Risk Assessment Study Report for Augmentation of Facilities at Crude Oil Terminal at Mundra, Gujarat

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT FOR AUGMENTATION OF FACILITIES AT CRUDE OIL TERMINAL AT MUNDRA, GUJARAT

PROJECT PROPONENT

HPCL-MITTAL PIPELINES LIMITED (HMPL) PLOT NO.6 (2), OLD PORT ROAD OPPOSITE MUNDRA CSF NEAR SAMUDRA TOWNSHIP MUNDRA, DISTT. KUTCH-370421 GUJARAT

MCPL/EMD/TANK/2017-18/02/02 October, 2018

Prepared By MANTEC CONSULTANTS PVT. LTD. (QCI Accredited EIA Consultant at S.No.102 as per List of Accredited consultant Organizations/Rev. 70 /October 2018) (NABET Accredited EIA consultant, MoEF & NABL approved Laboratory) Environment Division, D-36, Sector-6, Noida-201 301, U. P., Ph. 0120-4215000, 0120-4215807 Fax. 0120-4215809, e-mail : [email protected] http://www.mantecconsultants.com RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY FOR AUGMENTATION OF FACILITIES AT CRUDE OIL TERMINAL AT MUNDRA, GUJARAT

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... (I-IX) CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...... 1 1.1 Introduction ...... 1 1.2 Need of the Project ...... 1 1.3 Scope of Study ...... 1 1.4 Execution Methodology ...... 2 1.4.1 Kick Off Meeting with Mantec ...... 2 1.4.2 Study of HMPL Operations ...... 3 1.4.3 Study of HMPL Operating Parameters...... 3 1.4.4 Identification of Hazards ...... 3 1.4.5 Consequence Effects Estimation ...... 3 CHAPTER 2: PROJECT DESCRIPTION ...... 4 2.1 Project Description ...... 4 2.2 Facility operation ...... 4 2.3 Location ...... 7 2.3.1 Manpower data ...... 9 2.3.2 Ignition Source ...... 9 2.3.3 Meteorological Condition ...... 9 2.4 Pasquill Stability ...... 9 2.5 Fire Fighting Equipment, Facilities and other equipments to tackle the emergency ...... 11 2.5.1 Tanks Fire Protection Facilities...... 11 2.6 Other Safety Facilities ...... 13 CHAPTER 3: IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD AND SELECTION OF SCENARIOS ...... 15 3.1 Hazard Identification ...... 15 3.2 Hazards Associated with the Terminal ...... 17 3.3 Hazards Associated with Flammable Hydrocarbons ...... 17 3.3.1 Crude Oil ...... 17 3.4 SELECTED FAILURE CASES ...... 18 3.5 Hazard identification as per NFPA ...... 18 3.6 Characterizing the Failures ...... 19

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3.7 Operating Parameters ...... 20 3.7.1 Inventory ...... 20 3.7.2 Loss of Containment ...... 20 3.7.3 Liquid Outflow from a tank ...... 20 3.7.4 Vaporization ...... 20 CHAPTER 4: RELEASE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ...... 21 4.1 General ...... 21 4.2 Consequence Analysis Modeling ...... 21 4.2.1 Discharge Rate ...... 21 4.2.2 Flash Fire ...... 21 4.2.3 Jet Fire...... 21 4.2.4 Toxic Release ...... 22 4.3 Size and Duration of Release ...... 23 4.4 Damage Criteria ...... 23 4.4.1 LFL or FLASH FIRE ...... 23 4.4.2 Thermal Hazard Due to Pool Fire, Flash Fire, Jet Fire ...... 24 4.4.3 Domino Effect ...... 24 4.4.4 Boilover ...... 24 4.5 Plant Data ...... 25 4.6 Consequence Analysis for Crude Oil Tanks at Mundra Terminal ...... 25 4.6.1 Scenarios ...... 25 CHAPTER 5: RISK ANALYSIS ...... 31 5.1 Individual Risk ...... 31 5.1.1 Individual risk acceptability criteria ...... 31 5.1.2 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) ...... 34 5.1.3 Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR) ...... 34 5.2 Societal Risk ...... 35 5.3 Top risk contributors (Societal risk) ...... 37 5.4 Fault Tree Analysis ...... 37 5.4.1 Fault Tree can help to: ...... 37 5.4.2 Fault tree construction ...... 38 5.4.3 Guidelines for developing a fault tree ...... 38

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5.5 Event Tree Analysis ...... 39 5.5.1 Immediate Ignition ...... 40 5.5.2 Delayed Ignition ...... 40 5.5.3 Materials that is both Flammable and Toxic ...... 40 5.5.4 Delayed Ignition Probability (DI) ...... 40 CHAPTER 6: COMPARISON AGAINST RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ...... 41 6.1 The ALARP Principle ...... 41 CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RISK REDUCTION ...... 43 7.1 Conclusion and Recommendations ...... 43 7.2 General Recommendations ...... 44 7.3 Risk Reduction Recommendation and Mitigation Plan during Natural and Man-made Disaster 45 7.3.1 Natural Calamities: ...... 45 7.3.2 Extraneous ...... 48 7.4 Lessons to be Learnt from Earlier Incidents ...... 49 7.4.1 Safety Management System (SMS) ...... 49 7.5 SMS Elements ...... 50 7.6 Mock Drill Exercises ...... 51 CHAPTER 8: DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN ...... 52 8.1 Introduction ...... 52 8.2 Scope and Purpose ...... 53 8.3 Brief Description about Natural and Manmade Disaster ...... 53 8.3.1 Natural Calamity ...... 53 8.3.2 Action plan for Natural Calamity ...... 53 8.3.3 Disaster Originating from Outside ...... 55 8.4 Phases of Disaster ...... 56 8.4.1 Warning Phase (Before Disaster) ...... 56 8.4.2 Period of Impact Phase (Before Disaster)...... 56 8.4.3 Rescue Phase...... 56 8.4.4 Relief Phase (Post Disaster) ...... 56 8.4.5 Rehabilitation Phase ...... 56 8.5 Types of Emergencies/Disaster and Emergency Planning and Response Procedures ...... 56

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8.5.1 Definition of On-Site Emergency and Off-Site Emergency ...... 57 8.5.2 Classification of Emergencies ...... 57 8.5.3 Extent of Severity during Emergencies ...... 61 8.5.4 Priority in Emergency Handling ...... 62 8.6 Specific Objectives of the Disaster Management Plan ...... 62 8.7 Legal Authority and Responsibility ...... 65 8.7.1 On-Site Emergency Planning ...... 65 8.7.2 Off-Site Emergency Planning ...... 65 8.8 Key Elements of Disaster Management Plan ...... 65 8.8.1 Basis of Plan ...... 65 8.8.2 Emergency Planning and Response Procedures ...... 66 8.9 Structure of the Disaster Management Plan ...... 66 8.9.1 Identification of hazards and Scenarios ...... 68 8.9.2 Organizational Structuring, Duties and Responsibilities...... 68 8.9.3 Emergency Organisation ...... 69 8.9.4 Emergency control center (ECC) ...... 69 8.9.5 Emergency control center- Resource Requirement ...... 69 8.9.6 Duties and Responsibilities for Functionaries ...... 70 8.9.7 SIREN CODES ...... 76 8.9.8 EVACUATION ...... 77 8.9.9 Assessing the Situation at Site & Declaration of Emergency ...... 78 8.9.10 Response Procedures ...... 79 8.9.11 Initial Notification of Releases ...... 80 8.9.12 Establishment & Staffing of Field Command Post ...... 80 8.9.13 Formulation of Response Objectives and Strategy at the Incident Site ...... 80 8.9.14 Ensuring Health and Safety at Incident Scenes ...... 81 8.9.15 Evacuation...... 82 8.9.16 Fire Response ...... 82 8.9.17 Health Care ...... 83 8.9.18 Personal Protection ...... 83 8.9.19 Public Relations ...... 83 8.9.20 Spill Containment and Cleanup ...... 84

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8.9.21 Documentation and Investigative Follow Up ...... 85 8.9.22 Training ...... 85 8.9.23 Responsibility, Frequency and Procedure for Evaluation ...... 86 8.9.24 Off-Site Emergency Plan ...... 86 8.9.25 Legal Authority and Responsibility for Off-Site Emergency Response Legislation in India 86 8.9.26 Off-Site Emergency Plan Objectives ...... 87 8.9.27 Important Government Agencies Involved in Off-Site Emergency Actions ...... 88 8.9.28 Responsibility of DEA ...... 88 8.10 Responsibility of Crisis Group ...... 89 8.11 Action Plan to Avoid Cascading Effect ...... 89 8.12 List of Important Contact Details of personnel at Mundra Terminal ...... 90 CHAPTER 9: HAZOP REVIEW ...... 95 9.1 INTRODUCTION ...... 95 9.2 HAZOP PROCESS...... 95

List of Table

Table 1: Consequence Analysis Results of Worst Case ...... II Table 2: Maximum Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) ...... V Table 3: Maximum Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR) ...... V Table 4: Maximum Societal Risk ...... VII Table 5: Specification of Crude Oil Tanks ...... 4 Table 6: Design Data of crude oil tanks ...... 5 Table 7: Details of Existing Booster Pumps ...... 5 Table 8: Coordinates of the Crude Oil Terminal ...... 7 Table 9: Pasquill stability classes ...... 10 Table 10: Pasquill stability class description ...... 10 Table 11: Weather parameters for consequence analysis ...... 11 Table 12: List of Fire Fighting Equipment ...... 11 Table 13: List of Personnel Protective Equipments ...... 13 Table 14: Material Safety Data Sheet of Crude Oil ...... 17 Table 15: Physical and Chemical Properties of Crude Oil ...... 17 Table 16: Selected failure case for HMPL Crude Oil Terminal ...... 18 Table 17: NFPA for Crude oil ...... 18 Table 18: Explanation of NFPA classification ...... 18

Table 19: Effects of exposure to different vapour phase concentrations of H2S...... 22 Table 20: Leak size of selected failure scenario ...... 23

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Table 21: Effects due to incident thermal radiation intensity ...... 24 Table 22: List of documents used in study ...... 25 Table 23: Scenario for the Consequence Analysis ...... 26 Table 24: Acceptable Risk Criteria of various countries ...... 31 Table 25: Maximum Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) ...... 34 Table 26: Maximum Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR) ...... 34 Table 27: Emergency Organization COT Mundra ...... 61 Table 28: Estimates of expected damage and resources required ...... 62 Table 29: Structure, Role and Responsibility of Disaster Management ...... 67 Table 30: Medicines in the First Aid Box ...... 75 Table 31: Members in Crisis Group ...... 88 Table 32: Emergency Contact numbers inside the COT, Mundra ...... 90 Table 33: Emergency Contact numbers outside the COT, Mundra ...... 91 Table 34: List of Mutual Aid Members...... 92 Table 35: Medical Facilities available outside the plant...... 94

List of Figure

Figure 1: Map showing Overall risk Scenario for additional 3 tanks in Crude Oil Terminal ...... IV Figure 2: Individual risk of HMPL Crude Oil Terminal at Mundra ...... VI Figure 3: F-N Curve for HMPL Mundra Crude oil Terminal ...... VII Figure 4: Risk Assessment methodology ...... 2 Figure 5: Overview of process piping COT Mundra ...... 6 Figure 6: Location map of HMPL Crude Oil Terminal, Mundra ...... 8 Figure 7: Map showing Overall risk Scenario for additional 3 tanks in Crude Oil Terminal ...... 33 Figure 8: Individual risk of HMPL Crude Oil Terminal at Mundra ...... 35 Figure 9: Societal Risk Criteria ...... 36 Figure 10: F-N Curve for HMPL Mundra Crude Oil Terminal ...... 37 Figure 11: Fault tree construction ...... 38 Figure 12: Fault Tree for the project ...... 39 Figure 13: Event Tree for Continuous Release ...... 40 Figure 14: ALARP Detail ...... 42 Figure 15: Level -1 Crisis Management Organogram ...... 58 Figure 16: Level -2 Crisis Management Organogram ...... 59 Figure 17: Level -3 Crisis Management Organogram ...... 60 Figure 18: Emergency Response Team along with Level ...... 64 Figure 19: Assembly points in the Crude Oil Terminal ...... 70 Figure 20: communication flow chart ...... 74

List of Annexure

Annexure-A :Risk Assessment Graph

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Annexure-B :Material Safety Data Sheet Annexure-C :Plant Layout Annexure-D :Meteorological Data

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction HPCL-Mittal Pipelines Limited (HMPL) is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and having its Registered Office at Village Phulokhari, Taluka Talwandi Saboo, District Bathinda (Punjab). It is a subsidiary of HPCL-Mittal Energy Limited (HMEL) which is a Joint Venture between M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (a Government of India Public Sector Enterprise and a Fortune 500 company) and M/s Mittal Energy Investments Private Limited. HPCL-Mittal Pipelines Limited (HMPL) operates business related to crude oil receipt, its storage and cross-country transportation. The Mundra - Bathinda Pipeline transports crude oil from Mundra, Gujarat to HMEL’s Guru Gobind Singh Refinery at Bathinda, Punjab. HMEL has setup a refinery of 11.25 MMTPA capacity, near Bathinda, Punjab where crude oil for the refinery is being received from Mundra through a 1017 km pipeline. Crude is being first received at Mundra terminal and then transferred through a 1017 km cross country pipeline to Crude Receipt Tanks at Bathinda refinery. HMPL intends to expand the storage capacity of Crude Oil Terminal (COT) by constructing of additional 3 nos. crude storage floating roof tanks of 60000 KL capacity each at COT Mundra to meet crude oil requirement of HMEL’s Guru Gobind Singh Refinery (GGSR) near Bathinda. All the existing facilities of Crude oil Terminal (COT) like fire fighting, electrical system, Pump house, Pipeline etc. comply with national, international standards and M.B. Lal committee recommendations. The facilities required for operation of the project, viz., pumping units with associated facilities have been planned to be steel structure. Other facilities like RCC civil structure have been planned to accommodate control panels, HT/LT panels, Batteries etc. All the safety factors like wind load, seismic load, soil bearing capacity etc have been taken into account while designing the additional tanks. This document is prepared by Mantec Consultants Pvt. Ltd. for Risk Assessment (RA) study for Proposed Crude oil tanks at HMPL, Mundra Terminal and to identify the key hazards and risks. By conducting this type of RA it should be emphasized that the focus is on the major, worst-case, hazards and impacts from surrounding area of these units, essentially in order to priorities the off-site risks and potential impacts to the public.

Nature of the Project The proposed project is for addition of storage capacity by construction of 3 nos. of additional tanks of 60000KL capacity each or & above with existing crude storage capacity 845685 KL. After construction of these 3 additional tanks the combined crude storage

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capacity at COT Mundra will be 1025685 KL. These tanks are integral part of entire crude oil pipeline system supplying crude oil to Guru gobind singh refinery in bathinda through Mundra Bathinda Pipeline (MBPL).

Consequence Analysis Consequence analysis involves the application of the mathematical, analytical and computer models Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool (PHAST software) for calculation of the effects and damages subsequent to a hydrocarbon/toxic release accident.

PHAST Risk Micro Software is used to predict the Failure Scenarios, Applied consequence & Fatality Rate, physical behavior of hazardous incidents. The model uses below mentioned techniques to assess the consequences of identified scenarios:

 Modeling of discharge rates when holes develop in process equipment/pipe work.  Modeling of the size & shape of the LFL & UFL of flammable gas clouds from releases in the atmosphere.  Modeling of the flame and radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burn as pool fire, jet fire & flash fire.  Modeling of the explosion fields of releases which are ignited away from the point of release. The consequence analysis results of worst case of the terminal are given in the Table below-

Table 1: Consequence Analysis Results of Worst Case Name of Station Flash Fire (m) Crude oil tanks (Catastrophic Rupture) 301 Centrifugal Booster Pumps (Line rupture) 36.46 Screw Booster Pumps (Line Rupture) 36.67

(Note: - The worst case parameters selection is as per the PHAST software)

Risk Criteria Individual risks are the key measure of risk acceptability for this type of study, where it is proposed that:

Risks to the public can be considered to be broadly acceptable (or negligible) if below 10-6 per year (one in 1 million per year). Although risks of up to 10-4 per year (1 in 10,000 per year) may be considered acceptable if shown to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), since in India no any standard has been set, it is recommended that 10-5 per year (1 in 100,000 per year) is adopted for this study as the maximum tolerable criterion.

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Risks to workers can be considered to be broadly acceptable (or negligible) if below 10-5 per year and where risks of up to 10-3 per year (1 in 1000 per year) may be considered acceptable if ALARP.

The overall risk for additional 3 tanks in Crude Oil Terminal is given in Figure below-

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Figure 1: Map showing Overall risk Scenario for additional 3 tanks in Crude Oil Terminal

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Location specific individual risk (LSIR) The Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is risk to a person who is standing at that point 365 days a year and 24 hours a day. The maximum LSIR in the terminal is listed in Table below-

Table 2: Maximum Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR)

S. No. Unit Maximum LSIR

1. Proposed Crude Oil Storage Tanks 1.227E-004

Individual Risk to Worker (ISIR) The personnel in Terminal is expected to work 8 hour shift as well as general shift. The actual risk to a person i.e. “Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR)” would be far less after accounting for the time fraction a person is expected to spend at a location.

ISIR Area = LSIR X (8/24) (8 hours shift) X (Time spent by and individual/8 hours)

The maximum ISIR in the unit is listed in Table below-

Table 3: Maximum Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR) S. No. Unit Maximum ISIR

1. Proposed Crude Oil Storage Tanks 4.09E-05

(Note:- Values of LSIR and ISIR are obtained with the help of PHAST software)

ALARP summary & comparison of Individual risk with acceptability criteria.

The objective of this RA study is to assess the risk levels at COT, Mundra with reference to the defined risk acceptability criteria and recommend measures to reduce the risk level to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

After assessment of the risk it is found that the maximum individual risk to terminal personnel is 1.227E-004 per year which is in the ALARP region of the ALARP triangle.

The comparison of maximum individual risk with the risk acceptability criteria is shown in Figure below.

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Figure 2: Individual risk of HMPL Crude Oil Terminal at Mundra

Societal risk Societal risk is defined as the relationship between frequency and the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realization of specified hazards. Societal risk evaluation is concerned with estimation of the chances of more than one individual being harmed simultaneously by an incident. The likelihood of the primary event (an accident at a major hazard plant) is still a factor, but the consequences are assessed in terms of level of harm and the numbers affected (severity), to provide an idea of the scale of an accident in terms of numbers killed or harmed. Societal risk is dependent on the risks from the substances and processes located on a major hazard installation. A key factor in estimating societal risk is the population around the site, in particular its location and density. For example the more (occupied) buildings in any particular area, the more people could be harmed by a toxic gas release passing through that area. For an installation with a population located in a specific compass direction, the chance of a toxic gas release would depend on the probability of drift in that direction. Examples of sites that could present significant societal risk include:

 Chemical plants where liquefied toxic substances are manufactured, stored, or used;  Some water treatment plants where liquefied toxic chemicals are stored for use in water purification;

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Societal Risk criteria are also proposed, although these should be used as guidance only.

A criterion of 10-4 per year is recommended for determining design accidental loads for on- site buildings, i.e. buildings should be designed against the fire and explosion loads that occur with a frequency of 1 in 10,000 per year.

The result from the F-N curve shows that the societal risk due to additional Crude Oil Storage tanks is in the ALARP Region of the ALARP triangle.

Table 4: Maximum Societal Risk

S No. Unit Maximum SR

1. Proposed Crude Oil Storage Tanks 1.20E-004

Figure 3: F-N Curve for HMPL Mundra Crude oil Terminal (Note:- In the above figure ‘Combination 1’ i.e blue colored curve represents COT risk curve)

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Top risk contributors (Group Risk) The present major contributing scenarios to societal risk from additional 3 tanks in Crude oil Terminal is within the ALARP region.

Conclusions and Recommendations Although the results of this Risk analysis show that the risks to the human being are well within acceptable limit, they will be sensitive to the specific design and/or modeling assumptions used.

The maximum risk to terminal personnel is 1.227E-004 per year which is within ALARP region of ALARP triangle.

It is observed that the ISO-risk contour of 1x10-6 per year is within the terminal and the risk contour of 1x10-9 per year extended to the adjoining facilities which having generally Industrial Zone.

The major conclusions and recommendations based on the risk analysis of the identified representative failure scenarios are summarized below:

 The Terminal is covered in the process safety management system of HMPL. These additional 3 tanks along with associated piping & pumping facilities to be included in same.

 It is necessary to extend existing fire and gas detection system of the Terminal to these additional 3 tanks with similar facilities. As there will not be any additional manpower required for operation & maintenance of these 3 additional tanks. Existing operators who are well trained in handling fire and gas detection system shall take care of these additional tanks also.

 Existing system of emergency stop will be used for critical equipments from control room in the event of major leak/flash fire.

 The vehicles entering the Terminal should be fitted with spark arrestors.

 Routine checks to be done to ensure and prevent the presence of ignition sources in the immediate vicinity of the Terminal (near boundaries).

 Clearly defined escape routes shall be developed for the additional land over which these tanks will be constructed taking into account the impairment of escape by hazardous releases and sign boards be erected in places to guide personnel in case of an emergency.

 Existing assembly point in safe locations shall cater in case of emergency.

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 Additional windsocks shall be considered in the plant to ensure visibility from all directions. This will assist people to escape in upwind or cross wind direction from flammable releases.

 In order to further reduce the probability of failure of catastrophic rupture of additional tanks shall be identified and inspection methodologies to be finalized for continuous monitoring during operation and shutdown maintenance.

 The active protection devices like fire water sprinklers and other protective devices shall be tested at regular intervals.

 There should be an SOP established for clarity of actions to be taken in case of fire/leak emergency.

General Recommendations 1. Damage distances for the worst case could affect nearby facilities within the Terminal and some minimal direct effect on nearby industry is possible.

2. Ensure that combustible flammable material is not placed near the Critical instrument of the Storage Tanks. These could include oil filled cloth, wooden supports, oil buckets etc. these must be put away and the areas kept permanently clean and free from any combustibles. Secondary fires probability would be greatly reduced as a result of these simple but effective measures.

3. ROSOV and Hydrocarbon detector should be provided to the Crude Oil Storage Tanks & Pump house of the Booster Pumping Station as per OISD.

4. Proper lighting arrangements and CCTV should be provided at Proposed Storage Tanks.

5. Since the tank is storing Class A petroleum product, it shall be provided automatic actuated rim seal protection system mounted on floating roof as per OISD-116.

6. Spillages of crude oil will create a fire hazard and may form an explosive atmosphere so keep all sources of ignition and hot metal surfaces away from a spill/release.

7. To ensure that all electrical fittings & equipments are explosive proof.

8. Absorb spill with inert material such as sand or vermiculite, and place in suitable container for disposal.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction HPCL-Mittal Pipelines Limited (HMPL) operates business related to crude oil receipt, its storage and cross-country transportation. The Mundra - Bathinda Pipeline transports crude oil from Mundra, Gujarat to HMEL’s Guru Gobind Singh Refinery at Bathinda, Punjab. HMEL has setup a refinery of 11.25 MMTPA capacity, near Bathinda, Punjab where crude oil for the refinery is being received from Mundra through a 1017 km pipeline. Crude is being first received at Mundra terminal and then transferred through a 1017 km cross country pipeline to Crude Receipt Tanks- at Bathinda refinery.

HMPL intends to expand the storage capacity of Crude Oil Terminal (COT) by constructing of additional 3 nos. crude storage floating roof tanks of 60000 KL capacity each at COT Mundra to meet crude oil requirement of HMEL’s Guru Gobind Singh Refinery (GGSR) near Bathinda.

1.2 Need of the Project To meet the heavy demand of petroleum products in the country, HPCL-Mittal Pipelines Limited (HMPL) has decided to enhance its crude oil storage capacity from 14 x 60000 KL to 17 x 60000 KL by installing additional tanks 3 x 60000 KL along with associated piping & Booster pumping unit.

1.3 Scope of Study Mantec Consultants Pvt. Ltd., D-36, Sector-6, NOIDA (U.P.) is appointed for carrying out the Risk Assessment & HAZID study. The objective of the Risk Analysis study is to identify vulnerable zones, major risk contributing events, understand the nature of risk posed to nearby areas due to addition of these 3 proposed tanks and accordingly augment existing Emergency Response Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP). In addition, the Quantitative Risk Analysis is also necessary to ensure compliance to statutory rules and regulations. Risk assessment methodology is given in Figure below-

Risk Analysis broadly comprises of the following steps:

 Project Description  Identification of Hazards and Selection of Scenarios  Effects and Consequence Calculations  Risk Summation (Risk calculation)  Risk assessment (using an acceptability criteria)  Risk Mitigation Measures

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Figure 4: Risk Assessment methodology

1.4 Execution Methodology The methodology adopted for executing the assignment is briefly given below:

1.4.1 Kick Off Meeting with Mantec This was used to set the study basis, objectives and related matters and also identify in detail the facilities to be covered in the RA.

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1.4.2 Study of HMPL Operations This was carried out for studying the risk assessment study for Proposed Crude Oil Storage Tanks at HMPL, Mundra Terminal.

1.4.3 Study of HMPL Operating Parameters This involved collection of pertinent project information on the operation process details such as P&ID’s, PFD and Plant Layout, Critical instruments their temperature and pressure and other details. The data so collected would ensure a more realistic picture for the risks subsequently identified and estimated.

1.4.4 Identification of Hazards This includes estimation of possible hazards through a systematic approach. It typically covers identification and grouping of a wide ranging possible failure cases and scenarios. The scenario list was generated through generic methods for estimating potential failures (based on historical records on worldwide and domestic accident data bases) and also based on HMPL’s experience in operating the facilities.

1.4.5 Consequence Effects Estimation This covers assessing the damage potential in terms of heat radiation.

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CHAPTER 2: PROJECT DESCRIPTION

2.1 Project Description HPCL- Mittal Pipelines Ltd proposes the project for installation of additional 3 x 60000 KL crude oil tanks along with associated piping & booster pumping unit at its existing Crude oil Terminal. Currently 14 x 60000 KL crude oil tanks are existing at Mundra terminal and the proposed additional 3 nos. tanks will also be installed in the available space of the terminal.

The present storage capacity of the COT is 845685 KL and after enhancement, the total capacity of the COT Mundra will be 1025685 KL. The primary functions of COT Mundra is to receipt the Crude Oil from SPM, storage of the Crude oil at dedicated storage tanks and its further dispatch to Guru Gobind Singh Refinery (GGSR)- Bathinda through Cross Country Pipeline called Mundra Bathinda Pipeline (MBPL).

2.2 Facility operation Crude Oil received at the Terminal through a 48” diameter offshore/onshore pipeline from SPM within Mundra Port waters. From the pipeline, the product is received and stored in 14 tanks. The pressure of the crude oil is boosted by Booster pumps & finally it is delivered to the cross country pipeline through Mainline Pumps. Existing facilities at Mundra Terminal include Tank farm comprising of total 14 above ground for crude oil storage & 2 underground sump tanks, 1 above ground tank to receive crude oil due to possible surge in offshore/onshore pipeline, 1 above ground tank to receive oily water, 2 pump houses (Booster Pump House & Fire water pump house), 2 pump sheds (surge relief pump shed and pump shed for pumping realized crude from crude water drain tank), DG set for emergency closure of valves during grid power failure, diesel driven fire water pumps & 2 above ground fire water tanks. Facilities for pipeline includes mainline pump house, Ware house, Substation, Control room, Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) & foam tender shed etc.

Table 5: Specification of Crude Oil Tanks NO. OF NO. OF STORED TANK CLASS OF ADDITION Sr. TANK EXISTI DIA HEIGHT FLASH PRODUCT CAPACITY TYPE FARM PRODUC AL No. NO. NG (M) (M) POINT (M3) NO. T PROPOSED TANKS TANKS TF-1 82-T- TO TF- 01A 1. CRUDE 60000 FR 14 66 19.5 <24° 7 & TF- A 3 TO 82- 9 TO T-01Q TF-10 CRUDE 82-T- DRAIN 2. 3500 CR 1 20 12.5 <24° TF-8 A - 02 WATER TANK

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NO. OF NO. OF STORED TANK CLASS OF ADDITION Sr. TANK EXISTI DIA HEIGHT FLASH PRODUCT CAPACITY TYPE FARM PRODUC AL No. NO. NG (M) (M) POINT (M3) NO. T PROPOSED TANKS TANKS SURGE 82-T- 3. RELIEF 2145 CR 1 16 11.25 <24° TF-8 A - 03 TANK 083- TT- SUMP U/G 4. 00- TANK 20 - 2 2.2 6.4 (L) <24° A - VESSEL 111/1 VESSEL 12

Table 6: Design Data of crude oil tanks

DESIGN DATA CODE API-650 Design Pressure Full of liquid operating pressure atm. Design Temperature 65 °C Operating Temperature 7.7/47.1 °C Specific gravity of liquid 0.820-0.932 Design density 820-932 kg/m3

Bottom = 3.0 Bottom shell course = 3.0 Corrosion allowance (mm) Rest shell courses = 1.5 Roof = 1.0 Roof where vapour accumulation is possible = 3.0

Stored product Crude oil Type of roof Double Deck Floating Roof

Table 7: Details of Existing Booster Pumps

Sr. Pump No. of Suction Discharge Flow Pressure No. Pumps Line Line Rate 1. Vertical 4 20”-20” 16”-10” 550 7.6 – 8.5 kg/cm2 Centrifugal m3/hr Pump 2. Horizontal 2 12” 8”-10” 150 7.6 – 8.5 kg/cm2 Centrifugal m3/hr Pump 3. Screw Pump 4 12” 12” 250 7.6 – 8.5 kg/cm2 m3/hr

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Figure 5: Overview of process piping COT Mundra

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2.3 Location The proposed installation of additional crude oil storage tanks of 3 x 60000 KL along with associated piping & Booster pumping unit will be done inside the premises of existing Mundra Crude Oil Terminal of HMPL. The HPCL-Mittal Pipelines Ltd, COT Mundra complex is located in Village- Mundra, Taluka- Mundra, District- Kutch, State- Gujarat. National Highway No. 8A is about 4.5 kms from the site in North direction. Samudra township of Adani Port is located on the east side of the site at approx 1.5 km. The site coordinates are mentioned below - Table 8: Coordinates of the Crude Oil Terminal Sr. No. Lattitude Longitude

A 22°47’ 34.50” N 69°41’ 32.57” E

B 22°47’ 56.18” N 69°41’ 32.19” E

C 22°47’ 54.82” N 69°42’ 26.70” E

D 22°47’ 33.38” N 69°42’ 16.18” E

The general topography of the area is mildly undulating with very gently sloping. The location map is given in Figure below and showing the specific location of the Crude oil Terminal situated at Mundra.

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Location Map of HMPL Crude oil Terminal at Mundra (Gujarat) is given in Figure below:-

Figure 6: Location map of HMPL Crude Oil Terminal, Mundra

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2.3.1 Manpower data The Manpower details of the Terminal are given in Table below –

Sl. No. COT Mundra G-SHIFT 8:30 HRS TO 17:00 HRS A-SHIFT 7:00 HRS TO 15:00 HRS 1. Time of shift B-SHIFT 15:00 HRS TO 23:00 HRS C-SHIFT 23:00 HRS TO 7:00 HRS 2. No. of employee 42 3. Contract workmen 200 (approx.)

2.3.2 Ignition Source The ignition sources within and outside the COT premises is a key factor in performing RA Study. The ignition sources, combined with their ignition probability, wind directional probability and presence of flammable hydrocarbon is a key factor in determining the delayed ignition probability of the cloud which further results in flash fire and overpressure scenarios.

The various ignition sources considered in the study includes but not limited to heaters, Incinerators, smoking booth, canteen, traffic movement within the COT.

2.3.3 Meteorological Condition

Meteorological Data is attached as Annexure-D

2.4 Pasquill Stability One of the most important characteristics of atmosphere is its stability. Stability of atmosphere is its tendency to resist vertical motion or to suppress existing turbulence. This tendency directly influences the ability of atmosphere to disperse pollutants released from the facilities. In most dispersion scenarios, the relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground, varying in thickness from a few meters to a few thousand meters. Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature gradient.

Temperature normally decreases with increasing height in the atmosphere. The rate at which the temperature of air decreases with height is called Environmental Lapse Rate (ELR). It varies from time to time and place to place. The atmosphere is considered to be stable, neutral or unstable according to ELR is less than, equal to or greater than Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR), which is a constant value of 0.98°C/100 meters.

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Pasquill stability parameter, based on Pasquill – Gifford categorization, is a meteorological parameter, which describes the stability of atmosphere, i.e., the degree of convective turbulence. Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from ‘A’ (extremely unstable) to ‘F’ (stable). Wind speeds, intensity of solar radiation (daytime insulation) and night time sky cover have been identified as prime factors defining these stability categories.

The following table indicates the Pasquill stability classes.

Table 9: Pasquill stability classes Surface Wind Day time solar radiation Night time cloud cover

Speed(m/s) Strong Moderate Slight Thin< 40% Medium Overcast >80%

< 2 A A-B B - - D

2-3 A-B B C E F D

3-5 B B-C C D E D

5-6 C C-D D D D D

>6 C D D D D D

Table 10: Pasquill stability class description Class Description A Very unstable-sunny, light winds A/B Unstable-as with A only less sunny or more windy B Unstable -as with A/B only less sunny or more windy B/C Moderately unstable-moderate sunny and moderate windy C Moderately Unstable-very windy /sunny or overcast /light wind C/D Moderately unstable- moderate sun and high wind D Neutral- little sun and high wind or overcast/windy night E Moderately-stable -less overcast and less windy night than D F Stable -night with moderate clouds and light/moderate wind G Very stable -possibly fog

When the atmosphere is unstable and wind speed is moderate or high or gusty, rapid dispersion of pollutants will occur. Under these conditions, pollutant concentration in air

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will be moderate or low and the material will be dispersed rapidly. When the atmosphere is stable and wind speed is low, dispersion of material will be limited and pollutant concentration in air will be high. Stability category for this study is identified based on the cloud amount, day time solar radiation and wind speed.

Table 11: Weather parameters for consequence analysis S. No. Wind Speed(m/s) Pasquill Stability 1. 2 F 2. 3 D 3. 5 D

2.5 Fire Fighting Equipment, Facilities and other equipments to tackle the emergency All facilities in the Crude oil Terminal as per OISD-117 norms. A well laid out network of automatic fire hydrant system having 9.8 kg/cm2 pressure with following facilities is provided in plant areas:

2.5.1 Tanks Fire Protection Facilities Tanks are provided with RIM seal fire protection system, which is activated through a thermal sensor and foam pouring system is provided on the tank roof. Tank cooling is done by sprinkler system fitted outside the tank by 3 layer rings. Crude oil spillage is contend by providing Dyke wall as per OISD requirement. Other fire fighting systems are provided as per OISD-117 Requirement.

Table 12: List of Fire Fighting Equipment Sr. No. Fire Fighting Equipment Quantity 1) Fire Hydrant System a) Fire hydrant double headed 209 b) Foam cum water monitor 750 GPM 27 c) Foam cum water monitors 2000 GPM 23 d) Foam cum water monitors 4000 GPM 18 2) Water Storage Total Water Storage 15420 M3 (In two above ground tanks) 3) Fire Pumps Diesel engine driven pump 5 a) Capacity 812 M3 /hr, head 88 M. b) Electrically driven Jockey pump 2

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Sr. No. Fire Fighting Equipment Quantity Capacity 120 M3 /hr, head 98 M. 4) Fire Detection System 290 a) Multi sensor detector 260 b) Heat Detector 10 c) Smoke detector 20 5) Manual Call Points 87 6) Rim Seal Fire Protection System 14 7) Semi fixed foam pourer system 15 8) MVWS (Medium Velocity Water Spray) System for 17 tank cooling 9) HVWS (High Velocity Water Spray) System for 2 transformer cooling 10) Clean Agent gas flooding system 1 11) Fire Hoses a) 15 M each. 300 b) 22.5 M each. 31 c) 30 M each. 24 12) First-aid firefighting extinguishers (Portable) of various types have been provided in sufficient quantity [approx. 340 nos.] all over the plant areas at strategic locations to combat any fire Incident / accident 13) Foam Generator system for dyke area spill 16 14) Foam Tender 2 Water tank Capacity 6000 ltrs. Foam tank Capacity 4000 ltrs. Rear mounted Pump 1 No. Pump Capacity 6000 LPM @10 kg/cm2 15) Foam Nurser 2 Foam tank 10000 ltrs. Foam Transfer Pump 1 Foam Pump capacity 500 lpm @ 12 kg/cm2 16) DCP Tender 1 DCP Vessel 2 DCP Vessel capacity 1000 kg. Nitrogen Cylinder 16 CO2 Cylinder Bank 22.5 kg x 8 nos. 17) Rescue Tender 1 Pneumatic Lifting Bag 4 Pneumatic Rescue Bag 7 Pneumatic Rescue Bag 2 Portable Flood Lights 4 Lifebuoy Jacket 4 Hydraulic Spreader / Cutter 2 Leak Control Kit 1

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Sr. No. Fire Fighting Equipment Quantity Air Blower 1 Warning Boards 12 Fire Proximity suit 2 18) Portable water pump 2 Capacity 2250 LPM at 7kg/cm² 19) Foam trolley (1000 ltr. each) 2 20) Foam Monitor trolley (without tank) 3 21) Portable multi gas detector (pump) 5 22) Portable multi gas detector 5 23) Portable Torch (intrinsic Safe) 4 24) SCBA (Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus)Set 24 SCBA (Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus) Space 14 Cylinder 25) AFFF (Aqueous Film Forming Foam)/DCP (Dry Chemical Powder) for Fire Protection in sufficient quantity. 26) Ambulance 1 27) Mobile Oil Suction Recovery Unit 1

2.6 Other Safety Facilities CCTV should be provided at the relevant location. Table 13: List of Personnel Protective Equipments LIST OF PPEs Sr. No. Items Quantity 1) Safety Helmet 25 2) Stretcher 01 3) First aid box with anti-snake serum 02 4) Rubber hand gloves for electrical 02 5) PVC Suit 02 6) Fire Proximity Suit 02 7) Lifebuoy Jacket 04 8) Chemical Suit 02 9) Resuscitator 02 10) Red / Green Flag for fire drill 02 set 11) Breathing Apparatus 01 Pressure type self contained Breathing 12) 02 Apparatus with spare cylinder (45 min) 13) SCBA Set 32

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LIST OF PPEs Sr. No. Items Quantity 14) Water gel Blankets 04 15) Explosive Meter 02 16) Gas Meter 06 17) Emergency Torch 08 18) Bicycle 12 19) Ladder 07 20) Spare SCBA cylinder 08

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CHAPTER 3: IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD AND SELECTION OF SCENARIOS

3.1 Hazard Identification A classical definition of hazard states that hazard is in fact the characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for an accident. Hence, all the components of a system/plant/process need to be thoroughly examined in order to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of events, which can be termed as an accident.

In Risk Analysis terminology a hazard is something with the potential to cause harm. Hence, the Hazard Identification step is an exercise that seeks to identify what can go wrong at the major hazard installation or process in such a way that people may be harmed. The output of this step is a list of events that need to be passed on to later steps for further analysis.

The potential hazards posed by the facility were identified based on the past accidents, lessons learnt and a checklist. This list includes the following elements: Catastrophic rupture of tanks, Small hole, cracks, equipment failure and valve leaking, flammable liquid leak from a gasket.

Modes of Failure

There are various potential sources of large leakage, which may release hazardous material into the atmosphere. The most common initiating events or failure causes for floating roof tanks are grouped in the general headings presented below:

Operational errors

 Tank overfilling  Drain valve left open accidently  Oil leaks due to operators errors  High inlet pressure

Equipment/instrument failure

 Floating roof sunk  Level indicator  Discharge valve rupture  Rusted vent valve does not open

Lightning

 Poor grounding

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 Rim seal leaks  Direct hit

Static electricity

 Rubber seal cutting  Poor grounding

Maintenance errors

 Welding/cutting  Non explosion-proof motor and tool used  Short-circuit  Poor grounding of soldering equipment  Poor maintenance of equipment both normal and blast-proof

Tank crack/rupture

 Poor soldering  Shell distortion/buckling corrosion

Piping rupture/ leak

 Valve leaking  Flammable liquid leak from gasket  Piping failure  Pump leak

Corrosion Failures

 Internal corrosion (e.g. ingress of moisture)  External corrosion  Cladding/insulation failure (e.g. ingress of moisture)

External Impact Induced Failures

 Dropped objects  Impact from transport such as construction traffic  Vandalism  Subsidence  Strong winds

Miscellaneous

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 Earthquake  Escalation from another storage units (Domino effect)

3.2 Hazards Associated with the Terminal HMPL Mundra Terminal is to handle a hazardous material like Crude oil which have a potential to cause fire and explosion hazards. This chapter describes in brief the hazards associated with the crude Oil.

3.3 Hazards Associated with Flammable Hydrocarbons The list of hazardous material is as follows-

3.3.1 Crude Oil The properties (chemical and physical) of Crude Oil is indicated in Table (MSDS Table) given below-

IDENTITY OF MATERIAL

Table 14: Material Safety Data Sheet of Crude Oil

PRODUCT NAME CRUDE OIL Sour Crude Oil, Sweet Crude Oil, Light Crude Oil, Heavy Crude TRADE NAME Oil, Generic Crude Oil, FORMULA Complex mixture UN No. 1267 CAS No. 8002-05-9 LABEL/CLASS 3

Table 15: Physical and Chemical Properties of Crude Oil GRADES Crude oil PHYSICAL STATE Dark Liquid COLOUR Brown ODOUR Aromatic DENSITY @ 15°C 870 Kg/m3 KINEMATIC VISCOSITY @ 21.1°C 18.4 cSt LOWER EXPLOSION LIMIT 0.05 g dm3 UPPER EXPLOSION LIMIT 0.31 g dm3 DRY VAPOR PRESSURE 3.7 Kpa AUTO IGNITION TEMPERATURE 270°C

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3.4 SELECTED FAILURE CASES A list of failure cases was prepared based on process knowledge, engineering judgment, experience, past incidents associated with such facilities and considering the general mechanisms for loss of containment. The cases have been identified for the consequence analysis is based on the following- o Cases with high chance of occurrence but having low consequence: Example of such failure cases leak from the tanks, equipment failure, etc. The consequence results will provide enough data for planning routine safety exercises. This will emphasize the area where operator's vigilance is essential. o Cases with low chance of occurrence but having high consequence (The example includes Large hole on the storage tank, Catastrophic Rupture of tank.)

Table 16: Selected failure case for HMPL Crude Oil Terminal

Equipment Scenario Failure Frequency (per year)

Proposed Crude oil Tanks Catastrophic Rupture 5.0 x 10-6 Centrifugal & Screw Line Rupture 4.8 x 10-3 Booster Pump

3.5 Hazard identification as per NFPA The fire and health hazards are also categorized based on NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) classifications, described in Table below. Table 17: NFPA for Crude oil

S. No PETROLEUM PRODUCT Nh Nf Nr

1. Crude oil 2 3 0

Nh - NFPA health hazard factor

Nf - NFPA flammability hazard factor

Nr - NFPA reactivity hazard factor

Table 18: Explanation of NFPA classification Classification Definition Health Hazard Materials, which on very short exposure could cause death or major 4 residual injury even though prompt medical treatments were given. Materials, which on short exposure could cause serious temporary or 3 residual injury even though prompt medical treatments were given.

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Classification Definition Materials, which on intense or continued exposure could cause temporary 2 incapacitation or possible residual injury unless prompt medical treatment is given. Materials, which on exposure would cause irritation but only minor 1 residual injury even if no treatment is given. Materials, which on exposure under fire conditions would offer no hazard 0 beyond that of ordinary combustible material. Flammability Materials which will rapidly or completely vaporize at atmospheric 4 pressure and normal ambient temperature, or which are readily dispersed in air and which will burn readily. Liquids and solids that can be ignited under almost all ambient 3 temperature conditions. Materials that must be moderately heated or exposed to relatively high 2 ambient temperatures before ignition can occur. 1 Material that must be preheated before ignition can occur. 0 Materials that will not burn. Reactivity Materials which in themselves are readily capable of detonation or of 4 explosive decomposition or reaction at normal temperature and pressures. Materials which in themselves are capable of detonation or explosive 3 reaction but require a strong initiating source or which must be heated under confinement before initiation or which react explosively with water. Materials which in themselves are normally unstable and readily undergo violent chemical change but do not detonate. Also materials which may 2 react violently with water or which may form potentially explosive mixtures with water. Materials which in themselves are normally stable, but which can become 1 unstable at elevated temperature and pressures or which may react with water with some release of energy but not violently. Materials which in themselves are normally stable, even under fire 0 exposure conditions, and which are not reactive with water.

3.6 Characterizing the Failures Accidental release of flammable or toxic vapors can result in severe consequences. Delayed ignition of flammable vapors can result in blast overpressures covering large areas. This may lead to extensive loss of life and property. Toxic clouds may cover yet larger distances due to the lower threshold values in relation to those in case of explosive clouds (the lower

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explosive limits). In contrast, fires have localized consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in most cases; there are few mitigating actions one can take once a vapor cloud is released.

3.7 Operating Parameters 3.7.1 Inventory Inventory Analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short listing of release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the potential hazard. Larger the inventory of a vessel or a system, larger the quantity of potential release. A practice commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks and major releases from rupture of the tanks. Each section is then characterized by the following parameters required for consequence modeling:

 Mass of flammable material in the process/storage section  Pressure, Temperature and composition of the material  Hole size for release

3.7.2 Loss of Containment Plant inventory can get discharged to environment due to Loss of Containment. Various causes and modes for such an eventuality have been described. Certain features of material to be handled at the terminal need to clearly understood all significant release cases and then to short list release scenarios for a detailed examination.

3.7.3 Liquid Outflow from a tank Liquid release can be either instantaneous or continuous. Failure of a tank leading to an instantaneous outflow assumes the sudden appearance of such a major crack that practically all of the contents above the crack shall be released in a very short time. The flow rate will depend on the size of the hole as well as on the pressure in front of the hole, prior to the accident. Such pressure is basically dependent on the pressure in the vessel.

3.7.4 Vaporization The vaporization of released liquid depends on the vapor pressure and weather conditions. Such consideration and others have been kept in mind both during the initial listing as well as during the short listing procedure. Initial listing of all significant inventories in the process plants was carried out. This ensured no emission through inadvertence. Based on the methodology discussed above a set of appropriate scenarios was generated to carry out Risk Analysis calculations for Pool fire, fire ball, source strength, toxic threat zone, flammability threat zone.

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CHAPTER 4: RELEASE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

4.1 General Consequence analysis involves the application of the mathematical, analytical and computer models for calculation of the effects and damages subsequent to a hydrocarbon/toxic release accident.

Computer models are used to predict the physical behavior of hazardous incidents. The model uses below mentioned techniques to assess the consequences of identified scenarios:

 Modeling of discharge rates when holes develop in crude oil tank.  Modeling of the size & shape of the flammable/toxic gas clouds from releases in the atmosphere.  Modeling of the flame and radiation field of the releases that are ignited and burn as jet fire, pool fire and flash fire.  Modeling of the explosion fields of releases which are ignited away from the point of release.

The different consequences (Flash fire, pool fire, jet fire and Explosion effects) of loss of containment accidents depend on the sequence of events & properties of material released leading to the toxic vapor dispersion, fire & explosion.

4.2 Consequence Analysis Modeling

4.2.1 Discharge Rate The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the tank, size of the hole and phase of the release. The release rate decreases with time as the level of liquid in tank decreases. This reduction depends mainly on the inventory and the action taken to isolate the leak.

4.2.2 Flash Fire A flash fire occurs when a cloud of vapors/gas burns without generating any significant overpressure. The cloud is typically ignited on its edge, remote from the leak source. The combustion zone moves through the cloud away from the ignition point. The duration of the flash fire is relatively short but it may stabilize as a continuous jet fire from the leak source. For flash fires, an approximate estimate for the extent of the total effect zone is the area over which the cloud is above the LFL.

4.2.3 Jet Fire Jet fires are burning jets of gas or atomized liquid whose shape is dominated by the momentum of the release. The jet flame stabilizes on or close to the point of release and

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4.2.4 Toxic Release The aim of the toxic risk study is to determine whether the operators in the terminal, people occupied buildings and the public are likely to be affected by toxic substances. Toxic gas cloud e.g. H2S was undertaken to the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health concentration (IDLH) limit to determine the extent of the toxic hazard created as the result of loss of containment of a toxic substance.

Crude oil contains some amount of hydrogen sulphide. Hydrogen sulphide gas (H2S) is extremely toxic, even very low concentrations can be lethal, depending upon the duration of exposure. Without any warning, H2S may render victims unconscious and death can follow shortly afterwards. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA Regulations) set a 10 ppm ceiling for an eight hourly continuous exposure (TWA limit), a 15 ppm concentration for Short Term Exposure Limit for 15minutes (STEL) and a Peak Exposure of 50 ppm for 10 minutes.

Table 19: Effects of exposure to different vapour phase concentrations of H2S

H S 2 Symptoms/ Effects concentration

(ppm) 0.00011-0.00033 Typical background concentrations 0.01-1.5 Odor threshold (when rotten egg smell is first noticeable to some). Odor becomes more offensive at 3-5 ppm. Above 30 ppm, odor described as sweet or sickeningly sweet. 2-5 Prolonged exposure may cause nausea, tearing of the eyes, headaches or loss of sleep. Airway problems (bronchial constriction) in some asthma patients. 20 Possible fatigue, loss of appetite, headache, irritability, poor memory, dizziness. 50-100 Slight conjunctivitis ("gas eye") and respiratory tract irritation after 1 hour. May cause digestive upset and loss of appetite. 100 Coughing, eye irritation, loss of smell after 2-15 minutes (olfactory fatigue). Altered breathing, drowsiness after 15-30 minutes. Throat irritation after 1 hour. Gradual increase in severity of symptoms over several hours. Death may occur after 48 hours. 100-150 Loss of smell (olfactory fatigue or paralysis). 200-300 Marked conjunctivitis and respiratory tract irritation after 1 hour. Pulmonary edema may occur from prolonged exposure. 500-700 Staggering, collapse in 5 minutes. Serious damage to the eyes in 30

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H S 2 Symptoms/ Effects concentration

(ppm) minutes. Death after 30-60 minutes. 700-1000 Rapid unconsciousness, "knockdown" or immediate collapse within 1 to 2 breaths, breathing stops death within minutes. 1000-2000 Nearly instant death

4.3 Size and Duration of Release Leak size considered for selected failure cases are as listed in Table given below-

Table 20: Leak size of selected failure scenario Failure Description Leak Size 100 mm hole size Failure in crude oil tank 300 mm hole size 1000 mm hole size Catastrophic failure Complete rupture of equipment

The discharge duration is taken as 10 minutes for continuous release scenarios as it is considered that it would take plant personnel about 10 minutes to detect and isolate the leak.

4.4 Damage Criteria In order to appreciate the damage effect produced by various scenarios, physiological/physical effects of the blast wave, thermal radiation or toxic vapor exposition are discussed.

4.4.1 LFL or FLASH FIRE Hydrocarbon vapor released accidentally will spread out in the direction of wind. If a source of ignition finds an ignition source before being dispersed below lower flammability limit (LFL), a flash fire is likely to occur and the flame will travel back to the source of leak. Any person caught in the flash fire is likely to suffer fatal burn injury. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the distance of LFL value is usually taken to indicate the area, which may be affected by the flash fire.

Flash fire (LFL) events are considered to cause direct harm to the population present within the flammability range of the cloud. Fire escalation from flash fire such that process or storage equipment or building may be affected is considered unlikely.

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4.4.2 Thermal Hazard Due to Pool Fire, Flash Fire, Jet Fire Thermal radiation due to pool fire, jet fire or fire ball may cause various degree of burn on human body and process equipment. The damage effect due to thermal radiation intensity is tabulated below.

Table 21: Effects due to incident thermal radiation intensity Incident Radiation Type of Damage (kW/m2) 0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation 1.6 No discomfort for long exposure Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin (first 4.0 degree burns are likely) Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. Second degree burns after 9.5 20 sec. Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting 12.5 plastic tubing etc. Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long 25 exposure. 37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment. Source: Major Hazard Control, ILO The hazard distances to the 37.5 kW/m2, 12.5kW/m2 and 4 kW/m2 radiation levels, selected based on their effect on population; buildings and equipment were modeled using PHAST.

4.4.3 Domino Effect The domino effect is defined as an accident involving a processing unit or device that is followed by the destruction of other units & devices, leading to secondary, tertiary, and even more severe accidents. Domino effects are most commonly observed in crude oil storage facilities for accidents triggered by fire or explosions is sufficiently large to spread to surrounding tanks, leading to secondary (or greater) accidents, thereby causing a domino effect. In this study, only domino effects triggered by fire are considered.

4.4.4 Boilover Boilover is a phenomenon associated with storage tank fires where the burning Crude Oil is explosively released from the tank when the burning oil makes contact with water at the bottom of the tank. A boilover represents the worst case scenario in the event of crude oil tank on fire. Midrange gravity crude oils with a wide range of hydrocarbons have the potential for boilover during fires that last for extended periods. When faced with potential boilover, the incident commander must consider the evacuation of people from the tank vicinity when heat wave approaches the water interface at tank bottom. Since tank wall

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temperature or noise are not definitive guides in tracking the heat wave, infrared thermal imaging camera may be employed to locate the position of the heat wave. Characteristics of crude oil boilover:

a) The heat wave advances from the top towards the bottom of the tank at approximately 0.6 –1.0 m/h. b) A boilover covers approximately 10D (D is tank diameter).

4.5 Plant Data Risk Assessment study conducted is based on the data available from current engineering documents developed for the HMPL Crude oil Terminal. These documents are indicated in Table given below-

Table 22: List of documents used in study S. No Documents/Drawing Documents Drawing No. OVERALL PLOT PLAN CRUDE OIL 1. 9213-082-ENG-205-00001 TERMINAL (COT) MUNDRA 2. FIRE WATER NETWORK LAYOUT 1206-082-16-47-0332

4.6 Consequence Analysis for Crude Oil Tanks at Mundra Terminal 4.6.1 Scenarios The scenarios for consequence analysis have been identified as listed in Table given below-

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Table 23: Scenario for the Consequence Analysis Scenario Pasquill LFL Flash fire Jet Fire Pool Fire Maximum considered stability concentra Pool class tion At LFL Damage distance for various heat Damage distance for various heat radius(m) concentratio loads (m) loads (m) PPM n distance (m) 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5

kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2

2F 24.99 28.61 22.03 17.95 61.36 28.78 N.R. 113

Crude Tank 3D 7000 20.97 28.22 21.46 17.34 65.24 29.93 N.R. 113 (100 mm leak) 5D 19.02 27.79 20.81 16.65 69.22 31.07 N.R. 113

2F 25.95 46.02 35.27 28.69 135 66.32 N.R. 113

Crude Tank 3D 7000 27.15 45.00 34.04 27.45 143 67.26 N.R. 113 (300 mm leak) 5D 25.04 43.86 32.67 26.08 153 68.83 N.R. 113

2F 31.54 78.97 60.11 48.70 230 114 N.R. 113

Crude Tank 3D 7000 32.95 76.23 57.27 45.98 243 114 N.R. 113 (1000 mm leak) 5D 36.23 72.91 53.95 42.84 260 117 N.R. 113

2F 301 347 231 N.R. 113 Crude Tank (Catastrophic 3D 7000 255 - 243 114 N.R. 113 Rupture) 5D 300 377 233 N.R. 113

Centrifugal Pump 2F 3.59 3.03 1.74 N.R. 11.48 8.65 5.86 3.44 Inlet 7000 3D 3.97 2.97 1.67 N.R. 12.18 9.46 6.71 3.42 (3 mm leak)

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Scenario Pasquill LFL Flash fire Jet Fire Pool Fire Maximum considered stability concentra Pool class tion At LFL Damage distance for various heat Damage distance for various heat radius(m) concentratio loads (m) loads (m) PPM n distance (m) 4 12.5 37.5 4 12.5 37.5

kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2

5D 3.53 2.87 1.54 N.R. 12.91 10.43 7.76 3.41

2F 5.95 9.07 6.87 5.92 24.11 17.26 10.41 3.49 Centrifugal Pump Inlet 3D 7000 6.20 8.91 6.64 5.54 24.84 18.25 11.14 3.48 (10 mm leak) 5D 6.40 8.67 6.37 4.74 25.42 19.16 12.02 3.47

2F 10.69 29.14 22.39 18.23 35.37 25.64 15.88 3.52 Centrifugal Pump Inlet 3D 7000 10.95 28.67 21.70 17.48 36.35 27.08 16.47 3.52 (50 mm leak) 5D 11.08 28.01 20.85 16.59 3706 28.32 17.07 3.51

2F 11.98 58.88 45.06 36.63 35.19 25.39 15.60 3.55 Centrifugal Pump Inlet 3D 7000 12.35 59.23 44.75 36.09 36.18 26.85 16.18 3.55 (Line Rupture) 5D 12.26 57.95 43.13 34.42 36.63 27.83 16.34 3.55

2F 5.80 11.28 8.61 6.85 18.12 14.79 11.52 5.94 Centrifugal Pump outlet 3D 7000 5.20 11.74 8.81 6.93 22.82 19.99 17.13 5.00 (3 mm leak) 5D 4.54 11.13 8.17 6.28 33.55 31.96 30.17 2.76

Centrifugal Pump 2F 7000 14.86 23.08 17.72 14.48 36.84 28.42 19.91 21.96

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kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2

outlet 3D 17.88 25.28 19.05 15.32 40.68 32.69 23.81 21.35 (10 mm leak) 5D 20.93 27.40 20.20 15.95 44.79 37.37 28.30 20.63

2F 29.07 60.68 46.15 37.55 76.43 47.31 N.R. 114 Centrifugal Pump Outlet 3D 7000 33.95 63.42 47.34 37.88 84.65 53.61 N.R. 113 (50 mm leak) 5D 35.76 62.14 45.44 35.70 89.54 56.63 N.R. 113

2F 32.86 105 79.42 64.13 195 106 N.R. 185 Centrifugal Pump Outlet 3D 7000 35.14 104 77.70 61.89 207 108 N.R. 185 ( Line Rupture) 5D 36.46 100 73.51 57.70 220 110 N.R. 184

2F 3.59 3.03 1.74 N.R. 11.48 8.65 5.86 3.44

Screw Pump Inlet 3D 7000 3.97 2.97 1.67 N.R. 12.18 9.46 6.71 3.42 (3 mm leak) 5D 3.53 2.87 1.54 N.R. 12.91 10.43 7.76 3.41

2F 5.95 9.07 6.87 5.92 24.11 17.26 10.41 3.49

Screw Pump Inlet 3D 7000 6.20 8.91 6.64 5.54 24.84 18.25 11.14 3.48 (10 mm leak) 5D 6.40 8.67 6.37 4.74 25.42 19.16 12.02 3.47

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kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2

2F 10.69 29.14 22.39 18.23 35.37 25.64 15.88 3.52

Screw Pump Inlet 3D 7000 10.95 28.67 21.70 17.48 36.35 27.08 16.47 3.52 (50 mm leak) 5D 11.08 28.01 20.85 16.59 37.06 28.32 17.07 3.51

2F 11.98 58.88 45.06 36.63 35.19 25.39 15.60 3.55

Screw Pump Inlet 3D 7000 12.35 59.23 44.75 36.09 36.18 26.85 16.18 3.55 (Line Rupture) 5D 12.26 57.95 43.13 34.42 36.63 27.83 16.34 3.55

2F 5.80 11.28 8.61 6.85 18.12 14.79 11.52 5.94 Screw Pump outlet 3D 7000 5.20 11.74 8.81 6.93 22.82 19.99 17.13 5.00 (3 mm leak) 5D 4.54 11.13 8.17 6.28 33.55 31.96 30.17 2.76

2F 14.86 23.08 17.72 14.48 36.84 28.42 19.91 21.96 Screw Pump outlet 3D 7000 17.88 25.28 19.05 15.32 40.68 32.69 23.81 21.35 (10 mm leak) 5D 20.93 27.40 20.20 15.95 44.79 37.37 28.30 20.63

Screw Pump 2F 29.07 60.68 46.15 37.55 76.43 47.31 N.R. 114 Outlet 7000 3D 33.95 63.42 47.34 37.88 84.65 53.61 N.R. 113 (50 mm leak)

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kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2 kW/m2

5D 35.76 62.14 45.44 35.70 89.64 56.63 N.R. 113

2F 33.44 125 94.91 76.50 278 156 N.R. 147 Screw Pump Outlet 3D 7000 35.69 124 92.21 73.31 293 157 N.R. 147 (Line Rupture) 5D 36.67 119 87.12 68.25 311 160 N.R. 147

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CHAPTER 5: RISK ANALYSIS

5.1 Individual Risk The results of Risk Analysis are often reproduced as Individual Risk. Individual Risk is the probability of death occurring as a result of accidents at a fixed installation or a transport route expressed as a function of the distance from such an activity.

There are no specified risk acceptance criteria as yet in our country for Individual Risk levels. A review of risk acceptance criteria in use in other countries indicates the following-

 For fixed installations Official Individual Risk Criteria have been developed by various countries and the review indicates that Individual Risk of fatality to the members of the public outside the installation boundaries may be adopted as higher 10-5 per year (in populated areas) for intolerable risk and lower than 10-6 per year for negligible risk. The region in between is the so-called ALARP region where risk is acceptable subject to its being As Low As Reasonably Practicable (The ALARP principle).  The individual risk results show the geographical distribution of risk. It is the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of specified hazards and is normally taken as risk of death (fatality). It is expressed as risk per year.  Individual risk is usually presented in the form of Individual Risk Contours, which are also commonly known as ISO Risk Curves. This is the risk to a hypothetical individual being present at that location continuously there for 24 hours a day and 365 days a year.

5.1.1 Individual risk acceptability criteria As per IS15656:2006 Indian Standard code of practice on hazard identification & Risk analysis, in many countries the acceptable risk criteria has been defined for the industrial installations and are shown in Table given below-

Table 24: Acceptable Risk Criteria of various countries

Maximum tolerable risk Negligible risk Authority and Application (per year) (per year) VROM, the Netherlands (New) 1 x 10-6 1 x 10-8 VROM, the Netherlands (Existing) 1 x 10-5 1 x 10-8 HSE, UK (Existing hazardous 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-6 industries) HSE, UK (Nuclear power station) 1 x 10-5 1 x 10-6 HSE, UK (Substance transport) 1 x 10-4 1 x 10-6

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Maximum tolerable risk Negligible risk Authority and Application (per year) (per year) HSE, UK (New Housing near 3 x 10-5 3 x 10-7 plants) Hong Kong Government (new 1 x 10-5 Not Used plants)

Since there are no guidelines on the tolerability of fatality risk sanctioned in India to date, to demonstrate the risk to employee and public the following are considered.

 If the average expectation of life is about 75 years, then the imposition of an annual risk of death to individual is 0.01 (one in one hundred per year), it seems unacceptable. Hence 1 in 1000 per year, it may not be totally unacceptable if the individual knows of the situation, has been considered as upper limit of the ALARP triangle for people working inside the Crude oil Terminal.  Lower limit of ALARP triangle is taken as 1 x 10-5 per year.  Upper limit of tolerable risk to a member of general public is taken as 1x10-3 per year.  Similarly, 1x10-6 per year (Negligible risk) is considered for public to demonstrate the risk. This is the lower limit of the ALARP triangle.

The Individual Risk per annum levels discussed above is demonstrated graphically in the so called “ALARP triangle”. In the lower region, the risk is considered negligible, provided that normal precautions are maintained. The upper region represents an intolerable risk must be reduced. The area between these two levels is the “ALARP Region (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)” in which there is a requirement to apply ALARP principle. Any risk that lies between intolerable and negligible levels should be reduced to a level which is “As Low As Reasonably Practicable”.

The individual risks from an activity are the result of the cumulative of risks connected with all possible scenarios. The individual risk results show the geographical distribution of risk. It is the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realization of specified hazards and is normally taken as risk of death (fatality). It is expressed as risk per year.

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Figure 7: Map showing Overall risk Scenario for additional 3 tanks in Crude Oil Terminal

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5.1.2 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) The Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is risk to a person who is standing at that point 365 days a year and 24 hours a day. The maximum LSIR in the unit is listed in Table given below-

Table 25: Maximum Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR)

S. No. Unit Maximum LSIR

1. Proposed Crude Oil Storage Tanks 1.227E-004

5.1.3 Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR) The personnel in the respective Crude Oil Terminal are expected to work 8 hour shift as well as general shift. The actual risk to a person i.e. “Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR)” would be far less after accounting for the time fraction a person is expected to spend at a location.

ISIR Area = LSIR X (8/24) (8 hours shift) x (Time spend by an individual/8 hours)

The maximum ISIR in the unit is listed in Table below-

Table 26: Maximum Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR) S. No. Unit Maximum ISIR

1. Proposed Crude Oil Storage Tanks 4.09E-05

ALARP summary & comparison of Individual risk with acceptability criteria.

The objective of this RA study is to assess the risk level of additional 3 tanks at Crude Oil Terminal with reference to the defined risk acceptability criteria and recommend measures to reduce the risk level to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

After assessment of the risk it is found that the maximum individual risk to terminal personnel is 1.227E-004 per year which is in the ALARP region of the ALARP triangle.

The comparison of maximum individual risk with the risk acceptability criteria is shown in Figure below.

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Figure 8: Individual risk of HMPL Crude Oil Terminal at Mundra

5.2 Societal Risk It is the risk experience in a given time period by the whole group of personnel exposed, reflecting the severity of the hazard and the number of people in proximity to it. It is defined as the relationship between the frequency and the number of people suffering a given level of harm (normally taken to refer to risk of death) from the realization of the specified hazards, it is expressed in the form of F-N curve.

Societal risk acceptability criteria A formal risk criterion is used at all for societal risk; the criterion most commonly used is the FN curve. Like other forms of risk criterion, the FN curve may be cast in the form of a single criterion curve or of two criterion curves dividing the space in to three regions – where the risk is unacceptable, where it is negligible and where it requires further assessment. The latter approach corresponds to application to societal risk of the ALARP principle. Risk criteria for the Netherlands have been considered for the present study and it is represented in Figure given below:

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Figure 9: Societal Risk Criteria

Societal risk criteria are also proposed, although these should be used as guidance only.

The result from the F-N curve shows that the Societal Risk due to Crude oil Terminal of HMPL is within ALARP Region.

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Figure 10: F-N Curve for HMPL Mundra Crude Oil Terminal (Note:- In the above figure ‘Combination 1’ i.e blue colored curve represents COT risk curve)

5.3 Top risk contributors (Societal risk) The present major risk contributing scenarios to societal risk from additional 3 tanks in COT is within ALARP region of ALARP triangle.

5.4 Fault Tree Analysis Graphical representation of the logical structure displaying the relationship between an undesired potential event (top event) and all its probable causes

 Top-down approach to failure analysis

 Starting with a potential undesirable event - top event

 Determining all the ways in which it can occur

Mitigation measures can be developed to minimize the probability of the undesired event.

5.4.1 Fault Tree can help to: The following are the benefits of fault tree analysis.

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 Quantifying probability of top event occurrence

 Evaluating proposed system architecture attributes

 Assessing design modifications and identify areas requiring attention

 Complying with qualitative and quantitative safety/reliability objectives

 Qualitatively illustrate failure condition classification of a top-level event

 Establishing maintenance tasks and intervals from safety/reliability assessments.

5.4.2 Fault tree construction The following gates are used while construction of fault tree for a given process. The meaning and purpose of these are given in the below table.

AND gate The AND-gate is used to show that the output event occurs only if all the input events occur

OR gate The OR-gate is used to show that the output event occurs only if one or more of the input events occur

Basic event A basic event requires no further development because the appropriate limit of resolution has been reached

Intermediate event A fault tree event occurs because of one or more antecedent causes acting through logic gates have occurred

Transfer A triangle indicates that the tree is developed further at the occurrence of the corresponding transfer symbol

Undeveloped event A diamond is used to define an event which is not further developed either because it is of insufficient consequence or because information is unavailable

Figure 11: Fault tree construction

5.4.3 Guidelines for developing a fault tree Following guidelines are to be kept in mind while developing fault tree-

 Classify an event into more elementary events.

 Replace an abstract event by a less abstract event.

 Identify distinct causes for an event.

 Couple trigger event with ‘no protective action’.

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 Find co-operative causes for an event.

 Pinpoint a component failure event.

Below diagram shows the fault tree for the Project.

Figure 12: Fault Tree for the project

5.5 Event Tree Analysis An event tree is used to develop the various event outcome of a release and thereby estimate the result event frequency. An event tree is constructed by defining an initial event and the possible consequences that flow from this. The initial event is usually placed on the left and the branches are drawn to the right, each branch representing a different sequence of events and terminating in an outcome.

Each branch of the event tree represents a particular scenario. The tree is a means of estimating the frequency of the outcome for that scenario. For example, for a flammable release, a typical series of models are vapour dispersion, ignition, jet fire, pool fire and explosion.

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The data used in Event tree analysis are discussed below:

5.5.1 Immediate Ignition This is the probability that the release ignites immediately, at the release point, before the cloud has begun to disperse and to reach ignition sources away from the release point.

5.5.2 Delayed Ignition The immediate ignition outcomes are defined to occur with precisely the probability defined by the event tree probabilities. On the other hand the delayed ignition outcomes occur at a frequency calculated by available ignition sources which are fired heater, ignition due to vehicle movement, general ignition (canteen, smoking booth), high tension line etc. The outcome of the delayed ignition of released hydrocarbon results in flash fire or explosion. An un-ignited release will normally disperse with little or no consequence (unless the gas is toxic), whereas a fire or explosion can potentially escalate to endanger the whole installation.

5.5.3 Materials that is both Flammable and Toxic In reality the risk to personnel for a given event could be the result of toxic or flammable effects or combination of the two depending on the properties of the material being released. Common examples of such flammable and toxic materials include hydrogen sulfide. In such scenario, non-ignition probability shall be used to define the frequency of a subsequent toxic calculation.

Figure 13: Event Tree for Continuous Release

5.5.4 Delayed Ignition Probability (DI) Delayed ignition probability to be calculated based on available ignition source on down- wind direction of released hydrocarbon. Available ignition source may be due to fired heaters, vehicle movement, smoking booth etc.

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CHAPTER 6: COMPARISON AGAINST RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

A risk analysis provides a measure of the risks resulting from a particular facility or activity. It thus finds application as a decision making tool in situations where judgment has to be made about the tolerability of the risk posed by an existing/proposed activity. However, risk analysis produces only numbers, which themselves provide no inherent use. It is the assessment of those numbers that allows conclusions to be drawn and recommendations to be developed. The normal approach adopted is to relate the risk measures obtained to risk acceptance criteria.

Risk criteria, if they are to be workable, recognizes the following-

 There is a level of risk that is so high that it is considered unacceptable or intolerable regardless of the benefits derived from an activity.  There is also a level of risk that is low enough as to be considered negligible.  Levels of risk in between are to be considered tolerable subject to their being reduced As Low As is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). (The meaning of ALARP is explained in the following sub-section.)  The above is the formulation of the, now well-established, three tier structure of risk criteria and risk control.  The risk criteria simply attempt to establish whether risk is “tolerable”. Below is a list of words generally in use and their meaning.

ACCEPTABLE RISKS: Since risks in general are unwelcome no risk should be called “acceptable”. It might be better to say that the activity may be acceptable generally, but the risks can only ever be tolerable.

TOLERABLE RISKS: are risks the exposed people are expected to bear without undue concern. A subtle difference is made out here between Acceptable Risks and Tolerable Risks though these terms are sometimes used interchangeably.

NEGLIGIBLE RISKS: are risks so small that there is no cause for concern and there is no reason to reduce them.

6.1 The ALARP Principle The ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) principle seeks to answer the question “What is an acceptable risk?” The definition may be found in the basis for judgment used in British law that one should be as safe as is reasonably practicable. Reasonably practicable is defined as implying “that a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed on scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the risk

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(whether in money, time, or trouble) is placed on the other, and that, if it be shown that there is a gross disproportion between them–risk being insignificant in relation to the sacrifice–the defendants discharge the onus upon them” The ALARP details are represented in the Figure given below-

Figure 14: ALARP Detail

ALARP Summary: The Individual and Societal risk per year from additional 3 tanks in Crude Oil Terminal is within the ALARP region of the ALARP triangle.

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CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RISK REDUCTION

7.1 Conclusion and Recommendations Although the results of this Risk analysis show that the risks to the human being are well within acceptable limit, they will be sensitive to the specific design and/or modeling assumptions used.