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Eric Hayes FINNISH FOREIGN POLICY PAPERS 01, September 2011

From Cold War to Common Currency

A personal perspective on Finland and the EU

ULKOPOLIITTINEN INSTITUUTTI UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FROM COLD WAR TO COMMON CURRENCY:

A personal perspective on Finland and the EU by Eric Hayes

Eric Hayes is a former official of the European Commission, who served in a number of capacities involving responsibility for the EU’s relations with Finland, most notably as Ambassador and Head of the Commission’s Delegation in Helsinki from 1993 to 1995. Since retiring from the Commission in 2007, he has written and lectured on a range of EU-related themes.

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs Kruunuvuorenkatu 4 FI-00160 Helsinki tel. +358 9 432 7000 fax. +358 9 432 7799 www.fiia.fi

ISBN: 978-951-769-318-9 ISSN: 1799-9553

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The copyright to the text resides with the author. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 4 I A Piano Lesson in European Realpolitik 7 II Casting in Finnish Waters 12 III The European Waiting Room 18 IV The Dam Bursts 23 V The Race Begins 36 VI To Helsinki 39 VII Neutrality: The Dog That Didn’t Bark 47 VIII Åland Aspirations – and EU Anxieties 57 IX Agricultural Agonies 66 X Shakespeare and Elvis Presley 75 XI Towards The Referendum 80 XII The Final Furlong 89 Epilogue: Impressions and Realitites 94 Appendix – Timeline of Key Events 98 Bibliography 100 Preface inland’s decision to apply for member- ­Finland, unlike the others, would not become ship of the European Union1 was, in the “Sovietised”.4 Fwords of President Koivisto, “one of Instead, Finland spent the next four dec- the most important taken during Finland’s ades pursuing a careful geo-political balanc- independence”.2 Certainly, the sudden geo- ing act that sought pragmatically to combine political volte-face performed by Finland in the economically necessary with the politi- the early 1990s, culminating in her accession cally feasible. In so doing, Finland managed to the EU in January 1995, was one of many not only to set herself clearly apart from the remarkable chapters in the fundamental re- rest of the post-War Soviet sphere of influ- structuring of Europe’s political and secu- ence; but also to participate from an early rity architecture that took place in the closing stage in the economic integration of Western decade and a half of the twentieth century Europe. That this – highly successful – policy – even though many Finns would argue that should have inspired the derogatory term it was no more than the continuation, in a dif- “Finlandisation” has always seemed to me ferent geo-political environment, of Finland’s rather harsh on the Finns, who were after traditional policy towards European integra- all just seeking to make the best of the cards tion. Either way, it is a development that they had been dealt by others. Considerations has received relatively little attention from of Realpolitik – namely the paramount need non-Finnish commentators. Most have pre- to maintain friendly relations with Moscow ferred instead to focus on the nine countries, – ruled out any possibility of closer political formerly part of the Soviet Bloc, that became relations with the West. Even after the col- Member States of the European Union in 2004 lapse of the Iron Curtain and the reunification and 2007: the “Visegrad Four”, the Baltic of Germany, Finland proceeded with great States, Bulgaria and Romania. caution. Yet Finland too was consigned by the vic- Then, early in 1992, emboldened by devel- torious Allies at the end of World War II to opments in Moscow, and under the economic the Soviet sphere of influence. Initially, her pressure of Sweden’s sudden decision to apply position looked in some respects even more for EU membership, Finland’s political lead- precarious than that of some of her Central ers seized the narrow window of opportunity and Eastern European neighbours.3 Luckily that suddenly presented itself to confirm at for Finland, however, she had not been oc- last, urbi et orbi, Finland’s identity as a West- cupied by the Red Army and had throughout ern European nation, not only economically the War retained intact her pluralist demo- but also politically. cratic institutions. Not only was there a broad In tabling her application for membership political consensus; but the Finnish Social at that time, Finland ensured her participa- Democratic Party (unlike some of its coun- tion in the 1995 wave of EU enlargement. Had terparts elsewhere) was anti-Communist and she not done so, Finland might well have end- Western-oriented. Finland’s geo-strategic ed up joining the EU in 2004 alongside those position – sitting as she did at the northern Central and Eastern European countries that edge of Europe – was moreover, from Mos- had formally been part of the Warsaw Pact. As cow’s perspective, rather different from that it was, Finland demonstrated once again that of other countries in the Soviet sphere. By she was in a different class. At the same time, the mid-1950s it was becoming clear that Finland’s accession to the EU was an impor- tant positive signal for those other aspirants on whom the Soviet yoke had fallen rather harder over the previous half-century. 1 In the text that follows, I have generally used the By virtue of the successive functions I held more correct term “European Communities” (EC) prior in the European Commission during the 1980s to the finalisation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 2 Finland and the Evolution of Europe: Address to the Plenary Session of the European Parliament, 16 Nov 4 Finland did not join the Warsaw Pact when the latter 1993 (Ulkoasiainministeriö: Ulkopoliittisia Lausuntoja ja was created in 1955, but chose to join the Nordic Asiakirjoja 1993, p.246) Council. The following year, Moscow returned the 3 Saarikoski (2002) Porkkala military base to Finland. 5 and 1990s, I was a privileged outside observer of this unexpected, and ultimately breath- takingly rapid, transformation of Finland’s geo-political status. The narrative that fol- lows is, inevitably, only a personal and par- tial account of what happened during those momentous years, based on my notes, diaries and recollections. I have however sought, wherever possible, to check these against other accounts of the events covered.5 I have also benefitted from many helpful comments and suggestions from those closely involved on the Finnish side, in particular Heikki Haavisto, Veli Sundbäck, Erkki Liikanen, Antti Kuosmanen, Pekka Huhtaniemi, Esa Härmälä, Eikka Kosonen, Leif Blomqvist, Esko Hamilo and Niilo Jääskinen. Particular thanks are due to Pertti Salolainen, without whose constant encouragement this account would probably never have seen the light of day.

5 I have relied in particular on Kuosmanen (2001), Liikanen (1995) and Granell (1995); and also, more generally, on Koivisto (1997) and Jakobson (1998). I am indebted to the Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland for their assistance in checking the details of early ministerial contacts, as well as to the EFTA Secretariat in Geneva, who kindly permitted me to check a number of points against material in their archives. 6 Photo: Marko Helin / Wikimedia Commons

I

A Piano Lesson in European realpolitik y first exposure to the geo-political ­negotiations for an all-European Free Trade complexities of Finland’s relations Area.7 However, when the European Free Mwith the rest of Europe was in August Trade Association (EFTA) was founded in 1981. It was, although I was blissfully una- 1960 by Finland’s three Nordic neighbours ware of this at the time, a textbook example together with the UK, Austria, Switzerland of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line in action. and Portugal, Finland, after some delicate I was then a junior official in the trade de- manoeuvring,8 negotiated Associate Mem- fence section of the European Commission’s bership of the organisation. This effectively Directorate General for External Relations. I extended the Free Trade Area to Finland, but had never set foot in Finland before. I was, did not allow her to participate in the delib- like most Western Europeans, including erations of the EFTA Council; the formal de- most European Commission officials at that cisions of the latter being applied to Finland time, deeply ignorant about Finland and all by separate subsequent decision of the FIN- things Finnish. For most people, Finland was EFTA Joint Council. Finland was similarly ex- the home of Sibelius and/or the origin of the cluded from EFTA’s contacts with other in- term “Finlandisation”. For those addicted ternational organisations. Later in the 1960s, to spy fiction, it was a presumed hot-bed attempts were made to conclude a Nordic of East-West intrigue. A well informed few Economic Area (NORDEK) between Fin- were aware of Finland’s role as the originator land, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These of the “Helsinki Process” (which led to the however collapsed in 1970, partly owing to creation of the C.S.C.E and subsequently the pressure by Moscow on Helsinki, but also O.S.C.E.). because Denmark and Norway had by then Urho Kekkonen’s long Presidency was concluded that their own futures lay with in its final declining days. The Cold War was the European Communities (EC). Shortly still at its height. Ronald Reagan had just thereafter, Finland renewed for a further 20 that January taken over the White House. years her Friendship Cooperation and Mutual The death of the Arch-Cold-Warrior himself, Assistance Agreement with the USSR. Leonid Brezhnev, was still fifteen months Finland demonstrated similar caution away. Russia was bogged down in a guerrilla and hesitation when, in 1973, the UK and war with the Western-backed Mujahedeen in Denmark finally left EFTA in favour of mem- Afghanistan. The USA and its European allies bership of the EC. Given the need to ensure were in the middle of a bitter dispute over the her competitive position in these two tradi- possible security implications of European tionally important markets for her industrial plans to pipe Siberian oil and gas to Western products, Finland joined her EFTA partners Europe. Transatlantic relations were about in negotiating Free Trade Agreements with to be further troubled by widespread public the EC.9 Negotiations were concluded in July protests in Europe at the deployment of US Pershing II cruise missiles. Given the overriding importance of 7 The British Government had suggested that the maintaining good relations with the USSR, EEC Six should be linked with remaining countries Finland had understandably pursued a no- of Western Europe in a wider free trade area. This concept became known as the Maudling Plan. toriously cautious approach to the establish- Negotiations began within the OEEC in 1956; however, ment of economic and trade links with the two years later, the Six, fearful of seeing their own countries of Western Europe, despite the project diluted or submerged, put an end to them. fact that the latter had traditionally been an For a full account, see Benoit (1961), especially pp. important market for Finnish forestry and 70-7 and 92-5; Pedersen: EC-EFTA Relations – An other products. Having turned down the of- Historical Outline in Wallace (1991); Antola (2000) pp. fer of Marshall Aid, Finland had not become a 3-4. 8 member of the OEEC,6 and had thus not been Max Jakobson (Jakobson, p. 92) considers that Kekkonen effectively double-crossed both the USSR party to the (bitter and ultimately abortive) and the West. 9 In practice two agreements, one with the European 6 Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, Economic Community (EEC) and one with the predecessor of the OECD European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 8 1972. The prospect of a Free Trade Agreement European Commission’s External Relations with the EC was however to prove a contro- ­Commissioner, Wilhelm Haferkamp, had, at versial one for Finland, both domestically and the invitation of the Finnish Government, in terms of relations with Moscow. The USSR visited Helsinki in December 1979 for meet- was deeply suspicious of Western European ings with Prime Minister Koivisto, Foreign integration, and its leaders made this quite Minister Väyrynen and Foreign Trade Minis- clear to their Finnish counterparts. Many in ter Rekola. Discussions covered the operation Finland, especially on the political left, op- of the FTA, the need to resist protectionism posed the Agreement for both economic and and the pragmatic expansion of contacts in ideological reasons. Getting to the point of areas of mutual interest.12 Rekola had recip- signature required considerable efforts of rocated with a visit to Brussels in March 1981. persuasion by Kekkonen in Moscow, an ex- Finland did not share the enthusiasm of ceptional four-year extension of his Presi- some of her EFTA partners for developing dential mandate, a change of government in closer relations with the EC. This had been Helsinki and the appointment of a high level highlighted when, to celebrate the com- committee to evaluate the potential effects pletion of full free trade for most industrial of the FTA. Moreover, this step was taken products,13 the Austrian EFTA Presidency had only as part of a wider “deal” in which, in convened a meeting of EFTA Heads of Gov- line with Finland’s policy of strict neutrality, ernment in Vienna in May 1977. Chancellor equivalent privileges were simultaneously Kreisky, recalling the origins of EFTA in the granted by Finland to the member countries failed Maudling Plan of the 1950s,14 proposed of the CMEA (Comecon). The agreement was that Leaders should adopt a declaration “to finally signed, in low-key fashion by Fin- intensify economic cooperation within the land’s Ambassador to the EC, Pentti Talvitie, large free-trading area and thus consolidate only in October 1973. This was some fifteen it on a European scale”. In the course of months after the signature of the FTAs with the exchange of views that followed, Prime other EFTA countries10 and only just ahead of Minister Martti Miettunen stressed that Fin- the deadline by which the agreement would land’s point of departure was her policy of have lapsed.11 Moreover, Finland’s agree- neutrality and the retention of full national ment with the EEC, unlike those of her EFTA freedom of decision-making. He reminded partners, did not contain an “evolutionary” his colleagues that Finland’s agreement with clause, explicitly foreseeing the possibility the EC contained no “evolutionary” clause “to develop the relations established by the and that its objectives were limited to coop- Agreement by extending them to fields not eration in the trade field. Miettunen’s cau- covered thereby”. tious line is reflected in the final text of the In the years that followed the signature of Vienna Declaration, which specifically refers the FTA, Finland’s relations with the EC were to the absence of an evolutionary clause in essentially limited to the implementation the EEC-Finland Agreement. The text goes of the latter and, in contrast to those of her on to say that “it is the intention of Finland EFTA partners, conducted almost exclusively to develop her relations with the Community at official level. Numerous senior European in the framework of the objectives of that Commission officials responsible for ques- Agreement”. For Finland, in any event, the tions of particular interest to Finland – such most important date was not 1 July 1977, but as pulp and paper, shipbuilding and competi- 1 January 1984, when the remaining EC tariffs tion – were invited to make “familiarisation” visits to Finland. However, in the period up to end of Kekkonen’s Presidency, there were 12 only two contacts at ministerial level. The See communiqué of the visit (Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland); also General Report on the Activities of the EC 1979, para. 542 10 With the exception of Norway, with whom an FTA 13 Full free trade for all industrial products except a was signed in May 1973, following Norway’s decision few sensitive items was achieved on schedule on 1 not to proceed with EC membership. July 1977. 11 Art. 35 of the EEC/Finland Free Trade Agreement 14 See above 9 on pulp and paper products would be elimi- the EC in March 1979, setting out the position nated.15 of the Finnish Government on the follow-up Fortunately for Finland, and to the frus- to Vienna. This recalled once again that, for tration of many on the EFTA side, the EC side Finland, the Free Trade Agreement was the too was at that time far from enthusiastic cornerstone of EC-EFTA cooperation. Fin- about developing closer relations between land supported efforts, within the scope of EFTA and the EC. The text of the Vienna Dec- the FTA, to remove non-tariff barriers and laration had been formally communicated to to improve the rules of origin. Beyond the the EC under cover of a letter from Chancellor scope of the FTA, Finland was interested only Kreisky, in his capacity as Chairman of the in agriculture and fisheries. The practical meeting, to the President-in-Office of the EC results of this, by mid-1981, were some mi- Council, UK Foreign Minister David Owen. It nor improvements to the rules of origin, the rapidly became apparent that, within the EC, signature of a bilateral fisheries agreement views were very much divided as to how to (a necessary consequence of the introduc- respond. While the Commission took a fairly tion internationally of 200-mile exclusive positive stance, not all Member States shared economic zones) and the opening of negotia- this. Some saw no need to develop new forms tions for a bilateral cheese agreement. of cooperation with the EFTA countries, let But back to my visit to Finland. The Eu- alone of doing so with them collectively. For ropean Commission had, in February 1981, these, some of the language in the Declara- launched an investigation into imports of pi- tion may have looked too much like an at- anos from the GDR and Poland. Community tempt to revive the controversial concept of producers had alleged that these were being an all-European Free Trade Area. The end re- dumped at unfair prices on the Community sult was that the completion of (almost) full market. The investigation had been extended free trade with EFTA remained uncelebrated in July to include imports from Czechoslo- on the EC side. A short, polite but essentially vakia and the USSR. I was the case-handler non-committal reply was agreed for Owen to responsible for this investigation, on the ba- send to Kreisky. It was not until some twelve sis of which the Commission would have to months later that the EC Council, prompted decide, in due course, whether to propose by a Communication from the Commis- additional charges on these imports. A nec- sion, finally issued a statement confirming essary part of this process was the determi- that it “agreed on the utility of improving nation of the “normal” value to be used in and perfecting the operation of the agree- assessing the margin of dumping. Since the ments in all areas where this was deemed four countries under investigation did not at useful” and “that where additional coop- that time operate market economies, “nor- eration beyond the free trade agreements mal” value had, under EEC legislation and in was regarded as desirable by both sides, the accordance with international trade rules, Community was prepared to undertake such to be determined “in an appropriate and not cooperation in the mutual interest of the unreasonable manner” using if possible pric- parties concerned”.16 The ambiguity of the es or costs of production for the like product term “both sides” says all! The Council sub- of a market economy third country. It rap- sequently approved a list of areas where it idly became evident that the only European was considered that strengthened coopera- market economy producers of pianos outside tion with the EFTA countries was desirable the EEC itself were to be found in Finland. and achievable. Hence my visit. The cautious Finnish line was further con- We had already ascertained informally, firmed in an aide-mémoire handed over to via industry contacts, that the two Finnish producers, Fazer and Hellas, were willing in principle to assist us. (They were of course 15 It was moreover not until 1 January 1985 that Finland herself had to abolish the remaining tariffs also suffering from this unfair competi- on a wide range of textiles, machinery, electrical tion from Eastern Europe.) Before we could equipment and other goods proceed, however, we were required under 16 EC Council Press Release 830/78 (Press 89) GATT rules formally to notify the Finnish 10 ­authorities, in order to be sure that they had were deemed to be satisfactory price un- no objection to our visiting the premises of dertakings from the Czech, GDR and Polish their two producers for this purpose. A note exporters. The published legal texts of these verbale to this effect was duly delivered to decisions,17 which explain in some consider- Finland’s Mission to the European Commu- able detail how the Commission arrived at nities in Brussels (the EC having in those days its conclusions, include a list of all the firms no representation of its own in Helsinki). whose premises were inspected in order to This was regarded as a purely routine proce- verify the export prices of the pianos under dure, cooperation of this sort being the norm investigation. There is, however, for some between GATT Contracting Parties. mysterious reason, no mention of our visit to Our first indication that things might Finland; nor of any assistance or cooperation prove a little more complicated in this case from the Finnish side. came a few days later, when I received a tele- phone call from Esko Hamilo, then Counsel- lor at Finland’s Mission to the EC in Brussels. He confirmed that our note verbale had been duly passed to Helsinki, but said he was not at all sure what the reaction might be. Hel- sinki was of course well aware of the GATT rules here. However, being seen to cooperate with the EC in an action aimed against the economic interests of the USSR was inevi- tably a sensitive matter for Helsinki. Hamilo promised to come back to me as soon as he had news of Helsinki’s reaction. It was a couple of weeks before Hamilo contacted me again, to inform me that Hel- sinki would not be replying formally to our note verbale. (A formal reply was not, in any case, strictly necessary under GATT rules.) He was, however, instructed to convey to me orally the message that Helsinki did not object to our visiting the premises of the two Finnish producers, provided that during the visit we did not seek to make contact with any officials of the Finnish Government, and that there was no reference, in any subsequently published decision, to Finnish cooperation in the investigation. Reading between the lines, the clear message was that Helsinki wanted to be able, if the need arose, to deny any knowledge of the matter. Discretion was thus the order of the day. My accountant colleague and I spent two days visiting the offices and production facilities of the two Finnish companies, which were all in the Helsinki area, gathering the technical and commercial information we needed for our calculation of normal value and returned forthwith to Brussels. The case was conclud- 17 See in particular Commission Regulation (EEC) No ed the following April with the imposition of 871/82 of 14 April 1982 (OJ No L 101, 16/04/1982, p. additional duties on imports into the EEC of 30) and Council Regulation (EEC) No 2236/82 of 11 Russian pianos and the acceptance of what August 1982 (OJ No L 238, 13/08/1982, p. 1) 11 Photo: D100a / Wikimedia Commons

II

Casting in Finnish Waters y second visit to Finland, nearly six constituted by the two entities.19 From that years later, in late June 1987, took point on, while the FTAs remained the legal Mplace in very different circumstanc- and institutional bedrock of the EC-EFTA es. I had meanwhile become Private Secre- relationship, new initiatives for its further tary to the Commission’s Director-General development, even when legally enshrined for External Relations, Leslie Fielding, who in separate modifications to the individual took a close interest in EC-EFTA relations. FTAs, were increasingly the product of dis- He had been invited to pay an official visit to cussion and agreement at the EC-EFTA level. Finland, his third since becoming Director- That same year had also seen the genesis General, and had decided that I should ac- of the idea of holding a “jumbo” ministerial company him. Our programme consisted of meeting, bringing together, for the first time, a day of official discussions in Helsinki with the ministers of all EC member states and all Undersecretary of State Paavo Kaarlehto and EFTA member countries to provide a sym- his officials (including the then Director for bolic political impulse to closer EC-EFTA co- EC Affairs, Antti Satuli), following which we operation in its tenth anniversary year. This were whisked off by seaplane for further, was at the time a bold initiative, given the more informal, discussions during sauna, unprecedented nature of such a meeting and dinner and a morning’s pike fishing, hosted the uncertainty about what it might be ex- by Ilkka Haka at the Valio fishing cottage in pected to give rise to. Commission President the Turku Archipelago. It was my first in- Gaston Thorn had received support for the troduction to “sauna diplomacy”, as well as idea of such a meeting (or even an EFTA-EC to the natural wonders of the archipelago. I Summit) from the Austrians during his visit became addicted to both. to Vienna in June 1982. It had also received Kaarlehto was well known to Brussels, support from some other EFTA Ministers at having served as Finnish Ambassador to the the EFTA ministerial meeting in Geneva in EC from 1981 to 1985. There was much to talk early November. Then in December, with about, for since 1982, under the new leader- little prior warning, the incoming German ship of President Koivisto, Finland’s rela- Presidency of the EC announced its intention tionship with the EC had evolved substan- to organise, in mid-January 1983 in Aachen, a tially against the background of the change of meeting of “interested” ministers from each political leadership in Russia and of the EC’s of the EC and EFTA countries, plus the Com- programme for the completion of its internal mission. This would have been a symbolic sui market. generis gathering, ostensibly to mark (yet This evolution had been given impetus by again, and rather belatedly) the tenth anni- the various political declarations adopted on versary of the signing of the FTAs. In the end, both sides in the latter half of 1982, in con- owing to the extremely short notice, lack of nection with the tenth anniversary of the adequate preparation and disagreement as to signature of the EC’s Free Trade Agreements the precise format and purpose, the meeting with the EFTA countries.18 Not only did the failed to materialise. EC Council, for the first time, refer publicly The idea, however, remained very much to the “special” nature of the EC’s relations alive. At the EFTA ministerial meetings in with the EFTA countries; it also recognised Bergen in early June 1983 and in Porto in the importance of solidarity and cooperation late November, several ministers expressed between the EC and EFTA in the interests of regret that the proposed “Jumbo” meeting preserving and defending, in an otherwise had not taken place and urged that the idea uncertain and dangerous world, the zone of should continue to be pursued. Early in 1984, monetary and trade stability and security the Swedish EFTA Chairmanship took the

19 Declaration of the EC Council of 20 July 1982; Commission Statement of 22 July 1982 (Commission 18 These celebrations conveniently ignored the fact Press Release IP(82)193); Declaration by the EFTA that the EC-Finland Agreements had been signed only Councils at ministerial level of 8 November 1982 (EFTA in October 1973! Press Release 17/82/F) 13 matter up formally with the French EC Presi- Although the language of the Declaration dency (Swedish Trade Minister Mats Hell- itself carefully avoids any reference to this, ström being one of the strongest supporters the adoption of the Luxembourg Declaration on the EFTA side). This time it was accorded also led to a major upgrading of institutional a more favourable reception and Ministers of links between the EC and EFTA. This was all EC member states and all EFTA member an important breakthrough given the long- countries, plus the Commission, finally met standing EC preference for dealing with EFTA together in Luxembourg on 9 April 1984. at one remove via the seven separate sets of The timing was apposite: the final remaining bilateral Free Trade Agreements; and given tariffs and quantitative restrictions on EC- that a number of EC Member States would EFTA trade in industrial products had been clearly have preferred to keep things that eliminated on 1 January 1984,20 and there way. The EC Treaties, however, allotted the had been time on both sides to flesh out in lead role here to the Commission, which was more concrete terms the political aspirations favourable to closer institutionalised links set out in the various 1982 declarations. The with EFTA. Such links had previously con- Commission, for its part, had proposed to sisted essentially of a brief twice-yearly “tour the Council already in mid-1983 a list of 25 d’horizon” at working level between the sectors deemed suitable for closer coopera- Commission and the EFTA Secretariat. Post tion with the EFTA countries.21 Although this Luxembourg, a new EC-EFTA “High Level had not initially been foreseen, the meeting Contact Group” (consisting of senior officials ended up adopting a major declaration (the from the EFTA countries and the Commis- “Luxembourg Declaration”) laying down sion) was set up to oversee the implementa- “orientations to continue, deepen and ex- tion of the Declaration, meeting for the first tend cooperation within the framework of, time in September 1984 and thereafter twice and beyond, the Free Trade Agreements”.22 yearly. The tradition also became established The Luxembourg Declaration was an im- of an annual meeting, in the margins of the portant new departure in EC-EFTA relations. mid-year EFTA ministerial meeting, between It marked the final acceptance on the EC side the EC’s Commissioner for External Rela- of the notion that the EC and EFTA were part tions and his EFTA Ministerial counterparts. of a single “system of free trade” by laying On the first two such occasions, in Decem- down “the aim of creating a dynamic Euro- ber 1984 and May 1985, the President of the pean economic space”. An explicit link was Commission (Thorn, and subsequently De- created between the improvement of the free lors) also attended. circulation of industrial products between The Luxembourg Declaration marked, at the EC and the EFTA countries and the EC’s the same time, an important watershed in own efforts to strengthen its internal market. Finland’s attitude towards European inte- A major push was given to EC-EFTA coop- gration. This showed itself in her relations eration beyond the framework of the FTAs by both with the EC and with EFTA. agreement in principle on cooperation, con- With regard to the EC, Finland had until sultations, contacts or exchanges of informa- then continued to maintain the line, adopted tion in a whole range of new sectors. Parallel following EFTA’s Vienna Declaration of 1977, steps were taken to strengthen and improve that the bilateral FTAs were the cornerstone of cooperation within EFTA. the relationship. Finnish Foreign Trade Min- ister Jermu Laine23 had not been among those pushing for a “Jumbo” meeting, seemingly preferring still at that stage to stick with the 20 Except, as noted in Chapter I, for certain Finnish bilateral route with pragmatic “add-ons”. import duties. However, as Antti Kuosmanen recounts, Fin- 21 COM (83) 326, 6 June 1983 land now decided, without huge fanfare, to 22 Joint Declaration of the ministerial meeting between the European Community and its Member States and the States of the European Free Trade 23 Laine had taken over the post in May 1983, having Association, Luxembourg, 9 April 1984 (cf. EFTA occupied it already earlier at the time of the signature Bulletin 2/1984, pp. 6-7) of Finland’s FTA with the EC. 14 broaden the room for manoeuvre and to take considerable media coverage in Finland. This a full part in the Luxembourg process.24 This still being early days, however, the media was facilitated by the fact that the latter was “spin” given to the visit emphasised heavily implemented in an informal and pragmatic the purely “economic” and “commercial” fashion without any explicit invocation of nature of the discussions. More significant, the “evolutionary” clauses contained in the perhaps, is the fact that, shortly before the agreements with Finland’s EFTA partners. visit, Secretary A. A. Rannih of the Soviet Henceforth, even though the Joint Commit- embassy was given a personal briefing at the tee of the EC-Finland FTA continued to meet Foreign Ministry on EFTA and EC questions.29 regularly and conduct a substantial amount During the meeting, Rannih indicated that of bilateral business (including on important his authorities saw no problem with the issues like pulp and paper, shipbuilding and Thorn visit. processed agricultural products) almost all The Thorn visit was followed by numer- significant new initiatives in EC-Finland ous other high level exchanges. Competition relations emerged, and in many cases were Commissioner Frans Andriessen visited Fin- managed, via the EC-EFTA conduit. land in May 1983. Commissioners Sutherland Ministerial-level contacts between the (Andriessen’s successor at competition) and EC and Finland became more frequent. Of- De Clercq (external relations) were to do ficials at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had so in, respectively, March and April 1986. for some time been concerned that Finland De Clercq’s visit was also the occasion for was being left behind by her EFTA partners, the signature of an EC-Finland Framework all of whom maintained regular high level Agreement for Scientific and Technical Co- contacts, up to Head of Government level, operation, similar to those that had already with the European Commission.25 This had been signed with several other EFTA coun- prompted, already in late 1980, a personal tries. In the opposite direction, Foreign Trade letter from Foreign Minister Väyrynen to in- Minister Laine visited the Commission in coming Commission President Gaston Thorn May 1984, September 1985 and January 1986. (then still Foreign Minister of Luxembourg)26 Moreover, the Finnish Foreign Trade Min- extending an invitation on behalf of the ister and the EC Commissioner for External Finnish Government to visit Finland in his Relations now sat annually across the table forthcoming new capacity. (Thorn had al- from each other at the Commission/EFTA ready visited Finland in his previous capac- ministerial meeting. There was even at one ity of Prime Minister of Luxembourg).27 The stage a proposal30 that, while in Brussels for a visit finally took place in June 1982.28 Thorn meeting of the Socialist International in April met with President Koivisto, Acting Prime 1985, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa should Minister Pekkala, Foreign Minister Pär Sten- meet informally with Commission Presi- bäck, and other ministers. The visit attracted dent Delors. In the event, seemingly owing to scheduling difficulties, the meeting did not take place; and it was to be another five 24 Kuosmanen, p.4 years before a Finnish Prime Minister (Harri 25 Norway and Sweden had instituted annual Holkeri) was to set foot inside the European ministerial-level consultations with the Commission in 1980. Commission’s headquarters in Brussels.31 26 Letter of 24 October 1980 from FM Väyrynen to FM Thorn (Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland) 29 Memo of 8 June 1982 by Head of the Integration 27 This initiative was strongly supported by the Office Leif Blomqvist (Archives of the Ministry for Finnish Mission to the EC in Brussels in a telegram Foreign Affairs of Finland) of 16 October 1980, which points out that Thorn’s 30 Memo of 7 January 1985 by Head of the Trade Policy predecessor as Commission President, Roy Jenkins, Department Erkki Mäentakanen (Archives of the had visited all EFTA countries except Finland and Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland) Iceland (Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 31 Sorsa did, however, as a member of the Holkeri Finland). Government, become in December 1988 the first 28 Bulletin of the European Communities 6-1982, Finnish Foreign Minister to visit the Commission – see point 2.2.39 below. 15 The Luxembourg Declaration also pro- Another important development was that voked a change in Finland’s relationship to the new Finnish Government that had taken EFTA. The latter had, since its inception, been office at the end of April 1987, under the the central pillar of Finland’s policy towards leadership of Prime Minister Harri Holkeri, Western Europe; and Finland had, for this had launched a review of Finland’s relations reason, always been supportive of efforts to with the EC. Most ministers in the Holkeri strengthen it. The formal distinction between Government were understood to be in favour full EFTA membership and Finland’s associ- of closer relations with the EC, including ate membership had, for most practical pur- Foreign Minister Sorsa and Foreign Trade poses, by this time become largely irrelevant Minister Salolainen. The issue of member- in the day-to-day work of the organisation. ship itself however was seemingly not raised The one exception to this was external rela- within the government, the subject still be- tions, where Finland, as a mere Associate, ing considered at that time, for geopolitical had no speaking rights or decision-making reasons, to be taboo. Both Trade and Industry powers. This became a real problem with the Minister Ilkka Suominen (also then Leader of strengthening of EC-EFTA links now under the Conservative Party) and Paavo Lipponen way. In September 1985 Finland chose to ap- (then out of Government) did, however, ply for full membership of EFTA and acceded speak out publicly in positive terms about to that status on 1 January 1986, simultane- EC membership. The Government White Pa- ously with the departure of Portugal, which per presented to the Finnish Parliament by had become a Member of the EC. Salolainen in November 198833 predictably Further signs of Finland’s evolving policy ruled out the prospect of joining the EC, as towards European integration were its deci- being incompatible with Finland’s policy of sions to join (in 1985) Eureka and (in 1986) neutrality. Significantly, however, it did, on the European Space Agency. While these the other hand, argue for the closest possible two intergovernmental organisations were relationship short of full membership. formally separate from the EC, they were at All this was, moreover, happening at a that time purely Western European in mem- time when Finland’s wider international bership. profile, until then largely based on its role, Such was the state of Finland’s relation- back in the 1970s, in launching the Helsinki ship with the EC at the time of Fielding’s dis- Process, was receiving a major boost. Eco- cussions with Kaarlehto: substantially trans- nomically, Finland was gaining a reputation formed, but still revolving essentially around as the “Nordic Japan”, having become in trade and economic issues. Further major 1988 (before the collapse of its Soviet trade, changes were however already in the air. the devaluation of the Markka and the de- Finland, having now become a full Mem- scent into the Casino Economy) the eighth- ber of EFTA, was about to take over for the first richest country in the world on the basis time the chairmanship of the EFTA Council of World Bank GNP statistics.34 Politically, and was to host in Tampere in June 1988 the the process of post-Cold-War détente had mid-year EFTA Ministerial, together with highlighted the importance of Finland as a the parallel meeting between EFTA Ministers “bridge” between East and West, bringing a and the EC Commissioner for External Rela- string of Western leaders to Helsinki, many tions, Willy De Clercq. This inevitably raised of them to seek President Koivisto’s advice the profile of Finland in Brussels, coming as on how to interpret what was happening in it did at a key juncture in the implementation Gorbachev’s USSR. of the Luxembourg Declaration, and of the EC-EFTA relationship in general (rumours that Austria was considering applying for full 33 EC membership having been confirmed by Finland and the Western European Integration Process (Report to Parliament by the Council of State, Foreign Minister Mock to his EFTA colleagues 1 November 1988) in the margins of Tampere32). 34 Osmo Jussila et al.: From Grand Duchy to a Modern State – A Political History of Finland since 1809 32 Kuosmanen, p. 5 (Hurst, London 1999) Ch. 64, p. 331 16 Against this changing background, Brus- The two main messages exchanged dur- sels began to take a growing interest in Fin- ing the above plethora of high-level political land. One immediately visible result was a contacts were: (on the EC side) that the EC’s sudden surge in the number of visits to the relations with the EFTA countries should, country by high-level Commission personal- for the present, remain firmly based on the ities. The EC’s Internal Market Commissioner, Luxembourg Declaration, any new initia- Lord Cockfield, visited Finland at the end of tives having to wait until such time as the EC January 1988, Industry Commissioner Narjes had completed its own Internal Market pro- in March and Economic and Financial Affairs gramme; and (on the Finnish side) that Fin- Commissioner Christophersen in September, land wanted to develop its relations with the in addition to Commissioner De Clercq’s visit EC via the EC-EFTA framework and was not for the traditional Commission-EFTA meet- (unlike Austria) interested in applying for EC ing in the margins of the EFTA Ministerial in membership. Tampere. The highlight, however, was the By the end of 1988, however, it was be- visit in late July of Commission President coming increasingly clear that, in the new Jacques Delors, the first ever full official visit Europe that was progressively emerging, the to Finland by a President of the Commission. Luxembourg Declaration was no longer a These visits involved extensive discussions viable basis for managing relations between with Finnish counterparts, including Prime the EC and the EFTA countries. Those of us Minister Holkeri, Foreign Minister Kalevi involved sensed that something major and Sorsa, Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen, profound was occurring that was going to Trade and Industry Minister Suominen and have huge and permanent consequences for Finance Minister Erkki Liikanen, as well as the continent on which we lived. None of us, with representatives of Finnish industry and however, realised then just how far and how trades unions. Delors also had discussions fast things would change. with President Koivisto, mainly centring on I had meanwhile moved jobs, just prior East-West relations. to Sorsa’s visit to Brussels, to join the Com- A similar upsurge in contacts occurred mission’s EFTA Division, where I became in the opposite direction. Sorsa visited the responsible inter alia for relations between Commission in December 1988, the first ever the EC and Finland. I thus found myself di- such visit by a Finnish Foreign Minister. The rectly party to most of the above contacts, geopolitical significance of this was certainly both official and other. This was to be the not lost on those concerned in Brussels, and start of several years of intensive first-hand he was received accordingly. Sorsa’s visit involvement with Finland and, more gener- was followed by a number of other minis- ally, with the radical reshaping of the po- terial visits to Brussels in the course of the litical, economic and security architecture following months, including by Salolainen of Europe that was to have such important (who had already visited Brussels shortly af- consequences for Finland’s future. ter taking office) and Liikanen, as well as by Shortly after I took on my new responsi- Foreign Affairs Secretary-General Åke Wih- bilities, a mysterious package was delivered tol. Antti Kuosmanen, working at that time one day to my office (something that would of in Finland’s Mission to the EC, recalls35 that course be inconceivable in today’s security- Brussels “started to become flooded with a conscious climate). It had come from Antti huge variety of visitors from all corners and Kuosmanen at the Finnish Mission. The parcel walks of life in Finland”, wanting to know contained a small selection of books on Fin- more about the EC and Finland’s relations land, written in or translated into the English with it: Members of Parliament, representa- language (of which there were in those days tives of Finnish industry, trade unions, me- very few): works such as Urho Kekkonen’s dia, think-tanks, regional authorities and “A President’s View”, Max Jakobson’s “Myth the like. and Reality” and David Arter’s “Politics and Policy-making in Finland”. My Finnish edu- cation had begun. 35 Kuosmanen, p.5 17 Photo: Guy Fawkes / Flickr.com

III

The European Waiting Room he events leading up to and surround- that the EC should, in return, pursue a “poli- ing the launching, negotiation and con- tique de proximité” making full use of the Tclusion of the European Economic Area methods and instruments available to gener- have been extensively recorded, analysed ate ever closer relations with its neighbours. and commented upon, both by independent The content of Delors’s intervention scholars and by various of the participants in should not have taken anyone that much by these events.36 surprise. As Delors himself said at the time, Delors’s speech of January 1989, in which his remarks were designed to further ad- he set out his thoughts on the possible pa- vance a process of reflection that had already rameters of a broader and deeper coopera- begun. A considerable amount of discreet tion between the EC and the EFTA countries behind-the-scenes brainstorming on pos- has been widely interpreted as a belated (and sible new initiatives had been taking place unsuccessful) attempt to persuade Austria to for several months, involving key players delay its intended application for EC mem- from all parties concerned.40 Even the idea of bership. The reality, as so often in such cases, some sort of new institutional arrangements, was rather more complicated. which many saw as the central feature of De- Certainly, there was considerable reluc- lors’s “proposal”, had been batted back and tance on the EC side to launch negotiations forth in various informal discussions. for a further enlargement a time when the External Relations Commissioner Willy Community was still only part way through De Clercq, until then a firm proponent of the implementation of its Single Market pro- continued pragmatic cooperation under the gramme, and was already in the preliminary Luxembourg process,41 had, at his valedic- stages of a major new initiative in its own tory meeting with EFTA Ministers in Geneva integration process.37 The Commission, for in late November 1988, given a clear signal its part, had already stated very clearly at the that change might now be on the horizon.42 end of April the previous year38 that, until the In offering his thoughts on future prospects end of 1992 – deadline for completion of the – and firmly ruling out any prospect of early internal market –priority should be given to further enlargement – De Clercq had mused the EC’s own further integration, rather than briefly on the different alternatives: associa- to enlargement. No candidate or potential tion, customs union, framework agreement. candidate for membership could therefore “I do not exclude”, he said, “that a new from then on possibly have been under any reflection, both inside EFTA and inside the illusion that their application would lead to Community, about the future of our cooper- early negotiations.39 In the same statement, ation may be useful”. The only warning note moreover, the Commission had also proposed ­ was against rushing ahead too fast (“la fuite en avant”) or ignoring the respective specifi- 36 See in particular Dinkelspiel (2009), Dupont cities of the EC and EFTA. A few days later, in (1998), EFTA (2009), Gstöhl (1996), Hayes (1990), early December, the Rhodes European Coun- Laursen (1995), Norberg (1992), Pedersen (1994), cil stressed the EC’s wish “to strengthen and Sevon (1992), Toledano Laredo (1992) and Wallace expand relations with the EFTA countries”. (1991). De Clercq’s speech aroused considerable 37 The European Council had, at its meeting in interest in EFTA circles, and I and other Com- Hannover in June 1988, invited Delors to chair a group of experts to report on concrete steps to be taken mission officials involved were pressed hard towards economic union. This was the precursor to explain in more detail what it all meant. ­ to one of the two Intergovernmental Conferences launched in December 1990 that culminated in the Maastricht Treaty. 40 Some of these are recounted in Dinkelspiel (2009) 38 Commission Press release MEMO/88/66 of pp. 105-119. 02/05/1988, issued following study seminar at 41 See for example his speech at the College of Bruges Corsendonck of 30 June 1988 (Commission Press Release SPEECH 39 That applied, incidentally, not only to Austria, 88/61) but also to Turkey, which had applied already the 42 Speech by Mr. De Clercq at the Commission/EFTA previous year, and to Norway, rumoured at the time Ministerial Meeting, Geneva, 29 November 1988 be considering a new application. (Commission press release SPEECH/88/96) 19 In fact, at that time, although the Commis- the launching of exploratory talks, at senior sion’s general strategy was clear, there was official level, between the Commission and no fully worked-out proposal within the the EFTA side. Following an interim report Commission – let alone within the EC as a in November by the Commission and further whole. Knowing how difficult it was to get discussion at the December meetings of the major new initiatives of this sort launched European Council and of the EFTA Ministe- through the EC machinery, I indicated rial Council, it was jointly agreed to open for- privately to my EFTA contacts that if they mal negotiations.46 These were subsequently wanted to move forward they might need to launched in June 1990. Hopes thereafter of take the initiative themselves. (We knew that an early conclusion were, however, progres- preparations were already underway for a sively dashed. Summit meeting of EFTA Heads of Govern- Finland had welcomed the concept of the ment, to take place shortly in Oslo.) But the EEA when it was first mooted in 1989. The EFTA side were apparently not ready to do so Delors model appeared “tailor made” for at that stage. Then, a few weeks later, Delors Finland:47 it secured her vital economic in- caught everyone off guard, including many terest of equal treatment on the EC’s Single of his own officials, by seizing the initiative Market without compromising her estab- personally. lished foreign policy position. Finland went What was surprising, therefore, was not on to play an active and central role in the so much the content as the fact that Delors negotiations, particularly during her chair- himself should have taken such a high pro- manship of EFTA in the second half of 1991. file personal initiative, as well as the timing Despite inheriting a negotiation that and the manner of delivery of it.43 Unlike De was by then in serious difficulties, Finland Clercq’s earlier speech, which had been ad- worked hard, under the leadership of min- dressed directly to EFTA Ministers, Delors’s isterial chairman Pertti Salolainen and chief remarks were addressed to the Plenary Ses- negotiator Veli Sundbäck, to bring the ne- sion of the European Parliament, in the form gotiations to a successful conclusion.48 One of a short chapter in a 40-page keynote of the lead EFTA negotiators on the key issue speech on the work programme of the newly of legal and institutional structures was Leif appointed Commission.44 They did not even, Sevón,49 then a senior Finnish Government strictly speaking, constitute a proposal; lawyer. Negotiations on the EFTA Financial merely a series of personal reflections on the Mechanism, another major negotiating issue, possible consequences of pursuing various were led on the EFTA side by Finland’s Am- different future options in EC/EFTA relations. bassador to the EC Erkki Liikanen. Among Delors’s initiative did nevertheless other Finnish officials who played important achieve the effect of moving the process for- roles were Matti Vuoria (competition), Antti ward – and rapidly. EFTA leaders, when they Satuli (services) and Eikka Kosonen (free met in Oslo in mid-March 1989, responded movement of labour). Even if Finnish atti- positively to Delors’s initiative, and declared tudes towards EC membership were by then themselves ready to explore ways and means evolving, particularly in the light of Sweden’s to achieve a more structured partnership.45 application, Finland had no real alterna- A week later, a joint meeting of EC and EFTA tive but to battle on with the EEA, especially Ministers in Brussels gave the green light to given her responsibilities as EFTA Chairman,

43 As has since been revealed, this was at least in part the result of Delors’s discreet behind-the- scenes contacts with his fellow Social Democrats 46 EC Council press release 10949/89 of 19/12/1989 Swedish PM Ingvar Carlsson and Norwegian PM Gro 47 Jakobson, p.106, Lipponen (1994) Harlem Brundtland (Dinkelspiel (2009) pp. 118-119; 48 Sundbäck, The EEA Negotiations – Bumpy Road, Brundtland (p. 14) and Berg (p. 20) in EFTA (2009)). Worth Travelling in EFTA (2009), pp. 26-28 44 Press release SPEECH/89/3 of 17/01/1989 49 Sevón subsequently became a Member of the EU 45 Declaration adopted at the meeting of EFTA Heads Court of Justice, and later the President of the Finnish of Government, Oslo, 14-15 March 1989 Supreme Court. 20 and given that the EC had shown no interest Austrian negotiators, playing on the German in opening negotiations for new accessions.50 initials for the EEA (EWR = Europäischer The Finns nearly succeeded. The “political Wirtschaftsraum), had already early on agreement” that had been reached at an EC- joked that the EEA was really a “European EFTA Ministerial dinner in Luxembourg on Waiting-room” (Europäischer Warteraum). 18 June, under the previous Austrian Presi- I do not share the view of those who argue dency of EFTA, had in practice left a raft of that the EEA initiative in the end backfired important issues unresolved, leading to the on us in that, instead of providing a viable abandonment of plans to initial the text of an medium-term basis for managing our rela- agreement at an EC-EFTA Ministerial meeting tions with the EFTA countries while the EC in Salzburg the following week. However, by sorted out its internal affairs, it served merely 22 October, after a night spent shuttling back to accelerate the pressures for an early further and forth between EC and EFTA ministers, enlargement of the EC. Personally, I think this gathered for the purpose in Luxembourg, the misses the point. The real driver of events was two negotiating teams finally reached agree- the rapidly changing geo-political situation in ment on a draft text. It was subsequently Europe: the fall of the Berlin Wall in November arranged to initial the latter on Monday 18 1989, the reunification of Germany in October November, by which time the EC Court of 1990, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in Justice would – it was confidently expected February 1991 and, finally, the disintegration – have delivered its “green light” to the con- of the USSR itself in December 1991. These cept of a joint EEA Court, a central feature radically altered the balance of options open of the institutional provisions of the draft both to the EC and to the EFTA countries. agreement. A reception was duly planned The prime concern of the EFTA countries, by Ambassador Liikanen to celebrate this. A ever since the publication by the European few days before the planned initialling, how- Commission in June 1985 of its White Paper ever, it became apparent that the Court rul- on the Completion of the Internal Market, had ing was likely to take longer than originally been to preserve their competitive position thought. The reception was postponed. More in the face of the perceived negative effects ominously, it became increasingly clear that for them of this new initiative, in terms both this would not be a mere formality. A mood of market access and of investment flows. By of gloom and foreboding began to descend. 1988, it had become clear to most that, con- Finally, on 14 December came the unhappy trary to the high-flown political rhetoric,52 news that the EC Court of Justice had, con- the pragmatic case-by-case approach of trary to earlier informal soundings, ruled the Luxembourg Process was not up to that that the proposed EEA Court was incompat- task:53 it was, quite simply, what would now- ible with the EC Treaties. It was “back to the adays be described as the wrong “business drawing board”!51 model”. This left the EFTA countries facing A further fifteen months were to pass be- the risk both of economic marginalisation, fore the end result of the negotiations for the by exclusion from the market integration EEA (minus Switzerland) was finally ready process, and of satellisation, by being obliged for signature. By the time that the EEA finally to adjust autonomously to EC Directives and came into force between the EC and the other regulations.­ 54 The comprehensive approach six EFTA countries, on 1 January 1994, nego- tiations were already largely completed for 52 See e.g. the conclusions of the EC-EFTA Ministerial the accession of four of them, Finland among meeting of February 1988 in Brussels and of the June them, to full EC membership (although Nor- 1988 meeting between De Clercq and EFTA Ministers way, once again, did not in the end join); in Tampere 53 Switzerland had applied, but put its applica- See Berg in EFTA (2009), p. 20 and Nell (1990), p. tion on ice after its abortive EEA referendum. 352 54 Dupont (1998) and Nell (1990) both provide excellent and extensive analyses of the perceived 50 See Sundbäck op. cit. and also Koivisto, pp. 230- negative externalities of the Single Market 236 programme for the EFTA countries and of the failure 51 See Liikanen, pp. 56ff. of the Luxembourg process to address them. 21 of the EEA offered by contrast an escape from throughout the process. There was no way marginalisation. Indeed, by extending all four that the EC was ever going to accept the EFTA freedoms of the EC Internal Market to EFTA, position that there had to be a “genuine com- it offered most of the economic advantages of mon decision-making mechanism” whereby membership,55 albeit at a high political price the relevant EC decision-making bodies in terms of loss of regulatory sovereignty. In would be enlarged to nineteen delegations a geopolitical scenario in which accession to for the purpose of taking EEA-wide deci- the EC was excluded, both by the EC and by sions. Difficult though this was for the EFTA most of the EFTA countries themselves, it side to swallow60, it could hardly have been was nevertheless the best available option. a surprise to those with experience of deal- Once however that scenario changed in such ing with the EC. As Antti Kuosmanen rightly a way as to render the option of member- comments61, anything else “would have been ship politically possible, the latter inevitably rather odd”. became the preferred option for most of the Despite not proceeding according to the EFTA countries, since it offered political ad- original script, the EEA initiative did nev- vantages that the EEA could not.56 ertheless, in the end, achieve its primary Scholars have understandably been in- objective of postponing further enlargement trigued by the question of why the EC chose until the Internal Market programme had to “overprice” the EEA57 by insisting on an been completed and the Maastricht Treaty institutional structure that effectively satel- was in force. Moreover, the considerable in- lised its EFTA partners.58 (The fact that they vestment of ministerial and official time and were allowed to participate extensively in the effort involved in negotiating the EEA did not “decision-shaping” phase may have sugared go to waste. The EEA provided an important the pill, but did not change that harsh reality.) safety net for the EFTA countries, both for To understand this, once has to go back once those who had not applied for membership again to the failure of the Maudling Plan in and, pending the final ratification of the the 1950s. Then, as later, it was, quite simply, outcome (including of their own national politically unthinkable that the EC should, at referenda), for those, like Finland, that had. the risk of diluting its own purpose, re-write It also constituted a valuable advance down its founding Treaties so as to “nest” itself in a payment in the context of the subsequent vast Western European free trade area. accession negotiations, shortening them by The EC had, in its relations with the EFTA several months, since a large part of the EC countries, consistently insisted on respect acquis had already been examined and agreed for EC autonomy. This was later refined into to by the candidates, who had also as a result the three “Interlaken Principles”59 (EC in- become already familiar with the EC’s legis- tegration comes first; EC decision-making lative and institutional architecture. autonomy must be preserved; balance be- When historians come in due course to tween benefits and obligations). These were write the full history of this period, the EEA all the more important at a time when the EC initiative will, I am sure, be seen as an im- was in the process of moving, via the nego- portant transitional step in the post-Cold tiation of the Maastricht Treaty, to an even War restructuring of the geo-political archi- higher level of integration; and we had made tecture of Europe; and, no doubt, also as the clear, already early on during the exploratory final, belated chapter in the long saga of the talks, that the EEA too must allow each side Maudling Plan. to preserve its decision-making autonomy

55 Baldwin (1992), Flam (1995) 56 Baldwin, op. cit. 57 e.g. Dupont (1998) and Laursen (1995) 58 Reymond (1993) 60 An EFTA contact of mine exclaimed at one point in 59 so called because they figured prominently in De exasperation “you have to understand that EFTA is Clercq’s intervention at his May 1987 meeting in not an infectious disease!” Interlaken with EFTA Ministers 61 Kuosmanen, p.7 22 Photo: Wikimedia Commons

IV

THE DAM BURSTS he tabling, in July 1989, of Austria’s ­occasions, effectively endorse the Commis- membership application, unwelcome sion’s concept of a strengthened politique de Tthough it was from the EC’s point of proximité, starting with the Rhodes conclu- view, did not in itself change very much at sion in December 1988 that “the Community the time. Austrian intentions had been evi- wishes to strengthen and to expand relations dent for many months, so it was hardly a sur- with EFTA countries and all other European prise. Moreover, the next steps were entirely nations which share the same ideals and ob- in the hands of the EC, for whom further jectives”. enlargement was not at that stage a priority By the time of Austria’s application, the – indeed, as we have seen, quite the opposite. Commission and the Member States were, in The Commission, prompted initially by any event, much more concerned about, and Turkey’s application for membership in April focussed on, what was happening elsewhere 1987, and the prospect of applications from in Europe. Poland and Hungary had seized Cyprus and Malta, as well as of that of Aus- the opportunity presented by Gorbachev’s tria, had launched a major internal reflec- reforms in the USSR to launch their own tion on the question of the future widening processes of economic and political reform, and deepening of the EC (under the French leading the G7, at its Paris Summit the day title “approfondissement/élargissement”), before Austria’s application, to set up the culminating in a reflection seminar at Cors- Group of 24 to coordinate Western aid to endonck Priory62 in late April 1988. After these two countries. The Commission was, reviewing the EC’s relations with the EFTA at President’s Bush’s suggestion, appointed countries and the EC’s Mediterranean neigh- overall coordinator for the G-24. In late Au- bours, the Commission had, as mentioned gust, Hungary opened its border with Aus- already in Chapter III, concluded that “as tria. Czechoslovakia followed suit on 3 No- regards the dialectic between enlargement vember. The subsequent massive flux of East and building on existing structures, the Germans to the West via these two countries Commission takes the view that, between led to the sudden implosion of the GDR, now and the end of 1992 – the deadline for which was forced, on 9 November, to throw completion of the internal market – priority open the Berlin Wall, leading less than a year must be given to the latter”.63 It was noted later to the re-unification of Germany, with that, in practice, even if Austria were to ap- all its ramifications for the EC. By the end of ply in 1989, as many in Austria were now 1989, all of the USSR’s Warsaw Pact allies had urging, accession was most unlikely to take deposed their Communist governments and place before the end of 1992; and, in any the two super-powers had officially declared event, the Austrian Government was at that the Cold War to be over. time still hesitating because of concerns over Moreover, less than a month before Aus- Soviet opposition. The Commission’s Cors- tria’s application, the European Council, at endonck line was not at the time formally its meeting in Madrid, had decided, on the endorsed by the Council. Indeed, the issue of basis of the Report of the Delors Commit- enlargement was not even addressed by the tee, to launch the first stage of Economic Council (other than for the purely procedural and Monetary Union, as well as preparations purpose of requesting the Commission to de- for the convening the following year of an liver its Opinion on the various applications Intergovernmental Conference to prepare submitted) until over two and a half years the subsequent stages. The December 1989 later, at the Maastricht European Council of European Council in Strasbourg confirmed December 1991. There was no real pressure, that the IGC, which would be charged with however, for any other course of action; preparing the necessary Treaty amendments and the European Council did, on numerous for the final stages of EMU, would meet not later than the second half of 1990. No-one 62 A retreat hotel in the Belgian countryside near was in any mood to be distracted from this Turnhout task by negotiations for a new enlargement 63 Commission Press Release MEMO/88/66 of 2 May of the EC. 1988 24 A few days after the European Council’s only in the Directorate General for External meeting in Strasbourg, the Commission de- Relations, but also in many “internal” DGs livered its Opinion64 on Turkey’s membership such as Internal Market, Competition, Ag- application of two years earlier. The Opinion riculture, Transport, Research and Devel- was firmly against opening negotiations for opment, Fisheries, Financial Institutions, the present. This was not only because of Customs Union and Education. Indeed, with considerations relating to the economic and the EFTA countries, we were now operating political situation in Turkey, but above all be- simultaneously at three levels: bilaterally cause “the Commission is of the opinion that through the separate Free Trade Agreements; it would be inappropriate for the Community collectively through the implementation – which is itself undergoing major changes of the Luxembourg Declaration; and, again while the whole of Europe is in a state of flux collectively, in negotiations for the EEA. – to become involved in new accession ne- There was understandably little enthusiasm gotiations”. At another point in the text, the for committing yet further resources from Commission re-states its view that it would all these services to the drafting of a Com- be unwise to envisage the EC becoming in- mission Opinion on Austria’s membership volved in any new accession negotiations application (nor in due course of those on before 1993 at the earliest, “apart from ex- Malta and Cyprus). Nor was the Commission ceptional circumstances”. The Council duly under any particular pressure to do so. The “took note” of the Commission’s Opinion. Member States, having passed the ball to the As a result of the economic and political Commission, by launching the procedures upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe, provided for in the EC Treaties, were clearly the strengthened politique de proximité in no hurry to see the matter land back on the pursued by the Commission in line with its table of the Council. There was thus, as far as Corsendonck philosophy had, by early 1990, the Commission was concerned, no urgency. become a three-pronged strategy, consisting In September 1990, some fourteen months of: after the tabling of Austria’s application, we were still at the stage of technical contacts • exploratory conversations with with the Austrian authorities to obtain the the EFTA countries with a view to the information needed by the Commission to creation of a European Economic Area, draw up its Opinion.65 Even the Austrians based on the four freedoms of the EC must have realised, from the language of the Internal Market; Commission’s Opinion on Turkey’s applica- • efforts to achieve closer relations tion, that the earlier a Commission Opinion with Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, on the on Austria was delivered, the more negative basis of the already existing Association it was likely to be. Agreements with those countries; At that stage, of course, we were not • development of closer relations expecting any other membership applica- with the former Communist countries tions (other than those of Cyprus and Malta, of Central and Eastern Europe, initially which had been duly delivered in July 1990). via Trade and Economic Cooperation Finland and Sweden had both explicitly ruled Agreements and subsequently via the out the possibility of EC membership, on the conclusion of Europe Agreements grounds that it was incompatible with their holding out the prospect of eventual EC respective policies of neutrality. Norway, membership. while remaining a possible applicant, was on our analysis unlikely, given the current The implementation of this triple policy state of Norwegian public opinion and the involved a considerable commitment of re- divisions within the ruling Social Democrat sources on the part of the Commission, not party, to consider an application before the next general election, due in 1993. Iceland 64 Commission Opinion on Turkey’s Request for Accession to the Community, SEC (89) 2290 final/2 of 65 See Commission reply to Written Question (1990) 20 December 1989 1691 from Mr. Pisoni 25 and Switzerland had never indicated any in- aware that this was, in many cases, several terest in possible membership. steps ahead of the official government line. Meanwhile, within the EC, the process of We perused, like old-style Kremlinologists, laying the ground for what was to become every significant utterance by anyone in any the Maastricht Treaty on European Union position of power or influence, looking for was continuing apace. President Mitterrand subtle changes of emphasis or vocabulary. and Chancellor Kohl had tabled in early 1990 The EC was now of necessity forced into a joint proposal for the creation of a Politi- a serious internal reflection as to the best cal Union. This had been discussed, together strategy to follow with regard to the spate with a Belgian paper on the same subject, at of applications now in prospect. This was no a special meeting of the European Council easy task, given the very divergent views that in Dublin on 28 April. This led to a decision, then existed on the subject, not only as be- at the June European Council meeting, to tween the different Member States, but also convene an additional Intergovernmental within the Commission itself. Matters were Conference, on the subject of Political Union, further complicated by the uncertainty then which was to meet on 14 December, the day still prevailing about the likely final outcome after first meeting of the IGC on EMU that of the two Intergovernmental Conferences. had already been convened on the basis of There was a strong school of thought (to which the Report of the Delors Committee. The two both Delors and External Relations Commis- IGCs were instructed to conclude their work sioner Frans Andriessen then subscribed, rapidly, with the objective of ratification of as well as many in the European Parliament the result by Member States before the end and a number of Member States) arguing that of 1992. All the more reason therefore to keep changes to the EC’s decision-making institu- the process of drafting an Opinion on Aus- tions (involving in particular more qualified tria’s application, for the time being, on the majority voting) were necessary before any back burner. new members could be admitted. Others Our peace of mind (such as it was) was, (including, at a later stage, albeit somewhat however, to be brutally shattered in the reluctantly, Delors and Andriessen66) consid- autumn of 1990, even before the two IGCs ered that one could possibly envisage admit- had met. On 26 October, only four months ting one or two additional members within after the opening of formal negotiations for the existing institutional structures once the the EEA, and just three weeks after the re- Single Market programme was completed. unification of Germany, the Swedish Gov- There were, in addition, some of course who ernment, under pressure from the opposi- saw enlargement as a way of preventing, or tion parties and Swedish industry, and faced at least postponing, further internal integra- with a domestic economic crisis, announced tion. On one point, however, all sides were to the Riksdag – in a major policy U-turn – agreed: namely that it would be at least a that it would seek a parliamentary decision decade before membership for the newly “clarifying Sweden’s ambitions to become a emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Member of the European Community”. On Europe could be contemplated.67 As so often 2 December, the Riksdag voted by an over- in such situations, it was left to the Commis- whelming majority to apply for membership sion to take the lead. of the European Community “with the re- Given the limited staff resources available, tention of neutrality”. and the pressures already put on them by the From that point on, a flood of applications EEA negotiations, then in full swing, work from most if not all remaining EFTA countries was accelerated within the Commission on seemed inevitable. It was no longer a question the Opinion on Austria, in order to be ready of whether, but simply one of when. It was clear that the EEA could not now, for most 66 See e.g. Liikanen, pp. 49-50 EFTA countries, be more than a short term 67 Erkki Liikanen’s diary illustrates well the divergence holding operation. We began to monitor ever and progressive evolution over this period of the more closely the state of the membership de- views of the key protagonists on the EC side bate in each of the EFTA countries, being well (See Liikanen, passim) 26 to deal with Sweden’s application when it the need formally to take note of the Opin- arrived.68 By the time the latter was tabled, ion. August was dominated by the attempted on 1 July 1991, the same day as the formal dis- coup against Gorbachev and the declarations solution of the Warsaw Pact, the Opinion on of independence of Estonia and Latvia. By the Austria was almost finalised, being formally autumn, attention was focussed once again adopted by the Commission just one month on the crucial “final” stages of the EEA ne- later. In delivering its Opinion on Austria, gotiations while, within my Unit, work was the Commission was obliged in addition to already well under way on the Opinion on address both the difficult and sensitive issue Sweden. of neutrality69 and the institutional question. In December 1991, at the European Council The Foreword to the Opinion70 restated the meeting in Maastricht, where political agree- now well-known Commission line that no ment was finally reached on the draft Treaty negotiations on a fresh enlargement should on European Union,71 the Member States at be initiated before 1 January 1993. We went last got round to collectively addressing the on to say that, once that date was passed, issue of enlargement. There were by then five the EC “should be ready and willing to open applications on the table, two of them from negotiations with applicant countries meet- members of EFTA. The Swiss Federal Council ing the economic and political conditions had, on 22 October, declared (without indi- for accession”. Such negotiations would, cating any timetable) that EC membership we said, have to take as their basis the Com- should constitute the aim of Switzerland’s munity rules and structures emerging from European integration policy. In Finland, the the two IGCs. Furthermore, enlargements of recently appointed Aho Government had the Community “will entail, when the time announced already in September that it was comes, institutional adjustments according studying the implications of EC membership. to the nature and number of the accession”. It was also clear that most, if not all, of the Not knowing at that stage what the final Central and Eastern European countries saw contents of the Maastricht Treaty would be, their long term future as being within the there was probably not a lot more that the EU (as it was now about to become). We had Commission could have said. already negotiated Europe Agreements with Significantly, while the Opinion was gen- Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. erally referred to as being “favourable”, the While there was general agreement that Commission did not actually recommend the no negotiations for new accessions should opening of negotiations with Austria. We did, begin before 1993, there remained deep disa- it is true, conclude that, on the basis of the greements as to how far further institutional economic considerations, the EC should ac- change (beyond that agreed in the Maastricht cept Austria’s application; but we went on to Treaty) should be a prerequisite. Some argued say that Austria’s permanent neutrality cre- that the EC should indicate readiness to open ated problems for both the EC and Austria. negotiations only with Austria and Sweden However, by delivering its Opinion at the (the two EFTA countries that had by then ap- beginning of the Brussels summer break, the plied), although it would have been odd for Commission ensured minimum public pro- such a decision to be taken in the absence of file for its position. The Council, whose last the Commission’s Opinion on Sweden. There meeting before the summer had taken place have always been suspicions that the two ap- two days earlier, was conveniently spared plicants themselves pushed for this. Sweden certainly had good reason to do so. Con- stitutional changes had normally to be ap- 68 My small Unit in DG External Relations was proved by two successive Parliaments, with responsible for drafting all the Opinions on the a general election taking place in between. EFTA applicants, on the basis of contributions The next Swedish general elections were due from the “technical” services responsible for the different policy areas. I was in addition one of the to take place in September 1994. The Swedish­ Commission’s EEA negotiators. 69 See Chapter V below 71 Presidency Conclusions following the European 70 SEC (91) 1590 of 01/08/1991 Council meeting in Maastricht, 9/10 December 1991 27 Government was thus anxious to open ne- of enlargement there would now be; who gotiations, if at all possible, already in the would be in the first wave; whether the ob- course of 1992, with a view to completing jective should be to complete negotiations them by the end of 1993, so that the result in time for the first wave to enter before the could be submitted to the Riksdag for the new IGC now foreseen for 1996, or whether first time before the elections, with a further on the contrary the IGC should be limited to submission thereafter, paving the way for the present Member States, with new Mem- membership as of 1 January 1995. Sweden’s bers joining only thereafter, on the basis of chief ministerial negotiator, Ulf Dinkelspiel, revised institutional provisions. Above all, claims however that the idea came from the there was a growing conviction among po- EC side and that Sweden, on the contrary, tential applicants – politically inconvenient wanted any negotiations to include Finland though this was for Norway – that, to be in and Norway and hoped that they would ap- the first wave, it would be necessary to have ply.72 put in a formal application before Lisbon. What is undeniable on the other hand is While no such deadline was ever formally that, from Maastricht onwards, the Swedes mentioned, strong encouragement had been strove hard to launch what were effectively given informally from several quarters to po- “pre-negotiations” with the Commission’s tential applicants not to leave it too long.75 services.73 We were not in favour of this, as it Within the Commission, we were con- risked pre-empting decisions still to be taken vinced that the Swedish application would, by the EC machinery. We did, however, sooner or later, provoke an application in the end accept, after the adoption of the from Finland even though, at the time of Commission’s Opinion, a series of low-level, the Maastricht European Council, the of- low-key contacts of a “clarificatory” nature. ficial position of the Finnish Government Given the divergences of view, the Maas- was still that membership was incompatible tricht European Council limited itself to with Finland’s policy of neutrality. This mes- “noting” that negotiations for accession to sage had been conveyed to us on numerous the EU on the basis of the new Maastricht occasions, most notably during the visits of Treaty could start as soon as the EC had ter- PM Holkeri to the Commission in May 1990 minated its negotiations on Own Resources and of Commission Vice-President Andries- and related issues (the so-called Delors II sen to Helsinki in April 1991. (I was present package) in 1992. This effectively endorsed on both occasions.) Those of us close to the the Commission line that no negotiations dossier had, however, known since the late should begin before the beginning of 1993.74 1980s, from personal contacts with academ- Heads of State and Government declined ics, political commentators, Members of however to address the wider institutional Parliament and business leaders in Finland, issues. It was simply noted that “a number of that there were even then those who saw EC European countries have submitted applica- membership as possible and even desirable, tions or announced their intention of seeking even though public debate was at that time membership”. The ball was instead passed firmly discouraged. We were therefore not to the Commission, which was invited to altogether surprised when, after the March produce, in time for the June 1992 European 1991 Finnish general elections, more public Council in Lisbon, a report on “these ques- signs of a shift in political opinion began to tions including the implications for the Un- appear. The day after leaving government, ion’s future development”. former Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio stated These conclusions inevitably gave rise to openly that Finland should be prepared to intense speculation about how many waves apply for EC membership, a view he con- tinued to promote as Chairman of the in- fluential Foreign Affairs Committee of the 72 Dinkelspiel, p. 202 73 Ibid., p. 213 74 Maastricht was not due to enter into force until 75 Erkki Liikanen refers (Liikanen p. 51) to the “friendly 1 January 1993 at the earliest (Treaty on European advice” given by Frans Andriessen already in late Union, Article R, paragraph 2) September 1991 28 Eduskunta.76­ In late August, just after the was against EC membership.78 The Govern- failed coup against Gorbachev, Foreign Trade ment nevertheless decided to set up a work- Minister Pertti Salolainen (by then also Lead- ing party, under the chairmanship of Foreign er of the Conservatives) said that the Govern- Ministry State Secretary Martti Ahtisaari, to ment should increase its readiness to apply if study the effects of possible EC membership necessary for EC membership. Brussels began and report back by the end of the year. to sit up and take notice. We scrutinised with Aho’s discussions with Delors in Brussels a hair-toothed comb every public utterance, on 16 September confirmed our impression or leaked comment, by any member of Fin- that Finland was indeed now moving ir- land’s political elite. It was not an easy task, revocably towards applying for membership, given that the Commission did not in those but gave no firm indication as to the timing. days have a diplomatic mission in Helsinki, Delors, for his part, refused to be drawn on and given that none of us understood Finnish the question of a possible deadline by which (although the Desk Officer responsible in my applications had to be lodged in order to be in Unit fortunately spoke Swedish). We were the first wave of new accessions. Within a few consequently heavily reliant on the good of- weeks, however, the likely scenario on the fices of the Finnish Mission in Brussels and Finnish side gradually became apparent: ta- on the occasional tip-off from those Member bling early in January of a government report States that maintained substantial diplomatic on the pros and cons of membership, leading missions in Helsinki. to a formal decision to apply for membership We paid, of course, particular attention to not later than March or April. This prospect, the periodic – and often somewhat Delphic combined with the earlier Swiss declaration – pronouncements of President Koivisto, that it considered the EEA as only a transi- given his commanding role in the process. tional stage towards the objective of full EC The fact that Koivisto, following the Swedish membership, made it increasingly difficult Government’s U-turn in October 1990, had for those who wanted the Maastricht Eu- made no further public statements about the ropean Council to give a green light to the incompatibility of Finnish neutrality with opening of negotiations only with Austria EC membership was carefully noted. (We and Sweden. The end result (see above) was, now know that he sought – unsuccessfully however, by no means a foregone conclusion. – to persuade PM Holkeri to be similarly cau- Immediately after the New Year, the Com- tious.77) Koivisto’s speeches on the occasion mission set to work to draft its report for the of the opening of the new Parliament and on Lisbon European Council. This was a major the occasion of the swearing in of the new collegiate effort, based on in-depth studies Government in late April 1991 were notable of each of the applicant or potential applicant for not ruling out the possibility of eventual countries, spearheaded by a Task Force spe- EC membership. The Finnish position was cially set up for the purpose under the overall clearly evolving. leadership of Vice-President Frans Andries- That autumn, following the tabling of sen, and involving substantial contributions Sweden’s membership application and in the from almost every Commission department. run-up to the Prime Minister Aho’s visit to Meanwhile, in parallel, work continued on Brussels that September, the Finnish Gov- the preparation of the Commission’s Opin- ernment began to take a visibly more open ion on Sweden’s application, and we fol- position on the possible options. Aho’s posi- lowed closely developments in Finland and tion was, as we were well aware, a delicate Switzerland, in the firm expectation that one, since a majority of his own Centre Party both of these countries would lodge their ap- plications before Lisbon. In both cases, what mattered was not so much the fact of the

78 The most that they were prepared to concede, in a series of major meetings around the country in early 76 The Finnish Parliament 1992, was that he should check the terms on which 77 Koivisto, p. 230 the EC might be prepared to admit Finland. 29 application – by now regarded as a foregone the procedure of two hearings separated by a conclusion – as what was said in the process Parliamentary general election. by the key political actors involved, especial- This latter aspect touched on an impor- ly on the difficult and controversial question tant issue of timing. In Finland, as in Swe- of neutrality. den, constitutional changes had normally to In his speech at the opening of the opening be approved by two successive Parliaments, of the Parliamentary session on 7 February with a general election taking place in be- 1992, President Koivisto effectively gave his tween. For Finland, however, as Jaakko public backing for the first time to an applica- Kalela had explained to me shortly before the tion for EC membership. (The Government’s Eduskunta vote, the constitutional timing communication of early January on the pros was somewhat different. The next Finnish and cons of membership had not taken a po- general elections were not due until March sition for or against.) This opened the way for 1995. Thus, if the normal rule of submission the Government’s subsequent decision of 27 to two subsequent Parliaments were to be February to apply, subject to Parliamentary followed, this would tend to favour 1 Janu- approval, for membership of the EC. The text ary 1996 as the preferred date of accession of the decision flagged clearly Finland’s main (rather than 1 January 1995 as dictated by future negotiating objectives as regards de- the Swedish timetable). However, since the fence policy, agriculture, regional policy and Finnish Constitution also allowed such mat- the status of Åland. The proposal was tabled ters to be decided in a single Parliament by a in Parliament on 5 March and voted on 18 5/6 majority (rather than the 2/3 required in March. Brussels had meanwhile been del- the case of double submission), Finland could uged with a raft of visitors from Helsinki, all in the last resort be quite flexible on the mat- seeking in their different ways to check out ter of timing.79 the EC position or to explain that of Finland. Following the Parliamentary vote of 18 These included Ministers Ole Norrback, Eeva March, Finland’s application for EC acces- Kuuskoski and Martti Pura, Opposition MPs sion, signed by the President of the Republic Ulf Sundqvist and Paavo Lipponen, Presi- and the Prime Minister, was handed over at dential advisor Jaakko Kalela and Prime- official level in Brussels later the same day. Ministerial advisor Seppo Härkönen. The text was formally handed over a few days Explaining the Finnish Parliament’s vote later by PM Aho to Portuguese Prime Minis- of 18 March to my superiors in Brussels was ter Cavaco Silva, in his capacity as President not an easy matter, since the final vote had of the European Council. This was rapidly involved a choice between two motions, followed up by a further visit to Brussels by both of which were in favour of member- Aho on 1 April for discussions with Delors ship! The real test of MPs views on member- and with Council Secretary-General Niels ship had in fact been the intermediate “free” Ersbøll.80 Delors stressed the need for new vote between the Social Democrats motion Member States to take on board the whole in favour of accession and the Union of the of the future CFSP, including the eventual Left’s motion against. This had demonstrated framing of a common defence policy which clearly the split views of the Centre Party, the might in time lead to a common defence. He Greens, the Swedish People’s Party and the also reassured Aho that, as far as enlargement Christian League, as well as the outright op- was concerned, Finland was now in the same position of the Union of the Left and the Rural group as Austria and Sweden. Aho stressed Party. Even with the application of party dis- the issues of agriculture and regional policy. cipline in the final vote, however, the num- As presaged already in President Koivis- ber of abstentions and absentees was such to’s speech to the Parliament of 7 February, that the total number of MPs voting in favour Finland’s application was, like the earlier of accession was a few short of the 5/6 ma- jority which (it was then assumed) would be 79 As we shall see in Chapter XII below, views required to ratify the constitutional changes were later to evolve as regards the constitutional implied by EC accession without recourse to requirements for ratification. 80 Liikanen p. 84 30 Swedish application, drafted in the “short” that an application for EC membership by form, i.e. without any reservations regarding Switzerland was imminent. Luckily, work neutrality or any other matters. While this was by now already well advanced on the was naturally well received in Brussels, the Opinion on Sweden. handling of the application did, neverthe- The preparation of the Opinion on Finland less, give rise to some discussion when the brought me back almost full time to rela- matter arrived on the table of Member State tions with Finland for the first time since the Ambassadors in COREPER.81 This was the first launch of the EEA negotiations. This began, membership application to be received since appropriately enough, with an invitation to the signature in February that year of the join a group of senior Finnish officials and Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Some industrialists in Lapland over the Easter holi- Member States felt that, even though the day for a week of informal discussions, in- Treaty was not yet ratified and in force, the terspersed with the inevitable cross-country letter of acknowledgement to Finland should skiing and sauna sessions. The first few days draw attention to the fact that membership were spent at the Outokumpu lodge in Levi, would henceforth be to the European Union and the remaining days in Saariselkä. Among and no longer to the three separate European the senior officials in the group were sev- Communities (EEC, ECSC and Euratom).82 eral key players I knew already, such as Veli The matter was referred up to the Council of Sundbäck, Erkki Liikanen and Antti Satuli, Ministers, which referred it back to COREP- as well as others, like Esa Härmälä and Jarmo ER. The latter finally decided not to include Vaittinen, who were to become regular con- a formal reference in the official letter of ac- tacts in the period ahead. Among the senior knowledgement, but to draw the attention industrialists present, in addition to our two of the Finnish authorities orally to this new hosts, Jyrki Juusela and Eino Mantere, were element when handing over the EC reply. KOP Chairman Pertti Voutilainen and metal The Council had decided already on 6 industry chief Harri Malmberg. It was my April to set in hand the procedures foreseen first taste of Lapland life and, since I had nev- by the EC Treaties, the first stage of which er skied before, a further important chapter was the production by the Commission of in my Finnish education. its Opinion on Finland’s application. In line While in Saariselkä, I had the opportu- with previous practice, the Commission nity to meet briefly with Prime Minister formally established on 22 April an inter- Aho, Deputy Prime Minister Pertti Salolainen service group, bringing together representa- and other senior Finnish ministers, who like tives of most Commission services under the most of the rest of the Finnish élite, were chairmanship of the Directorate-General gathered there for the Easter weekend. I was, for External Relations, with my Unit play- and remain still today, amazed and deeply ing the key coordinating role. The group was impressed that such a gathering could take tasked with gathering all the information place. In any other European country it and documentation necessary to enable the would, even then, have been firmly ruled out Commission to evaluate the consequences by security considerations. It is a remarkable and implications of Finland’s accession, both statement on the nature of Finnish society, for the Community and for Finland. The first of which I was to come across many other meeting was held already on 29 April. Given examples. the time-frame set by the Maastricht Euro- Meanwhile, work continued on the Com- pean Council, we knew that the Opinion on mission’s Lisbon report.83 This was not limit- Finland would have to be produced within ed just to the implications of accession by the a very short period. We were also conscious EFTA applicants (who by the time the report was finalised included not only Finland but 81 The French acronym by which the Committee of Permanent Representatives (i.e. the Member States’ Ambassadors to the EU) charged with preparing 83 Commission of the European Communities: Europe meetings of the EU Council is generally known. and the Challenge of Enlargement (Bulletin of the 82 Article O of the Treaty on European Union European Communities, Supplement 3/92) 31 also Switzerland84) but set out, over and above On the one hand, there was no possible ob- this, the Commission’s views on the wider jective basis for discriminating between the challenge posed in the medium term by the different EFTA applicants in terms of their possible enlargement of the EU to twenty, acceptability as candidates. On the other thirty or more members. The latter, however, hand, the longer the opening of negotia- need not concern us here, other than to note tions with the EFTA applicants was delayed, that the Commission made a clear distinction the longer the list of applicant countries was between, on the one hand, those countries bound to become, and the more politically (EFTA candidates and – possibly – Cyprus difficult it would be to limit negotiations to and Malta) who could adopt the EU system the EFTA countries alone. But extending the without a period of preparation and with list would have involved extremely difficult whom early negotiations could be launched decisions of selection and timing. The idea with a view to simultaneous accession; and, that the EU could rapidly negotiate the ac- on the other hand, those (Turkey, the coun- cession of those EFTA candidates wishing to tries of Central and Eastern Europe and of join, and postpone all other accessions to a the Western Balkans) who were not yet in a future wave several years down the line, was position to take on the obligations of mem- therefore a seductive one. It implied, howev- bership and with whom negotiations, if and er, accepting that the EFTA applicants could when they manifested themselves as can- in principle join the EU prior to the Intergov- didates (as Turkey had already done), could ernmental Conference on the revision of the be envisaged only at a much later date. The EU’s institutional structures that, under the Commission also expressed the view that, for Treaty of Maastricht, was due to be convened a limited number of new members, bringing in 1996. the total up to less than twenty, institutional The Lisbon European Council of 26/27 adaptations could be limited to those tradi- June 1992 was a crucial watershed on the tionally included in treaties of accession. path to EU membership for Finland and the This was, on the face of it, a significant other EFTA applicants. Despite the genu- step back from the more restrictive posi- ine concerns that remained on the EC side tions earlier taken by Andriessen and Delors. about the possible negative consequences Underlying it, however, was the recogni- of neutrality for the future CFSP and about tion that the parameters of the exercise had the need for institutional reform within the meanwhile changed irrevocably. The disin- future EU,85 the Heads of State and Govern- tegration of the USSR at the end of the pre- ment unequivocally confirmed their readi- vious year and the break-up of Yugoslavia ness to open enlargement negotiations, with meant that we were now facing the very real a view to early conclusion, with those EFTA possibility of a future EU consisting of 20, countries seeking membership of the EU. The 30 or more members. By the time of Lisbon, EC institutions were invited to speed up the there were already 7 applications on the ta- preparatory work, including the preparation ble. Like it or not, we were now forced to face before the December European Council in the question of “organising the queue” in a Edinburgh of the Union’s general negotiat- manner that would ensure that enlargement ing framework. Official negotiations were to did not come at the expense of deepening. At be opened immediately after the ratification the same time, we had also to consider the of the Maastricht Treaty and the agreement broader questions of European architecture, on the Delors-II Package, and were, to the taking account of the EC’s relations with its extent possible, to be conducted in paral- European neighbours, and the need to devel- lel, while dealing with each candidate on its op these relations during the (in some cases own merit. In other words, the field was now possibly very long) period before accession open for all EFTA countries to participate in a could become a realistic possibility. We were first wave of EU enlargement, which would caught between the two horns of a dilemma. 85 See e.g. Benelux Memorandum on the Decisions 84 Switzerland had submitted her application for EC to be taken regarding EU Enlargement (Europe membership on 20 May Documents, Agence Europe, Brussels, June 1992) 32 moreover take place on the basis of the exist- finally adopted on 4 November, the content ing EU institutional framework, even if the of Koivisto’s discussions with Delors, as well precise timing for the opening of negotia- as of his lecture the previous day to the Col- tions was now somewhat put in question by lege of Europe in Bruges.88 the negative result of Denmark’s referendum President Koivisto’s visit to the Commis- on the Maastricht Treaty earlier that month. sion on 29 October was a symbolically im- Shortly after the Lisbon European Coun- portant one, not only because of the essential cil, Delors and Andriessen were in Helsinki messages he was able to convey in relation for the CSCE Summit. On 10 July they met to Finland’s application for EC membership, with both Koivisto and Aho. Koivisto con- but also because it was the first ever such vis- firmed once again that, as regards foreign it by a Finnish President. Following on from and security policy, Finland, once she was a the visits to Brussels of Sorsa in December member, would respect all her obligations.86 1988, of Holkeri in May 1990 and of Aho in On 31 July the Commission delivered its April 1992, it sent a clear signal that the re- Opinion on Sweden’s application.87 On the lationship was now being notched up to the strength of the Commission’s Lisbon report, very highest level. Koivisto used the oppor- and the European Council’s conclusions, we tunity to stress once again that Finland, as an recommended that negotiations be opened EU Member State, would live fully up to her with Sweden in accordance with the Lisbon obligations under the CFSP, and would not timetable. This now left us free to concentrate be an obstacle to any arrangement decided more fully on the preparation of the Opin- in common.89 He was accompanied to Brus- ion on Finland, where we were already un- sels by Pertti Salolainen and Paavo Väyrynen, der great time pressure. The UK Presidency who had useful side meetings with Andries- wanted us to deliver the Opinion by the end sen and Commissioner Bruce Millan (respon- of September, so that it could be considered sible for Regional Policy). This being now the by the General Affairs Council at its meeting third meeting between Koivisto and Delors, of 5 October, in parallel with the preparation it added also to the growing personal chem- of the EC’s general negotiating framework istry between these two remarkable leaders. for the accession negotiations. (The press I had by this time already been nominated release of the Council meeting of 20 July had (subject to the agrément of the Finnish au- incorrectly recorded Andriessen as having thorities) to become the European Commis- promised to do this.) Logistically, this was sion’s first Head of Delegation to Finland. a virtually impossible deadline, given the While this was not strictly in accordance need for me and my desk officer Jorge Bento with the dictates of diplomatic protocol, Silva to conduct a final “round-up” mission Erkki Liikanen seized the opportunity to to Finland (including Åland) after the sum- introduce me in that capacity to President mer break and the need to get the final text Koivisto at the reception given by the Finn- translated and distributed for consideration ish Ambassador to Belgium the evening be- by the Commission. We were also under fore Koivisto’s meeting with Delors. I was strong pressure from Helsinki to deliver the grateful for this since, although I had been Opinion in advance of President Koivisto’s present at most of Koivisto’s meetings with meeting with Delors in Brussels, now sched- Commission leaders, I had not before had the uled for 29 October. This would have meant opportunity of a one-to-one conversation putting it to the Commission meeting of 21 with the President. I do not remember the October, which also proved beyond us in the precise details of our discussion, but I do re- end. This did, however, have the advantage call that Koivisto appeared remarkably well that we were able to reflect in the text, when

88 Ulkopoliittisia Lausuntoja ja Asiakirjoja 1992, pp. 86 For a fuller account of these discussions, see 273-278 Liikanen p. 98 89 The visit was followed up by the handing over of a 87 Commission Opinion on Sweden’s Application for memorandum setting out in detail Finland’s position Membership (Bulletin of the European Communities, in relation to foreign and security policy (Ibid., pp. Supplement 5/92) 139-142) 33 briefed on, and ­positively disposed towards, potential problems in relation to the Finn- my appointment. Our next such meeting was ish alcohol monopoly and to Finland’s free to be on the occasion of my presentation of trade agreements with the Baltic countries. credentials in Helsinki. Comparing this list with what happened The Commission’s Opinion,90 like the ear- during the negotiations, the one significant lier Opinion on Sweden, was a positive one, problem that we failed to foresee was the is- recommending the opening of negotiations sue of duty-free sales on Baltic ferries. This with Finland in accordance with the timeta- was perhaps forgivable, given that the issue ble decided at Lisbon. The Opinion analysed only surfaced much later in the day and that carefully the state of the Finnish economy and the Finnish position here was (as Kuosmanen of Finland’s relations with the EC, examining readily admits93) in fairly obvious contradic- for each key sector the foreseeable impact of tion with that taken in relation to the alcohol Finland’s accession, both for Finland and the monopoly and to duty-free allowances for EC, and flagging up the likely problem areas, travellers. We did not make a big issue of the without however seeking – since this was not devaluation of the Finnish Markka in Novem- part of our task – to anticipate or prejudge ber 1991, or of its subsequent unpegging from the solutions which might in due course be the ECU in September 1992, even though this negotiated to resolve them. In doing so, we had drawn sharp criticism at the time from relied heavily, not only on the technical some Member States. expertise of our colleagues in other Com- I and my colleagues in the EFTA Division mission departments, but also on the replies were of course not party to the ongoing ef- provided by the Finnish authorities to the forts during the autumn to find a solution to detailed questionnaires we had sent to them. the problem of the Danish “no” vote to Maas- Ironically, as Antti Kuosmanen also recalls,91 tricht; but we did of course follow events some of the processing of these replies within closely since they affected us directly. Even these other Commission departments was if a solution could be found for the Danes, the actually undertaken by Finnish interns, to need for them to hold a further referendum whom the Commission had offered places in was inevitably going to delay the completion order for them to become acquainted with of the Maastricht ratification process, one of the working of the EC machinery. The final the preconditions set at Lisbon for the open- drafting of the text was, however, firmly in ing of accession negotiations with the EFTA the hands of my own Unit, reporting via our applicants. There was also the question of hierarchy to Vice-President Andriessen. We how to finesse the issue of Norway. The Nor- took great care to try to get our facts straight wegian Government had, as long expected, and to ensure that our conclusions were put in its application on 25 November, im- as objective and soundly based as possible. mediately after the governing Labour Party’s We were only too aware that what we were national congress; but the Council could not producing was, as Kuosmanen rightly points take the formal decision to open negotiations out,92 the most thorough document on Fin- until it was in possession of the Commis- land hitherto produced on the EC side; and sion’s Opinion, which could not realistically one on which the Council would rely heav- be delivered before March the following year. ily in its subsequent deliberations. The key At the European Council meeting in Ed- problem areas that we identified as requiring inburgh on 11/12 December, Heads of State special attention in the negotiations were, and Government approved as expected a not surprisingly, agriculture, regional policy, series of decisions and declarations designed the common foreign and security policy and to enable Denmark to proceed (subject to a the special status of Åland. We also noted second referendum) with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. This meant, however, that the entry into force of the Treaty, origi- 90 Commission Opinion on Finland’s application for membership (Bulletin of the European Communities, nally foreseen for 1 January 1993, was now Supplement 6/92) 91 Kuosmanen p. 20 92 Kuosmanen p.230 93 Kuosmanen p. 268 34 inevitably going to be postponed by several Council (7 December 1992) and its adoption months. If the opening of the accession ne- by the Commission (24 March 1993). By the gotiations were to be similarly postponed, latter date, however, although I happened as implied by the decisions taken at Lisbon, by chance to be in Brussels on that day, I had this would reduce considerably the already already taken up my new duties in Helsinki. rather limited time available to complete ne- gotiations in time for the new Member States to participate in the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference on EU institutional reform. There was also the complication of the Swedish ratification timetable. The solution that was finally arrived at was that negotiations would begin with Austria, Sweden and Finland at the beginning of 1993, i.e. before the final ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and be extended to Norway once the Commission had produced its Opinion. (Switzerland’s application for EC accession had, at the re- quest of the Swiss authorities, been put on ice following the negative result of the Swiss ref- erendum on the EEA Agreement.)94 Negotia- tions would be opened under the existing EC Treaties, but concluded only once the Maas- tricht Treaty had been ratified by all Member States. Accession would thus imply full ac- ceptance of the European Union acquis. Work was meanwhile already well ad- vanced within the Council of Ministers on the preparation of the EC’s general negotiating framework. The incoming Danish Presidency consequently proposed that a joint ministe- rial opening session with the Three take place on 1 February 1993, to be followed by the for- mal opening of negotiations with Norway as soon as the Council was in possession of the Commission’s Opinion (which, it was tacitly assumed, would be positive). To maintain the parallelism of the four negotiations, it was obviously important that the Commission’s Opinion on Norway be available rapidly. It was therefore agreed that, pending my departure to Helsinki to take up my new functions there, I should apply myself full time to this, together with my desk officer for Norway Milvia Van Rij. The Commission’s Opinion on Norway still holds the record for the fastest ever delivery of a Commission Opinion on an application for EC/EU membership, as measured by the interval between the formal request from the

94 The application was not however withdrawn, and still even today remains formally on the table. 35 Photo: Jinx! / Flickr.com

V

THE RACE BEGINS he joint Ministerial Session that took in accordance with their respective consti- place on the afternoon of 1 February 1993 tutional procedures. Within the negotiating Tto mark the opening of accession nego- conference, however, the EU Member States tiations with Austria, Finland and Sweden95 negotiate as a bloc, on the basis of common was essentially a ceremonial affair. During positions prepared within the framework of the one-and-a-half hour meeting, prepared the EU Council machinery and presented to statements were read out by Foreign Min- the conference by the EU Presidency. ister Uffe Ellerman-Jensen (on behalf of the The Commission’s role in the accession Danish Presidency), Commissioner Van Den process is also a rather particular one. The Broek, and the ministerial lead negotiators formal decision to open accession negotia- of each of the candidate countries. Deputy tions is taken only after the Commission has Prime Minister Pertti Salolainen delivered delivered a detailed Opinion on the candidate the Finnish opening speech.96 The content of country’s application. That Opinion – a long these various speeches was, however, im- established tradition – is not, however, the portant for setting the tone and parameters one referred to in the Treaties: the latter is of the negotiations that were to follow. the one page document delivered at the end Negotiations for EU accession are a rather of the negotiations. Formally speaking, the special sort of international negotiation. The Commission has, under the Treaties, no role process for handling an application is a com- to play in the accession negotiations them- plicated mixture of supra-national (Com- selves, which are – as already noted – a mat- munity) procedures and intergovernmental ter purely for the Member States. In practice, procedures based on public international however, the technical complexity of the law.97 The application is addressed to the EU issues to be negotiated is such that the Com- Council; and it is the latter that takes the mission’s expertise is indispensable. The formal decision to accept it, after consult- common positions collectively defended by ing the Commission and receiving the assent the EU Member States are consequently, in of the European Parliament. The accession almost all cases, based on drafts drawn up by negotiations themselves, on the other hand, the Commission. Similarly, it is the Commis- fixing the conditions of admission and the sion that conducts, on behalf of the Member corresponding adjustments to the EU Trea- States, most of the informal and technical ties, take place entirely outside the formal EU contacts that take place with the authorities structures, being conducted within an inter- of the candidate country in between the for- governmental conference between the EU mal sessions of the negotiating conference. Member States and the candidate country. There are moreover areas, such as competi- The resulting Treaty is ratified not by the EU tion policy, that fall within the executive as such, but by the individual Member States authority of the Commission and where the Member States have no say. Such issues are handled entirely outside the framework of 95 Negotiations with Norway were launched the Accession Conference, in separate dis- separately on 5 April 1993, a few days after the cussions between the Commission and the Commission had delivered its Opinion. Candidate Country. Work within the Com- 96 Ulkopoliittisia Lausuntoja ja Asiakirjoja 1993, mission is traditionally coordinated by a p. 257 97 At the time of the various applications, the relevant Task Force specially set up for the purpose, provisions were those of Article 237 of the EEC Treaty working in close coordination with the many (as modified by the Single European Act of 1986), and Directorates-General responsible for the the corresponding Articles of the ECSC and EURATOM individual issues of substance. Within the Treaties. By the time of signature and ratification of Council machinery, the work of Ministers the resulting Treaty of Accession, these had been and COREPER is traditionally prepared by replaced by the (effectively identical) language of an ad hoc working party dealing specifically Article O of the (Maastricht) Treaty on European with the enlargement negotiations. Union. These days, accession is governed by the somewhat more elaborate provisions of Article 49 of A further particular characteristic of ac- the Treaty on European Union, as last modified by the cession negotiations is that the agenda is to a Lisbon Treaty. large extent set by the applicants themselves. 37 The EU’s starting point, as was made clear in the EU in the context of accession. Finland our opening statement on 1 February 1993, is indicated already at the first negotiating ses- that accession implies full acceptance of the sion that it could accept without modification EU acquis (Treaties, secondary legislation 7 of these 29 chapters. It was rapidly apparent (i.e. Directives and Regulations), case law, that many other chapters were also essentially resolutions, international agreements), sub- non-problematic. The “real” negotiations be- ject only to technical adjustments, temporary gan only towards the summer of 1993, with derogations and transitional arrangements to the tabling of Finnish position papers on the be agreed in the negotiations. Apart from the key problem areas. Finnish negotiators had unavoidable institutional adaptations, these identified three broad areas of particular dif- almost invariably arise from requests tabled ficulty: agriculture, regional policy and the by the candidate. The negotiation thus es- customs union, as well as a number of more sentially revolves around the EU’s response specific issues of concern, such as the status to such requests. of Åland, the future of the alcohol monopoly Negotiators identified 29 chapter- and the issue of travellers’ allowances. There headings­ for the negotiations with Finland was, over and above these high profile issues, and the other candidates, corresponding to a whole raft of more minor technical issues to the areas covered, or shortly to be covered, resolve or clarify. by the acquis. These chapter-headings fell The negotiations were, from the begin- into five groups: ning, conducted against very tight time constraints. EU leaders had, quite under- • areas wholly covered by the EEA; standably, not wanted to begin them before • areas partly covered by the EEA (e.g. the completion of their own internal negotia- agriculture); tions on the Maastricht Treaty and on future • other areas covered by the existing financing (the Delors II package). Nor, as EC Treaties, but completely excluded confirmed by the Edinburgh European Coun- from the scope of the EEA (e.g. customs cil in mid-December 1992, could accession union, structural funds, economic and negotiations be completed before Maastricht monetary cooperation); was actually in force. This left, however, only • new areas introduced by the Maas­ a short time window if the candidates were to tricht Treaty (e.g. foreign and security accede in time to participate in the planned policy, justice and home affairs, EMU); 1996 Intergovernmental Conference on fu- • general questions (e.g. institutions, ture institutional arrangements. Matters budget) were further constrained by Sweden’s need to make an initial submission of the Accession The early months of the negotiation were Treaty to the Riksdag before the September largely taken up with the technical examina- 1994 general election.98 In the light of these tion of the tens of thousands of pages of the various considerations, and having reviewed Community’s secondary legislation: an un- the state of the negotiations, the Copenhagen glamorous but necessary process designed, on European Council of June 1993 concluded that the one hand, to identify the purely technical EU enlargement “should become a reality by adaptations which would be needed to reflect 1 January 1995”. Given the time needed for the addition of further Member States (e.g. ratification (both in the candidate countries lists of official bodies in the Member States, and in the EU Member States), and given that lists of currencies) and, on the other, to iden- the Accession Treaty could not be signed until tify areas that were problematic for the candi- the European Parliament had given its assent dates. The fact that a sizeable part of the acquis to the four accessions, this meant that nego- had already been scrutinised for the purposes tiations had to be concluded at the latest by 1 of the EEA was of course a major advantage. March 1994. This objective was subsequently The fact that a temporary or permanent dero- formally confirmed by the Brussels European gation had been agreed in the context of the Council of October 1993. EEA did not, however, necessarily mean that a similar derogation would be acceptable to 98 See Chapter IV above 38 Photo: mac steve / Flickr.com

VI

TO HELSINKI he opening by the European Commis- struck Helsinki. I promptly went out and sion of a permanent diplomatic mis- purchased a warm Finnish fur hat. Political Tsion in Helsinki, to reflect the growing correctness has no place in cold climates. importance of EC-Finland relations, had first An advance team, consisting of two of been formally proposed by Prime Minister the three Brussels-based staff who would Harri Holkeri, during Delors’s visit to Finland be working with me99 was already in place in July 1988. The issue was thereafter raised at our offices at 31 Pohjoisesplanadi (which systematically by the Finnish side during continued to be occupied by the Commission every high level contact with the Commis- until very recently).100 Our office infrastruc- sion. Despite the high priority accorded to ture consisted of one rather battered laptop relations with the EFTA countries, the other computer, an old typewriter and a few pieces pressures on the Commission’s limited re- of borrowed furniture. Apart from a twice- sources were such that it was not until 1991 weekly diplomatic bag, our only communi- that the Commission was finally able to place cation links with Brussels were a fax machine Helsinki on the list of future new delegations. and a single telephone. My two most urgent From then on, however, matters moved tasks were to recruit local staff for the Del- more rapidly. By early October 1992, I had egation – essential if we were to become op- been formally nominated by the Commission erational, since none of the Brussels-based as the Head of the new delegation – subject staff at that stage spoke any Finnish – and of course to agrément by the host authori- to find a suitable residence. The former was ties. (The latter had, incidentally– thanks to accomplished fairly rapidly: the economic the tenacious efficiency of Finnish diplomacy crisis that had struck Finland enabled us to –got wind of my likely nomination even be- engage some first-rate people. The latter fore I myself knew that it was being consid- took a good deal longer, forcing me to live for ered.) A Headquarters Agreement between an extended period in hotel accommodation. the Commission and Finland was signed in Meanwhile, the accession negotiations had Brussels on 6 November 1992, two days after been launched and we were expected, both the adoption of the Commission’s Opinion by Brussels and by our Finnish hosts, to be on Finland’s membership application. It was fully operational. tentatively agreed that I should aim to take Fortunately, I was able to present my up my new functions in Helsinki early in the credentials to President Koivisto already the New Year. week after my arrival. The protocol arrange- In the event, things took a little longer. In ments for this proved somewhat of a teaser. the first place, the Headquarters Agreement Although I had the personal rank and cour- had not yet been cleared by the Eduskunta. tesy title of Ambassador, I was not of course Second, and rather more painfully for me, I the Ambassador of a sovereign state. Initial- was hospitalised in late November for urgent ly, I was informed that I would therefore not back surgery, and was able to return to work be accorded the customary guard of honour only in mid-January. This inevitably delayed on my arrival at the Presidential Palace. I my departure to Helsinki. A further unfortu- had no problem with that. A few days later, nate consequence was that I was unable to be however, I was told it had been decided that present at the dinner that Erkki Liikanen had I would after all be accorded a guard of hon- kindly organised in my honour to celebrate, our; but that, in place of the usual national in the presence of all the EFTA countries’ anthem, the band would play a fanfare. I Ambassadors to the EC, my appointment as was duly flattered. My conversation with the Commission Head of Delegation to Helsinki. Instead, I received their farewell present in 99 my hospital bed a couple of days later. The third, my deputy Wouter Wilton, arrived, like It was thus not until 1 March 1993 that I fi- me, on 1 March. 100 The Delegation (which formed part of the EU’s nally flew to Helsinki to take up my new du- external relations structure) was converted, ties. In Brussels, it was by then almost spring. upon Finland’s accession, into a Commission In Finland, it was still very much winter. The Representation similar to those in existing Member weekend after my arrival, a major blizzard States. 40 President was, in accordance with normal better informed than I was about the planned practice, devoted to matters of substance, visits to Helsinki of some of my colleagues rather than to formalities. Among the sub- from other Commission services. jects raised by the President were the state In mid-April, the political scene in Hel- of ratification of the EEA, prospects for the sinki was shaken by the sudden resignation Uruguay Round and relations with Eastern as Foreign Minister of Paavo Väyrynen, os- Europe and the former USSR – all important tensibly to pursue his campaign for the Janu- subjects on the current agenda. We did not ary 1994 Presidential elections. There was discuss Finland’s membership negotiations, even greater surprise when it emerged that which had of course barely begun. his successor would be the current Presi- My presentation of credentials coincided dent of the farmers’ association MTK, Heikki with the first of what was to be a constant Haavisto. While widely regarded for his stream of high level visitors from the EC In- competence in agricultural and trade policy stitutions. The President of the EC Court of matters, Haavisto had, by his own admis- Justice, Ole Due, was in Helsinki to speak, sion, little experience of Foreign Policy. He alongside Minister of Justice Hannele Pokka had never served before in Government or in and Leif Sevón of the Supreme Court, at a Parliament. seminar jointly organised by the Univer- Once people got over their initial sur- sity of Helsinki and the Ministry of Justice. prise, however, Haavisto’s appointment was The seminar was timed to coincide with the generally interpreted as a shrewd move by launch of a new Finnish language database Aho. Indeed, it was later to prove central to summarising the judgements of the ECJ. the success of the accession negotiations, Also in town, on separate business, was the given the importance for Finland of the ag- Commission’s Deputy Director-General for ricultural dossier and the need to neutralise Industry, Alex Schaub. possible opposition from the farming lobby The following week saw the arrival of a and to ensure unity in the Centre Party. The further large delegation from Brussels, head- appointment, which was seemingly made ed by Hans van den Broek, since January the with the full support of the President, had Commissioner for External Political Relations the additional advantage of avoiding the need and Enlargement. They were in Helsinki for for a Government reshuffle at this crucial the Ministerial Meeting of the Council of juncture. Baltic Sea States. Van den Broek had bilat- The role of a Commission Delegation in a eral meetings with President Koivisto, Prime candidate country was not, in those days, a Minister Aho, Foreign Minister Väyrynen and well defined one. Commission Delegations Foreign Trade Minister Salolainen. There was represented the Commission and not the general agreement that the accession nego- EU as such. Moreover, like the Commission tiations were progressing well, although our Heads of Delegation in the other candidate Finnish interlocutors were concerned about countries, I was not formally a member of the the consequences of a possible non-ratifi- EU negotiating team. We had nevertheless a cation of Maastricht. Väyrynen stressed the key bridging role to play. One of our most need to establish, within the CAP, a system important tasks was to provide the Com- for the support of Nordic agriculture. mission’s enlargement team – and through Such were my first two weeks in the job, as them the EU machinery more widely – with I struggled in addition to sort out the staffing timely, succinct and authoritative analysis and infrastructure of the Delegation, and to of political and economic developments in progress with the extensive round of cour- Finland and of their likely impact on the ne- tesy calls that newly accredited Ambassadors gotiations. This was especially so in the case are expected to pay. Luckily, I already knew of the new Helsinki Delegation as, follow- Finland well, and was able to draw heavily ing the restructuring that had taken place in on the large network of contacts that I had the Commission services earlier in the year, established. Of particular value in these early there was no longer anyone working on the days was my “hot line” to Ambassador Erkki Finnish accession file in Brussels who had ex- Liikanen in Brussels, who was frequently tensive firsthand knowledge of the country. 41 Equally important was to explain and was also the Parliament’s rapporteur for Fin- defend EU and Commission positions in land in the handling of the accession dossier Finland. Few Finns, outside the small circle and was, in this latter capacity, a regular vis- dealing directly with the negotiations, had itor to Helsinki. The Spring and summer saw any real knowledge at that time of what the visits by Economics and Finance Commis- EU was or how it worked. This was the main sioner Henning Christophersen, Agriculture focus of our press and information activities. Commissioner Steichen and a string of senior I tried, in addition, to spend at least a couple EU officials, among them Council Secretary of days each month visiting places outside General Niels Ersbøll and Commission Direc- the capital, in order to meet, and listen to the tors General Landaburu (Regional Policy), views of, as wide a cross-section of the pop- Burghardt (External Political Relations) and ulation as possible. Many of these visits were Almeida Serra (Fish). The Belgian Prime Min- organised via the good offices of Finland’s ister also visited Helsinki during this period. excellent network of Chambers of Commerce Between my arrival and the Finnish mid- or via organisations such as MTK. Realising summer break, while the accession negotia- that this would bring me into contact with tions were going through their preliminary many people with little if any command of technical phases, I set about establishing – English, I took an early decision to apply my- or, as it was in many cases, re-establishing self to the difficult task of acquiring at least a – personal contact with as many as possible basic knowledge of Finnish. of the key actors on the Finnish side. This We were expected in addition, like all meant not only Prime Minister Esko Aho and Commission Delegations, to establish a close his key ministerial colleagues, but also their working relationship with the local Embas- senior officials, the major personalities in sies of the EU Member States, of whom all ex- Finnish industrial and trade union circles, cept Luxembourg had resident Ambassadors the agricultural lobby, major think-tanks accredited to Helsinki.101 My EU colleagues and the leading editors and journalists of were, for the most part, senior and experi- the Finnish media. I maintained close and enced diplomats, with good contacts around regular contact with the Finnish negotiat- town but little if any knowledge of the in- ing team, in particular the two ministerial ternal workings of the EU or of the acces- level lead negotiators Pertti Salolainen and sion process. Our monthly EU Ambassadors’ Heikki Haavisto and the senior official level meetings (usually with a high-level Finnish negotiator Veli Sundbäck. The fact that so luncheon guest) were important occasions many doors were willingly thrown open to to exchange and pool information, both as me was the clearest possible indication of the regards the domestic Finnish scene and as importance Finland attached to the accession regards what was going on in Brussels. dossier. I was particularly gratified to be told A further – major – part of our workload that I would have access whenever needed to was the handling of the succession of high Aho himself – a privilege which, although I level visitors from Brussels that flooded into rarely invoked it, was to prove of importance Helsinki (at least during the more clement at certain critical junctures. months of the year!) as a result of the ac- These multifarious contacts were invalu- cession negotiations. European Parliament able to me in keeping Brussels briefed on the President Egon Klepsch visited Finland at the wider background to Finland’s negotiating end of April 1993, overlapping with the inau- requests, as well as in flagging in good time gural meeting in Helsinki of the EC-Finland potential problems further down the line. I Parliamentary Joint Committee.102 The EU tried in return to give my Finnish interlocu- Co-Chairman of the latter, Gary Titley MEP, tors as realistic a picture as possible of what EU reactions were likely to be to the many ideas floating around on the Finnish side at 101 Ireland opened an Embassy in Helsinki shortly after my arrival. that stage. 102 This upgrading of the former EP Delegation The autumn of 1993 saw a further influx was a product of the formal opening of accession of high level personalities from Brussels, negotiations. with visits by Commissioners Paleokrassas 42 (Environment & Fisheries), Bangemann (In- Secretary-General Wörner and EC Council dustry) and a further visit by Christophersen Secretary-General Ersbøll. The discussion (attending a Liberal International meeting). with Delors was inevitably dominated by the The Italian President, Austrian Chancel- accession negotiations, in particular the CFSP lor Franz Vranitzky and Portuguese Prime chapter on which negotiations were about Minister Cavaco Silva were also in town. The to be opened. (Aho had a few weeks earlier, high point for us, however, was the official in a speech to a Wilton Park conference in opening of the Commission Delegation on 25 Helsinki, argued firmly that the Candidates September. This had been timed to coincide should not be asked to commit themselves with a visit to Helsinki by Foreign Affairs to anything more than the existing Member and Enlargement Commissioner Hans Van States. For Finland, he had added, no future Den Broek. This was taking place at a crucial option was a priori excluded, but there was point in the accession negotiations, just after no current alternative to Finland’s existing the tabling of the Finnish position paper on policy of non-alliance and independent de- agriculture. Van Den Broek held meetings fence.103) There was only a cursory discussion with Aho, Salolainen and Haavisto, as well as on agriculture, given that the Finnish posi- with Eduskunta Speaker Ilkka Suominen and tion paper was still being studied internally with representatives of the Finnish Industry in the Commission. Delors limited himself to and Employers Association. expressing confidence that solutions could The reception held to mark the official be found within the existing framework of opening of the Delegation was attended the CAP. (or so it seemed) by the whole of Helsinki: A second, even more important, high level Government ministers and senior officials, visit to the EU took place in mid-November, Members of Parliament, representatives of when President Koivisto travelled to Stras- Finnish industry, agriculture, trade unions bourg to address the European Parliament and the media and, of course, the Ambas- in Plenary Session. Given the President’s sadors of the EU Member States. We were constitutional responsibilities in this field, particularly honoured by the presence of his remarks on foreign and security policy President Koivisto, who did not normally – coming as they did just after the opening accept invitations to attend such events. The of the CFSP chapter of the accession nego- fact that he had agreed to do so in this case tiations and delivered as they were to an was a marker of the political importance now audience where concern about neutrality attached to Finland’s relationship with the was still widespread – were noted with even EU. Somewhat to the surprise of my Brussels greater attention than Aho’s earlier com- colleagues, the President chose to travel the ments. Koivisto stressed that Finland was short distance from the Presidential Palace “not asking for a free ride in terms of secu- on foot, with only minimal security. There rity”; that she was fully prepared to take an were speeches by Van Den Broek and (on be- active part in the EU’s CFSP “and its future half of the host country authorities) Foreign development as foreseen in the Treaty”; and Minister Haavisto. When the time came to that no options were excluded. Koivisto also make the concluding toast, Haavisto caused put down a brief but clear marker on the great amusement by producing from his problem of agriculture. Keeping the whole jacket pocket a full glass of champagne that country populated, he stressed, was of vi- he had somehow managed to keep there – tal importance for Finland. This meant that unspilled – throughout his speech. “limited additions to the present repertoire The flow of visitors was not entirely one- of Community measures in agriculture” were way. Salolainen and Haavisto were of course necessary; in requesting these Finland was regularly in Brussels, in their capacity as Fin- land’s ministerial level negotiators. Aho also 103 Finland’s European Policy: Speech by PM Esko paid a visit to Brussels on 18/19 October, in Aho at a Wilton Park Conference on the impact of the course of which he attended a working EC Policies on the New Members and Neighbouring lunch hosted by Delors and held meetings States, Helsinki, 16 September 1993 1993 with Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene, NATO (Ulkopoliittisia Lausuntoja ja Asiakirjoja 1993, p. 232) 43 doing no more than seeking to adjust long- would be resolved – one way or another – standing Community objectives to Finland’s along the lines of existing precedents. Some particular conditions.104 Although the Hemi- of the more minor issues, such as secondary cycle was only around a third full, Koivisto residences, fisheries and Sami issues, also was given a warm reception and his address remained open until virtually the end of the received loud applause. negotiations, but this was generally either for Later in the day, Koivisto met with Delors tactical reasons or because they were com- (who was also in Strasbourg for the Parlia- mon to other Candidates as well as Finland. ment’s Plenary Session). It had been agreed, The politically sensitive issue of the fu- in order to avoid a special trip to Strasbourg ture of the alcohol monopoly was not strictly by the Commission’s Head of Protocol, that I speaking a part of the accession negotiations should greet President Koivisto and his party as such since it lay within the executive com- at the entrance to the Parliament. Unfortu- petence of the Commission, as “guardian of nately, instead of stopping as planned at the the Treaties”, subject only to the jurispru- main entrance to the Parliament building, dence of the European Court of Justice.106 It Koivisto’s cortège shot past and stopped at was clear from the latter that the import, ex- the “back” door used by Commission of- port and production monopolies would have ficials. I was forced to perform a rapid 100 to be dismantled to comply with EU law. metre sprint in order to catch up with them. The Commission, for its part, had confirmed Given that the EU was still in the process of that it would not itself take any initiative to defining its position on the two main po- challenge the retail monopoly, provided that tential subjects of discussion – agriculture the latter operated in a non-discriminatory and CFSP – the meeting was not the most fashion. That left the question of the whole- productive. Delors’s remarks about the in- sale monopoly, which the Finnish Minister terlinkages between agricultural policy and responsible, Toimi Kankaanniemi (the one regional policy appear to have heightened, Christian League Minister in the Government rather than reduced, concerns on the Finn- Coalition) was initially unwilling to disman- ish side.105 tle. The Commission however was adamant: By this stage, the focus of the accession if it were not dismantled on accession, Fin- negotiations was narrowing down to a hand- land would be taken to the ECJ. The Finnish ful of key issues. The biggest and most com- side in the end gave in and the “deal” was plicated problems, as foreseen all along, were confirmed in an exchange of letters.107 agriculture and the closely related issue of Closely linked to the issue of the alcohol regional policy, which nobody expected to be monopoly was that of travellers’ allowances, solved until the very end of the negotiations. on which a totally disproportionate amount For most other major issues, by contrast, of time and negotiating capital was spent; the broad outlines of the way forward were and which remained an open issue right up to clear, even if the precise details were not in the start of the final “marathon”negotiating ­ all cases yet agreed. The potential problem of Finland’s free trade arrangements with 106 the Baltic States, one of the major issues in Article 37 (1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 37 TFEU) requires Member States to adjust any monopolies the customs union chapter, looked set to be of a commercial character so as to ensure that no resolved by the EU’s own conclusion of free discrimination regarding the conditions under which trade agreements with the latter. Most other goods are procured and marketed exists between outstanding customs union issues related to nationals of Member States. the detailed arrangements for adjustment to 107 The fact that the Commission would not of its the EU’s common external tariff regime. It own initiative challenge the retail monopoly did not was generally assumed that the Åland dossi- however prevent anyone else from doing so. Indeed, er, on which negotiations had barely begun, just after accession the legality of the Swedish monopoly was challenged in the courts by a Swedish entrepreneur, Harry Franzén. The subsequent ruling 104 Ulkopoliittisia Lausuntoja ja Asiakirjoja 1993, pp. of the ECJ (C-198/95) confirmed the Commission’s 240-26 view that a retail monopoly was not illegal as long as 105 Liikanen, p. 162 it operated in a non-discriminatory fashion. 44 session.108 Finland (along with Norway and of bringing Finland into the EU were more Sweden) sought, in line with her general likely to be achieved under a Government led policy on alcohol, and contrary to the rules of by the Centre Party than if the latter were in the EU single market, to continue to restrict opposition. The Finnish negotiating position the quantities of beer, wines and spirits that would undoubtedly be tougher; but if a deal individuals travelling to Finland from other could be clinched it would be more likely to Member States could bring in with them. be approved. Despite increasing difficulties Although the Commission and most Member on the economic front and declining popu- States were reluctant, the Nordic position larity in the opinion polls, Aho himself, as was helped by the fact that Denmark, as part I reported to Brussels at the time, showed of its Maastricht referendum “package”, had every intention of continuing in office until been granted this right for a transitional pe- the next scheduled parliamentary elections riod. A similar transitional period was in the in March 1995. If things went badly wrong on end agreed for the three Nordic Candidates. the agricultural chapter of the accession ne- The Delegation naturally kept a close gotiations, however, nobody could be certain eye on all of these open issues. It was clear, what the end result might be. however, that for some of these our value- We were motivated by similar concerns in added to the negotiation was fairly limited: our monitoring of the Presidential elections, they were essentially issues to be thrashed the first to be held on the basis of popular out between the technical experts of both ballot, rather than the former electoral col- sides. I focussed my personal efforts primar- lege system. Of course, all diplomats love ily on agriculture – which was clearly going predicting the outcome of elections in their to be the “make-or-break” chapter – and host countries, and I was no exception. We on Åland – given the political sensitivities it sent regular status reports to Brussels, based aroused on both sides. On the other issues, I on the latest opinion polls and our contacts was called upon to get directly involved from around town. Having, like most commen- time to time; but otherwise limited myself to tators, been caught out by Elisabeth Rehn’s keeping Brussels briefed on the overall tem- surprise performance in the first round, perature and mood on the Finnish side. I carefully hedged my bets on the second Beyond the accession negotiations round. But for Brussels the most important themselves, my political reports to Brus- thing was the likely impact on the accession sels in the early months of my posting were negotiations. At no time did it appear likely dominated primarily by the economic crisis that any of those candidates that were op- and its impact on the popularity of the Aho posed to EU membership would win. Our Government; and, increasingly as the year concerns were therefore two-fold. On the progressed, by the prospects for the Janu- one hand, there was a risk that the rhetoric ary 1994 Presidential elections – matters that of the electoral campaign might force the were of particular interest to Brussels in view Government, for domestic party political of their potential impact on the course of the reasons, to toughen its stance on agriculture, accession negotiations. making it harder for us to reach agreement We all knew that it would be difficult for by the 1 March deadline. Secondly, there Finland to become a member of the Union was the question of the implications of the unless the Centre Party (whose political outcome for the future of the Aho Govern- base lay in the countryside) were prepared ment. There had been much debate among to go along with the result of the negotia- political theorists in Finland as to whether tions. This they would do only if there were constitutional practice required the Govern- what they regarded as an acceptable result ment automatically to tender its resignation on agriculture. The conventional wisdom, to the new President. In the end, this did to which I also subscribed, was that parlia- not happen. Doubts remained however as to mentary and popular majorities in favour how long the Coalition would be able to hang together in the politically charged run-up to 108 For a full account of this see Kuosmanen pp. the referendum. 220–223 45 But before we were allowed to embark on the endgame of the accession negotiations, we had first to undergo what was for many of us one the more surreal experiences of the whole accession dossier: the anticlimax of the open- ing – and closing – of the CFSP chapter.

46 Photo: redwolfoz / Flickr.com

VII

NEUTRALITY: THE DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK hen the accession negotiations had • applicants should be ready and been launched in February 1993, able to support the specific policies of Wthe EU side had served notice that the Union in force at the time of their negotiations on the CFSP and other new accession. chapters introduced by the Maastricht Treaty would begin only once that Treaty had en- Nobody had, at that stage, considered how tered into force. This compromise, reached at all this was to be reflected in the text of the the Edinburgh European Council the previ- Act of Accession. Acts of Accession are, as ous December, had enabled the negotiations already noted,110 essentially a catalogue of as a whole to start early in 1993 despite the technical adaptations and transitional pro- upset caused by the “no” vote in Denmark’s visions modifying the EU acquis upon the first Maastricht referendum. Negotiations on accession of the new Member(s). The acces- the CFSP chapter were thus duly launched sion negotiations revolve essentially around at the Fourth Ministerial Session of the Ac- the reaction of the current Member States to cession Conferences on 9 November 1993.109 the requests for such modifications that are By the time of the Fifth Ministerial Sessions tabled by the Candidate(s).111 This methodol- on 21 December, the chapter had – without ogy, while in general a sound one, was quite great difficulty or fanfare – been brought to unsuited for dealing with the CFSP chapter a close. since the issues at stake had nothing to do There were in essence two main reasons with the acquis as such, to which neither why, after five years of doubts and drama side was, in this case, proposing any changes. about the compatibility of neutrality with EU The Council’s Political Committee was in- membership, the negotiations themselves structed to establish a list of CFSP acquis – i.e. proved to be such a non-event. The first re- the common actions, positions, declarations lates to the rather special manner in which and statements adopted over the years by accession negotiations are conducted. The EC Ministers – which the Candidates would second lies in the rapidly shifting parameters be expected to sign up to in addition to the of the wider geo-political architecture of the provisions on a Common Foreign and Secu- Europe of the early 1990s. rity Policy set out in Title V of the Maastricht At the opening session with Finland and Treaty. Having examined these, Finland and the other candidates in February 1993 the the other Candidates indicated that none Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann- of this acquis posed any problem for them. Jensen, on behalf of the EU Presidency, had They were willing and able to take on board, indicated that, when the time came to open without any derogations or modifications, the the CFSP chapter, the following principles entirety of acquis communautaire, the Maas- would apply: tricht Treaty and the finalité politiqueof the European Union. The CFSP chapter could, as • enlargement should strengthen the far as they were concerned, consequently be internal coherence of the Union and its closed, since there was nothing to negotiate. capacity to act effectively in foreign and This left the EU side somewhat wrong- security policy; footed, since what concerned EU negotiators • applicants must from the time of was of course not the acquis itself, but the po- their accession be ready and able to sitions that the neutral Candidates might take participate fully and actively in the CFSP (or which it was feared they might take) in as defined in the Maastricht Treaty; future CFSP decisions once they had become • applicants must, on accession, Members. Would they, as Member States, take on in their entirety and without participate in a constructive manner in its reservation all the objectives of the Treaty, the provisions of its Title V, and 110 See above, Chapter V the relevant declarations attached to it; 111 In only very few cases– transitional periods for fish upon the accession of Spain and Portugal being a 109 The Maastricht Treaty had entered into force on notable example – had such requests emanated from 1 November 1993. the EC side rather than from the Candidate(s). 48 development? Or would they, as some feared, result was little more than a statement of end up throwing a spanner in the works of the obvious, but it sufficed to close the CFSP the fledgling Common Foreign and Security chapter of the negotiations. The fact that it Policy? There were, understandably, particu- did was a telling indication of how far things lar fears about Austria, which had entered a had moved over the previous half a decade. written reservation on this subject at the time Looking back at these events from today’s of her membership application. The problem, perspective, one could be forgiven for won- however, was to find a way of expressing all dering what the fuss was all about in the first this textually in the Act of Accession. Matters place. It would not even enter the mind of any were not helped by the fact that there was, serious commentator these days to suggest at that time, no consensus among the exist- that Finland’s policy of military non-align- ing Member States as to how the CFSP should ment and credible national defence (as it is develop in the future. What, in short, should now described) were in any way at odds with the Candidates be asked to sign up to? her membership of the European Union. On The Belgian Presidency initially proposed the contrary, Finland has been an active par- an “innovatory approach”: each of the Can- ticipant in developing and implementing the didates would be interrogated on their re- EU’s European Security and Defence Policy. spective attitudes to the future evolution of A Finnish General, Gustav Hägglund, was the CFSP acquis. Since, however, Member (from 2001-2004) the first Chairman of the States were unable to agree on the precise list EU’s Military Committee. Successive Finnish of questions to be put to the Candidates, and Governments have supported further deep- since the Candidates themselves were in any ening of the ESDP, on the grounds that this event opposed to the idea, this proposal soon would bolster Finland’s security.113 Even the fell by the wayside. question of possible NATO membership is A few weeks later, the Presidency came now openly discussed in official government up with an alternative idea. Candidates documents.114 would be asked to make a common unilateral Back in the autumn of 1988, however, declaration, incorporating the language of when the future geo-political architecture of the Presidency’s intervention at the opening Europe was still in a state of uncertain flux, of negotiations (see above) and confirming the prospect that neutral Austria might ap- their commitment to the “actual and poten- ply for EC membership created major shock- tial” acquis of the CFSP. This proposal was waves in Brussels. The timing of Austria’s not acceptable as it stood to the Candidates, application and the terms in which it was since the latter were not prepared to sign up drafted were, moreover, indelibly to influ- to language that appeared to impose obliga- ence the manner in which the EC/EU ap- tions on them over and above those applying proached the whole question of neutrality to existing Member States. It did, however, and membership. in the end prove to be the way forward. After some discussion, the words “and potential” were dropped, as was language singling out 113 The Programme of the Katainen Government, as Austria (which had been inserted because submitted to the Eduskunta on 22 June 2011, states (p. 23) that “Finland will actively work for the of Austria’s neutrality reservation) and the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and declaration was converted into a joint dec- Security Policy (CFSP) and the common European laration by both the Candidates and the ex- defence policy in accordance with the opportunities isting Member States, to be appended to the offered by the Lisbon Treaty”. See also Finnish Final Act of the Accession Treaty.112 The end Security and Defence Policy 2009, Government Report 13/2009, p.72. 114 The current Government Programme (see note 5 112 Joint Declaration on Common Foreign and Security above) states that, although Finland will not prepare Policy (Declaration no. 1 to the Final Act concerning an application for membership of NATO during the the accession of the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom term of office of the present Government, “Finland of Sweden, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom will evaluate a possible NATO membership on the of Norway to the European Union, Official Journal No C basis of its own national security and defence policy 241 , 29 August 1994) interests”. 49 At that time, one should remember, the its soil.116 Given this background, together Berlin Wall and the rest of the Iron Curtain with Moscow’s well-known concerns about were still in place, as were the USSR and the the possibility of Austrian EC membership,117 Warsaw Pact. The EC, moreover, was in the it was hardly surprising that the Austrian preliminary stages of a major new initiative Government felt it necessary to include such in its further integration, which many were extensive language on neutrality in its let- hoping would lead to a far-reaching political ter of application. Had the application been and economic union, including a common made two years later, things might well have foreign, security and defence policy. Those been otherwise. At the time, however, even whose thoughts ran in that direction found if the risk of a military reoccupation by the it hard to believe that Austria and the other USSR could reasonably be discounted, the European neutral states would be able or possibility of other unpleasant manifesta- willing to participate fully in such a process. tions of Soviet displeasure could not. There were even doubts as to whether such Faced with this unwelcome political hot neutrality was legally compatible with parts potato, and having put Austria on notice that of the existing EC Treaties. the remarks on neutrality in her reservation EC concerns were further exacerbated would require further examination,118 the EC by the content of Austria’s letter of applica- Council, after some difficult internal delib- tion, delivered in July 1989, which included erations, opted to pass the ball to the Com- a lengthy statement reserving Austria’s right mission by adopting the traditional formal to pursue, as an EC Member State, her ex- Council decision “to initiate the procedures isting policy of neutrality.115 The Austrians foreseen by the Treaties” (i.e. to request the were, in a strict sense, correct to say that the Commission to deliver its Opinion). This de- legal basis of their permanent neutrality was cision119 was accompanied by a declaration the (legally autonomous) Constitutional Act in the Council’s minutes, confirming that its on Neutrality of October 1955. It was, on the examination of Austria’s neutrality reserva- other hand, common knowledge that there tion would be carried out “at the appropriate was a political link between the State Treaty time”120 in the light of the relevant provisions (under which Austria recovered its post- of the Single Act and in particular those121 re- War sovereignty) and neutrality. In order to lating to European Political Cooperation (the obtain Soviet agreement to the State Treaty, forerunner of CFSP). Having thus disposed and the consequent removal of Soviet troops of the issue, the Council did not return to it from Austrian soil, the Austrian Government until over three years later in the autumn of had been obliged to undertake (in the so- called Moscow Memorandum of April 1955) that Austria would immediately and of its 116 Memorandum on the Results of Negotiations own free will espouse permanent neutrality between Government Delegations of Austria and the of the Swiss type, including the obligation to Soviet Union (Moscow, April 15, 1955) defend that neutrality, join no military alli- 117 For details of the various Soviet demarches at the ance and permit no foreign military bases on time, see Luif: Austria in Wallace (1991) 118 Letter of 17 July 1989 to Austrian Foreign Minister Mock, acknowledging Austria’s application, signed by Mr. Roland Dumas, French Foreign Minister, in his capacity as President-in-Office of the EC Council 115 The full text of the key passage reads: “Austria 119 Council document 8233/89 of 28 July 1989 (+COR 1 submits this application on the understanding that of 3 August 1989) its internationally recognised status of permanent 120 One Member State, in a separate unilateral neutrality, based on the Federal and Constitutional declaration, made clear its own view that this Law of 26 October 1955, will be maintained and examination should not be conducted before that, as a Member of the European Communities by 1 January 1993. virtue of the Treaty of Accession, it will be able to 121 Article 30 (5) of the Single European Act, which fulfil its legal obligations arising out of its status as a states that the external policies of the EC and the permanently neutral state and to continue its policy policies agreed in EPC must be consistent. The of neutrality as a specific contribution towards the Presidency and the Commission are jointly charged maintenance of peace and security in Europe”. with ensuring this. 50 1992,122 in the context of formulating the ne- for all practical purposes all permanent neu- gotiating guidelines to be followed by the EC trals.) Our concerns related both to certain side in the accession negotiations. provisions of the existing EC Treaties – in The Commission, meanwhile, was in no particular economic sanctions and other rush either to get its fingers burned. Nor trade measures motivated by political and/or was there any need to do so, since nobody security considerations – and to those of the on the EC side was contesting the Commis- future Common Foreign and Security Policy sion’s well-publicised view that no negotia- (CFSP). Some on the EC side considered that tions for new accessions should be launched the main goals of the CFSP124 (in particular before the beginning of 1993 at the earliest. safeguarding the independence of the Union The relevant Commission departments were and strengthening its security) could not be in any case fully engaged with other matters. reconciled with permanent neutrality what- The negotiations for the Maastricht Treaty ever its basis. The central problem however were at that time still not completed. Even was not so much the CFSP acquis. At that the basic outlines of the new Common For- stage this was largely an empty framework eign and Security Policy remained uncertain. of general objectives and procedural rules, The “appropriate time” to examine Austria’s to which the applicants would in any case neutrality reservation was therefore put off have to sign up. What concerned us more for as long as possible. were the future policy decisions to be taken It was, as already noted,123 the prospect of within that framework. These required una- a Swedish application for membership that nimity, and the fear was that the presence ultimately forced the Commission’s hand. of the EFTA neutrals in the decision-making The Swedish Parliament’s vote of December process might “neutralise” progress towards 1990 in favour of full EC membership opened European security and defence policies, by up the very real possibility that we could excluding in advance, in a manner not sus- potentially find ourselves confronted within ceptible to debate, certain policy options a short space of time with membership ap- that might be deemed to be contrary to their plications from all four of the EFTA neutrals. principles of neutrality. A coherent line on the issue of neutrality was None of the four documents concludes urgently needed. This was no mean task. that these considerations should lead the EC The Commission’s conclusions were set out to reject applications from the EFTA neutrals. in four separate documents produced over a All four, however, stress that solutions to the period of fifteen months: namely, the Opin- problems identified would need to be found ions on Austria’s, Sweden’s and Finland’s in any accession negotiations; and that, applications and the Commission’s report to with regard to the future CFSP, specific and the Lisbon European Council of June 1992. binding assurances would need to be sought Central to all three Opinions, and implicit with regard to the applicant’s political com- in the Lisbon Report, is the Commission’s mitment and legal capacity to undertake the concern at the possible implications of what obligations entailed by this new policy. international lawyers call the “anticipatory Beyond these common elements, each effects” (Vorwirkungen in German) of per- of the four documents is subtly different in manent neutrality: the restraints on foreign tone. This is partly a reflection of the under- policy that permanent neutrals are obliged to lying differences in the character of the neu- respect even in peacetime, in order to be able trality practised by each of the four countries to adhere to a policy of strict neutrality in the concerned. Mainly, though, it is the product event of war. (The differences in the politi- of events; and, in particular, the rapid and cal and/or legal or constitutional basis of the progressive evolution of three separate but neutrality of each of the four EFTA neutrals inter-connected factors: first, the finalisa- were, for this purpose, irrelevant: they were tion and ratification of the text of the Maas- tricht Treaty; second, the wider geo-political 122 Informal meeting of Foreign Ministers at Brockett Hall (UK) on 12/13 September 1992. 124 Art J.1(2) of the Maastricht Treaty (now transposed 123 See Chapter IV above into Art 21 TEU) 51 architecture of the New Europe; and, third, It would have been difficult for the Com- the applicants’ own definitions of their re- mission to be much more forthcoming at spective concepts of neutrality. a time when German reunification was The Commission’s Opinion on Austria, only a few months old, the Warsaw Pact being the first official public manifestation of had only just been dissolved, the USSR was EC thinking on the compatibility of neutral- still in existence and we did not know for ity with EC/EU membership, was the subject certain what the final content of the Maas- of careful deliberation. Moreover, Austria tricht Treaty would be. Moreover, although was a particularly worrisome case since (a) Sweden’s application, unlike Austria’s, had her neutrality was enshrined in a Constitu- contained only the essential language, with tional Law that was difficult to change; (b) a no reference to her neutrality, it was appar- formal written reservation had been entered ent from the Government’s declaration to in her membership application: and (c) we the Swedish Parliament that they intended, were being obliged to take a position at a as EC Members, to continue to pursue Swe- time when events in Europe were still evolv- den’s traditional security policy; and that, in ing and when the final outcome of the Maas- particular, they reserved their position with tricht negotiations was still far from clear. respect to any possible defence option.126 Had Luckily, on the other hand, events in Europe the Commission’s lawyers had their way, the had moved on considerably in the two years language of the Commission’s Opinion on since Austria’s application. The risk of Rus- Austria would have been markedly tougher. sian opposition to Austrian membership had But the Commission’s Opinions on accession evaporated: the Moscow Memorandum could applications are political documents, not be consigned to the dustbin of history. The legal documents. The Austrian Government, Commission’s analysis thus focussed solely for its part, sensibly chose to interpret the on the compatibility of neutrality with the Opinion as a positive sign that membership future EU Treaties such as they were likely to and neutrality were at least not necessarily emerge from the ongoing Intergovernmental incompatible in principle. Conference. It was not until almost a year later that the The Opinion on Austria was unquestion- Commission tabled its next two contribu- ably the most toughly worded of the four tions on the subject: its report to the Lisbon documents. We did not accept the argument European Council and, shortly thereafter, its put forward by the Austrian authorities that Opinion on Sweden’s membership applica- Austria’s neutrality represented an obliga- tion. During the intervening period, much tion “accepted for the purpose of maintain- had changed. Estonia and Latvia had declared ing peace and international security” such their independence. The dismemberment, at as to permit Austria to exempt herself from the end of 1991, of the USSR had marked the certain Treaty obligations.125 Consequently, definitive end of the Cold War. The EC had unless the EU were to grant Austria a spe- meanwhile signed association agreements cial derogation from the EC Treaties, Aus- (Europe Agreements) with three former tria would have to redefine her neutrality. Warsaw Pact members – Poland, Hungary Moreover, with regard to the future common and Czechoslovakia – and was well advanced foreign and security policy it was not at all in its negotiations for similar agreements self-evident, by reference to the draft texts with another two – Bulgaria and Rumania. which had at that stage been accepted as the All of these agreements held out the ultimate basis for negotiations, that Austria would be prospect of full EC membership. constitutionally capable of entering into the Events had also moved on within the EC sort of obligations to which the CFSP might itself. The Maastricht Treaty, agreed in prin- give rise. Such was the Commission’s clear ciple at the Maastricht European Council of message at that stage to Austria, Sweden and December 1991, had been signed in Febru- other potential neutral applicants. ary 1992. The text, as finalised, provided for

125 Cf. Art 347 TFEU (at that time Art. 224 of the EEC 126 Government Declaration to the Swedish Parliament Treaty) of 14 June 1991 52 the establishment of a common foreign and members than of existing Member States.129 security policy that “shall include all ques- The fact was however that the Commission tions relating to the security of the Union, had a duty, under the EC Treaties, to ana- including the eventual framing of a common lyse the issue and present its conclusions to defence policy, which might in time lead to the EC Council. The Member States were, by a common defence”. However, just three contrast, under no obligation at that stage to weeks before Lisbon, the Treaty had been make their views known and remained, at narrowly rejected by the Danish people in a least in public, largely silent. The tabling of referendum. the Commission’s report was noted without How large a role the Danish “no” vote comment. As already mentioned, the issue of played in influencing EC attitudes toward neutrality was not collectively addressed by neutrality has been the subject of much the Member States in the Council Framework debate. In practice, it seems to have influ- until the informal Foreign Ministers meeting enced attitudes in two mutually conflicting at Brocket Hall in September 1992; and it was directions. On the one hand, there was an not until the opening of the CFSP chapter of understandable desire to ensure that the ap- the negotiations in November 1993 that sub- plicant countries would not create the same stantive positions had to be taken. sort of difficulties that the Danes just had; or, This did not mean, however, that Mem- as President Koivisto puts it: “from now on ber States did not hold strong views. As the our breath would smell different”.127 On the internal EC discussions about the handling other hand, the Danish “no” vote was – to- of Austria’s application showed, Member gether with the subsequent close result of the States were far from indifferent to the issue French referendum – an important reality of neutrality. Nor, as some have claimed, check for those with high ambitions for the were concerns limited to a small group of the EU’s future common security and defence more “federal” minded Member States. The policy, for whom the final outcome of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for Maastricht negotiations had already been a example, went on record in February 1992130 disappointment. The lower those ambitions, with the following: “We and other Member the sooner would the progressive redefini- States would want new members to par- tion by the EFTA neutrals of their concept of ticipate fully in CFSP and related Commu- neutrality reach the bar of acceptability. nity activities (e.g. an economic embargo). In its report to the Lisbon European The neutral EFTA applicants would need to Council,128 the Commission took a favour- demonstrate that they could and would fully able attitude towards the accession of the comply with the acquis.” The report contin- EFTA applicants, whose membership “would ues: “Keeping defence in the WEU, with its strengthen the Community in a number of Treaty link to NATO, should ensure that fu- ways”; but with the qualification that “the ture accessions to the Union (for example by question of neutrality, and its compatibility neutral countries) do not undermine NATO’s with the common foreign and security poli- central role in European defence.” A few cy, is however a particular concern”. weeks earlier, FCO Minister Tristan Garel- The Commission suffered a fair amount of Jones, during a visit to Helsinki, had asked criticism from the applicants for proposing President Koivisto outright whether Finland that they should be obliged to give “specific would be prepared, as an EC member, to join and binding assurances” in respect of the fu- in sanctions against Russia if this became ture CFSP. The constant refrain was that the necessary.131 EC was demanding more of its future new

129 See for example Koivisto p. 245 and Lipponen (1994) p. 96 130 Memorandum on Enlargement of the European 127 Koivisto, p.243 Community: Implications for the UK, submitted in 128 European Commission: Europe and the Challenge evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on of Enlargement, 24 June 1992 (Bulletin of the the European Communities, 25 February 1992 European Communities, Supplement 3/92) 131 Koivisto, p.237 53 When the moment finally came for Mem- to the EU, it was not in our interest to make ber States to address the issue, the Commis- too great an issue of this. A certain amount sion’s proposal proved to represent pretty of fudge was necessary to keep the show on much the consensus view of the Member the road while geo-political developments in States. Europe took their course and the likely future The Lisbon European Council was the de- evolution of the CFSP became clearer. When, cisive moment in the debate about neutral- in August 1992, the Commission delivered its ity, even though the word itself did not figure Opinion on Sweden’s application,133 Bildt’s in the conclusions of the meeting. The deci- remarks were thus duly noted as proof that sion by EU Leaders that negotiations would Swedish policy had evolved considerably. We be opened with the EFTA applicants (albeit remained concerned, however, about Swe- without fixing a precise date) was implicit den’s apparent reservations in relation to the confirmation of the Commission’s view that eventual framing of a common defence policy neutrality was not in principle an obstacle to and, even more markedly, in relation to the membership. From then on it was merely a possible establishment in time of a common question of defining precisely what assur- defence.134 ances the EU side would seek during the ac- Ironically, at the very moment when Aus- cession negotiations in order to assuage its tria and Sweden were trying so hard, against concerns. Moreover, the decision to open the scepticism of international lawyers, to negotiations was a clear sign of confidence defend the compatibility of neutrality with that those concerns could now be met. EC/EU membership, the Finnish Govern- Central to this process was a succession ment was still, as late as mid-1991, officially of official statements from the candidates proclaiming the opposite. Finnish neutral- themselves, defining what neutrality meant ity was, of course, quite different in nature to them in the new geopolitical realities of from that of the other EFTA neutrals. Unlike Europe. The new Swedish Prime Minister, that of Sweden and Switzerland, it did not go Carl Bildt, had declared in his Government’s back in time to any of the great rendezvous policy statement of 4 October 1991 that the of European history, such as the Congress of term “policy of neutrality” was no longer an Vienna or the Versailles Treaty. Unlike that adequate description and that his govern- of Austria, it had not been imposed by out- ment preferred instead to speak of a “Swed- side forces. Indeed, quite to the contrary, ish foreign and security policy with a Eu- Finland had struggled for years to get her ropean identity”. He went on, in December self-proclaimed neutrality recognised at all 1991, to welcome the decisions taken at the by the two main Cold War protagonists and Maastricht European Council and to confirm had finally achieved unreserved recognition Sweden’s willingness to participate fully only during the respective visits to Helsinki in the CFSP. A few days prior to the Lisbon by Reagan in May 1988 and Gorbachev in European Council Austria addressed an aide- October 1989.135 Some indeed (like those of memoire to all EC Member States in which, the “Finlandisation” school) had argued that echoing an earlier statement by Foreign Min- the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line did not really ister Mock, she committed herself fully and count as neutrality at all in the traditional unreservedly to the objectives of the CFSP sense of the term, owing to Finland’s Treaty and undertook to “participate in this policy of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual As- and its dynamic development actively and in sistance with the USSR. Moreover, Finland a spirit of solidarity”.132 had from 1947 to 1956 (albeit not voluntarily) Bildt’s statements, like the later Austrian hosted a Soviet naval base on her territory, ones, were visibly somewhat ahead of domes- tic public opinion. Having acknowledged, 133 Opinion of the Commission of 31 July 1992 on however, that the accession of the EFTA Sweden’s application for membership (Bulletin of the applicants would on the whole be of benefit European Communities, Supplement 5/92) 134 Cf Treaty on European Union, Art. J.4(1) 132 Full text (in the original German) available at: 135 Koivisto, pp. 111-112 and 128-129; Lipponen pp. http://www.ena.lu 85-86 54 which, in the words of President Paasikivi clauses in the 1947 Treaty of Paris that limited himself, “lent Finnish neutrality a colour of the size of Finland’s armed forces, as well as its own that did not quite fit the handbooks of the references in the FCMA to Germany as a international law”.136 Paavo Lipponen argues potential aggressor. The next important step that Finland in reality practised two paral- was the replacement of the FCMA by a CSCE- lel foreign policies after the Second World style bilateral treaty, without any clauses War: on the one hand, a policy for bilateral on military cooperation, which was signed relations with the Soviet Union; and, on the with Russia in January 1992, following the other, a policy of neutrality to increase the collapse of the USSR. These two initiatives, room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and taken already prior to the tabling of Fin- to permit Finland to participate in Western land’s application, were important elements economic integration.137 The Commission’s in our evaluation. We also noted closely the task, however, was not to pass judgment on language on foreign and security policy used Finland’s foreign policy line during the Cold in the two Government reports tabled in the War, but to assess to what extent Finland’s Finnish Parliament in the run-up to the ta- policy of neutrality, as currently defined, bling of Finland’s application. In these, the might constrain her future fulfilment of the core of Finnish neutrality was characterised obligations of EU membership. Here, our as “military non-alignment and independ- concern was essentially the same as for the ent defence”. other neutral applicants: namely how far the Aho, in his speech to the Parliament on peacetime foreign policy limitations implicit 16 March, had stressed that “in seeking EC in the “anticipatory effects” of permanent membership, Finland approves the acquis neutrality would prevent the applicant, as communautaire, the content of the Maas- an EU member, from participating as a truly tricht Treaty and the finalité politiqueof the free actor in the decision-making processes European Union”. Identical language was of the future CFSP. used by President Koivisto in the speech he The main issue here was, of course, Fin- delivered in October 1992 to the College of land’s relationship with her neighbour to the Europe in Bruges. The Finnish Government East. As Soviet power waned, Finland had did not, however, regard membership of the begun (in Max Jakobson’s colourful simile) WEU as constituting a precondition of mem- “to edge towards full participation in West- bership of the EU. When pressed on this point ern institutions, but gingerly, like a hunter by Delors, when the two met in Brussels just who has shot a bear but is not quite sure that after the Bruges speech, Koivisto replied that the beast is dead”.138 We followed this process a decision regarding WEU membership could closely, and with great interest, in Brus- be taken only once Finland had become an sels. We took little, if any, reassurance from EU member. Although we did not share the the USSR’s informal indications (of which apparent view of the Finnish authorities that the Finns were well aware139) that they had the WEU would be developed merely as an no objection to Finland’s joining the EC. If instrument of crisis management for the Un- anything, they served on the contrary to re- ion, we did not press the point further at that inforce the suspicions of those who saw the stage. EFTA neutrals as potential “Trojan horses” Thus, by the time the Commission came to within the CFSP. What really mattered was adopt its Opinion on Finland’s application,140 how Finland interpreted the situation and Finland’s post-WWII foreign and defence what the reaction of the Finnish Government policy had already undergone a huge meta- was. morphosis. In being a late comer to the list By October 1990, the latter had felt con- of applicants, Finland had the advantage of fident enough to abrogate unilaterally the being able to observe, and learn from, EC reactions to the applications, and subsequent 136 Jakobson, p. 60 137 Lipponen, p. 94 140 Opinion of the Commission of 4 November 1992 on 138 Jakobson, p. 103 Finland’s application for membership (Bulletin of the 139 Kuosmanen, p.7 European Communities, Supplement 6/92) 55 “clarificatory” statements, of Austria and Sweden. Moreover, by the time of Finland’s application, and even more so by the time the Commission delivered its Opinion, most of the factors that would inevitably have com- plicated matters had, in one way or another, been resolved. Thus, while the Commission’s Opinion contains the same Lisbon language on “specific and binding assurances” as for Sweden, it is otherwise noticeably more positive, and softer in tone, in its assessment of foreign and security policy. In short, neutrality was, in the end, large- ly a non-issue during the accession negotia- tions themselves because the real debate had already taken place earlier in other forms. By the time negotiations on the Common Foreign and Security Policy chapter began in November 1993, the candidates had, for the most part, already adapted their respective concepts of neutrality to the new geo-polit- ical realities of Europe and confirmed their preparedness to accept without question the full application to them of the EU’s CFSP acquis. There was, in the end, not much else that could realistically be requested of them.

56 Photo: Bruno Girin / Flickr.com

VIII

ÅLAND ASPIRATIONS – AND EU ANXIETIES lthough the Åland chapter of the ac- in 1917.142 The League recognised Finland’s cession negotiations did not, at any sovereignty over the Åland Islands, subject to Astage, look set to be a deal-breaker, certain guarantees for the protection of the it was one of number of issues that had been islanders. Subsequent bilateral discussions flagged by Finland as being of specific con- between Finland and Sweden led to a Finnish cern. It was also one that demanded a fair undertaking to introduce into the existing amount of my own personal attention during 1920 Law of Autonomy of the Åland Islands the negotiations. The main challenge lay not certain additional guarantees for the preser- so much in the difficulty of the issues on the vation of the Swedish language, culture and negotiating table (on most of which agree- local traditions of Åland.143 By the time of the ment was fairly rapidly reached) as in the accession negotiations, these new provisions difficulty of defining precisely what those is- had undergone review and major extension sues should be. While discussions never quite twice, most recently through the 1991 Au- descended to the level of surrealism of the tonomy Act, which is still in force. CFSP chapter, they certainly had their oc- Finland’s international obligations are casional Kafkaesque moments. Even today, moreover not limited to preserving the lan- misconceptions still abound. guage, culture and traditions of Åland. She is The difficulty of the dossier was essentially also required to maintain the archipelago as a threefold. In the first place, the legal status of demilitarised and neutralised zone. The his- Åland is inherently complex, based as it is on tory of this obligation – sometimes referred a series of international and domestic legal to as the Åland Islands Servitude – goes back instruments adopted over the previous cen- to the little-known Northern Campaign of tury and a half. Secondly, few if any on the EU the Crimean War, when the Russian for- side had, at the time of Finland’s application, tress at Bomarsund was destroyed by a large much knowledge of this. Thirdly, the Åland Anglo-French naval force.144 As part of the authorities, whose consent Helsinki needed subsequent Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, the on matters over which Åland had autonomy, Åland Islands were, at British and French in- had at that time little understanding of the sistence, made into a permanently demilita- workings of the EU and were primarily con- rised zone. The taking over of this obligation cerned with testing the limits of the recently by Finland, as successor state, was confirmed modified Autonomy Act. by the 1921 Convention on the non-fortifica- Åland’s legal status is quite unlike that of tion and neutralisation of the Åland Islands, any other region or territory of an EU Member drawn up pursuant to the above Resolution of State. There are within the EU many examples the League. Similar obligations are imposed of autonomous or semi-autonomous regions on Finland by the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of and territories, including several with their 1940 concerning the Åland Islands, as well own special language regime. But in none as by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. The 1921 of these cases is this special status a conse- Convention, which was signed by Germany, quence of the international obligations of the Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Member State in question. Åland’s special Latvia, Poland, Sweden and the UK, includes status is, by contrast, a direct result of a 1921 in addition a prohibition on military and na- Resolution of the now-defunct League of Na- val operations in the archipelago.145 tions141 – one of the few success stories of the League –adopted in response to a territorial 142 For a comprehensive account of the League’s dispute between Finland and Sweden that deliberations and the events leading up to them, see had arisen following Finland’s independence­ Barros (1968) 143 This undertaking was formally annexed to the above Resolution by the Council of the League’s decision of 27 June 1921 (Official Journal of the League of Nations, Sept 1921, p. 701). 144 For a full account of this campaign see Greenhill & 141 Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations Giffard (1988) of 24 June 1921 (Official Journal of the League of 145 For a detailed analysis of Finland’s obligations Nations, Sept 1921, p. 699) under these various instruments see Rosas (1997) 58 At the time of Finland’s application, few, by the EEA Agreement147 – to which at that if any, on the EU side were aware of all this, stage the Åland Lagting had still not yet if indeed they had ever heard of Åland at given its assent. On the issues arising from all.146 Some of our legal experts might have Åland’s autonomy, much would depend on been able to cite the international case law what requests for derogations Helsinki in referred to above, but would probably have the end chose to table (bearing in mind the been hard-pressed to locate Åland on a map. more ambitious agenda of Mariehamn). As Even the handful of us in the European Com- for Åland’s demilitarised and neutralised mission who by then knew Finland reason- status, this was, like neutrality in general, a ably well had a fair bit of homework to do deeply sensitive issue; all the more so given on the subject. I had never set foot in Åland that Finland was bound by international ob- before and therefore included a stopover in ligations to which a number of existing and Mariehamn in the visit I made to Finland in future EU Member States were also party, as late August 1992 as part of the Commission’s well as Russia. The Commission’s Opinion, preparatory work on its Opinion. This ena- after summarising in a few paragraphs the bled me to have the benefit of full briefings, essential features of Åland’s autonomy and of both from the Åland authorities and from its demilitarised and neutralised status, con- their counterparts in Helsinki. These were sequently limited itself to noting that “the extremely useful, not least in revealing the status of the Åland Islands… thus calls for a considerable differences in their respective more detailed examination during accession approaches. negotiations”.148 Our work at that stage was of a purely The negotiations themselves were, as far analytical nature, focussed, on the one hand, as the Åland chapter was concerned, effec- on getting an overall picture of Finland’s tively a pas de deux à trois. Formally speak- international legal obligations in respect of ing, given that Åland has no treaty-making Åland and of the key relevant provisions of competence, there were only two negotiating the new Autonomy Act, then about to enter partners: on the one hand, the EU Member into force; and, on the other hand, on mak- States (represented by the Presidency and/ ing a broad assessment of possible conflicts or the Commission); and, on the other, the between these provisions and the EU acquis. Finnish authorities in Helsinki. Since, how- Were there elements in Åland’s autonomy or ever, Finland could not bind Åland, in respect in its demilitarisation and neutralisation that of matters covered by the Autonomy Act, might lead to Finland’s being unable or un- without the consent of the Åland Lagting, willing to implement parts of the EU acquis? Helsinki was obliged, both in drawing up That was the essential question the Commis- its initial negotiating position and through- sion had to answer. It was neither an exhaus- out the negotiations, to conduct a parallel tive process, akin to the later “screening” of negotiation with Mariehamn. Matters were the acquis, nor a negotiation, aimed at find- further complicated by the fact that the ac- ing solutions to the problems identified. cession negotiations were taking place at a It was clear, from our analysis of the time when the Åland authorities were testing material available to us, that there were at the possibilities open to them under the new least potential conflicts with the EU acquis Åland Autonomy Act that had entered into in respect of both autonomy and demilita- force in January 1993. There was moreover a risation/neutralisation; and that Åland was therefore inevitably going to be a negotiating issue that would require a special mention in 147 Finland had sought and obtained special provisions the Opinion. It was, however, extremely dif- (Article 126 (2)) permitting Åland to retain vis-à- ficult at that stage to foresee precisely what vis non-Ålanders, on a non-discriminatory basis, the parameters of that negotiation were like- restrictions on the purchase of real estate and on the right of establishment and freedom to provide ly to be, over and above the points covered ­ services. 148 Opinion of the Commission on Finland’s 146 In one document, Åland was confused with the application for membership, Bulletin of the European Swedish island of Öland. Communities, Supplement 6/92 59 considerable lack of knowledge on the Åland international­ legal instruments governing side about the EU; and in particular about the status of Åland. how negotiations for EU enlargement were At the formal opening of the accession conducted. negotiations in February 1993, the EU side The Åland authorities had set out, in had, as already noted,150 stressed that acces- a Communication of early 1992 to the sion implied full acceptance by the Candi- Lagting,149 a very ambitious agenda for the date Country of the EU acquis, subject only accession negotiations. The “model” they to such technical adjustments, temporary were seeking for Åland participation in the derogations and transitional arrangements EU, on which I was given an extensive brief- as were agreed in the negotiations. We had ing on the occasion of my visit to Mariehamn also made it clear that EEA provisions de- that August, involved: parting from the acquis, such as transitional measures and derogations, could not auto- • measures to safeguard the Ålanders matically be transposed into the Accession as a unilingual Swedish-speaking Treaty. In the EEA, special derogations, pro- national minority; vided they were strictly limited in number • full participation in the common and scope, had been in principle acceptable. market for goods and services, but with EU accession was an entirely different mat- the right to retain restrictions connected ter and any such requests would have to be to regional citizenship; examined afresh ab initio. • special solutions concerning taxation This did not mean that the EU was neces- and economic legislation (especially sarily opposed a priori to special provisions of continuation of duty-free sales on some sort for Åland. On the contrary, it was ferries to Åland, VAT exemption for obvious that special arrangements would be tourism services and the possibility to needed. However, if Finland considered that operate “offshore” financial services); she needed to derogate from the full applica- • confirmation of Åland’s status as a tion of the acquis in order to accommodate demilitarised zone; the special situation of Åland, then it was, • EU to take over the role of the in the first instance, for Finland to justify League of Nations in policing the 1921 this and to come forward with appropriate guarantees and settling conflicts of proposals in the negotiating conference, to authority between Mariehamn and which the EU would then respond. Helsinki Nor, it should be stressed, was anybody on the EU side seeking to question the principle There was also considerable concern (as in or extent of Åland’s autonomy, let alone its other parts of Finland) about the effects of EU demilitarisation and neutralisation. The EU membership on local agriculture and fisher- was in any event – not being (unlike certain ies. of its Member States) a party to any of the in- We could not of course react formally to ternational legal instruments concerned – in these ideas, since negotiations had not yet no position to do so. These were simply the been launched and our formal negotiating fixed parameters of the equation. What was partner would in any case be Helsinki, and at issue was whether, in those cases where not Mariehamn. I and other Commission the special status of Åland created actual or colleagues did, however, make clear in our potential conflicts with Finland’s imple- informal contacts that some of these propos- mentation of the EU acquis, mutually satis- als, in particular the two last bullet points factory solutions could be found within the above, were quite unrealistic. We explained context of Finland’s accession negotiations. the general EU approach to accession nego- This fundamental point, central to the EU’s tiations and reminded our interlocutors that whole approach to the Åland dossier, was not the EU as such was not party to any of the always well understood in Mariehamn.

149 Landskapstyrelses meddelande till Landtinget (EG-med. nr 1) of 11 March 1992 150 See Chapter V above 60 The Finnish Government, for its part, over the policing of Finland’s international put down a firm marker in Foreign Trade ­obligations; nor did the EU have a position as Minister Pertti Salolainen’s statement to the regards the internal allocation of a Member opening Ministerial Session: “The specific le- State’s seats in the European Parliament. We gal and constitutional position of the Åland already knew that Helsinki did not regard Islands must be taken into account in the ne- demilitarisation, neutralisation or autonomy gotiations. Accession by Finland to the Com- as such to be issues for negotiation with the munity must not affect the rights granted to EU. It therefore came as no surprise to us that this province by virtue of its autonomy”. This these issues were not in the end taken up in was a clear indication that Finland’s negotia- the Finnish Position Paper when it was finally tors intended to focus on the autonomy is- tabled. sue; it left open the question of how far they The Paper stressed that Finland’s goal was intended (as desired by Mariehamn) to raise that her EU Membership should also cover the issue of the demilitarisation and neutrali- the Åland Islands; but that, by virtue of the sation of the islands. archipelago’s special legal status and eco- Although work was, by this time, seem- nomic circumstances, special terms of acces- ingly already well advanced on the prepa- sion would be necessary. The “special terms” ration of the Finnish position,151 the formal proposed were effectively (as in the earlier Finnish Position Paper on the status of the EEA negotiations) a modified version of the Åland Islands in the context of Finland’s ac- solution agreed for the Faroe Islands at the cession was tabled only at a much later stage time of Danish accession, namely: in the negotiations, in October 1993. The EU side had given Helsinki to understand that • that the EEC,152 ECSC and Euratom there was no great urgency here. Helsinki Treaties should not apply to Åland was, moreover, still in deep disagreement unless Finland, when depositing its with Mariehamn about the content of the ratification, gave notice that they should Paper. apply (which replicated exactly the After taking up my post as Ambassa- Faroese precedent); dor and Head of the European Commission • that in that latter event, the Delegation in Helsinki in March 1993, I had application of the Treaties to Åland maintained close and regular contacts with should be subject to a special Protocol both Helsinki and Mariehamn on this dos- providing derogations in respect sier. By the end of July, I was able to report of voting rights, the right to hold to Brussels that agreement had been reached or acquire real estate, the right of between the two on most issues concerning establishment and freedom to provide the Åland economy and regional citizenship, services and the application of EU rules including the very important question of on the harmonisation of taxation (the the preservation of duty-free sales on fer- proposed content of the Protocol was ries. (The latter was not formally speaking novel, since none of the EU provisions in a part of Åland’s autonomy, but it was re- question had been in force at the time of garded, both in Mariehamn and in Helsinki, previous enlargements). as essential to the maintenance of a viable local economy in Åland.) Mariehamn was, Helsinki proposed in addition that Finland however, still pressing for references in the should be allowed to make a unilateral dec- Finnish position paper to demilitarisation/ laration recalling that the Finnish consti- neutralisation, guarantees for Åland autono- tutional and legal provisions governing the my and the possibility of an Åland seat in the autonomy of the Åland Islands had been European Parliament. I had stressed, dur- adopted pursuant to the two League of Na- ing a visit to Mariehamn earlier that month, tions Resolutions of 1921 and “that the Åland that Åland could not expect the EU to take 152 Which would become the European Community (EC) Treaty following the entry into force of the Treaty 151 Kuosmanen, Ch. 25, p. 257 of Maastricht 61 Islands are the subject of an established sta- indirect­ tax derogation (designed to permit tus under international law”. the continuation of duty-free sales on fer- The fact that the Finnish Government, in ries to and from Åland) to create a tax-free drawing up its formal position paper, had haven in Åland. This was not an altogether understandably and quite sensibly based unfounded fear. Helsinki had, it was true, itself on established precedents from previ- stressed in its Position Paper that it was not ous accession negotiations ought in theory seeking, via the requested derogation, un- to have made the negotiation of the Åland justified economic benefits. But it was com- chapter a fairly straightforward affair. The mon knowledge that Mariehamn had been potential economic impact of the deroga- seeking a wider economic derogation similar tions requested was relatively easy to as- to that applying to the Isle of Man. Only fol- sess. Indeed, except for those relating to lowing further specific reassurances from voting rights and duty–free sales, they had Finland in this regard, and the introduction already been examined in depth during the of some additional language in the Protocol, EEA negotiations. Unfortunately for Finland, was the matter finally resolved. however, these were the first accession ne- The imminent entry into force of the gotiations to take place since the completion, Maastricht Treaty, creating as it did a new following the Single European Act, of the three-pillar European Union with its own EU’s Single Market. As we were to see also in Common Foreign and Security Policy, led to other areas of the accession negotiations (in additional complications for the Åland chap- particular as regards transitional arrange- ter. Although Helsinki had been most careful ments for agriculture) this made the EU less not to make any reference in its Position Paper willing to follow without question some of to the demilitarised and neutralised status of the precedents established in earlier acces- the Åland Islands,153 it was a fact of life that sion negotiations. could not be denied. For those concerned Thus it was that, when a draft EU position about the future development of the CFSP, paper, essentially favourable to Finland’s it posed the same basic problem as Finland’s requests, was circulated for inter-depart- neutrality in general:154 namely, whether it mental consultation within the Commis- might limit the political commitment and sion, major concerns were voiced about the legal capacity of Finland to fulfil the obliga- potential consequences of the proposed tions of the EU’s future Common Foreign derogations for the proper functioning of and Security Policy. But it posed it in a more the Single Market, particularly in view of acute manner since Finland was, by virtue of their permanent nature, the possible future her international obligations, not at liberty, use that might be made of them and the fact as she was for Finnish neutrality in general, that not all of them appeared to be strictly to alter or reinterpret the demilitarised and justified by Finland’s international obliga- neutralised status of the Åland Islands. Finn- tions in respect of the Åland Islands. After ish political leaders had of course reiterated some internal debate, the Commission did in on several occasions that Finland accepted the end propose broadly to grant the Finnish in full the acquis of the CFSP as well as the requests here, but only with respect to exist- finalité politique of the Union, and that they ing restrictions, and subject to the possibil- were not looking for any derogations or spe- ity of review should these subsequently lead cial arrangements for Finland in respect of to distortions of competition within the EU. the CFSP. Neither had Finland asked for any The Commission also proposed that the EU for any special reference to Åland’s demili- should reserve the right to take any neces- tarisation or neutralisation, let alone for any sary measures to avoid trade distortions for special provisions to accommodate them. agricultural products in the event that Åland But it left some on the EU side nervous, not in the end remained outside the EC. Further problems surfaced when the 153 Helsinki submitted a separate “non-paper” on formal EU response was being finalised the status of the Åland Islands under national and with Member States. A number of the latter international law. were concerned that Finland might use the 154 See Chapter VII above 62 least since we knew that Mariehamn had binding upon each party in respect of its en- been pushing for just that. tire territory. The EU’s legal advisors, on the Concern became focussed on the proposed hand, were of the view that, since the newly- Finnish unilateral Declaration. Some of the formed European Union was “founded on EU’s legal experts considered that, by men- the European Communities”, to which the tioning the League of Nations Resolution, it new policies and forms of cooperation were drew attention – albeit indirectly – to the merely a supplement,155 the provisions on the Convention on non-fortification and neu- territorial application of the EC Treaty ap- tralisation. Allowing such a reference, it was plied by extension to the two new “pillars”. feared, could be tantamount to giving sup- Moreover, even if there was some ambiguity port to legal provisions that were potentially concerning the status of certain territories of incompatible with future developments of Member States that had acceded earlier, the the CFSP; at the very least, it placed a ques- Maastricht Treaty stated clearly156 that acces- tion mark over Finland’s full participation sion was now possible only to the Union as a in the latter. While such seeming paranoia whole, not to individual “pillars”. might appear strange today, it was perhaps There followed several weeks of learned understandable in the context of other de- and intense exchanges between the legal velopments at the time. The end result was experts of both sides. Helsinki argued force- that the proposed unilateral Declaration was fully that it was Finland, not Åland, that was not appended to the Act of Accession itself, seeking to join, and that Finland did indeed but inscribed instead in the Minutes of the intend to accede to all three “pillars”. The Conference. debate lingered on until, virtually at the end The entry into force of the Maastricht of the negotiations as a whole, the EU’s chief Treaty also gave rise to a second, more ex- negotiators concluded that this was a can istential problem: namely, whether Åland of worms it was more prudent to leave un- could have the possibility of “opting out” of opened and decided not to press the point. the EC Treaty while remaining covered by the It is interesting to note that, had the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs “pillars” Lisbon Treaty been in force at the time, the of the EU Treaty. (In its Position Paper, which issue would have been resolved rather dif- had been tabled before the entry into force ferently since the latter, like the defunct of Maastricht, Helsinki had argued that, re- Constitutional Treaty, provides for a single gardless of what happened in respect of the uniform scope of territorial application for Community Treaties (EEC, ECSC, Euratom), the EU Treaties as a whole.157 The effect of the future Maastricht provisions on CFSP and this would have been that, had the Åland Justice and Home Affairs would in any event Lagting not given its assent to the terms of apply to Åland.) accession, none of the provisions of the EU It rapidly became apparent that this was Treaties would have been applicable to the a contentious and sensitive legal grey area. Åland Islands. Åland would thus have been The drafters of the Maastricht Treaty had left completely outside the EU, as the Faroe not thought to include any special provi- Islands are now confirmed to be.158 sions concerning the territorial application There was one last-minute issue that has of the new Treaty on European Union. They since provoked controversy: namely the ad- had, however, left untouched the existing dition of a preamble to the Åland Protocol. provisions on the territorial application of It is a basic rule of EU legal drafting that all the EEC (now EC) Treaty, as well as the cor- provisions must be motivated. When the responding (identical) provisions of the ECSC final texts on Åland were being prepared and Euratom Treaties. Finnish legal experts concluded from this that the territorial ap- 155 Article A of the Maastricht Treaty on European plication of the CFSP and JHA “pillars” was Union consequently governed by the “default” pro- 156 Article O of the Maastricht Treaty on European visions of the Vienna Convention on the Law Union of Treaties: namely that, in the absence of 157 Article 52 TEU, together with Article 355 TFEU specific provisions to the contrary, they were 158 Article 355 (5) (a) TFEU 63 for adoption at the penultimate ministerial This did not mean, however, that these issues negotiating session in February 1994, one of were necessarily unimportant in influencing the EU legal experts noted that the provi- Åland’s decision on the overall package. sions of the draft Protocol were lacking such Secondly, even though the negotiations a motivation. A preamble was consequently between Helsinki and Brussels had been con- inserted referring to “the special status that cluded, talks continued for several months the Åland Islands enjoy under international between Helsinki and Mariehamn on a range law”. (The language used replicated exactly of questions arising from Finland’s prospec- that already figuring as the justificatory tive EU membership. The most important preamble to the EU’s Common Position on and difficult of these were the implementa- Åland.) The text thus amended was approved tion of Åland’s EU tax exemption and the by the negotiating session. question of representation in the European Some commentators have since argued Parliament. Brussels had a direct interest in that this preamble effectively constitutes the the first of these, since we were concerned to reference to demilitarisation and neutralisa- ensure that there were no negative effects on tion that Mariehamn had so fervently been the interests of the Union or on its common seeking. Personally, I do not share this inter- policies.160 Our concerns were heightened pretation. It seems to me quite clear that the by the fact we had been given to understand “special status” referred to is the autonomy, that Mariehamn was still hoping to achieve in not the neutralised and demilitarised status due course a status equivalent to that of the of the islands. There was no reference to the Isle of Man. The question of representation in latter in any of the formal position papers. the European Parliament was, by contrast, a The EU side most certainly did not want purely domestic Finnish issue in which we such a reference (see above). Moreover, the were not, and did not wish to be, involved. Protocol was “attached” to Article 227 of the We nevertheless followed the discussions EC Treaty and the corresponding articles of closely in view of their likely impact on the the ECSC and Euratom Treaties. There was deliberations on EU membership in the Åland no reference to it in the Treaty on European Lagting. Union. It had been agreed in the accession nego- Thus was the Åland chapter of Finland’s tiations that Finland should have the right accession negotiations concluded, as part of to elect 16 representatives to the European a wider mini-package agreed on the eve of Parliament, the same as Denmark (an exist- the final marathon negotiating session. The ing Member State of similar population size). provisions agreed were enshrined in Art.28 Helsinki was proposing that these should be of the Act of Accession and Protocol No.2 to elected on the basis of a single national list, the latter (the “Åland Protocol”).159 But that meaning that there would be no MEP specifi- was by no means the end of the story. cally representing Åland in Strasbourg. Ma- In the first place, it is important to realise riehamn argued that this would lead to a loss that only strictly Åland-specific issues, i.e. of influence for Åland on those matters where where Finland was seeking special deroga- sovereignty passed to Brussels on accession. tions from the EU acquis in respect of the The issue was still around in August 1995 Åland Islands, were dealt with in the Åland when I paid my farewell visit to Åland, just Protocol. There were many other issues of before leaving my post as Commission Head undoubted interest to Åland in the acces- of Delegation in Helsinki. I reiterated once sion negotiations (e.g. agriculture, regional again, in the concluding press conference, policy) where Finland sought transitional ar- that the question of whether Åland should or rangements or technical adaptations of one should not have its “own” MEP was not an sort or another to the EU acquis. But here issue on which the EU could be called upon Åland was treated no differently from any to take a position. As far as the EU was con- other comparable region of Finland or the EU. cerned, the total number of seats for ­Finland

159 See Act of Accession Art. 28 and Protocol No. 2 on 160 Article 2 (b) of Protocol No. 2 to the Accession the Åland Islands, OJ C 241, 29/08/1994 Treaty 64 had been definitively settled in the Act of Accession and the manner in which those seats were allocated geographically among its citizens was a purely domestic matter for Finland.161 Helsinki had therefore been quite right not to raise this question in the Finnish position paper on Åland.162 The final text of the Åland Protocol was, together with the rest of the Act of Acces- sion, submitted for the assent of the Åland Lagting in accordance with the provisions of the Act on Autonomy. It was decided that a separate advisory referendum should be held in Åland (in addition to Åland participation in Finland’s national referendum). The Åland referendum was to take place a month after the national referendum since the question of Åland assent naturally arose only if Fin- land as a whole voted yes. The Åland referen- dum was also timed to come after Sweden’s EU referendum. It was hoped that if, as ex- pected, the latter produced a “yes” result, this would have a positive influence on the Åland vote. Helsinki’s goal – as was made clear already in the Position Paper on Åland – was that Finland’s EU membership should also cover the Åland Islands. Åland’s EU referendum on 20 November 1994 produced a decisive majority of 73.6 % in favour of including Åland in Finland’s EU membership. The result was undoubt- edly boosted by the fact that both Finland as a whole and Sweden had by then voted to join: in the Finnish national referendum of 20 October, only 51.9% of Ålanders had voted in favour. Shortly thereafter the Åland Lagting gave its assent by a majority of 26 to 4. The way was thus set for Åland’s full participation in Finland’s EU membership, on the basis of the provisions set out in the Åland Protocol.

161 Ålandstidningen 18 August 1995 162 This remains however a current issue in relations between Helsinki and Mariehamn, Finland’s “quota” of MEPs having meanwhile been reduced from 16 to 13 in accordance with the Treaty of Nice. 65 Photo: Sami Oinonen / Flickr.com

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AGRICULTURAL AGONIES e had known all along that agri- rules and obligations; only that they should culture was going to be the most be applied and developed in a manner that Wdifficult issue in the Finland’s ac- took the special conditions of Finland into cession negotiations. “Accession”, the Com- account. “As to agriculture, our objectives mission had noted in its Opinion on Finland’s in the negotiations are simple: to ensure that application, “would represent an important the goals of the Common Agricultural Policy challenge for Finnish agriculture, resulting – including a fair standard of living for farm- in lower prices, reduced support levels and ers and the availability of agricultural prod- increased competition”. The key issue was ucts – will also be reached in Finland”. the price level. The basic objectives of Finn- The negotiations thus revolved essentially ish agricultural policy, as well as its main around the “technical” adaptations to be policy instruments, were in most other re- made to the EC’s agricultural and regional spects rather similar to those of the CAP. EC policy acquis so as to take account of the par- policy was, like Finnish policy, also gradually ticular conditions of the Nordic candidates expanding to encompass wider rural policy and the “transitional” measures needed to and agro-environmental objectives. We allow the full integration of Finland’s agri- knew that it was for crop products – and in cultural sector into the CAP. This concerned particular for cereals and horticulture – that not only EU support measures, but also the the biggest problems were likely to arise, as EU’s rules regarding the nature and level of a result of the short growing season and low permissible national support to farmers and temperatures prevailing at Finnish latitudes. food processors. Owing to divergent posi- For livestock producers, we calculated, low- tions of principle, the transitional arrange- er producer prices would to some extent be ments to apply for the downward alignment offset by lower production costs, in particu- of Finnish agricultural support prices onto lar for feedstuffs. What none of us realised those of the EU were also a major negotiating however until much later was that the great- issue. Among other issues, the most impor- est stumbling block would in the end be, not tant related to production quotas and animal the arctic and sub-arctic regions of N. and and plant health. Although formal and sub- E. Finland, but the agricultural heartland of stantive negotiations on agriculture began the South and Southwest where the climate, only with the tabling in September 1993 of though still harsh by normal EU standards, the Finnish Position Paper, this was preceded was relatively less extreme. by several months of informal and techni- The fundamental challenge in the nego- cal contacts between Finnish and Commis- tiations was to square two seemingly irrec- sion officials, much of this connected to the oncilable positions. On the one hand, Finland “screening” of the EU acquis. The feedback needed to achieve modifications to existing I received at the time, from both Commis- EC rules if a viable agricultural sector were to sion and Finnish interlocutors, was that be maintained in all regions of the country. these talks were proceeding satisfactorily. On the other hand, the EU’s basic position Unfortunately, essential as they were to the was that candidates had to accept the acquis process, they were also the source of many as it stood, subject only to technical adjust- later misunderstandings and accusations of ments and exceptionally to temporary – but back-tracking. not permanent – derogations and transi- In mid-June 1993, Commissioner Steichen tional arrangements. The Commission was visited Finland. This was primarily to at- moreover, for its part, most anxious to avoid tend an international ministerial meeting on re-opening any of the elements of the CAP forestry that was taking place in Helsinki. reform that had, with great difficulty, only He took the occasion, however, to meet bi- recently been agreed within the EU. Seen in laterally with both PM Aho and Agriculture this context, the basic Finnish approach was Minister Pura. Steichen’s programme also tactically a very sound one. Finland, said Sa- included a farm visit, as well as briefings lolainen in his statement to the first Ministe- for the EU Ambassadors in Helsinki and the rial Meeting of the Accession Conference, was Finnish media. There had been a rather un- not seeking derogations from Community ­ helpful article in Helsingin Sanomat based 67 on an interview he had given earlier in Brus- The first reactions from the EU side were sels, to the effect that Finland’s needs were set out in a Memorandum adopted by the not being recognised. Steichen did his best to Commission in late November 1993 and cov- correct this, stressing his optimism that so- ering the three interlinked fields of structural lutions to Finland’s agricultural needs could policy, regional state aids and support for indeed be found within the existing CAP. As agriculture in respect of all four candidates. I pointed out privately to some of my Finn- It was not a formal EU Position Paper, but ish contacts, however, bringing Steichen an internal document intended to pave the to Southern Finland in the middle of June, way for the subsequent tabling of individual when the sun was shining most of the day, EU positions papers. It did not consequently the crops were shooting up in the fields and attempt to respond in detail to each of the re- the cows were grazing contentedly on lush quests tabled by the Candidates. It was nev- green grass, may have left him with a rather ertheless an important indication of the way over-rosy impression of the real difficulties thinking was going. facing Finnish farmers. Conscious of the huge sensitivity of this The Finnish Position Paper on agricul- issue in Finland, I arranged, with the agree- ture, when it finally emerged, was a detailed ment of Brussels, to give a personal briefing document of some 125 pages, accompanied to Prime Minister Aho, who had earlier that by a further 60 or so pages on animal and month written to Delors to express his con- plant health issues: a total, according to Antti cerns on the subject. The Commission Mem- Kuosmanen’s calculations, of 134 separate orandum was in fact more positive towards requests.163 The central thrust was the con- Finland’s requests than we were initially tinued provision of a high level of support to given credit for. As I stressed to Aho and oth- Finnish farmers, to compensate them for the ers, the Commission had explicitly accepted difficult production conditions prevailing that the candidate countries should be able in Finland. The two key elements proposed to maintain farming throughout their ter- for achieving this were: on the one hand, ritory. We had indicated openness towards the classification of the whole of Finland as the Finnish proposal to consider latitude as a “less-favoured” area for the purposes of a surrogate for altitude in the definition of the EU Structural Funds; and, on the other, mountain, hill and less-favoured areas. We the payment of regionally graduated direct had also taken a positive attitude towards subsidies per hectare and per livestock unit. national support measures, even accepting Finland requested in addition to be allowed that these could, where justified by agro-cli- to grant national support to livestock pro- matic conditions, be of a long-term nature. duction in the northern half of the country, Contrary to the many rumours that had been as well as national transport subsidies for the flying around earlier in Helsinki, the Com- primary processing of milk, meat and eggs. mission had not rejected out of hand Finnish By way of transitional arrangements, Finnish requests in relation to Southern Finland, but support prices, it was proposed, should be had deliberately left the issue open for nego- reduced only gradually to the EU level. tiation. The Position Paper was not without its Much of the negative press reporting cen- critics in Finland. On the one hand, the So- tred on the Commission’s rejection of grad- cial Democrat Opposition attacked both the ual price alignment, which was widely mis- budgetary cost and the burden placed on understood as implying an immediate drop consumers by the proposed gradual price in farm incomes. As I had to keep pointing alignment. In the opposite direction, there out, this did not mean that there would no were criticisms from the farming lobby, and transitional regime, just that it would have from within Aho’s own Centre Party, that it to take another form. I had, from my arrival did not do enough for farmers in Southern in Helsinki onwards, warned my Finnish in- Finland. For Brussels, it was problematic on terlocutors that the prevailing view in Brus- several fronts. sels – which I shared – was that the abolition of frontier controls within the Single Market 163 Kuosmanen, p.113 effectively ruled out gradual price alignment 68 for agricultural products. There were, admit- other, more fundamental, issues and was a tedly, divided views on the matter, and the source of irritation to EU Ministers. Finnish side appears to have concluded from In the early weeks of 1994, as the negotia- its exploratory contacts with Commission tions proceeded towards their final climax, officials in the agriculture department that there was a flurry of high level contacts in price alignment could be organised as for both directions. On 20 January, Greek For- previous enlargements, with levies or re- eign Minister Pangalos, who – as President- funds (“accession compensatory amounts”) in-Office of the EU Council – was now chair- being respectively charged or granted on ing the negotiations from the EU side, visited Finnish imports and exports to compensate Helsinki, as part of his final round of Applicant for the remaining price differential. But this, capitals, accompanied by Council Secretary as the Commission’s Memorandum pointed General Ersbøll and by officials from Athens out, meant the retention of border controls, and the Commission. He met with President not just for agricultural trade but – because Koivisto, Prime Minister Aho, Foreign Min- of the risk of fraud – for all trade between ister Haavisto and Foreign Trade Minister Finland and the rest of the Union. The Com- Salolainen. His reassurances on procedure mission, for its part, was not prepared to were well received. He confirmed in par- sanction such a fundamental breach of Sin- ticular the Presidency’s commitment to the gle Market principles. This was perhaps the 1 March deadline, and outlined the timetable most high profile issue on which exploratory of Ministerial Sessions foreseen for February, contacts between Finnish and Commission to culminate in a last minute marathon ses- experts led the subsequent negotiations se- sion. (He declined however, at the subsequent riously astray. Unfortunately, it was not the press conference, to rule out the possibility last such incident. of a break in parallelism.) On substance, he A different Finnish line might not neces- was – perhaps understandably – rather less sarily have facilitated earlier agreement on specific, limiting himself to expressing un- the transitional regime, as the final details derstanding for Finnish difficulties, openness of the latter were so closely bound up with to the use of latitude as a criterion for agri- those of the longer term regime towards cultural support, as well as to the possibility which Finnish agriculture was supposed to of national coverage for special measures and adapt. This applied in particular to the budg- to the idea of EU co-financing both for tran- etary implications: if transitional payments sitional income support and for permanent were to be made to Finnish producers to aid. He stressed the need to remain within compensate for the immediate fall in support the existing EU Financial Perspectives and prices, how was the cost to be divided be- Structural Fund provisions. tween Helsinki and Brussels? Had it not been, Four days later, as part of a continuing however, for the continued stand-off on the round of visits to EU capitals, Aho stopped basic issue of principle, work could have off in Brussels on his way to a Council of Eu- begun at a much earlier date on some of the rope meeting in Strasbourg. Shortly after his underlying technical problems. Price align- return, he gave a dinner for EU Ambassadors ment, whether immediate or in stages, poses in Helsinki, at which President Koivisto was the risk of speculative market disruption. the guest of honour. The mood on the Finnish There is also the problem of how to deal with side was distinctly downbeat. Aho expressed higher-priced stocks produced at an earlier himself concerned that, despite what ap- date. The (still relatively inefficient) Finnish peared to be firm political will at the highest primary processing sector faced its own spe- level, Finland’s situation was not yet fully cial problems of adjustment. As it was, none understood by those who sat at the negoti- of these questions was seriously addressed ating table on our side. Even Koivisto gave until the final marathon session at the end an uncharacteristically gloomy assessment, of February 1994. The continued presence complaining that people on our side seemed on the table of these complex and essentially to regard the negotiations as a “zero sum technical transitional issues further com- game”, in which any gains by Finland must plicated the already difficultdiscussions ­ on necessarily involve corresponding loses by 69 others. Haavisto too was visibly concerned through. The Delegation’s EU flag was pulled and subdued. down and burned. By Brussels standards, on On 8 February, Haavisto and Salolainen the other hand, it was a rather tame affair; travelled to Brussels for the 6th meeting of the and some on the Finnish side clearly thought Accession Conference at ministerial level, at I was, as a result, rather too complacent in which there were further exchanges on agri- my subsequent media reactions. culture and regional policy and at which the The following day’s ministerial meeting of Customs Union chapter was closed. Shortly the Conference was able, as expected, to reg- afterwards, on 11 February, the Commis- ister that agreement had now been reached sion’s chief negotiator at official level, Steffen on a raft of non-agricultural issues (second- Smidt, was in Helsinki for talks with Finnish ary residences, fisheries, maritime links, officials. He was followed on 14 February (in Åland and Sami-related issues) permitting his EU Presidency capacity) by Greek Ag- them to be cleared from the negotiating table. riculture Minister Moraitis – who at least, The main substantial business of the meeting, unlike Commissioner Steichen the previous however, was the presentation by the EU side summer, had some opportunity to witness of its recently adopted position papers on the at first hand the rigours of the long Finnish key agricultural issues outstanding, as well winter. It was hoped that the remaining out- as on the proposed new Objective 6 Regional standing issues, with the inevitable excep- Policy structural instrument. The Finnish tion of agriculture, could be settled at the 7th side declared itself disappointed and accused – and penultimate – meeting at ministerial the EU of failing to understand the problems level on 22 February in Brussels. faced by Finnish agriculture. Not all visits during this crucial final pe- In order to brief Brussels in preparation riod of the negotiations were agriculture- for the ministerial “marathon” at the end related. Both Internal Market Commissioner of February, I took contact in the following Vanni d’Archirafi and Research Commission- few days with most of the key personalities er Ruberti were in Helsinki in early February. involved on the Finnish side at both min- Vanni’s visit in particular provided a good isterial and official level, in addition to the opportunity to review the status of some contacts I had already taken with key figures of the other main questions that remained in the Eduskunta, in MTK and in the Confed- open. In his meetings with Aho, Salolainen, eration of Finnish Industries and Employers. Haavisto and others, Vanni pressed the ad- It emerged that the Finnish side expected vantages of immediate alignment of agricul- four agricultural issues to have to be settled tural prices and sought to calm Finnish fears at Ministerial level: long term (i.e. LFA and on institutional issues. Nordic) support, production quotas (milk/ On the eve of the ministerial meeting in sugar), veterinary questions (mainly for the Brussels, a large group of Finnish farmers Swedes to fight) and price alignment. In addi- staged a noisy demonstration in Helsinki, di- tion, there would be regional policy (Objec- rectly outside the Commission Delegation’s tive 6) and (possibly) travellers’ allowances. offices in Pohjoisesplanadi. We knew of the The two major sticking points, as far as I was demonstration in advance, and I agreed to able to judge were: (a) on long term agricul- receive a small delegation of farmers earlier in tural support, the need to achieve a solution the day in my offices to listen to their views. which provided some EU money for all parts I told them that the EU understood their of the country; and (b) on regional policy, predicament and that, although it was not the need to achieve visibly equal treatment an easy process, we were confident solutions with the other Nordics (even if this would be could be found within the constraints of the of limited real benefit to Finland, given the CAP that would ensure the future of farming already very good infrastructure that existed in Finland. They were clearly sceptical. Later in the regions that would qualify). On (a), in the day, the demonstration became – by I warned Brussels that a line drawn at 62° Finnish standards – quite violent. Truckloads was simply not sellable, given that three- of snow were brought in and dumped in the quarters of Finland’s cereal production took road outside, preventing traffic from getting place south of that line, in conditions that 70 were manifestly far less favourable than any- The key issue here was the latitude to be where in the present EU. If there were not taken as the reference point for “mountain” a satisfactory solution here, it was likely that LFA status. Finland had argued that all re- Haavisto would be unable to sell the deal to gions north of 60 degrees should be classified the Centre Party, with serious consequences as mountain LFA (the most generous regime) both for the referendum and for the future of on the basis that this corresponded to an the Aho Government. On price alignment, by altitude of 600m further south. This would contrast, I advised that this should in the end have provided 100% coverage for Finland. be sellable to the Finnish side, provided we Unfortunately, within the existing acquis, showed sufficient willing to resolve the vari- it was 800m, and not 600m, that was the ous, very real, practical problems it gave rise determining altitude for mountain LFA sta- to, in particular the risk of market disruption tus based on the shortness of the growing in the early months of membership. season. The inclusion of certain regions (e.g. The ministerial “marathon” duly convened the Vosges) at lower altitudes was based on in Brussels, beginning with a formal meeting other, non-climatic factors, such as steep- of the EU Council on the evening of Friday 25 ness of slope or difficulty of access. Commis- February to finalise remaining EU common sion experts had calculated that 800m in the positions and review outstanding issues. I Alps was the equivalent of 62 degrees North: a had flown to Brussels the previous evening in growing season of 160/170 days. A limit of 60 order to be available for last minute briefing. degrees would have implied substantial spill The next three days were taken up mainly over elsewhere in the Union. Certain Finn- with a succession of informal and technical ish regions south of 62 degrees could qualify contacts with Finland and the other Candi- for “normal” LFA status; but since that was dates, interspersed with brief formal sessions determined by comparison with national, of the EU Council to report back and review rather than EU, averages, this could not by positions. This pattern was broken briefly in definition lead to 100% coverage, though it the evening of 27 February, when there was could mean that at least 72% of Finland was a ministerial dinner followed by brief super- classified as either mountain or normal LFA. restricted (Ministers + 1) sessions of the four The fact that certain other EU regions further Accession Conferences. This apart, the Ac- south had “normal” LFA status was irrele- cession Conferences did not actually meet in vant, since that depended on the national av- formal session until the “moment of truth” erage data for the Member State concerned, arrived on 1 March. While such a procedure is not on a comparison with Finland. Moreover, not abnormal in EU negotiations of this sort, neither mountain nor normal LFA provided it inevitably contributed to the general sense any support for wheat or sugar beet, mean- of confusion.164 ing that it would be of limited help anyway to On the central question of longer term Southern Finland. agricultural support, the basic difficulty was There were similar Commission concerns that, while there was a willingness on the about spill over in relation to the granting of EU side to adapt the acquis to reflect the additional, nationally-financed “Northern” special circumstances of Nordic agriculture, support. It was important that no new rights the Commission wanted to avoid any “spill were created for any region of the exist- over” effect that would create new rights – at ing EU-12. There were also concerns about the expense of the EU Budget – for produc- encouraging over-production, particularly ers in existing Member States. There were in the cereals, beef and dairy sectors. The many misunderstandings about this, which solution proposed was to limit such aid to were only ultimately clarified in “technical” areas that would qualify, under the new meetings between senior Commission and latitude criterion, for mountain LFA status, Finnish officials that took place on Sunday 27 with certain additional restrictions related February. to land-use and production potential. The Finnish side retorted that these additional restrictions would limit support to only 5% 164 See Kuosmanen, pp. 140-142 of agricultural land. 71 I had predicted, in a report to Brussels national support ­would be such as to ensure in early December 1993, that agriculture in full coverage for all areas north of 62 de- Southern Finland could well be the issue that grees “as well as in a small adjacent area to would determine Finnish accession. And so the south of this”. There were also improved it was now to prove. The Finnish problem, offers on milk, sugar and aid to the process- I had earlier reported to Brussels, was basi- ing industries, as well as on Regional Policy cally four-fold: firstly, poor structures (small coverage under the new Objective 6 (where farm size, fragmented holdings); secondly, we knew that visible parity with Sweden was poor marketing for most products (many ce- important to the Finns). The most that could real farmers sold most of their produce pri- be offered for Southern Finland, however, vately to local livestock producers); thirdly, was that those areas not covered by LFA or poor climatic conditions, resulting in low Northern support could be especially tar- and heavily fluctuating yields; and, fourthly, geted, within Finland’s overall national pro- regional specialisation under the current gramming, for receipt of EU structural and domestic agricultural policy. The first two environmental funds. Recourse to national problems could, to some extent, be solved direct aid “could be contemplated” in the given time. The third would of course re- case of serious remaining difficulties. main a permanent reality. Here, the South The offer was rejected by Haavisto as in- of Finland was now particularly vulnerable sufficient and – in the exhaustion of the early because of the legacy of regional specialisa- morning of 1 March – it looked for a time tion. Current domestic Finnish policy, de- as if negotiations had broken down (the EU vised at a time when accession was politically Council having rejected a compromise pro- inconceivable, sought to reserve the South of posal put together by the Presidency and the the country for crop production (and related Commission). sectors such as pigs and poultry) by encour- Talks were, however, subsequently re- aging dairy production in the Central and sumed and a deal was finally struck late in Northern regions. This reflected the logic the afternoon. The most important improve- of regional comparative advantage, even ments (from a Finnish perspective) were: though the South undoubtedly had an ab- first, an increased agro-budgetary package of solute advantage in almost all sectors. With 855 MECU; second, confirmation that moun- accession, however, Southern cereal farm- tain area status would be given to “the areas ers now faced a situation where they would referred to in the Union’s position”; third, be unable to compete under normal market confirmation that recourse to national direct conditions with other cereal producers in the aid “will be considered” for the remaining European Union, but had little possibility of serious difficulties; and, last but not least, switching to other products because of the a clear statement that the whole of Finland quota restrictions that existed in the dairy “will be eligible” for Nordic, national and/ and sugar sectors and the high levels of aid or Community support. Indicative amounts which were likely to be given to the Northern were provided for future Finnish receipts regions of the country. from the EU Structural Funds. There were In the afternoon of 28 February 1994, also new elements in relation to the market the EU side tabled a “final” package of re- regimes for a number of products, plus a vised positions. Finland would receive 725 declaration on how to deal with any market MECU of “agro-budgetary” support, just disturbances during the transitional period. under half of which was – on Finnish fig- With this last minute political deal, all the ures – effectively a contribution to the cost remaining open questions in relation to agri- of transitional compensation for immediate culture and regional policy were considered price alignment. LFA status would apply to to have been settled. Both sides went off to 85% of Finnish agricultural land, including brief the press accordingly and returned certain small areas of Southern Finland af- home to catch up on lost sleep. fected by specific handicaps, with mountain However, once the legal drafters set to LFA status for all areas north of 62 degrees. work to convert this into treaty language, The definitional criteria applied for Northern a number of disputes arose about what had 72 actually been agreed. This was almost in- however, certainly not consistent with the evitable, given the chaotic nature of the final overall logic of the LFA package, nor with the stages of the negotiations and the ambiguous positions taken in the Council’s discussion language of the final negotiating documents. of 28 February. It emerged that, in Brussels There was much haggling about the precise too, there was considerable doubt, espe- status of “long term” national support. The cially within the Commission, as to whether EU position was that the Accession Treaty such a concession had in fact been made. could provide only for technical adaptations Helsinki, however, remained adamant: the of the acquis and transitional measures, in final negotiating document listed a number line with the basic EU philosophy that there of clarifications and precisions to the Un- could be no permanent derogations. The ion’s earlier common position; one of these provisions on both long term national sup- was that “mountain farming status will be port and national aid for remaining serious given to the areas referred to in the Union’s difficulties were thus consigned to that part position”. A political crisis loomed, not least of the Treaty dealing with transitional meas- since the Finnish side had gone public with ures. In other words, although they were their interpretation in a press release issued not specifically limited in time, their perma- at the end of the final negotiating session. nence was not guaranteed. The Commission Despite the doubts that persisted, the EU had moreover, in order to obtain agreement in the end accepted the Finnish interpreta- to the final package, been obliged to enter tion. The Accession Treaty duly records that a number of declarations into the Council “the areas above the 62nd Parallel and some minutes, one of which committed it to ensure adjacent areas” shall be treated as mountain “that national aids designed to facilitate the areas for the purposes of the LFA Directive.167 integration of the agricultural sector into the Furthermore, an EU Declaration appended to common agricultural policy are of a transi- the Final Act makes clear that this applies to tional and degressive nature”.165 This caused all areas of Southern Finland that form part considerable upset on the Finnish side when of the agreed 85%.168 they later learned about it.166 This issue was, A third problem related to the size of the as we shall see below, to resurface again later production quotas for sugar. A precise figure in connection with the Commission approval of 144,278 tonnes had been proposed for Fin- of the national aid package. land’s “A” quota169 for sugar in the document A second major dispute concerned the setting out the various modifications and precise status of the 85% of Finland that was precisions to the EU’s common position that to be classified as LFA. It was clear that all had formed the basis for the final agreement regions north of 62 degrees were to receive at ministerial level. It later transpired that an mountain LFA status. But what of those ar- error had been made within the Commission eas to the south? Both Heikki Haavisto and services and that the text should have made Veli Sundbäck raised this issue with me a clear that this was the total “A” quota for both few days after the political agreement of 1 sugar and isoglucose.170 The EU’s insistence March. Helsinki understood it to have been agreed that these latter areas were also to 167 Annex 1 to the Act of Accession, point V.C.1 be mountain LFA and was deeply concerned 168 The relevant part of the Declaration reads: “For at rumours that the EU was now seeking to Finland, counting the northern latitude as a relevant backtrack on this. I immediately sought in- criterion for the purposes of Article 3, paragraph structions from Brussels. I had not attended 3 of Council Directive 75/268/EEC as well as the the final negotiating session on 1 March, as I amendment to Article 19 of Council Regulation (EEC) had returned to Helsinki to be present with No 2328/91 will allow the coverage of 85 % of the the rest of the Helsinki Diplomatic Corps utilized agricultural area within the meaning of Article 3, paragraph 3 of Council Directive 75/268/EEC”. at the inauguration of President Ahtisaari. 169 i.e. that part of the production quota eligible for Mountain LFA status south of 62 degrees was, the full benefits of the price support system 170 A starch-based fructose sweetener that is also 165 Council document 5057/94 ADD 1 covered by the EU’s sugar regime and which, like 166 Kuosmanen, pp. 150-151 sugar, is subject to a production quota. 73 on correcting this error after final ministerial agreement had been reached caused consid- erable resentment on the Finnish side.171 The resolution of these three outstanding issues cleared the way for the finalisation of the drafting of the Accession Treaty. It was however far from the last that was to be heard on the subject of agriculture in the context of Finnish accession. As we shall see in the fol- lowing chapters, it was to figure as a central element in the referendum campaign and in the subsequent parliamentary debate. Even long after Finland’s actual accession to the EU, there were still loose ends to be tied up in relation to some of the provisions that had been agreed in that difficult final package.

171 See Kuosmanen, p. 152 74 Photo: Thomas Schoch / Wikimedia Commons

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SHAKESPEARE AND ELVIS PRESLEY lthough the ministerial “marathon” to participate in the 1996 Intergovernmental session that ended (for Finland) in the ­Conference provided for in the Maastricht Aafternoon of 1 March is generally con- Treaty.173 Although the IGC itself was for- sidered to have been the decisive concluding mally opened only at the end of March 1996, moment, the accession negotiations did not the preparations for it were to be launched in fact formally end until some weeks later, already at the Corfu European Council of with the approval by the final sessions of the June 1994. In particular, the Reflection Group four Accession Conferences of the legal texts chaired by Carlos Westendorp was to begin of the Treaty of Accession. Although the le- its work already in June 1995, on the basis of gal drafters had begun their work already at contributions submitted in the meantime, the end of the previous year, they still had to and to report to the Madrid European Coun- convert into legal treaty language the nego- cil in December that year. If the Candidates tiating documents that had formed the basis were to participate fully in that process, they for the final political agreement reached by therefore needed to accede not later than Ministers. As we saw in the previous Chapter, the beginning of 1995.174 Sweden, as we have this was a far from straightforward process, already noted, was in any event pressing for given the differing interpretations of what that date for domestic constitutional rea- had actually been agreed. sons.175 There were moreover certain institutional Following the precedent of all previous issues on which substantive agreement had enlargements, the Treaty of Accession had still not been reached, owing to problems consequently set a deadline of 31 December on the EU side. The most important of these 1994 for the deposit of ratifications, failing related to qualified majority voting in the en- which the Treaty would lapse. The Treaty was larged Council of Ministers, and in particular however so crafted – again following previ- the number of votes that would constitute a ous precedents – that, if one or other can- blocking minority. The EU was finally able to didate was unable to ratify, the Treaty could agree on a Common Position (the so-called still enter into force for the others, provided “Ioannina compromise”) only at the infor- that the all EU Member States had ratified. mal EU Foreign Ministers meeting of 26/27 For the four Candidates, ratification re- March in Ioannina in Greece. This enabled the quired in all cases the approval of the Treaty institutional chapter to be formally closed by their parliaments. Each of the four had, in at the meeting of the Accession Conference addition, decided to hold an advisory refer- (Deputies) of 30 March.172 endum in advance of the parliamentary vote. It was not however until 12 April, under On the EU side, the process of ratification the inexorable time pressure resulting from was a rather more complicated affair. Under the European Parliament’s assent procedure the EU Treaties, the accession of new Member (see below), and after much shuttling back States required – then as now – the approval and forth of officials between COREPER and of the EU Council, acting by unanimity af- the respective Accession Conferences, that ter consulting the Commission176 and after the definitive legal text of the Accession Treaty together with its various appendages 173 Articles A (5th indent) and N (2) was – with a certain amount of bad temper 174 The possibility that Candidate Countries might be on both sides – finally approved by the ne- allowed to participate in the work of the IGC prior gotiators of the EU and the Candidate Coun- to their date of accession, as was the case for the tries. This opened the way for the process of 2002-3 Convention on the Future of Europe, was not, ratification to begin. as far as I am aware, ever considered as a possible The Copenhagen European Council of alternative. 175 June 1993 had set a target date of 1 January See Chapter IV above 176 1995 for the accession of the new Member The Opinion which the Commission delivers at this point – which is the one referred to in the Treaties – States. This was primarily to enable the latter is not to be confused with the detailed analysis (also called an Opinion) that the Commission traditionally delivers before the Council’s decision to open 172 See Council press release 6004/94 of 11 April 1994 accession negotiations. 76 ­obtaining the assent, by an absolute majority could, conversely, be launched only on of its component members, of the European the basis of a signed text. The timing of the Parliament.177 As for the Treaty of Accession ­European Parliament’s vote was thus crucial itself, fixing the conditions of admission and to the meeting of the January 1995 deadline consequent adjustments to the EU Treaties, for accession. this – being the product of an intergovern- For the Parliament to deliver its vote at mental conference between the Candidate its May Session, it had first to receive the Countries and the existing Member States – final legal texts in sufficient time for them had to be ratified by each of the latter in ac- to be examined in detail by the relevant cordance with their respective constitutional Parliamentary Committees. Given that the requirements. Session was taking place already in the first By the standards of the previous three en- week of May, the final legal texts needed largements, the time allowed for ratification to be with the Parliament not later than was not unprecedentedly short. On these 12 April. Hence the time pressure on the legal earlier occasions there had been a gap of be- drafters. It was however by no means a fore- tween five-and-a-half and nineteen months gone conclusion that, even if the Parliament between the date of signature and the date of did receive the legal texts in time, it would accession. This time round there were eight- be prepared to vote on the accession package and-a-half months from the final sessions at its May Session; nor, if it did, that the vote of the Accession Conferences on 12 April to would necessarily be a positive one. the target accession date. This was, however, There was a strong body of opinion in the the first enlargement to be subject to the as- Parliament that considered that the institu- sent of the European Parliament, since this tions of the EU needed to be reformed before requirement had been introduced only by any further enlargements could be contem- the Single European Act of 1987. Those eight- plated. The Parliament had put down a clear and-a-half months had moreover also to marker already in 1991, during the nego- accommodate four national referenda (plus tiations for the Maastricht Treaty, “that the a separate provincial referendum in Åland) Community cannot embark upon a process on top of the usual parliamentary ratification of enlargement unless the Treaty amend- procedures. In the case of Finland, there was ments currently under discussion result in a the additional need to finalise, in advance of substantial strengthening of the Community the referendum, the accompanying domes- institutions”.178 Judging the outcome insuffi- tic agricultural package. Against this back- cient, the Parliament subsequently declared ground, the timetable looked distinctly less that “it will not be able to agree to the ac- generous. cession of new Member States unless further One of the first key deadlines in this tight reforms are adopted in addition to the Maas- schedule related to the assent of the Euro- tricht Treaty”.179 A whole raft of very specific pean Parliament. This was because 1994 was proposals for institutional reform was set an election year. If the relevant Resolutions out in the Resolution adopted by the Parlia- were not voted at the May Part-session, ment in January 1993 pursuant to the Hänsch before Parliament was dissolved prior to Report.180 The Parliament’s Resolutions on the June elections, they were unlikely to be voted before September. The Accession Treaty could not be signed until the Parlia- 178 European Parliament Resolution of 15 May 1991 ment had given its assent. (This was not a on Community enlargement and relations with Treaty requirement, but the Member States other European countries (Official Journal C 158 , had deemed it politically prudent to go along 17/06/1991 P. 0054) 179 with the Parliament’s insistence on this.) European Parliament Resolution of 7 April 1992 on Parliamentary ratification procedures, in the the outcome of the intergovernmental conferences (OJ No C 125, 18.5.1992, p. 81) Member States as in the Candidate ­Countries 180 European Parliament Resolution of 20 January 1993 on the structure and strategy of the European 177 Now called “consent” (Article 49 TEU) since the Union with regard to its enlargement and the creation entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty of a Europe-wide order (OJ No C 42, 15.2.1993, p. 124) 77 enlargement of February181 and July 1993,182 to muster the requisite 260 votes in favour. as well as its March 1994 Resolution on en- As late as 27 April Member State Ambas- largement and neutrality,183 recalled and re- sadors in COREPER were still being urged affirmed these earlier prises de position. by certain of their colleagues, in the light of The Parliament’s institutional concerns the uncertainties that persisted, to get their were further exacerbated by the actions of capitals to lobby actively their compatriots of the Greek Presidency. There was deep dissat- all political groups in the Parliament to seek isfaction with the Presidency’s proposal that their support. the Parliament should – like the Economic Worried that they would end up being and Social Committee and the Committee of taken hostage by the institutional concerns of the Regions – be only “associated” with the the Parliament, the four Candidate Countries preparations for the 1996 IGC, rather than sent their Prime Ministers (or their deputies) being a full member of the Reflection Group. to a special hearing organised by the Parlia- Many MEPs moreover were strongly opposed ment on 19 April. Pertti Salolainen attended to the Ioannina compromise, considering for Finland. Further opportunities for Hel- that the blocking minority should simply be sinki to lobby the European Parliament were raised to 27 votes as the simple arithmetic of provided by the meetings in Helsinki of the enlargement would suggest. EU-Finland Joint Parliamentary Committee Moreover, although there was for the (of which the EP rapporteur for Finnish ac- most part no objection to the four candidates cession, Gary Titley, was the EU co-chair) in themselves, there were, in some quarters, mid-March and the EEA Joint Parliamentary still lingering worries about neutrality, par- Committee at the end of April. (Finland was ticularly in respect of Austria. This was clear- chairing the EFTA Council – for the last time ly visible in the above-mentioned Resolution – in the first half of 1994.) The Secretary Gen- on enlargement and neutrality, which ex- eral of the Socialist Group in the EP, Julian pressed concern that public opinion in some Priestley, also visited Helsinki in mid-April. of the Candidate Countries might be opposed Contrary to all the pessimistic forecasts, to the development of a defence policy di- the Parliament did in the end put the item on mension within the EU; also that Austria’s its Plenary agenda for 4 May; and, confound- neutrality in particular might pose problems ing all fears of the opposite, gave its assent to for participation in joint measures and joint the four accessions by comfortable majori- action under the newly established CFSP. ties. The two draft motions for referral back Austrian neutrality had also been the subject to committee – which would effectively have of a number of parliamentary questions.184 postponed accession – were voted down by There was, on top of all this, the risk that, decisive majorities. The debate itself was a this being the last Session before the June mammoth, atmospheric occasion, lasting Parliamentary elections, many MEPs might over six hours, with 105 interventions. The absent themselves to prepare their elec- Ambassadors of the four candidate countries tion campaigns or – for those not seeking sat looking on, in a public gallery packed re-election – to prepare their future new with journalists and television cameras. The careers. If this happened it might prove dif- Parliament’s rapporteur for Finland, Gary ficult, given the strength of the opposition, Titley, began his intervention with a quote from Shakespeare (“There is a tide in the af- fairs of men…”) and ended with one from 181 European Parliament Resolution of 10 February Elvis Presley (“It’s now or never!”). When 1993 on enlargement (OJ No C 72, 15.3.1993, p. 69) the four draft Resolutions (one for each of 182 European Parliament Resolution of 15 July 1993 on the Candidates) were put to the vote, the enlargement (OJ No C255, 20.9.1993, p. 207) accession of Finland was approved by an 183 European Parliament Resolution of 24 March overwhelming majority of 377 to 21, with 1994 on enlargement and neutrality (OJ No C 114, 25.4.1994, p. 61) 61 abstentions. There were similar, though 184 See for example Written Question no. 2408/92 (OJ not totally identical, majorities for the three No C 86, 26.3.1993, p. 20) and Question H-1297/93 other Candidates. (EP Debates no 441, p. 174) 78 The key to this quite unexpectedly good Council in the interim period between sig- result was that, once it became clear that the nature of the Accession Treaty and the actual motions for referral would be defeated, many date of accession. By this time, attention in of those MEPS who had supported them went Finland had long since become focussed on on – having made their point – to vote in fa- the package of domestic agricultural support vour of assent in the main vote. Matters were measures that Finland would need to intro- undoubtedly helped by the impassioned and duce in consequence of her EU membership. warmly applauded speech Delors had de- So central was this to the domestic debate on livered when the Ioannina compromise had EU membership that it was not until 20 June been debated by the Parliament on 20 April that the Finnish Government finally took the – and to which Van Den Broek had referred formal decision to proceed with the signature during his intervention in the assent debate. of the Accession Treaty at Corfu. There were Delors had reminded his audience that he also divided views in Helsinki over the ques- personally had been a firm advocate of insti- tion of who should represent Finland at the tutional reform ever since the IGC that had meeting, given the respective constitutional prepared Maastricht. The Commission, he competences of the President and the Prime had stressed, was determined that the Ioan- Minister. In the end both attended, although nina compromise should not be allowed to the debate continued back home over what prejudge the outcome of the 1996 IGC. The ac- should happen when Finland became a full cession of the current four Candidates would EU member. in no way worsen the institutional “dérive” that already resulted from the Maastricht Treaty. The Parliament would do better to save its powder for the battle to come in 1996. With the Parliament’s assent confirmed, the EU Council was now in a position to adopt, a few days later, its brief formal Deci- sion accepting the applications for member- ship of the four Candidates.185 (The Commis- sion had, already a month earlier, given its green light in its – equally brief – Opinion on the four accessions).186 Moreover, the way was now clear for signature of the Accession Treaty. It was proposed that the signature cer- emony should take place on 24 June in the margins of the European Council’s meeting in Corfu, which the Leaders of the four Acceding Countries (as they would henceforth become) would be invited to attend as observers. This was in line with the traditional EU policy of allowing observers from acceding states to attend meetings of the various organs of the

185 Decision of the Council of the European Union of 16 May 1994 on the admission of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European Union (OJ C241 of 29 August 1994, p. 6) 186 Commission Opinion of 19 April 1994 on the applications for accession to the European Union by the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Norway (COM(94) 148 of 19 April 1994) 79 Photo: Aldo Cavini Benedetti / Flickr.com

XI

TOWARDS THE REFERENDUM t had been apparent ever since the final ­motion in mid-June (see below); and no ministerial negotiating session that the written communication until the tabling in Iextent and nature of Finnish domestic ag- August of the bill for ratification of the Ac- ricultural support post-accession was going cession Treaty. President Ahtisaari was, by to be one of the decisive factors in determin- contrast, in his frequent public utterances, ing whether Finland would in the end ratify unequivocal in his support for Finland’s EU the Accession Treaty. It would, in particular, accession. determine whether Aho could sell the deal to Until well into June, the future timetable his own Centre Party – or even to some of his at the Finnish end remained very uncertain. Centre Party colleagues in the Government. There was, in particular, much debate about It was also an important issue for the Swedish when the referendum should take place. People’s Party because of the vulnerability of Initial indications were that, provided the the horticultural producers in the Vaasa re- European Parliament gave its assent in May, gion. the referendum would take place sometime These factors, and the divisions within the in September, i.e. before the Swedish ref- Government to which they had given rise, erendum. Later indications suggested that were, I reported to Brussels, the main reason Aho had a preference for holding it on 13 why the Finnish Government’s reaction to November, the same day as Sweden, while the deal reached on 1 March was so muted, the President and other Party Leaders were compared with the generally positive media pressing for early October.187 There was even, reaction and the continuing high popular so we were reliably informed, talk at one support for membership. Latest polls were stage in some Centre Party circles of seeking showing 45% for vs. 27% against, with 27% to postpone accession until 1 July 1995, with undecided. We estimated that there was a the referendum being held only after the hard core of around 25% who would vote March 1995 general elections. The one thing “no” whatever happened (not necessarily on which everyone apparently agreed was because of agriculture). The key battlefield that the Centre Party conference in June was was therefore the 27% of “don’t knows”. likely to be the decisive rendezvous, both for How far would they be swayed in a negative the fate of Finland’s EU membership bid and direction if MTK and/or the Centre Party for the survival of the Aho Government. Only were to pronounce themselves in outright thereafter would the remainder of the time- opposition to EU membership on the terms table become clear. negotiated? Meanwhile, work had begun in earnest on In presenting to the Eduskunta on 4 the domestic agricultural support package March the deal that had emerged from the (Tukipaketti). This was a two-stage opera- final ministerial marathon, Aho limited tion. The first stage consisted of a “Govern- himself to saying that the result obtained ment Decision in Principle”, which was “will secure the preconditions for agricul- published at the end of May,188 in good time ture”; he went on to stress that it would be ahead of the Centre Party National Congress only “together with the national measures in mid-June. The second stage involved the to be subsequently decided upon” that the tabling of the necessary draft national legis- outcome could be regarded as fulfilling Fin- lation in the Eduskunta, as part of the August land’s basic negotiating objectives. Four package of bills related to the ratification of high-level working groups were established the Accession Treaty; the objective being that by the Government to report on the various aspects (agriculture, food industry, taxation, structural policy), with instructions to come 187 up with draft proposals by early May, fol- There had been much discussion between the lowing which the Government would table a three Nordic Candidates as to the “optimum” order of the three referendums. bill in the Eduskunta. There were no further 188 Government Decision in Principle on the Government presentations to the Eduskunta adjustment of Finnish agriculture and food on the outcome of the accession negotiations economy as well as regional and structural policy to until Aho’s response to a no-confidence membership in the European Union, 27 May 1994 81 the Eduskunta should approve this in ad- with the Commission until there was some vance of the referendum. measure of agreement within the Govern- The nature and size of the tukipaketti ment itself. It was thus not until 18 May that rapidly became the object of a complicated the first serious contacts took place, in the – and, to outside observers, peculiarly Finn- form of a meeting in Brussels between Pesälä ish – game of political poker; pitting not only and Steichen.189 By then, a fair amount of ma- the Government against the Social Democrat terial had already been made public at a press Opposition, but also creating splits and pres- conference given by Pesälä on 15 May. At the sures within the Coalition itself. There were meeting a non-paper was handed over, sum- divided views, not only within Aho’s Cen- marising the main lines of the “Government tre Party, but also within the Conservative Decision in Principle” which was in the pro- Party, where internal pressures were to lead cess of being finalised. Steichen responded in June to the resignation of Pertti Salolainen in a carefully worded letter in which, while from the party leadership (although not from stressing that he could not commit the Com- the Government). mission either way in advance of Finnish Although we were mere observers on the accession, he nevertheless put down a clear sidelines of all this, the Commission was di- marker of concern regarding the nature of rectly involved in a different fashion with the the long term national aids that were being elaboration of the tukipaketti. This was be- envisaged. The letter did however confirm cause, under the EU Treaties, national state the Commission’s willingness to continue aids have to be notified to, and in most cases discussions. approved by, the Commission before they The Government’s “Decision in Princi- may be put into force. This applied also to the ple” was duly published on 27 May. Shortly transitional and longer term support meas- thereafter, on 7 June, Aho met with Delors in ures that Finland was entitled to introduce Brussels. The discussion was mainly devoted under the Act of Accession. Formal Commis- to the political situation in Finland in relation sion approval could however be given only to EU accession. Aho outlined the timetable once Finland became an EU Member State. now envisaged for ratification: This posed a problem that Veli Sundbäck had raised with me when we had met in early • Government statement to the March, just after the ministerial marathon, Eduskunta on 13 June, on both the namely: how could the Commission be in- outcome of the negotiations and the volved in this in advance of the date of ac- domestic package, culminating in a vote cession, to avoid a situation where measures of confidence (simple majority); presented as part of a referendum package • tabling of the formal bills in the were subsequently declared illegal by the Eduskunta as soon as possible after Commission after accession? I had suggested signature at Corfu, probably late July/ that the Finnish side take this up informally early August; with Brussels (to whom I duly reported on • referendum 16 October; our conversation). This was subsequently • final vote in the Parliament (two- done and resulted in a series of informal thirds majority) after the referendum contacts and exchanges in the course of the following months. It was a delicate and high Aho added that the Finnish Government risk operation, which indeed on a couple of wanted to discuss the domestic package with occasions nearly came unstuck. I kept in the Commission well ahead of the referen- regular contact throughout with Minister dum. Mikko Pesälä and Secretary of State Reino Delors agreed that it was important to Uronen at the Ministry of Agriculture as well have a common attitude if trouble were to as with Agriculture Commissioner Steichen’s be avoided later on. The Commission's pre- senior advisors in Brussels. This proved to be liminary examination suggested that there a wise precaution. One initial major problem was that it was 189 This was the first time they had met, as Pesälä had difficult to have any meaningful discussion only taken over his post the previous month. 82 were two main difficulties: the list of areas party leadership. On 20 June, the Govern- south of 62° that would be eligible for Nordic ment took the formal decision to proceed support;190 and the measures to deal with any with the signature, on 24 June in Corfu, of remaining serious difficulties.191 The Com- the Accession Treaty. This led, as widely mission had been assuming that contacts on expected, to the departure from the Coali- the package would stretch out until the date tion of the Christian League. (Although this of accession. If a Commission reaction was theoretically reduced the Government’s ma- needed earlier, then it would be necessary jority by 8 seats, it did not in reality change to proceed in strict confidentiality. It was anything much, since the Christian League agreed to follow up at official level, in a very could probably be counted on to support restricted format, with a view to reaching the Government on the agricultural support (informal) agreement in good time before the package, and would in any case vote against referendum. ratification of the Accession Treaty.) The fol- A week after his return from Brussels, Aho lowing day, the Eduskunta unanimously ap- delivered as expected his statement to the proved the Government’s referendum bill, Eduskunta on the outcome of the accession providing for a referendum on 16 October on negotiations and the national measures pro- the basis of a yes/no response to the ques- posed by the Government to complement the tion: “should Finland join the EU on the basis Accession Treaty. He stressed that the legis- of the negotiated agreement?”. lation related to the latter would have to be In late July, Commission President Jacques passed before the referendum; and that “suf- Delors paid a long-planned visit to Finland ficient certainty as to their acceptability will (which he had last visited in July 1988). His be obtained from the EU Commission prior visit had been deliberately postponed until to the parliamentary proceedings”. Aho’s after the end of the accession negotiations, statement was, technically speaking, the re- and the programme – which took place be- sponse to a Left Wing motion of no confidence tween 21 and 23 July entirely outside Helsinki concerning the effects on Finland of partici- – was carefully crafted to minimise the risk pation in the CFSP; but it became in effect a of Delors’s being drawn into the domestic vote on EU membership and the tukipaketti. ratification debate. Delors was one of the At the end of the two-day debate, the Gov- speakers (together with President Koivisto, ernment survived by 97 votes to 80, with 18 Prime Minister Aho, Foreign Trade Minis- abstentions. But Aho failed to get the “broad ter Salolainen and other dignitaries) at the national consensus” he had argued for. The Chydenius Seminar in Kokkola, in between Social Democrats, forced to vote on the two a visit to the Pori Jazz Festival – a particular issues together, voted against – but report- interest of Delors – and the Kaustinen Folk edly only after carefully doing their sums to Music Festival. A visit to a local dairy farm ensure that this would not result in the fall of was also included, as well as an address to a the Government and the possible consequent seminar of representatives of the two sides of derailing of EU accession. Significantly, most industry and a round table discussion with of the 18 abstentions were from the Govern- representatives of the Finnish cultural com- ment parties, half of them from Aho’s own munity. In the margins, Delors had meetings Centre Party. with President Ahtisaari, PM Aho and Social From then on, until the summer break, Democrat Leader Paavo Lipponen. events moved rapidly. With the Govern- It was, contrary to Delors’s earlier fears, ment’s “Decision in Principle” under his a very successful visit. Delors was given a belt, Aho was able on 18 June to obtain an warm and friendly welcome throughout, and impressive two-to-one vote in favour of his there was much positive press coverage. The Government’s EU policy at the Centre Party latter showed that, without being drawn into national congress – albeit (so we were in- the domestic debate, Delors had succeeded formed) only after threatening to resign the in getting across a number of important public messages: first, that Finland would 190 Article 142 of the Act of Accession find a warm welcome as a Member of the EU; 191 Article 141 of the Act of Accession second, that the Nordic model of society was 83 safe inside the EU; thirdly, that EU member- issues were: the list of areas south of 62° ship would strengthen Finland’s security; eligible for Nordic support (“the map”); the and, last but by no means least, there was maximum levels for Nordic support; and the no contradiction between the CAP and the problems surrounding the long term national objectives of Finnish agricultural policy – the aids to be granted to offset “remaining seri- EU would not abandon Finnish agriculture ous difficulties”.192 The problem with the lat- The fact that Delors’s own father had been a ter was that the Finnish side wanted to fix the small farmer was also favourably commented amounts already now, whereas the Commis- on. sion’s line was that such difficulties could by Both Ahtisaari and Aho expressed opti- definition be measured only once all the other mism about the outcome of the Finnish refer- instruments were in force. There were also a endum. In respect of the Commission’s eval- few more technical issues which the Finnish uation of the tukipaketti, it was agreed that side wished to see resolved between experts no public statement should be made while in advance of the parliamentary debate. talks were still continuing. Aho stressed the I also called on MTK Chairman Esa Härmälä importance of reaching agreement before the (whom I knew well from his previous func- Eduskunta began its deliberations on the re- tions in the Prime Minister’s Office and as a lated legislative bills. member of Finland’s negotiating team) to The informal talks between the Commis- discuss the outcome of the 3 September MTK sion and Finnish officials continued over the meeting. Härmälä agreed that the timing had summer, leading up to a meeting on 9 Sep- been unfortunate, but claimed that MTK had tember in Brussels between Haavisto, Pesälä earlier been given to understand that the in- and Steichen. In preparation for this, I called formal contacts between the Commission and beforehand on Haavisto, Reino Uronen and Finnish officials would be concluded by the Veli Sundbäck to get their assessments. I end of August. He stressed that the resolution also had the opportunity for a conversation adopted by MTK, while negative, had limited with Pertti Salolainen, who was the lunch- itself to the purely sectoral considerations of eon guest at the EU Ambassadors’ meeting Finnish farmers. It did not take a position on on 7 September. Haavisto, when I called the wider balance of national interest; nor on him, was about to address the following would MTK be combining its efforts with the day (3 September) an extraordinary general mainstream “no” lobbies, or contributing to assembly of the farmers’ association MTK, them financially. which was expected to adopt a negative The Haavisto/Pesälä/Steichen meeting in position towards EU membership. He was Brussels went reasonably well. The feedback I concerned about the possible impact of this received from the Finnish side indicated that on the parliamentary vote. Regarding the they were quite satisfied with the outcome. ongoing talks on the tukipaketti, it emerged There had been, as hoped, agreement on “the from my various contacts that these did not map” (a copy of which was duly signed by the formally speaking stand in the way of the three ministers), as well as on the basis for Government’s tabling the various bills in the fixing the borderline between LFA and non- Eduskunta, since these were mainly enabling LFA areas. On transitional support and Nordic legislation. On the other hand, the Govern- support (now that the map had been agreed) ment would need to be much more specific in there appeared to be no outstanding political the course of the debate itself. problems. On support for remaining serious There was recognition that not everything difficulties a compromise had been reached could be settled in detail now. But it was im- permitting the problem to be postponed. portant, I was told, to be able to say that the In his subsequent comments to the press, basic issues were solved, that Finland’s basic Steichen announced that overall agreement problems were understood, and that there had been reached on the most important is- were no reasons to expect any difficulties sues, even if more work was still required at from the Commission in the implementation of the support package as now tabled in the Parliament. The politically most important­ 192 Article 141 of the Act of Accession 84 technical level. At Finnish ­request, Steichen On receiving Uronen’s phone call, I had subsequently confirmed, in a letter to Pesälä, immediately contacted Steichen’s office his understanding of what had been agreed. to inform them, and to seek instructions. As always, however, the devil was in the Steichen himself was in Latin America and detail. This proved to be the case both for the difficult to get hold of. The press line agreed agro-environmental support measures to be was that Steichen’s letter had confirmed that implemented under existing CAP rules and, the overall approach of the national support above all, for the transitional measures to package appeared acceptable. The details re- compensate for immediate price alignment. leased the previous week by the Finnish side This became painfully apparent when, on 6 had been the subject of technical contacts October, Pesälä gave a press conference at between the two sides, but there had been which he outlined the details of the tukipa- no formal Commission decision. Since, how- ketti as it now stood. This included detailed ever, the overall approach had been agreed at figures for transitional production aid to a political level, there was no reason to suppose series of products in the form of additional that there would be any fundamental diffi- price supports per kg of output. culties in agreeing the technical implement- During the weekend, there were reports ing details. I immediately informed Uronen in the Finnish press that the Commission had of the line we were taking. In their own press just rejected similar proposals from Norway. release, put out on the Monday, the Finnish I was rung up at home by a deeply disturbed side took a similar approach, stressing that Reino Uronen, to be told that his Minister was there had been agreement on the structure on the verge of resigning. Uronen was ada- and scale of the measures and that the details mant that the measures envisaged by Finland had been discussed with the Commission reflected the outcome of technical contacts services, albeit that no formal decision had with Commission officials who, according to yet been notified to Finland. Uronen, had not only been aware for some The main Finnish TV news channels were time of Finnish intentions but had even, at still however reporting later in the week ru- an earlier stage, encouraged them to go in mours supposedly emanating from Buenos this direction. Shortly thereafter, I received a Aires that the Commission had difficulties call from my German colleague, Ambassador with the Finnish proposals. In response to Peter Bazing,193 who had been himself been press questions on Friday 14 October (just rung up on the same issue by Heikki Haavis- two days before the referendum) the Com- to. Haavisto himself was subsequently the mission’s Spokesman categorically denied luncheon guest at that Monday’s EU Ambas- that Steichen had given interviews to any sadors’ meeting, where he was highly critical Finnish journalist. He also quoted from of the Commission’s handling of the issue. Steichen’s letter to Pesälä to demonstrate We were thus faced, less than a week from that – contrary to what was being reported Finland’s EU referendum, with a situation – there had indeed been agreement on the where the credibility, both of Agriculture overall approach to transitional aid. As for Minister Pesälä personally and of the Com- the ongoing discussions at technical level, mission as a reliable negotiating partner, important progress had been made and these were at stake. If Pesälä were obliged to retract were continuing “in a climate of confidence or modify what he had said to the press the and goodwill”. Pesälä did not resign. previous week, this would be ruthlessly ex- The referendum campaign itself had ploited by the opponents of EU Membership meanwhile got into full swing already in ear- as evidence that the Commission should not ly August, at the end of the Finnish summer be trusted with the future of Finnish agricul- break. The role of the Commission Delegation ture. The situation could hardly have been in Helsinki during this period was a rather worse. delicate one. Brussels was firmly hoping for a positive result in the three Nordic refer- 193 German Ambassador to Finland 1989-1995. endums, following the two-thirds majority Germany held the Presidency of the EU Council during in favour in the Austrian referendum of 12 the second half of 1994. June – although we all knew that it would be 85 a close call in Norway. My clear mandate was resulting in better terms. I argued that re- to do what I could to help things along in a jection of the current deal would, on the positive direction. But, as a diplomatic mis- contrary, mean postponing membership for sion, we could not be seen to be interfering in several years and joining the EU alongside a domestic political debate in our host coun- the former Communist countries of Central try. Moreover, if we had done so, it would al- and Eastern Europe. The EU would moreover most certainly have been counterproductive. in the meantime have moved further forward We consequently kept a low profile, limiting with its own integration, on the basis of de- ourselves mainly to providing information cisions in which Finland would have had no on the EU and its policies to those interested. say. Boarding a moving train was already dif- I did nevertheless, after careful consul- ficult enough. It would certainly not get any tation, accept a few invitations to speak in easier as the train accelerated out of the sta- public during this period. One such occa- tion towards its next destination. sion was a seminar organised in Helsinki in As with the visit of Delors in July, great late September by the Association of Finnish care was taken to ensure that none of the Local and Regional Authorities (Kuntaliitto), numerous high level visitors from Brussels sharing a platform with Paavo Väyrynen. during this period found themselves dragged I began my intervention (probably to the into the domestic debate. The only other ­disappointment of many in the audience) by Commissioner to visit Finland during this stressing that I was not there to tell them how period was Henning Christophersen, who to vote on 16 October: Finns had to weigh up represented the Commission at the tradi- for themselves the arguments for and against tional meeting with EFTA Ministers in the EU membership on the basis of the package margins of the EFTA Ministerial meeting in that had been negotiated. I did however in- late June – the last to be chaired by Finland. vite them, in doing so, to bear certain points The most difficult question he had to face in mind. I reminded them that the EU was came, however, not from the Finnish media about pooling national sovereignty – not sur- but from the meeting itself, when Icelandic rendering it – in order to do certain things in Foreign Minister Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson common more effectively than they could be asked quite out of the blue what the EU reac- done separately. I stressed that Finland was tion would be if Iceland were now to apply for most warmly welcome as a future Member membership. Most visits by senior officials State and that we were looking forward to the were related to the future implementation contribution which Finland’s long and suc- of the EU acquis by Finland in areas such as cessful experience could make to helping us transport, the environment, development, play our part in ensuring the peace and sta- justice and home affairs and competition. bility of post-Cold War Europe. I urged those These involved almost exclusively contacts present to look at the accession package as with counterparts in the Finnish Adminis- a whole, and not just at those few chapters, tration. In a few cases, arrangements were such as agriculture, that had received the made, in cooperation with the latter, for most attention during the accession nego- them to address selected audiences on their tiations. Finally, I reminded them that EU particular area of interest. membership did not just mean taking on Even though we were not active par- board the existing acquis communautaire­ ; it ticipants in the referendum campaign, we of meant participation in the decision-making course monitored developments closely, and procedures of the EU and in the shaping of reported regularly back to Brussels. I made a the EU of the future. point of keeping in close and regular contact These were the essential points that we with the key personalities in the campaign. sought to get across, in low key fashion, in We paid particular attention to the evolution all our public and private contacts. I sought of Finnish public opinion towards EU mem- in addition actively to counter the illusion, bership. Up to the start of the campaign, most promoted by opponents of EU accession, that polls had shown a clear majority in favour a “no” vote in the referendum could lead, of EU membership – albeit with 20-30% of within a few months, to new negotiations ­ “don’t knows” – and this had widened after 86 the conclusion of the accession negotiations. of EMU constraints and because of “social In late August/early September however the dumping” from Member States with lower gap suddenly narrowed. At the time of the standards. For the Christian League, the EU Pesälä and Haavisto’s meeting with Steichen was a supranational Catholic conspiracy. in Brussels, some polls were even showing a Another key argument was that EU mem- majority against membership. bership would mean once again surrender- Many reasons were advanced by the media ing Finnish sovereignty to an outside power and others to explain this apparent194 sudden (“from Tehtaankatu to Esplanadi”196). For shift in public opinion: the long-drawn-out the “yes” lobbies, by contrast, promoting discussions over the tukipaketti; the exces- the advantages of EU membership involved, sive generosity of the latter to farmers to the at least initially, addressing a much wider detriment of Finnish tax-payers; the non- agenda, rather than just one or two central committal attitude of the Government;195 the arguments. domestic debate about who should represent Most of the key actors in the “yes” cam- Finland at meetings of the European Coun- paign had moreover deliberately chosen to cil; the recent debate within the EU about a play it low key. Virtually the whole of Fin- multi-speed Europe. Whatever the reasons, land’s political and economic élite was in fa- the “yes” campaign undoubtedly got off to a vour of EU membership. Drawing the lesson bad start and was widely considered not to of the Danish Maastricht referendum, how- have performed well in the first two televised ever, they were anxious to avoid what might debates. This was probably inevitable, given be perceived as a co-ordinated attempt to the nature of the debate and the character of bulldoze the Finnish people into a “yes” the players. vote. The Confederation of Finnish Industries Both the “yes” and the “no” lobbies were and Employers and the three main trade un- coalitions of fairly disparate interests. The ion confederations, all of whom were pro- “no” lobby, moreover, was made up both of membership, had thus been concentrating those who were opposed to membership on most of their efforts on their members/em- any terms and those (such as Paavo Väyrynen) ployees, mainly at shop-floor level. The two who claimed not to be opposed to member- main pro-membership political parties, the ship as such, but only to the terms that had Conservatives and the Social Democrats, had been negotiated. But, as is so often the case in also been directing their campaigns largely to such debates, the “no” campaign had the ad- their own constituency groups. The Govern- vantage of being able to focus its efforts nar- ment (as distinct from its individual minis- rowly and forcefully on a few key messages, ters) had so far limited itself to launching an making maximum use of the public funding extensive campaign of factual information, that had been made available to both sides without actively campaigning in favour of in the campaign. For the agricultural lobby, the membership deal it had negotiated. At this was that EU membership posed a threat national level, the task of putting the case to the future of Finnish agriculture. For the for EU membership was thus, in the early far Left, it was that the EU would erode levels weeks of the campaign, left largely, on the of employment and social security because one hand, to President Ahtisaari and, on the other, to an umbrella group of “non-active” 194 It is interesting to note that the polls published by political personalities, under the leadership EVA – based on more in-depth surveys conducted of former Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa. over longer periods – had consistently shown a By early October, public opinion polls more even result (40% for, 40% against, 20% don’t were once again recording a clear majority know) that had hardly shifted since the opening of in favour of membership. President Koivisto negotiations in February 1993. had intervened for the first time in the de- 195 While the Government undoubtedly was, as a bate to explain why he personally supported result of its internal divisions, extremely low key in its support for the accession package, it is by no means certain that a more active approach would have 196 The former being the location of the Russian helped: indeed, probably to the contrary, given the Embassy in Helsinki and the latter that of the offices Government’s unpopularity by this time. of the European Commission Delegation 87 EU membership. Opponents continued to In the event, when the day of the refer- cite agriculture as a reason for saying “no”, endum arrived on 16 October 1994, the Finn- but much of the earlier steam appeared to ish people voted by a comfortable margin of have gone out of this issue (although it was, 56.9% to 43.1% in favour of EU membership. as we saw above, to resurface in the final There were however, as expected, considera- week of the campaign). Following the anti- ble variations according to age, sex, occupa- membership resolution adopted by MTK on tion, political affiliation and location (North 3 September, there was, quite frankly, not vs. South, urban vs. rural). much more to be said on the subject, espe- In his television address following the an- cially after both Haavisto and Pesälä had in- nouncement of the result, President Ahtisaari dicated that they now supported accession; remarked that this “historic referendum” it was assumed in any event that a majority of was “the first time [that] the Finnish nation farmers would vote “no”. The debate began have decided for themselves which road the to revolve instead primarily around the is- country should follow”. He appealed for na- sues of “security” (in the widest sense of the tional consensus (“the commitment of every term), sovereignty and independence; and, Finn”) in the forthcoming adjustment to EU behind these, a series of “soft” issues, such membership; stressing that the latter was as the environment, the position of women the natural extension of the policy of Euro- and religion. pean cooperation that had been followed so The defence/security question (the far, and that the EU also offered new ways of “Zhirinovsky factor”, as it became known197) strengthening Finland’s own well-being and was, I reported to Brussels in the final days security. Ahtisaari also stressed that the out- before the referendum, one of the strongest come of the referendum was “morally and arguments in favour of membership. While politically binding” on Parliament, the Presi- most Finns did not expect membership to dent of the Republic and the Government. lead to other European soldiers defending the On the EU side, Delors expressed his own Finnish frontier, they did perceive it as lead- personal pleasure at the choice Finnish vot- ing to increased political security, by raising ers had made. He recognised that, for many the potential political and economic cost to Finns, it had not been an easy decision. He Russia of any possible future attempt to pres- confirmed his respect for the position of surise Finland. This perception was, I added, those who had voted against (“that’s democ- reinforced by the strong psychological desire racy”). This would, he stressed, in no way of most Finns, having lived for centuries at diminish the welcome extended to them as the very margins of Western Europe, to af- EU citizens (“there will not be passports of firm unequivocally their Western European different colours for those who voted for and identity.198 At the same time, I warned, Finns those who voted against”). do not want to be railroaded into defence al- With the outcome of the referendum now liances which might lead to potential conflict assured, attention now turned to the vote in with Russia. (This issue had been given par- the Eduskunta. ticular prominence in the previous few days following fears expressed by the Defence Committee of the Parliament that observer status in WEU will lead indirectly to mem- bership of NATO.)

197 The success of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s radical nationalist Liberal-Democratic party in its opposition to President Boris Yeltsin had aroused great concern in the West, and particularly in Finland. 198 David Arter – one of the top non-Finnish experts on Finnish politics – comes to a similar conclusion in his own later analysis of the outcome of the referendum (Arter (1995)). 88 Photo: Deutsches Bundesarchiv / Wikimedia Commons

XII

THE FINAL FURLONG here had been speculation for several with a view to agreeing on a name to propose months as to who would be nominated to the President in good time before Santer’s Tto be Finland’s first Member of the Eu- visit. It was our understanding that, although ropean Commission. It was widely assumed, the President personally favoured the nomi- however, that no formal decision would be nation of Liikanen, he would not press this if taken until after the referendum, in order there were another name on which the Gov- not to be seen to be prejudging the outcome. ernment could agree unanimously. There was also an ongoing domestic debate as The Council of State duly convened on to whether the constitutional responsibility 19 October, but was unable to achieve una- for the nomination lay with the President or nimity. Aho pressed for the nomination of with the Prime Minister. With the referen- Haavisto (who was reputedly not particularly dum now settled, the matter began to acquire keen to go to Brussels) but the other Coalition some urgency. partners were not prepared to support him Under the new provisions introduced in this, especially as Santer had ruled out the by the Maastricht Treaty, the appointment agriculture portfolio for Finland. The Centre by the European Council of the President Party ministers were unwilling to support ei- and other Members of the Commission who ther of the possible Conservative candidates: would take office on 7 January 1995 was now Salolainen and Parliament Speaker Ilkka subject to the prior approval of the European Suominen. None of the Coalition partners Parliament. Moreover, the nomination by was prepared to propose Liikanen, a Social Member State Governments of their can- Democrat. The decision on the nomination didates for the post of Commissioner had was accordingly postponed to the follow- to be made in consultation with the person ing Tuesday (the day of Santer’s visit). This already nominated by the European Council was generally interpreted as increasing Lii- to be President of the Commission. The Eu- kanen’s chances, although we were not to- ropean Council had decided in July to nomi- tally ruling out the possibility of a last minute nate Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques “dark horse” compromise candidate. Santer to that post – albeit only after much When Santer landed in Helsinki late in the difficulty, both internally and with the Eu- evening of Monday 24 October, there was ropean Parliament (whose approval of the thus still no agreement on the candidate to be nomination was now required). The process nominated. Santer was met at the airport by of nominating the other Members of the new PM Aho, who briefed him on latest develop- Commission was meanwhile well advanced. ments. Jim Cloos200 and I discussed the situa- It had been agreed some weeks earlier that tion further with Santer at his hotel. Santer’s Santer would come to Helsinki on 25 October programme the following day involved late for discussions on the subject with the Finn- morning meetings with both Ahtisaari and ish Government. Aho, followed by an official lunch in his hon- As of mid-September, a wide range of our. In the meantime, the Council of State names was still being floated in the Finn- would have met and, it was hoped, reached ish media. The front runners appeared to be agreement. Erkki Liikanen, Heikki Havisto and Pertti Veli Sundbäck rang me early the following Salolainen. But several other names were morning to give me the latest update and to also being mentioned around town, includ- outline the scenario for the Council of State’s ing former Prime Ministers Harri Holkeri deliberations, so that I was able to brief Sant- and Kalevi Sorsa, as well as Justice Minister er as fully as possible in advance. Sundbäck Anneli Jäätteenmäki, State Secretary Veli promised to get back to me once the meeting Sundbäck and former Ambassador Jaakko was over to me to let me know the outcome. Ilomiemi. We were informed that, provided This he did shortly before we left for the Pres- the referendum was positive, the Council of idential palace. It transpired that the Council State199 would meet immediately thereafter of State, when it had met early that morning,

200 Santer’s Chef de Cabinet, who had previously 199 The formal term for the Finnish Cabinet served as Chef de Cabinet to Commissioner Steichen. 90 had still been unable to reach a unanimous We had long known that the Eduskun- decision on a candidate, since the Ministers ta’s approval of the Accession Treaty was of each of the two main parties remained un- ­dependent on the adoption of a domestic willing to abandon support for their party’s agricultural support package (tukipaketti) own candidate. Haavisto had meanwhile in- that was acceptable to the Centre Party. For dicated to Aho that he no longer wished to be a large number of Centre Party MPs, the final considered for the Brussels post and Aho was shape of the tukipaketti would determine instead pressing for Bank of Finland Director which way they would vote on EU accession. Esko Ollila (a former Centre Party minister Opponents of ratification, moreover, were whom the Swedish People’s Party ministers seeking to keep the debate going until after were ready to support). The Conservatives the Swedish and Norwegian referendums, in were now pressing for Salolainen. When the the hope that, if either or both of these were Council had subsequently reconvened in the negative, it would increase the likelihood presence of the President, Ahtisaari, having of there being sufficient “no” votes in the been apprised of the Government’s delib- Eduskunta to prevent Finland’s accession. erations, had announced that he was nomi- Although Ahtisaari had argued201 that the nating Liikanen, justifying his decision in a outcome of the referendum was morally and statement - subsequently made public - en- politically binding, and a majority of Mem- tered in the minutes of the Council of State. bers was indeed expected to vote in line with Aho was at pains to present a united front it, the Eduskunta was not legally bound to on the issue when he and other Government follow the vote of the people. Ministers met Santer later in the day. In the There was however an additional issue at media, however, the nomination of Liikanen stake, namely whether the Eduskunta was was being generally interpreted as a defeat constitutionally entitled to take a final vote at for Aho, vis-à-vis both the President and all on the ratification of the Accession Treaty his own Coalition partners, in particular the in advance of the March 1995 general elec- Conservatives. It was clear moreover that tions. It was this question, which revolved the outcome had left the Centre Party, and around the interpretation of certain articles Aho in particular, in a rather bitter mood. of the Finnish Constitution, that was at the Against that background, Liikanen’s imme- core of the filibustering campaign. diate announcement that he was appointing We had long assumed, in line with what Aho’s Foreign Affairs advisor, Pekka Huht- Jaakko Kalela had told me back in March aniemi, as his future Chef de Cabinet was, as 1992,202 that Finnish membership as of 1 I reported to Brussels, a politically shrewd January 1995 would necessitate Eduskunta “bridge-building” move. approval of the Accession Treaty on the basis The nomination of Finland’s Commission- of an “urgency” vote, which required a five- er was by no means the last cliff-hanger in sixths majority. We had, for that reason, not- the nerve-wracking final months leading up ed with some concern that, in the Eduskunta to Finnish accession. The same was to be the debate on Finland’s decision to apply for EU case in even more public and dramatic fash- membership, the number of Members in fa- ion with the parliamentary vote on the ratifi- vour had fallen slightly short of that thresh- cation of the Accession Treaty and the related old. In the meantime, however, opinions on tukipaketti. The debate in the Eduskunta had this issue in Helsinki had evolved. begun already on 6 September, although the It is indeed the case that amendments final vote on accession could take place only to the Finnish Constitution first require a after the referendum, since the latter was motion of urgency, passed by a five-sixths merely advisory and the last word was with majority in the Eduskunta, before they can the Eduskunta and the President. At the time be voted through in a single parliamentary of Santer’s visit to Helsinki, the parliamen- term. Otherwise the matter has to be voted tary debate had become bogged down in a through by two successive Parliaments, with seemingly endless series of procedural fili- busters. 201 See Chapter IX above 202 See Chapter IV above 91 a general election in between. In either case, After several weeks of such filibustering, the final vote requires a two-thirds majority. the Act incorporating the Accession Treaty For acts incorporating international treaties (and the various other EU Treaties) was put into the law of the land a simpler procedure to the vote on 18 November. This was five was, however, available,203 involving a single days after Sweden’s national referendum, passage by a two-thirds majority without which had produced a narrow majority of the requirement for the prior passage of an 52% to 48% in favour of accession. By then, urgency motion. Was the ratification of the it looked increasingly likely that there would Accession Treaty tantamount to a modifica- be a negative result in the Norwegian refer- tion of the Finnish Constitution, or was it just endum on 28 November. (Norway did indeed the incorporation of an international treaty? vote against by an equally narrow margin Expert opinion on this delicate question was of 52.5% to 47.5%). The outcome of the divided. The matter was considered in early Eduskunta vote now depended on the posi- October by the Constitutional Committee of tion taken by the Members of Aho’s Centre the Eduskunta, which adopted the latter in- Party. Some (including Paavo Väyrynen) terpretation by a majority of 13 to 5.204 were certain to vote against. If they were When this was put to the full Eduskunta, joined by more than a few further defectors, it provoked uproar among opponents of EU there would not be the necessary two-thirds accession since this factor, more than any majority in favour of ratification. other, was in all likelihood going to deter- In the event, the Eduskunta voted in favour mine whether or not Finland would accede of accession by 152 votes to 45, with 1 absten- to the EU. A substantial minority of Members tion and 1 absentee, which was comfortably (Rural Party, Christian League, Left Wing Al- beyond the two thirds majority needed. This liance, some Greens) were committed to vot- paved the way for the formal ratification of ing against, despite the outcome of the refer- the Accession Treaty by President Ahtisaari endum. They were expected to be joined by at on 8 December, following the positive out- least some Centre Party Members (prominent come of Åland’s provincial referendum and among them Paavo Väyrynen). There would the assent of the Åland Lagting. thus not be the necessary five-sixths major- Finland’s accession was not however as- ity to pass an urgency motion. If it were to sured until all EU Member States had also be decided that ratification of the Accession deposited their own instruments of ratifica- Treaty had to be treated as a constitutional tion with the Italian Government within the amendment the final vote would conse- deadline of 31 December 1994 set by the Ac- quently have been postponed until after the cession Treaty. A regular check on the state March 1995 elections. Since the deadline for of play regarding the latter was conducted at Finland to deposit her instrument of ratifica- the weekly meetings of COREPER in Brussels. tion was 31 December 1994, this would effec- When the latter took stock at its final meet- tively have scuppered Finland’s accession to ing of the year on 22 December, no fewer the EU. If, on the other hand, the Accession than five ratifications were – rather alarm- Treaty was to be treated like any other inter- ingly – still outstanding. Four of the Member national treaty, then there was at least a very States concerned (Belgium, Luxembourg, good chance that the requisite two-thirds France and Portugal) were able to confirm majority could be mustered in favour. It was that their ratifications would be deposited thus hardly surprising that opponents of EU before the end-year deadline. Spain, by con- accession tried every trick in the procedural trast, was in difficulty because the Spanish book to prevent the matter being put to such Parliament was linking its approval to the a vote. satisfactory resolution of a completely sepa- rate issue concerning fishing rights. When I left Helsinki that day, to spend the Christmas 203 Section 69, paragraph 1 of the Parliament Act vacation with my family in England, I was of 1928 consequently still uncertain whether I would 204 See Rosas (1995) be returning in January to a newly acceded Member State of the EU or not. 92 When Spain had joined the EU in 1986, it had done so on terms which (to Spain’s deep resentment) had provided, for a lengthy transitional period, only partial access for Spanish fisherman to the full advantages of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy.205 The Council was supposed to have taken, already a year earlier, on the basis of a report from the Commission, a decision on the adjust- ments to be made to this regime as of 1 Janu- ary 1996. The matter had, however, become bogged down in the Council, which had been unable to agree to Spanish demands for full integration into the CFP. The EU’s Fisheries Council was convened in emergency session, in parallel with the COREPER meeting of 22 December, to try to break the deadlock. After lengthy and dif- ficult discussions, the Council was finally able to reach overall agreement on the basis of a detailed and complicated compromise, drawn up by the Presidency and the Com- mission, that provided for the integration of the Spanish and Portuguese fleets into the Common Fisheries Policy as from 1 January 1996. The way was thus cleared for the Span- ish Government to proceed with its ratifica- tion of the Accession Treaty and to deposit its instrument of ratification in the period between Christmas and New Year. On 30 De- cember the Italian Government duly notified all signatories that all the necessary ratifica- tions206 had been received in due time, thus permitting the Treaty of Accession to enter into force as planned on 1 January 1995. The last hurdle on the way to Finland’s EU acces- sion had been cleared.

205 Articles 156-166 of the Act of Accession of 1985 (OJ No L 302 of 15 November 1985, pp 69-73) 206 Apart, of course, from that of Norway. 93 Photo: Niccolò Caranti / Flickr.com

EPILOGUE:

IMPRESSIONS AND REALITIES efore taking up my new duties in Hel- her interests within the Union, while deter- sinki in March 1993, I made the usual mined and consistent, would, first and fore- Bround of pre-departure courtesy calls most, be constructive.207 With the swearing in in Brussels. One of these was to the UK Per- of the Lipponen Government in mid-April, manent Representative to the EU, Sir John work on the preparations for the IGC began Kerr. We discussed, amongst other things, in earnest. When Commissioner Edith Cres- the sort of Member State we thought Fin- son met PM Lipponen in Helsinki on 4 May, land would be when (as both of us assumed Lipponen told her that Finland wanted to be would be the case) she joined the EU. I said in the mainstream of the future development that, from my own experience of the coun- of the EU and would not be seeking special try, I thought that London had got it wrong. opt-outs. When Commission Secretary Gen- They seemed to be under the impression eral David Williamson called on him in Hel- that Finland and the other two Nordic can- sinki a few days later, Lipponen stressed the didates would be rather like Denmark and importance of EMU and that the new Gov- would generally tend to sit on the UK side of ernment’s economic policy was designed to the supranational/intergovernmental fault meet the EMU criteria. The following week, line. Whatever the other two might do, I was he told the local EU Ambassadors that Fin- pretty certain, I said, that this would not be land wanted to strengthen the EU, so that it the case for Finland. For her, EU member- would work effectively and produce results. ship was central to the affirmation of her full Fast forward a decade and a half. Finland Western European identity in the post Cold is today a fully integrated Member of the EU. War world. There was no way she was going She is, unlike Sweden, Denmark and the UK, to be a half-hearted Member or a “wrecker”. a founder member of the euro zone. She has Kerr confirmed that the general perception (unlike the UK) been a full member of the in London was indeed as I had described it. Schengen passport union since 2001, when He went on, somewhat to my surprise, to the problems arising from the simultaneous add that he himself did not hold that view existence of the Nordic passport union were but tended on the contrary to share a similar finally resolved. Finland has, unlike a number assessment to my own. of Member States, no opt-outs or derogations I also well remember that, early on in the from the EU acquis, nor has she ever sought accession negotiations, Veli Sundbäck and any. Finland’s first EU Presidency in 1999 was others said to me that Finland would be a dif- instrumental in establishing closer coopera- ficult negotiator but a good Member State. It tion in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, was a phrase I repeated to myself on numer- following the modifications introduced by ous occasions by way of reassurance dur- the Treaty of Amsterdam. Confounding the ing some of the more difficult stages in the scepticism expressed at the time of her ac- negotiations. It was not however until the cession, Finland has been an active and loyal difficulties surrounding the negotiation and participant in the EU’s Common Foreign and ratification of the Treaty of Accession had Security Policy. A Finnish General, Gustav been surmounted, and accession had become Hägglund, was the first Chairman of the EU a reality, that the main planks of Finland’s Military Committee. future EU policy began to emerge, prompted In line with those of its predecessors,208 in the first instance by the pressure of the on- the Government Programme of the recently going preparations for the 1996 IGC. appointed Katainen Government209 declares A first debate on the guidelines of Fin- Finland to be “a dynamic and proactive land’s European policy took place in the Member State of the European Union” that Eduskunta in mid-February 1995, on the basis of a report from the Aho Government. 207 Guidelines of Finland’s European Policy (Govern­ Although the debate was inevitably over- ment Report to Parliament, 14 February 1995), p. 1 shadowed by the upcoming general elections 208 See e.g. Government Programme of Prime Minister of March 1995, which were expected to lead Matti Vanhanen’s second Cabinet, 19 April 2007 to a change of Government, it did serve to put 209 Programme of the Finnish Government (Prime down a first marker that Finland’spursuit ­ of Minister’s Office, 22 June 2011) 95 “will support the EU’s development, build- ing on the potential of the current Treaties” and “will continue to take part in the Union’s key projects as much as possible”. Recognis- ing recent public criticisms, the document stresses the importance of broad-based civil society participation in the handling of EU affairs, and the need for the operation and fi- nancial administration of the Union to be ef- ficient and open. The programme goes on to argue that “activities based on the commu- nity method offer the best means of securing stable and balanced operation of the Union and democracy”. Finland will consequently need to pursue a “determined and targeted strategy” in the current enlarged Union “in which intergovernmentalist tendencies have become stronger”. She “will actively work for the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the common European defence policy in accord- ance with the opportunities offered by the Lisbon Treaty”. At the time of writing, the new Govern- ment has yet to produce its promised EU Policy Report. I was meanwhile re-reading the report on Finland’s EU policy that the second Vanhanen Government submitted to Parliament in April 2009, which is a remark- ably positive and upbeat document. One par- ticular passage caught my eye: “EU member- ship” it reads “has given us new influence, enhanced the conditions for economic de- velopment and, above all, anchored Finland in the European mainstream”.210 This one sentence seems to me to encap- sulate perfectly where Finland stands these days in relationship to her membership of the EU and to illustrate dramatically just how much has changed compared with the Fin- land I encountered when I first set foot there just under thirty years ago. Finland may, in geographical terms, still lie at the periphery of Europe; but, in geo-political terms, she has, by contrast, long since “come in from the cold” to sit at the very centre of European developments.

210 Government Report on EU Policy (Prime Minister’s Office Publications no. 20/2009), p. 9 96

APPENDIX

TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS LEADING UP TO FINLAND’S EU MEMBERSHIP 1948 Finland signs FCMA (YYA) Treaty with USSR 1955 Finland joins Nordic Council 1961 Finland becomes Associate Member of EFTA 1973 Finland signs Free Trade Agreements with European Communities 1977 EC-EFTA free trade achieved for most industrial products 1982 European Commission President Gaston Thorn visits Helsinki 1984 Jan Full industrial free trade achieved between EC and EFTA countries Apr EC-EFTA Luxembourg Declaration 1986 Finland becomes full member of EFTA 1988 Jul European Commission President Jacques Delors visits Helsinki Dec Sorsa is first Finnish Foreign Minister to visit European Commission 1989 Jan Delors speech to European Parliament launches EEA initiative May Finland becomes member of Council of Europe Jul Austria applies for EC membership Nov Fall of Berlin Wall Dec Bush-Gorbachev Summit in Malta marks end of Cold War 1990 May Holkeri is first Finnish PM to visit European Commission Jun Formal launch of EEA negotiations Oct German reunification; Finland unilaterally revokes certain clauses of the 1947 Peace Treaty and the FCMA 1991 Jul Warsaw Pact officially dissolved; Sweden applies for EC membership Aug Commission Opinion on Austria’s application Sep PM Aho visits European Commission in Brussels Dec Maastricht European Council opens door to new accessions; USSR ceases to exist 1992 Jan FCMA is replaced by a normal CSCE-style bilateral treaty with Russia Feb Signature of Maastricht Treaty on European Union Mar Finland applies for EC membership May Signature of EEA Agreement in Oporto Jun Denmark rejects Maastricht Treaty in national referendum; Lisbon European Council confirms readiness to open negotiations with EFTA applicants once Maastricht Treaty and Delors II package in place Jul Commission Opinion on Sweden’s application Oct Koivisto is first Finnish President to visit European Commission Nov Commission Opinion on Finland’s application; Norway applies for EC membership Dec Switzerland rejects EEA Agreement in national referendum; Edinburgh European Council paves way for new Danish referendum 1993 Feb Accession negotiations opened with Finland, Sweden and Austria Mar Accreditation of first Commission Head of Delegation to Finland Apr Accession negotiations opened with Norway; Haavisto appointed as Foreign Minister following Väyrynen’s resignation Nov Entry into force of Maastricht Treaty; Koivisto addresses Plenary Session of European Parliament 1994 Jan EEA Agreement finally enters into force Feb Ahtisaari wins second round of Presidential elections Mar Final ministerial session of accession negotiations May European Parliament assents to accession of the four Candidate Countries Jun Signature of Treaty of Accession in Corfu Jul Delors visits Finland Oct Finnish referendum approves EU membership by 56.9% to 43.1%; Nomination of Erkki Liikanen as Finland’s first European Commissioner Nov Eduskunta approves Treaty of Accession by 152 votes to 45 1995 Jan Finland, Sweden and Austria accede to EU membership 99 BIBLIOGRAPHY Antola, E. (2000). Special Relationship: EFTA and the Kuosmanen, A. (2001). Finland’s Journey to the European Community as Actors in European Free European Union. EIPA, Maastricht. Trade. EFTA Bulletin, 2000 (2). Laursen, F. (1995). EC-EFTA Relations: A Game-Theory Arter, D. (1995). The EU Referendum in Finland on 16 Perspective. In F. Laursen (Ed.), The Political Economy October 1994: A Vote for the West, not for Maastricht. of European Integration (pp. 179-210). Kluwer Law Journal of Common Market Studies, 33 (3), 361-387. International.

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