role of European citizens. Today, our EU membership goes without saying at a time where much change is once again afoot. The conditions are dramatically different to those of 1989. Nowadays, more walls are being built than demolished. In many countries, nationalism is more appealing than internationalism. If the right and left wing can agree on one thing, it is that most things are the EU’s fault. Those who wish to destabilise Europe and European cooperation see great opportunities. This is why now is no time to stand back and wait. Now is the time for Sweden’s European policy to be determined by all of us in favour of cooperation, and not by those fundamentally opposed to it. We must leave the spirit of the Metalworkers’ Union speech behind us once and for all. For me, this is about the values that once ensured my commitment to Swedish EC membership, and that are today more important than they have been in a long time. Democracy. Rule of law. Tolerance. Openness. Market economy. A European cooperation in the form of sovereign states joined in a common European destiny. *** When talking about domestic Swedish politics, I often say that we must be able to keep two ideas in mind at the same time. On the one hand, we must take a serious look at our country, to see and understand what is so good about it, so that we can understand why it must be defended and developed. The generations that came before us built up these positive elements, and we have no right to endanger or destroy them.

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