GLOSSOGONY OR EPISTEMOLOGY? EUNOMIUS OF CYZICUS’ AND BASIL OF CAESAREA’S STOIC CONCEPT OF EPINOIA AND ITS MISREPRESENTATION BY GREGORY OF NYSSA

John A. Demetracopoulos

My intention1 is to shed more light on Gregory of Nyssa’s attempt at justifying Basil of Caesarea’s views of §p¤noia and show that in so doing he misrepresented Basil’s (as well as Eunomius’) views. Before, however, examining the most relevant passages from Gregory’s Contra Eunomium II, some crucial notes on what §p¤noia means in Eunomius’ and Basil’s texts are naturally in order. ÉEp¤noia was placed in the context of the Trinitarian quarrels of the 4th century by Eunomius. Unfortunately, Eunomius’ usage of this term in his first piece, the ÉApolog¤a, is rather obscure. Nowhere does he define it; he just uses it thrice in the 8th chapter: ÉAg°nnhton d¢ l°gontew, oÈk ÙnÒmati mÒnon katÉ §p¤noian ényrvp¤nhn semnÊnein ofiÒmeya de›n, épotinnÊnai d¢ katÉ élÆyeian tÚ pãntvn énagkaiÒtaton ˆflhma t“ Ye“, tØn toË e‰nai ˜ §stin ımolog¤an. Tå gãr toi katÉ §p¤noian legÒmena, §n ÙnÒmasi mÒnon ka‹ proforò tÚ e‰nai

1 Let a double note be made in advance. This paper is a highly selective abridg- ment of a forthcoming monograph of mine on The Philosophical Theology of Eunomius of Cyzicus: a Restoration, Athens, forthcoming in 2007. For more documentation and full secondary literature one should refer to the monograph. Secondly, its point hap- pens to clash with the established admiration of Gregory of Nyssa and match with the critical approach to his thought inaugurated by H. F. Cherniss and followed recently by C. G. Stead and others. The former, in his old well-known study, The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa, Berkeley 1930, concluded that Gregory, in his attempt at submitting philosophy to theology, “contradicted himself at every point” (H. F. Cherniss, The Platonism, 57; 63) and that in his “polemic against Eunomius...every weapon is used that is suited to hurt the enemy” (27), regardless of the inconsis- tencies in which he was involved. The latter, in his “Ontology and Terminology in Gregory of Nyssa” (in: H. Dörrie – M. Altenburger – U. Schramm, eds., Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie. Zweites internationales Kolloquium über Gregor von Nyssa, Freckenhorst bei Münster 18.–23. September 1972, Leiden 1976, 107–127, esp. 107) concluded from his research into special topics that Gregory “lacks the essential attributes of the philosopher – the concern for consistency and the respect for truth”. “Provided [his conclusions] seem reasonably persuasive, he is satisfied; and 388 john a. demetracopoulos

¶xonta, ta›w fvna›w sundialÊesyai p°fuken, ı d¢ YeÚw ka‹ sivp≈ntvn ka‹ fyeggom°nvn ka‹ gegenhm°nvn ka‹ prÚ toË gen°syai tå ˆnta ∑n te ka‹ ¶stin ég°nnhtow.2 Surprisingly enough, no scholar has thus far paid due attention to the mÒnon of the first sentence.3 Contrary to what Basil and Gregory say of Eunomius’ §p¤noia, this mÒnon shows that Eunomius does not discard §p¤noia en bloc; what he says is just that conceiving God through §p¤noia is not sufficient (oÈ ...mÒnon), since there is a way of a closer approach to His ‘being’ (tÚ e‰nai, oÈs¤a or ÍpÒstasiw). Eunomius, when saying épotinnÊnai ...katÉ élÆyeian (not just katÉ §p¤noian), used the Stoic distinction between élhy°w and élÆyeia.4 ÉAlhy°w is a truth which can be possessed even by a non-sage, who does not know why what he believes is true and, for that reason, may wrongly change his mind and fall into falsehood. That is why Eunomius says that tå ...katÉ §p¤noian legÒmena ...ta›w fvna›w sun- dialÊesyai p°fuken.5 ÉAlÆyeia, in contrast with élhy°w, is the firmly

this [is] characteristic of his...opportunistic use of philosophical themes” (C. G. Stead, “Ontology and Terminology”, 116; cf. id., “Why Not Three Gods? The Logic of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian Doctrine”, in: H. R. Drobner – C. Klock, eds., Studien zu Gregor von Nyssa und der christlichen Spätantike, Leiden – New York – København – Köln 1990, 149–163, esp. 149). This is the spirit of my monograph Philosophy and Faith. The Demonstrability of Christian Dogmas according to Gregory of Nyssa or Fides deprecans intellectum, Athens 1996, where Cherniss’ main point was enriched and systematized by a list of Gregory’s plain contradictions in matters regarding ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics, and apologetics. 2 Eunomius, Apologia 8 (Vaggione 40–42; SC 305, 246–248). 3 Even desperate ‘corrections’ of this passage (in full despise of the manuscript evidence) have been suggested, so as to make it match somehow with the standard interpretation (see e.g. K.-H. Uthemann, “Die Sprache der Theologie nach Eunomius von Cyzicus”, ZKG 104 [1993] 143–175, esp. 153). 4 See Sextus Empiricus’ Adversus Mathematicos VIII 81–83 (Mutchmann II 120–121) (VIII 80–84, Mutchmann II 120–121: Per‹ élhyoËw ka‹ élhye¤aw). Cf. A. A. Long, “Language and Thought in Stoicism”, in: A. A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, 75–113 (esp. 98–112). An ethical statement in chapter 13 of the ÉApolog¤a is very close to the main ethical corollary drawn by the Stoics from their distinction between élhy°w and élÆyeia. This distinction taken for granted the Stoics said that falsehood does not consist in uttering something contrary to an élhy°w but in clashing with élÆyeia, “ceud°w or élhy°w are words which fix the truth or falsity of statements made at a particular time” (A. A. Long, “Language and Thought”, 101). Likewise, Eunomius declares that speaking the truth is good not in principle but only under conditions: mhd¢n t«n élhy«n [nota bene the care- ful use of élhy°w, not élÆyeia] §n kair“ ka‹ m°trƒ legom°nvn Ípa¤tion (Eunomius, Apologia 13,3–4, Vaggione 48; SC 305, 258). 5 Let us also recall the Biblical dictum: Logismo‹ går ynht«n deilo¤, ka‹ §pi- sfale›w afl §p¤noiai ≤m«n (Sap 9,14).