FREE WARS IN 1994-2009 PDF

Mark Galeotti | 96 pages | 09 Dec 2014 | Bloomsbury Publishing PLC | 9781782002772 | English | Osprey, United Kingdom ’s Wars in Chechnya – - Osprey Publishing

In this fully illustrated book an expert on the conflicts traces the progress of the wars in Chechnya, from the initial Russian advance through to urban battles such as , and the prolonged guerrilla warfare in the mountainous regions. Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 assesses how the wars have torn apart the fabric of Chechen society and their impact on Russia itself. Featuring specially drawn full-colour mapping and drawing upon a wide range of sources, this succinct account explains the origins, history and consequences of Russia's wars in Chechnya, shedding new light on the history — and prospects — of the troubled region. These are the stories of low-level guerrilla combat as told by the survivors. They cover fighting from the cities of Grozny and Argun to the villages of Bamut and Serzhen-yurt, and finally the hills, river valleys and mountains that make up so much of Chechnya. The author embedded with Chechen guerrilla forces and knows the conflict, country and culture. Yet, as a Western outsider, he is able to maintain perspective and objectivity. He traveled extensively to interview Chechen former combatants now displaced, some now in hiding or on the run from Russian retribution and justice. The book is organized into vignettes that provide insight on the nature of both Chechen and Russian tactics utilized during the two wars. They show the chronic problem of guerrilla logistics, the necessity of digging in fighting positions, the value of the correct use of terrain and the price paid in individual discipline and unit cohesion when guerrillas are not bound by a military code and law. Guerrilla warfare is probably as old as man, but has been overshadowed by maneuver war by modern armies and recent developments in the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 of war. As Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines and Chechnya demonstrate, guerrilla war is not only still viable, but is increasingly common. Fangs of the Lone Wolf provides a unique insight into what is becoming modern and future war. Over 2, total pages It quickly became clear, as well, that Russian authorities had been less than candid about the number of held and the extent to which they were prepared to deal with the situation. Amid grief, calls for retaliation, and demands for reform, one of the more telling reactions in terms of hardening public perspectives appeared in a national poll taken several days after the event. This pessimism was the consequence not just of the , but the accumulation of years of often spectacular failures by Russian special operations forces SOF, in the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 US military acronym. There have been other, more ambiguous, but equally unsettling dimensions of Russian SOF activity Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 well, that have strong internal and external political aspects. These constitute the continuing assertions from Russian media, the judicial system, and other Federal agencies and officials that past and current members of the SOF establishment have organized to pursue interests other Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 those publicly declared by the state or allowed under law. This includes especially the alleged intent to punish by assassination those individuals and groups that they believe have betrayed Russia. The murky nature of these alleged activities has formed a backdrop to other problems in the special units. Humankind has always sought out innovative and new ways of waging war, establishing new forms of warfare. Set against a background of global strategic instability this Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 of innovation has, over the last two decades, produced a new and complex phenomenon, hybrid warfare. Distinct from other forms of modern warfare in several key aspects, it presents a unique challenge that appears to baffle policymakers and security experts, while giving the actors that employ it a new way of achieving their goals in the face of Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 Western Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009, doctrinal, and strategic superiority. The Hybrid Age analyses the phenomenon of hybrid warfare through theoretical frameworks and a range global case studies from the Lebanon War to the Russian intervention in in This book Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 to establish a unified theory of hybrid warfare, which not only outlines what the term means, but also places it in its context, and provides the tools which enable an observer to identify and react to a future instance of hybrid warfare. From the chaos of the civil war to the political manoeuvring of the , Russia's armed forces have shaped the future not only of Russia but of countless other countries around the globe. The Great Bear at War: The Russian and , —Present explores the development and struggles of Soviet and across the numerous conflicts which mark its history. The post-Soviet development of the Russian military into a modern force is explored in detail, including Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 controversial campaigns in Chechnya —Georgiaand Ukraine from At a time when the world is closely focused upon Russian military behaviour, The Great Bear at War is both timely and fascinating. The Russia-Chechen wars have had an extraordinarily destructive impact on the communities and on the trajectories of personal lives in the North Republic of Chechnya. This book presents Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 analysis of the Chechen conflicts and their consequences Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 Chechen society. It discusses the nature of the violence, examines the dramatic changes which have taken place in society, in the economy and in religion, and surveys current developments, including how the conflict is being remembered and how Chechnya is reconstructed and governed. Feminist International Relations scholarship in the United States recently celebrated its 20th anniversary. Over those years, feminist researchers have made substantial progress concerning the question of how gender matters in global politics, global economics, and global culture. The progress has been noted both in the academic field of international relations and, increasingly, in the policy world. Celebrating these achievements, this book constructs conversations about the history, present state of, and future of feminist International Relations as a field across subfields of IR, continents, and generations of scholars. Providing an overview and assessment of what it means to "gender" IR in the , the volume has a unique format: it features a series of intellectual conversations, presenting cutting-edge research in the field, with provocative comments from senior scholars. It examines issues including global governance, the United Nations, war, peace, security, science, beauty, and and addresses key questions including: What does viewing the diverse problems of global politics through gendered lenses look like in the 21st Century? How do feminisms accommodate differences in culture, race, and religion? How do feminist theoretical and policy analyses fit together? These conversations about feminist IR are accessible to non-specialist audiences and will be of interest to students and scholars of Gender Studies, Feminist Politics and International Relations. Was speaking out the right thing to do with regard to Russia, a power with a veto at the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 Security Council and a tradition of propaganda control of the public arena? Should MSF take into account the possibility of a casual link between instances of its public speaking out and the security incidents involving its staff? The First War began in December and lasted for one year and nine months, ending in August There were two major urban battles - the Battle of the Chechen capital of Grozny from December to March and the Battle of Grozny Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 August - and two major battles in the rural areas, the Russian offensive in the Southern Chechnya in May and Juneand fighting in the foothills part of the Republic from February to May The Second War began in August and lasted much longer - until mid-Aprilfor almost ten years. It also included a Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 urban battle, and it again occurred in New Year's Eve - the Battle of Grozny in December - February There was also a major battle in the countryside - the Battle for the village of Komsomolskoye, located in Urus- Martanovsky District, in March And there were also two large attacks outside Chechnya -in Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 Octoberand in the North Ossetian town of Beslan in September During these war, Russian federal troops took heavy losses, while the number of deaths reached nearlypeople. Milyukov's expert and meticulous chronicle lists the major events of these conflicts soberly and without editorial Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994- 2009 to document their events in all their brutality and horror. How the massive power shift in Russia threatens the political dominance of the United States There is a new cold war underway, driven by a massive geopolitical power shift to Russia that went almost unnoticed across the globe. Russia is in the midst of a rapid economic and geopolitical renaissance under the rule of , a tenacious KGB officer turned modern- day tsar. Understanding his rise to power provides the keys to understanding the shift in the energy trade from to Russia. This powerful new position threatens to unravel the political dominance of the United States once and for all. Discover how political coups, hostile takeovers, and assassinations have brought Russia to the center of the world's energy market Follow Putin's rise to power and how it has led to an upsetting of the global balance of trade Learn how Russia toppled a Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 of robber barons and positioned itself as the most powerful force in the energy market Study Putin's long-range plans and their potential impact on the United States and the U. The Colder War takes a hard look at what is to come in a new global energy market that is certain to cause unprecedented impact on the U. Widespread media interest Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 conflict reflects an ongoing concern about the evolution of federal Russia. Why did the Russian leadership initiate military action against Chechnya in December but against no other Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 part of the Federation? This study demonstrates that the Russian invasion represented the culmination of a crisis that was perceived to have become an increasing Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 not only to the stability of the region, but also to the very foundations of Russian security. It looks closely at the Russian Federation in transition, following the collapse of the communist , and the implications of the Chechen Declaration of Independence in the context of Russia's democratisation project. Twentieth-Century Europe: A Brief History presents readers Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 a concise and accessible survey of the most significant themes and political events that shaped European history in the 20th and 21st centuries. Features updates that include a new chapter that reviews major political and economic trends since and an extensively revised chapter that emphasizes the intellectual and cultural history of Europe since World War II Organized into brief chapters that are suitable for traditional courses or for classes in non-traditional courses that allow for additional material selected by the professor Includes the addition of a variety of supplemental materials such as chronological timelines, maps, and illustrations. Deriving in part Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 its Soviet past, Russia's military doctrine represents more than just a road map of how to fight the nation's wars; it also specifies threats to national interests, in this case the United States, NATO and international terrorism. Against this background, Robert Brannon demonstrates that the military's influence may reveal as much about politics as it does the military. Russia has recently re-emerged as the dominant political, economic and military actor in former Soviet nations. Kanet and Freire bring together a stellar cast of contributors to consider Russia's recent return as a major regional and international actor and its likely future policy toward its neighbours. Where do Vladimir Putin's ideas come from? How does he look at the outside world? What does he want, and how far is he willing to go? The great lesson of the outbreak of World War I in was the danger of misreading the statements, actions, and intentions of the adversary. Today, Vladimir Putin has become the greatest challenge to European security and the global world order in decades. Russia's 8, nuclear weapons underscore the huge risks of not understanding who Putin is. Featuring five new chapters, this new edition dispels potentially dangerous misconceptions about Putin and offers a clear-eyed look at his objectives. Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 presents Putin as a reflection of deeply ingrained Russian ways of thinking as well as his unique personal background and experience. Praise for the first edition If you want to begin to understand Russia today, read this book. Central Intelligence Of the many biographies of Vladimir Putin that have appeared in recent years, this one is the most useful. It is a psychological portrait. If so, which ones would you recommend? There's Mr. Putin, by Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy. This book examines reform of the Russian military since the end of the Cold War. It explores the legacy of the Soviet era, explaining why - at the time of the fall Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 the Soviet Union - radical reform was long overdue in the wake of changing military technology, new economic and political Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009, and the emergence of new threats and challenges. It discusses the problems encountered by Gorbachev in his attempts to promote military reform in the late s, and goes on to analyse in detail the mixed fortunes of the policies of his successors, Yeltsin and Putin. It describes how the onset of war in Chechnya in provided clear evidence of the weaknesses of the Russian military in modern conflicts, and shows that although the Chechnya debacle did provide some impetus for reforms in the armed forces inthe momentum was not continued under the Putin government. Moreover, it argues that in his attempts to concentrate all means of control to a corrupt and inefficient Kremlin bureaucracy, Putin has deprived himself of all alternative channels of independent scrutiny, control and oversight, thus exacerbating the problems that continue to plague the Russian military. This groundbreaking work examines the complex dynamics of Russia's relations with the Caucasus, revealing the profound effects that Caucasian forces have had upon Russia's development. Essays show how Georgian sparks ignited conflagrations in and Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009spreading northward to conflicts in Ossetia and and Chechnya Combined with jihadist influences Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 entered from the South and East by way of , these events culminated in the second Russo-Chechen war Chechnya transformed both the Russian military and the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Beginning inPutin's Chechenization strategy had unforeseen and controversial results for the entire Russian Federation. This book explores how norms-based international organizations, namely the Council of Europe and the OSCE, are still able to win in world politics. Fawn uses the concept of internal conditionality to explain how these organizations have been able to respond to members with a lack of material incentives or instruments Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 coercion. Terror in Chechnya is the definitive account of Russian war crimes in Chechnya. Emma Gilligan provides a comprehensive history of the second Chechen conflict of torevealing one of the most appalling human rights catastrophes of the modern era--one that has yet to be fully acknowledged by the international community. Drawing upon eyewitness testimony and interviews with refugees and key political and humanitarian figures, Gilligan tells for the first time the full story of the Russian military's systematic use of , disappearances, executions, and other punitive tactics against the Chechen population. In Terror in Chechnya, Gilligan challenges Russian claims that civilian casualties in Chechnya were an unavoidable consequence of civil war. She argues that racism and nationalism were substantial factors in Russia's second war against the and the resulting refugee crisis. The Other Side of the COIN: The Russians in Chechnya | Small Wars Journal

The two most recent wars should be viewed in part as chapters in a historical narrative which stretches back more than Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 centuries. A great deal has been written about the terrible atrocities and human rights violations committed by both sides during the First and Second Chechen Wars but considerably less attention has been devoted to the study of Chechnya as an example of success in counterinsurgency. Although such numbers are significant, they are a mere fraction of the death rate at the height of the war. According to statistics from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs MVD26, people were killed Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 armed conflict fromincluding 2, Russian servicemen Such hesitancy may be partly due to the extreme unpalatability of Russian tactics, as well as a sense of consternation and bewilderment at their efficacy. Numerous Western theorists have underlined the foundational importance of winning and retaining the goodwill of the indigenous population ThompsonKitsonNaglKilcullen In defiance of such a position, several Western theorists have outlined a more coercive approach to counterinsurgency. These theoretical paradigms suggest that the authoritarian model of counterinsurgency can prove highly effective if the population is convinced that their best chance of survival lies in complying with the counterinsurgent. Russian counterinsurgency practitioners have consistently flouted Western counterinsurgency best practices while continuing to enjoy considerable success in quashing . Yuri Zhukov notes that Russia has successfully defeated 18 out of 21 Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 fought since the start of the 20 th century, the vast majority of which occurred within the territory of Russia Zhukovp. Chechnya seems to be no exception to this trend and in spite of the brutality of the Russian campaigns, the republic is now firmly under federal control. These methods will be elaborated on Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 the third part of this article and include: stage-managing the presentation of the war for the domestic audience to win popular support and terrorizing the Chechen population to make the cost of supporting Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 prohibitively high. In order to illustrate this argument, this article has been divided into three sections: a brief history of the conflict and its context, an evaluation of the problems facing the Russians and an assessment of the four key factors which enabled the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 victory. Chechnya has had a long history of resistance to Russian imperial expansion. Although this uprising failed, it was followed by a much longer insurrection led by Imam Shamil from which has become mythologized in Chechen folk tradition. The breakdown of the Russian Empire allowed Chechnya to indulge in a brief flirtation with independence from before the republic was forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. In Stalin unjustly accused the Chechen-Ingush Republic of mass collaboration with the Nazis and decided Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 abolish the republic and deport all of its inhabitants around half a million people to . Approximately a third of the population died during the roundup, journey and subsequent exile Miakinkovp. Strong clan structures, low levels of industrialization, an unrelated language and adherence to Islam serve to differentiate Chechnya from largely Orthodox and formerly Soviet Russia. Such a code of conduct is reminiscent of the Pashtunwali observed in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and parallels can be made between Chechens and Pashtun society. Both groups experienced successive bloody counterinsurgencies, both are Islamic cultures in which kinship bonds are hugely important and in both societies young men prize honor and many carry weapons as a matter of course. Nevertheless, unlike Afghanistan, Chechnya had been considered a Russian territory for a very long time and the First War was essentially an issue of contested sovereignty. Control of Chechnya was important for the transportation of energy resources and the Russian authorities feared that allowing independence might set a precedent and trigger a domino effect. If Chechnya left, it was possible that Balochistan and oil rich Tatarstan would try to secede and Russia might lose all of the remaining ethnic republics. However, the Chechens were ready and waiting - one Russian military analyst estimates that 6, Russian soldiers were facing 10, Chechen fighters with , Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 pieces and an assortment of anti-armor weaponry Raevskyp. Unsurprisingly, the column was severely defeated, with several tanks and soldiers being captured, thereby pushing Yeltsin to a full-scale invasion. The conflict was ended by the fragile ceasefire known as the Accord which led to the withdrawal of Russian forces and the election of as President Dudayev had been killed in During the interbellum, Islamic factions became increasingly powerful within Chechnya and they eventually forced Maskhadov to adopt Sharia law in Kommersantp. In the same year, , a prominent warlord and unsuccessful presidential candidate, together with Saudi cleric Ibn al-Khattab, launched raids into Dagestan accompanied by 1, fighters Schaeferp. It seemed that the Chechen contagion might spill over into neighboring republics and that Russian control of the region could be lost. At around the same time there were a string of highly-publicized apartment bombings in which killed over people and wounded many more. Another was found in the basement of an apartment block in the city of Ryazan and two men were arrested. It later emerged that the two men were FSB agents, the bomb was live and that it had been made of RDX — the same component used in the other bombings. By ordering the troops into Chechnya shortly after the explosion, Putin won plaudits for being a hardliner and became the most popular politician in Russia Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 of the Presidential Elections in Yet taking the city still meant a great deal of hellish urban fighting involving flamethrowers and close artillery strikes. Needless to say, large numbers of died in the fighting, along Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 many Russian soldiers. Nevertheless, by mid-March of all of the large urban centers were under Russian control and the war metastasized into a more traditional guerrilla war fought from the mountains. While Kadyrov remains in charge, a reignition of the insurgency is unlikely. Russian forces in Chechnya were confronted with a bewildering array of difficulties. Certain problems were commonplace to all COIN endeavors: state building and winning over the local population, while others were largely self-inflicted: Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 civilian casualties, inter-service infighting and poor military performance. This article will evaluate both by examining seven key factors: geography; the brutalization of Chechens; Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 weaknesses within the Armed Forces, equivalent deficiencies within the Special Forces, difficulties with state building, foreign fighters and terrorism within Russia and the tactical success of the insurgents. Geography has always been an important consideration in counterinsurgency. Unsurprisingly, flat and sparsely forested landscapes and islands favor the counterinsurgent as they leave the enemy with few places to hide and make moving undetected difficult. By contrast, many successful insurgencies have taken place in large, mountainous and inaccessible areas such as Afghanistan, Vietnam and . The mountains of southern Chechnya part of the Greater Caucasus chain provided excellent cover for the rebels, allowing them to frequently ambush Russian forces, conceal ammunition and weapons and move practically unhindered between safe havens in and neighboring republics. The hilltop village structure of many Chechen settlements provided excellent elevation and vantage for the rebels to survey or attack Russian forces. Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 order to gain control of the republic the Russians flooded Chechnya with security and military personnel. If active and armed insurgents were separated from the population at Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 then Russian troops and police outnumbered the rebels by more than These numbers are significantly higher than the force ratios suggested by Galula yet the guerrillas consistently outmaneuvered Russian troops for more than a decade. Byten years after the start of the , there were 1, guerrillas facing off against 90, Russian troops yet the insurgents were able to repeatedly inflict heavy losses on government forces and survive Kramerp. Although geography was not everything in the Chechen Wars, it certainly enabled the insurgents to sustain a protracted and seemingly inexorable war against the Russian military. Whatever the true figure, it is certain that the Wars were cataclysmic events for Chechen society and that the Russian authorities were ready to accept extremely high levels of civilian casualties. Pavel Felgenhauerp. Additionally, Russian forces fell afoul of crucial clan and honor structures in the highly traditional society. Failure to avenge an insult leads to a loss of face and decline in status, meaning that an attack upon an individual becomes an attack upon the clan. In fact, one scholar estimated that the and particularly of a single Chechen could trigger the mobilization of Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 average of male relatives seeking revenge Souleimanov and Aliyev a, p. Thus, atrocities perpetrated by agents Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 the Russian state inadvertently ignited the tradition of blood feud and honor killing. The majority of Russian troops suffered from inadequate training, outdated equipment, poor healthcare and dedovshchina. The officer corps was overworked, underpaid and largely unconcerned by troop welfare, meaning that life in many army units was similar to prison conditions. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say that Russian soldiers were fighting a war on two fronts; one against the rebels and another against their own comrades. Furthermore, due to the high casualty rates in Chechnya and the terrible conditions within the army, the majority of military aged men tried to dodge the draft as best they could. There were as many as 31, dodgers in the autumn of Dickp. This meant that many of the draftees were those who were too poor or too powerless to pay their way out of conscription. Many had only basic education and were medically unfit due to the scourges of drug usage, alcoholism, STDs, malnutrition and pleurisy which were rife in the s in Russia Herspringp. Low levels of pay meant that both officers and soldiers tried to make money on the side and sales of weaponry and explosives by Russian soldiers to insurgents were common Baevp. Even more shockingly, Russian soldiers frequently accepted bribes to allow insurgents past military checkpoints. The untrustworthiness, poor morale, inadequate training and general unreliability of Russian conventional forces certainly took a toll on their ability to fight an effective counterinsurgency. units were better Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 to operate in the remote, mountainous terrain and hunt the small bands of insurgents Khodarenok However, the professionalism of the Special Forces was also under question as even they suffered from corruption, a shortage of equipment and links to organized crime. Additionally, it is clear that very few of the COIN lessons from Afghanistan were applied in Chechnya and many of them had to be relearned the hard way. Indeed, in the s Russian Special Forces were woefully underprepared for counterinsurgency because the focus in preceding years had been on a mass-mechanized war with the West. Moreover, Russian Special Forces in Chechnya frequently lacked crucial language skills and extremely few of them spoke Chechen, making good intelligence work complicated. Nevertheless, Russian Spetsnaz were still a cut above the rest and over the course of the conflict their use and usefulness increased dramatically as they focused more on sniping, high-value targeting HVT and intelligence gathering. As with many counterinsurgencies, one of the most difficult tasks facing the Russians in Chechnya Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 the creation of a strong and stable Chechen government which would be completely loyal to Moscow. The first pro-Russian Chechen government was notoriously corrupt and relied on violent coercion to win support. In the early days, such double-crossing eroded much of the trust that Russian soldiers might Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 extended to Chechen loyalists and hindered the construction of an Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 security architecture. Although the tide was eventually turned by the rise of the , state building in the First Chechen War and the start of the Second was at best a mixed success. The role of foreign Islamic fighters in Chechnya has been much debated and is an issue which must be dealt with carefully. Although the Russian government has sought to do exactly that, it is important to remember that political, cultural, strategic and anthropological considerations played an enormous role in engendering the conflict and that the religious dimension should not be championed above all else. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Islamic fundamentalists set up training camps in Chechnya, providing both religious indoctrination and military training to would-be Chechen jihadists. Even so, with the exception of the Boston bombings, Chechen extremists have been responsible for relatively few terrorist attacks outside Russia itself, suggesting a localization of the conflict. However, if Chechen terrorists have been relatively inactive abroad, unfortunately the same cannot be said for Russia itself and the violence in Chechnya has frequently spilled over into neighboring republics and Moscow. As early as Shamil Basayev launched a large raid on a municipal hospital in the Russian city of Budyonnovsk outside Chechnya. More than 1, hostages were seized and the rebels managed to extort several concessions from the government, probably encouraging more raids Baevp. Russian Special Forces pumped a gas into the building to knock everyone out but as many as hostages died due to the effects of the gas. Finally and most tragically, in Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 of 33 heavily armed Chechen militants took 1, parents and primary school children . During negotiations a bomb exploded apparently by accident, leading the insurgents to open fire. Russian forces stormed the building and in the ensuing firefight between adults and children were killed. All of these terrorist attacks served to harden Russian attitudes against Chechen separatists. In contrast to the deficiencies of the Russian Armed Forces, the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 rebels demonstrated an almost textbook application of tried and tested insurgent tactics which proved highly effective. Chechen fighters became adept at laying ambushes, creating mines and IEDs, employing sniper warfare, using suicide bombers and bringing down Russian aircraft with SAMs. Right from the start Chechen guerrillas were well-armed as they had freely looted Soviet stockpiles of weapons in Chechnya and neighboring republics. Such a proliferation of weaponry allowed the rebels to target the convoys and armoured trains used to move troops and supplies between bases, usually at night. They became skilled at such attacks and in one ambush in 98 Russian troops and officials were killed and wounded, while all but 2 of the rebels escaped Kramerp. Mine warfare also became highly important, causing a significant proportion of Russian deaths. Chechen rebels became highly proficient at bomb making, managing to successfully assassinate , the then sitting President of Chechnya. Moreover, Chechen rebels had access to large stockpiles of Russian shells which were unexploded, bought or stolen Kramerp. This allowed the rebels to create using dynamite which had a much higher explosive yield than is usual for IEDs. To make matters Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009, the insurgents would use these bombs to set booby-traps, rigging everyday objects like books, beer cans and flashlights to catch Russian soldiers unawares Thomasp. Russia's Wars in Chechnya : Mark Galeotti :

Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. After the initial campaign of —, culminating in the devastating Battle of GroznyRussian federal forces attempted Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 seize control of the mountainous area of Chechnya but were set back by Chechen guerrilla warfare and raids on the flatlands despite Russia's overwhelming advantages in firepowermanpowerRussias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009, artillerycombat vehiclesairstrikes and air support. The first war was preceded Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 the Russian Intervention in Ichkeriain which Russia tried to covertly overthrow the Ichkerian government. The resulting widespread demoralization of federal forces and the almost universal opposition of the Russian public to the conflict led 's government to declare a ceasefire with the Chechens in and sign a peace treaty a year later. The official figure for Russian military deaths is 5, while most estimates put the number between 3, and 7, or even as high as 14, Various figures estimate the number of civilian deaths at between 30, andkilled and possibly overinjured, while more thanpeople were displaced by the conflict, which left cities and villages across the republic in ruins. Chechen resistance against Russian imperialism has its origins from during the time of Sheikh Mansurthe first imam leader of the Caucasian peoples. He united various North-Caucasian nations under his command in order to resist the Russian invasions and expansion. Following long local resistance during the — Caucasian WarImperial Russian forces defeated the Chechens and annexed their lands and deported thousands to the Middle East in the latter part of the 19th century. The Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 pretext [23] was punishment for collaboration with the invading German forces during the — insurgency in Chechnyadespite tens of thousands of Chechens and Ingush being aligned to the Soviet Union and fighting against the Nazis, and despite 50 Chechens receiving the highest military award in the Soviet Union e. Eventually, Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev granted the Vainakh Chechen and Ingush peoples permission to return to their homeland and restored their republic in Russia became an independent state after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December The Russian Federation was widely accepted as the successor state to the USSRbut it lost a significant amount of its military and economic power. In the Soviet period, some of Russia's approximately nationalities were granted ethnic enclaves that had various formal federal rights attached. Relations of these entities with the federal government and demands for autonomy erupted into a major political issue in the early s. Boris Yeltsin incorporated these demands into his election campaign by claiming that their resolution was a high priority. There was an urgent need for a law to clearly define the powers of each federal subject. Such a law was passed on 31 Marchwhen Yeltsin and Ruslan Khasbulatovthen chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet and an ethnic Chechen himself, signed the Federation Treaty bilaterally with 86 out of 88 federal subjects. In almost all cases, demands for Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 autonomy or independence were satisfied by concessions of regional autonomy and tax Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009. The treaty outlined three basic types of federal subjects and the powers that were reserved for local and federal government. The only federal subjects that did not sign the treaty were Chechnya and Tatarstan. Eventually, in earlyYeltsin signed a special political accord with Mintimer Shaeymievthe president of Tatarstan, granting many of its demands for greater autonomy for the republic Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 Russia; thus, Chechnya remained the only federal subject that did not sign the treaty. Neither Yeltsin nor the Chechen government attempted any serious negotiations and the situation deteriorated into a full-scale conflict. The storming caused the death of the head of Grozny's branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Vitaly Kutsenko, who was defenestrated or fell while trying to escape. The Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 of president and parliament of Chechnya held on 27 October A day before, Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union published in local Chechen press, that the elections are illegal. Dudayev won overwhelming popular support [ citation needed ] as evidenced by the later presidential elections with high turnout and a clear Dudayev victory to oust the interim administration that was supported by the central government. He was made president and declared independence from the Soviet Union. In NovemberYeltsin dispatched to Grozny, but they were forced to withdraw when Dudayev's forces surrounded them at the airport. After Chechnya made its initial declaration of sovereigntythe Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic split in two in June amidst the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 armed conflict against another Russian republic, North Ossetia. From totens of thousands of people of non-Chechen ethnicity left the republic amidst reports of violence and discrimination against the non- Chechen population mostly Russians, Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 Armenians. A month later, Dudayev introduced direct presidential rule, and in Junedissolved the Chechen parliament to avoid a referendum on a vote of non- confidence. In late OctoberRussian forces dispatched to the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict were ordered to move to the Chechen border; Dudayev, who perceived this as "an act of aggression against the Chechen Republic", declared a state of emergency and threatened general mobilization if the Russian troops did not withdraw from the Chechen border. To prevent the invasion of Chechnya, he did not provoke the Russian troops. In Augustthe coalition of the opposition factions based in north Chechnya launched a large-scale armed campaign to remove Dudayev's government. However, the issue of contention was not independence from Russia: even the opposition stated there was no alternative to an international boundary separating Chechnya from Russia. InRussian newspaper Moscow News made note that, just like most of the other seceding republics, other than Tatarstan, ethnic Chechens universally supported the establishment Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 an independent Chechen state. This did not go off well with most Chechens, who came to view him as a national embarrassment at times if still Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 patriot at othersbut it did not, by any means, dismantle the determination for independence, as most Western commentators note. Moscow clandestinely supplied separatist forces with financial support, military equipment and mercenaries. Russia also suspended all civilian flights to Grozny while the aviation and border troops set Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 a military blockade of the republic, and eventually unmarked Russian aircraft began combat operations over Chechnya. The opposition forces, who were joined by Russian troops, launched a clandestine but badly organized assault on Grozny in mid-Octoberfollowed by a second, larger attack on 26—27 November Despite Russian support, both attempts were unsuccessful. Dudayev loyalists succeeded in capturing some 20 Russian Army regulars and about 50 other Russian citizens who were clandestinely hired by the Russian FSK state security organization to fight for the Provisional Council forces. When the government in Grozny refused, Yeltsin ordered the Russian army to "restore constitutional order" by force. Beginning on 1 December, Russian forces openly carried out heavy aerial bombardments of Chechnya. of Russia had agreed to "avoid the further use of force", Russian forces entered the republic in order to "establish constitutional order in Chechnya and to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia. On 11 DecemberRussian forces launched a three-pronged ground attack towards Grozny. More than professional soldiers and officers refused to take part in the operation; of these, 83 were convicted by military courts and the rest were discharged. The Chechen Air Force as well as Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 republic's civilian aircraft fleet was completely destroyed in the air strikes that occurred on the very first few hours of the war, while around people took advantage of the mid- December amnesty declared by Yeltsin for members of 's armed groups. Nevertheless, Boris Yeltsin's cabinet's expectations of a quick surgical strikequickly followed by Chechen capitulation and regime changewere misguided. Russia found itself in a quagmire almost instantly. The morale of the Russian troops, poorly prepared and not understanding why and even where they were being sent, was low from the beginning. Some Russian units resisted the order to advance, and in some cases, the troops sabotaged their own equipment. In Ingushetia, civilian protesters stopped the western column and set 30 military vehicles on fire, while about 70 conscripts deserted their units. Advance of the northern column was halted by the unexpected Chechen resistance at Dolinskoye and the Russian forces suffered their first serious losses. Yeltsin ordered the Russian Army to show restraint, but it was neither prepared nor trained for this. Civilian losses quickly mounted, alienating the Chechen population and raising the hostility that they showed towards the Russian forces, even among those who initially supported the Russians' attempts to unseat Dudayev. Other problems occurred as Yeltsin sent in freshly trained conscripts from neighboring regions rather than regular soldiers. Highly mobile units of Chechen fighters inflicted severe losses on the ill-prepared and demoralized Russian troops. Although the Russian military command ordered to only attack designated targets, due to the lack of training and experience of Russian forces, they attacked random positions instead, turning into carpet bombing and indiscriminate barrages of rocket artilleryand causing enormous casualties among the Chechen and Russian civilian population. With the Russians closing in on the capital, the Chechens began to hastily set up defensive fighting positions and grouped their forces in the city. When the Russians besieged the Chechen capital, thousands of civilians died from a week-long series of air raids and artillery bombardments in the heaviest bombing campaign in Europe since the destruction of Dresden. The Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 claimed the lives of an estimated 1, to 2, Russian soldiers, mostly barely trained and disoriented conscripts; the heaviest losses were inflicted on the st 'Maikop' Motor Rifle Brigadewhich was completely destroyed in the fighting near the central railway station. After armored assaults failed, the Russian military set out to take the city using air power and artillery. At the same time, the Russian military accused the Chechen fighters of using civilians as human shields by preventing them from leaving the capital as it came under continued bombardment. On 19 January, despite heavy casualties, Russian forces seized the ruins of the Chechen presidential palacewhich had been heavily contested for more than three weeks as the Chechens finally abandoned their positions in the destroyed downtown area. The battle for the southern part of the city continued until the official end on 6 March By the estimates of Yeltsin's human rights adviser Sergei Kovalevabout 27, civilians died in the first five weeks of fighting. Russian historian and general Dmitri Volkogonov said the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 military's bombardment of Grozny killed around 35, civilians, including 5, children, and that the vast majority of those killed were ethnic Russians. While military casualties are not known, the Russian side admitted to having 2, soldiers killed or missing. International monitors from the OSCE described the scenes as nothing short of an "unimaginable catastrophe", while former Soviet leader called Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 war a "disgraceful, bloody adventure" and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl called it "sheer madness". Following the fall of Grozny, the Russian government slowly but systematically expanded its control over the lowland areas and then Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 the mountains. In what was dubbed the worst massacre in the war, the OMON and other federal forces killed at least civilians while seizing the border village of Samashki on 7 April several hundred more were detained Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 beaten or otherwise tortured. Chechnya's second-largest city of Gudermes was surrendered without a fight, but the village of Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 was fought for and defended by the men of . Eventually, the Chechen command withdrew from the area Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994- 2009 Vedeno to the Chechen opposition-aligned village of Dargo, and from there to Benoy. As the war continued, separatists resorted to mass- hostage takings, attempting to influence the Russian public Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994- 2009 leadership. In Junea group led by the maverick field commander Shamil Basayev Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 more than 1, people hostage in southern Russia in the Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis ; about Russian civilians died before a ceasefire was signed after negotiations between Basayev and the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. The raid enforced a temporary stop in Russian military operations, giving the Chechens time to regroup during their greatest crisis and to prepare Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 the national militant campaign. The full-scale Russian attack led many of Dudayev's opponents to side with his forces and thousands Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 volunteers to swell the ranks of mobile militant units. Many others formed local self-defence militia units to defend their settlements in the case of federal offensive action, officially numbering 5,—6, armed men in late Altogether, the ChRI forces fielded some 10,—12, full-time and reserve fighters at a time, according to the Chechen command. According to a UN report, the Chechen separatist forces included a large number of child soldierssome as young as 11 and including females. The successful use of improvised explosive devices was particularly noteworthy; they also effectively exploited a combination of mines and ambushes. In the fall ofGen. Anatoliy Romanovthe federal commander in Chechnya at the time, was critically injured and paralyzed in a bomb blast in Grozny. Suspicion of responsibility for the attack fell on rogue elements of the Russian military, as the attack destroyed hopes for a permanent ceasefire based on the developing trust between Gen. Human rights organizations accused Russian forces of engaging in indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force whenever encountering Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009, resulting in numerous civilian deaths for example, according to Human Rights Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994- 2009Russian artillery and rocket attacks killed at least civilians during the December separatist raid on Gudermes [38]. The dominant Russian strategy was to use heavy artillery and air strikes throughout the campaign, leading some Western and Chechen sources to call the air strikes deliberate terror bombing on parts of Russia. The villages, however, were also heavily targeted from the first weeks of the conflict Russian cluster bombsfor example, killed at least 55 civilians during the 3 January Shali cluster bomb attack. Russian soldiers often prevented civilians Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 evacuating from areas of imminent danger and prevented humanitarian organizations from assisting civilians in need. It was widely alleged that Russian troops, especially those belonging to the MVDcommitted numerous and in part systematic acts of torture and summary executions on separatist sympathizers; they were often linked to Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 "cleansing" raids, affecting entire town districts and villages suspected of harboring boyeviki — the separatist fighters. Humanitarian and aid groups chronicled persistent patterns of Russian soldiers killing, raping and civilians at random, often in disregard of their nationality. Separatist fighters took hostages on a massive scale, kidnapped or killed Chechens considered to be collaborators, and mistreated civilian captives and federal prisoners of war especially pilots. Both the separatists and the federal forces kidnapped hostages for ransom and used human shields for cover during the fighting and movement of troops for example, a group of surrounded Russian troops took approximately civilian hostages at Grozny's 9th Municipal Hospital. The violations committed by members of the Russian forces were usually tolerated by their superiors and were not punished even when investigated the story of Vladimir Glebov serving as an example of such policy. However, television and newspaper accounts widely reported largely uncensored images of the Russias Wars in Chechnya 1994-2009 to the Russian public. As a result, the Russian media coverage partially precipitated a loss of public confidence in the government and a steep decline in president Yeltsin's popularity. Chechnya was one of the heaviest burdens on Yeltsin's presidential election campaign. In addition, the protracted War in Chechnya, especially many reports of extreme violence against civilians, ignited fear and contempt of Russia among other ethnic groups in the federation.