“The Skeleton of the State:” The Fiscal Politics of Pergamon, 188-133 B.C.E. By Noah Kaye A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Ancient History and Mediterranean Archaeology University of California-Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Emily Mackil Professor Erich Gruen Professor Nikolaos Papazarkadas Professor Andrew Stewart Professor Dylan Sailor Fall 2012 Abstract “The Skeleton of the State:” the Fiscal Politics of Pergamon, 188-133, B.C.E. by Noah Kaye Doctor of Philosophy in Ancient History and Mediterranean Archaeology University of California, Berkeley Professor Emily Mackil, Chair In 188 B.C.E., a Roman commission awarded most of Anatolia (Asia Minor) to the Attalid dynasty, a modest fiefdom based in the city of Pergamon. Immediately, the Roman commissioners evacuated along with their force of arms. Enforcement of the settlement, known as the Treaty of Apameia, was left to local beneficiaries, chiefly the Attalids, but also the island republic of Rhodes. The extraction of revenues and the judicious redistribution of resources were both key to the extension of Attalid control over the new territory and the maintenance of the empire. This dissertation is a study of the forms of taxation and public benefaction that characterized the late Attalid kingdom, a multiscalar state comprised of many small communities, most prominent among them, ancient cities on the Greek model of the polis. It argues that the dynasty’s idiosyncratic choices about taxation and euergetism help explain the success of the Attalid imperial project. They aligned interests and created new collectivities. Civic values as much as royal interests determined the cultural categories within which taxation and redistribution took place. To a greater extent than Rhodes, the Attalids integrated and taxed their new 1 subjects, no easy task in a world of flimsy bureaucracy and taxpayers who spoke of the taxman and the pirate in the same breath. Previous research has explained the Attalid success in two divergent ways. Either the Attalids were fiscally predatory and manipulated civic institutions, or they were laissez-faire “constitutional monarchs.” Neither picture accords well with the evidence, primarily inscriptions and coins. These documents reflect a social process of mutual implication in fiscal structures. This dissertation builds on models of the Hellenistic king as interactive with his subjects, and of the Greek city as capable of imposing ideological constraints on monarchs, but it advocates a new model for the Hellenistic kingdom that assigns a permanent, predictable, and rational role to the king in the economy of the city. Part I explores royal acts of giving. Ch. 1 treats the Attalid habit of applying certain royal revenues for the provision of specific public goods in the cities where they were collected, the practice of “earmarking.” I argue that earmarking arrangements were neither a form of sugarcoating the bitter pill of imperialism, nor simply the city’s re- appropriation of what were in origin civic resources, but the end product of a social bargaining process. Negotiations over earmarking provided the Attalid king with an arena for the display of the virtue of providence (pronoia). They also necessitated frequent forays into the domain of private property. Ch. 2 examines Attalid patronage of civic gymnasia, which in its intensity distinguished the dynasty from its rivals in this period. I explain the Attalid preference for giving to the gymnasium by re-conceptualizing that institution in the political landscape of the city. While the Hellenistic gymnasium is often seen as a miniature version of the civic community, I draw attention to its autonomy, both institutional and ideological. This autonomy invited royal participation in the finances of the gymnasium. It also rendered the gymnasium a privileged site of negotiation between city and crown where kings, princes, and courtiers interacted with civic elites. Part II presents the other, less generous side of Attalid political economy after Apameia: the extraction of revenues. Chapter 3 tells a story of wide-scale monetary change, since we now agree that the Attalids instituted their new coinage, the cistophori, after 188. Light weight and strangely decorated, the cistophori are one of the greatest puzzles of Greek numismatics. Against the common view that the production of these coins was highly centralized, I argue that a series of negotiations stands behind the successful imposition of the new monetary regime and that its responsibilities – and profits – were shared. Further, the cistophoric monetary system was not a closed currency zone. The Attalid kingdom operated on a ramified system, in which different currencies were required for different payments. Coinage helped to integrate economic microregions oriented in very different directions, and thus should be seen as integral to a process of 2 state formation. Chapter 4 analyzes the fiscal system of the Attalids. It systematically reviews the evidence for the types of taxes, the personnel of tax collection, and tax rates. For direct taxation of agriculture, assessment by community was the norm, and negotiation over the annual rate seems to have been routine. Military settlers (cleruchs), on the other hand, paid individually on allotments granted by royal authority. Their taxes were a mixed liability of cash and kind, the mixed-phoros regime known in Anatolia since the Achaemenids. Direct taxation of persons, typically those living in non-polis communities, was irregular. The bulk of our evidence for indirect taxation points to a focus on customs dues and usage taxes levied on different parts of the royal patrimony, such as coastal lagoons, saltpans, mines, and royal forests. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Attalids did not employ tax farmers directly, but relied on the subject communities to collect royal taxes as they wished. In this, as in many other respects, continuity with the earlier Seleukid kingdom is evident. Under the pressure of a highly competitive interstate political system, the Attalids pursued greater revenues. Yet royal fiscality always remained a calque on civic: it did not create new categories of taxation, and civic fiscality survived the encounter intact. Generally, fiscal intensification was pursued through indirect taxation. The Attalids aimed to capture revenue on goods moving between the different fiscal zones of Anatolia. To this end, they built up what is described as an infrastructure of surveillance. 3 For Mario Segre (1904-1944). Table of Contents List of Illustrations i Acknowledgments iii Introduction 1 Part I 1 Following the Money: Earmarking and the Creation of Consensus 12 2 Before the “Second Agora:” Interaction and the Gymnasium 40 Part II 3 Room for Change: Coinage and State Formation after Apameia 75 4 An Analysis of the Fiscal System of the Attalid Kingdom 122 Conclusion 167 Epigraphical Appendix 170 Bibliography 174 List of Illustrations IMAGE 1: Silver tetradrachm of Pergamon, “Philetairos” of the Post-Apameian series. Photo: www.coinarchives.com, accessed July 15, 2012. IMAGE 2: Silver tetradrachm of Pergamon, late “posthumous Alexander.” Photo: Price 1991. IMAGE 3: Pamphylian silver tetradrachm with countermark of bow and case. Photo: www.coinarchives.com, accessed July 15, 2012. IMAGE 4: Cistophoric tetradrachm. Photo: www.coinarchives.com, accessed July 15, 2012. IMAGE 5: Cistophoric didrachm. Photo: Kleiner and Noe 1977. IMAGE 6: Cistophoric drachm. Photo: Kleiner and Noe 1977. IMAGE 7: Silver tetradrachm, portrait coin of Eumenes II. Photo: Nicolet-Pierre 1989. IMAGE 8: Silver tetradrachm of Pergamon in the name of Athena Nikephoros. Photo: www.coinarchives.com, accessed July 15, 2012. IMAGE 9: Silver tetradrachm of the Koinon of the Technitai of Dionysos of Ionia and the Hellespont. Photo: Psoma 2009. IMAGE 10: Silver tetradrachm in name of ΘΕΩΝ ΚΑΒΕΙΡΩΝ ΣΥΡΙΩΝ. Mint of Pergamon? Photo: the American Numismatic Society. IMAGE 11: Gold stater of Tralles. Photo: Jenkins 1978. IMAGE 12: Late silver drachm of Ephesos. Photo: www.coinarchives.com, accessed July 15, 2012. IMAGES 13, 14, and 15: Silver tetradrachms of Herakleia-under-Latmos, Myrina, and Kyme, respectively. “Wreathed Coinages.” Photos: www.coinarchives.com, accessed July 15, 2012. IMAGE 16: Table 1 from Kleiner and Noe, 1977. IMAGES 17 and 18: Kleiner P24 and Kleiner S10 , respectively. Photos: Kleiner and Noe, 1977. i IMAGES 19, 20, and 21: Cistophoric tetradrachms of Pergamon, Ephesos and Tralles, respectively. Photos: Kleiner and Noe, 1977. IMAGE 22: Proconsular cistophoric tetradrachm. Photo: www.coinarchives.com, accessed July 15, 2012. IMAGE 23: Late cistophoric drachm of Tralles Photo: Head 1901. IMAGE 24: Pronconsular cistophoric tetradrachm of Tralles. Photo: Stumpf 1991. IMAGE 25: Silver tetradrachm of the Athenian New Style countermarked by Tralles. Photo: Andrew Meadows of the American Numismatic Society. ii Acknowledgments I have benefited from the support and kindness of so many people over the course of the training and research that went into this dissertation. From Princeton, many thanks to Prof. Mark Domingo-Gygax in the Department of Classics, who inducted me into ancient history, and to those who urged me to pursue a scholarly career, especially Profs. Thomas Hare and Eileen Reeves in the Department of Comparative Literature. In Cambridge, I benefited from the instruction and guidance of Profs. Dorothy Thompson, Julia Shear,