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<0125701>F7100 [¾Æ¶Ø/¿Μ¾î]Ç¥Áö À_≠à_˝ˇ À_≠à_˝ˇ ÎÙ®˚È: 0017F ENGLISH Revision 1.1 Revision 1.1 PRINTED IN KOREA P/N : MMBB0125701 P/N : MMBB0125701 PRINTED IN KOREA ˆ_Çê_◊ SRPG ˆ_Çê_◊ ®Á¸È ÅÁÏ≥ë•©Ó GPRS Phone ®Á¸È ÅÁÏ≥ë•©Ó ®Á¸È USER’S MANUAL ÎÙ®˚È: 0017F ÎÙ®˚È: MODEL: F7100 ÅÁ≠òÇá Ÿ≠Åá˘˙ ˆ´Å ÅÁ©Á¸È àÃÇ˚¯˙ ŸâÈ ŸâÈ àÃÇ˚¯˙ ÅÁ©Á¸È ˆ´Å Ÿ≠Åá˘˙ ÅÁ≠òÇá Please read this manual carefully ê∑–¸È ò˜ÇÆ ÅÁëË÷ÙÚ Å†ë÷» ௠௠ņë÷» ÅÁëË÷ÙÚ ò˜ÇÆ ê∑–¸È before operating your set. ›Ï≠òÕ ’˝ˇ ÅÁÏ≥ë⁄âÈ. ÅÁÏ≥ë⁄âÈ. ’˝ˇ ›Ï≠òÕ Retain it for future reference. G•P•R•S•P•H•O•N•E G•P•R•S•P•H•O•N•E 1 1 À_≠à_˝ˇ ›Ï≠òÕ ’˝ˇ ÅÁÏ≥ë⁄âÈ. ê∑–¸È ò˜ÇÆ ÅÁ˜Çê◊. ņë÷» ௠ÅÁ≠òÇá Ÿ≠Åá˘˙ ˆ´Å ÅÁ©Á¸È àÃÇ˚¯˙ ŸâÈ ÎÙ®˚È: 0017F ®Á¸È ÅÁÏ≥ë•©Ó ˆ_Çê_◊ SRPG À_≠à_˝ˇ 3 À_≠à_˝ˇ  êËÏ¥ ÅÁ∑Ç†Ò à¸© Îâë˯˙. êë≥âä ’˝ˇ §√≠ ŧëÇ‹. †¸ñ ÅÉÔ¯ ˚°Ù˛ˇ ÀË˝ ÅÉòØÅá ∫–¸≠˘˙ ŸÇà˯˙ ÁÊÔ÷ªÇÍ ÎÏÇ Å†÷» ÅÁ˜Çê◊ ’˝ˇ ÎfiÇÚ ÄÎÒ àø©Å ÀÒ ÎëÇÛÍ Å¬÷ÇÍ Â ê⁄Ì àëôØÖ¯˙ ÅÁ˜Çê◊ ÅÉÛ ÅÁâ√Ǩ˚¯˙.  êÏ≥fl ÅÁ˜Çê◊ ษ‡ ÅÉîÇá Ÿ¸Ç®˘˙ ≤¸Ç¨êfl. ÅÉò˜Ø˘˙ ÅÁfiÏâ¸Ùê≠ Ûœ¸≠ˆÇ. Ÿ© ˚Ùıî≠ ÅÁë©Å§È ÅÁ√÷¸◊ ÀË˝ ÅÉò˜Ø˘˙ ÅÁëË÷Ø˚ÙÚ ÛÅÁ≠Å®˚Ù, ÛÎ≥ÇÀ©Åì ÅÂò˜Ø˘˙ ÅÁ≥Ïø¯˙. ®Å§È ÅÁÏ≥ë∑÷¸Çì à≥âä êÇÉî≠ Î«Ì ®ŸÇì ÅÁ⁄Ëä †≥ä ÅÁËÙÅÖ¢ ÅÁÏø¯˙. ÎïÊ,  ˚≥Ï¢ àÇ≤ëÃÏÇÍ ÅÁ˜Çê◊ ŸÌ à⁄÷È ÅÁ˜Çê◊ ’˝ˇ ÅÁÏǬ¤ ÅÁ뽡 êôâ≠ ’¸˜Ç à´Áfl ÅÁٟٮ, ÅÁÏ∑Ǩ˚Õ ÅÁfi¸ÏÇÛ˚¯˙ ÅÉÛ ÅÉÎÇ›Ò ∫ÇÀ¯˙ ÅÁÏë÷ô≠Åì.  ê⁄Ì àë∑–¸Ë¯ àÇÁ⁄≠ã ÎÒ Î°√Çì êØÛ˚© ÅÁٟٮ, ΕÇÆÚ ÅÁ√ÇÖ≠˘˙. ˚ôä Ÿ÷È ˆÙÅê◊ ò˝ˇ ŵ ÅÓ MSG ’˝ˇ ›È ÅÂÛŸÇì ®Å§È ÅÂÁfië≠ÛÔ¸¯˙ ÅÁ⁄≠˚â¯˙ ÎÒ ÅÁÏôÇÍ ÅÁÏ–√¸≥˝ˇ. ê°ÏÈ ›È ÅÉò˜Ø˘˙ Ũ≤ÇÍ ÅÁ≠Å®˚Ù §√≠ †©Ûó ÅÁë©Å§È ÎÕ ÅÂò˜Ø˘˙ ÎÒ ÅÉòÈ ≤ÊÎëfl 4 À_≠à_˝ˇ ÛÅæ°¯˙ ≤Ùÿ ˚ÃÏÈ ÀË˝ ÅÁ–Çá æÏÇÔ¯˙ ˆ´Å ÅÁÏëö. Åò≠Åá Åɲˇ ê–¸¸≠ ÅÉÛ êé˚È ’˝ˇ Î≠∂© ÅÁÏ≥ë•©Ó ˆ´Å à©ÛÚ ÎÙÅ’⁄¯˙ ÅÉ’øÈ Ÿ©¨ ÎÒ Å®Åá ÛÁÏÕ †©Ûó Åɲˇ êË◊ ÅÉÛ ≤Ùá Å≤ëÃÏÇÍ ÅÁ˜Çê◊. Ûê∑–¸È ˆ´Å ÅÁ˜Çê◊. ÅÁ≠òÇá Ÿ≠Åá˘˙ ˆ´˘ ÅÁÏÃËÙÎÇì àÃÇ˚¯˙ ÎÒ ÅÉòÈ ˚°Ù˛ˇ Î≠∂© ÅÁÏ≥ë•©Ó ˆ´Å ÀË˝ ÎÃËÙÎÇì ˆÇί˙ †ÙÍ Å≤ëÃÏÇÍ ÎÃËÙÎÇì ˆÇί˙ ÁÊêªÇÂì ÅÁ˜Çί˙ ÎïÈ ÅÁ°ÇÂì ÅÁÃÊò¸¯˙ ÅÁ√Ǩ֯˙. ÅÂêªÇÍ. ÛÀ˸¯, ˚ôä ÅÉÚ Â êÃëÏ© ’⁄ƒ ÀË˝ ÅÁ˜Çê◊ Ÿ©  êëÙ’≠ ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì ÅÁ√Ǩ֯˙ ÎÒ ŸâÈ ›È ∂âfiÇì Å≤ëÃÏÈ ’⁄ƒ ÅÁÏË°⁄Çì ÅÂ∫˸¯˙ Áëôä êË◊ ÅÁ˜Çê◊. Á⁄ÙÅÔ¸Ò ÅÁ÷Ç˚Çì ÅÁÏø¯˙. ˚ôä ÅÁë•Ëº ÎÒ ÅÁâ√Ǩ˚Çì ÅÁ–¸≠ Î≥ëÃÏ˯˙ ¬â⁄Ç ÅÁ≠òÇá ÅÁÏʆ«¯˙ ÅÁ˝ ÅÂê˝ˇ: ÅÂ∫Ë˝ˇ ÁëË÷ÙÔfl. ÎÒ ÅÉòÈ ≤ÊÎëfl, Å≤ëÃÏÈ ’⁄ƒ ÅÁâ√Ǩ˚Çì ÛÅÁ∑Ç†Ò ÎÒ ÅÉòÈ ≤ÊÎëfl 5 À_≠à_˝ˇ ∫©Û‹ ÅÁªÇ®¨ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1-4] 83 • ............................................. ∫©Û‹ ÅÁÙŨ® [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1-3] 63 • ................................................ ›ëÇà¯˙ ¨≤ÇÁ¯˙ Û≤ÇÖƒ Îë鮢˙˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1-2] 13 • ............................ ›ëÇà¯˙ ¨≤ÇÁ¯˙ Ÿª¸≠˘˙˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1-1] 92 • ...................................... ÅÁ≠≤ÇÖÈ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1] 92 ......................................................... ≤≠® Û∆ÇÖ◊ ÅÁ⁄ÙÅÖÌ 62 ......................................................... ¨ÎØ ÅÁ°ÏÇ˚¯˙ (4 ÅÑÁ˝ 8 ÅɨŸÇÓ) 52 • ............................................... ¨ÎØ 2KUP (4 ÅÑÁ˝ 8 ÅɨŸÇÓ) 42 • ................................................. ¨ÎØ KUP (4 ÅÑÁ˝ 8 ÅɨŸÇÓ) 42 • ................................................... ¨ÎØ 2NIP (4 ÅÑÁ˝ 8 ÅɨŸÇÓ) 42 • .................................................. ¨ÎØ NIP (4 ÅÑÁ˝ 8 ÅɨŸÇÓ) 42 • .................................................... ¨ÎÙÆ ÅÁÙ∫ÙÍ 42 ................................................................... ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì Îë鮢˙ ÅÂɬ≠Åÿ ÅÉÛ ÎfiÇÁÏÇì ÅÁÏÙıêÏ≠Åì 12 • ................... ÅÉîÇá ÅÁÏfiÇÁϯ˙ 91 • .............................................................. ŸÇÖϯ˙ §ÊÍ ÅÁÏfiÇÁϯ˙ 91 ....................................................... 81 ÅÑò≠Åá ÅêªÇÍ àÇ≤ë•©ÅÓ ®Á¸È ÅÁ˜Çê◊ • ..................................... ÀÏÈ ÅêªÇÍ àÇ≤ë•©ÅÓ Æ¨ Ũ≤ÇÍ 81 • ........................................ 81 ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì ÅÁ©ÛÁ¸¯˙ • ......................................................... 81 ÅÑò≠Åá ÎfiÇÁϯ • ............................................................... 81 ÅÑò≠Åá ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì ÛÅÁ≠® À˸˜Ç ............................................. 71 ’ªÈ ÅÁ∑Ç†Ò • ............................................................... 61 ∂°Ò ÅÁâ√Ǩ˚¯˙ • .............................................................. 41 ê≠›¸ä à√ÇŸ¯˙ MIS • ......................................................... 41 ÅÁë≠›¸ä ........................................................................ ÅÁ≠ÎÙÆ ÅÁ뽡 ꫘≠ ÀË˝ ÅÁ∑Ç∂¯˙ 21 • ........................................... 21 ÎÃËÙÎÇì ÅÁ∑Ç∂¯˙ ........................................................... 11 ∂≠£ ÅÁÏ÷Ç긢 ................................................................ 01 ÅÁô˜¯˙ ÅÁ•Ë÷¸¯˙ • ............................................................. 8 ÅÁô˜¯˙ ÅÂÎÇθ¯˙ • ............................................................... 8 ÅÉòØÅá ÅÁ˜Çê◊ ................................................................... ÅÁÏ°ëÙ˚Çì 6 À_≠à_˝ˇ ÅÑÀ©Å® ÅÁÏ©˚¯˙˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 5-4] 56 • .............................................. ÅÑÀ©Å®Åì ÅÂ^™ÅÚ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 5-3] 36 • .............................................. À≠¡ ÅÂ^™ÅÚ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 5-2] 36 • ................................................. ÅêôǢ ÅÁ⁄â˯˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 5-1] 26 • ............................................... ÅÁªÊ˘˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 5] 26 ........................................................... ÅÑÀÇ®˘˙ æ⃠ÅÂÑÀ©Å®Åì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 4-7] 16 • ..................................... ÅÑÀ©Å®Åì ÅÁ∑âfi¯˙˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 4-6] 16 • ........................................... ÅÑÀ©Å®Åì ÅÁ°ÏÇ˚¯˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 4-5] 85 • ........................................... ÅÑÀ©Å®Åì ÅÁÏfiÇÁϯ˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 4-4] 35 • ........................................ ÅÑÀ©Å®Åì ÅÁ˜Çê◊ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 4-3] 25 • ........................................... ÅÁëǨ˚¶ ÛÅÁÙŸí [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 4-2] 15 • ............................................ ≤ÇÀ¯˙ ÅÁÏ⯠[ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 4-1] 15 • .............................................. ÅÂÑÀ©Å®Åì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 4] 15 ........................................................ ≤ÏÇÀÇì ÅÁ≠Åɵ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 3-5] 84 • ............................................ ∫Ùì ÀÇÍ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 3-4] 84 • .................................................. 84 ÀÇÓ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 3-3] • .......................................................... 84 ∫ÇÎí [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 3-2] • ...................................................... 84 ňëØÅÆ ’⁄ƒ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 3-1] • ................................................. 84 §ªÇÖº [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 3] ........................................................ ÎÃËÙÎÇì SRPG [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 2-7] 74 • ......................................... ΰÇ≤â¯˙ ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 2-6] 44 • ..................................... 44 †´ÿ ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì ÅÁ°©˚ï¯˙˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 2-5] • ................................ 44 ›È ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 2-4] • ............................................ 44 ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì ÅÁÏ√ËÙà¯˙˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 2-3] • .................................... ÎfiÇÁÏÇì Î≥ë⁄â˯˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 2-2] 44 • ...................................... ÎfiÇÁÏÇì à©ÛÚ ¨® [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 2-1] 44 • .......................................... 44 ≤ôÈ ÅÁÏfiÇÁÏÇì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 2] ............................................. 24 ÅÂÑÀ©Å®Åì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1-8] • ................................................... 14 ÔÏÇ™õ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1-7] • ....................................................... 93 §©Î¯˙ ÅÁÏÃËÙÎÇì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1-6] • ......................................... 93 ÅÁâ≠˚© ÅÁªÙê˝ˇ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 1-5] • ............................................. ÅÁÏ°ëÙ˚Çì 7 À_≠à_˝ˇ à¸ÇÔÇì ’¸¯˙ 39 .................................................................... ÅÁÃÇ˚¯˙ ÛÅÁª¸ÇÔ¯˙ 19 ............................................................. ÅÁÏË°⁄Çì 09 ...................................................................... §©Î¯˙ à√ÇŸ¯˙ MIS [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 9] 98 ............................................. ŸÇÖϯ˙ ÅÁ•ƒ ÅÁÏ÷ëÙ£ 88 ....................................................... Ô≥•¯˙ ÅÁÏëª÷¢ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-9] 78 • ........................................ ÅÑÀÇ®˘˙ æ⃠ÅÁ•ªÇÖº [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-8] 78 • ................................... ∂˜Ç®˘˙ ÅÁ°ÏÇ˚¯˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-7] 78 • ........................................... ÅÑÀ©Å®Åì ÅÁ´Å›≠˘˙ ÅÁÏÙıŸë¯˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-6] 68 • ................................. ÅÁ´ˆÇã ÅÑÁ˝ ÅÁÃÙÅÚ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-5] 68 • ........................................ §ªÇÖº [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-4] 48 • ................................................... ¨≤ÇÖÈ ÅÁ©’Õ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-3] 38 • ............................................... ÅÁÃÊÎÇì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-2] 38 • .................................................... ÅÁª÷°¯˙ ÅÁ≠Ö¸≥¸¯˙˙˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8-1] 38 • ....................................... 38 ÅÑÑÔë≠Ôí [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 8] ........................................................... 28 òÇ’Ç [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-9] • ......................................................... 08 ¨® ÄÁ˝ˇ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-8] • ........................................................ 97 Î≥ôÈ ÅÁªÙì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-7] • ............................................ ÅÁëÙŸ¸í ÅÁÃÇÁÏ˝ˇˇ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-6] 97 • ......................................... 87 ΰÙÍ ÅÁÙ†©˘˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-5] • .............................................. 87 ÅÁ°Ç≤â¯˙˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-4] • ................................................... 77 ÎÙıÁ◊ ÅÂÉÁ°ÇÚ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-3] • ............................................. ÅÁ°Ç’«¯˙ ÅÁ∑•ª¸¯˙ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-2] 67 • ..................................... 67 ÅÂÉÁÃÇã [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7-1] • ...................................................... 67 ê≥˸¯˙ ÛÅÉ®ÛÅì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 7] .................................................. 57 ÅÑÀ©Å® ÅÁë⁄Ù˚Ì [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 6-3] • ............................................. 96 ®Á¸È ÅÁ˜Çê◊ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 6-2] • ............................................... 76 ÅÁÏô©ÛÍ [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 6-1] • .................................................... 76 Î«Ì ÅÁÏÙÅÀ¸© [ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙ 6] ............................................... ÅÁÏ°ëÙ˚Çì 8 À_≠à_˝ˇ ÁË°ªÙÍ ÀË˝: ê∑¸ƒ ÅêôǢ ÅÁ⁄â˯˙ Î÷ëÇ£ ÂÉ≤÷È • §ÊÍ ÅÁÏfiÇÁϯ: Áë–¸≠∫Ùì ÅÁ≥ÏÇÀ¯˙ • ’˝ ÅÁ⁄ÇÖϯ˙: ÅÁë⁄È Â≤÷È Û ÂÉÀË˝ • ’˝ ÛæÕ ÅÂ≤ëéŮ: ÁªÙì ÁÙ†¯˙ ÅÂƨŨ • 7 7 ÅƨŨ òÇÔⸯ˙ 6 Ω§È ≤ÏÇÀ¯˙ ÅÂÆÚ 6 5 ÅÔ븽
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