DOCSLIB.ORG

Public Awareness in the Pre-Accession Period in Sweden

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Public awareness in the pre-accession period in Sweden 1 Editor: Rolf Engström, MFA, Press and Information department Layout: Jonas Nilsson, MFA, Press and Information department Cover photo: Jonas Nilsson, MFA, Press and Information department Print: XBS Grafisk Service, Stockholm 2002 ISBN 91-7496-300-7 Art. no.: UD 02.066 2 The Swedish Government’s work on information and the media 1991–1994, prior to the Swedish referendum on membership of the EU Contents: 0. Introduction....................................................................................5 1. Background to the negotiations.........................................................6 2. Selected strategy..............................................................................8 3. Financing.....................................................................................12 4. Media management – focus and organisation...................................14 5. The Secretariat for Information on European Affairs..........................18 6. Public opinion on membership.......................................................25 7. Conclusions..................................................................................27 8. Appendix......................................................................................30 9. Appendix II......................................................................................36 3 4 Introduction Sweden’s membership of the European Union became an issue in the early 1990s. Application for membership was submitted in 1991. By then, negotia- tions on the EEA agreement between the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the European Community (EC) were already well under way. Soon enough, Sweden would have close cooperation with the EEA countries. The Government had declared its intention of submitting the question of Sweden’s membership to a referendum even before Sweden’s formal applica- tion. All political parties represented in the Swedish Riksdag (Parliament) agreed. The Riksdag also informed the Government that major information activities would be necessary prior to a referendum. The outcome of a referendum was not given. Irrespective of a possible out- come, it was recognised that thorough information was needed on the EEA agreement, on the existing EC and on the EU, which would come into force in November 1993, well before an eventual Swedish membership. There were thus several steps in European integration that had to be covered in the Swedish information campaign. The information activities that took place between 1992-1994 are described in this leaflet. It has been put together by Martin Haag, who at that time was Press Secretary to the Minister of European Affairs, and Thomasine Hindmarsh, then Information Officer at the Secretariat for Information on European Affairs. The material is based on the writers’ own experiences from that time. During the autumn of 2002, it will also be presented in speeches in some of the candidate countries engaged in planning referendums of their own. 5 1. Background to the Swedish negotiations · Sweden outside the EC/EU for many years · Surprise application in 1991 · Public opinion positive from the outset The Swedish request for membership of the European Community was made public in late 1990. The formal application was submitted to the EC Council of Ministers in July 1991 by the (then) Social Democratic Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson. This step was seen as a total change in direction, as opposed to the earlier, very hesitant Swedish attitude towards EC membership. The question of membership had been an issue of public debate for many years, but the main obstacle had always been the traditional Swedish foreign policy of non-alignment. What made the situation change was primarily the new security order within Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. After the general elections in September 1991, a new, centre-right government was formed, headed by Prime Minister Carl Bildt from the Moderate Party. The new government fully supported the application for EC/EU membership and made it one of its top priorities. The Government wanted “to bring Sweden fully into the European Cooperation through negotiations for Membership of the European Community”, as it stated in its first declaration to the Riksdag in October 1991. The Prime Minister appointed a special minister within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Foreign Ministry) to be responsible for the forthcoming negotiations. The assignment was given to Mr Ulf Dinkelspiel, Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade. The application for membership had broad political support, both from the Social Democratic Party (Sweden’s largest party) and the new coalition government, although there were very different opinions towards membership 6 within the four government parties as well as within the Social Democratic Party. Membership or not was an issue that divided parties from within, rather than between them. The (smaller) Left Party and the Green Party were clear opponents to membership however. Around the time of application, public opinion was very much in favour of membership. According to the main poll institute (SIFO/Research Inter- national) over 60 per cent of the population was in favour. The question in the poll was phrased as follows: if there were a referendum today, would you vote Yes or No to a Swedish membership (of the European Community). The Yes-side had had a majority in the polls for several years, but public opinion was soon to change in a negative direction. Public opinion was a key to the whole process of membership, since the main political parties had decided in 1991 that the people should have the final vote through a referendum after negotiations. It is thus fair to say that, even at an early stage, the Government knew that it would have to conduct two parallel negotiations: one with the EC/EU and its members concerning the conditions for membership, and one with the Swedish people concerning public support for this bold new project. 7 2. Selected strategy · Information seen as a key issue · A separate body for factual and unbiased information · Financial support for adult education and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) · Government taking part in the debate – in favour of membership With the future referendum in mind, the issue of information, the media and opinion was seen as crucial from the beginning. This had also been of prime importance during the earlier process of Swedish-European integration, comprising membership of the EEA, an area of cooperation between the EU and EFTA (where Sweden had been one of the founders). The Swedish Riksdag had already asked the Government for proposals for increased information of various kinds. In view of this, the Government proposed to the Riksdag an information campaign in two stages: Stage 1. During the first year (fiscal year 1992/93) financial support was to be awarded to organisations wishing to inform and bring into discussion the European process of integration; the EEA agreement, the EC/EU and the Swedish membership application. The Government proposed a separate delegation, under the chairmanship of former Centre Party Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin, to allocate grants and financial support to adult education and NGOs. Establishing a separate delegation was a way of avoiding the Government being accused of only promoting its own EU-positive policies. The Riksdag had also expressed the importance of engaging the adult education associations. 8 The Fälldin Delegation consisted of five persons, all of them experts on European integration. They also had very different opinions on the membership issue. The delegation was given the task of allocating money to adult education information projects run by adult education associations and Swedish NGOs over a two year period. The aim was to raise public awareness on EC/EU issues. (See more in details in the Appendix). Apart from the delegation, the main responsibility for EU information rested with the Foreign Ministry, which also conducted and coordinated the negotiations. Within the ministry, a separate body, the Secretariat for Information on EU Affairs, was planned to be set up. Stage 2. During the second year (fiscal year 1993/94) financial support would also be allocated to organisations wishing to conduct a formal campaign pro or contra Swedish membership, with the upcoming referendum in mind. The Government proposed to the Riksdag that the money available should be divided equally between the “Yes” and “No” side. Information issues led to a comprehensive debate in the Riksdag. Support for an information campaign was vast. There were requests for special information for women, as well as strong support for the traditional Swedish NGOs conducting various kind of education. The Riksdag stipulated that information was to be broad and comprehensive and mirror all sides. Both the positive and negative aspects of a Swedish membership should be highlighted and debated. The Government’s own ambition, with support from the Riksdag, was to concentrate primarily on information about the negotiation process. The Government was to provide basic information about the negotiations, proving that the results were in line with the demands that Sweden had already presented at the outset of negotiations. It would be false to pretend that the Government could give a “neutral” or indifferent attitude towards membership. It was clear from the start of the process that the Government’s
Recommended publications
  • From Democratic Socialism and Rational Planning To

    From Democratic Socialism and Rational Planning To

    NORDIC COUNTRIES IN FINNISH PERSPECTIVE FROM DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM AND RATIONAL PLANNING TO POSTMODERN IDENTITY POLITICS AND MARKET-ORIENTATION Ideological Development of the Social Democrats in Sweden and Finland in the Late 20th Century Sami Outinen D.Soc.Sc., University of Helsinki Democratic socialism and planning of term goal was a “socialist society” and “equality the economy between people”, which would be achieved by This article will deconstruct the ideological de- seeking the support of the majority of citizens. velopment of the Swedish Social Democratic Finland’s Social Democrats also favoured the ex- Party SAP (officially, “the Social Democratic pansion of public services, state companies and Workers’ Party of Sweden”) and the Social cooperatives, “democratic economic planning Democratic Party of Finland SDP. This will […] including the effective regulation of capital be done by analysing their own alternative movements” and “the societal control of com- scopes of action in relation to the concepts mercial banks and insurance companies”.1 The of major ideologies and economic theories SAP committed similarly in 1975 at its Party such as socialism, capitalism, economic plan- Conference to long-term planning of the econ- ning, market economy, postmodernism and omy (planmässig hushållning). It positioned Keynesianism as well as researching how Nor- itself as the representative of democratic social- dic social democrats redefined their conven- ism between communist planned economy and tional ideological meanings. capitalism.2 Accordingly, one of the motives for The SDP stressed at the Party Conference in stressing democratic socialism by the SDP was 1975 that democratic socialism was the basis to win the support of the radicalised post-war of its programmatic identity.
  • Swedish Interests in Times of European Change

    Swedish Interests in Times of European Change

    Swedish interests in times of European change Speach by Ulf Kristersson, Europahuset, 16th of May 2018 The spoken word applies Ulf Kristersson, Europahuset, 16th of May 2018 First of all, I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Katarina Areskough Mascarenhas for giving me the opportunity to come and say a few words about the development and future of European cooperation, what it means for Sweden, and the role I see our country playing within the EU. *** On the 31st of August 1961 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons that the UK would apply for membership of the European Economic Community, or the EEC, the predecessor of the modern EU. History – or rather Charles de Gaulle – stood in Macmillan’s way, however, and it would take the UK more than a decade to finally gain membership. The process saw several vetoes from the French President, and eventually his resignation and death, before the UK became a member. Some things have not changed; every time the UK moves to change its relationship with Europe, its actions have an affect on everyone else, including Sweden. It is the same story repeating itself. Within a few weeks, Sweden’s relationship with the EEC would also be determined in a way that would have a significant impact on the European politics debate in Sweden for the next thirty years. The business community, the Liberal People’s Party, and not least my own party pushed for membership. In the 1962 elections, my predecessor Gunnar Hecksher appeared on election posters bearing the message ‘Yes to Europe – for freedom and security’.
  • Fiscal Policy After the Financial Crisis

    Fiscal Policy After the Financial Crisis

    This PDF is a selecon from a published volume from the Naonal Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Fiscal Policy aer the Financial Crisis Volume Author/Editor: Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi, editors Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0‐226‐01844‐X, 978‐0‐226‐01844‐7 (cloth) Volume URL: hp://www.nber.org/books/ales11‐1 Conference Date: December 12‐13, 2011 Publicaon Date: June 2013 Chapter Title: The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments Chapter Author(s): Alberto Alesina, Dorian Carloni, Giampaolo Lecce Chapter URL: hp://www.nber.org/chapters/c12654 Chapter pages in book: (p. 531 ‐ 570) 13 The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments Alberto Alesina, Dorian Carloni, and Giampaolo Lecce 13.1 Introduction The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of budget defi cits (which we label “fi scal adjustments”) is that they are the kiss of death for the governments that implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In certain countries spending cuts are very unpopular, in others tax increases are politically more costly, but everywhere, the story goes, fi scal rigor is always unpopular. The empirical evidence on this point is much less clear cut than the con- viction with which this conventional wisdom is held. In this chapter, in fact, we fi nd no evidence that governments that reduce budget defi cits even deci- sively are systematically voted out of office. We also take into consideration as carefully as possible issues of reverse causality, namely the possibility that only “strong and popular” governments can implement fi scal adjust- ments and thus they are not voted out of office “despite” having reduced the defi cits.
  • Affärsängel Med Fingertoppskänsla För Bra Teknikidéer

    Affärsängel Med Fingertoppskänsla För Bra Teknikidéer

    Så hoppas Sverige Sveriges lägga beslag på smartaste EU-myndighet 22 industri 5 IVAAKTUELLT NR 1 2017. GRUNDAD 1930 JANE WALERUD Affärsängel med fingertoppskänsla för bra teknikidéer Asea-robot långkörare i Genarp Första kvinnan som blev professor i Sverige IVA Opinion Digitaliseringens vardagsutmaningar igitalisering är vår tids stora tade uttrycket ”cash is king”. förändringskraft. I vardagen blir Självklart är det här ingen katastrof av vi ständigt påminda om hur den episka mått. Men det är irriterande att påverkar i stort och smått, på varken jag eller stormarknaden har en fung- jobb och fritid. Näringsliv och erande backup. Och min kundupplevelse av Dmyndigheter blir effektivare, våra sociala liv det som brukar kallas ”fintech” blir negativ. förändras och vår vardag enklare. Det finns runt 5 miljoner privata användare Smarta mobiler gör det lättare att skicka av Swish i dag. Men företagslösningar för pengar, hitta vägen, jämföra priser, boka butiker är än så länge bara på provstadiet. resor och hotell, konsumera media, spåra Samtidigt vill inte bankerna hantera borttappade mobiler, kolla tv-serier och kontanter och det blir allt längre mellan styra värmen i fritidshuset. Det mesta har bankomaterna. Särskilt i glesbygd. Att gå blivit lite bättre. Så länge allt fungerar. omkring med en bunt sedlar i plånboken Det är när tekniken slutar fungera som betraktas närmast som suspekt. vi plötsligt inser hur irriterande beroende Att it-system går ner och inte har hund- vi blivit av digitaliseringens positiva sidor. ra procents tillgänglighet är något vi lärt Det räcker med att den trådlösa routern oss att acceptera. Att samhällsfunktioner hemma går ner så drabbas familjen av blir allt mer beroende av dessa medför att kollektiv panik.
  • Environmental Management Since World War II Mattias Hjärpe & Björn-Ola Linnér

    Environmental Management Since World War II Mattias Hjärpe & Björn-Ola Linnér

    Environmental management since world war II Mattias Hjärpe & Björn-Ola Linnér The Royal Academy of Engineering Sciences, IVA, is an independent arena for the exchange of knowledge. By initiating and stimulating contacts between experts from different disciplines and countries the Acacemy promotes cross fertilisation between industry, academia, public administration and various interest groups. For further information about IVA and current projects visit IVA’s web page www.iva.se. This is one of the reports produced on behalf of the IVA-project ”Environmental Forsight”. For further information and documentation from this project is found on the project website www.iva.se/mna. Project manager: Thomas Malmer Communication manager: Eva Stattin Publisher: Kungl. Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademien (IVA) 2006 Box 5073 SE-102 42 Stockholm Tfn: 08-791 29 00 IVA-R 457 ISSN: 0348-7393 ISBN: 91-7082-740-0 © Department for Water and Environmental Studies and Centre for Climate Science and Policy Research, Linköpings universitet and IVA, 2006 2 Introduction to the background papers within the IVA-project Environmental Foresight How much resource depletion can the earth take? According to many estimates, consumption of the world’s natural resources is far higher than the earth can tolerate, while others maintain that shortages will drive the development of new technology. Regardless of where you stand, it is fair to say that the demand for various natural resources in the world is constantly increasing, not least because of the growth of new economies such as China and India. This applies to both renewable and finite resources, for energy transformation as well as manufacturing products.
  • Taxonomy of Minority Governments

    Taxonomy of Minority Governments

    Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design Volume 3 Article 1 10-17-2018 Taxonomy of Minority Governments Lisa La Fornara [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijcd Part of the Administrative Law Commons, American Politics Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Comparative Politics Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legislation Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Rule of Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons Recommended Citation La Fornara, Lisa (2018) "Taxonomy of Minority Governments," Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design: Vol. 3 , Article 1. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijcd/vol3/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Taxonomy of Minority Governments LISA LA FORNARA INTRODUCTION A minority government in its most basic form is a government in which the party holding the most parliamentary seats still has fewer than half the seats in parliament and therefore cannot pass legislation or advance policy without support from unaffiliated parties.1 Because seats in minority parliaments are more evenly distributed amongst multiple parties, opposition parties have greater opportunity to block legislation. A minority government must therefore negotiate with external parties and adjust its policies to garner the majority of votes required to advance its initiatives.2 This paper serves as a taxonomy of minority governments in recent history and proceeds in three parts.
  • Agents in Brussels

    Agents in Brussels

    THOMAS LARUE AGENTS IN BRUSSELS DELEGATION AND DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UMEÅ UNIVERSITY Statsvetenskapliga institutionen Umeå universitet Statsvetenskapliga institutionens skriftserie, 2006:01 ISSN 0349-0831 ISBN 91-7264-058-8 © Thomas Larue Tryck: Print & Media, Umeå universitet, 2006:2001780 Abstract: This dissertation explores delegation and democracy within the European Union (EU). The EU now constitutes one of the cornerstones of the democratic systems of its member states. The most vital instrument of democracy is lawmaking, which increasingly occurs at the European level. Many different actors contribute to the shaping of EU legisla- tion. Among the most important of these are national bureaucrats representing their mem- ber states in Council negotiations. This thesis focuses on these bureaucrats. In particular it analyzes the delegation and accountability relationship between member states’ govern- ments and their national bureaucrats stationed at the permanent representations (PRs) in Brussels. It is based on semi-structured elite interviews with 80 French and Swedish senior civil servants in Brussels, Paris and Stockholm. Using an explorative and descriptive comparative case study of two EU member states, France and Sweden, the dissertation seeks to describe and analyse how delegation between member states’ capitals and Brussels are affected by: i) the coordination and preparation of EU issues in member states’ government offices, ii) the organisation and functioning of the permanent representations, and, most importantly, iii) existing accountability mechanisms. Applying a principal-agent approach, this study shows that the delegation between govern- ments and their Brussels-based bureaucrats is adequate, despite relatively weak delegation and accountability designs. The study identifies institutional divergence between France and Sweden as regards the design of national systems of EU delegation, particularly moni- toring and reporting requirements, where Sweden seems to have a more developed system.
  • ANNUAL Report

    ANNUAL Report

    Annual report TORVILD AAKVAAG BJARNE AAMODT OLAV AARNA LARS-ERIC AARO TEODOR AASTRUP KENT ABBÅS ENNO ABEL EGIL ABRAHAMSEN JONAS ABRAHAMSSON ERIK AGERMAN GUNNAR AGFORS CARLOS AUGUSTO LIRA AGUIAR CHRISTOPHER AHLBERG INGA-BRITT AHLENIUS LENNART AHLGREN GÖRAN AHLSTRÖM KRISTER AHLSTRÖM KRISTINA AHLSTRÖM ESKO AHO MATTI ALAHUHTA HORST ALBACH ANN-CHRISTINE ALBERTSSON PER-ÅKE ALBERTSSON EVA-LENA ALBIHN MARCUS ALDÉN UNO ALFREDEEN HENRIK ALFREDSSON BERT ALLARD THOMAS ALLARD STURE ALLÉN GUNNAR ALMGREN ANDREAS ALSÉN KRISTINA ALSÉR OLLE ALSHOLM LEO ALTING JAVIER ALVAREZ VARA JOHNNY ALVARSSON LOUIS AMÉEN JOAKIM AMORIM PIA ANDERBERG ARNE ANDERSSON BENGT ANDERSSON BERTIL ANDERSSON BJÖRN ANDERSSON BRITT-INGER ANDERSSON CURT ANDERSSON EVERT ANDERSSON GÖRAN ANDERSSON INGER ANDERSSON INGVAR ANDERSSON JOHAN ANDERSSON LARS ANDERSSON MATS ANDERSSON MATS ANDERSSON PATRIK ANDERSSON ROLAND ANDERSSON ROLF ANDERSSON RUNE ANDERSSON SIV ANDERSSON SVEN-ERIK ANDERSSON SÖREN ANDERSSON THOMAS ANDERSSON TOMAS ANDERSSON ÅKE E ANDERSSON ROBERT ANDREEN PETER ANDREKSON CARL-GUSTAF ANDRÉN SVEN G ANDRÉN INGEGERD ANNERGREN KARIN ANNERWALL PARÖ MARKUS ANTONIETTI ULLA ANTONSSON JEANETTE ANTTILA MARIA ANVRET MASAHIKO AOKI KARIN APELMAN GUNILLA ARHÉN ANTTI ARJAS JOHN ARMSTRONG CHRISTEL ARMSTRONG-DARVIK SIGNHILD ARNEGÅRD-HANSEN ROAR ARNTZEN BERTIL ARONSSON LARS AROSENIUS FREDRIK ARP GÖRAN ARVIDSSON OLOF ARWIDI MICHAEL ASHBY LEIF ASP OLA ASPLUND PETER AUGUSTSSON JÖRGEN AXELSSON ANNA AXELSSON WÅLLBERG SVEN AXSÄTER ROLF BACK LARS BACKSELL SIGVARD BAHRKE CLAES BANKVALL DEAN BANNON SERGIO
  • M061chairmen's Report

    M061chairmen's Report

    Chairmen’s Report on the High-level Expert Group Meeting “The Islamic World and the West” Chaired by Ingvar Carlsson, Co-chairman Abdelsalam Majali, Organizing Chairman 27-28 April 2006 International Leadership Institute, United Nations University Amman, Jordan © InterAction Council ISRAEL VS. PALESTINE Rooted in a conflict centuries old, a peaceful future for Israel and Palestine is critical to the region and to the world as a whole. The goals of both Israel and Palestine, in the resolution of their conflict, represent the goals of the world at large; lasting peace and international security. In an effort to better understand the problems facing the international community in relation to this conflict, the InterAction Council High-level Expert Group Meeting, held on the 27th and 28th April 2006 in Amman, Jordan, was convened to tackle the walls that surround the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. After concentrated discussion, participants of the High-level Expert Group Meeting developed a series of recommendations for the development of an enduring peaceful coexistence between Israel and Palestine. Mutual Recognition Mutual recognition, non-violence, and adherence to previous agreements from both sides are essential to the peace process moving forward. Israel and the international community must recognise the role that Palestine’s democratically elected government plays in contributing to the efficacy of the process for peace. It was recognised that Hamas won the 2006 election, and for this reason, it is crucial that the international community take immediate action to engage the Palestinian Authority in a political process based on dialogue, in order to revive the peace process and allow for renewed economic support.
  • 3 Hotet Från Öst

    3 Hotet Från Öst

    3 Hotet från öst 3.1 Sovjetunionen och Norden För Sovjetunionen var Norden vid slutet av 1960-talet inte något prioriterat område. Mot bakgrund bl.a. av de spända relationerna till Kina var en förbättring av relationerna till väst, och särskilt fortsatt avspänning gentemot den andra supermakten, de viktigaste prioriteterna för den sovjetiska utrikespolitiken. På den europeiska scenen var det för Moskva av vikt att få principen om status quo efter andra världskriget befäst, och att få till stånd en europeisk säkerhetskonferens för detta ändamål. Vägen dit låg via de stora fördragsverken rörande Tyskland och Centraleuropa, och Norden låg i detta perspektiv vid sidan av. 3.1.1 Allmänt Den ökade militära betydelse som Nordområdena (med Nordområdena menas här norra Norge, Sverige och Finland, och angränsande havsområden i Norska havet och Barents hav), senare under 1970-talet skulle komma att få hade ännu vid slutet av 1960- talet inte börjat göra sig gällande. Norden var ”den glömda flanken”. Moskvas intresse vid denna tid var av allt att döma att bevara Norden som ett lågspänningsområde. Sällan gjorde sovjet- ledningen uttalanden om Norden eller frågor som rörde de nordiska länderna, och i den sovjetiska pressen var ämnet vid denna tid sparsamt förekommande. Det ansågs dock i det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet att en ”aktivisering” av Nato i de nordliga med- lemsländerna Danmark och Norge pågick.1 Genom sin geografiska position var det ofrånkomligt att Norden drogs in i den globala öst-västkonfrontationen, och även om området inte låg i centrum för supermakternas intresse är det i 1 Promemoria 1970-06-10, Skandinaviska avdelningen vid det sovjetiska utrikesministeriet.
  • Sweden: Gender Equality and Feminist Foreign Policy

    Sweden: Gender Equality and Feminist Foreign Policy

    Editorial Team: Beata Surmacz (Director of ICE), Tomasz Stępniewski (Deputy No. 356 (53/2021) | 24.03.2021 Director of ICE), Agnieszka Zajdel (Editorial Assistant), Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik, Jakub Olchowski, Konrad Pawłowski, Agata Tatarenko ISSN 2657-6996 © IEŚ Damian Szacawa Sweden: gender equality and feminist foreign policy Gender equality policy has been developed for many years in Sweden and is now one of the cornerstones of the country's international activities. It is visible especially in the course of Sweden’s activities on the forum of international organizations: the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It is also the basis for feminist foreign policy (FFP), officially pursued by Sweden since 2014. Genesis: from electoral law to an equality policy. In 1919, the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) passed universal and equal suffrage for women and men. On this basis, elections to the parliament were held in 1921 in which women could cast their votes for the first time. After one hundred years, Sweden is regularly named as at the forefront of states in terms of gender equality. The Gender Equality Index score for Sweden in 2020, developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), was 83.8 and was the highest in the European Union (average – 67.9)1. The latest Global Gender Gap Report published in 2021 by the World Economic Forum ranks Sweden fifth (out of 156 countries). This synthetic index, which was introduced to benchmark progress towards gender parity and compare countries’ gender gaps across four dimensions, was 82.3% (the global gender gap score is 67.7%)2.
  • What Is Social Democracy?

    What Is Social Democracy?

    What is Social Democracy? A book about ideas and challenges by Ingvar Carlsson and Anne-Marie Lindgren Published by Arbetarrörelsens Tankesmedja and the publishing house Idé och Tendens Barnhusgatan 16, 3 tr S-111 23 Stockholm Sweden www.arbetarrorelsenstankesmedja.se Printing house: Sjuhäradsbygdens Tryckeri AB, Borås, Sweden, 2007 ISBN 978-91-976756-0-4 Foreword Every social democrat has his or her own personal answer to the question of what social democracy stands for. Social democracy is not and never has been a party with a fixed body of dogmas that every member must swear by. It has a tradition of ideas shaped by more than a hundred years of theoretical debate and practical politics, the development of which can be followed in the party manifestos. This collection of ideas covers values and social analysis, dreams about the society of tomorrow and practical policies for the society of today. This booklet describes this tradition of ideas: how it has developed and how it can be used to understand the period of change that society and policy has now entered. In this sense it is an introduction to the history of ideas and the discussion of ideas within social democracy. It is of course also a personal answer to the question of what social democracy stands for. Furthermore, it is a contribution to a debate on the future of social democracy, a world that has changed much both in relation to the society that saw the birth of the Labour Movement and the world in which social democracy implemented its big reforms, but in which the issues of equality and solidarity are as topical now as they were then.