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1941:Soviet Mobilization for a First Strike

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1941:Soviet Mobilization for a First Strike 1941: SOVIET MOBILIZATION FOR A FIRST STRIKE ____________ A Thesis Presented To the Faculty of California State University Dominguez Hills ____________ In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Masters of Arts In Humanities ____________ by Olexiy Koumpan Fall 2017 Copyright by OLEXIY KOUMPAN 2017 All Rights Reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE COPYRIGHT PAGE ..............................................................................................................ii TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................... iii ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................ iv CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION. ............................................................................................................. 1 2. THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP TREATY IN CONTEXT ......................................... 4 3. THE SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX ............................................... 18 4. NOTES ON THE 1940-41 WAR PLANS ...................................................................... 29 5. THE WAR PLANS OF AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1940 ................................................ 33 6. THE REVISION OF OCTOBER 1940 ........................................................................... 36 7. MP-41 AND THE MARCH WAR PLAN 1941 ............................................................. 41 8. THE WAR PLAN OF MAY 1941 ................................................................................... 44 9. THE AFTERMATH ......................................................................................................... 54 10. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 58 WORKS CITED ..................................................................................................................... 64 iii ABSTRACT After Stalin’s failed negotiations with Britain and the subsequent signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty, the Soviet Union looked to gather the resulting spoils from the west’s war with Nazi Germany. As Hitler’s military continued to gain quick victories throughout Europe, Stalin’s calculations were soon stalled. Stalin now realized that a battle with Germany was inevitable. What followed from this point onward are Stalin’s attempts to upgrade the Red Army for war. I will argue that Stalin planned to strike Germany first. Evidence for this claim will base itself in the military doctrine of the Red Army, which has always been based on offensive strategies. The documentation of Soviet war plans point towards this direction. However, in order for the Soviet offensive to be successful, certain force levels would have to be attained. In the end, the Germans attacked first, while Soviet troops were in the preparatory stages of mobilization. 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Seventy-five years have passed since the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, questions concerning the foreign policy of the Soviet Union from 1939-41, along with offensive intentions (if any) of the Red Army against Germany before Hitler’s first strike remain debatable. Evan Mawdsley (2002) explains that two general historical interpretations have emerged as a result (818). One accepts the long-held view that Moscow’s diplomacy and strategy in 1941 was “defensive, pragmatic and essentially passive in the face of German danger” (818). The other, more controversial argument centers on “significant offensive and active elements – military, diplomatic, or even ideological – in Russian policy at this time” (818). In the West, two of the leading authorities of the defensive, “traditionalist” view, are Gabriel Gorodetsky and David Glantz who have produced book-length rebuttals to Rezun- Suvorov’s controversial Icebreaker thesis in which they not only stress that a notion of a German preventative attack is farfetched, but that the Red Army was in no way ready, prepared or ordered to be used offensively (Mawdsley 820). The “Revisionists” who retain some of Rezun-Suvorov’s claims, include historians like Joachim Hoffmann and Walter Post, along with Western scholars such as C.S Raack and Daniel W. Michaels who stress the role of political ideology of Stalinist foreign policy, while others like Mikhail Meltyukhov and Lennart Samuelson document the notion that Soviet military mobilization was well underway in the Soviet Union before 1941. 2 For the purposes of this paper, my argument will remain focused on the perspectives of the latter group. I aim to oppose the traditional western historical narrative that Stalin ignored the growing threat of Hitler to the Soviet Union, choosing to remain passively on the sidelines until the inevitable opposition attack. The preparation of several war plans, including the consequent Timoshenko-Zhukov plan of May 1941 show a different narrative, in which Stalin schemed to put the May 1941 plan into action after realizing that the events following the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty were not in his favor. However, the Red Army was not able to organize itself in time – though they tried. Evidence of mobilization confirms this. Employing Evan Mawdsley (2003) as one of my main sources, I will argue that the May Plan of 1941 was not counter-offensive to a German first strike, but a recommended first strike by the Red Army to catch the German forces while they were deploying rather than defending. Although the prescribed numbers of forces were not reached by June 1941, production rates allow us to assume that Soviet Forces would have been ready for 1942. Consequently, Hitler’s forces struck first and caught the Red Army in the early stages of deployment. Meltyukhov’s (2000) research into the development of Soviet forces indicates that the Soviet military had around 2.5 million troops in total before the war, but increased substantially by 140% to reach 5.7 million in 1941 (497-504). Such evidence allows us to deduce that Germany’s quick rise to power prompted a monstrous build up of Soviet troops in preparation for possibility of war. Seeing that his plan for a long war between the Allied Nations and the Nazis was spoiled by quick victories from Germany, Stalin prepared the USSR for an offensive. Summoning the Soviet commissar for Defence, 3 Timoshenko, and the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Zhukov, to prepare a detailed plan in May of 1941 for a pre-emptive strike against the German forces that were assembling in German-occupied Poland, Stalin preferred waiting until he reached total superiority with armaments before casting the first strike. Under this proposed war plan, a Soviet force of 152 divisions, along with 3000-4000 aircraft would launch a surprise attack on the German Forces stationed in southern Poland (Mawdsley 818). Ultimately, no Soviet attack came that summer, as certain force levels would have to be attained in order for a Soviet offensive to be deemed successful. Instead, when news broke of the impeding German invasion, Stalin ordered the preparations to be made for putting the May plan into action. The Soviet Union pursued a last-ditch effort to scramble troops for an early, and likely unsuccessful offensive in the late summer of 1941. However, Soviet troops could not be organized on time. When German Wehrmacht launched its first strike on June 22, 1941, the Red Army was caught in the midst of implementing the preparatory stages of the May plan. In hindsight, one is tempted to wonder what would happen if the Soviet Union launched its preemptive strike in mid June when the discrepancy between the total of stationed opposing forces was not as large as then seemed. 4 CHAPTER 2 THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP TREATY IN CONTEXT In order to affirm the notion that Stalin was preparing to launch an offensive strike on Nazi Germany, it is important to examine the period between the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty on August 23, 1939 and the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. One of the essential questions concerns the nature of the Soviet- German relationship and its potential state in the future. Was the signing of the pact a sign of a relationship that could sustain itself in the future? On the other hand, if Stalin believed that armed conflict with Germany was inevitable, did he plan to adopt a defensive stance or take up the initiative to launch a preemptive attack? Such questions are further complicated by the development of Germany’s war with the west. Documentation provides us with some insight on Stalin’s mindset, suggesting the idea that he presumed the war between Germany and the Allied nations would leave both sides exhausted and vulnerable to Soviet advances. However, to what extent did the German victories at the start of the war influence his strategy? The change, if any, must be carefully considered as well in order to accurately judge Stalin’s intentions. Nazi Germany and the USSR signed a Treaty of Non-Aggression on August 23, 1939. In an analysis of the Soviet Union’s planned offensive against Germany, it is important to note that Stalin was ready to sign an alliance with Western powers, provided that his conditions were met. However, if his demands were not accepted, Stalin would just as well make a pact with Hitler. Carefully dealing his cards, Stalin’s main objective 5 was to place the Soviet Union in a position from which it could be of most benefit. Stalin finally signed for a non-aggression
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