(Rfi) for Submarine Damage Control and Fire Fighting Training Facility for the Indian Navy

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(Rfi) for Submarine Damage Control and Fire Fighting Training Facility for the Indian Navy REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) FOR SUBMARINE DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIRE FIGHTING TRAINING FACILITY FOR THE INDIAN NAVY 1. The Ministry of Defence, Government of India intends to procure One Damage Control and Fire Fighting Training Facility along with its associated equipment and civil works. 2. This Request for Information (RFI) consists of two parts as indicated below:- (a) Part I. The first part of the RFI incorporates operational characteristics and features that should be met by the equipment. A few important technical parameters of the proposed equipment are also mentioned. (b) Part II. The second part of the RFI states the methodology of seeking response of vendors. Submission of incomplete response format will render the vendor liable for rejection. Part I 3. The Intended Use of Equipment. The Submarine Damage Control and Fire Fighting Training Facility is required to be set up at Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, India depending on the land requirement and availability to impart realistic training to personnel on damage control and fighting fire in the closed and confined (space constrained) submarine environment. 4. Important Technical Parameters. The Submarine Damage Control and Fire Fighting Training Facility would be set up at Vishakhapatnam. The design of the Submarine Damage Control and Fire Fighting Training Facility should meet the requirements at Appendix A. The vendor is to provide parawise compliance for aspects brought out at Appendix A along with specific comments for compliance (if any). The vendor is to provide following additional inputs:- (a) Approximate Cost Estimate. Indicative cost for setting up the Submarine Damage Control and Fire Fighting Training Facility. It should take into account all aspects of supply, installation, integration, training, Factory Acceptance Trials (FATs), Onsite System Acceptance Test (OSAT) & life cycle support. The indicative cost should also cater to the AMC as per details in Appendix A. Other aspects (if any), may be mentioned specifically. (b) Vendor is to indicate whether he has supplied the same or similar equipment to any other customer. Additionally, the vendor is to indicate whether similar equipment is in use in any other Navy. (c) Vendor is to indicate the manpower required to operate and maintain the training facility. Additionally, the details of training required for such personnel is also to be indicated. (d) Vendors may consider RFI as advance information to obtain requisite Government clearances. 2 (e) Tentative Delivery Schedule. The overall timeframe of production, delivery with stage wise break-up of the entire project post conclusion of contract is required to be submitted. (f) Payment Terms. Vendor is to indicate acceptability to the terms of payment as per DPP-16. (g) Vendor is to indicate its capability to execute the project and provide product support including:- (i) Technical support being provided for maintenance and support of the facility during its service life, including warranty. The service life of the facility should be at least 30 years. (ii) Modalities for Annual Maintenance Contract including spares, post warranty period. (h) Vendor is to indicate the provisions for upgradeability of equipment to avoid system obsolesce. (j) Vendor is to indicate restrictions related to exports in its country and how long will it take to get clearance. (k) The details of the land requirement and electrical power requirements for creation of the training facility. (l) Earliest date by which OEM is willing to give a presentation at Naval Headquarters, New Delhi. 5. Vendor should confirm that the following conditions are acceptable:- (a) The solicitation of offers will be as per ‘Single Stage –Two Bid System’. It would imply that a ‘Request for Proposal’ would be issued soliciting the technical and commercial offers together, but in two separate sealed envelopes. The validity of commercial offers would be at least 18 months from the date of submission of offers. (b) The technical offers would be evaluated by a Technical evaluation Committee (TEC) to check its compliance with RFP. (c) Amongst the vendors cleared by TEC, a Commercial Negotiation Committee (CNC) would decide the lowest cost bidder (L1) and conclude the appropriate contract. (d) Vendor would be bound to provide product support for time period specified in the RFP, which includes spares and maintenance tools/jigs/fixtures for field and component level repairs. (e) Vendor is to accept all conditions of DPP-16, if not, which Para/ Clause of DPP-16 is not acceptable is to be indicated. Further, the vendor would be required to accept the general conditions of contract given in the Standard Contract Document at Chapter VII of DPP placed at www.mod.nic.in. 3 (f) Integrity Pact. An Integrity Pact along with appropriate Integrity Pact Bank Guarantee (IPBG) is a mandatory requirement in the instant case. (Refer Annexure I to Appendix M of Schedule I of Chapter II of DPP 2016). (g) Performance-cum-Warranty Bond. A performance-cum-Warranty Bond both equal to 5% of value of the Contract is required to be submitted after signing of the contract. Part II 6. Procedure for Response (a) Vendor must fill the form of response as given in Appendix B to Chapter II DPP 2016. Apart from filling details about company, details about the exact product meeting the generic technical specifications should also be carefully filled. Additional literature on the product may be attached with the form. Vendors are to provide para wise compliance in a tabular format to this RFI along with reasons for non-compliance, if any to all aspects of this RFI. (b) The filled form should be dispatched at under mentioned address:- Principal Director Submarine Acquisition Directorate of Submarine Acquisition IHQ MoD(Navy) Room No. 120, 'C' wing Sena Bhawan New Delhi – 110 010 Tel: +91-11-2301 0162 Fax No.: +91-11- 23010830 e-mail: [email protected] (c) The last date of acceptance of filled form is 03 Aug 16. The vendors shortlisted for issue of RFP would be intimated. A presentation on the subject may also be sought in case it is felt that certain parameters mentioned in replies to this RFI need further clarification. 7. The Government of India invites responses to this request only from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) / Authorised Vendors / Government Sponsored Export Agencies (applicable in case of countries where domestic laws do not permit direct export by OEMs) / Vendors with experience of production of Training Simulators of equivalent complexity. The end user of the equipment is the Indian Navy. 8. This information is being issued with no financial commitment and the Ministry of Defence reserve the right to change or vary any part thereof at any stage. The Government of India also reserves the right to withdraw it should it be so necessary at any stage. The acquisition process would be carried out under the provisions of DPP-2016. 4 Appendix A (Refers to Para 4) OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL PARAMETERS FOR SUBMARINE DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIRE FIGHTING TRAINING FACILITY SECTION A INTRODUCTION 1. A state-of-the-art Submarine Damage Control (DC) and Fire Fighting (FF) Training Facility is required to be set up at Visakhapatnam to impart realistic training to personnel on damage control and fighting fire onboard submarines. 2. Role of Training Facility. The training facility should be designed to fulfill following roles:- (a) Ab initio training of personnel joining submarines for damage control and fire fighting. (b) Refresher training of submarine personnel for damage control and fire fighting. 3. Training Objectives. The Submarine DC and FF simulator training objectives are as follows:- (a) Trainee will acquire knowledge and practice skills for Damage Control and Fire Fighting onboard a submarine in a near realistic environment. (b) Adaptability of a trainee to tackle an emergency in the closed and confined (space constrained) submarine environment. (c) Enabling a trainee to comprehend the fundamental principles and concepts necessary to mitigate, solve and control an emergency whilst exposed to the elements of flooding, smoke, fire and heat within the compartment. (d) Enable a trainee to acquire knowledge and practice correct use of Individual Protective Devices (IPD) and breathing sets. (e) Enable trainees of affected and adjacent compartments to take necessary action regarding energising / de-energising equipments/systems, measurement of microclimate of affected compartment, procedure of entering the affected compartment by an investigation / repair party along with associated gear, methodology of inspection and evacuation of affected compartment etc. 5 (f) The simulator should also be capable of facilitating the following training aspects:- (i) Training of individual watch-keepers in responding to a flooding incident damage control and fire emergency. (ii) Training of multiple trainees forming a team representing compartment crew, in responding to flooding damage control and fire emergency. (iii) Training / examining of Command Teams at central command posts by Submarine Workup Team on proficiency in responding to a damage control and fire fighting emergency whilst directing the compartment crew in affected / non affected compartments. (g) A team of trainees comprising a compartment crew should be able to undertake following common actions:- (i) Switching on / off, emergency lighting / easy access lighting. (ii) Switching on / off, all electrical equipment in the compartment like compartment blowers / ATUs, and individual machinery
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