SIX Ambassadorial Appointment (August 1940–January 1941)

It cannot be thought, just because Japan has occupied vast tracts of the earth, that it will defeat the United States in a protracted war. —Nomura Kichisaburō, October 1940

In the period surrounding his appointment as ambassador to the United States, Nomura provided his colleagues with a penetrating, powerful, ac- curate, compelling, and even brave forecast of the foreign policy course they were piloting. Almost alone among Japanese officialdom, the ad- miral coolly discerned the disparity between Japan’s policy goals and the means the nation had at its disposal.1 At its most basic, his vision was predicated on a realistic awareness of the practically unlimited power that the United States could bring to bear on Japan, as well as a forebod- ing sense that, if provoked, Americans would fight for their interests, beliefs, and ambitions. His ambassadorial appointment, of course, coincided neatly with the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Pact. Nothing could have been better designed than this pact to signal Japanese dis- regard for American interests, beliefs, and ambitions. Nomura well un- derstood the seriousness of the situation. On 9 September 1940, even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke and his German counterparts en- tered negotiations preliminary to conclusion of the pact, Nomura de- spondently noted: “Once an alliance with Germany [and Italy] is con- cluded, the chances of Japan fighting in the Pacific will greatly increase.” Ambassadorial Appointment 115

Gallingly, this had arisen because, as Nomura saw it, “Germany intends to avail itself of the Japanese navy.”2 In view of the foregoing, the question rather naturally arises: what hope did Nomura maintain—indeed, what hope could he maintain—for his forthcoming mission to Washington? The answer lay in large part with the Japanese navy. It was no secret that the navy would bear the brunt of the fighting if war broke out in the Pacific. And although the navy had its share of hawkish elements champing for a fight with the United States, the service’s upper echelons in their more reflective mo- ments recognized such a war as unwinnable. In what would have been unthinkable for an ambassador other than one who had risen to the navy’s highest rank, Nomura demanded of the navy minister and his immediate subordinates more definite leadership than they had displayed in giving their assent to the Tripartite Pact. In a word, he was calling on the navy leadership to independently decide on its own strategic and diplomatic objectives, regardless of the cacophony of voices—from within and with- out the service—arrayed against it. On this score, it might be noted that, en route to the United States aboard the Kamakura Maru, Nomura pored over Mutsu Munemitsu’s Kenkenroku, paying special attention to the for- mer foreign minister’s refusal during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 to be dragged along by the wilder ambitions of his contemporaries.3

I On 22 July 1940, Konoe Fumimaro, who as prime minister in 1937 had led Japan into war with China, formed his second cabinet. It was a time of enormous upheaval in world affairs. Weeks earlier, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France had surrendered in the face of the German armies’ blitzkrieg. Only Britain, which German forces were busy assailing from the air and sea, stood between Hitler and mastery over Western Europe. Regarding “England’s fate as sealed,” Japanese policy- makers—Konoe prominently among them—were determined that Japan should claim its part of the spoils, which loomed in the form of British, French, and Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia.4 The New Order that Konoe had proclaimed in November 1938 expanded, at a stroke, from its original emphasis on Japan, Manchuria, and China, to include virtually the entire Far Eastern region. Characterizing the mood then prevailing, historians Sumio Hatano and Sadao Asada wrote: “Ger- man successes . . . had so dazzled Japanese officials as to generate a fever- ish clamor for an opportunistic southern advance that would take ad- vantage of an apparently imminent German victory.”5 Needless to say,