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Home , December 1941, February 1941, Pearl Harbor, USS Breese, USS Nevada (BB-36), USS Oklahoma (BB-37)

First Hand Accounts of , 1941 in

William Brown East Carolina University Faculty Mentor: Wade Dudley East Carolina University

ABSTRACT This project involves researching and writing a narrative combining the first-hand accounts of sail- ors in the Navy at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941. The goal of the project is to gather the personal accounts provided in oral histories and to synthesize those into a narrative describing the emotions of that morning. This has been accomplished by examining the oral histories provided by five men who graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1941 and survived the Japanese attack. A sixth account is provided by Lt. Alexander B. Coxe, Jr., who was the executive officer aboard the U.S.S Breese. Each individual perspective provides a different angle to the horror that surrounded Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The research highlights the raw emotions as the Japanese planes flew above and the destruction and death surrounding these men.

n the morning of December 7, by documenting their memory of the at- O 1941, the naval and aerial forces of tack. Each of these men graduated from the Japanese Empire secretly attacked the the United States Naval Academy in 1941 at the naval base of with the newly bestowed rank of Ensign, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. For over two hours, except for Lt. Coxe. These men would two waves consisting of over three hundred begin their naval careers with the defin- Japanese aircraft destroyed the Pacific Fleet ing moment of Pearl Harbor. This group of the United States Navy. Every ship along held a special bond as recent graduates of Row either took significant dam- the academy and a new bond as survivors age or sank during those early morning of December 7, 1941. Archie Kelly noted hours. Thousands of sailors in the United that a battleship is a “world in itself. You States Navy witnessed in horror as the can be in the bow…and I can be in the Japanese bombed and destroyed their ships. stern and write down an entirely different These men, including Charles Merdinger history of what is going on.”1 By piecing and John Landreth of the U.S.S. , together these first-hand accounts, it is pos- Archie Kelly of the U.S.S. West Virginia, sible to gain a better understanding of the Richard Wright of the U.S.S. , surprise attack and discover the emotions, Joseph Spitler of the U.S.S. , and Alexander Coxe, Jr. of the U.S.S Breese, wit- nessed the events of December 7, 1941 and 1 From the Archie Parmalee Kelley Oral History, Collection No O.H. 197. East Carolina Manuscript provide a glimpse into that tragic morning Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C. 14.

41 Explorations | Humanities and Fine Arts feelings, and events that American sailors for its expansive reserves of natural experienced at Pearl Harbor. resources. officially acknowledged The prelude to the events at Pearl Harbor in that it would “not give that began in 1937 as a standoff between assurances to the preservation of the open the United States and the Japanese Empire door.” 4 This allowed for the Japanese to be took place over national interests in China. “self-sufficient” and immediately decreased The Japanese advanced into northern American trade in both China and Japan.5 China and Manchuria, breaching the long The American government refused to al- standing open door policy in China held low Japan to become increasingly power- supported by the government of the United ful with the capture and exploitation of States. If the government maintained the Chinese resources. While this hardening open door policy by providing the Chinese of Far East policy was clearly taken with with significant financial help, it would lead the risk of future war, the concern for to further escalation with Japan. The other American interests in China resulted in the possibility involved the government of the government of the United States requir- United States allowing Japanese aggres- ing the open door policy to remain open, sion, maintaining its neutral status, but also therefore aggravating an already frustrated risking all property and rights invested in Japanese Empire. China. For over one hundred years, the United The government of the United States re- States adhered to the , mained undecided between these two op- which interprets any attempt at coloniza- tions as late as the end of 1937. Members tion in the Western Hemisphere as an at- of the government were unwilling to chal- tack on the interest of the United States, lenge an ever-growing Japan, but refused to requiring intervention. In the beginning forfeit all interests in China. In October of the twentieth century, the Japanese of 1937, President Roosevelt announced a Empire wanted to adopt this same form recommendation that“peace-loving states of continent monopolization on the Asian isolate aggressor states” in an attempt to continent. Due to personal interests in limit possible Japanese advances.2 The China, the United States refused to allow decision to avoid immediate relief to the the Japanese to have free reign over the Chinese would have possibly appeased the Pacific, in fear that the Japanese would be- Japanese long enough to avoid armed con- come too powerful. While the government flict. Instead, President Roosevelt refused of the United States gave themselves free to invoke the Neutrality Act and Secretary reign in the Western Hemisphere, eventu- of State Cordell announced that “the ally extending their reach to the Pacific, existence of serious hostilities anywhere they refused to give this same power to in the world affected the interests…of the the Japanese Empire. The United States United States.” 3 wanted to “claim an ‘open door’ in China, This policy towards the Japanese aggres- while maintaining a ‘closed door’ in the sion was necessary for the United States as Western Hemisphere.”6 Stanley Hornbeck, the Japanese planned to exploit northern the head of the State Department’s Far

4 Ibid., 92. 2 Frederick C. Adams, “The Road to Pearl Harbor: A Reexamination of American Far Eastern Policy. July 5 Ibid., 77. 1937-,” The Journal of American History 58, no. 1(1971): 76. 6 John Murnane, “Japan’s Monroe Doctrine?: Re- Framing the Story of Pearl Harbor,” The History Teacher 3 Ibid., 75. 40, no. 4 (2007): 508.

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East Division, refused to acknowledge any graduated from the United States Naval form of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine by Academy in 1941 and immediately took “dismissing any parallels between United residence aboard the U.S.S Nevada as an States policy in the Americas and Japanese Ensign . His post on the ship was in the 7 policy in Asia…” The Japanese recog- fire control division that “basically did the nized this immediate double standard calculations for firing the .”9 resulting in a defensive posture from the This kept Merdinger in the bottom of the Japanese Empire with increased aggression ship while the Japanese sprung their attack. and hostility against the United States. Merdinger was still in his bunk as the bom- The Japanese began to develop a strike bardment began, so he went to his station force in late 1941 to annihilate the Pacific in his bedroom slippers.10 He struggled in Fleet of the United States Navy. While the bottom of the ship until three in the the United States tracked Japanese naval afternoon relaying messages, keeping com- movements and anticipated a Japanese munication lines open on the ship. attack, it was impossible to know the date As the Japanese fighters gunned or time of the attack. The United States down American sailors on the top , Navy used radio intelligence to track the Merdinger sent half of his men to man activities of the Japanese military in 1941. the anti-aircraft guns.11 These sailors faced Radio intelligence officers focused their -ef a horrific dilemma because “the people forts with the use of cryptanalysis, naval who were going up thought they were go- traffic analysis and intelligence reporting ing to get shot, and the ones who stayed to gain knowledge of Japanese tactical thought they were going to get drowned.”12 plans. While many of these decoded mes- Merdinger’s men were incredibly disci- sages revealed that “a strike force had been plined and immediately answered his call 8 formed,” no exact data ever surfaced. The to replace their fallen comrades. The re- United States Navy continued to track the maining men continued to work the lines strike force’s movements, but the date of at- of communication despite loss of power, tack was unpredictable. Many Americans flooding, and loss of oxygen in the lower assumed that war with Japan was inevita- deck. ble, but had no way to guess the date and At three in the afternoon, long after the time of a Japanese attack. Without know- Japanese planes left the island, Merdinger ing the precise moment of the attack, these and his men realized they had to evacuate. intelligence reports were useless to naval The metal plates surrounding the men be- commanders. The Japanese struck swiftly gan to buckle to water pressure and the re- in the early hours of December 7, 1941, maining oxygen supply quickly became ex- preventing the American sailors from be- hausted. Merdinger relayed the dramatic ing fully prepared for the bombardment. situation to the executive officer, informing This attack would forever change the lives him that his crew could “hold it about five of American sailors as they were suddenly more minutes” and requested permission shaken from sleep and thrown into the hell- ish morning of December 7, 1941. 9 From the Charles J. Merdinger Oral History, For Charles Merdinger, the events of Collection No O.H. 121. East Carolina Manuscript Pearl Harbor served as a brutal entry Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, into the United States Navy. Merdinger Greenville, N.C. 47. 10 Ibid., 53.

7 Ibid., 512. 11 Ibid., 49.

8 Wilford, 38. 12 Ibid., 50.

43 Explorations | Humanities and Fine Arts to come to the surface.13 The men aban- on his way to breakfast as the alarm on doned their stations with discipline as they the ship sounded. He thought this to be would in a normal drill. As they climbed a “low blow, having a fire drill (on) Sunday to the surface, the magnitude of the day’s morning.”16 The Nevada conducted numer- events quickly dawned upon them. ous drills in the weeks before December 7 Merdinger faced the conflict of smell- and he assumed this to be yet another drill. ing “the most wonderful air” and looking As Landreth “half-heartedly loped up” the across to see the harbor aflame due to the hatch to the main deck, machine gun fire massive leakage of oil.14 He witnessed hun- assaulted the deck.17 When he heard the dreds of dead bodies covered in oil litter- firefight taking place above him, he quickly ing the waters of Pearl Harbor. As he wit- rushed to his post at the anti-aircraft guns. nessed the horror, he accepted the fact that As he commanded his station, he caught he survived while thousands of others did his first glimpse of the horror that sur- not. An ironic thought struck Merdinger rounded him. Landreth stood witness from as he stood in awe of the “perfection” in his post as the U.S.S. Oklahoma capsized and which the Japanese executed their brutal the U.S.S Arizona exploded directly in front attack.15 He also witnessed the anxiety of of him. the naval forces on the island as American Japanese dive bombers began to attack planes attempted to return to the island, the Nevada as Landreth took his station at the but were shot down in the assumption that anti-aircraft guns. Commander Robertson, these were Japanese fighters returning for leader of the Nevada, ordered that all am- another attack. munition boxes remain completely filled One of Merdinger’s comrades on the and guns remain in the ready position as U.S.S. Nevada was John Landreth. Landreth, he sensed the imminent attack. This order, also a member of the United States Naval although against Navy regulations, allowed Academy class of 1941, specifically asked Landreth and the other gunners to return for a commission on the Nevada due to its fire faster than any other ship on the island. fame as a great ship for wrestling. Landreth While the dive bombers began to swarm was a wrestler at the Naval Academy, so the ship, they dropped their bombs with this ship was a perfect fit for him. In the little accuracy. Landreth survived these summer and autumn preceding the attack close encounters as two bombs missed the at Pearl Harbor, Landreth and the other Nevada with a third hitting the ship, landing members of the crew held wrestling tour- “eleven inches away” from him inside the naments on board as a means of friendly protective deck of the ship.18 While one of competition and a way to stay fit. Wrestling his friends on board congratulated him for became part of Landreth’s official duties being “cool under fire” by turning to ad- on the ship as he was the wrestling coach just a setting in the ship’s director, Landreth for the other sailors. insisted that he only turned to “keep from Ensign Landreth was the eighth junior watching that thing hit me.”19 officer in the Sixth Division of the anti-air- craft unit aboard the Nevada on the morn- 16 From the John L. Landreth Oral History, Collection ing of December 7, 1941. Like many of No O.H. 119. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. the sailors that morning, Landreth was Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C. 23.

13 Ibid., 52. 17 Ibid., 24.

14 Ibid., 53. 18 Ibid., 26.

15 Ibid. 19 Ibid., 27.

44 William Brown

As the Nevada attempted to escape the har- the rest of his shipmates viewed the call bor, Landreth was clueless as to any move- with skepticism. Immediately, a second ments the ship made. Landreth was on the call came, saying “General Quarters. Man port side of the ship while any landmarks to your battle stations. No [expletive]!”23 This identify movement were on the starboard use of language was necessary as the call side. He also did not give any meaning or to man battle stations occurred throughout importance to the movement as “all (he) the summer to initiate drill sessions and this was doing was looking up at planes” as he was no drill. attempted to shoot any Japanese fighter out Kelley rose quickly and hurried to his of the sky.20 In Landreth’s opinion, if the battle station. His job was to make sure Nevada remained in the harbor, and stayed that all watertight doors were closed to pre- under the cover provided by the smoke vent further flooding in the ship. TheWest from the Arizona, Japanese dive bombers Virginia, like the other , received would not have seen the Nevada.21 Instead, seven torpedoes and three bombs.24 The the ship took numerous machine gun hits ship did not sink because of the quick re- and absorbed many casualties, before run- action to close the watertight doors below ning aground at Hospital Point, as a result deck. Kelley made this quick decision be- of the attempted escape. cause, as soon as he reached his post, he Archie Parmalee Kelley had a family his- discovered the compartment on the oppo- tory of service to the United States Navy. site side of his post flooding rapidly. His uncle, Bruce Kelley, graduated from the As Kelley closed the watertight seal, he Naval Academy in 1925 while Archie grad- immediately noticed four men entering uated in 1941. They were both stationed the compartment. These men attempted in Pearl Harbor with Bruce serving aboard to undo Kelley’s work by opening the wa- the U.S.S. Arizona and Archie aboard the tertight door, but could not because of U.S.S. West Virginia. Bruce Kelley switched the many sailors locking it in place on the duties the night of , so he could opposite side. Kelley faced a horrific mo- be with his wife since she was also on the ment away from the machine gun fire and island. This type of switch was quite com- bombs on the upper deck. He looked at mon while ships were in the harbor. The his commanding officer with “the unspo- sailor who switched with Bruce Kelley died ken question of ‘Shall I open the door?’”25 on December 7, leaving Bruce with incred- Commander Harper looked at Kelley with ible guilt for the rest of his life. a face that implied he wanted the door to At 7:45 on the morning of December 7, remain shut. Kelley then heard the tortur- calls of “Away, fire and rescue party” rang ous sounds of the men screaming as they from the top deck as bombs burst on Ford frantically fought for their lives. Island, presenting the sailors with their first Although the decision to shut the door encounter with the beginnings of war.22 was a bloodcurdling choice, Kelley made The “away, fire and rescue party” call in- the correct decision. This watertight door formed the sailors that there was fire on was the only available door to the central a nearby ship. Ensign Kelley was an as- station of the lower deck, so it was neces- sistant damage control officer on the low- sary to keep that area from flooding for est deck of the West Virginia. Kelley and as long as possible. Kelley also had forty

20 Ibid., 30. 23 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 27. 24 Ibid., 10.

22 Kelley, 9. 25 Ibid., 12.

45 Explorations | Humanities and Fine Arts men under his command in the central obstacles.”28 Kelley held the responsibil- station. If he had attempted to save the ity of continuing the logbook of the West four trapped men, the rapidly moving wa- Virginia. For normal log records while at ters would have killed all of the men in the sea, the writer would start with “steaming lower deck. These men were then able to as before…” but in the case of the West escape, one at a time, through an escape Virginia, Kelley had no other choice but to tube to the top deck. They remained in the write “sunk as before.”29 lower deck for an hour until the flooding Joseph Spitler reported to the U.S.S water and oil reached their shoulders, forc- Oklahoma with the rank of Ensign after ing them to search for an escape. Drawing his graduation from the United States from the discipline instilled in him by the Naval Academy in 1941. Before going to Naval Academy, Kelley made the difficult, Pearl Harbor, the ship took station in San but correct decision for the greater good of Francisco, for a holiday trip. The the men under his command. ship then proceeded to Pearl Harbor, arriv- After the men in his command reached ing just before December 7. Spitler went the surface, Kelley and his crew immedi- ashore on December 6 and passed by the ately began fighting fires on board the ship. impressive sight of every battleship in the The U.S.S Tennessee docked directly beside Pacific Fleet docked in the harbor. Spitler the West Virginia in the harbor. This loca- received an eerie order on December 6 to tion prevented any damage to theTennessee , attack “any unidentified ,” sug- keeping its water supply clean. Kelley and gesting that“somebody knew something.”30 his men attached hoses to the ship from As the Japanese bombardment began, the Tennessee to provide clean water for Spitler walked to his living quarters after all firefighting efforts. They continued to being relieved from working his early morn- battle the flames onboard theWest Virginia ing duty. Before Spitler could get settled, until Commander Harper issued a call to the call to man battle stations rang over “Abandon Ship” at 1:30 in the afternoon.26 the ship. As in the case of Archie Kelley, a For Kelley, life in Pearl Harbor was never few expletives from the division officer -ex the same after the events of December 7, plained the severity of the situation to the 1941. The island soon went under mar- sailors. Spitler hurried to his post in the tial law with all cargo ships being used for fourth division in the number four turret. military purposes. The government de- As he raced past the junior officer’s quar- livered gas masks and required people to ters, he noticed that many of them were have one with them at all times. As for still asleep, ignoring the call to battle. A few the younger members of the island popu- moments after he ran past these quarters, a lation, they “soon removed the mask and ripped through the room produc- used the carrying bag for swimming trunks ing many casualties. This was a mistake in and towels.”27 As citizens with Japanese the Japanese attack plan resulting from a heritage on the island disappeared in fear failure in reconnaissance. The Japanese of internment, fear of a possible Japanese used a scout plane to investigate whether invasion swept the island in the days follow- ing the attack. The beaches of Hawaii re- sembled the famed beaches of Normandy 28 Ibid. with “barbed wire fences and landing craft 29 Ibid.

30 From the Joesph C. Spitler Oral History, Collection 26 Ibid., 17. No O.H. 125. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, 27 Ibid., 19. N.C. 9.

46 William Brown the American carriers were docked at Ford torch due to concern for setting the oil in Island. The signal used to tell the attack tanks and surrounding the ship on fire. squadron became compromised as one of They began to carefully cut a hole into the flares used as a signal “went into the the metal to prevent the hole from flood- clouds.”31 The Japanese, under the as- ing and drowning the sailors. The sailors sumption the carriers were at Pearl Harbor, then took a large sledgehammer to knock attacked , providing a small the plate out and create an opening to res- warning to the men on . cue the trapped men. As the plate broke, In his sprint to his post, Spitler noticed five men immediately “popped out of the the Oklahoma beginning to turn over. The shaft.”34 The men had been trapped in the Japanese torpedoes were pummeling the hull of the Oklahoma from Sunday morning forward section of the ship because this to Wednesday afternoon. Spitler and the was the only section of the ship open to the crew rescued thirty men from the horror of harbor channel. As he ran, Spitler could being trapped inside the capsized ship. feel the ship “jump up a bit” with each suc- Richard Wright graduated from the cessive torpedo strike. As Spitler finally United States Naval Academy with less reached his post in the turret, the water than stellar marks. He struggled academi- level had already reached the middle of the cally while at the Academy and was a “very deck and the commanding officer gave the ordinary midshipman,” graduating with a order to abandon ship. 2.7 grade point average.35 Wright gradu- As he escaped from the capsizing ated in and went to serve on Oklahoma, Spitler faced numerous close en- the U.S.S. Tennessee with the rank of Ensign. counters with death. As he jumped in the Despite his academic struggles, he was oily water, he turned to look over his shoul- more than adept as a sailor because “class der and saw the gigantic ship directly over standing did not have much to do with his head. Spitler cleared the ship’s edge what you did afterwards.”36 by a mere ten feet.32 Once he passed this On the morning of December 7, Wright threat, he noticed Japanese bombers flying awoke from sleep as the alarm rang at overhead preparing to drop bombs on them 7:55. Wright was furious that the alarm as he swam away. Luckily for Spitler, the would sound so early because the Navy Japanese did not drop any bombs then, as was not allowed to hold drill sessions on they “lost their point of aim.”33 As Spitler Sunday mornings. As he arose from bed, finally reached land, the Japanese began to he heard the first explosion, informing him fire machine guns at survivors, but he es- that this was a real attack. Wright sprinted caped injury. to his battle station, but passed by the anti- Once the Japanese attack ceased, Spitler aircraft battery and noticed there was no and others returned to the Oklahoma; but officer on duty. He then took this post, due to the ship capsizing, they walked onto as it was vital to the defense of the ship the hull of the ship. As Spitler and the and the harbor. As the Japanese planes other sailors walked, they heard tapping swarmed the harbor, Wright realized that from inside the hull. Sailors, trapped in- side the hull, and cried to be rescued. The sailors could not use the typical cutting 34 Ibid. 35 From the Richard M. Wright Oral History, 31 Ibid., 14. Collection No O.H. 202. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, 32 Ibid., 11. Greenville, N.C. 6.

33 Ibid., 12. 36 Ibid.

47 Explorations | Humanities and Fine Arts there “was no time to analyze” and that he one, a professional wants to be in it.”40 had to do “what seemed like the right thing While the ships on Battleship Row re- to do.”37 Wright and the other sailors of ceived most of the notoriety following the the Tennessee had no warning of the events attack, there were many other ships in the unfolding around them. The sailors had a harbor. Pearl Harbor was the home of the “general sense…that a war with Japan was Pacific Fleet of the United States Navy, so inevitable.”38 Wright was not surprised there were many other ships present that that the Japanese attacked, but date and morning besides the battleships. One location of a possible attack had remained of the ships was the U.S.S. Breese, a light unknown. . Alexander Coxe, Jr. was the As Wright climbed to his spot on top of Executive Officer of the USS Breese on the anti-aircraft battery, the reality of the Dec. 7, 1941 and wrote a detailed report of war’s beginnings dawned upon him. From the actions of the Breese. this post, he watched as the Arizona ex- Coxe called “away fire and rescue party” ploded, the Oklahoma capsized, and theWest five minutes after eight on December 7, Virginia sank right beside the Tennessee. As 1941 after seeing a loud explosion on Ford theWest Virginia sank, it wedged theTennessee Island. 41 After watching another bomb against the concrete pylons anchoring the explode, he sounded the general alarm ship. These pylons eventually had to be de- and the Breese began to return fire at the stroyed to allow theTennessee to escape the Japanese planes at approximately 7:57 that harbor. While at his battery, Wright and morning, the first ship to return fire in the other sailors fired back at the Japanese dive harbor. As he observed the events occur- bombers, hitting many planes, with some ring in the harbor, Coxe estimated seventy being shot down. Wright gained incredible or eighty Japanese planes engaged in the pride from the fighting spirit of his crew as bombardment. The Japanese planes were he never noticed a sense of panic “or even painted with white underbellies to blend fear.”39 with the white clouds of the harbor, mak- After the Japanese bombardment ended, ing them virtually invisible to the anti- only three of the eight battleships in the har- aircraft batteries. Coxe watched as three bor remained usable. The Tennessee, along Japanese planes burst into flame alongside with the Maryland and the , left the Breese because of the anti-aircraft fire. the harbor and sailed to , One of these planes took a direct hit and California and Bremerton, for burst into pieces in mid-air while another minor repairs. Once receiving all neces- plunged violently into the water directly in sary repairs, the ships sailed aimlessly, or so front of the ship. The third plane, still fly- it seemed, through the Pacific until 1943. ing despite fire protruding from the body, As Wright realized that the Tennessee was enacted tactics by intentionally not getting close to the action of war, he re- flying into the side of theU.S.S Curtis. 42 quested a transfer to a submarine division. While the attack continued from the air, While Wright did not want to have a war, he decided that “if there was going to be 40 Ibid., 10.

41 Alexander B. Coxe, Jr., [Report on Japanese air raid], 9 , Alexander B. Coxe, Jr. 37 Ibid., 7. Papers. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, Special Collections, Joyner Library, East Carolina University, 38 Ibid. Greenville, NC 27858 USA. #194.3b.

39 Ibid., 8. 42 Ibid.

48 William Brown the Breese received reports of a Japanese the radio intelligence crew did not give a submarine in the channel of Pearl Harbor. clue as to the date or the time the Japanese The Breese and the Monaghan im- force would strike. mediately left their post in search of the These six interviews allow for a greater submarine. The Monaghan attempted to understanding of the personal experiences ram the submarine while it was above the of American sailors during the attack on water, but as the ship approached, the sub- Pearl Harbor. The overwhelming feeling marine submerged before contact could of surprise forced the sailors to immedi- be made. A barrage of depth charges was ately rely on their disciplined training in then dropped in the area, but did not result order to survive. Their individual stories, in sinking the submarine. A PT boat then from Archie Kelley making the gut wrench- informed the Breese that the submarine es- ing decision to close the watertight doors caped to a different area. The ship sailed to to Joseph Spitler rescuing thirty men from this location and its sonar operator quickly a watery grave on the Oklahoma, are cap- discovered the location of the submarine. tivating. Nearly seventy years later, these The Breese proceeded to drop five depth stories provide incredible insight into that charges in the area, resulting in a massive terrifying day and serve as a reminder of amount of debris rising to the surface, im- the events that took place at Pearl Harbor. plying the charges struck the submarine.43 Each of these young men were newly The interviews of these five men and graduated Ensigns from the United States the report from Lt. Coxe provide just a Naval Academy in 1941. Their rigid train- glimpse into the horrific Sunday morn- ing and preparation at the Academy al- ing of December 7, 1941. The Japanese lowed for their individual survival and their strike force bombarded Pearl Harbor for excellent response in the face of the enemy. over two hours, crippling the Pacific Fleet These green ensigns set an example for of the United States Navy. Increased hos- American warriors to follow as they held, tilities between the United States and the then forced, the Japanese tide to recede. Japanese Empire, beginning in 1937, cul- Without these first-hand accounts, the true minated in the brutality unleashed on the experiences of American sailors would Pacific Fleet and its sailors. While the be lost and the world would never know United States held the ability to track the the true terror of the horrific events that Japanese fleet and decode their communi- took place on December 7, 1941 in Pearl cations, these sources proved to be unreli- Harbor, Hawaii. able. The intelligence reports provided by

43 Ibid.

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Bibliography

Primary Alexander B. Coxe, Jr. Papers. #194.3b. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, Special Collections, Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27858 USA.

Archie Parmalee Kelley Oral History, Collection No O.H. 197. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C.

Charles J. Merdinger Oral History, Collection No O.H. 121. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C.

Joesph C. Spitler Oral History, Collection No O.H. 125. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C.

John L. Landreth Oral History, Collection No O.H. 119. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C.

Richard M. Wright Oral History, Collection No O.H. 202. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C.

Secondary Adams, Frederick C. “The Road to Pearl Harbor: A Reexamination of American Far Eastern Policy, -December 1938.” The Journal of American History 58, no.1 (1971): 73-92.

Murnane, John R. “Japan’s Monroe Doctrine?: Re-Framing the Story of Pearl Harbor.” The History Teacher 40, no. 4 (2007): 503-520.

Wiliford, Timothy. Pearl Harbor Redefined: USN Radio Intelligence in 1941. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, Inc., 2001.

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