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Syria: a Way Forward Syria: A Way Forward December 2012 Cover photo: Aleppo, Sayf Al‐Dawla District, November 2012 ICOS Field Research trip 2 Syria: A Way Forward A report by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) President and Lead Field Researcher Senior Middle East Analyst Norine MacDonald QC Alexander Tylecote Policy Analysts Assistant Researchers Ayesha Malik Mostafa Al‐Mossallami Majeed Sahebzadha David Arnold www.icosgroup.net [email protected] 3 4 Contents MAPS ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 I) MAP OF SYRIA IN THE REGION ........................................................................................................................ 9 II) MAP OF SYRIAN CONFLICT........................................................................................................................... 10 III) MAP OF US MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS IN THE REGION ......................................................................... 11 SYRIA UPRISING TIMELINE ‐ FROM PROTESTS TO MELTDOWN ....................................................... 12 1. EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW .................................................................................................................................. 18 1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... 18 1.2 FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................ 21 1.3 ICOS FIELD RESEARCH ‐ CORE FINDINGS ........................................................................................................ 24 2. THE BACK STORY ............................................................................................................................................. 25 2.1 THE ARAB REVOLTS: SPONTANEITY AND INEVITABILITY ................................................................................ 25 2.1.1 Egyptian opposition groups ....................................................................................................................... 25 2.1.2 From Palestine to Iraq and beyond ............................................................................................................ 25 2.1.3 The youth bulge and economic reasons for the Arab revolts ...................................................................... 26 2.1.4 Khalid Said and Mohammed Bouazizi – the triggers to the revolts ........................................................... 27 2.1.5 Syrian protests ........................................................................................................................................... 27 2.1.6 Anti‐western sentiment and tensions ........................................................................................................ 28 2.1.7 The rise of Islamism? ................................................................................................................................. 29 2.2 SYRIAN DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................. 29 3. SYRIA DYNAMICS: ‘THE SUICIDE STATE’? .............................................................................................. 34 3.1 SYRIA: BIRTH OF A NATION .............................................................................................................................. 34 3.1.1 Greater Syria .............................................................................................................................................. 34 3.1.2 Alawite supremacy ..................................................................................................................................... 34 3.1.3 The Assad personality cult ......................................................................................................................... 35 3.1.4 Bashar the reactive President ..................................................................................................................... 36 3.1.5 Alawite entrenchment ................................................................................................................................ 36 3.1.6 Call my bluff .............................................................................................................................................. 37 3.2 THE HISTORY OF THE SYRIAN OPPOSITION: A HOUSE DIVIDED ...................................................................... 37 3.2.1 Birth of the new opposition and its suppression ........................................................................................ 37 3.2.2 Lebanon and the rise of opposition to the regime ....................................................................................... 38 3.2.3 The Muslim Brotherhood and the Massacre in Hama ............................................................................... 38 Variations in opposition to the regime‐ three towns ........................................................................................... 40 3.3 ISLAM, ISLAMISM AND JIHADISM ...................................................................................................................... 41 3.3.1 Islamism and its origins ............................................................................................................................. 41 3.3.2 The History of Syrian Islamism and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood ...................................................... 41 3.3.3 The Brotherhood in the Syrian Conflict ..................................................................................................... 42 3.3.4 Religion and the regime ............................................................................................................................. 43 5 3.3.5 Neo‐Salafist mutations and al‐Qaeda in the Syrian conflict ..................................................................... 44 3.3.6 The other ‘Islamists’ in Syria: Traditional religion and the ‘Ulema’ ......................................................... 45 3.4 SECTARIAN DYNAMICS: A BLOODBATH ON THE HORIZON ............................................................................. 47 3.4.1 The big taboo .............................................................................................................................................. 47 3.4.2 Minority anxiety ........................................................................................................................................ 47 3.4.3 Alawite ‘otherness’ ..................................................................................................................................... 48 3.4.4 Shia mistrust .............................................................................................................................................. 49 3.4.5 Christian loyalty ........................................................................................................................................ 49 3.5 THE FORGOTTEN ISSUE: WEALTH, CLASS AND FAMILY IN SYRIA ..................................................................... 50 3.5.1 The Ba’ath Party loses its moorings ........................................................................................................... 50 3.5.2 The rural deficit ......................................................................................................................................... 51 3.5.3 Ba’thism is big business ............................................................................................................................. 51 3.5.4 Support for the opposition from big business ............................................................................................. 52 3.5.5 Government missteps ................................................................................................................................. 53 3.6 SYRIA, LEBANON AND IRAN: SHIA TENSIONS .................................................................................................. 54 3.6.1 Fallout to Lebanon ..................................................................................................................................... 54 3.6.2 Away from sectarianism ............................................................................................................................ 54 3.7 THE KURDISH WILDCARD ................................................................................................................................. 55 3.7.1. Kurdish exceptionalism ............................................................................................................................. 55 3.7.2 Kurdish Moves in Syria ............................................................................................................................. 56 3.7.3 A New Kurdish Federation? ...................................................................................................................... 57 4. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT – INSIDE THE REGIME ........................................................................... 59 4.1 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................... 59 4.2 KEY FIGURES SYRIAN GOVERNMENT
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