Politics and policy: Rome and , 200-172 B.C.

Eric Brousseau, Department of History

McGill University, Montreal

June, 2010

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts.

©Eric Brousseau 2010 i

Abstract

Stephen Dyson’s The Creation of the Roman Frontier employs various anthropological models to explain the development of Rome’s republican frontiers. His treatment of the Ligurian frontier in the second century BC posits a Ligurian ‘policy’ crafted largely by the Senate and Roman ‘frontier tacticians’ (i.e. consuls). Dyson consciously avoids incorporating the pressures of domestic politics and the dynamics of aristocratic competition. But his insistence that these factors obscure policy continuities is incorrect. Politics determined policy.

This thesis deals with the Ligurian frontier from 200 to 172 BC, years in which

Roman involvement in the region was most intense. It shows that individual magistrates controlled policy to a much greater extent than Dyson and other scholars have allowed. The interplay between the competing forces of aristocratic competition and Senatorial consensus best explains the continuities and shifts in regional policy.

Abstrait

The Creation of the Roman Frontier, l’œuvre de Stephen Dyson, utilise plusieurs modèles anthropologiques pour illuminer le développement de la frontière républicaine. Son traitement de la frontière Ligurienne durant la deuxième siècle avant

J.-C. postule une ‘politique’ envers les Liguriennes déterminer par le Sénat et les

‘tacticiens de la frontière romain’ (les consuls). Dyson fais exprès de ne pas tenir compte des forces de la politique domestique et la compétition aristocratique. Mais son insistance que ces forces cachent les continuités de la politique Ligurienne est incorrecte. ii

Ce thèse évalue les développements dans la Ligurie entre les années 200 et 172 avant J.-C.—les trentes ans pendant lesquelles les romains faisaient de la guerre à presque chaque année en Ligurie. La thèse montre que les individus influençaient la politique plus souvent et plus fortement que Dyson et autres historien(ne)s concèdent.

Les continuités et changement dans la politique régionale sont mieux expliqués selon un cadre qui prend compte de la tension entre la compétition aristocratique et le consensus Sénatorial.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Prof. Michael Fronda. Without his painstaking editorial work while halfway around the world, this thesis would be replete with Germanic compound nouns and other less egregious grammatical and syntactical errors. His suggestions regarding structure and analysis have also been tremendously helpful. Any remaining errors are entirely my own.

Table of Contents

Abstracts and Acknowledgements i

Introduction 1

Chapter 2: Developments in Liguria, 238-183 25

Chapter 3: Developments in Liguria, 182-175 66

Chapter 4: The Popillian Affair: A Case Study in Roman Politics and Foreign Relations 92

Conclusion 126

Bibliography 131 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

Book thirty-nine of ’s opens with a passage that directly addresses the importance of the seemingly endemic Roman campaigns in Liguria, which were fought almost yearly from 197 to 171:

This enemy [the Ligurians] was born, as it were, to keep alive the military discipline of the Romans during the intervals between their great wars; nor did any province do more to put an edge to the soldier’s courage. For , on account of the pleasantness of its cities and the abundance of its treasures of land and sea and the feebleness of the enemy and the wealth of its kings, made armies richer rather than braver. Especially under the command of Gnaeus Manlius was discipline slackly and indifferently enforced; and so a somewhat more difficult advance in Thrace and a rather more effective enemy had taught them a lesson with great slaughter. Among the Ligurians there was everything to keep an army alert- hilly and rough ground, which was difficult for both the men themselves to occupy and to dislodge the enemy who had already occupied it, and roads difficult, narrow, dangerous by reason of ambuscades; an enemy lightly equipped, mobile an unexpected in his movements, who permitted no time or place whatever to be quiet or safe; the besieging of fortified points was necessary and at the same time toilsome and dangerous; the district was poor, which constrained the soldiers to simple living and offered them little plunder. Accordingly, no civilian camp-follower went along, no long train of pack-animals stretched out the column. There was nothing except arms and men who placed all their trust in their arms. Nor was there ever wanting either the occasion of the cause for war with them, because on account of their poverty at home they were constantly raiding their neighbors’ land. And yet the fighting never brought about the final settlement of a campaign.1

Livy’s moralizing is unmistakable, and indeed this passage sets the tone for a series of moralizing episodes throughout book thirty-nine.2 But Livy’s point is well taken. Roman involvement in Liguria demanded tremendous expenditures of manpower and military effort. In twenty-two of the thirty-four years between 200 and 167, at least one and

1 Livy 39.1.2-8. Ligurians as a nation ‘inured to war’: Livy 27.48. 2 Briscoe (2008) 209. Ligurian hardiness: Farney (2007) 195, 197, 199-201; Williams (2001) 54, 75-76; Toynbee (1965) 273-277, for Ligurian topography and its effect on the Romano-Ligurian wars. 2

often both consuls were sent to Liguria.3 It was the most common province for Roman consuls in the first three decades of the second century. These numbers alone would justify a detailed study of the Roman involvement in Liguria. Yet these commands also provide an excellent case study for the relationship between politics and policy in the development of the republican frontier.

Historiography of Liguria

The subject of Roman Liguria has produced a somewhat paradoxical historiographic tradition. The archaeological scholarship’s volume is extensive but text- based, historical treatments have been few and far between. French and Italian scholars have tended to deal with the regions of ancient Liguria bounded by their modern nations, focusing on two topics in particular: pre-Roman Liguria; the

Romanization of Liguria.4 In both cases the treatments have been predominantly, almost exclusively, archaeological. Archaeologists and historians have attempted to recreate pre-Roman Liguria from the little evidence available. The trend has been to stress the interconnectedness of pre-Roman Liguria with the wider Mediterranean world, especially with the Carthaginians, Massiliotes, Etruscans and the inhabitants of

Magna Graecia. Similarly, recent treatments of the Romanization of Liguria have emphasized cultural continuity and exchange rather than a narrative of cultural imperialism.5 This thesis is emphatically not concerned with the archaeology or the

3 Harris (1979) 225, notes that Roman armies fought in Liguria annually from 197-172 with the exception of the Syrian-Aetolian War; cf. Williams (2001) 21; Gargola (2006) 156. All dates are BC unless otherwise indicated. 4 Crucial work on Italian Liguria has been done by Lamboglia, Mansuelli and Tozzi. In France, F. Benoit, R. Chevallier, M. Lejeune, and H. Rolland have been seminal. 5 See Häussler (2007) 45-78, for a recent survey. 3

Romanization of Liguria. The sources are predominantly historical and the focus is

Romano-centric.

Surprisingly little scholarship has focused on the Roman conquest of Liguria and this region’s place in the larger framework of Roman imperialism. Indeed, though there are many treatments of Rome’s overseas wars in the post-Hannibalic period6, Liguria has rarely been addressed in depth since William H.B. Hall did so in an 1898 work entitled The Romans on the Riviera and the Rhone: a sketch of the conquest of Liguria and the . Hall’s work is informed by late nineteenth century

Romanticism: “Passing my winters as I do within sight of the ruins of Forum Julii, which is really a Rome in miniature, I have been imbibing an atmosphere as completely

Roman, as if I had been living on the outskirts of the Eternal City.”7 Citing an “intimate acquaintance with the locality”, Hall’s aim is to “bridge over the gap in Roman history between the narratives of Livy and Caesar” by integrating history and archaeology into a grand narrative of Roman conquest.8 But the work is mostly narrative history and does not integrate aspects of Roman political culture or domestic politics.

A.J. Toynbee dealt with the Romano-Ligurian wars at some length in the second volume of Hannibal’s Legacy. According to Toynbee, after the Second Punic War, a

“systematic plan” was developed to conquer and Liguria. The basin was an agricultural Eden and the Roman state fastened on a plan of conquest in order to expand the available ager Romanus.9 Toynbee portrays the wars and the mass

6 Second Macedonian War: Warrior (1996). Antiochene War: Granger (2002). Achaean War: Gruen (1976). Third Punic War: Baronowski (1995). More generally: Eckstein (2006b), Gruen (1984). 7 Hall (1898) viii. 8 Hall (1898) vii. 9 Toynbee (1965) 260-264. 4

deportations after 180 as part of Rome’s aggressive agrarian policy—he cites the

Senate’s ambivalent response to M. Popillius Laenas’ attack on the Statellae in 173

(condemnation of the consul’s actions yet forced-migration of Ligurians) as evidence that Roman aims were the acquisition of new land.10

More recently, W.V. Harris devotes a mere two pages to the Ligurian wars in the period 197 to 172. He thinks “the contribution of defensive thinking at Rome is hard to discern” but acknowledges that piracy, the defense of Roman colonies (Bononia and

Arretium) and roads (Via Flaminia, ) as well as newly acquired possessions

() potentially contributed to Roman involvement in Liguria. However, “thoughts of gain probably contributed to the Ligurian wars. Plundering and enslavement went on as usual, the latter relatively more important against poor opponents. Livy’s notices sometimes give the impression that plundering was the main objective, and this can be accepted without difficulty.”11 This assertion situates the Ligurian Wars within Harris’ larger contention that the Roman Senate consistently pursued an aggressive, expansionist agenda for material gain.

Stephen Dyson provides perhaps the most detailed recent analysis of Roman imperialism in Liguria. Dyson’s The Creation of the Roman Frontier argues that “the roots of Roman frontier thinking and the development of methods of border control lay in the rich experience of the Republic.”12 He believes that Rome’s republican frontiers laid the groundwork for imperial frontier strategy and accordingly deserve closer

10 The Popillian Affair was a political showdown between various magistrates and the Senate in the years 173-172 and is the subject of a detailed case study in chapter 4. 11 Harris (1979) 226-227. Harris rejects Livy’s statement that the Ligurian wars provided little plunder (39.1.6) as “merely part of a sermon on their beneficial effect on the Roman army”. North (1981) 2, notes that Harris’ theoretical framework is well developed but that his treatment of individual wars is strained. 12 Dyson (1985) 3. 5

scrutiny than they have received. The entire third chapter is devoted to the development of the Ligurian frontier. In his introduction, Dyson writes:

Growing out of events, attitudes, and accumulated experience were policy and institutions. The provides a fascinating study of a highly complex but basically prebureaucratic society. Modern historians of Rome have tended to stress the individual power politics and elite group dynamics of Republican society. But no system functions without a policy and the means for instituting it. This is especially true for frontier situations where the convergence of two societies requires clear policy and flexible application. The apparent informality of policy-making during the Republic and the stress on personal and familial control have obscured continuities in both policy and action. One advantage of considering the frontier in larger perspective is that isolated events in a particular area can be seen as part of a larger policy.13

Dyson follows these parameters in crafting a narrative of Roman frontier policy in

Liguria. He finds that Liguria is a particularly illustrative case study: “In all its aspects, the Ligurian frontier provides an excellent illustration of the complexities and problems of Roman frontier development.”14

In Dyson’s view, the Ligurian frontier supposedly developed in accordance with a Senatorially directed policy. It was ‘the Romans’ or the ‘Senate’ that recognized the need for a policy-shift from yearly raiding to resettlement and pacification in 180.

Consuls could deviate from the policy and innovate but this innovation was then incorporated into existing policy and subsequent consuls perpetuated this new innovation. The influence of Roman politics is almost an afterthought in both Dyson’s framework and the previous scholarship. Scholars have presented a neat picture of a

Senate bent on subjugating the region. Little interest has been taken in the actions of

13 Dyson (1985) 6. 14 Dyson (1985) 94; 124-125: “The information we do have shows that the conquest of Liguria not only involved some of the most difficult campaigning faced by the Roman army but also required some of the most imaginative use of more peaceful frontier policies. The variety of devices used and the imagination evident in their application speaks well for Roman frontier strategists.” These were not ‘frontier strategists’ but annually elected consuls. 6

individual magistrates and their relationship with the Senate. In fact, Dyson acknowledges the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy only once: the

Popillian Affair.15 Apart from this infamous episode, he repeatedly downplays or ignores the role of politics and competition in the making of frontier ‘policy’. But the separation of politics and policy ignores fundamental aspects of the Roman republic.

Roman Foreign Relations and Political Culture

At the end of his introduction, Dyson claims: “[I] have avoided embracing any overarching theory since I do not believe any is relevant to this subject.”16 But he acknowledges having read and subtly incorporated various anthropological theories, and his work explicitly responds to historians who have hitherto privileged the role of personal politics and aristocratic competition in shaping Roman foreign relations. Thus

Dyson’s work is shaped by certain operating assumptions even if he addresses them only obliquely. The following discussion will accomplish three things: concisely illuminate various debates regarding republican expansion, foreign policy and political culture17; situate Dyson’s work as well as previous Ligurian scholarship within the intellectual framework of those debates; demonstrate the need for a renewed approach to the Ligurian frontier.

The mechanics of Rome’s rise to Mediterranean domination have fascinated and perplexed historians since . The Greek historian spent seventeen years as a

15 Dyson (1985) 110: “Most of the actions of Laenas can best be explained by political rivalries at Rome and the growing ambitions of the Popillian family”; 111: “The issue rapidly became caught up in the internal politics of Rome *…+ The case of Laenas is a fascinating study in the imperial politics of the period.” 16 Dyson (1985) 6. 17 The scholarship on these topics is vast and a full treatment would be a colossal undertaking. Jehne (2006) is an excellent overview of republican historiography; Eckstein (2006a) summarizes the ongoing controversy regarding republican expansion and imperialism. 7

hostage in Rome and attempted to find order amidst the chaotic expansion of Roman imperium so as to explain to his fellow Greeks “by what means, and under what kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought under the dominion of the single city of Rome” in a span of fifty-three years.18 Polybius’ answer rested on Rome’s mixed constitution and its good fortune (tyche). The debate has more recently been structured between the two poles of defensive imperialism and aggressive expansionism.

The model of ‘defensive imperialism’ holds that Roman expansion occurred as the result of threats, perceived or actual, to its security. This approach emphasizes fetial law and the Roman obsession with fighting just wars (bellum iustum). Roman expansion was fitful—Rome was an empire by accident.19 Arthur Eckstein has recently revived the theory albeit in a slightly altered form, responding directly to Harris’ continued influence.20 Eckstein incorporates political science and Realist theory to show that Rome was not an exceptionally bellicose society in comparison to its neighbours.

Its disposition and behaviour was no different than its contemporaries—it was just more successful than the Italian powers, the Hellenistic dynasties and its Carthaginian rivals. As such, Roman expansion cannot be explained by an innate Roman bellicosity.21

W.V. Harris’ reaction to the theory of ‘defensive imperialism’ ignited serious debate about Roman expansionary motives. Harris contends that republican expansion

18 Polyb. 1.1. Polybius’ fifty-three years went from 220 to 167. 19 Early examples include Holleaux (1921); Badian (1968). 20 Eckstein (2006a) 573, on Harris’ theory: “The majority of studies on Roman expansion under the Middle Republic now take this stance.” 21 Eckstein (2006b, 2009). 8

was aggressive and imperialistic.22 Rome was not the reluctant recipient of an unwanted empire but an aggressive superpower perpetually seeking to augment its territory and extend its imperium—an empire by design. For Harris, the Roman state was pre-disposed to war; from its yearly war-making to the militarism of the aristocracy and people alike to the censors’ oath that they would augment the Roman state,

Roman bellicosity was a national trait that both set them apart from other societies and facilitated their Mediterranean domination.23

A second debate has focused on the existence and nature of Roman foreign policy. Some scholars argue that the Romans maintained a coherent foreign policy over the longterm, though they differ substantially on specifics of what that policy comprised. Harris saw foreign policy as a simple directive of expansion. Badian employs the framework of patronus-clientela relationships to explain Roman foreign policy.

Others such as Sherwin-White, Gruen, Morstein-Marx and Ebel have focused on foreign policy in specific geographic regions.

Eckstein has challenged this popular view. He asserts that Rome’s “eventual success need not imply the existence of a conscious, insistent, and specific policy (if not, indeed, plan) of imperial expansion on a grand scale.”24 The Roman historiographical tradition lacks such coherency so that “even the most important Roman decisions concerning foreign relations do not appear in Livy’s books 21-45 as the result of cool

22 Harris (1971, 1979, 1990). See also Hölkeskamp (1993); Millar (1984) 1: “It was in Liguria, in the Celtic lands of the and in Venetia and Histria that the Romans of this period exhibited a consistent and unremitting combination of imperialism, militarism, expansionism and colonialism.” 23 For an excellent review article which highlights the strengths and weaknesses of Harris’ work, see North (1981). 24 Eckstein (1987) xvii. 9

calculations or long-term, planned policy: rather, everything is ad hoc.”25 He has since expanded on the narrow scope of Senate and General and demonstrated that the

Roman rise to hegemonic status occurred within the volatile multipolarity of the

Hellenistic world. It was also the result of a series of contingent decisions rather than a rational plan.

One of the main points of contention in the second debate concerns the nature of decision-making and political power. Scholars since Mommsen have looked to the

Senate as the guiding force in Roman foreign policy in the middle republic. North has recently written that “the Senate was, then, the key institution in the making of policy decisions. The power of action lay with the magistrates, but they received and usually respected the Senate’s advice.”26 Many scholars have accepted the leadership of the

Senate in foreign policy decisions.27 Fergus Millar raises important objections to this position:

… if we talk about Roman imperialism we must, at least at one level, try to make clear whose imperialism we are discussing. Who, in the Roman political system, actually decided the declaration of war or the making of peace, the scale of the military call-out for each year and its allotment to different areas, the answers to be given to Italian and foreign embassies, the dispatch of colonies: the consul or pro-consul in the field, the Senate, or the Roman people in their assemblies? Thus to understand Roman imperialism, but not that alone, we must understand the Roman political system itself.28

Millar stresses the role of the people and their assemblies. Eckstein too has challenged the view that the Senate played the leading role in determining Roman foreign policy such as it was. His aptly titled Senate and General attempts to “reexamine the

25 Eckstein (1987) xvii. 26 North (2006) 269. 27 Toynbee (1965); Sherwin-White (1986); Badian (1958); Hölkeskamp (1993, 2010); Harris (1979); Gargola (2006) 156: “In northern , the initiative clearly lay with the Senate, and eliminating or drastically reducing the Gallic population may well have been among its goals.” 28 Millar (1984) 1. 10

hypothesis that the senate was the dynamic force behind the creation of Roman foreign policy in the third and early second centuries B.C. and to place new emphasis on the vital role played in Roman foreign relations by Rome’s generals in the field.”29

Eckstein is fundamentally skeptical regarding the consensual nature of Senatorial politics and policy. He also cites the “primitiveness of the Roman senate as an institution for decision making in foreign relations” as well as “the inherently cumbersome nature of the senate itself.” More recently he has pointed to factional, family and personal jealousies within the Senate.30

Nathan Rosenstein echoes some of Eckstein’s concerns over Senatorial consensus. He criticizes Develin’s contention that Senators could and did manipulate elections in times of military crises, writing that “the patres emerge looking rather less like a collection of self-interested politicians and rather more like an assembly of statesmen than one might have imagined, and military crisis stands revealed as an important brake on aristocratic competition.”31 The debate between the two points to a much larger topic of research that has received considerable attention: the tension between competition and consensus within the Senatorial aristocracy. Harris, Develin and Hölkeskamp have embraced a consensual Senate.32 Rosenstein’s work has focused on the innate tensions within the aristocracy, their limitations and effects on

29 Eckstein (1987) xii. 30 Eckstein (1987) xix, xx; Eckstein (2006a) 573. Scullard (1951) accepts the Senate’s leading role in foreign policy but parallels Roman foreign policy with shifting factional and familial control of the Senate. 31 Rosenstein (1993) 314. 32 Hölkeskamp (1993, 2010); Harris (1971, 1979, 1990); Develin (1979, 1985). 11

governance and society.33 In short, the Senatorial class’ defining characteristic was intense competition within consensually defined parameters.34

Extent and Limitations of Senatorial Frontier ‘Policy’

The republican Senate was not powerless and it indeed directed certain aspects of foreign policy and frontier development. The Senate was equipped with powers and privileges that went beyond entertaining foreign embassies and sending Roman embassies abroad.35 But as Eckstein has demonstrated, individual magistrates in the field exerted great influence on policy. In order to fully account for developments in

Roman foreign and frontier policy we must consider not only the Senate, but also individual magistrates and the interplay between them. Politics did not interfere with policy—they dictated it. The following are some specific Senatorial practices and institutions that constitute methods of control and shaped policy to some extent.

Colonization was integral to frontier strategy and largely controlled by the

Senate. In the years 200 to 167, a Senatorial decree and a plebiscite were both required to found a colony.36 While late republican colonies increasingly provided economic benefits, land for veterans and helped relieve the pressure of surplus population, colonies founded in the third and early second centuries served first and foremost as forward positions for gathering intelligence and as bulwarks against the invasion of

33 Rosenstein (1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1993) for military service and the aristocratic ethos; Rosenstein (2006) for a more general summary. 34 Rosenstein (1990c) 294; Millar (1984) 13-14, for competition before the people as a defining trait; Rosenstein (1990b) 255ff., for some of the constraints on aristocratic competition; Gruen (1996) 214ff., for a balanced view. 35 Polyb. 6.13.1-9. 36 Gargola (1995) 53. Gargola, following Velleius Paterculus (1.14.1), notes that the Senate founded all colonies before the Gracchi. 12

Roman Italy. called them the propugnacula imperii, the bulwarks of empire.37

They projected Roman power and protected Roman interests in the peninsula.

Founding colonies was a Roman undertaking involving boards of men (triumviri or decemviri) who were Senatorially selected to lead the foundations.

However, even colonization, one of the truly state-level republican policies, was not immune to the pressures of aristocratic competition. Individuals within the Senate were responsible for initiating colonization projects even if their identities are rarely known and “a successful proposal potentially could serve a number of purposes in such an individual’s personal or political agenda.”38 As has been proposed regarding the

Minucii and Cisalpine Gaul,39 certain families might have a special relationship with a tribe, a city or a region and would naturally have vied for the position of triumvir or decemvir coloniae deducendae when colonies were founded in that area. But the

Senate retained control of the process: it voted to found a colony, established its size and mandate and created the board that oversaw either the colonial founding or the distribution of land ad viritum.40

Roman road-building occupies a position between outright policy and practices characteristic of aristocratic competition. Road-building and colonization were always intimately connected; roads facilitated the rapid transportation of troops and connected newly founded colonies to pre-existing Roman roads. But roads were built or repaired by aristocrats seeking to glorify themselves and their families, often when they had met with little military success, a quiet province or as a symbol of their devotion to

37 Cic. De Leg. Agr. 2.27. 38 Gargola (1995) 52. 39 Wiseman (1996) 62. 40 Colonization in Liguria: Brunt (1971) 190ff.; Dyson (1985) 114ff. 13

the well-being to the res publica.41 Road construction and repair fell to the censors but consuls too could initiate and carry out such a task on their own.42 The nomenclature of

Roman roads in Liguria attest to this: the Via Aemilia was begun by the consul M.

Aemilius Lepidus in 18743; his colleague C. Flaminius began construction of a road between Bononia and Arretium in the same year44; the Via Postumia was built in 148 according to a milestone that identifies Sp. Postumius Albinus Magnus (cos. 148) as the road’s builder.45 On one level, road-building was Roman policy in that it was a practical necessity that Roman expansion demanded. But much like temple-building and games- vowing, road-building had a distinctly competitive facet. It was one of the many tools available to an aristocrat to augment his own gloria and that of his family.

Three further methods of control, all of them political, aided the Senate in guiding frontier ‘policy’ to a certain extent. First, it controlled the treasury and was, as such, the highest authority governing the dispersal of state funds. Polybius begins his description of the Senate’s competencies with this fact and adds that the spending of both quaestors and censors was limited to funds specifically allotted them by a decree of the Senate.46 In the Ligurian resettlement of M. Baebius Tamphilus and P. Cornelius

Cethegus the Senate’s role as financier was tremendously important.47 The Senate tacitly condoned or admonished consular behaviours by selectively funding certain projects and not others. The Senate looked to past precedent for guidance but was also

41 See Ch. 2 for the road-building of C. Flaminius and M. Aemilius Lepidus. 42 Polyb. 6.13.3 for the censors’ jurisdiction. 43 Dyson (1985) 115; MRR 1.368; Livy 39.2.10; Strabo 5.1.11. 44 Dyson (1985) 115; MRR 1.368; Livy. 39.2.5-6. 45 MRR 1.461; Dyson (1985) 116; CIL 5.2045 46 Polyb. 6.13.1-3. 47 See Ch. 3 for in-depth analysis of this case. 14

willing to respond to specific requests on an ad hoc basis, creating new precedents in the process.

The importance of the triumph within the arena of aristocratic competition cannot be overstated. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp has gone so far as to declare that “A triumph was a major asset in the permanent competition within the ruling circles- probably the most important one.”48 To enter Rome as triumphator elevated an aristocrat to a select group, one that was smaller than the consulares and more prestigious than the censorship. The triumph was the highly sought after capstone to a successful military command. The potential triumphator would convene the Senate in the Temple of Bellona (outside the sacred pomerium of Rome) and request the right to enter the city at the head of his army and a long procession of spoils and captives. It was the only time magistrates were legally permitted to enter the city under arms. A triumphator benefitted from increased prestige in the curia as well as massive exposure to the Roman populace at large.49

The triumph’s centrality to aristocratic competition guaranteed two things: debates concerning triumphs were heated, intensely political affairs; the broad guidelines of which behaviors did or did not merit a triumph, established mostly through precedent, formed an important guideline for potential triumphators as well as a valuable check on excessively vicious commanders. In controlling access to triumphs,

48 Hölkeskamp (1993) 29; Harris (1979) 21-26, declares that “The triumph, however, was palpably the supreme moment of the individual Roman’s glory *...+ The most impressive manifestation of the individual’s glory was of course the triumph.” 49 Vishnia (1996) 178-179, describes the political and social prestige that a triumph brought the triumphator. She notes that most consuls would not be aspiring to another consulship owing to the lack of iteration at the consular level, but that the successful triumphator’s position both in public and in the curia would be greatly augmented. 15

the Senate could reward imaginative military tactics or methods of pacification and punish magistrates who aggressively pursued bellicose agendas.50

The people’s role in the triumphal process is less clear. There are several early examples of magistrates triumphing by order of the people alone but these must be taken with a dose of “healthy skepticism”.51 However, in the period after the Second

Punic War, “every attested triumph debate began in the senate even if it did not end there, and all but one in Livy 21-45 take place entirely within the ranks of the curia.”52

Even if the people played an occasional, marginal role, the magistrate’s peers in the

Senate dominated the debate and controlled access to the triumph in the second century.

The relationship between Senate and magistrate was further complicated by two factors. First, a returning consul or praetor who for all intents and purposes deserved to triumph might be barred from doing so for overtly political reasons.53 This point perfectly illustrates the juncture of politics and policy that determined the disjointed nature of Roman foreign policy in the republic.

50 Failed consuls could occasionally celebrate a triumph on the Alban Mount, paid for ex manubia and recognized as less prestigious, though they were nonetheless inscribed on the (Pittenger [2008] 44-46).

51 Pittenger (2008) 37-42; Richardson (1975) 58. 52 Pittenger (2008) 36-37. The one exception is the debate over Aemilius Paullus’ triumph in 167. 53 Vishnia (1996) 179, cites the role of plebeian tribunes in interjecting personal and political rivalries. Famous examples include L. Cornelius Merula (193), Q. Minucius Thermus (190), M. Fulvius Nobilior (187): “The pattern that emerges is evidently clear: if a triumphal candidate could enlist sufficient support among the senators and the tribunes, he had good chances of celebrating a triumph or an ovation, irrespective of his actual achievements. On the other hand, inadequate support or formidable opposition could easily obstruct requests for a rightly-earned triumph.” (180) cf. Harris (1979) 26: “It was not an inaccessible honour like the spolia opima, but while it was often awarded for victories of less than world-historical importance, it was not merely commonplace. It was an honour jealously competed for, and one which must have given great psychological rewards as well as political ones.” 16

The second complicating factor is that the commander in the field was generally able to control the flow of information from his province to the Senate.

Formal requests for a triumph always involved a meeting of the Senate in the Temple of

Bellona at which the potential triumphator was present, but the Senate signaled its intention to proceed with the formulaic ritual if it voted days of thanksgiving in response to the magistrate’s dispatches. A personal appearance could help sway

Senatorial opinion. L. Furius Purpurio’s appearance before the Senate in 200 while L.

Aurelius Cotta was still in Gaul almost certainly influenced the vote regarding Purpurio’s controversial triumph. The Cenomani’s envoys successfully lobbied the Senate to deal with their disarmament at the hands of the praetor M. Furius Crassipes precisely because they had made the trip to Rome while the praetor was still in Gaul and could not defend his actions. Otherwise, the exchange of letters and dispatches between

Senate and general constituted the flow of information to the patres; the opportunity for lies and embellishments to paper over defeats, inflate successes or exaggerate frontier dangers is evident. Liguria’s proximity to Rome permitted the Senate to be more involved in policy decisions than it was in Spain or the Greek East, but the snail’s pace of information exchange guaranteed that magistrates were occasionally forced to respond to military disasters and foreign policy issues before consulting the Senate and could in any case control the story to a certain extent.

One final way in which the Senate controlled the development of the frontier was the allotment of consular and praetorian provinciae.54 In determining how many

54 Eckstein (1987) xxi, calls it the administration of the empire in “the most fundamental sense”. Prorogation might also be included except that in Northern Italy it was a fairly routine affair. See Gargola (2006) 155, for an excellent, concise explanation of the importance of defining provinciae. 17

Roman and allied legions would go where, the Senate greatly influenced the development of the frontier and the expansion of the empire. During the early part of the second century, there was much annual activity in Spain, Gaul and Liguria while the

Greek East, Asia Minor and North received attention and an influx of troops only when the geopolitical balance was threatened. Spain, and Sicily were praetorian preserves but Liguria was almost strictly a consular province.

The decision regarding consular provinces was a political affair. The year’s provinces and troop allotments were decided after the incoming consuls had been elected. As such, political opponents could lobby fellow Senators to prorogue current magistrates or assign the new ones to quiet provinces. Understandably, the incoming consuls lobbied the Senate for potentially lucrative commands. Perhaps unremarkably, the Ligurian province was viewed with disdain by many incoming consuls. In 196,

Marcellus and Purpurio both coveted the province of Macedonia but were assigned to

Italy instead.55 In 194, in response to the Senate’s suggestion that both consuls operate in Italy, Scipio Africanus declared that an impending war with Antiochus made it imperative that Macedonia be one of the consular provinces.56 Both consuls in 190, L.

Cornelius Scipio and C. Laelius, wanted to be assigned the command in Greece in order to carry on war with Antiochus. Breaking from the traditional method of allotting provinces by lot, the Senate decided the consular provinces by vote; once Scipio

Africanus promised to accompany his brother on the foreign campaign, the Senate voted almost unanimously to grant the province of Greece to the younger Scipio.57 M.

Aemilius Lepidus, for diverse reasons, complained about being cooped up in Liguria

55 Livy 33.25.5-10. 56 Livy 34.43.4-5. 57 Livy 37.1.7-10. 18

with his co-consul while M. Fulvius Nobilior and Cn. Manlius Vulso were in Asia and

Aetolia, “ruling like monarchs and virtually replacing Phillip and Antiochus.”58

War with was on the horizon in 172 and competition for provinces was once again fierce. The Senate effectively deprived the incoming consuls

C. Popillius Laenas and P. Aelius Ligus of Macedonia because they refused to submit a motion regarding the censure of Caius’ brother. As punishment, the Senate decreed that both consuls were to go to Liguria, a clear indication that Macedonia was much more desirable than Liguria as a consular province.59 The next year was no different.

Livy says that P. Licnius Crassus gained the province of Macedonia by an act of clever rhetoric and trickery, relying on arguments his co-consul, C. Cassius Longinus, had used as praetor several years earlier.60 Longinus was not pleased with having drawn Gaul and without accomplishing much set off for Macedonia through Illyricum.61 The livid Senate appointed three men to overtake Cassius and order him to return to his province. The ancient evidence overwhelmingly confirms Livy’s statement that Liguria was an undesirable province.62

From the above list it would appear that the Senate played an active and important role in shaping frontier policy. Surely its importance as a governing body is neither in question nor in jeopardy. But Dyson’s operative thesis at the level of individual consuls and their supposed role within a broader Roman strategy for the

Ligurian frontier is incorrect. The modern historians of Rome who recognize that Roman

58 Livy 41.18.7-15. 59 Livy 42.10.10-13. 60 Livy 42.32.4; cf. 41.15 for Cassius’ religious arguments against leaving Italy as praetor. 61 Livy 43.1.4-12. 62 Livy 39.1; cf. Dyson (1985) 94: “It is hardly surprising that Roman commanders preferred the more lush assignments to the east.” 19

foreign relations were necessarily and inextricably bound up in the internal machinations of the Roman political elite cannot be so easily swept aside. Dyson acknowledges the “complexities and problems” of Roman frontier policy in Liguria, but this still assumes an overarching, long-term, coherent policy directed by what would appear to be a concerted Senate. At a certain point, a policy shaped and reshaped by ad hoc decisions, countless innovations and personal motives ceases to be a policy.

At its core, this thesis is an extended response to Dyson’s views in particular regarding developments on the Ligurian frontier. Dyson takes the Senate’s authority and leadership for granted. But the relationship between Rome and Liguria was always determined by the demands of Roman politics and aristocratic competition. The trends

Dyson identifies are easily explained within the context of aristocratic competition and do not constitute a Ligurian policy. Dyson argues that the apparent informality of policy-making obscures continuities in policy; this thesis demonstrates that the term

‘policy’ presupposes a willing and empowered Senate and obscures the complexities and paradoxes of foreign relations and frontier development. Consuls possessed of individual agency and a range of choices determined yearly policy in Liguria; the Senate regulated competition without dictating policy.

Eckstein’s treatment of Romano-Celtic relations up to 197 finds that the Senate was more involved in directing policy in Northern Italy than it was further afield. There were two reasons for this: communication between magistrates in this region and

Rome was quicker and more efficient; the area was closer to Rome and the importance of protecting against another Gallic sack was manifest.63 Even so, Eckstein finds that

63 Eckstein (1987) 3, 320-324. 20

“there was room for important individual initiative.”64 Many of Eckstein’s examples of

Celtic policy in this early period are colonial foundations such as Sena Gallica,

Ariminum, Placentia and .65 Senatorial involvement in the colonial movement is undeniable; its role in controlling consular operations is more suspect. Also the sense of urgency that drove the post-Telamon colonial foundations was lacking in the post-

Hannibalic Ligurian warfare.

Sources

The great majority of evidence in the following chapters is drawn from Livy.

Indeed, the chronological framework has been largely determined by Livy’s extant books, though warfare in Liguria declined significantly after 166 and ceased almost entirely after 155. More skeptical scholars, such as Harris and Mellor, tend to place little stock in Livy’s account. For them, heavy reliance on such a questionable source necessarily detracts from the overall force of any further arguments.66 But Polybius largely ignored Roman domestic politics and Northern Italian warfare in favour of developments in his native Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean.67 Livy is often the only and certainly the most complete source for domestic developments in these years.

Three further points should reassure Livy’s skeptics.

First, Livy is not as bad as some detractors have claimed. On his early republican history, Vishnia writes that Livy’s reputation, “which was severely attacked by Italian and German scholars at the turn of the century, has been rehabilitated in

64 Eckstein (1987) xii, 3, 25, 69-70. 65 Eckstein (1987) 23. 66 Harris (1979) 5-6; Mellor (1999) 63-70. 67 Briscoe (1973) 2. 21

recent years.”68 Eckstein has called him the “the most coherent account of the third and early second centuries”, arguing that he is preferable to the accounts of other lesser known annalists and historians.69 Briscoe, author of commentaries on Livy’s books 31-40, takes a cautious approach to the annalistic sections of the work: “one must decide each case on historical grounds alone, and without general preconceptions about the reliability of the annalists.”70 The annalists Livy used (Claudius Quadrigarius,

Valerias Antias, Calprunius Piso Frugi) were not a priori worse than Polybius and entire non-Polybian swaths should not be outright condemned, especially in the fourth and fifth decades.

As a result, I do my utmost to separate historical fact from fiction throughout. I approach the speeches cautiously and seek alternate explanations for Livy’s dismissive comments and personal biases. Particularly in the case study of the Popillian Affair, I separate a hostile historiographic tradition from the more straightforward elements of

Livy’s narrative to create a more coherent account. Most importantly, the bulk of analysis is based on Senatorial or consular actions rather than Livy’s interpretation of them. When Livy says the Senate did X for Y reason, it is likely that X came from the annales maximi or another annalistic source whereas Y may be pure speculation and requires further explanation.

Finally, I incorporate other sources wherever possible. Degrassi’s edition of the fasti triumphales has been an important supplement to Livy’s triumph notices. T.R.S.

68 Vishnia (1996) 3, 8-9. She acknowledges that “although problematic and fraught with anachronisms, the Livian narrative most probably preserves the main outline of both domestic and foreign events. Moreover, the sources from which Livy derived his information had little scope to tamper with the basic facts.” Cf. Pittenger (2008) 6-17. 69 Eckstein (1987) xvii. 70 Briscoe (1973) 12. 22

Broughton’s Magistrates of the Roman Republic (cited MRR) has also been incalculably valuable in supplementing or checking Livy’s narrative against alternate sources. But ultimately Livy should be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The battle narratives may be exaggerated, the speeches may be historically expedient, but there is no reason to assume that Livy’s picture of domestic politics or the situation in Northern Italy is anything but broadly correct. Without him, “our knowledge of early second-century politics would be threadbare.”71

Thesis Outline

The object of this thesis is to modify and add to the scholarship on the understudied Roman involvement in Liguria, addressing Stephen Dyson’s work in particular. Dyson stresses that emphasis on “individual power politics and elite group dynamics of Republican society” has obscured “continuities in both policy and action.”72

But his approach suffers from several flaws that seriously undermine it. The elite group dynamics of Rome are precisely what drove aristocratic behaviour both at home and abroad. While the Senate was able to control foreign policy in many ways, it could not do so as Dyson imagines. The yearly rotation of autonomous magistrates, prorogation notwithstanding, guaranteed that ‘policy’ would never be perfectly implemented.

Dyson’s ‘big picture’ approach isolates Roman magistrates and their decisions from the very context and political culture in which those decisions were made. To properly understand the trajectory of Roman ‘policy’ in Liguria, we must recognize that the magistrates sent there were at once members of the collective Senate and ambitious

71 Bispham (2006) 38; 37-40 for the period’s sources more generally. Bispham defends Livy against his detractors. 72 Dyson (1985) 6. 23

individuals, and that tension between the competing forces of aristocratic competition and consensus was responsible for trends and long-term developments.

The following three chapters are organized chronologically, the best way to trace or refute regional policy over a finite period. Scrutinizing yearly developments in

Liguria reveals several patterns and historical trends. However, these do not constitute a Ligurian policy and are easily explained within a framework that accounts for the

Roman political culture and competition amongst the elite. The following is a partial list of recurring themes which are addressed more fully within the next three chapters: military co-operation of consular colleagues for political ends; the politicization of triumph-debates; Senatorial deference to consular judgment and authority; Senatorial concern for the treatment of enemies (esp. those received in deditionem); the selective application of military tactics by consuls for political purposes; consular control of the flow of information shaping frontier developments and the political ramifications when that dynamic is interrupted by foreign envoys or Roman subordinates.

Chapter two addresses the beginnings of Roman imperialism in Liguria before launching into a detailed analysis of yearly developments in the region from 200 to 183.

It does not address campaigns in Liguria against combined Carthaginian and Ligurian forces during the Second Punic War since they were of a decidedly different nature and add little to the discussion. The chapter deals extensively with every Roman magistrate in Liguria during those years, to demonstrate the degree of change on a yearly basis.

Magistrates came and went, each one bringing a different set of expertise, analysis of the situation and military and political history and ambitions. The one constant was aristocratic competition manifested in the desire for military and political glory. 24

Chapter three examines the consular campaigns in the years 182 to 175. The chronological break between chapters two and three is not random. According to

Dyson, the consulship of P. Cornelius Cethegus and M. Baebius Tamphilus (cos. 181) was a crucial turning point in Roman policy towards Liguria. It marked the transition from yearly fighting campaigns to a policy of forced migrations. There was a change in the way some consuls dealt with Ligurians but this shift did not occur for the reasons

Dyson proposes. Thus, chapter three reinterprets the events preceding, during and stemming from the consulship of Cethegus and Tamphilus from a perspective that emphasizes consular initiative, the power of precedent and the centrality of aristocratic competition.

The fourth and final chapter is a detailed case study of what I refer to as the

Popillian Affair. The affair occupies five full chapters in Livy and provides unique insight into the relationship between Senate and magistrate. The chapter illustrates the various people and forces that shaped this relationship and how foreign policy could be conditioned by domestic politics. The concluding chapter briefly discusses Roman involvement in Liguria after 172 and reiterates the study’s main findings. 25

Chapter 2: Developments in Liguria, 238-183

As the introduction made clear, Stephen Dyson’s approach to Roman policy in

Liguria is founded on untenable assumptions regarding Roman politics and provincial administration in the republic. Livy’s frequent silence regarding the flow of information between the Senate and its magistrates leaves room for speculation. Dyson’s reconstruction assumes Senatorial control and in many ways reduces consuls and praetors to Senatorial pawns. But this accords neither with Livy’s testimony on a host of other occasions nor with the realities of Rome’s political culture. This thesis will demonstrate that magistrates enjoyed a much freer hand and that ‘policy’ was the result of consular initiative. The broad continuities are attributable to competition for triumphs and peer-recognition within the aristocracy.

Below is a yearly account of magistrates and their actions in Liguria from 238 to

183, emphasizing the ways in which politics interacted with policy decisions in Liguria as well as the many occasions on which the Senate tacitly or openly ceded decision- making authority to consuls and praetors. I have avoided a lengthy discussion of

Roman-Ligurian relations in the Second Punic War since they were conditioned by substantially different variables. Essentially, Mago used Liguria as a staging point and raised Ligurian troops to fight in his army; most subjugated Ligurian tribes revolted from Rome. After Zama, Rome spent the next thirty years renewing and extending the conquest.

26

238-223: The Beginnings of Ligurian Conquest

The year 238 marks not only the first time Rome engaged in open hostilities since the closing of the doors to the Temple of Janus at the end of the First Punic War, but also the first in which a waged war on Ligurians.1 Polybius completely omits mention of the engagement and the other sources are brief on details.2 Our most detailed account is that of Zonaras who preserves parts of Cassius Dio’s history. Zonaras is brief and confusing—untangling anything more than a threadbare narrative is difficult. He writes that the Romans attacked the Boii, their Gallic neighbors and some of the Ligurians. Two years later, P. Cornelius Lentulus and C. Licinius Varus made war in

Gaul, whereupon Lentulus broke away and attacked some Ligurians.3 In 235, the

Carthaginians supposedly persuaded the Sardinians to revolt, and the Corsicans and

Ligurians followed suit. The next year, Rome attacked all three rebel groups simultaneously and the campaign against the Ligurians fell to L. Postumius Albinus. The

Ligurians once more revolted, so Q. Fabius Maximus marched against them in 233. He defeated them so soundly that he claimed to have ended the Ligurian war. He subsequently celebrated a triumph and dedicated a Temple of Honor vowed in the course of his campaign.4 Maximus’ claim may have been substantiated since the

1 On the debate over whether the doors were closed in 241 or 235 see Harris (1979) 191 n.1; Vishnia (1996) 15. 2 Vishnia (1996) 15, cites some authors, De Sanctis among them, who outright deny the episode’s authenticity. True, Zonaras is a twelfth century Byzantine chronicler, Florus a second century historian and Orosius a late fourth century Christian historian. But Livy Per. 20.3 confirms the historicity of these first Ligurian campaigns: Adversus Liguras tunc primum exercitus promotus est. Diod. 25.2, says that Carthaginian allies, including Ligurians, revolted at this time. 3 Lentulus received the first Ligurian triumph [Degrassi (1947) 76f., 549]. Zon. 8.18, credits Lentulus with the initiative for the attack on the Ligurians. 4 Zon. 8.18; cf. Flor. 1.19.4-5; Oros. 4.12.1; Livy Per. 20.3; Plut. Fab. 2.1. cf. Dyson (1985) 95; Vishnia (1996) 13-22; Eckstein (1987) 6-12; Gargola (2006) 149-151; Toynbee (1965) 260, noting 27

Romans did not fight Ligurians again until 223 when the consul P. Furius Philus triumphed over both and Ligurians.5

Harris has questioned Zonaras’ defensive explanation of these early Ligurian campaigns. He claims Roman actions “had nothing detectable to do with defense”, rejecting the notion that piracy was the root issue, though allowing that an established treaty with Massilia might have encouraged Roman operations against Massilian enemies.6 Vishnia posits that Rome’s true targets were the Insubres and Boii and that securing Liguria was a necessary precursor.7 Dyson is ambivalent as to whether Roman actions were aggressive or defensive: “The principal aim seems to have been to defend

Italian lowland territory under Roman protection.”8

But responsibility for opening hostilities with the Ligurians in 238 remains murky. Ti. Sempronius Gracchus had not been allotted the province of Liguria. Rather, he had been put in charge of operations in Sardinia and apparently involved himself in

Liguria on his own initiative.9 Harris’ claim that “Rome entered into entirely separate and equally unprovoked campaigns in Liguria and Gaul *…+ The initiative was an obvious one for Rome to take” obscures the fact that Gracchus’ Ligurian campaign was not a

Roman policy but rather the actions of one consul.10 Consuls later campaigned in

Liguria, presumably at the behest of the Senate, in the years 237, 236, 234, 233 and that there is no evidence of a “systemic Roman plan for conquering Cisalpine Liguria” until after 225. 5 Polyb. 2.32.1; Zonaras 8.20; Dyson (1985) 96; Degrassi (1947) 76f., 549. 6 Harris (1979) 193. 7 Vishnia (1996) 15-16. She subscribes to the notion that Ligurian piracy was an important motivating factor, citing the simultaneous campaigns in Sardinia and Corsica. 8 Dyson (1985) 95. 9 Polyb. 1.88.8-12, for Roman operations in Sardinia in 238, though Gracchus is not mentioned by name. 10 Harris (1979) 193. 28

230, but the first consul to do so made the decision on his authority alone. The evidence for this early Roman ‘policy’ is heavily based on inductive logic and we would do well to take heed of Vishnia’s cautious approach at this early stage:

The frequent use of the proper noun ‘Rome’ or the collective noun ‘the Romans’ camouflages the fact that we have practically no information about the persons who guided Rome’s policy-making at that period or about the domestic controversies which the prevalent policies and issues doubtlessly aroused. *…+ Personal rivalries and competition were always intrinsic characteristics of Roman politics, and from this aspect, this period was no different. Nonetheless, there seems to have been general agreement on the need to control the Po Valley.11

200: L. Furius Purpurio and the Resumption of Hostilities

Hostilities with Ligurians resumed in 200, following the Second Punic War, under the praetor L. Furius Purpurio.12 Purpurio had been decreed the province of Gaul while the consul C. Aurelius Cotta was to serve in Italy, essentially at the Senate’s whim.13 Eckstein has perceptively noted that far from a policy of (re)conquest in

Northern Italy, the allotment of provinces and troops in 201-200 suggest that the

Roman Senate did not pursue nor were they expecting open warfare. Troop allotments were meager: both P. Aelius Paetus (consul in 201) and Purpurio (praetor in 200) were given insufficient armies if a general offensive was the goal. Each man was given only 5

11 Vishnia (1996) 24; 15: “Our meager sources make it practically impossible to draw a coherent picture of Roman ‘foreign policy’ in the aftermath of the First Punic War in general or of the strategy devised for the north, in particular. Thus we are unable to follow the decision-making process, a difficult task even in better-documented periods. Still, we are able to conjecture about the factors that guided Roman policy-makers in that period by examining the facts which are known to be reasonably well established; in our case, Roman military operations.” See also Harris (1979) 117: “Roman aims can best be inferred from Roman actions.” Against Harris, Rich (1993) 53: “Roman expansion was a patchy, untidy business, and we must take full account of this when seeking to explain the processes which were at work.” 12 Some doubt the historicity of Purpurio’s actions in 200 based on their similarities with his campaigns as consul in 196. Briscoe (1973) 82, 110, and Eckstein (1987) 57 n.127, rightly reject this: though there are some similarities, there is enough difference between the accounts that it would be unwise to entirely deny the historicity of this earlier episode. 13 Livy 31.6.1-2. 29

000 allied soldiers and Purpurio was ordered to guard (praesidiis) his province, not launch an offensive. Further, Livy explicitly attests to the fact that the Roman Senate expected little trouble in Gaul in 200.14 This is not an argument for defensive imperialism but a caution that Senatorial ‘policy’ was not as centralized or as well- planned as historical hindsight might suggest.

While encamped at Ariminum, Purpurio learned of a massive Gallo-Ligurian uprising comprised of the Insubres, Cenomani, Boii, Celines and Ilvates that had overrun Placentia and were besieging Cremona.15 Purpurio sent word to the Senate and informed them that as affairs stood he was powerless unless they wished to see his 5

000 allies perish beneath an enemy coalition of 40 000. The Senate decreed that Cotta’s army, which was supposed to gather in , should instead gather at Ariminum.

They instructed the consul that either he should set out immediately to suppress the revolt or else he should inform the praetor Purpurio that when the consular army had joined him at Ariminum, he should send his 5 000 allied troops to Etruria as a garrison and relieve the siege of Cremona with Cotta’s army.16

Cotta was detained in Rome on official business,17 so the consular army gathered at Ariminum without him. Purpurio followed Senatorial directions to the

14 Livy 31.10.1: bellum Gallicum nihil minus eo tempore timentibus [Romanis]; Eckstein (1987) 54ff., for the ad hoc campaigns of 201-200. 15 Livy 31.10.1-7; Zon. 9.15, blames the Carthaginian Hamilcar with fomenting the rebellion. I have included Purpurio’s actions and the ensuing Senatorial debate for three reasons: though the tribes involved were primarily Gallic, the Ilvates were Ligurian; as Eckstein (1987) argues, Senate-magistrate relations in Northern Italy ( and Ligurians) were distinct from those same relations in the context of provinces further afield; most importantly, the episode reveals important truths about Senatorial comportment and established far-reaching precedents. 16 Livy 31.11.1-4; Briscoe (1973) 83-84. 17 He acted as an intermediary between the Senate and Q. Minucius Rufus, praetor in Bruttium, regarding plundering of the treasury house of Persophone at Locri [Livy 31.12.3]. Briscoe (1973) 30

letter, dismissing his 5 000 allied troops to Etruria and advancing by forced marches to relieve the Gallo-Ligurian siege of Cremona.18 According to Livy, the praetor killed or captured more than 35 000 men (while fewer than 6 000 escaped), captured 70 standards and over 200 wagons full of spoils. He recovered 2 000 colonists from

Placentia and lost only about 2 000 of his own men.19 Cotta belatedly arrived in Gaul and, furious with Purpurio for acting of his own accord, dismissed him to Etruria (where his original army had been garrisoned) and carried on the war with “more booty than glory”.20 Purpurio marched from Etruria to Rome, assembled the Senate in the Temple of Bellona and requested a triumph.21

The debate over Purpurio’s triumph is one of the most rancorous preserved in extant Livy.22 The affair was intensely political, though prosopography is not the most helpful tool to analyze the Senate’s decision.23 One group of senators, led by the

84, suggests that there is some confusion in Livy regarding which praetor Cotta was in communication with, but it is clear that Cotta was caught up in other business at Rome and could not accompany his army in Gaul. 18 Livy 31.21.1-3; Briscoe (1973) 110, notes that the account of Purpurio’s actions is stylistically awkward, which does not damage its credibility, but rather suggests an annalistic source which Livy has copied but failed to properly incorporate. 19 Livy 31.21.3-22.3, for the battle and outcome; Oros. 4.20.4. 20 Livy 31.47.4-6; Dio fr. 57.81; Zon. 9.15, says the Ligurians sued for peace and that Cotta “who was jealous of the praetor’s victory, conducted a retaliatory campaign against them”; Eckstein (1987) 57. Toynbee (1965) 277, 660-661, conjectures that Cotta may have been responsible for the Via Aurelia from Rome to Pisa but Salmon (1982) 77-78, places its construction earlier. 21 Livy 31.47.6-7. Livy suggests that a quiet Etruria and a desire to appear before the Senate without the angry and jealous Cotta in their midst prompted Purpurio’s unexpected visit to Rome. Though we cannot be sure of Purpurio’s reasons, both are plausible enough; the triumph- request caused a good deal of debate, as Purpurio was no doubt aware it would. The Temple of Bellona was the traditional meeting place of the Senate for a triumph-request because it was outside the sacred pomerium, meaning that potential triumphators would not have to relinquish their auspicia and the subsequent right to triumph [Briscoe (1973) 159]. 22 Eckstein (1987) 58 n.132, defends the historicity and main thrust of the debate even if it “suffered a certain elaboration at the hands of Livy and/or his sources”; cf. Briscoe (1973) 158- 161. 23 Contra Briscoe (1973) 158; Scullard (1951) 95. 31

consulares,24 declared that Purpurio had won a victory using another man’s army under another man’s auspices, that he should have waited for the consul and that they would be happy to judge the merits of Purpurio’s request once the consul had returned and the pair could debate face-to-face. The patres who sided with Purpurio argued that such a verdict meant that either the Senate was at fault for entrusting a consular army to a praetor, or else the consul Cotta himself was to blame for sending to Gaul an army that could not legally be mobilized without him. What mattered was that Purpurio, who was invested with his own praetorian imperium, “had conducted affairs, not poorly and rashly, but well and successfully.”25

After arguments on both sides were heard, a full house (frequentes26) voted

Purpurio a triumph. We will never know whether Purpurio’s arguments (as Livy presents them), his political supporters, the absence of Cotta’s countervailing voice, or a combination of all three ultimately secured his triumph.27 The triumphal procession itself was apparently a sad sight, though Purpurio deposited 320 000 bronze asses and

171 500 silver denarii in the treasury.28

24 Briscoe (1973) 159, doubts that the groups in the triumph debate broke down between older consulares and younger Senators. However, Livy’s use of the term accords well with Richardson’s (1975) findings that the triumph had hitherto been the preserve solely of consulares. 25 Livy 31.48.1-12, for the debate. 26 Briscoe (1973) 160, notes that this means ‘full house’ rather than ‘quorum’ as it does in the late republic. There is no evidence that a quorum was required for the voting of a triumph, especially not at such an early date. The importance and divisiveness of the debate are corroborated by the high attendance of the vote. Cf. Vishnia (1996) 182. 27 Livy twice states that Purpurio’s personal appeal and political prestige outweighed Cotta’s [Livy 31.48.1, 49.1]. 28 Livy 31.49.3: “There were no captives led before his chariot, no spoils displayed, no soldiers in his train. Everything but the victory was in the possession of the consul.” Briscoe (1973) 160- 161, on the numbers and their significance. Purpurio may also have built and dedicated a temple to Veiovis with his manubia [Livy 31.21.12], though evidence suggests that he in fact vowed the temple as consul in 196 [Briscoe (1973) 112-114]. 32

In a society obsessed with precedents of every kind, the Senate’s decision on this occasion had tremendous impact on a number of levels. To begin, Purpurio was the first praetor to celebrate a triumph.29 Henceforth, consular imperium would no longer be necessary in order to celebrate a triumph; praetorian imperium would suffice. In the following thirty-three years to the end of Livy’s narrative, fourteen praetors or propraetors would request triumphs.30 It is noteworthy that never again did a praetor or propraetor whose province was Gaul or the Ligurians request a triumph. Of the fourteen requests, the vast majority came from Nearer or Farther Spain, along with one for Corsica and Sardinia (C. Cicerius, 172), one for a naval command off the coast of

Crete (Q. Fabius Labeo, 188) and one for victory against the Illyrians (L. Anicius Gallus,

167). Harris notes that a majority of praetors awarded triumphs in the years 227-79— fifteen out of nineteen- went on to win the consulship.31

29 Considerable debate over this assertion exists and I must hedge my position slightly. Of particular interest is M’. Curius Dentatus’ status when he triumphed in 284 [Brennan (1994) 423- 439+. Brennan’s arguments are not convincing, and it is clear that even if Dentatus’ celebration was a proper triumph, it did not open the praetorian floodgates in the way that Purpurio’s did. We can confidently assert that Purpurio was the first praetor to openly and clearly triumph; Richardson (1975) 53, posits that it was because he was the first praetor to wear the purple triumphal robe that Purpurio received his cognomen, an attractive suggestion. Richardson (1975) 51-52, also acknowledges two apparent contradictions from the First Punic War: A. Atilius Calatinus, who triumphed in 257, held praetorian imperium, but had been consul the year before, following the older cursus honorum in which the praetorship came after the consulship; Q. Valerius Falto, who celebrated the last triumph of the war in 241. Richardson’s lengthy explanation of Falto’s triumph is well elaborated and shows that overwhelmingly, prior to 200, the triumph was strictly the reserve of consuls or consulares (cf. Vishnia [1996] 177-178; Rich (1993) 50). 30 For a complete list of triumph requests from 218-167, see Pittenger (2008) Appendix A. Rich (1993) 50, attributes the spike in the number of triumphs between 200-167 to praetors and propraetors. 31 Harris (1979) 32; Vishnia (1996) 179, notes that a triumph significantly increased a praetor’s chance of becoming consul, an ovatio less so. 33

The practical effect of the Purpurio precedent was that Spain emerged as a fertile breeding ground for triumphs.32 Spain was Rome’s major territorial gain after the

Second Punic War and the need to pacify and govern it probably contributed greatly to the election of six praetors in alternating years. For a variety of reasons, consuls and proconsuls were rarely assigned Spain as their province of operation and it, like Sicily,

Corsica and Sardinia, remained the preserve of praetorian and propraetorian governors.33 Purpurio’s bold actions both on the battlefield and in the Temple of

Bellona made the triumph more accessible, reducing however intangibly its prestige in the eyes of the consulares but increasing rather substantially the number of requests for triumphs as well as the number of triumphs actually granted in the subsequent thirty years.

Most importantly, the relationship established between Senate and magistrate is of fundamental importance to the question of Roman foreign policy. Purpurio’s political triumph in the Temple of Bellona amounted to an explicit recognition by the

Senate that Roman commanders were forced to make ad hoc decisions in the field.

Upholding and condoning these decisions, even when they went beyond instructions or contravened accepted practices, was the necessary corollary of keeping the republic safe. Had the Senate denied Purpurio’s request and reprimanded him for acting outside the chain of command, responses to military crises in the following decades might have been dramatically different. In giving magistrates with the widest possible leeway, the

32 Richardson (1975) 54. 33 Rich (1993) 46. 34

Senate tacitly conceded decision-making and reinforced the authority of magistrates everywhere.34

197: Q. Minucius Rufus and C. Cornelius Cethegus

In the midst of the war with Phillip V of Macedon, Q. Minucius Rufus and C.

Cornelius Cethegus were both decreed the province of Italy.35 They were each assigned two legions along with a matching number of allied troops and told to wage war on some Cisalpine Gauls who had defected. Cornelius advanced against the Insubres and the Cenomani while Minucius made his way to Genoa and attacked the Ligurian towns of Clastidium and Litubium as well as the Celeiates and the Cerdiciates.36 The Boii, hearing that the Roman consuls had consolidated their forces, opted to consolidate with the Insubres and Cenomani in order to stand a better chance of survival. Although there is no evidence of the consuls fighting a joint battle, they waged war on the Boii at the same time and the camps of Cornelius and Minucius were at one point only two miles apart. Each consul presumably knew the position of the other and acted in tandem to defeat the enemy coalition. Upon sending dispatches of their successes to

Rome, a supplicatio of four days was decreed.37

The consuls presented themselves in the Temple of Bellona and submitted a joint triumph-request. This was not unprecedented; the joint triumph of M. Livius

34 Eckstein (1987) 58-60, singles out the praetor Cn. Baebius Tamphilus’ seemingly unprovoked attack against the Insubres in 199, with Cotta’s army no less, as a probable upshot of Furius’ precedent the year before. He cites a “failure to distinguish between individual volition and general senatorial policy that has misled scholars into presenting Baebius as an instrument of the senate in his attack on the Insubres.” 35 Livy 32.28.2-9, for the debate, culminating in the prorogation of T. Quinctius Flamininus [Polyb. 18.11.1ff]. 36 He proceeded to capture 15 Ligurian towns and force the surrender of some 20 000 men (Livy 32.29.5-30.13). 37 Livy 32.30.1-31.6. 35

Salinator and C. Claudius Nero a decade earlier furnished an illustrious precedent.38 But the circumstances under which Salinator and Nero had obtained their joint triumph were exceptional. The elation at having defeated Hasdrubal at Metaurus, the united front which these two hitherto unfriendly consuls presented and the unique details of their joint triumph mollified potential Senatorial opposition stemming from their breach of triumphal mos maiorum. Salinator and Nero had jointly won a seminal victory that the Romans recognized as a turning point in the war with Hannibal and were accorded a splendid joint triumph.

This was not the case in 197. Two plebeian tribunes, C. Atinius Labeo and C.

Afranius, made a counter-proposal that each man should submit a triumph request, and the Senate should be free to debate and award or deny each individually. Minucius argued that they campaigned with a shared purpose and strategy while Cornelius declared that Minucius’ success in plundering the fields of the Boii had broken up the

Gallic coalition and thus ensured his own success against the Cenomani and Insubres.39

After two full days of negotiations between the consuls and the two tribunes who stood in the way of their triumphs, the consuls referred separate requests to the Senate.

Cornelius Cethegus was unanimously awarded a triumph over the Insubres and

Cenomani while Minucius Rufus’ request was soundly rejected; he celebrated a triumph on the Alban mount, privately paid for and much less illustrious than a full triumph.40

38 Full treatment of the Salinator/Nero joint triumph in Pittenger (2008) 68-71; Eckstein (1987) 46-48. 39 Livy 33.22.1-4. 40Dyson (1985) 98, completely papers over Minucius’ political defeat at home, claiming that “Minucius Rufus accomplished his basic goals and was awarded a triumph on the Alban mount.” Briscoe (1973) 226, suggests that the consuls had provoked hostilities in that year, which might have adversely affected the triumphal vote in Minucius’ case. He also notes that the Alban 36

Minucius Rufus’ triumph over Gauls and Ligurians was recorded on the fasti triumphales, though it specified that he had done so on the Alban Mount.41 His presence on the list of triumphators is interesting. It suggests that Alban triumphs were still legitimate and deserving of state recognition. It also seems to confirm that purely political opposition was the determining factor in Minucius’ rejected request for a regular triumph.

Whether or not Minucius Rufus and Cornelius Cethegus co-operated in the field to the extent that they suggested during the Senatorial debates, they evidently agreed to present a united front when requesting a joint triumph. Their reasons are not immediately obvious. It is attractive to suggest that Minucius was riding Cornelius’ coattails. If the plebeian tribunes were correct, Minucius’ accomplishments were not triumph-worthy and he was attempting to take credit for the successes of his colleague.

Zonaras’ account preserves such supposed disparities in their records:

The consuls parted company any each ravaged a different district; accordingly the enemy also divided forced to meet them. One band under Hamilcar encountered Cethegus and was defeated; the rest upon learning of this became faint-hearted and would no longer face Rufus, and he consequently overran the country at will. Those who had fought against Cethegus then made peace, while the remainder still continued under arms.42

If Zonaras’ rendering is accurate then Minucius may have been denied a triumph on the legitimate grounds that he accomplished nothing of military importance. While

Cethegus subdued tribes, Minucius’ enemy were too scared to fight and remained armed. This version is entirely at odds with the story in Livy and without more

Mount was outside the city and very steep, factors which would potentially have limited viewership (292-293). 41 Degrassi (1947) 78f., 552. 42 Zon. 9.16. Toynbee (1965) 269-270, presents a similar version of events. 37

compelling reasons to reject the latter in favour of the former it is unwise to do so.

Zonaras seems to have internalized the tribunes’ objections and presented them as fact.

Livy records that the wealth and military standards borne in each triumph were almost equal: 237 500 bronze asses and 79 000 silver coins for Cornelius against 254

000 bronze asses and 53 200 silver coins for Minucius.43 From this list it would appear that the two consuls conquered roughly equal numbers of men and captured similar amounts of booty. The tribunician objection that Minucius’ victories were concocted and inconsequential appears at odds with this. Far from being inconsequential,

Minucius’ campaign added to the res publica everything on the Italian side of the Po apart from the Boii and the Ligurian Ilvates, the latter a tribe which he proceeded to subjugate.44

The last objection voiced by the tribunes was that Minucius had suffered heavy casualties.45 But there is no mention in Livy anywhere of Minucius having suffered irregularly high casualty rates.46 It was certainly well within the tribunes’ right to refuse to consider a joint triumph request and the consuls were probably overly audacious in

43 Livy 33.23.8-9. He is explicit in comparing the wealth and opulence of the triumphs. 44 Livy 32.31.4. 45 Eckstein (1987) 18 n.60, suggests that high casualty rates prevented Cn. Cornelius Scipio from winning a triumph alongside his successful colleague, M. Claudius Marcellus, in 222 (Cf. Oros. 4.12.1). There certainly existed some loose understanding that the ratio of enemy killed to Roman casualties should be high, though no exact number survives or probably existed in the first place. 46 Further, the tribunes mention by name only two military tribunes who had been killed (T. Iuventius and Cn. Ligurius, both otherwise unknown, which certainly does not add to the credibility of the charges against Minucius Rufus [Briscoe (1973) 292]). In 196, M. Claudius Marcellus triumphed over these very same tribes but Livy records the names of no less than 4 military tribunes along with a figure of 3 000 men who lost their lives when Marcellus’ camp was ambushed by the Boii (Livy 33.36.4-8). If Marcellus’ loss of 3 000 men did not constitute an excessively high casualty rate, either Minucius’ was higher, a fact which would merit mention, or else the casualty rate was somewhat arbitrary and politically motivated. 38

attempting it. But the actual objections of the tribunes, presumably the same ones that prevented Minucius from obtaining a full triumph like his colleague, are of questionable veracity. Therein lays the real reason for the joint request.

Minucius probably foresaw that he would have trouble obtaining a triumph.

The spurious charges brought against his request suggest political opposition in the

Senate. Cornelius Cethegus’ motivation for standing by Minucius is not entirely transparent. Perhaps Cornelius believed Minucius’ military actions were triumph- worthy. He might have foreseen the staunch political opposition to Minucius and tried to shield him from criticism by agreeing to the joint request. Pittenger addresses their request but refers to it as “Minucius’ bid” and writes that Minucius’ “resolve to triumph alongside Cethegus, no matter what the cost, almost matched that of his opponents to stop him.”47 She fails to grapple with Cethegus’ role in the joint request. Livy is silent and we may only speculate, but the fact that Cethegus stood by the joint request for so long suggests that it was firmly rooted in something other than his co-consul’s best wishes. Perhaps he was apprehensive of his achievements and believed that unless he praised Minucius for helping to disband the coalition of enemies, some other senator would do so and attempt to deny him a triumph on these grounds. Or he foresaw the potential opposition to the joint triumph and used it to deflect unwanted attention from his own record. Both consuls, feeling themselves in a position of relative weakness vis-à-vis the Senate, co-operated militarily to end the campaigning season on a high note. They further opted to present a united front in the Temple of Bellona, hoping thereby to bolster their chances of obtaining a triumph. Minucius and Cornelius co-

47 Pittenger (2008) 46. 39

operated in the field and more importantly in their request for a triumph not to ensure the safety of Rome but to increase their chances of winning a triumph. The gambit paid off for Cethegus but not for Minucius.48

On the surface this has little to do with Ligurian policy as such. But it highlights the interconnection of domestic politics and foreign policy. For all intents and purposes,

Minucius Rufus and Cornelius Cethegus had won similar victories: they sacked multiple towns, subdued many peoples and filled Rome’s coffers to roughly the same extent.

The allegations that forced Minucius to triumph on the Alban Mount rather than the

Capitoline were baseless and political. Roman interests were not easily separated from individual interests and politics was a pervasive force.

196: L. Furius Purpurio and M. Claudius Marcellus

In 196, L. Furius Purpurio once again found himself in command of an army in

Northern Italy. The two consuls were assigned the province of Italy and told to wage war against the same Cisalpine Gauls whom Cornelius and Minucius had fought the previous year.49 The chronology of events is unclear: either Marcellus suffered a loss at the hands of the Boii which he then made up for with a splendid victory against the

Insubres at Comum, or else he won a great victory against the Insubres that was sullied

48 Pittenger (2008) 46, accepts as fact that Minucius’ res gestae were not worthy of a triumph nor an ovatio. 49 Zon. 9.16. The fact that a consul received a triumph for subjugating a tribe that the very next year revolted from Rome never seemed to be an issue. In other areas of the growing empire, where the governments were organized along broadly Greco-Roman lines, questions concerning pacification formed a serious impediment towards obtaining a triumph. Marcellus wanted Flamininus’ peace settlement rejected so that he might have Greece for himself (Polyb. 18.42.2- 5). In Liguria, Gaul and Spain, ‘subjugation’ of tribes took on little permanence. As per Dyson (1985) 98: “Yet the campaigns of Rufus hardly ended the war.” 40

by his subsequent defeat.50 The second chronology seems more attractive given that his colleague Purpurio arrived shortly thereafter to reinforce him. They proceeded to ravage some Boian territory before turning their attention to the Ligurians and finally they won a decisive battle against a group of Boii who had been trailing them for some time.

The co-operation of the two consuls again demonstrates the interconnectedness between consular practices and domestic politics. Marcellus presumably did not wish to submit a joint triumph request, as he had probably witnessed the debacle of the previous year. If the failure of the joint Cornelius-Minucius motion was precipitated by Minucius’ weaknesses as a commander (the plebeian tribunes ostensible reasoning) then the parallels ran even deeper. Marcellus was in an even worse position than Minucius had been: he suffered an acknowledged defeat by the Boii in which he lost 3 000 men. He no doubt saw the futility of attempting to cover up his defeat by appearing alongside his colleague in the Temple of Bellona and submitting a joint triumph request.

Instead Marcellus headed almost immediately to Rome, requested and was granted a triumph by Senatorial majority before Purpurio could return from his province. As was the case in 200, the force of the consul’s personal presence counted for a lot when awarding a triumph.51 Technically, a formal request in person by the

50 Livy calls it “a matter of dispute amongst historians” although he seems to have followed the version that places Marcellus’ defeat first (Livy 33.36.13-15). Oros. 4.20.11, says that Marcellus was defeated by the Boii before combining his army with his colleague’s and almost annihilating that tribe. 51 Pittenger (2008) 234: “The highly theatrical process of telling the story of his campaigns to the crucial senatorial audience could allow a commander to reap tremendous political profits.” 41

potential triumphator was the first step in the triumphal process.52 However, the

Senate signaled its receptiveness to proceed by ordering days of thanksgiving in response to consular dispatches. Marcellus deprived the Senate of this opportunity by proceeding immediately to Rome where he could control the discourse in a way that dispatches could not.

Livy reports that Marcellus triumphed over the Insubres and Comenses, leaving open the possibility that Purpurio could triumph over the Boii.53 It is curious that

Purpurio never requested or received a triumph over the Boii. Whether tensions were still high after his praetorian stunt four years earlier or else some other factor prevented him from making a request is not clear. But what is clear is that Marcellus exploited Purpurio’s help in order to further his own aims and diminish the memory of his defeat by the Boii.54 In co-operating with Purpurio and winning such a large victory,

Marcellus essentially undid all the damage to his triumphi spes that had resulted from his earlier defeat. To maximize his chances of realizing those hopes, Marcellus, emboldened by the knowledge of what had transpired in 200 as well as the year before, opted to appear alone before the Senate and request his own triumph. His tactic proved successful and he was awarded a triumph.

Pittenger acknowledges that no record exists of Purpurio’s request for a triumph, and he certainly did not celebrate one. She suggests that either Purpurio did

52 Pittenger (2008) 35-36. 53 Livy 33.3710-11. It would be odd if Marcellus purposely left the prospect of a triumph over the Boii to his colleague since he could take at least partial credit for their recent success against them. Rather, he knew that to request a triumph against them would have opened him up to all sorts of criticism that could potentially derail his triumph-request. 54 Livy states that Marcellus had “been victorious when associated with his colleague”, i.e. that he was using the co-operation of his colleague to his own advantage. 42

not wish to repeat the events of 200 or else that he had “heeded the warning of what had happened to Minucius the year before and did not want to press his luck.”55 This is an unsatisfactory explanation since Purpurio was surely in a better position to request a triumph than Marcellus who had lost to the Boii. Even if he had learned from the previous year’s events, namely Minucius’ failure, not to request a joint triumph, this still does not fully explain the lack of request since Marcellus’ actions made it clear that there would be no joint request. Purpurio’s failure to request a triumph upon his own return to Rome must remain a mystery; the comparison with Minucius’ position a year earlier does not provide any insight.56

However, these events do suggest much about Roman imperial ‘policy’ and its relationship to individual magistrate’s desires to obtain glory. The triumph stood out as the perfect finish to a successful consular career. As such, consular actions were driven not by a centrally planned administrative policy but by the prospects of a triumph.

Colleagues co-operated in the field and the Temple of Bellona neither because the

Senate ordered them to nor because they were necessarily inclined to do so. Co- operation occurred sporadically throughout the period of Ligurian conquest because it either potentially or actually increased one or both consuls’ odds of triumphing at the end of their command. In the period under investigation an average of 1.15 triumphs was celebrated per annum; the triumph was a powerful policy incentive within reach of consuls and praetors alike.57

55 Pittenger (2008) 79. 56 Purpurio may have requested a triumph, but Livy does not record it, and certainly no triumph was celebrated. Briscoe (1973) 320, speculates that his triumph in 200 may be to blame. 57 Figure in North (1993) 50. 43

195-194: P. Porcius Laeca, P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus and Ti. Sempronius Longus

Little of note happened in Liguria in 195, when the praetor P. Porcius Laeca was ordered to Pisa with a force of 10 000 troops and 500 cavalry “so that he might be in the rear of the Ligurians”. But Laeca’s was essentially a garrisoning force and he did not engage the enemy.58 In 194 both consuls operated in Italy and made war on both Gauls and Ligurians. Sempronius Longus fought an intense battle against some Boii led by

Boiorix, their chieftain. His army slew 11 000 Gauls but he lost 5 000 Romans in the process before taking his legions to Placentia.59 Livy is frank about source discrepancies regarding Scipio’s actions, citing some who claim that Scipio united his army with that of his consular colleague and ravaged Boii and Ligurian lands as far as possible, and others who record that nothing of note occurred and he returned to Rome to hold elections.60 If joint actions did occur, it is likely that Sempronius Longus proposed them.

His casualty ratio against Boiorix (11:5) was too high to realistically expect a triumph and the prospect of joining his colleague for more successful campaigns at the end of the season must have been tempting.

193-190: Q. Minucius Thermus

Q. Minucius Thermus’ Ligurian career was one of the longest of any consul; thrice prorogued, he unsuccessfully sought a triumph at the end of his proconsulship.

Events surrounding his three years in the field and the failed triumph-request illustrate the political nature of Senatorial decisions and the lack of coherence in frontier development. To begin, the Senate was caught completely off-guard by a series of

58 Livy 33.43.5.9; Briscoe (1973) 331. 59 Livy 34.46.4-47.8; Oros. 4.20.17. 60 Livy 34.48.1; Briscoe (1981) 124; Harris (1979) 258, notes that these two historiographic threads are not inconsistent: a mere ravaging expedition could easily be downgraded to “nothing of note” by later historians. 44

Ligurian uprisings in this year. The praefectus at Pisa, M. Cincius, informed the Senate that 20 000 Ligurians had devastated the fields around Luna before ransacking the entire Pisan coast. At the same time, a dispatch arrived from Ti. Sempronius Longus, the previous year’s consul, stating that 10 000 Ligurians had pillaged and burned the territory around Placentia right up to the city’s walls.61 Rather than direct a methodical pacification of Ligurian tribes, the Senate was forced to respond quickly to a military emergency that threatened several northern colonies. Minucius (on Senatorial instructions) ordered the two city legions to present themselves in Arretium in 10 days, as well as 15 000 Latin allied soldiers.62 L. Cornelius Merula, Minucius Thermus’ colleague, was to enroll a number of troops, assemble in Etruria and deal with the

Ligurians who were harassing Placentia as well as the Boii.

Minucius arrived at Pisa and drove off the Ligurians. A brief stalemate followed: the Ligurians refused to meet Minucius in pitched battle after which the consul suffered not one, but two calamities.63 Livy’s account is stylized but there is no reason to doubt the veracity of its essentials. He reports that Minucius’ camp was attacked and defended with great difficulty. More importantly, the consul was caught in a pass (Livy explicitly refers to the disaster at the Caudine Forks) and escaped only because of some trickery by his Numidian cavalry.64 Minucius Thermus’ imperium was prorogued and in early 192 he finally met the Ligurians in pitched battle. His army killed 9 000 Ligurians

61 Livy 34.56.1-3, 10-11. At 35.3.1, the number has swelled to 40 000 Ligurians surrounding Pisa, perhaps because universae gentis means that all Cisalpine Ligurians had joined (Briscoe [1981] 136). 62 Livy 34.56.4-7; Toynbee (1965) 277. 63 Livy 35.11.1; copying Livy: Frontinus, Str. 1.5.16; Oros. 4.20.17. 64 Livy 35.11.1-13. 45

though their abandoned camp yielded less booty than was desirable.65 Livy does not report his second prorogation but in 191, the proconsul Minucius Thermus was still in

Liguria, his camp under attack. He succeeded in putting the Ligurians to flight, killing more than 4 000 while losing fewer than 300 men.66

A brief digression to address the debate over Scipio Nasica’s triumph is in order because it involves the career of Q. Minucius Thermus, the nature of the Ligurian frontier and the Senatorial role in frontier policy-making.67 Scipio Nasica had won a singular victory against the Boii. Livy doubts Valerias Antias’ numbers (38 000 slain, 3

400 captured, 124 military standards, 1 230 horses, 247 carts with only 1 484 Roman casualties) but upholds the importance of the victory based on the magnitude of the

Boian surrender and subsequent supplicatio at Rome.68 The consul had also taken hostages and about half the Boian land for future Roman use.

Rather presumptuously, Scipio Nasica dismissed his troops, telling them to be in

Rome on the day of the triumph.69 According to custom, he convened the Senate in the

Temple of Bellona and demanded the right to enter the city in triumph. The plebeian tribune, P. Sempronius Blaesus, intervened, arguing that Scipio should be permitted to triumph but not immediately. According to Blaesus, the Ligurian and Gallic campaigns were always intimately connected, and if Scipio dismissed his troops without marching into Liguria or sending them to the aid of Minucius Thermus, he had failed in his duty.

65 Prorogation: Livy 35.20.6. Battle: Livy 35.21.7-11. 66 Livy 36.38.1-5. 67 Dyson regularly fails to acknowledge political developments in Rome even when they are connected to frontier administration. The debate over Scipio Nasica’s triumph is missing and he refers to the debate over Minucius’ triumph by way of a footnote, writing “The actions of Minucius roused considerable controversy, and he was vigorously attack by Cato.” (99 n.56) 68 Livy 36.38.5-7. 69 He had apparently already chosen the date of his triumph [Briscoe (1981) 279]. 46

Blaesus concluded that Scipio Nasica should return to the field with his army, help

Minucius Thermus prosecute the war and only then return to triumph.70 Scipio responded that his province had not been Liguria and he was not requesting a Ligurian triumph; further, he felt confident Minucius Thermus would soon end the war and request a well-deserved triumph; lastly, his own troops could not be induced to fight another consul’s war after they had already fought and won such a significant victory.71

The Senate compelled the tribune to withdraw his veto and unanimously awarded

Scipio Nasica a triumph.

The plebeian tribune’s objections amounted to little more than political posturing.72 The historicity of his arguments and Nasica’s response is a question with no definite answer. Briscoe suggests that Livy “allows his rhetoric to carry him away, and it would be rash to conclude that Nasica’s speech stood in Antias in anything like the form in which it appears in L*ivy+”73, though this is specifically in response to the number of

Boii he claimed to have killed. There is no reason to doubt the tribune’s intervention on political grounds, nor the general outline of his arguments, nor the Senate’s definitive response. Both Livy and Antias concur that Scipio Nasica’s victory was immense; the number of enemy slain and booty captured along with the small number of Romans killed would not have stood in the way of Nasica’s triumph-request. In this context, it is not surprising that Sempronius Blaesus employed unusual arguments to try and win over the Senate. If he could convince the patres that Scipio Nasica’s zeal for a triumph

70 Livy 36.39.6-10. 71 Livy 36.40.1-10. 72 Briscoe (1981) 279, suggests that the Sempronii Blaesi were enemies of the Scipii. 73 Briscoe (1981) 280. 47

had imperiled Rome in leaving Minucius Thermus exposed to Ligurian attacks he might be successful in denying the consul’s request.

The Senate’s response signaled that it was not prepared to regulate the conduct of consuls to such a minute degree. There is no reason to doubt that Senatorial opinion would have supported Scipio Nasica had he gone to the aid of Minucius

Thermus before coming to Rome. But the Senate as a body was not prepared to make the call on matters that required intimate knowledge of frontier conditions. Scipio

Nasica had been assigned the province of Gaul and had carried out his task commendably. Sempronius Blaesus could try and obstruct the triumph but without winning over others he was forced to withdraw his political objections.74 Political opposition to a legitimately earned triumph depended on the blockers winning enough support in the Senate.

Minucius’ actual predicament at the time of Nasica’s presence in Rome is also of interest. The consul had not had an easy time in Liguria. In 193 his camp had been attacked and he had been trapped by Ligurian forces in a narrow pass (a tactical situation reminiscent of the Roman disaster at the Caudine Forks). He had since won a fairly significant if unprofitable victory in 192. More recently (two months prior to

Scipio’s victory) his camp had been attacked by Ligurian forces. Though he was successful in repelling the attack, Livy’s description portrays a consul who was caught off-guard and had a difficult time defending his camp.75 Minucius’ mixed success in

Liguria makes it all the more likely that Sempronius Blaesus employed the arguments

74 For a similar episode involving the tribune Aburius blocking the triumph of Fulvius Nobilior at the behest of M. Aemilius Lepidus: Livy 39.4.1-13; Vishnia (1996) 179-180. 75 Livy 36.38.1-5. 48

that Livy credits him with. Perhaps the tribune’s remarks reflect some apprehension about the state of affairs in Liguria. Again, the Senate’s laissez-faire attitude is instructive. So long as a dire emergency was not at hand, they preferred not to interfere with consuls in the field.

At the beginning of 190, Minucius Thermus announced that his province had been completely reduced and that all the Ligurians had surrendered. He was ordered to send all his troops to Scipio Nasica who, as proconsul, was overseeing the removal of

Boii from his newly acquired ager Romanus.76 Upon his return to Rome, Minucius

Thermus’ triumph-request was denied. Livy is uncharacteristically brief regarding the reasons for Thermus’ denial: “two proconsuls at about the same time came from their provinces to Rome with hopes of triumphs; Quintus Minucius [Thermus] from the

Ligures, Manius Acilius [Glabrio] from Aetolia. When the achievements of the two had been heard, Minucius was refused a triumph, while Acilius was granted one with general approval”.77

Livy’s brevity has encouraged scholarly speculation that generally suggests politics is to blame. Scullard cites the failed triumphal bid as the first in a series of attacks on the Scipionic group.78 Several fragments of two different speeches delivered by Cato against Minucius Thermus support a political interpretation, though not necessarily the prosopographical approach.79 Livy does not implicate Cato in Minucius

Thermus’ failed triumph, but since we know of no instance in which Cato formally

76 Livy 37.2.5-6. 77 Livy 37.46.1-3. 78 Scullard (1951) 133-134. Followed by Briscoe (1981) 362, but refuted by Astin (1978) 69ff. 79 Astin (1978) 59, upholds the historicity of two separate speeches contra Scullard (1951) 248, who thinks they are fragments of a single oration. 49

prosecuted Thermus in court, the Senate seems the likely (only?) candidate for the venue of the speeches. Furthermore, the substance of the charges lends itself to such an occasion.80 Astin does not doubt the zeal with which Cato prosecuted office-holders but admits that “there is a strong case to be made for the view that rivalry for office was also a major factor in these events.”81 On this occasion Cato may have been looking forward to the censorial elections for 189. As returning proconsul from Further Spain in

195, Q. Minucius Thermus had already celebrated one triumph.82 Thermus would have been well placed to run in the upcoming elections after a successful campaign in Liguria and a second triumph. Minucius’ failure to stand for the censorship might demonstrate that Cato was successful in tarnishing Thermus’ image enough to keep him from running for office, though this must remain at the level of speculation.83

192-188: L. Quinctius Flamininus and M. Valerius Messala

In 192 Flamininus ravaged Ligurian territory far and wide. According to Livy, he captured many Ligurian forts, much plunder and many enemies while returning to freedom some Roman citizens and allies who had been captured by the Ligurians.84

Livy’s sketch of events is highly confused, though there is no reason to doubt that

80 Scullard (1951) 258; Astin (1978) 59, declares that one speech for sure and probably both were delivered in connection with Minucius Thermus’ failed triumphal bid; cf. Astin (1978) 63- 65, 143, 326ff. 81 Astin (1978) 64. He minimizes the role of politics in Cato’s orations against Minucius Thermus but on the subject of his subsequent attacks on M’. Acilius Glabrio he admits that “the situation was rather different” (73). 82 Degrassi (1947) 78f., 552. 83 Astin (1978) 65, vigorously denies such claims. But if Cato’s attacks on others were both successful and partially politically motivated and given Livy’s silence we have only the outcome to determine causality (Thermus’ failed triumph-request and his subsequent failure to stand for the censorial elections), it is exceedingly likely that Cato’s role in denying Minucius Thermus a triumph was politically motivated. 84 Livy 35.22.4-5, 40.2-5. 50

Quinctius Flamininus did engage some Ligurians.85 Rome’s preoccupation with the war in Asia Minor from 192-188 temporarily quieted the Ligurian theatre. The consul in

188, M. Valerius Messala, was assigned the Ligurians with Pisa as his base. He enrolled a sizeable force of two Roman and three allied legions along with 600 cavalry.86 The consul’s year appears to have been uneventful: “the consul M. Valerius came from the

Ligurians to Rome to hold the elections of magistrates, having done nothing in the province so worthy of note that it could be a plausible reason for delay, to cause him to arrive later than usual for the elections.”87

187: M. Aemilius Lepidus and C. Flaminius

The consular campaigns of C. Flaminius and especially of M. Aemilius Lepidus occupy an important place in Dyson’s account of Roman policy in Liguria and deserve a detailed treatment. The Senate decreed that both consuls should receive the province of Liguria owing to circulating rumors of an impending uprising. Lepidus strenuously objected, ostensibly because he thought M. Fulvius Nobilior and Cn. Manlius Vulso wielded too much power and were beginning to act like kings rather than consuls, but probably for two real reasons: a long-standing personal animosity between Lepidus and

Nobilior; the prospects of campaigning in Asia or the Greek East were infinitely more exciting than a season in Liguria.88 The Senate remained firm in its decision. The Senate sent both consuls to Liguria due to rumored uprisings. Though we may question

85 Briscoe (1981) 203. 86 Livy 38.35.8-10. 87 Livy 38.42.1. Harris (1979) 258-259, writes that developments in Asia forced Messala to avoid escalating conflict. 88 Livy 38.42.8ff. Briscoe (2008) 152, for the view that Lepidus did not necessarily want an Eastern command himself but did not want to see Manlius Vulso and Fulvius Nobilior’s commands prorogued. 51

whether this was truly defensive imperialism89, the Senate’s reactionary, ad hoc allotment of provinces is consistent with historical trends.

Flaminius initially fought the Ligurian , a tribe that lived north of the

Apennines.90 They surrendered after several successful battles and he disarmed them.

But the Friniates had surrendered only part of their arms and fled across the

Apennines. Flaminius fought a second series of engagements with them after which they fully surrendered and were stripped of all their weapons. Flaminius then fought some , people living south of the Apennines (Flaminius was now in that area, having pursued the Friniates across the Apennines).91 He subdued them and, according to Livy, “that he might not leave his army idle”, he built a road from Bononia to

Arretium.92

M. Aemilius Lepidus’ campaigns followed those of his colleague in reverse itinerary. He waged war against several tribes south of the Apennines before crossing the mountains and fighting the Friniates that Flaminius had left untouched. Like his colleague, he disarmed them. But having encountered difficulties fighting Ligurians holed-up in mountain strongholds (Ballista and Suismontium in particular), Lepidus went one step further and ordered the descent of defeated tribes from the hills to the plains. Afterwards, he built a road from Arretium to Placentia.93

89 Briscoe (2008) 151. 90 Briscoe (2008) 212-213, contra Sage (1965) 220. 91 Briscoe (2008) 212-213. 92 Livy 39.2.1-7; Dio. fr. 65.2; Strabo 5.1.11. 93 Livy 39.2.7-11. 52

We may discount Livy’s explanation of Flaminius’ motive for constructing the road.94 But it does not constitute what Dyson calls a Roman “road-building program”95, using terminology that assumes Senatorial policy and corporate consensus over individual agency. True, both consuls in 187 built roads that extended Roman power and would facilitate trade and troop movement. They both seem to have been concerned with longer-term solutions to Rome’s Ligurian problem as well; they disarmed defeated tribes and Lepidus moved some down from the easily defensible mountains to the plains. But Livy’s statement, stripped of its subtle moralizing, may hide a kernel of truth. At risk of circularity, both consuls seem to have faced military campaigning that occupied only a portion of their time. Each had time to traverse the

Apennines, fight multiple Ligurian tribes and build a road, an extraordinary undertaking since neither was prorogued and so was in the field for only one season.

It is safe to assert that Flaminius and Lepidus’ triumphal prospects were dim.

Livy records neither great battles nor any statistics regarding casualty ratios or spoils.

Lepidus ravaged farms and villages, classic consular behavior when there were no major pitched battles to be fought. Combined with the seeming ease with which both men defeated enemies, this would imply that the campaigns were neither difficult nor terribly significant in the grand scheme. Rather, their cross-Apennine marauding

94 Briscoe (2008) 214, links this statement with Livy’s point in the previous chapter about the importance of Ligurian campaigns in maintaining military discipline. 95 Dyson (1985) 102, specifically in reference to M. Aemilius Lepidus’ efforts; Williams (2001) 208-209, with similar implications. 53

signifies that they were ‘in search of monsters to destroy’. Such roving and inconsequential campaigns were rarely rewarded with triumphs.96

Lepidus and Flaminius’ road-building should be understood in the context of aristocratic competition. Knowing that their military exploits were mediocre and that a triumph was not in the cards, these two men glorified themselves in other ways.97 This is not to say that Rome did not benefit; self-glorification and aristocratic competition were not mutually exclusive. Most buildings and public works in republican Rome were constructed by aristocrats who in so doing were providing a service to the state as well as publicly reinforcing their wealth and fame. The Senate played an important role within the arena of aristocratic competition, letting contracts, allocating funds and generally regulating competition so that it did not threaten the political stability of the republic.98 But the impetus came from the individual aristocrats themselves. A closer look at M. Aemilius Lepidus’ career supports this conclusion and provides a more nuanced explanation for Dyson’s proposed road-building ‘program’.

Within the same campaign Lepidus vowed two temples, to Diana and Juno

Regina.99 Eric Orlin notes that he is the only commander ever to vow two different temples in the course of a single campaign. Orlin also remarks that while it is possible

96 Orlin (2002) 72: “His campaign did not involve any major pitched battles, it did not bring the war against the Ligurians to a successful conclusion and quite properly he was not granted a triumph for his activities.” 97 Orlin takes a somewhat confusing stance on this issue. Though he equates Lepidus’ unprecedented dual temple-vowing to his inglorious consulship, he states that “one should not assume that Lepidus was attempting to arrogate gloria to himself that he had failed to win on the battlefield” *Orlin (2002) 73+. In refuting the theory of manubial temple-building, he does connect the relative poverty of Ligurian and Gallic triumphs to an unusually high rate of consular temple-vowing (129, 160). 98 For this dynamic as it applied to temple-building specifically, Orlin (2002) 74-75. Importance of public service to the Roman elite: Rosenstein (2006) 370ff. 99 Livy 39.2.8, 11. 54

that Lepidus felt genuinely threatened in the course of his campaigns (the traditional reason to vow temples in the heat of battle), the evidence suggests otherwise.100 Orlin discredits previous attempts to explain Lepidus’ motives and proposes his own: “It is more beneficial to focus on Lepidus himself; given the relatively unglamorous operations he was assigned for his consulship, he seems to have made a conscious decision to present himself as one who aligned himself closely with the needs of the state.”101 Orlin’s focus on Lepidus as an individual acting in both personal and state interests rather than as an agent of the Roman state is both correct and instructive.

Lepidus’ road-building would also have aligned him with the needs of the republic while permanently placing himself and his family on the map, as it were.

As aedile, Lepidus had constructed two porticoes and a wharf and beautified the Temple of Jupiter with gilded shields on the roof.102 He and his colleague paid for these constructions with fines they had levied on people using ager publicus to graze animals. In 183, Lepidus was one of the triumviri coloniis deducendis for the foundations of Mutina and Parma.103 Lepidus’ censorial career follows a similar pattern.

He and M. Fulvius Nobilior, elected censors in 179, were publicly reconciled and proceeded with an ambitious building program which both Broughton and Orlin describe as ‘notable’ in reference to other censorial programs.104 The Basilicas Aemilia and Fulvia on the forum are only the most conspicuous of their many ventures. Also during his censorship, Lepidus dedicated the two temples he had vowed eight years

100 Orlin (2002) 72. 101 Orlin (2002) 73. 102 Livy 35.10.11-12; Orlin (2002) 141. Livy notes just how ambitious this building program was. Lepidus’ aedilician colleague was a fellow Aemilius, L. Aemilius Paullus. 103 Livy 39.55.7-8; Dyson (1985) 101-102; MRR 1.380. 104 MRR 1.392; Orlin (2002) 155. 55

earlier (as well as a Temple of Lares Permarini vowed by a clansman, L. Aemilius

Regillus) and received 20 000 asses from the Senate to celebrate games in conjunction with the temple openings.105

Lepidus’ career from his aedileship (193) through his consulship (187) to his censorship (179) demonstrates a commitment to public works and building projects that situate him squarely within the arena of aristocratic competition. There is no doubt that Lepidus was politically ambitious. As praetor in 191, he had been allotted the province of Sicily, instructed to split it with his predecessor L. Valerius Tappo if he saw fit and raise two tithes of grain to be shipped to Greece.106 Apparently dissatisfied and eager for advancement, he left his province without Senatorial permission in order to stand for the hotly contested consulship of 189, a move which brought “universal disapproval” and caused his failure to be elected according to Livy.107 It is also interesting that during his second Ligurian consulship Lepidus met with military success and was rewarded with a triumph but there is no indication that he was involved in building-projects.108

There is no doubt that M. Aemilius Lepidus was involved in numerous public works and projects that benefitted the republic. But one man’s actions do not a Roman policy make. His road-building in Liguria is best understood within the context of a career that repeatedly demonstrates a predilection for the construction and dedication of public monuments as a form of both personal glorification and state amelioration.

105 Livy 40.52.1-3; Orlin (2002) 181-182. 106 Livy 36.2.10-12; MRR 1.352. 107 Livy 37.47.6-8. Vishnia (1996) 182, notes that this did not hinder his election to the consulship in 187. 108 See below under the year 175. 56

His disarmament and forced migration of the Friniates was certainly in Rome’s best interests and represented an innovative approach to the Ligurian question but it did not mark “an innovation in the administration of the area.”109 Dyson’s blanket statement implies annual continuity in administrative policy which is simply not the case. Consuls in Liguria were free to conduct warfare and administer the area as they saw fit within the extremely broad confines of the Senatorial consensus regarding proper magisterial conduct. Consuls fought in Liguria yearly without necessarily adopting this innovative administrative ‘policy’.

One further event in the consulship of Flaminius and Lepidus deserves mention.

The praetor M. Furius Crassipes, operating in the province of Gaul, “seeking in peace the appearance of war, had disarmed the Cenomani, who had given no provocation”.110

The Cenomani subsequently complained to the Roman Senate, who referred them to

M. Aemilius Lepidus and authorized him to investigate the complaint and render a decision. After contentious meetings between the praetor, the Cenomanian envoys and

Lepidus, the Cenomani received their arms and Furius Crassipes was ordered to leave his province. Diodorus’ account does not mention an initial Senatorial hearing and includes the imposition of a fine by the consul Lepidus on Furius Crassipes.111

109 Dyson (1985) 100. 110 Livy 39.3.1-2. Briscoe (2008) 216, notes that the phrase in pace speciem belli quaerens probably means that Crassipes threatened them with war if they did not surrender their arms, rather than the usual translation that he claimed they were preparing for war. The Cenomani had been at peace with Rome since 197 (Livy 33.23.4). cf. Vishnia (1996) 182, though she mistakenly places the events in 189. 111 Diod. 29.14. Though Walsh has dismissed the Senatorial hearing as a Livian invention in the name of ‘protocol’ and claims that Livy omitted the fine since he thought it improbable, Briscoe (2008) 215, defends Livy’s version on the following grounds: the Cenomani “were not aware of the constitutional status of the person with whom they were dealing” and so would plausibly 57

The episode fits well within Livy’s moralizing theme throughout Book 39.112

Lepidus’ just treatment of the Cenomani also accords well with his image as one concerned with the well-being of the republic.113 The striking aspect is that the Senate pointed the Cenomani’s envoys to the consul rather than deciding the matter itself.

Crassipes was vested with his own imperium and his own province (Gaul)—it is tough to believe that the Senate was constitutionally obliged to forward the Cenomani to the consul. It is possible that they reached a settlement at Rome and instructed Lepidus to oversee the return of arms but this entirely negates Livy’s explicit testimony which lacks such Senatorial directives and includes a heated debate in the field. The truth is that the Senate was presented with a foreign policy dilemma with which it could reasonably and constitutionally have dealt. If we acknowledge that the Senate needed Lepidus to oversee the implementation of that policy, it could at least have provided him with instructions of some sort. Instead, the Senate placed complete authority in the consul, which is hardly consistent with a Senate that implicated itself in the minutiae of frontier and foreign policy.

have approached the Senate first; Diodorus’ account corrupts Furius’ name to Fulvius and calls the Cenomani ‘Ligurians’, thereby raising suspicion. The political fallout is harder to determine. Crassipes may have been expelled in the lectio senatus of 174 but this is long after the fact (Vishnia [1996] 182-183). Briscoe (2008) 215, suggests he was removed from the Senate either by Cato in 184 or Lepidus in 179. Crassipes was re-elected as praetor in 173 and allotted Sicily (Livy 42.1.5). 112 Briscoe (2008) 215. Other examples include but are not limited to Marcellus’ similar actions at the end of the book, Roman misbehavior during the Third Macedonian War, the Bacchanalian Affair and the Trials of the Scipios. 113 Diod. 29.27. Williams (2001) 136, wrongly concludes that the Cenomani were Roman auxilia at this time and actively sought integration. Scullard (1951) 143, places the event within the framework of a Scipionic ‘decline’ which was partially forestalled by the decisive action of the consul Aemilius, a Scipionic ally. 58

186-184: Sp. Postumius Albinus and Q. Marcius Phillipus; Ap. Claudius Pulcher and M. Sempronius Tuditanus; P. Claudius Pulcher and L. Porcius Licinius

In 186, both consuls, Sp. Postumius Albinus and Q. Marcius Phillipus, were assigned Liguria as their province and given the forces of Aemilius Lepidus and

Flaminius.114 Postumius Albinus probably did not make it to Liguria due to investigations into the Bacchanalian Affair, but Q. Marcius Phillipus finished his portion of the investigation and marched against the Apuani, the same people against whom

Flaminius and Lepidus had previously fought.115 The historiography is unanimous in recording the disastrousness of the campaign. Livy says that Philippus was ambushed in a narrow pass and lost 4 000 soldiers as well as 3 Roman and 11 allied standards. In an attempt to conceal his defeat he quit the Ligurian country for a more peaceful area and disbanded his army.116 There is no sign of a shift in administrative policy precipitated by

Lepidus, just a badly defeated consul who tried unsuccessfully to conceal his failures.117

In 185 both consuls, Ap. Claudius Pulcher and M. Sempronius Tuditanus, were again assigned to the increasingly violent Ligurian theatre. Sempronius Tuditanus set out from Pisa with his army and fought the Apuani. His tactics consisted of devastating

Ligurian land and burning their villages and forts as well as dislodging them from an ancestral stronghold (sedem maiorum). Claudius Pulcher engaged the Inguani, a tribe from south-west of Genoa. He captured 6 towns and many thousands of men and beheaded 43 belli auctores.118 Again, there is no sign of a general Roman policy of

Ligurian relocation. Tuditanus forced his opponents down from a mountain-top but this

114 Livy 39.20.2. 115 Dyson (1985) 101. 116 Livy 39.20.9-10; Oros. 4.20.26. Briscoe (2008) 292, shows that the historiography is overwhelmingly hostile to Philippus, citing both Polybius and Diodorus. 117 For Q. Marcius Philippus’ career, see Briscoe (1964) 66-77. 118 Livy 39.32.1-4. 59

was in the context of battle rather than of permanent resettlement. The consuls were free to conduct their campaigns as they saw fit. For example, Pulcher was the only consul operating in Liguria to specifically behead what he believed to be belli auctores.

Pulcher’s tactic was probably ineffective but was neither proposed nor condemned by the Senate; it represents his own estimation of the causes of frontier warfare.

Liguria remained a consular preserve in 184, though Livy confusingly adds

“since there was war nowhere else.” The consuls, P. Claudius Pulcher and L. Porcius

Licinius, were assigned the previous consuls’ armies. Little is known of their activities but Harris has suggested that Licinius’ prorogation and the vowing of a temple to Venus

Erycina are “indications of real (but unsuccessful?) warfare.”119

183: M. Claudius Marcellus and Q. Fabius Labeo

This year forms an interesting case study since Marcellus’ career in particular illustrates the complex relationship between Senate and consul.120 Both consuls were once again sent to Liguria with their predecessors’ armies.121 Before going to Liguria,

Marcellus ordered the proconsul Porcius Licinius to send his army to a town that the

Gauls were building near Aquileia. The praetor L. Julius (Caesar) had been ordered to use every means short of war to dissuade the Gauls from building and to quit the

119 Livy 39.32.1. No consul had gone anywhere but Northern Italy since 189; the reasons behind Livy’s cryptic statement are obscure [Briscoe (2008) 345]. Harris (1979) 259; Livy 40.34.4, for temple to Venus Erycina. 120 Q. Fabius Labeo did little of note during his consulship (Livy 39.56.3) apart from informing the Senate that the Apuani near Pisa were on the verge of rebellion (Livy 40.1.3-4). Harris (1979) 259, posits that Labeo’s prorogation may conceal skirmishes or guerilla warfare but evidence for this is lacking. 121 Livy 39.45.3-4. 60

territory.122 Unsuccessful, he informed Marcellus whose task was now to forcibly remove these trespassers. The Gauls quickly surrendered upon Marcellus’ arrival and

12 000 men were stripped of their arms and possessions.123 A fragment of L. Calpurnius

Piso Frugi’s Annales says that Marcellus burned the Gallic town to the ground and that the Senate disapproved of this as well.124 Consequently, the Gauls sent envoys to Rome to complain of their treatment by Marcellus.125

The Senate’s response to the Gallic envoys was one of the rare instances it intervened and reversed the decisions of a consul.126 According to Livy, the Senate found both parties in the wrong. The Gauls were wrong to have occupied land in a

Roman province without the express consent of a Roman magistrate.127 But Marcellus had been wrong to despoil enemies received in deditionem. The Senate resolved to send three men (L. Furius Purpurio, Q. Minucius Thermus and L. Manlius Acidinus) to

Marcellus instructing him to return the Gauls’ property and oversee their expulsion

122 Livy 39.45.6-7. 123 Briscoe (2008) 404, argues that ex agris rapta refers to farming implements rather than weapons. A group of landless Gauls intending to settle peacefully will hardly have needed so many weapons. 124 Fr. 35, cited in Toynbee (1965) 629; cf. Zon. 9.21; Briscoe (2008) 404. 125 Livy 39.54.1-4. They made a compelling case that overpopulation had caused their migration into Roman territory and that construction of a city was proof of their peaceful, sedentary intentions. 126 The Gallic elders “reproved the Roman people for their excessive lenience” in this decision (39.55.1-4). The fictitious anecdote almost certainly preserves the opinion of Livy or his source and ties in perfectly with the moralizing theme of book 39. This, the Senate’s decision regarding Crassipes in 187 and the decision regarding Ambracia (Livy 38.44.3-6) are the only examples to this point when the Senate reversed a magistrate’s decisions based on a foreign embassy (Briscoe [2008] 405). 127 An admission that Marcellus could unilaterally have granted the Gauls permission to reside in the province. Also, the Senate was hardly interested in letting war-like Gallic tribes inhabit the Italian doorstep (cf. Livy 40.53.5-6 for a similar situation). 61

from Italy. It is noteworthy that Marcellus retained direct control of the situation; it was he, not the Senate’s three envoys, who was still in charge of the expulsion.128

Most importantly, the Senate’s response illustrates a pattern in Senatorial action which bears directly on foreign policy: its careful protection of the deditio relationship. The Senate refrained from interfering in consular affairs unless a consul’s comportment somehow damaged the republic’s reputation. Surrendered enemies were to be treated fairly otherwise the incentives for surrendering disappeared. Enemies who placed themselves in deditionem in fidem poluli Romani entered into what was technically a unilateral relationship but which always had strong bilateral behavioural expectations.129

A slightly different version of the same concern manifested itself in 187 when

M. Furius Crassipes disarmed the peaceful Cenomani, though responsibility was delegated to the consul M. Aemilius Lepidus. The chapter on the Popillian Affair will show that an identical concern guided Senatorial responses in that case as well.130 The

Senate was relatively disinterested in consular actions as they pertained to frontier

‘policy’ but was deeply invested in ensuring that the informal rules governing relationships between enemies in deditionem and consuls were upheld. The consuls were magistrates of the Roman republic and their actions constituted Roman policy, broadly speaking. Thus Senatorial expectations regarding consular treatment of surrendered enemies constrained consular freedom of action to a degree approaching

128 The long-term political consequences for Marcellus were minimal. In 173 he acted as a Roman envoy to the Aetolian and Achaean assemblies (Livy 42.5.10-6.2; MRR 1.409). 129 Toynbee (1965) 609-611; Badian (1958) 4-7. Both discuss the nuances of the formal and informal rules governing the relationship. 130 Toynbee (1965) 629-630, explicitly connects the two. M’. Acilius Glabrio’s treatment of the Aetolians in 191 and his staff’s ensuing shock is another example. 62

but not quite attaining ‘foreign policy’. But this policy determined acceptable limits to consular actions rather than dictating the actions themselves.

Immediately following the Gallic expulsion Marcellus attempted to engineer a war with the Histrians. Rather than march into Histria and explain himself later, the consul asked the Senate’s permission to attack the Histrians.131 Marcellus’ request is odd but understandable in the perpetual quest for military glory and triumphs.

Understandable because his previous bid for gloria had ended with the Gauls’ successful self-portrayal as aggrieved victim of consular aggression which had effectively cost Marcellus any potential triumph. Grasping at alternate routes towards glory was not new and Marcellus’ attempted war against the Istrians fits the mold.

Marcellus’ action appears strange in that he sought Senatorial permission, though Livy’s brief statements leave room for interpretation. The content of the letters beyond their stated purpose is unknown, but the importance of fetial law and the imperative of a bellum iustum make it probable that Marcellus provided some pretext for war against the Histrians. Each subsequent letter to the Senate presumably escalated the perceived threat the Histrians posed. But the Senate would not budge; the successful and peaceful founding of Aquileia, very near Istria, was of paramount importance.132 Marcellus’ initial actions had met with Senatorial disapproval and so he attempted to engineer a war, though he sought Senatorial permission since he had previously run afoul of the Senate.

131 Livy 39.55.4-5. Harris (1979) 263, deals briefly with war-votes in the comitia centuriata. Harris argues that a war-vote was not always a necessary preliminary to war, citing Cn. Manlius Vulso’s attack on the (Livy 38.45.4-7, 46.13, 48.9, 50.1) and that of A. Manlius Vulso in 177 BC (cf. Vishnia [1996] 185). Commanders could start a war and have it ratified later (Vishnia [1996] 183). 132 Livy 39.55.5-6. 63

Marcellus was recalled to hold the elections even though his colleague was closer and hardly engaged with the Ligurians, perhaps because he strove to engineer a

Histrian war.133 He also disbanded his army which would suggest that his consular campaign was finished. This was not the case. After the election he returned to Gaul and in early 182 his imperium was prorogued and he was provided an additional force of 7 000 infantry and 400 cavalry.134 The Senate’s displeasure with the consul, if it had ever existed, was ephemeral and had quickly dissipated.

At some point in the year, 2 000 Ligurians approached Marcellus and asked to be under his protection.135 Marcellus once again consulted the Senate on how to proceed. His motivation is unclear. Perhaps he was still on thin ice with the Senate and wished to tread carefully. More likely, he was concerned that the jurisdiction belonged to the new consuls whose province actually was Liguria and asked the Senate to interpret this constitutional matter. The Senate told Marcellus to send the Ligurians to

Cn. Baebius Tamphilus and L. Aemilius Paullus, the new consuls, who were well positioned to decide what was best for the republic. The Senate further stipulated that the Ligurians should only be received in deditionem and their arms taken from them.136

The Senate’s reply seems ambiguous. It appears to have directed the consuls to accept the surrender of the Ligurians and remove their arms, but it also acknowledged the consuls’ superiority in determining what was good for the republic. The direct

Senatorial orders were shaped by Marcellus’ earlier debacle with the Gauls near

Aquileia: in case the new consuls had missed the point, they were to accept the

133 Livy 39.56.4; Briscoe (2008) 407; Vishnia (1996) 183. 134 Livy 40.1.6-8. Q. Fabius Labeo was prorogued as well. 135 This was not a formal request to be received in deditionem (Briscoe [2008] 453). 136 Livy 40.16.5-6. 64

Ligurians in deditionem and remove only their arms. It was up to Tamphilus and Paullus to accept or decline the Ligurian entreaty but if they did so it was to be within the familiar framework of a deditio.

Ironically, Marcellus was unable to capitalize on his most promising shot at glory and a triumph. When Cn. Baebius Tamphilus wrote the Senate regarding Aemilius

Paullus’ plight he also wrote Marcellus who was closest to Paullus and might have lifted the siege.137 But Marcellus arrived in Rome just days after Tamphilus’ letter, having already turned his army over to the praetor Q. Fabius Buteo and thereby eliminating the possibility that he might rescue Paullus. The situation was dire and Paullus later triumphed for breaking the siege himself; Marcellus would probably have been the triumphator had he liberated Paullus.

Conclusions

We have seen that the early years of Ligurian conquest were marked by consular initiative as much as Senatorial control. The period beginning with L. Furius

Purpurio’s precedent-setting triumph and ending with M. Claudius Marcellus’ various actions in Histria, Gaul and Liguria shows increased Senatorial concern with the

Ligurians which manifested itself in provincial allotments and the founding of several colonies. But a Ligurian ‘policy’ is more difficult to discern. Domestic political concerns often dictated actions in the field and in Rome and the quest for a triumph dominated consular decision making. The separation of policy and politics is hopelessly optimistic and unenlightening.

137 Livy 40.25.8-9. 65

Further, the Senate repeatedly left major policy decisions to the consuls. On multiple occasions the Senate let magistrates determine military and political responses when it could have done so. The result was a ‘policy’ whose broad consistency and occasional inconsistencies are best explained by the competing demands of aristocratic competition and Senatorial consensus. 66

Chapter 3: Developments in Liguria, 182-175

The consulship of P. Cornelius Cethegus1 and M. Baebius Tamphilus (cos. 181) is singularly important to Dyson’s thesis regarding the evolution of Roman frontier policy.

Dyson cites the failure of simple disarmament and concludes that “more radical steps were needed, and seven years later [180] the new policy emerged that was to lead the pacification of Liguria.”2 This new policy was “the physical movement of populations down into the plain area where they could be more closely watched.”3 Dyson acknowledges Lepidus’ campaign of 187 as the true predecessor but credits Baebius

Tamphilus and Cornelius Cethegus with kick-starting the shift in Roman policy: “The success of the program *Tamphilus’ and Cethegus’ forced migrations] led to its application with modification by other Roman generals.”4 Dyson correctly identifies the increased use of forced migrations immediately following the consulship of Cethegus and Tamphilus but his reasoning, based on a Roman administrative policy in Liguria, fails to account for the subtleties and nuances of republican politics.

This chapter will revisit the subject of Rome’s alleged ‘forced migration’ policy in Liguria, with particular focus on the consulship of Cethegus and Tamphilus and the activities of Roman magistrates in the subsequent years. Rather than assume that a coherent Roman policy remained in place for several years, I will instead consider developments in Rome and Liguria over time. By paying closer attention to chronology and the specific contexts in which Roman commanders made decisions, it will be clear

1 Livy mistakenly refers to him as Lentulus, but the Fasti give a cognomen of Cethegus. 2 Dyson (1985) 105. 3 Dyson (1985) 105. 4 Dyson (1985) 106; Gargola (2006) 156. 67

that forced migration of Ligurians was not a consistent Roman policy determined by the

Senate, but rather a tactic taken up by consuls over a short period of time for specific political reasons. The ‘policy’ actually encompasses two tactics—forced migrations and removal from mountain-tops to plains—which were both politically rewarded.

Regardless the motives behind the adoption of these two related tactics, we will see that the former was more effective in creating long-term stability.

182-181: Cn. Baebius Tamphilus and L. Aemilius Paullus

Full contextualization of the forces at work during Cethegus and Tamphilus’ consulship demands an analysis of prior developments. So we begin with the consuls for 182, Cn. Baebius Tamphilus and L. Aemilius Paullus, and the events that led to

Cethegus and Tamphilus’ unprecedented triumph. Both consuls in 182 were sent to

Liguria since “there was no province to be decreed except the Ligurians.”5 Q. Fabius

Labeo had written that the Apuani were contemplating rebellion and would possibly invade Pisan territory, providing at least the pretext for assigning Liguria as the sole consular province. Both men met with some success and a one-day thanksgiving was voted.6 Baebius Tamphilus proceeded to Rome to preside over the elections in which his younger brother Marcus was elected; Aemilius Paullus wintered at Pisa.7

Aemilius Paullus led his army against the in the spring. The Ingauni feigned a desire for peace and asked for a ten day ceasefire during which they would convince other tribes to surrender along with them. They retreated into the mountains, regrouped, attacked and besieged Paullus’ camp. Paullus accordingly sent entreaties for help to Cn. Baebius Tamphilus at Pisa but Tamphilus had already handed over his

5 Livy 40.1.1. 6 Livy 40.16.4-5. 7 Livy 40.17.6-8. 68

army.8 So Baebius informed the Senate of Paullus’ request and also wrote to Marcellus, asking him to come from Gaul if it seemed prudent.9 Emergency procedures were enacted in Rome but with no outside communication Paullus could not be sure Baebius had even received his messengers in Pisa so he resolved to break the siege himself.10

After a typically Livian speech by Paullus in which Ligurians are unfavourably compared to Spaniards, Gauls, Macedonians and Carthaginians, Paullus led his men out against the enemy and won a major victory, killing more than 15 000 Ligurians and capturing more than 2 300.11 The Senate permitted him to return to Rome and discharge his troops, the necessary first step in the campaign for a triumph.

Aemilius Paullus’ triumph was poor by comparison to others. Only 25 golden crowns were carried in the procession but no other gold or silver. Additionally, each of his soldiers was given 300 asses, but this money apparently came from the Roman treasury rather than the spoils he had won.12 He was awarded a triumph more for the unexpected and fortuitous nature of his victory and the fact that it had caused the capitulation of the entire Inguani rather than his enrichment of the treasury, though he had killed an impressive number of enemy soldiers. Most importantly for our purposes,

Ligurian envoys appeared during his triumph and asked the Romans for perpetual peace. The praetor Q. Fabius Maximus, on Senatorial orders, demanded that their deeds mirror their words and ordered them to present themselves to the two consuls currently in Liguria.13 The Ligurian envoys’ appearance and the Senate’s response are

8 Briscoe (2008) 472, is clear that Aemilius Paullus wintered at Rome; Baebius Tamphilus had overseen the elections. Tamphilus’ presence in Pisa remains inexplicable. 9 Livy 40.25.1-9. 10 Reactions in Rome: 40.26.1-8; Paullus’ actions: 40.27.1ff. 11 Speech and battle narrative: Livy 40.27.11-28.2; Briscoe (2008) 471-478; cf. Plut. Aem. 6.1-7. 12 Livy 40.34.7-9; Briscoe (2008) 495, thinks the money did not come from the aerarium. 13 Briscoe (2008) 495, says the envoys were probably from the Apuani. 69

important preliminary events whose significance Dyson does not acknowledge. They set the stage for the subsequent forced resettlement of Ligurians and the triumph of

Tamphilus and Cethegus. The Senate’s response perfectly demonstrates their tendency to deflect responsibility to the consuls currently in the field, even when the Senate had a clear opportunity to shape frontier policy directly. That is, in this instance, the Ligurian envoys came to Rome, presented themselves to the Senate, and asked for instructions on how to secure a lasting peace. Yet the Senate sent them packing. This hardly resembles a Senate who was intimately involved in frontier development.

One might suggest that the Senate intended to employ the consuls in the execution of a settlement of its own devising. Surely they were more opportunely placed to carry out whatever the Senate instructed. But Livy’s statements suggest otherwise: “They *Ligurian envoys+ should go to the consuls and do whatever was ordered by them. The senate, he said, would believe a statement from no one except the consuls that the Ligurians were at peace in genuine good faith.”14 The consuls were to be the final arbiters, both deciding the course of action and vouching for the peacefulness of these Ligurian tribes. The tremendous power the consuls possessed as the conduit of information from province to Rome is on full display.

181: P. Cornelius Cethegus and M. Baebius Tamphilus

The two consuls were ordered to depart Rome earlier than usual to relieve the

Ingaunian siege of L. Aemilius Paullus. But as we have just seen, Paullus struck at the lackadaisical siege and won a spectacular victory. The further activities of the pair in

181 are unrecorded but they were prorogued in 180 and eventually instructed to hold

14 Livy 40.34.11-12. 70

the province until the incoming consuls for 179 replaced them.15 Meanwhile, Paullus had deprived Cethegus and Tamhilus of their original objective and the Senate made it clear that they were to discharge the armies and return to Rome upon the arrival of

Postumius Albinus and Calpurnius Piso (cos. 179). The window of opportunity for

Cethegus and Tamphilus was closing rapidly.

The two proconsuls took exploited circumstances in Rome to determine policy on their own. The consul C. Calpurnius Piso had died. Q. Fulvius Flaccus was elected suffect consul, but the entire affair slowed the levy of troops. The two proconsuls took advantage of the situation and attacked the Apuani. The action was a desperate one from a pair of consuls whose triumphi spes were almost exhausted; Livy strongly implies causality in writing that “P. Cornelius et M. Baebius, qui in consulatu nihil memorabile gesserant, in Apuanos exercitum induxerunt.”16 Whether or not they consciously sought to catch the Apuani off-guard with an early attack, their enemy put up no resistance and surrendered immediately.17 The two proconsuls were faced with the surrender of 12 000 Apuani and still nothing worthy of a triumph. So they devised a solution that would benefit Rome and themselves, recalling the appearance

15 Livy 40.36.7; 40.25.1-10, for Paullus’ actions against the Ingauni and his plea for help; 40.18.3 for the sortition; 40.26.4-8 for the Senatorial order telling the consuls to leave as early as possible. 16 Livy 40.37.8-9. 17 Livy 40.38.1-2. Livy says the Ligurians “had not anticipated a war before the arrival of the consuls *i.e. Albinus and Flaccus+ in the province” but this credits the Apuani with an intimate acquaintance with the rotation of Roman magistrates. Most likely, they did not expect an attack so unseasonably early. Scullard (1951) 178, writes that “the effective work had been done by Aemilius Paullus” the year before (cf. Harris *1979+ 259). Briscoe (2008) 505, correctly notes that Paullus had fought Ingauni and these were Apuani. He also suggests that knowledge of Paullus’ victory the year before made the Apuani less inclined to fight. Dyson (1985) 105, says that the pastoral Ligurians were in the lowlands in the spring and were more vulnerable to attack than mid-summer. 71

of and Senatorial response to the Apuani envoys at Paullus’ triumph the previous year: the forced-migration of these Apuani.18

Our understanding of the forced-migration, the proconsuls’ triumph and the developments of the following years is deeply altered depending on whether the

Senate or Cethegus and Tamphilus were the primary authors of the policy. They worked in co-ordination with each other but responsibility for its conception is vital. Dyson’s thesis demands that the Senate provide the leadership since he invokes the resettlement as evidence that the Senate was exasperated with what he calls “the cycle of raid and reprisal” and sought “radical new solutions”.19 In relating the events of 180

Dyson writes that “The number of Ligurians seized was large enough for the two proconsuls to think it prudent to consult the senate on next steps. The decision was made to take the captives to an area well removed from Liguria. Without such an action, the senate felt that nullum alium ante finem rati fore Lingustini belli.”20 But an alternate explanation better incorporates the known facts and is therefore more attractive. The proconsuls consulted the Senate by letter in between the Apuanian surrender and the transfer but Livy does not say that the Senate instructed them to move the Ligurians to . Similarly there is no indication that the feeling regarding the endemic Ligurian warfare was that of the Senate as expressed in the exchange of letters. The Senate’s reply to the Apuani envoys at Aemilius Paullus’ triumph further weakens Dyson’s argument. Textual evidence regarding the Senate’s

18 Toynbee (1965) 667, suggests that the Forum Cornelii was also founded in this year and links the lack of military glory in M. Aemilius Lepidus’ consulship with this one. 19 Dyson (1985) 104. 20 Dyson (1985) 105. 72

role is ambiguous at best and the circumstantial evidence does not support a Senate that pro-actively supported forced migration.

Events make more sense if Cethegus and Tamphilus were responsible for the decision. They consulted the Senate to obtain permission, funds and land for the transfer of the 12 000 Apuani who had surrendered, a number that later swelled to 40

000.21 The importance of the Senate’s control of the treasury in influencing foreign policy is evident, and there must surely have been forward-thinking patres who saw the value in what Cethegus and Tamphilus proposed. The Ligurian envoys’ plea the year before was also a catalyst in this process, showing the Senate that at least some of the

Ligurian tribes were tired of fighting and wanted a more permanent solution. But resettlement was a proconsular initiative that required Senatorial approval, not a

Senatorial policy that demanded proconsular executives. Co-operation and conflict between multiple actors shaped ‘policy’ at all times. The Senate played a vital role but the credit belongs to the pronconsuls. Baebius and Tamphilus’ request for a board of five to help them carry out the task of resettlement also suggests that the impetus was theirs.

Cethegus and Tamphilus were voted a triumph upon their return to Rome: Hi omnium primi nullo bello gesto triumpharunt.22 Livy’s words have caused much confusion. Harris rejects a literal interpretation and thinks that “they probably

21 Gargola (2006) 156. 22 Livy 40.38. 7-9. Livy’s “triumphus ab senatu est decretus” is noteworthy. The singular triumphus rather than the plural triumphi suggests that it was a joint-triumph which would certainly be in keeping with the apparently collegial nature of the resettlement. The entries in the fasti triumphales have unfortunately been lost and cannot confirm this. 73

undertook some campaigning and certainly were awarded triumphs.”23 He follows

Scullard who writes that “the claim that their triumph was undeserved will have come from the propaganda of their Fulvian successors whom they robbed of the chance of outstanding military victory.”24 Vishnia also places it within the context of the politicization of the triumph-debate, “a tendency reduced ad absurdum when two consuls were awarded a triumph although they had not engaged in any battle.”25 The historical narrative records no major battles and Briscoe is certainly correct to note that

“marching an army towards the enemy may be ‘military activity’, but is certainly not what a Roman meant by bellum gerere.”26

The triumph makes sense if we accept that the Senate was inclined towards a lasting peace in Liguria without actively pursuing it and that Cethegus and Tamphilus proposed a viable solution. Making war had hitherto been the primary role of annually elected consuls, though Harris’ claim that more than three-quarters of consuls between

200 and 167 engaged in warfare is based on questionable assumptions about Livian lacunae and arguments ex silentio. War-making was indeed the traditional occupation of consuls and Liguria fosters no shortage of years when the consuls ravaged territory for no apparent purpose.27 The triumph had traditionally been the preserve of magistrates with imperium who were successful in war and was intimately linked to military glory.28 But Senatorial attitude towards the triumph need not have remained

23 Harris (1979) 259, uses their triumph as evidence that they had accomplished something of military importance. 24 Scullard (1951) 178 n.5. 25 Vishnia (1996) 178. 26 Briscoe (2008) 507. 27 Harris (1979) 259; 9-41, for the aristocracy’s relationship with war. 28 Oakley (1993) 29: “No institution was so characteristic of the military ethos of Rome as the triumph”; Rich (1993) 41: “The Romans valued military achievements above all others and their strongly militaristic culture was displayed in such institutions as the triumph.” 74

static. With the patres desirous of peace and readily accepting the forced-migration as a step in the right direction, the triumph of Cethegus and Tamphilus can be seen as a reward for the consuls’ imaginative approach. Dyson recognizes as much: “The appreciation of the senate and the Roman people for this imaginative and well- executed application of a new native policy was demonstrated by the voting of a triumph to the two former consuls, despite the fact that hi omnium…”29 It would be strange if the Senate rewarded the two for carrying out a plan of its own devising. The course of events in 180 only makes sense if Cethegus and Tamphilus hatched the idea of Ligurian resettlement, proposed it to the Senate in order to obtain necessary land and financing, and were rewarded with a triumph.

180: A. Postumius Albinus, C. Calpurnius Piso and Q. Fulvius Flaccus (I)

Postumius Albinus and Q. Fulvius Flaccus werethe first consuls in Liguria after

Cethegus and Tamphilus; they represent the first of Dyson’s ‘other Roman generals’ who applied the recently developed ‘program’. But the success of this ‘program’ was not only in creating the conditions for a lasting peace. More importantly, the success was political—Cethegus and Tamphilus had triumphed and demonstrated that battles, captives and booty were no longer triumphal prerequisites. The two consuls elect,

Albinus and Piso, were assigned Liguria and told to enlist new armies. Their task was to relieve Tamphilus and Cethegus and make war on the Apuani.30 Livy’s text is clear: Cum hoc exercitu Apuanis Liguribus ut bellum inferrent, mandatum est.31 The Senate further specified the otherwise vague province of ‘Liguria’ by ordering the consuls to fight the

Apuani in particular. This is a rare case of direct Senatorial shaping of foreign policy and

29 Dyson (1985) 106. 30 Livy 40.35.8. 31 Livy 40.36.7. 75

constitutes an exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, the incoming pair was to relieve the outgoing consuls, meaning they would be in the territory of the Apuani; it made sense for them to continue campaigning in the region occupied by previous consuls unless those campaigns were finished.32

Most important in this statement is the chronology. Cethegus and Tamphilus had not yet attacked the Apuani nor had they commenced their massive resettlement of them. If the Senate were contemplating resettlement as a way of moving beyond the apparent tactical stalemate in Liguria one would expect to find it in Senatorial instructions. Instead, it was business as usual: the consuls were instructed to make war on, not resettle, the Apuani.

C. Calpurnius Piso died before he could leave for Liguria.33 Livy calls his death

“especially suspicious” and implicates Piso’s wife, Quarta Hostilia. According to Livy, she grew tired of watching her son, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, repeatedly stand for and fail to win a consulship. She resolved to make him consul within 2 months and on the death of her husband and his stepfather, he was elected consul suffectus.34 In the period between the election of Flaccus as suffect consul and the consuls’ departure against Ligurian enemies of their own, Cethegus and Tamphilus carried out their attack on the Apuani, resettled them in lowlands and returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph. Thus Flaccus and Albinus will have been acutely aware of Cethegus and Tamphilus’ achievement and its ultimate reward.

32 It is difficult to understand the cryptic statement that “There was peace among the Ligurians” (40.34.11.) 33 Livy 40.37.1. 34 Livy 40.37.4-9. 76

Postumius Albinus attacked the mountain strongholds of Ballista and Letum before destroying the vineyards and crops of other Ligurian mountain tribes until they were “compelled by the disasters of war” to give up their weapons. He then proceeded to explore the coastline belonging to the Ingauni and Intemelii.35 There is no sign here of any forced migrations from highlands to lowlands even though Livy is explicit that

Albinus’ enemies were in fact mountain-dwelling (montanorum Ligurum). The fact that he was able to explore the extensive Ligurian coastline of the Ingauni and Intemelii means that time-constraint cannot have been a factor in Albinus’ failure to carry out this new Roman ‘program’ either. Postumius Albinus demonstrates that even in the direct aftermath of Cethegus and Tamphilus’ warless triumph, consuls were not directed by the Senate to resettle defeated Ligurians. The Senate was relatively disinterested if a consul opted for a more traditional approach including crop-burning and disarmament rather than emulate the new ‘policy’ of the previous year.

The other consul, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, emulated his predecessors. He attacked the Apuani, forced the surrender of 7000 men and consequently put them on boats to

Neapolis, where they were transferred to Samnium and given land.36 Livy is exceptionally brief on Flaccus’ actions but there are several plausible assertions that bear mention. First, like Cethegus and Tamphilus before him, Flaccus was faced with the rapid capitulation of his enemy, hardly perfect conditions under which to win a triumph.37 Flaccus would have been cognizant of Cethegus and Tamphilus’ achievement

35 Livy 40.41.1-2, 5-7. Briscoe (2008) 513, says both consuls fought tribes of Apuani. 36 Livy 40.41.3-4; Dyson (1985) 106. 37 Though admittedly far-fetched, it is at least possible that the Apuani surrendered so quickly precisely because they expected the same treatment as their countrymen the year before. They were in fact settled in the same region of Samnium as the previous 40 000 Apuani (Inde in Samnium traducti, agerque iis inter populares datus est [Livy 40.41.4-5]). The Apuani would not have known that the consul was not bound by a strict ‘policy’ of resettlement. 77

and might have inclined towards a similar course of action in the hopes of a similar reward. The Senate’s role in this relocation is less clear but the placement of these 7

000 Ligurians next to their country-men suggests that they received unoccupied ager

Romanus in Samnium, as had occurred the year before.

Unlike Cethegus and Tamphilus, Flaccus did not triumph; nor did he even summon a meeting in the Temple of Bellona and request one.38 Flaccus could legally have triumphed, though suffect consuls were apparently barred him from conducting elections.39 We know of several suffect consuls who triumphed starting with M.

Valerius Lactuca Maximus in 437.40 The reason for Flaccus’ non-triumph is not to be sought in his constitutional or religious competence. Rather, the answer may lie in

Flaccus’ ascension to the suffect consulship. If rumours were circulating in Rome that his mother had killed his step-father so that he might finally have a consulship, this would hardly have endeared him to the Senate or to the gods. The suspicious circumstances surrounding his step-father’s death meant that his consulship was tainted from the beginning. The highly religious nature of the triumph would militate against a possible accomplice to murder dressing up like a god and celebrating one of

Rome’s most important religious ceremonies. The fact that Livy’s sources related the

38 The most obvious explanation is that Flaccus requested a triumph, was denied, and Livy failed to record it. This is both unsatisfactory and an argument ex silentio. 39 Livy 41.18.16 (in reference to the year 176): “Those who were skilled in the rules of religion and in public law said that, since the two regular consuls of the year had perished, the one from disease, the other in battle, a substituted consul could not properly conduct an election…” cf. North (2006) 263-265. 40 Degrassi (1947) 95, 538. 78

rumour at all meant it probably had some currency in Rome at the time and the Senate may have been ill-disposed towards Flaccus.41

The suffect consul may have been attempting to mollify Senatorial opposition and potentially position himself for a triumph by emulating Cethegus and Tamphilus. It is significant that he appears not to have been in charge of the resettlement beyond putting the 7 000 Apuani on ships. The Senate, as a corporate whole, supported resettlement but was reluctant to let Flaccus reap too much benefit. Flaccus probably understood the significance of his diminished role and recognized that he was not going to triumph, thus his failure to request one.

179: Q. Fulvius Flaccus (II) and L. Manlius Acidinus Fulvianus

The incoming consuls were assigned the same provinces and armies as their predecessors.42 The consul L. Manlius Fulvianus did nothing worth noting but Flaccus’ actions in Liguria are noteworthy. He fought a pitched battle with Ligurians in the mountains of Ballista, the same area that Postumius Albinus had occupied the previous year. Flaccus transferred the 3 200 who surrendered from the mountains to the plains and garrisoned the mountains so that they could not return to the defensible strongholds. The news was well-received in Rome, where a three day thanksgiving was decreed and 40 full-grown victims were sacrificed.43 Whereas Tamphilus, Cethegus and the previous Q. Fulvius Flaccus (I) had shipped the Ligurians to Samnium, Q. Fulvius

41 Evans (1994) 28-34, argues that the story is a later invention by the historian L. Calpurnius Piso who was motivated by hostility towards M. Fulvius Flaccus (cos. 125). Briscoe (2008) 503-504, points out Evans’ contradictory conclusion and upholds the veracity of the anecdote based on Hostilia’s execution. 42 Livy 40.44.3-4. Flaccus is not to be identified with the suffect consul of the previous year. Dyson (1985) 106, equates the two; Briscoe (2008) 26, is clear that they were homonymous cousins. 43 Livy 40.53.1-4; cf. Flor. 1.19.5, for a very confused account that mixes disparate tribes as well as many consuls from different years. 79

Flaccus (II) moved the defeated down to plains in their territory and garrisoned the mountain tops. Flaccus’ actions reflect a similar but not identical pattern and in any case there is no explicit evidence that the Senate was involved in the decision.

Flaccus was awarded a triumph for his efforts. Livy preserves a historiography hostile towards Flaccus’ triumph as he did with the war-less triumph of Tamphilus and

Cethegus: “this triumph was clearly due to influence rather than to the greatness of his achievements. He carried in the triumph a great quantity of arms taken from the enemy, but practically no money. *…+ Nothing in the triumph was more noteworthy than that it happened to occur on the same day on which, in the previous year, he had triumphed after his praetorship.”44 Two triumphs in two years was certainly a heady privilege but Flaccus’ supposed popularity alone cannot fully explain this anomaly even if it made it easier for him to win his second triumph.45 Contrary to Cicero’s derision of

Ligurian triumphs as easily obtained and meaningless46, aristocratic competition virtually guaranteed that triumphs were not handed out freely. The dynamic worked in the other direction, ensuring that many potential triumphators failed to triumph based on political enmities within the Senate.47 We have seen that this was probably what kept Q. Minucius Thermus from a triumph in 190.

44 Livy 40.59.1-4. Flaccus’ triumph in 180: Livy 40.43.4-7. 45 Against this view is Briscoe (2008) 565-566: “We are at the beginning of a period when the consulship, in my mind, was dominated by the Fulvii and their political allies. That does not, of course, mean that the consuls commanded an automatic majority in the senate. Fulvius had to use his gratia to persuade uncommitted senators to vote for his triumph.” 46 Cic. Brut. 255-256; Dyson (1985) 94. Harris (1979) 225: “though some of them [Ligurian triumphs] may have been spurious and none of them bestowed the glory of an African or Asian victory, their value was real.” 47 Vishnia (1996) 178, posits an entirely opposite dynamic: “The highly competitive ambience of this period encouraged the Roman commanders to request triumphs for insignificant victories or even to fabricate them especially when it was becoming obvious that personal connections could often militate in favour of an otherwise unjustifiable triumph”. Against this, see Harris 80

Looking beyond the hostile historiographic tradition, Flaccus’ triumph fits well within the Senate’s new disposition towards more permanent efforts at Ligurian pacification. The scale of the victory was by no means spectacular and hardly deserving of a triumph based on previous criteria and precedents. But the game had changed: the criteria expanded when Tamphilus and Cethegus had created a new precedent.

Exhausted by decades of intractable fighting in Liguria, the patres were open to new methods of pacification. Tamphilus and Cethegus had shown that forced removal and resettlement could be carried out on a large scale with beneficial results.48 The Senate was prepared to reward non-traditional behavior with a triumph in the interests of solving the problems that had plagued the Ligurian frontier. Though it probably did “tip the balance in Liguria toward Rome” the ‘process’ of Ligurian resettlement was not as straightforward as Dyson claims.49

178-177: M. Iunius Brutus; C. Claudius Pulcher

Virtually nothing happened in Liguria in 178. The consul M. Junius Brutus was stationed at Pisa and when the Senate instructed him to cross over into Gaul to levy troops, the praetor peregrinus Tiberius Claudius Nero was instructed to hold the province in the consul’s absence.50 The following year, the consul C. Claudius Pulcher

(1979) 26 n.2. Oakley (1993) 29, shows that triumphs were celebrated just as frequently between 312-293 and 282-264 as they were in this period; Rich (1993) 50, shows there were 39 triumphs between 200-167. 48 Dyson (1985) 105: “The Romans undoubtedly saw this as a positive step. A disrooted people become a disoriented one, and therefore more controllable. Modern imperialism offers its parallels.” 49 Dyson occasionally recognizes the complex relationship between individual efforts and Roman policy. See, for example, his comments regarding the Senate’s appreciation of Cethegus and Tamphilus (94). But his admission that the ‘policy’ of Cethegus and Tamphilus was imaginative and original does not explain why they attempted it in the first place and is an exception to Dyson’s intensely Senatorial focus. 50 Livy 41.5.5-6, 9-10. 81

was initially assigned the war against the Histrians. However, the previous year’s consuls had both crossed over and joined the Histrian campaign, thereby depriving

Claudius Pulcher of his army and the potential for victory.51 He hastily set out towards

Histria to dismiss the two proconsuls and assume control.52 Pulcher arrived during the siege of Nesattium, sent the two consuls away, successfully captured the town and subdued the Histrians.53 Shortly thereafter, the proconsul Tiberius Claudius Nero wrote the Senate from Pisa informing them that Ligurian war councils were supposedly in progress.54 The Senate forwarded the dispatch to Claudius Pulcher and informed him that if it seemed wise to him he should now lead his legions against the Ligurians. The

Senate did not order him to launch attack the Ligurians. They did not allot him the province of Liguria. They offered the consul an option which we must assume he was free to decline. Even if he was unlikely to pass on the offer of another province where he could win even more glory, the choice was his, not the Senate’s.55

Claudius Pulcher was tremendously successful against his Ligurian foe. He killed

15 000 and captured more than 700 as well as 51 standards. He spent the rest of the season burning farms far and wide.56 There is no hint that Claudius Pulcher attempted resettlement. His actions in Liguria closely mirrored more traditional forms of Roman warfare in Italy and the western provinces. For his efforts he celebrated a rare double-

51 Provincial assignments: Livy 41.9.8; Polyb. 25.4.1. Political situation of Histrian War: Livy 41.10.1-13. 52 Vishnia (1996) 185, cites Claudius Pulcher’s aggressive actions as evidence of triumph-hunting: hastily departing Rome with his legions out of fear that his predecessors would complete his assigned tasks; returning to complete the necessary rites; returning to his province just as quickly. 53 Livy 41.11.1-9. He captured and sold 5 632 prisoners, beheaded many auctores belli and accepted hostages from neighbouring tribes. 54 Livy 41.11.10-12.4. 55 Livy 41.12.4-8. 56 Livy 41.12.7-10. 82

triumph over the Histrians and the Ligurians at the end of his consulship.57 Claudius

Pulcher had not implemented the new ‘Ligurian policy’ because there was not one to implement. He had availed himself of choices before him, both with regards to whether he was going to take up the Ligurian war or not and then whether he would fight or engage in some combination of fighting and resettlement. Policy was in the consul’s hands.

The bankruptcy of Claudius Pulcher’s strategy was apparent when the same

Ligurians immediately revolted. Livy claims they realized that both Claudius Pulcher and

Tiberius Claudius Nero were no longer in Liguria and so they attacked, freed from fear of retaliation. Whether Livy’s statement is true or not, the Ligurian revolt indicates that

Claudius Pulcher had not fully subdued the people over whom he triumphed. This neither tarnished Claudius Pulcher’s triumph nor sullied his reputation. When word of

Mutina’s fate reached Rome, the Senate instructed Claudius Pulcher to conduct elections as early as possible, prorogued him and sent him back to the field to rescue the Roman colony.58 The Senate was apparently unconcerned that Pulcher, who claimed to have pacified the Ligurians and triumphed for it, was shown to be a liar so quickly.

Pulcher quickly relieved the siege of Mutina killing 8 000 Ligurians in the process. He sent a dispatch to Rome bragging that “as a result of his valour and good fortune there was no longer an enemy of the Roman people on this side of the Alps, and that a large amount of land had been captured which could be divided individually

57 Degrassi (1947) 103; Livy 41.13.6-8. 58 Livy 41.14.3-5. The Ligurians ravaged the land surrounding Mutina before capturing the colony itself. 83

among many thousands of men.”59 Such a boast must have seemed empty coming from a man who had earlier made a similar claim only to be proven wrong. Before long the

Ligurians again rose in revolt, once more discrediting Claudius Pulcher. What is more,

Livy equates these rebellious Ligurians with the ones Pulcher had defeated in 177 and at Mutina, writing that they cowered at his arrival since they recalled their defeat at the

Scultenna River and that they were all the more enraged because of the booty taken from them at Mutina.60

Further evidence supports Livy’s testimony that these Ligurians are to be identified with the previously defeated tribes. When confronted by Claudius they retreated to the familiar mountain strongholds of Ballista and Letum.61 Aemilius

Lepidus had forced his Ligurian foe down from the mountains of Ballista and

Suismontium in 187. A. Postumius Albinus had fought Ligurians on both mountains in

180. Q. Fulvius Flaccus fought against Ligurians on the mountain Ballista in 179 before bringing them down to the plains and garrisoning the mountaintop. The critical difference between the long-distance resettlements of 180 (Cethegus, Tamphilus and the suffect consul Q. Fulvius Flaccus) and the short-term strategies of Lepidus and

Flaccus is manifest. Ligurians removed to Samnium and forced to farm were incapable of returning to ancestral mountain strongholds whereas those Ligurians who were simply deposed from mountains to neighbouring plains were free to return once the consul and his army had vacated the area.62 Toynbee has noted that “it is not stated in

59 Livy 41.16.7-8. 60 Livy 41.18.1-3. 61 On continuing Roman activity around Letum, Ballista and Suismontium, see Harris (1979) 226 n.2; Toynbee (1965) 280-281. 62 Dyson (1985) 105, hints at the ephemeral effects of mountain-top removal: “But men of the mountains are not easily turned into men of the plain. With the native mountains in sight, it would be tempting to flee and return to old haunts and old ways.” It is as if the Ligurians were 84

Livy’s narrative that the strongholds themselves were occupied by the Romans on either occasion [187 and 180], and we may guess that the second capitulation was therefore as illusory as the first had been.”63

176: Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispallus, Q. Petillius Spurinus and C. Valerius Laevinus

The Senate decreed Pisa and Liguria as the two consular provinces; Scipio

Hispallus received Pisa and Petillius Spurinus received Liguria. But Scipio Hispallus died before leaving Rome and Spurinus held an election at which C. Valerius Laevinus was chosen suffect consul. News reached Rome that the Ligurians were in revolt and

Petillius set out for his province, satisfied with this new development since “he had long been eager for his province”.64 The uprising convinced the Senate to send a third legion to meet Claudius Pulcher at Parma, whence he could engage the enemy. The Senate also sent duumviri navales along the Ligurian coast to spread terror by sea. Meanwhile, the consul Petillius went to Parma to meet his newly levied troops. There would now be

3 magistrates with consular imperium and two duumviri navales operating against the rebellious Ligurians.

Petillius Spurinus, “fearing lest the war should be finished in his absence”, asked Claudius Pulcher to bring his army to him at Campi Macri. Claudius obliged the consul and turned his army over.65 Petillius’ was concerned that Claudius, well- positioned to suppress the rebellion, would do so and thereby diminish his own potential glory. Claudius was probably obligated to defer to the incoming consuls and

recovering drug addicts at risk of relapse, not a people forcibly removed from their ‘old haunts’ who naturally returned to their more defensible strongholds in the absence of Roman power. 63 Toynbee (1965) 279-280. 64 Livy 41.15.5-6, 16.3-5, 17.5-6. 65 Livy 41.18.5-6. 85

acquiesce to Petillius’ request. He had also been operating in the region for almost two years and already celebrated a triumph against the tribes that were now revolting. Q.

Fulvius Flaccus had celebrated two triumphs in two years but never had anyone triumphed over the same tribe in two consecutive years. It is noteworthy that troop movements were politically rather than militarily motivated. The well-placed proconsul was forced to forego military action because of an incoming consul who jealously guarded his province. Even if the delay lasted only a few days and Petillius’ army was ultimately successful, the exchange between the consuls demonstrates the interaction of political concerns and military strategy.66

C. Valerius Laevinus joined Petillius at Campi Macri and the pair launched a two-pronged attack. Petillius attacked Ballista and Letum but died in battle, the result of a flaw in pre-battle auspices according to Livy.67 The Romans were nonetheless successful and killed 5 000 Ligurians while suffering only 52 casualties. Valerius

Laevinus’ actions remain largely unknown because the manuscript is missing an entire quaternion but the fasti triumphales do not record a triumph for the suffect consul.

However, Laevinus probably successfully ended the Ligurian rebellion since Livy informs us that the next year’s consuls quelled a rebellion that broke out only at the beginning of 175.

175: P. Mucius Scaevola and M. Aemilius Lepidus

The election, provincial assignment and the initial campaigns of P. Mucius

Scaevola and M. Aemilius Lepidus (the same consul of 187) are lost in the missing

66 The most obvious manifestation of a consul jealously guarding his province and achievements are the circumstances surrounding the prorogation of T. Quinctius Flamininus in 198 (Polyb. 18.11.1; Plut. Flam. 7.1-2). 67 Livy 41.18.8ff; Val. Max. 1.5.9, 2.7.15. 86

quaternion noted above.68 The tantalizingly fragmentary evidence is unfortunate given the apparent importance of these consular campaigns towards an overall thesis regarding resettlement and the Ligurian frontier. Livy’s text breaks off with the news of

Petillius’ death reaching Valerius Laevinus and resumes with the extraordinarily important word deduxit followed by a list of Ligurian tribes, their positions in Northern

Italy and the actions of Mucius Scaevola.69 The obvious conclusion is that the lost text outlined M. Aemilius Lepidus’ campaign, one which culminated in the resettlement of the , the Lapicini, the Hergates and the Friniates, all Ligurian tribes.

Whether Lepidus’ resettlement resembled the forced migrations of 180 or the movement from mountains to plains of 187 and 179 is more difficult to determine. In passages relating the actions of Baebius, Tamphilus and the suffect consul Flaccus, Livy employs various forms of the verb traduco: eo cum traducere Ligures Apuanos

(40.38.3); traducti sunt publico sumptu (40.38.6); agro dividend dandoque iidem qui traduxerant (40.38.7); inde in Samnium traducti (40.41.4). This contrasts with passages in which the Ligurians are ordered down from the mountains and a form of deduco is used: deducere ex montibus in agros campestres procul ab domo (40.38. 2); omnes

Aemilius subegit armaque ademit et de montibus in campos multitudinem deduxit

(39.2.9-10); consul deditos in campestres agros deduxit (40.13.3). The use of deduxit at

41.18.16 suggests that Lepidus simply moved the Ligurian tribes from the mountains to the surrounding plains without transferring them to an entirely different location.

68 Both names are preserved on the fasti triumphales (Degrassi [1947] 80f., 555); Livy 41.19.1 (Mucius Scaevola); Oros. 4.20.34 (Aemilius Lepidus). 69 41.18.15-19.1. A fragment regarding the impropriety of a suffect consul conducting elections must have been included in the missing text as it can only refer to the elections for the year 175. 87

However, Livy also says that the tribes had (fuerant) lived cis Appenninum, which implies that Lepidus subjected them to forced migrations and they now resided elsewhere. But based on the philological argument which shows a clear pattern of linguistic differentiation between mountain-top removal and forced migrations, we must include Lepidus’ activities in 175 in the former category. Furthermore, Lepidus had forced the Ligurians from the mountain-tops in 187; that he did so again would be consistent with his earlier actions.

Mucius Scaevola fought the tribes that had ravaged Luna and Pisa and disarmed them upon their defeat. For the various successes of the consuls in Gaul and Liguria the

Senate voted a three day thanksgiving and sacrificed 40 victims.70 The evidence for consular co-operation is ambiguous. Any textual evidence that Scaevola participated in

Lepidus’ campaign and resettlement is lost and he seems to have been occupied fighting more traditional battles in southern Liguria. The Senatorial decree of thanksgiving celebrated the successes of the two consuls (duorum consulum) but this does not necessarily imply military co-operation. The strongest argument against consular co-operation is that deduxit is in the singular which implies Lepidus as the verb’s only subject.

One other source further complicates the issue. According to the fasti triumphales, Lepidus and Scaevola both celebrated triumphs on March 12 (4 id. [Mart.]) against the same people (the Ligurians). Triumphs on the same day and against the same people were not unheard of: in 268, P. Sempronius Sophus and Ap. Claudius

Russus triumphed over the Picentes, though the date is missing; M. Atilius Regulus and

70 Livy 41.19.1-2. 88

L. Junius Libo triumphed over the Sallentini on January 23, 267; the joint triumph of C.

Claudius Nero and M. Livius Salinator is well documented though lost on the fasti; the triumph of M. Baebius Tamphilus and P. Cornelius Cethegus is also lost from the fasti but appears to have been joint based on Livy’s singular triumphus.71 A triumph on the same day and against the same people strongly hints at consular co-operation.

Unfortunately, any potential reference to their triumph-request or the actual triumph is lost due to another lacuna at 41.20.13. But given the rarity of joint triumphs and the apparent lack of consular co-operation it would be rash to declare theirs a single, joint triumph.72

The outline of consular activities in 175 is admittedly fragmentary but the following is the most plausible reconstruction: Lepidus campaigned against some

Ligurian tribes and forced them down from the mountains to the surrounding plains without subjecting them to long-distance forced-migrations; Scaevola, working separately, fought Ligurian tribes in the region of Pisa and Luna; both celebrated a triumph on the same day against the same peoples, but this was not a joint triumph.

Although Dyson addresses the year only cursorily, the implications for his thesis are huge: “A fragmentary reference to the Ligurian wars of 175 B.C. ends with the word deduxit, implying another forced mass movement.”73 A close reading of the text shows that the ‘forced mass movement’ was closer to Lepidus’ earlier tactic of removing the

Ligurians from the mountain-tops without forcing them out of the area. It also shows that the other consul, Mucius Scaevola, fought more traditionally but was rewarded

71 Degrassi (1947) 40f., 432. 72 Statistically speaking, most triumphs occurred between January and April (especially March- April) because the consular year began mid-March. Successful consuls in search of a triumph would have returned to Rome towards the end of their consulship (January-February) or else once they had been relieved by their replacement (March-April). 73 Dyson (1985) 106; Toynbee (1965) 280-281, for similar assertions. 89

alongside Lepidus with a triumph nonetheless. The year’s developments perfectly encapsulate the nuances of the supposed forced-migration policy and the continuing options facing Roman consuls.

Conclusions

Dyson is correct to demonstrate that Roman strategy in Liguria had to evolve beyond one of yearly pillage-and-plunder before the province could be fully pacified.

He is also correct to recognize that the Senate was increasingly aware of this as the years passed. But Roman policy did not and could not immediately and unequivocally shift. The Senate was the central, thought not the only, figure in founding colonies, a tactic that solidified the Roman presence in Liguria. It also played an important role in rewarding war-less and relatively blood-less campaigns that contributed to a lasting peace in Liguria without stipulating that consuls abide by a fixed Ligurian policy. The

Roman Senate’s ability to control foreign policy was similar to that of a modern market- oriented government’s economic control; it provided powerful incentives for certain types of behaviours and restricted others while hardly ever legislating or mandating the actions of the consuls.74 To do so routinely would have infringed upon consular imperium and the long-standing tradition of consular independence.

In the period after 180, where Dyson sees a policy shift, consuls in Liguria were faced with a broader range of options that might potentially lead to a triumph. Yet these were indeed options. The consul determined his strategy: he could chance a

74 Vishnia (1996) 180-181: “It is doubtful, however, that any regulation would have restrained an ambitious Roman general. On the contrary, as demonstrated in the Spanish campaigns of the 50s and 40s, it only encouraged them both to exceed their authority and to engage in unnecessary and sometimes calamitous battles.”; North (2006) 267: “The constitutional powers of the Senate were limited, but their informal influence was very great." 90

pitched-battle in the hopes of winning a victory so momentous that he would be awarded a triumph or he could try to resettle thousands of Ligurians and pacify the province in that manner. Comparison to the effects of the Purpurio triumph in 200 is instructive. Then, a praetor had been permitted to triumph, thereby opening the floodgates to the praetorian triumph. The triumph of Cethegus and Tamphilus created a precedent that now rewarded consuls who sacrificed short-term military victories for long-term peace efforts. But this pacific ‘program’ was both complex—it includes long- distance forced migrations and the less effective mountain-top removal—and co- existent with more traditional tactics. To further complicate matters, the specifics of a consul’s campaign greatly reduced the burden of choice. That is, consuls who faced a long, tough season of campaigning against a particularly difficult enemy were not forced to consider resettlement as an option. Their primary task was to defeat whichever Ligurian tribe they were engaged with. If that occupied their campaigning season, this did not disadvantage their potential for triumph.

Without resorting to circumstantial evidence, Livy provides little corroborating detail about consular campaigns that involved resettlement.75 One exception is the joint effort of Cethegus and Tamphilus. Aemilius Paullus’ spectacular victory deprived them of their Senatorial assignment so they took advantage of political disarray in

Rome and attacked the unsuspecting Apuani. The tactic worked too well and instead of an unprepared enemy and an easy victory the consuls received the surrender of 12 000 men without a battle. With much time on their hands and little to merit a triumph, the consuls jointly proposed a state-financed resettlement of the surrendered tribes,

75 It is patently circular to argue that all consuls who undertook resettlement clearly had time to do so since they would otherwise have been fighting. 91

probably convincing the patres with arguments about the Roman national interest and an enduring peace.76 Similarly, Livy tells us that the Gallic and Ligurian uprisings in 175 were quickly and easily dealt with, which helps explain Aemilius Lepidus’ removal of a number of Ligurian tribes from the mountains.77 On both occasions we find idle consuls with dwindling triumphi spes who resorted to tactics of pacification: Cethegus and

Tamphilus carried it out on a scale large enough to garner a triumph and set a precedent; Lepidus was continuing a tactic he had employed in 187 but which gained him a triumph in 175 because of the earlier precedent.

76 Their interest in the well-being of the res publica was also expressed in the lex Cornelia Baebia of 181, an anti-electoral bribery law (Rosenstein [2006] 376). 77 Livy 41.19.3-4. 92

Chapter 4: The Popillian Affair: A Case Study in

Roman Politics and Foreign Relations

In 173 M. Popillius Laenas fought a battle with the Ligurian tribe called the

Statellae, received their surrender and proceeded to disarm and sell them into slavery.

The ensuing political turmoil consumed the remainder of his consulship as well as his brother’s the following year; I refer to the entire episode as the Popillian Affair. Livy weaves the Popillian Affair in and out of his narrative at the beginning of Book 42 and is clearly disgusted with Popillian comportment. The Popillian Affair provides one of the most striking examples of the breakdown in relations between the Senate and individual magistrates and is often cited as the most blatant example of so-called triumph-hunting.1 The (mis)deeds of the Popillii brothers occupy an important place in

Livy’s narrative and modern works alike, but Pittenger correctly notes that “scholarly treatments of this curious episode are few and far between.”2 There are more than the two treatments that Pittenger cites but she is correct to identify a conspicuous lack of in-depth and critical investigation of a case that looms so large on the historical horizon.

The Popillian Affair serves as a fitting final case study since it highlights several themes from the previous chapters and because it is an unusually well documented example of the interplay between foreign policy and domestic politics. Below is an outline of the Popillian Affair which includes all pertinent information. Following that is

1 Payne (1962) 73; Dyson (1985) 110-112, says Popillius was “engaged in simple triumph-hunting *…+ The actions of Popillius Laenas were pure adventurism”; Rich (1993) 58; Eckstein (2009) 227- 228. 2 Pittenger (2008) 119 n.10, cites only Vishnia (1996) and Rich (1993). 93

a critical discussion of the Popillian Affair’s historiography which makes the case for a renewed treatment. The analytical section scrutinizes relevant precedents and potential motives for each party’s behaviour (M. Popillius, the Senate, etc.). It demonstrates the adverse effects of systemic checks and balances that permitted the participation of multiple individuals with diverse motives. A concluding section reiterates main themes and discusses the causes and effects of the constitutional deadlock that characterizes the Popillian Affair.

Livy and the Popillian Affair

The Popillian Affair’s narrative is derived entirely from Livy (Book 42.7-10, 21-

22), who imposes a moralizing tone and doctors the chronology to fit his annalistic framework.3 But his personal opinions and the harsh historical tradition can be separated from the narrative history and the events and their relative order are fairly straightforward. The following is a summary of the main actions of the Popillian Affair as described by Livy.

Livy first mentions M. Popillius’ actions in the context of a straightforward military campaign against a group of Ligurians gathered at the town of Carystus in

Statellan territory. Ten thousand Ligurians were killed in a battle that lasted many hours;

Popillius lost three thousand men. The remaining Ligurians placed themselves in deditionem fidem populi Romani. Popillius accepted the Ligurian surrender and proceeded to disarm them, demolish their town and sell them into slavery. The consul then announced his accomplishments in a dispatch to the Senate which was read aloud by the praetor A. Atilius Serranus.

3 Harris (1979) 270-271. 94

According to Livy, the Senate was furious with Popillius. They ordered him to remain in his province until he had purchased the Ligurians from bondage and restored their arms, land and liberty. When Popillius learned of the decree he immediately wintered his troops at Pisa and summoned the patres to the Temple of Bellona, whereupon he harangued and fined the praetor and demanded that the Senate rescind its decree and restore his victory. In response, several Senators delivered speeches against him; Popillius returned to Liguria having accomplished nothing. Towards the end of 173, while M. Popillius was still in a standoff with the Senate, his younger brother Caius was elected consul for the following year.

At the outset of C. Popillius’ consular year, the Senate proposed that the decree regarding the Ligurians be re-submitted and re-adopted. The consul P. Aelius Ligus was willing to do this but C. Popillius threatened to veto any decree concerning his brother.

C. Popillius convinced Aelius Ligus to side with him and thus drew the two Popilii and

Aelius Ligus into a stalemate with the Senate. Since war with Macedon was on the horizon and the potentially lucrative command was on the table, the Senate announced that both consuls would be sent to Liguria without new troops or reinforcements if they did not submit. The consuls responded by adopting work-to-rule, conducting only the business they absolutely must and refusing to depart for their province.

While C. Popillius and Aelius Ligus were still in Rome, M. Popillius sent another dispatch celebrating a second victory over the Statellae that left six thousand Ligurians dead. The Senate was furious. M. Marcius Sermo and Q. Marcius Scilla, two plebeian tribunes, were spurred by Senatorial ire and proposed a decree demanding that all

Statellae be restored to freedom by the Kalends of August. Otherwise, the Senate 95

would appoint someone to investigate and punish whoever was responsible (M.

Popillius). The plebeian assembly passed the decree with ‘complete unanimity’ and the praetor C. Licinius was placed in charge of the investigation.

Only after the decree did both consuls depart for Liguria. M. Popillius, the outgoing proconsul, was fearful of retribution in Rome and was compelled to return only when another tribunician decree declared that he would stand trial in absentia if he did not return by November 13th. He twice stood trial before C. Licinius but pressure from the Popillii and the consul P. Aelius Ligus led Licinius to schedule the mandatory third day of hearings for March 15th, when he would no longer possess the imperium necessary to discharge his duties. “Thus the decree about the Ligurians was evaded by trickery.”4 The Senate also passed a decree declaring that all Ligurians who had not been enemies (hostes) of the Roman people since 179 should be freed and given land across the river Po. C. Popillius was put in charge of carrying out this senatus consultum and faced questions about his failure to do so upon his return to Rome at the end of the year 172.

Historiography of the Popillian Affair

H.H. Scullard places the Popillian Affair within a prosopographical framework and cites it as an example of plebeian versus patrician conflict. Scullard does not elaborate on the supposed tensions between the Atilii Serrani and the Popillii Laenates5, but explains the outcome of the elections for 171 (presided over by C. Popillius Laenas

4 Livy 42.22.8. 5 Toynbee (1965) 633 n.3, addresses the issue, suggesting that the Popillii Laenates and the Atilii Serrani were “rivals for leadership in the Roman colonization of Cisalpine Liguria and Gaul”, citing a series of facts that makes heavy use of prosopography to determine the tension between the two families. 96

and in which P. Licinius Crassus won the consulship) as a direct result of C. Licinius

Crassus’ technical dismissal of the suit against M. Popillius Laenas.6 However, prosopography’s tantalizing promise of unlocking the vagaries of Republican politics has fallen under increasing scrutiny and its value has been heavily curtailed if not altogether obliterated.7

Scullard also cites the Popillian Affair as an example of the “violence and rapacity displayed by many of the newer men who were gaining power”, which he portrays as the symptom of a much deeper political shift in Rome: the predominance of plebeian families in the curule magistracies in the years 173-170.8 Scullard argues that these plebeians “were not merely flouting the will of the elder senators, but were imperiling the mos maiorum”, without explaining why they should have clashed so violently with the Senate.9

A.J. Toynbee offers one of the most detailed interpretations of the Popillian

Affair.10 He casts it in a long tradition of magisterial misdeeds and as a chapter in the ongoing struggle between Senate and magistrate, he declares the Popillian Affair to be a “major defeat” for the Senate.11 He also soundly refutes Scullard’s claim that it is indicative of a plebeian-patrician power struggle.12 Further, Toynbee places the

6 Scullard (1951) 196; Münzer (1920 [1999]) 200-203. 7 See especially Hölkeskamp (2001); Millar (1984) 15. 8 Scullard (1951) 194-195. He cites 173 as the beginning of the shift, but the crux came in 172 when “for the first time in Roman history both consuls were plebeians”. Both consuls were plebeian in 171 and 170 as well. 9 Scullard (1951) 200. 10 Toynbee (1965) 185, 206-208 and esp. 632-635. 11 Toynbee (1965) 634. 12 Toynbee (1965) 635 n.1: “The fact would, of course, have been highly significant if the date had been in the fifth or fourth century B.C.; but, by 172 B.C., political alignments at Rome had long since ceased to follow the line of division between the patrician and the plebeian order.” 97

Popillian Affair within the context of Roman agrarian policy. He prefaces his discussion of the Popillian Affair with the following statement:

This exhaustion of Cisalpine ager publicus available for allotment pulled the Roman Government up short in the pursuit of its policy of trying to please all parties in the Roman state by giving the capitalists a free hand in the Peninsula and by finding compensation for the dispossessed peasantry in the Peninsula’s Cisalpine annex. In this impasse, which had been reached by 173 B.C., one of the consuls for that year, M. Popilius Laenas, confronted the Senate with a fait accompli.13

The term ‘capitalists’ is anachronistic and reveals much concerning Toynbee’s ideological framework. He contends that Popillius accomplished “in the teeth of the

Senate’s opposition, what had evidently been his object from first to last”: obtaining

Cisalpine land to put at the disposal of the land commissioners, appointed that same year, who would then distribute it to Roman and Latin peasants.14 He cites an

“unavowed recognition that Popillius’ atrocious conduct had exposed the bankruptcy of the Senate’s current agrarian policy” as the reason that M. Popillius’ actions met with such Senatorial hostility; Popillius had “had confronted the Senate with a dilemma which the Senate was unwilling to face.”15

Apart from Toynbee’s anachronistic and loaded language, his analysis rests on two equally unpalatable axioms. The first is that Popillius’ one and only goal was to procure land. But it is clear that M. Popillius aimed at a triumph—the skirmish with the

Senate only began when his request for three days of thanksgiving, a prerequisite for a triumph-request, was denied.16 Toynbee’s explanation of the Senatorial reaction

(ostensibly furious at Popillius’ despoliation of the deditio relationship, but truly

13 Toynbee (1965), 206. 14 Toynbee (1965), 206-207. 15 Toynbee (1965), 208. 16 Livy 42.9.1-6. 98

because it had been shown the futility of its agrarian policy) is unconvincing and forces a more complicated reading of the evidence than necessary.

Secondly, Toynbee’s view of an alleged Roman agrarian policy presupposes an aggressive long-term foreign policy, a dubious theoretical construct. Rome was frequently aggressive and benefitted from spear-won ager Romanus but this does not establish causality. Dyson has also pointed out that Statellan territory was “well removed from the line of intermeshed colonial and ad viritum settlements farther south, and their land was surrounded by untamed natives. It was hardly the place where the Romans would place scattered farmsteads.”17

W.V. Harris calls the Popillian Affair an exercise in “blatant land-grabbing”, adding Roman aggressiveness to Toynbee’s agrarian argumentation. Yet Harris fails to understand the nuances of the situation when he portrays it as a Roman initiative and reduces the affair to “a dispute at Rome about how the Statellates should be treated”.18

Harris points to supposed hostility between A. Atilius Serranus and Popillius, rejects

Scullard’s novi homines thesis and suggests that M. Popillius’ ‘untraditional’ response to the Ligurian deditio caused the Senatorial reaction.19 He correctly notes that the

Senatorial outcry “was far from unanimous”, though it is not true that “inaccurate statements have often had the effect of making the Senate seem more tender towards

17 Dyson (1985) 110. 18 Harris (1979), 226. 19 Harris (1979) 271: “M. Popillius’ offence, in so far as he was genuinely believed to have committed one, was to have achieved traditional ends by an untraditional, even if technically permissible, response to the Statellates’ act of deditio.” 99

the Ligurians than it was.”20 Harris offers the possibility that the Senate was upset because Popillius had engulfed his province in violence on the eve of a Macedonian war.

John Rich’s analysis of the causes of middle-republican war-making situates M.

Popillius squarely within the group of magistrates who engineered wars for personal gain.21 He cites many second-century examples and concludes that “simple triumph- hunting was the exception, not the rule” because “unscrupulous triumph-hunting was politically risky.”22 But if simple triumph-hunting was rare, long-term political repercussions for engaging in it were rarer still. Neither of the Popillii damaged their political prospects through their protracted standoff with the Senate.

Rachel Feig Vishnia also addresses the Popillian Affair. She characterizes the period 172-170 as one marked by magisterial abuses of power which placed new strain on the traditional legal system and gave rise to plebiscite-approved, praetor-conducted inquiries against magistrates suspected of wrongdoing.23 In this respect, the Popillian

Affair helped establish certain legal precedents, though this offers little in the way of explanation for Popillius’ or the Senate’s motives.

Vishnia addresses the Popillian Affair in a list of what she terms magisterial

‘deviations’ from Senatorial orders. Beginning with L. Furius Purpurio’s unprecedented boldness in 200, Vishnia lists thirteen instances down to 167 when Roman magistrates

20 Harris (1979) 271, accuses Scullard in particular of making the Senate seem too ‘tender’. 21 Other examples Rich cites: A. Manlius Vulso (accused of unauthorized campaigns in and Histria [Livy 38.45.6, 41.7.7-8]), M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina (against the Vaccaei in Hither Spain [App. Hisp. 80-83; Oros. 5.5.13]), M. Junius Silanus (the Cimbri [Asc. 80C]), L. Licinius Lucullus (the Vaccaei [App. Hisp. 51-55]), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (the Salassi [Dio fr. 74]) and L. Caecilius Metellus (the Dalmatians [App. Ill. 11]). 22 Rich (1993) 58; 57-59 for full discussion. 23 Vishnia (1996) 132-135. 100

defied the will of the Senate. She concludes that magistrates had more effective power than the Senate.24 Magistrates overstepped their boundaries because they knew that it was unlikely they would be severely reprimanded and even more improbable that this censure would limit their career in any way. Similarly, John North cites the Popllian

Affair as an example of the conflict created by “the charged relationship between the

Senate and the individual commander or governor.” North addresses the constitutional issues at stake and concludes that “the Senate’s constitutional weakness is very clear here.”25

Pittenger provides an even more recent discussion of the Popillian Affair. She concerns herself with the triumphal culture of mid-Republican Rome, focusing mostly on the performative aspect of the triumph-request, the triumph debate and the triumph itself. Pittenger addresses the Popillian Affair as an inverted paradigm of the traditional triumph-request and debate.26 By establishing stylistic similarities with actual triumph-requests, both in Livy’s language and in M. Popillius’ actions themselves,

Pittenger argues that Popillius was unsuccessful precisely because he attempted to invert the power relations that governed traditional triumph-requests: “Laenas refused to play by the established rules and bow to the authority of the patres.”

24 “In fact, it was the consuls who had the power to paralyze senatorial activity if they chose to do so.” (Vishnia [1996] 189). 25 North (2006) 271. 26 Pittenger (2008) 231: “Even without any mention of a triumph, that is, the familiar concepts, performative elements, formulaic expressions, and basic expectations from a triumph debate still underlie the historian’s narrative, but subtly hidden, because they have all been systematically overturned or transgressed by the negative exemplum. In short, what we have here is a triumph debate turned on its head”. 101

Precedents and Motivations

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Popillian Affair has been approached from a number of directions and yielded various conclusions. But apart from Pittenger’s analysis of Livy’s language and narrative structure, the treatments have been superficial and generally contextualize the affair within a narrative of

Senate-magistrate breakdown, patrician-plebeian tensions, Roman aggression or constitutional weakness. The scholarship has not done justice to such an exceptional and informative episode in republican history. The Popillian Affair is exceedingly well- documented and invites a renewed approach that fully exploits the cases particularities.

I will approach the Popillian Affair from a different perspective, one which analyzes the motivations of every actor in the Popillian Affair. The object is to demonstrate their conflicting motivations, the mechanisms by which these led to political turmoil and constitutional gridlock, and some truths about Roman government and foreign relations. Some analyses of minor actors will unfortunately be brief for lack of more detailed information. This only reinforces one of the main findings of my analysis: individuals whose motives are partially obscure and who were only peripherally involved greatly influenced the course and outcome of the Popillian Affair.

M. Popillius Laenas

Popillius Laenas’ motivations are the most difficult to recover because Livy’s obvious disgust with the consul has shaped his narrative: “the historian has cast his own implicitly negative vote in the supplicatio debate before even allowing the consul’s 102

letter to reach the Senate floor.”27 Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of the events and narrative structure dispels certain common explanations of Popillius’ actions and permits a more balanced interpretation. The most persistent misconception is that

Popillius Laenas attempted to engineer a war.28 This view has persisted despite the clear implications of Livy’s description of the initial confrontation between Popillius and the Statellae. The Ligurians had amassed a ‘great army’ (magnus exercitus Ligurum) at

Carystus. They initially kept within the town but eventually met Popillius in pitched battle. The battle supposedly lasted more than three hours and “hope inclined to neither side” (ut neutro inclinaret spes) before Popillius’ deployment of cavalry decisively shifted the prospects in his favour. Ten thousand Ligurians were killed, more than seven hundred captured along with eighty-two military standards while more than three thousands Romans were lost.

Livy’s description of the initial engagement lacks the moral indignation of the

Senate’s supposed response and reads like a standard battle description.29 Indeed,

Livy’s paragraph opens with the highly formulaic, annalistic statement that “the following were the events of the year in the provinces”.30 The Ligurian army’s presence is taken for granted and certainly neither Livy nor the Senate denies its existence.31 Nor

27 Pittenger (2008) 233; Harris (1979) 270-271. Pittenger disagrees with Harris in contending that the language “does not represent a superficial bias on Livy’s part, beneath which the unembellished historical truth lies hidden”. But the misunderstanding began with the Senate, not Livy. 28 Toynbee (1965) 208, suggests that Popillius’ ultimate goal was to engage multiple tribes in an attempt to win as much new ager Romanus was possible. He also says Popillius ‘forced’ a battle upon the Statellae (260, 611); Rich (1993) 57; Dyson (1985) 110-111; Brunt (1971) 188. 29 Pittenger (2008) 231, describes Livy’s account as following a ‘predictable pattern’; 241-243, for Livy’s narrative structure and its effect on the reader’s perception of the Popillian Affair. 30 Livy 42.7.1: In provinciis eo anno haec acta. 31 Contrary to Dyson’s assertion that Popillius’ claim about the presence of Ligurian forces was “most likely an excuse designed to justify his provocation and turn it into a bellum iustum” (110). 103

do the length of the engagement and casualty numbers imply a lopsided slaughter; the ratio of 10:3 is significantly higher than other commanders in legitimate engagements.

Unlike the remaining chapters in the Popillian Affair, Livy’s description is so straightforward because it has not been tainted by bias. The inevitable conclusion is that Popillius attacked a large Ligurian armed force that he believed threatened Roman security.

We are left to wonder if Popillius’ actions were warranted. Livy, the Roman

Senate and most historians concur that Popillius wantonly attacked a peaceful people.

But consuls had been fighting Ligurian coalitions for the previous four years. In 177,

Claudius Pulcher had to defeat a group of Ligurians (Ligures concilia).32 This same group succeeded in capturing Mutina a year later, forcing Pulcher back into the field as proconsul.33 Later that year the consuls were occupied with multiple tribes once again.

Finally, Aemilius Lepidus removed four different Ligurian tribes from the mountain-tops signaling that they had fought in concert against the Romans.34 Though the Statellae had always been at peace with the Romans, amassing an army of considerable size cannot have seemed peaceful, and Ligurian tribes had proven time and again that surrender was nominal and peace ephemeral. Popillius took a pro-active approach in the face of what resembled yet another Ligurian uprising. That the Statellae were surrounded by tribes hostile to Rome further vindicates Popillius’ fear of a sudden

Statellan uprising.

The historiography is so anti-Popillius that it would be strange to find a claim, stated as fact, that cast Popillius in a favourable light. 32 Livy 41.11.10. 33 Livy 41.14.3. 34 Livy 41.18-19. 104

After the battle, Popillius received the surrender of the less than ten thousand remaining Statellae. Livy does not use the full phrase for a deditio (deditionem in fidem populi Romani) but he employs the verb (dediderunt) and adds that this was done

“without, indeed, making any stipulations” (nihil quidem illi pacti). This phrase signals that the surrendered Ligurians had no legal grounds to protest their treatment, a sentiment echoed in their hope (speraurerant) that Popillius would show leniency.35

They had in fact placed themselves in deditionem and accepted all that the relationship entailed.36

Popillius proceeded to disarm them, demolish their town and sell them into slavery. Disarmament of surrendered peoples was neither new nor likely to draw the

Senate’s ire.37 The Senate’s response to M. Claudius Marcellus in 182 stipulated that if the consuls Cn. Baebius Tamphilus and L. Aemilius Paullus were to accept the two thousand Ligurians in deditionem they should remove their arms (receptis arma adimi).38 In 187, the consul C. Flaminius had accepted the surrender of the Friniates and disarmed them (in deditionem gentem accepit et arma ademit).39 A. Postumius Albinus had disarmed the defeated Apuani in 180.40 Consuls had received enemies in deditionem before and disarmed them, sometimes at the Senate’s urging, without falling afoul of Senatorial opinion.

35 The full formulation (deditos in fidem populi Romani) is found in the Senatorial response. 36 Toynbee (1965) 609-611; Badian (1958) 4-7; Harris (1979) 270. 37 For debate regarding this practice under the empire: MacMullen (1974); Brunt (1975). But they refer to long-term disarmament of imperial subjects, not immediate disarmament of a defeated army by a republican consul. 38 Livy 40.16.6. 39 Livy 39.2.2. 40 Livy 40.41.1-2. See also P. Mucius Scaevola in 175: Livy 41.19.1-2. 105

But disarmament was as far as most consuls went. Popillius’ demolition of the

Ligurian town was harsh but also not without precedent. Marcellus had demolished the

Gallic town near Aquileia and though the Senate was supposedly unhappy, he was prorogued and continued to hold command in Northern Italy.41 But that town’s recent construction had alarmed the Senate and prompted the Roman response whereas the

Ligurian town of Carystus had presumably been around much longer and did not ‘merit’ destruction. Both and Corinth would be razed to the ground in 146 but these were the seats of power of legitimate enemies defeated in a legitimate war and done on Senatorial instructions.

The Senate found Popillius’ final action—the sale of the Ligurians’ property and of the Ligurians themselves into slavery— the most repugnant. In this, Popillius can only have had one goal: personal enrichment. Besides lining his pockets, Popillius will also have desired the profits as donatives for his troops and as spoils to carry in what he hoped would be a triumphal procession. The treatment of Haliartus, Coronea and

Thisbe in 171 provides comparative evidence for the Senate’s reaction. All three cities fell to Roman forces and were equally harshly treated but only Thisbe and Coronea received redress. Toynbee has plausibly speculated that these two cities surrendered whereas Haliartus had not and so its destruction and the sale of its inhabitants into slavery constituted legitimate practices of war. The Senate upheld the sanctity of the

41 Zon. 9.21; L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi fr. 35 (Toynbee [1965] 629; Briscoe [2008] 404). Toynbee draws a parallel. 106

deditio relationship while reinforcing the dire consequences for those who held out until final defeat.42

Popillius’ praetorship helps illuminate his treatment of the Statellae after their surrender. He was praetor in 176 and received Sardinia as his province but requested permission to remain in Rome, claiming that the current praetor (Ti. Sempronius

Gracchus) was doing an excellent job and that changing magistrates cum imperio at this point would be militarily disastrous.43 Two of Popillius’ colleagues refused to take command of their provinces as well: P. Licinius Crassus (Nearer Spain), citing his need to perform certain sacrifices in Rome; M. Cornelius Scipio Maluginensis (Farther Spain), for reasons unknown. Their motivations are particularly puzzling.44 Aspiring triumphators rarely turned down opportunities for glory. Popillius’ failure to occupy his province and conclude a war in 176 probably left him even more covetous of the public recognition that accompanied one’s rise up the cursus honorum. His lackluster praetorship might help explain the lengths to which he went to ensure an adequate supply of booty for himself, his soldiers and his proposed triumph.

There is no evidence that Popillius tried to shield his record in Liguria. In fact, he openly trumpeted his achievements in dispatches to the Senate and expected thanksgivings to be decreed. Popillius must have believed that the Ligurian army had presented a threat, and, more importantly, that he had successfully dealt with the situation in an appropriate manner. Whether he had been justified in attacking the

42 Toynbee (1965) 637-639; Zon. 9.22. 43 Livy 41.15.6-9. Gracchus was indeed doing very well in Sardinia, eventually garnering a second triumph (Degrassi [1947] 80-81, 555). 44 Vishnia (1996) 185-187, deals with these three and dejectedly declares “reluctantly, we have to leave this affair shrouded in mystery.” 107

Statellae, his treatment of them crystallized the Senatorial opposition. When the

Senate ordered Popillius to reverse his actions, he sent the legions into winter-quarters at Pisa and made straight for the Temple of Bellona. He harangued and fined the praetor A. Atilius Serranus before begging the patres to repeal the decree against him and grant him his deserved thanksgiving in order to honour to the gods and show him some respect.

Popillius’ actions on this occasion say much about his motivations. His convening of the Senate in the Temple of Bellona is unassailable evidence that he aimed at a triumph. Pittenger’s careful study of the Popillian Affair places it squarely within the context of triumph-requests. It is possible that Livy’s arrangement of the episode casts it in the mold of a triumph-request, though Popillius’ actions themselves- sending dispatches to Rome recording his achievements, convening the Senate in the

Temple of Bellona, requesting that thanksgiving be voted- point substantively to a failed bid.

Popillius believed that a personal appearance in Rome would reverse the

Senate’s stance. His appearance changed little but he was at least drawing on a lengthy tradition; Purpurio was successful in 200 because he was in Rome while Cotta was in

Gaul; Marcellus’ triumph-request was strengthened by his co-consul’s absence; M.

Fulvius Nobilior prevailed over the objections of M. Aemilius Lepidus and his lackey tribune, M. Aburius. Arguing one’s own case before the Senators went a long way towards securing votes in the curia.45

45 Pittenger (2008) 236-237, compares and contrasts Popillius’ actions with Purpurio’s in 200. 108

Popillius’ anger towards the praetor may point to some personal hostility between the two,46 but it also demonstrates that he thought Atilius Serranus was responsible for the decree against him. Popillius was not entirely unprecedented in fining Atilius Serranus: Aemilius Lepidus had fined the praetor M. Furius Crassipes in

187.47 Popillius was on the wrong side of Senatorial opinion yet was still vested with the power to fine a praetor who had personally offended him. The consul’s belief in the praetor’s role and Popillius’ authority to fine Serranus point to a larger constitutional problem: the propensity of individual magistrates to influence and interfere with the workings of the Roman state. The Roman system of checks and balances—Polybius’

‘mixed constitution’— limited the absolute power of any one governing institution. But it also meant that individual magistrates, especially consuls and plebeian tribunes, wielded disproportionate amounts of authority. Coupled with individual ambitions, political allegiances and ulterior motives, magistrates were capable of throwing a wrench into the smooth functioning of government. The Senate’s will was easily thwarted by magistrates with competing motives.

After Popillius failed to reverse the Senate’s position, he returned to his province and wintered at Pisa. His prorogation can be inferred from Livy’s use of the word proconsul (42.21.2); he had probably been prorogued in order to carry out his

Senatorial instructions. But Popillius instead fought another engagement with the

Statellae and killed six thousand, a feat which he trumpeted in dispatches to the Senate.

His actions on this occasion deserve a more detailed treatment than they have

46 Toynbee (1965) 633 n.3, suggests that the Atilii Serrani and the Popillii Laenates contended for influence in Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria. 47 Diod. 29.14. 109

generally received. They cannot have been simple triumph-hunting since they assuredly did not ingratiate him with the Senate. The Senate had already signaled its unwillingness to grant Popillius a triumph after his first victory. A more nuanced explanation is needed to make sense of his actions. Two possibilities suggest themselves: the second campaign was intended to convince the Senate that the war was more serious than they believed and force them to reverse their position, or, the war in Statellan territory was more serious than the Senate believed.

The first possibility is that Popillius engaged the Statellae again in order to make it seem as though they were a real danger. This cynical reconstruction of

Popillius’ motives adheres to the standard position that the consul was the unjustified aggressor. It incorporates the traditional war-mongering and triumph-hunting explanations but explains how Popillius sought to accomplish those tasks. It is not enough to say that he attacked the Statellae a second time in the hunt for a triumph.

Popillius needed to change the Senate’s sentiment towards him.48 They had already dismissed the validity of the war based on his post-deditio treatment of the enemy. But if he could fight them again and somehow strengthen his case that this was a bellum iustum, he could reverse the Senate’s initial stance and be properly rewarded. The second campaign was effectively a double-or-nothing bet which would clear Popillius if he were successful or else further enrage the Senate. The Senate, skeptical of Popillius’ claims and infuriated with his newly elected brother, did not buy it. This explanation does not absolve M. Popillius of wrongdoing but provides a fuller picture of his

48 Pittenger (2008) 235: “the imperator sought to paint one self-portrait whereas the solemn vote of his aristocratic peers inscribed something quite different into the historical record.” It is unfortunate that Pittenger astutely recognizes the duality of Livy’s narrative but rarely challenges the ‘official’ version. 110

motivations. Whereas Marcellus had tried to convince the Senate that a Histrian war was necessary by words, Popillius tried twice to do the same with actions.

The second possibility has received virtually no attention since it is taken for granted that Popillius engineered a war against an innocent Ligurian tribe. But the

Senate’s initial outrage was caused by his treatment of the surrendered Statellae and the consequent (mis)perception of the casus belli. Popillius’ second campaign was devoid of booty, enemy enslavement and personal enrichment. Further, he felt compelled to tell the Senate of his feat, an odd thing for a consul who had just directly contravened Senatorial instructions. He cannot have hoped to win any support in the

Senate by flouting its authority so brazenly. We should thus entertain the possibility that his second campaign was waged in self-defense against Statellan attacks. Livy’s brevity certainly does not preclude this conclusion. Popillius’ spoil-less victory suggests he refrained from the practices that had earlier landed him in hot water. The proconsul had learned his lesson and attempted to stay on the Senate’s good side, contenting himself with victory in battle alone.

Both possibilities are inherently plausible yet entail vastly different ramifications for our understanding of the Popillian Affair. Fortunately, Livy’s statement immediately following the announcement of Popillius’ second victory clarifies the situation: “because of the injustice done in this war the rest of the Ligurian peoples also took up arms.”49 A Ligurian uprising was one of the Senate’s main concerns but there is no evidence that it occurred to any significant extent after Popillius’ second campaign.

The consuls in 172, C. Popillius Laenas and P. Aelius Ligus, achieved nothing of note

49 Livy 42.21.2-3: propter cuius iniuriam belli ceteri quoque Ligurum populi ad arma ierunt. 111

because “it was considered more useful to the state that the thoroughly aroused

Ligurians should be restrained and calmed.”50 But this is not evidence for widespread military action and suggests that the consuls were restrained from pursuing bellicose agendas rather than engaged in pacifying rebellions. Furthermore, Liguria remained quiet for several years following the Popillian Affair. No magistrate was sent there until

170 and even then Livy notes that he had a quiet year in Gaul and Liguria since “neither did the enemy take up arms, nor did the consul lead the legions into their fields.”51

Serious warfare in Liguria did not resume until 167 and this can hardly be attributed to

Popillius’ actions.

Livy’s statement makes more sense if the Ligurians who took up arms are the same ones whom Popillius defeated in his first campaign. In other words, if Livy or his source has misinterpreted or misrepresented the sequence of events, then Popillius’ initial attack on the Statellae forced others to rebel and prompted the second battle.52

This chronology accords well with the Senate’s supposed response that Popillius had

“roused pacified people to rebellion”.53 Thus Popillius’ second campaign was a successful defense against an attack that his first campaign had precipitated. Popillius’ victory in self-defense would have demonstrated that the Ligurians had in fact represented a threat and prompted a dispatch to Rome which asked for the Senate to recognize the legitimacy of his actions. Thus the statement’s content supports the view that Popillius’ second campaign was waged in self-defense; the statement’s position in the narrative probably reflects Livy’s internalization of the Senate’s concerns or else the

50 Livy 42.26.1. 51 Livy 43.9.1-3. 52 Pittenger (2008) 240, seems to support this interpretation. 53 Livy 42.21.4: pacatos ad rebellandum incitasset. 112

effects of a hostile historiographic tradition. Evidence that Popillius’ second campaign caused a real rebellion is lacking.54

The rest of M. Popillius’ actions are self-explanatory. He was initially fearful of retribution in Rome and was forced to return only by a decree that granted the praetor the power to try Popillius in absentia. He twice stood trial before Licinius before his entreaties and those of P. Aelius Ligus prevailed and forced a compromise that allowed him to save face.

The Senate

Determining the Senate’s motivations at any particular time is more difficult than has generally been allowed. The Senate’s task involved protecting Roman interests while safeguarding its own interests as well. Families looked out for one another and individuals protected themselves and their friends. Tension between competition and consensus was the defining factor of Senatorial dynamics and is responsible for the seemingly inconsistent nature of Roman policy. However, there are a few issues in the

Popillian Affair on which the Senate seems to have agreed almost unanimously.

First, it should be emphatically noted that Senatorial sympathies did not lie with the Statellae per se. Harris is correct to identify the locus of Senatorial opposition in something other than pro-Statellan leanings.55 Roman magistrates routinely perpetrated offences against allied, friendly or neutral peoples and were only occasionally called to account for it, generally following a plea by the aggrieved party or

54 Dyson (1985) 113, writing of the military dimension of Popillius’ actions: “The actions of Popillius do not seem to have had negative repercussions.” 55 Harris (1979) 271. Harris overstates the opposing case; Scullard does not accuse the Senate of pro-Ligurian sympathies. 113

else an investigation undertaken by political opponents. Pittenger correctly notes that

“at a different moment another imperator who had dealt with the Statellates no less harshly might well have met with praise rather than censure.”56

We must also be wary of accepting that the Senate acted unanimously and univocally. According to Livy, Senatorial consensus prompted the plebeian tribunes to pass the Marcian decree.57 But we know that for various reasons, C. Popillius Laenas, C.

Licinius Crassus and P. Aelius Ligus—two consuls and a praetor—sided with M. Popillius at various stages of the Popillian Affair. It would be highly unlikely if the Popillii had no other political or personal friends in the curia. A majority of Senators could recognize the gravity of the situation and, for a multitude of public, political and private reasons, express the corporate will of the Senate. But there must certainly have been others who advocated on Popillius’ behalf. Thus we may legitimately speak of a Senatorial reaction having been conditioned by certain considerations, but should bear in mind that it was probably not unanimous.

Protection of the deditio relationship was the strongest initial factor in the

Senate’s reaction. The Senate’s outrage against Popillius was sparked because of his brutal treatment of the surrendered Statellae. It is this objection that comes through most forcefully in Livy. Popillius had established “the worst possible precedent” and debased the deditio relationship, one based on trust and expectation of fair treatment.

We have seen that protection of the deditio and of Rome’s public image was one of the

Senate’s prerogatives. Senators who seldom agreed could see the value in restraining

56 Pittenger (2008) 234. 57 Livy 42.21.6: hoc consensu patrum accensi… 114

the most vicious practices in favour of later payouts on the battlefield. Even Harris agrees: “M. Popillius’ offence, in so far as he was genuinely believed to have committed one, was to have achieved traditional ends by an untraditional, even if technically permissible, response to the Statellates’ act of deditio.”58

Popillius’ conscious inversion of the triumph-request paradigm probably entrenched the opposition. Consuls and praetors calling the Senate to order in the

Temple of Bellona and outright demanding recognition of their feats was nothing new but Popillius took the behavior to the extreme. Rather than submitting to the Senate’s wishes or celebrating an unsanctioned Alban triumph as unsuccessful applicants occasionally did59, Popillius went on the offensive, fining the praetor Atilius Serranus, haranguing the Senate for depriving him of due credit before storming off to Liguria.

Such brazen flouting of authority could not fail to enrage at least a majority of the

Senators and is responsible for escalating tensions between the wayward consul and the conscript fathers.60

A third possible motive for concerted Senatorial action against Popillius involves geopolitical calculations. The Roman republic was gearing up for war against

Perseus of Macedon and preparations were taking place on a massive scale.61 With war on the horizon the Senate cannot have been eager to let Popillius drag them into a

Ligurian war against tribes that had previously been peaceful whether the consul was

58 Harris (1979) 271; cf. Dyson (1985) 111. 59 M. Claudius Marcellus in 211 (Livy 26.21.1-13); Q. Minucius Rufus in 197 (Livy 33.23.1-3); C. Cicerius in 173 (Livy 42.21.6-8); Pittenger (2008) 231-245, for paradigm inversion. 60 Pittenger (2008) 236ff. 61 Both praetors in charge of the investigation against M. Popillius were also busy with preparations for war against Macedon (Livy 42.27.1-8; MRR 1.411). Harris (1979) 231, doubts the urgency with which Rome viewed the war with Perseus, calling the war preparations ‘unhurried’ and suggesting that Rome was the aggressor and need not have gone to war. 115

justified in his actions or not.62 The Senate might have contented itself with letting

Popillius triumph and focusing on the war with Perseus if it were not for two factors: doing so would have set a most dangerous precedent wherein consuls were rewarded for reckless behaviour (Popillius’ despoliation of the deditio) if it were politically or militarily expedient to do so; as outlined above, Popillius’ first attack had actually roused other Ligurians to rebellion. Rome had spent the better part of two decades pacifying Liguria tribe by tribe and the hard-won (if fleeting) respite had been interrupted at precisely the wrong time. The Senate had expressed such geopolitical calculations before: Marcellus had been forbidden from attacking the Istrians in 183 because regional peace would allow for the successful founding of Aquileia.

Livy explicitly references such a calculation in 172. The consuls C. Popillius and

Aelius Ligus achieved nothing of note since “it was considered more useful to the state that the thoroughly aroused Ligurians should be restrained and calmed.”63 The Senate’s instructions to the two consuls were meant to restrain the usually free hand consuls enjoyed in making war. That Livy frequently notes uneventful consulships without providing explanation speaks to the plausibility of his comment here.64

These rationales are not mutually exclusive. All three would presumably have surfaced during the rancorous debates after Serranus’ reading of Popillius’ dispatches and when Popillius himself came to Rome. Senatorial response to the Popillian Affair

62 Pittenger (2008) 234: “It did not matter much whether the consul’s deeds actually fell within the bounds of the ius belli or outside them. 63 Livy 42.26.1; Pittenger (2008) 234, 240, suggests quite improbably that the Senate knew the stalemate would continue and gave the consuls Liguria in order to buy time in Macedonia and not appear the aggressor. 64 Contrast with Livy 43.9.1-3, where Aulus Atilius Serranus, consul in Liguria in 170, achieved nothing of note because the enemy did not engage him, nor he them. 116

was conditioned by political, military and geopolitical considerations rather than any affection for the Statellae as staunch allies and buffers against more aggressive tribes to the North. These considerations do not constitute a frontier ‘policy’ but do demonstrate an uncommon level of cohesion in the face of an overzealous consul whose actions threatened Roman security and the aristocratic ethos.

One further Senatorial action has been the subject of speculation. The Senate’s decree that all Ligurians who had not been enemies of the roman people since 179 should be restored to freedom and given land across the Po has been explained several ways. Toynbee cites the mass movement as evidence that the Popillian Affair was always about land and that the Senate supported Popillius’ aims but abhorred his method.65 Pittenger interprets the decree as a Senatorial muscle-flex intended to “leave no doubt that the senate meant business now in defending its interests and curbing men like Laenas.”66 But the year 179 was a “more or less arbitrary terminus ante quem”67 and there had been significant Roman activity in Liguria between 179 and 172.

C. Claudius Pulcher had triumphed over Ligurians in 177, both consuls had been sent there in 176 and both consuls had triumphed over Ligurians in 175.68 The mid-170s had seen much action in Liguria and the Senate had awarded a number of triumphs in those years, so the Senate’s stance is prima facie confusing and contradictory.

Dyson’s interpretation limits the decree’s scope and accords well with our picture of the Senate. He thinks the decree “provides another insight into a persistent frontier problem”: the illegal enslaving of Ligurians. The decree singled out only those

65 Toynbee (1965) 208; Harris (1979) 271. 66 Pittenger (2008) 244. 67 Pittenger (2008) 244. 68 Harris (1979) 259, speculates that both consuls were also sent there in 174. 117

Ligurians who had not been enemies (hostes) of the Romans and “was not intended to abrogate any legitimate actions of victorious Roman generals.” The Senate intended to restore to freedom Ligurians who had been enslaved by “well-organized slaving operations.”69 Dyson draws an instructive parallel between the Popillian Affair and ongoing developments in Spain. The illegal enslaving of Spanish tribes and their re- instatement had led to an ‘inner frontier’ of Romanized natives whose leaders were at the forefront of the mid-century Spanish Wars. Dyson thinks the Senate purposely settled the newly freed Ligurians across the Po, away from their former habitations.70

Dyson’s interpretation is attractive because it does not presuppose a Senatorial reversal of ‘policy’—the Senate did not declare the victories and triumphs of the last 7 years null and void. The retroactive de-legitimization of consular victories and triumphs would have been an unprecedented breach of the Senate-magistrate relationship.

Instead, the decree reinforced the illegitimacy of Popillius’ war by declaring that his enemies were not official Roman hostes. It further ordered the return to freedom of all

Ligurians who had not been hostes since 179, which implies that frontier slaving- operations had reached a breaking point. Popillius may have been the most visible and flagrant perpetrator in a long line of entrepreneurial Romans that the Senate was now attempting to stop.

69 Dyson (1985) 112. 70 On a traditional reading of the Senate’s decree, it is the most blatant example of forced Ligurian migrations at the Senate’s insistence. But Dyson does not endorse this point of view and notes that “policy considerations for northern and southern Liguria were different, however” (112). The northern tribes were not moved en masse because they supposedly formed a good buffer against invasion. 118

A. Atilius Serranus

The praetor urbanus read M. Popillius’ initial dispatches in the Senate because the other consul was in . His subsequent role in the decree against Popillius is less clear. Toynbee suggests that the Atilii Serrani and the Popillii Laenates contended for influence in Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria, though there is no way to confirm this.71

There is no direct evidence that Atilius Serranus was responsible for conditioning the

Senate’s response but Popillius’ actions indicate that he at least thought so. The praetor may have used his messengerial role to be the first to denounce Popillius Laenas and thereby augment his own visibility and reputation. His tone, body language and other communicative devices could have deeply influenced the Senate’s reception of

Popillius’ dispatch.

Serranus’ cursus honorum provides further evidence that he may have benefitted politically. He had been moderately successful as praetor in 192 and was prorogued into 191 but failed to reach the consulship thereafter. Serranus’ odds of winning the consulship were greatly diminished with every passing year since his initial praetorship. Thus his praetorship in 173 amounted to a second political life. Serranus was prorogued in 172 and sent to deal with troop levies in Brundisium. He was also part of a Senatorial delegation sent to Greek communities to keep them allied with Rome against Macedon. Finally, he was elected consul for the year 170, the earliest possible date under the lex Villia annalis. It is possible that Serranus’ early advocacy of what would become the Senate’s position in the Popillian Affair ingratiated him with the

71 Toynbee (1965), 633 n.3. 119

patres and afforded him recognitions and opportunities for advancement that culminated in his attainment of the consulship.72

C. Popillius Laenas

Caius’ motives are straightforward though revealing. He tried to protect his older brother from the Senatorial decree levied against him .73 The initial decree against

M. Popillius ordered him to reverse his actions without stipulating any political consequences; Caius was protecting his brother’s victory and honour, not his brother himself. There is no reason to doubt that C. Popillius was motivated by brotherly love and family solidarity in his opposition to the Senate. Other Roman pairs of brothers acted similarly. The Scipii had shown similar close relations in 194 and again during the trials of the Scipios.

More important is C. Popillius’ ability to hold up proceedings with the consular veto. His threat to veto the re-adoption of the decree against his brother caused the political system to breakdown. The Senate responded by allotting the consuls Liguria and denying their request for new armies or reinforcements, to which the consuls responded with essentially work-to-rule. Politics was very much a family affair at Rome and familial ties turned Senatorial consensus into a political stalemate.

72 Praetorship in 192: Livy 35.20.12-13, 22.1-3; Zon. 9.19. Prorogation in 191: Livy 36.11.9, 12.9, 20.7-8. Praetorship in 173: Livy 42.6.10. Prorogation: Livy 42.27.4. Delegation: Livy 42.38.1-47.3; Polyb. 27.1.1, 2.11-12. 73 The brothers were likely only a year apart: Marcus was praetor in 176 and consul in 173; Caius was praetor in 175 and consul in 172. This suggests that in accordance with the Lex Villia Annalis (passed in 180) the brothers held these magistracies at the earliest possible point in the cursus honorum. 120

P. Aelius Ligus

P. Aelius Ligus initially sided with the Senate but was prevailed upon by his co- consul to relent. His new allegiance to the Popillii extended so far as pressuring the praetor C. Licinius to let M. Popillius escape his trial unscathed. The reason a consul from a little known family would side with a pair of brothers who were invoking the

Senate’s wrath is not immediately obvious.74 The only clue apart from Livy’s statement that Caius discouraged Aelius Ligus from acting is to be found in the pair’s cursus honorum. The likely date of P. Aelius Ligus’ praetorship is 175, though the chapters of

Livy which name the year’s magistrates have been lost.75 Thus Aelius Ligus and C.

Popillius had probably been praetorian colleagues. It is probable that neither man was assigned a province, raising the possibility that they spent their praetorship in Rome together, perhaps as praetors urbanus and peregrinus. In addition to simple persuasion,

(political) friendship between Aelius Ligus and C. Popillius might have cemented their alliance in 172.76 This would partially explain why Aelius Ligus supported his co-consul against the wishes of the Senate. He might also have supported the Popillii knowing that the Senate had little power to formally reprimand him and that his political prospects were not endangered.77

74 Scullard (1951) 195, notes Ligus’ obscurity and his connection with the ‘new men’ (plebeians) who were rapidly wresting control of the consulship from older gentes. 75 MRR 1.403-404. 76 Admittedly a tenuous argument, we do know that pairs of consuls frequently developed strong working relationships and went on to hold the censorship together. 77 He was part of a Senatorial delegation to aid in an Illyrian settlement in 167 (Livy 45.17.4; MRR 1.435). 121

M. Marcius Sermo and Q. Marcius Scilla

These two plebeian tribunes introduced what Livy refers to as the ‘Marcian proposal’ (rogationem Marciam de Liguribus), spurred by a strong consensus against M.

Popillius and the two new consuls. The plebeian assembly’s overwhelming support for their decree shows that they were acting on behalf of plebeian interests if nothing else.

When Popillius failed to return to Rome they proposed a second decree that would permit C. Licinius to pass judgment on the ex-consul in absentia if he did not return by

November thirteenth. Unfortunately, little else is known of these magistrates and they do not appear to have gone on to illustrious careers.

C. Licinius Crassus

C. Licinius Crassus was the praetor urbanus placed in charge of investigating M.

Popillius. Livy says that Popillius twice stood trial before him but that he set the third trial date for March fifteenth, when he would no longer be praetor. He effectively let

Popillius off the hook since his imperium would at that point be finished. Livy explains that Licinius was “overcome by the influence of the absent consul [Aelius Ligus] and the entreaties of the house of Popillius”. Though Scullard’s prosopographical explanation is tempting yet unverifiable, it is obvious that the administration of justice was easily disrupted by political concerns.78

The trials of three former Spanish governors provide a contemporary parallel.

In 171, envoys from both Spains complained about mistreatment at the hand of three former governors. The praetor L. Canuleius was directed to assign five recuperatores to

78 Scullard (1951) 196; Münzer (1999 [1920]) 202. 122

each case and allow the Spanish to choose Roman advocates on their behalf. They chose men of illustrious birth: Cato, Scipio Nasica, Aemilius Paullus and Sulpicius Gallus.

But political manipulation and the supposed unwillingness of these four to prosecute their own kin hampered progress. The charges were dropped in one case and the accused fled into ‘exile’ at Praeneste and Tibur in the other two. Canuleius gave up and left for his province without completing the investigation.79 The Senate passed legislation designed to curtail future abuses but its constitutional impotence in making magistrates accountable was on full display.

Outcomes and Conclusions

The fate of the Ligurians who were to be returned to freedom remains unclear.

Most scholars accept that the Ligurians were in fact moved and that Livy’s statement about the Ligurian decree being evaded by trickery (ita rogatio de Liguribus arte fallaci est) refers only to Popillius’ political maneuver.80 But while in the Temple of Bellona at the end of his consular year, Caius Popillius was assailed by Senatorial outcry over why he had not restored the Ligurians to freedom.81 There is no reason to doubt Livy and it seems more probable than has been allowed that the Ligurians received no actual redress. This would confirm the ephemeral political interests at stake, the Senate’s concern with image rather than reality and its relative impotence in controlling magistrates. So long as Rome appeared to have corrected the problem, magistrates escaped unscathed and the issue was permitted to lapse. The Spanish trials followed a similar pattern.

79 Livy 43.2.1-12; Toynbee (1965) 636-637. 80 Harris (1979), Toynbee (1965), Salmon (1982), Dyson (1985) and Vishnia (1996). 81 Livy 42.28.2-3. 123

The future careers of the Popillii provide strong evidence that politics dominated the Popillian Affair. Those who found themselves on the wrong side of

Senatorial opinion need not have feared lasting ill-effects. In 169, M. Popillius served as a military tribune under the consul Q. Marcius Phillipus in Macedon, undertaking special commissions for him. He was elected to Rome’s most prestigious office, that of censor, in 159.82 His row with the Senate had not permanently damaged his political prospects.

C. Popillius invoked Senatorial ire for failing to carry out their instructions but he was in Aetolia only two years after his consulship, successfully preventing Perseus from capturing the town of Stratus, strengthening bonds between Greek communities and Rome and commanding the key stronghold of Ambracia. He was part of a delegation to Egypt in 168 and obtained the friendship of Antiochus IV by infamously demanding his answer before he stepped out of the circle in the sand. A decade later, the year after his brother was elected censor, Caius Popillius was elected consul for a second time.83

Miriam Pittenger shows the interconnectedness of politics, pageantry and performance in Livy’s exemplary rendition of republican politics; M. Popillius plays his role of pessimum exemplum perfectly. For Livy, the Popillian Affair is a theatrical performance with a host of actors: the overzealous consul recklessly bent on glory; the consul’s younger brother who lets family ties determine political action; the easily-

82 Military tribune: Livy 44.4.11, 5.10, 8.8, 9.1-10, 13.1-6; MRR 1.425. Censor: Cic. Brut. 79; Gell. 4.20.11; MRR 1.445. 83 Aetolia: Livy 43.22.2-3, 43.17.2-10; Polyb. 28.3; MRR 1.422, 1.426. Egypt: Polyb., 29.2.1-4; Livy 44.19.1-3, 29.1-5; 45.10-12.8; MRR 1. 430. Consulship: Pliny NH 34.30; MRR 1.446.

124

cowed co-consul overwhelmed by political influence; the praetor derelict in his duties to administer justice; the univocal Senate protecting Roman interests and traditional

Roman values. The Popillian Affair looms so large in part because Livy transformed it from a crisis exposing constitutional weakness into an exciting narrative of heroes and villains.

Livy’s amplification of the theatrical elements of the Popillian Affair has obscured facts and motives in favour of character development, plot structure and moral outcome. A detailed, historiographically critical analysis of the episode speaks volumes about politics and policy in the late-middle republic. Several conclusions can be drawn from a close reading of the Popillian Affair.

First, the system of checks and balances that kept tyranny at bay also fostered constitutional crises and governmental inertia. Power was so decentralized that the

Senate had difficulty holding magistrates accountable for flouting authority. The Senate could withhold triumphs and pass senatus consulta but justice was obstructed by uncooperative consuls and intimidated praetors.

Second, the Senate was not concerned for the Statellae. The patres’ reaction consisted of three complementary factors: cultivation of Rome’s public persona and maintenance of the deditio’s enduring value; geopolitical calculations meant to ensure regional stability in the face of more pressing issues; the scoring of quick political points by opponents.

Third, the Senate was ineffective at policy-implementation for structural reasons.

The implementation of a majority decision required the co-operation of consuls, 125

praetors and other magistrates in the field. If their co-operation could not be secured, the Senate could threaten a number of outcomes, but there was neither a guarantee that this would force the offending magistrate to submit nor that he would actually face the proposed punishment upon his return. Gargola identifies the same problem: “The

Senate’s leadership depended on the willingness of officeholders to submit in important matters to the senatorial consensus and on the readiness of more junior senators to follow those who were more senior.”84

Lastly, defiant magistrates rarely suffered permanent damage to their careers. Both

Popillii brothers crossed the Senate on multiple occasions and were not only re-elected by the people but participated in Senatorial delegations shortly after the Popillian Affair.

Any short-term political objectives had been met; the Senate had publicly upheld

Roman virtues and the offending magistrates were virtually unscathed. The dynamic perfectly illustrates the result of the tension between competition and consensus.

84 Gargola (2006) 162. 126

Conclusion

The Popillian Affair did not mark the end of Roman campaigning in Liguria though, owing to the disappearance of Livy’s narrative after 167, “our information about subsequent operations in Cisalpine Liguria is scanty.”1 Livy reports that A. Atilius

Serranus had a quiet year in Liguria and Gaul in 170.2 In 167, the consul M. Junius

Pennus held command at Pisa against unnamed Ligurians.3 Both consuls celebrated triumphs over different Ligurian tribes the following year: M. Claudius Marcellus over the Contrubrian Gauls and Ligurian Eleiates(?) and C. Sulpicius Galus over the

Taurini(?).4 In 159, M. Fulvius Nobilior was sent as consul against the Eleiates. He was prorogued and awarded a triumph de Liguribus Eleatibus in 158.5 Marcellus was elected to a second consulship in 155 and fought once more with the Eleiates and the Apuani, celebrating a second triumph de Eleatibus.6 Three triumphs over the same Ligurian tribe in barely a decade including two by the same consul imply that ‘policy’ had not changed and that the forced migration of Ligurian tribes was not the only option.

Consuls were fighting yearly campaigns and triumphing.

However, the military subjugation of Ligurian tribes was but the first step in the lengthy process of integrating Liguria into the Roman republic. Ligurians had played a central role in Carthaginian armies during the Second Punic War. They had even fought

1 Toynbee (1965) 281. 2 Livy 43.9.1-3. 3 Livy 45.16.3, 17.6, 44.1. 4 Degrassi (1947) 556-557; Livy Per. 46; Dyson (1985) 113; Toynbee (1965) 281. The entries in the fasti are only partially legible. 5 Degrassi (1947) 557; Toynbee (1965) 281; Dyson (1985) 114. 6 Polyb. 33.8; Degrassi (1947) 557; Dyson (1985) 114; Toynbee (1965) 281; Harris (1979) 233- 234. 127

alongside Hannibal at the Battle of Zama, buoyed by the prospect of descending from the mountain-tops to the fertile plains of Northern Italy.7 But Ligurians had never served as auxilia in a Roman army either before or after the Second Punic War, which is why their presence in a consular army destined for Macedon in 171 is an important development.8 Livy does not specify which Ligurian tribe(s) provided the 2 000 soldiers, but their employment as auxilia marks the beginning of a new, more peaceful phase of

Ligurian integration. It is also noteworthy that three years later, during a battle in the

Third Macedonian War, the Ligurian shield is said to have been of defensive value to the Roman soldiers: “at close quarters the Romans were steadier, and better protected by either the cavalry targe or the Ligurian rectangular shield.”9 The wordings in both

Polybius and Livy suggest that the shields did not just belong to the Ligurian auxilia but had actually been employed by other auxilia and the Romans themselves. The relationship between Rome and Liguria was not entirely unidirectional.

As the wars of pacification ended, colonial foundations and road-building increased as Rome more fully incorporated the new territory into its existing structure.10 Evidence for the process is patchy, but the Sententia Minuciorum of 117, also known as the Tabula Polcevera, provides an excellent example of the balance between Romanization and local traditions.11 The Romans had been called on to settle a land dispute between the inhabitants of Genoa and a Ligurian tribe, the Langenses

Viturii. The inscription outlines the results of the arbitration carried out by two Minucii, a family believed to have a special connection with Genoa dating back to the campaigns

7 Livy 30.33.1-8. 8 Livy 42.35.6; Brunt (1971) 169 n.3. 9 Livy 44.35.19; Polyb 29.14.4. See Diod. 5.39.7, for description of Ligurian shield. 10 Dyson (1985) 114-123. 11 CIL 5.2.7749. 128

of Q. Minucius Rufus in 197. Centuriation of the land is evident and indeed some of the termini described in the arbitration have been found and identified. The inscription also employs the Roman legal categorization of lands (ager publicus, ager privatus, etc.), demonstrating that Rome had significantly influenced the pattern of land-holding in and around Genoa.

The more interesting elements of the Sententia Minuciorum show the degree to which local culture and practices continued to flourish. The inscription employs indigenous names for topographical features (Manicelum, Edus, Lemuris) as well as people (Mocus Meticanius son of Meticonus, Plaucus Pelianus son of Pelionus), suggesting adherence to the local language after almost one hundred years of Roman domination. The inscription also mentions payment in the form of 400 victoriatus

(“victory stamp”), the equivalent of 300 denarii. The Romans struck this coin as an equivalent to the Massilian drachma, a popular currency whose use in the region actually increased following the Roman occupation. Rather than force the Ligurians in and around Genoa to adopt the denarius, Rome designed a coin meant to accommodate the existing currency structure.12

Conclusions

The almost yearly campaigns waged by Roman consuls in Liguria between 200 and 172 have received curiously little attention from historians. Toynbee integrates them into a narrative of Roman expansion for the sake of obtaining agricultural land.

Harris places them in the context of aggressive Roman imperial expansion, though he

12 For discussion: Dyson (1985) 123-124; Bispham (2007) 50, 138; esp. Williamson (2005) 171, 201, 295. Williamson emphasizes the nuances of the document and the insights it provides into the process of acculturation. Significance of the victoriatus: Crawford (1975) 629-630. 129

finds it more difficult in Liguria than elsewhere to deny the contribution of defensive imperialism. Dyson, whose treatment is the most detailed of the three, portrays Liguria as but one theatre in the development of the republican frontier. His attention to regional details and variations and their effect on Roman policy greatly enhances his analysis. However, Dyson’s insistence on a ‘big picture’ approach which separates politics and policy is mistaken.

This thesis has systematically re-evaluated the ancient evidence concerning

Roman involvement in Liguria during the first three decades of the second century BC, analyzing consular and praetorian actions in Liguria on a yearly basis. The result might appear to some to have “obscured continuities in both policy and action”13, and indeed, the analysis may seem jerky at times owing to the strictly chronological framework. Yet this was part of the organizational objective: to demonstrate that the rotation of offices under the republican political system significantly determined and contributed to

Roman ‘policy’ in Liguria.

Furthermore, though Dyson claims that a focus on “individual power politics and elite group dynamics” as well as “stress on personal and familial control” obscures the continuities he sets out to expose, this thesis has not done so.14 We agree that certain continuities existed and even that a fundamental shift in Roman ‘policy’ occurred in the year 180. I disagree with Dyson, however, on the mechanisms which created and sustained the continuities and shifts. Dyson envisions the Senate as a body of wise elder statesmen whence foreign policy emanated. The demands and pressures

13 Dyson (1985) 6. 14 Dyson (1985) 6. 130

of domestic politics rarely, if ever, interfered in the consular task of carrying out Roman foreign policy in Liguria and elsewhere.

This was simply not the case. We can only meaningfully comprehend consular decision-making by understanding its full context; decisions were made by men who were at once generals and politicians. It is counterproductive to imagine a Roman world in which field magistrates operated in a vacuum, unconcerned with their political fortunes in Rome. Similarly, many Senators were consulares and most had at least some experience in war. But they were also rivals in the same high stakes game of republican politics. Under these conditions, the possibility that politics and policy would converge became a certainty. Isolating provincial policy from Roman politics fails to accurately account for the development of the Ligurian frontier, as it would for any republican frontier. The only way to properly understand developments in Liguria is to take account of the driving force of aristocratic competition and how this shaped the

Senate-magistrate relationship. 131

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