First Hand Accounts of December 7, 1941 in Pearl Harbor William Brown East Carolina University Faculty Mentor: Wade Dudley East Carolina University ABSTRACT This project involves researching and writing a narrative combining the first-hand accounts of sail- ors in the United States Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The goal of the project is to gather the personal accounts provided in oral histories and to synthesize those into a narrative describing the emotions of that morning. This has been accomplished by examining the oral histories provided by five men who graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1941 and survived the Japanese attack. A sixth account is provided by Lt. Alexander B. Coxe, Jr., who was the executive officer aboard the U.S.S Breese. Each individual perspective provides a different angle to the horror that surrounded Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The research highlights the raw emotions as the Japanese planes flew above and the destruction and death surrounding these men. n the morning of December 7, by documenting their memory of the at- O 1941, the naval and aerial forces of tack. Each of these men graduated from the Japanese Empire secretly attacked the the United States Naval Academy in 1941 United States Navy at the naval base of with the newly bestowed rank of Ensign, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. For over two hours, except for Lt. Coxe. These men would two waves consisting of over three hundred begin their naval careers with the defin- Japanese aircraft destroyed the Pacific Fleet ing moment of Pearl Harbor. This group of the United States Navy. Every ship along held a special bond as recent graduates of Battleship Row either took significant dam- the academy and a new bond as survivors age or sank during those early morning of December 7, 1941. Archie Kelly noted hours. Thousands of sailors in the United that a battleship is a “world in itself. You States Navy witnessed in horror as the can be in the bow…and I can be in the Japanese bombed and destroyed their ships. stern and write down an entirely different These men, including Charles Merdinger history of what is going on.”1 By piecing and John Landreth of the U.S.S. Nevada, together these first-hand accounts, it is pos- Archie Kelly of the U.S.S. West Virginia, sible to gain a better understanding of the Richard Wright of the U.S.S. Tennessee, surprise attack and discover the emotions, Joseph Spitler of the U.S.S. Oklahoma, and Alexander Coxe, Jr. of the U.S.S Breese, wit- nessed the events of December 7, 1941 and 1 From the Archie Parmalee Kelley Oral History, Collection No O.H. 197. East Carolina Manuscript provide a glimpse into that tragic morning Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, N.C. 14. 41 Explorations | Humanities and Fine Arts feelings, and events that American sailors China for its expansive reserves of natural experienced at Pearl Harbor. resources. Japan officially acknowledged The prelude to the events at Pearl Harbor in November 1938 that it would “not give that began in 1937 as a standoff between assurances to the preservation of the open the United States and the Japanese Empire door.” 4 This allowed for the Japanese to be took place over national interests in China. “self-sufficient” and immediately decreased The Japanese advanced into northern American trade in both China and Japan.5 China and Manchuria, breaching the long The American government refused to al- standing open door policy in China held low Japan to become increasingly power- supported by the government of the United ful with the capture and exploitation of States. If the government maintained the Chinese resources. While this hardening open door policy by providing the Chinese of Far East policy was clearly taken with with significant financial help, it would lead the risk of future war, the concern for to further escalation with Japan. The other American interests in China resulted in the possibility involved the government of the government of the United States requir- United States allowing Japanese aggres- ing the open door policy to remain open, sion, maintaining its neutral status, but also therefore aggravating an already frustrated risking all property and rights invested in Japanese Empire. China. For over one hundred years, the United The government of the United States re- States adhered to the Monroe Doctrine, mained undecided between these two op- which interprets any attempt at coloniza- tions as late as the end of 1937. Members tion in the Western Hemisphere as an at- of the government were unwilling to chal- tack on the interest of the United States, lenge an ever-growing Japan, but refused to requiring intervention. In the beginning forfeit all interests in China. In October of the twentieth century, the Japanese of 1937, President Roosevelt announced a Empire wanted to adopt this same form recommendation that“peace-loving states of continent monopolization on the Asian isolate aggressor states” in an attempt to continent. Due to personal interests in limit possible Japanese advances.2 The China, the United States refused to allow decision to avoid immediate relief to the the Japanese to have free reign over the Chinese would have possibly appeased the Pacific, in fear that the Japanese would be- Japanese long enough to avoid armed con- come too powerful. While the government flict. Instead, President Roosevelt refused of the United States gave themselves free to invoke the Neutrality Act and Secretary reign in the Western Hemisphere, eventu- of State Cordell Hull announced that “the ally extending their reach to the Pacific, existence of serious hostilities anywhere they refused to give this same power to in the world affected the interests…of the the Japanese Empire. The United States United States.” 3 wanted to “claim an ‘open door’ in China, This policy towards the Japanese aggres- while maintaining a ‘closed door’ in the sion was necessary for the United States as Western Hemisphere.”6 Stanley Hornbeck, the Japanese planned to exploit northern the head of the State Department’s Far 4 Ibid., 92. 2 Frederick C. Adams, “The Road to Pearl Harbor: A Reexamination of American Far Eastern Policy. July 5 Ibid., 77. 1937-December 1938,” The Journal of American History 58, no. 1(1971): 76. 6 John Murnane, “Japan’s Monroe Doctrine?: Re- Framing the Story of Pearl Harbor,” The History Teacher 3 Ibid., 75. 40, no. 4 (2007): 508. 42 William Brown East Division, refused to acknowledge any graduated from the United States Naval form of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine by Academy in 1941 and immediately took “dismissing any parallels between United residence aboard the U.S.S Nevada as an States policy in the Americas and Japanese Ensign . His post on the ship was in the 7 policy in Asia…” The Japanese recog- fire control division that “basically did the nized this immediate double standard calculations for firing the main battery.”9 resulting in a defensive posture from the This kept Merdinger in the bottom of the Japanese Empire with increased aggression ship while the Japanese sprung their attack. and hostility against the United States. Merdinger was still in his bunk as the bom- The Japanese began to develop a strike bardment began, so he went to his station force in late 1941 to annihilate the Pacific in his bedroom slippers.10 He struggled in Fleet of the United States Navy. While the bottom of the ship until three in the the United States tracked Japanese naval afternoon relaying messages, keeping com- movements and anticipated a Japanese munication lines open on the ship. attack, it was impossible to know the date As the Japanese fighters gunned or time of the attack. The United States down American sailors on the top deck, Navy used radio intelligence to track the Merdinger sent half of his men to man activities of the Japanese military in 1941. the anti-aircraft guns.11 These sailors faced Radio intelligence officers focused their -ef a horrific dilemma because “the people forts with the use of cryptanalysis, naval who were going up thought they were go- traffic analysis and intelligence reporting ing to get shot, and the ones who stayed to gain knowledge of Japanese tactical thought they were going to get drowned.”12 plans. While many of these decoded mes- Merdinger’s men were incredibly disci- sages revealed that “a strike force had been plined and immediately answered his call 8 formed,” no exact data ever surfaced. The to replace their fallen comrades. The re- United States Navy continued to track the maining men continued to work the lines strike force’s movements, but the date of at- of communication despite loss of power, tack was unpredictable. Many Americans flooding, and loss of oxygen in the lower assumed that war with Japan was inevita- deck. ble, but had no way to guess the date and At three in the afternoon, long after the time of a Japanese attack. Without know- Japanese planes left the island, Merdinger ing the precise moment of the attack, these and his men realized they had to evacuate. intelligence reports were useless to naval The metal plates surrounding the men be- commanders. The Japanese struck swiftly gan to buckle to water pressure and the re- in the early hours of December 7, 1941, maining oxygen supply quickly became ex- preventing the American sailors from be- hausted. Merdinger relayed the dramatic ing fully prepared for the bombardment. situation to the executive officer, informing This attack would forever change the lives him that his crew could “hold it about five of American sailors as they were suddenly more minutes” and requested permission shaken from sleep and thrown into the hell- ish morning of December 7, 1941.