HAZARD IDENTIFICATION • Identify potentially hazards that can cause loss of human life/injury, loss of properties and deteriorate the environment due to loss of containment. • Identify potential scenarios, which can cause loss of containment and consequent hazards like fire, explosion and toxicity.

7.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS • Evaluate the magnitude of consequences of different potential hazard scenarios and their effect zones. • Consequence analysis is a measure of potential hazards and is important for taking precautionary measures for risk reduction as well as for preparation of Disaster Management Plan. This report has been prepared by applying the standard techniques of risk assessment and by using DNV, Technica software “Phast Risk Micro (Version 6.7)” and the information provided by IOCL as well as field study.

7.4 GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN RISK ASSESSMENT The common terms used in Risk Assessment and Disaster Management are elaborated below: “Risk” is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death) occurring within a specified period or under specified circumstances. This may be either a frequency or a probability depending on the circumstances.

“Hazard” is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury, damage to property or the environment or some combination of these criteria.

“Hazardous Substance” means any substance or preparation, which by reason of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment.

“Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an industry, which may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or connected therewith or which may result in pollution of the general environment.

“Disaster” is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic disruptions, loss of human life and deterioration of health and health services on a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected area or community. Disaster occasioned by man is factory fire, explosions and release of toxic gases or chemical substances etc.

“Accident” is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal injury or property damage or both.

“Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the resources. This highlights the typical nature of emergency “It will be after experience that enough is not enough in emergency situations. Situations of this nature are avoidable but it is not possible to avoid them always.”

“Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall Management. Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capability of the persons engaged in direct action, will require support from others in the organization before, during and after an emergency.

7.5 SCOPE OF STUDY The risk assessment has been carried out in line with the requirements of various statutory bodies for similar type of projects: ● Identification of potential hazard areas; ● Identification of representative failure cases; ● Identification of possible initiating events; ● Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the impact zones from the accidental scenarios; ● Consequence analysis for all the possible events; ● Assess the overall suitability of the site from hazard minimization and disaster mitigation points of view; ● Furnish specific recommendations on the minimization of the worst accident possibilities; and ● Preparation of broad Disaster Management Plan (DMP).

7.6 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY Risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of an event or sequence of events. The description of the tasks of the various phases involved in risk analysis is detailed below:

PHASE-I: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION The technique employed for the Hazard Identification is MCA analysis. MCA stands for Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum damage distance, which is believed to be probable. MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice, the selection of accident scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering judgment and expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis. Process information study and relevant data would help in the identification of hazard prone section of the plant. Inventory analysis and Fire and Explosion and Toxicity Indices and following manufacture, storage and Import of hazardous chemicals rules of Government of India GOI Rules, 2000) are also the methods used in hazard identification.

PHASE-II: HAZARD ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION Ranking of each unit in hazard prone sections are done based on the Fire and Explosion Index (F & EI), Toxicity Index (TI) and Inventory Analysis. Safety of hazard prone section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis.

A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a part of the US Military Standard System Safety Program requirements. The main purpose of this analysis is to recognize hazards early, thus saving time and cost, which could result from major plant redesigns, if hazards are discovered at a later stage. Many companies use a similar procedure under a different name. It is generally applied during concept or early development phase of a process plant and can be very useful in site selection. PHA is a precursor to further hazard analysis and is intended for use only in the preliminary phase of plant development for cases where past experience provides little or no insight into any potential safety problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA focuses on the hazardous materials and major plant elements since few details on the plant design are available and there is likely not to be any information available on procedures. The PHA is sometimes considered to be a review where energy can be released in an uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of formulating a list of hazards related to:

● Pipeline / equipment; ● Interface among system components; ● Operativeenvironment; ● Operations (tests, maintenance, etc.); ● Facility; and ● Safety equipment.

The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the subsequent plant design phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and Consequence Analysis.

Phase-III & IV: Disaster Management Plan (DMP) and Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP)

Safety review of especially vulnerable process units is covered in this phase. This helps in reducing the risk qualitatively while the outcome of Phase-I and Phase-II would reduce risk in quantitative terms. Emergency Preparedness Plan based on the earlier studies is covered in this activity. Customarily, major industries to have their EPP’s and therefore, there is a need to look into those details and recommend a realistic EPP based on the above studies.

7.7HAZARD Identification 7.7.1Introduction Identification of hazards in the proposed project is of primary significance in the analysis, quantification and cost effective control of accidents involving chemicals and process. A classical definition of hazard states that hazard is in fact the characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for an accident. Hence, all the components of a system/plant/process need to be thoroughly examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned event/sequence of events, which can be termed as an accident.

Typical schemes of predictive hazard evaluation and quantitative risk analysis suggest that hazard identification step plays a key role.

Estimation of probability of an unexpected event and its consequences form the basis of quantification of risk in terms of damage to property, environment or personnel. Therefore, the type, quantity, location and conditions of release of a toxic or flammable substance have to be identified in order to estimate its damaging effects, the area involved and the possible precautionary measures required to be taken. The following two methods for hazard identification have been employed in the study:

• Identification of hazardous storage units based on relative ranking technique, viz. Fire- Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE&TI); and • Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA)

7.7.2 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes namely flammable/explosive substances, unstable substances and toxic substances.

Flammable substances require interaction with air and a source of ignition for their hazard to be realized. Under certain circumstances the vapours arising from flammable substances when mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces. However, if present in sufficient quantity such clouds may explode in open air also.

Unstable substances are liquids or solids, which may decompose with such violence so as to give rise to blast waves.

Finally, toxic substances are dangerous and cause substantial damage to life when released into the atmosphere. The ratings for a large number of chemicals based on flammability, reactivity and toxicity are given in NFPA Codes.

7.8 DOW INDEX 7.8.1 Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE & TI) Approach Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Indexing (FE & TI) is a rapid ranking method for identifying the degree of hazard. The application of FE&TI would help to make a quick assessment of the nature and quantification of the hazard in these areas. However, this does not provide precise information. Respective Material Factor (RMF), General Hazard Factors (GHF), Special Process Hazard Factors (SPHF) are computed using standard procedure of awarding penalties based on storage, handling and reaction parameters. Before hazard indexing can be applied, the installation in question should be subdivided into logical, independent elements or units. In general, a unit can logically be characterized by the nature of the process that takes place in it. In some cases, the unit may consist of a plant element separated from the other elements by space or by protective walls. A plant element may also be an apparatus, instrument, section or system that can cause a specific hazard. For each separate plant process, which contains flammable or toxic substances, a fire and explosion index F & EI and/or a toxicity index TI may be determined in a manner derived from the method for determining a fire and explosion index developed by the Dow Chemical Company.

7.8.2 FE and TI Methodology Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index (F and EI) is a product of Material Factor (MF) and Hazard Factor (F3) while MF represents the flammability and reactivity of the substances, the hazard factor (F3), is itself a product of General Process Hazards (GPH) and Special Process Hazards (SPH). An accurate plot plan of the plant, a process flow sheet and Fire and Explosion Index and Hazard Classification Guide published by Dow Chemical Company are required to estimate the FE & TI of any process plant or a storage unit.

7.8.3 Computations and Evaluation of Fire and Explosion Index The Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) is calculated from the following formula:

F & EI = MF x (GPH) x (SPH)

The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as per the criteria given below: F & EI Range Degree of Hazard 0 – 60 Light 61 – 96 Moderate 97 – 127 Intermediate 128 – 158 Heavy 159 – Up Severe

7.8.4 Toxicity Index (TI) The toxicity index is primarily based on the index figures for health hazards established by the NFPA in Codes NFPA 704, NFPA 49 and NFPA 345 m. However, the products handled in the plant are not toxic. 7.8.5Classification of Hazard Categories By comparing the indices F&EI and TI, the unit in question is classified into one of the following three categories established for the purpose (Table - 7.1).

TABLE-7.1: FIRE, EXPLOSION AND TOXICITY INDEX Category Fire & Explosion Index (F&EI) Toxicity Index (TI) I F&EI, 65 TI < 6 II 65 < or = F&EI < 95 6 < or = TI < 10 III F&EI > or = 95 TI > or = 10

Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the three hazard categories.

7.8.6 The Basic Data: 7.8.6.1Basic Data for MS (i) Substance stored - Motor Spirit (ii) Quantity stored - 3x5203KL (FR) (iii) Type of storage - Floating Roof Tanks.

7.8.6.2 Basic Data for SKO (i) Substance stored - Superior Kerosene Oil (ii) Quantity stores - 2x2604KL (CR) (iii) Type of storage - Conical Roof Tanks. 7.8.6.3 Basic Data for HSD (i) Substance stored - High Speed Diesel (ii) Quantity stored - 3x4382KL (CR)+ 20 KL(Own use, U/G) (iii) Type of storage - Conical Roof Tanks

7.8.6.4 Basic Data for Ethanol (i) Substance stored - Ethanol (ii) Quantity stores - 2x70KL(U/G) + Proposed 2x1000 KL(A/G) (iii) Type of storage - Underground &Aboveground Tanks.

7.8.6.5 Basic Data for Biodiesel (i) Substance stored - Biodiesel (ii) Quantity stores - Proposed 2x600KL (A/G) (iii) Type of storage - Underground Tanks & vertical cone roof.

7.8.6.6 The Properties The relevant properties of the above substances are given in Table - 7.2.and has been shown in Annexure-XI

7.8.6.7 The Results The detailed calculations are summarized in Table - 7.3.

7.8.6.8 Comments The recommended minimum features, according to DOW Fire and Explosion Index have been given at Table - 7.3 Based on these features and the various values obtained, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1. The SKO and Ethanol Storage Tanks pose a “MODERATE” hazard, with an exposure radius of about 51.1 ft and 58.7 ft respectively.

2. The Radii of Exposure for the MS & HSD Storage Tanks are 97.0ft & 79.8ft and the hazard potential is “Intermediate”. 3. The Radii of Exposure for the Biodiesel Storage Tanks are 46.3ft and the hazard potential is “Light”. Table - 7.2 PROPERTIES OF MS, SKO, HSD, ETHANOL AND BIODIESEL Flash Boiling Sr. Capacity Density Tank No. Stored Material Class Point oC, Point oC, No. KL Kg/m3 max max 01. T-1, T-2, T-3 Motor Spirit 15609 A 750 < - 10.0 35 - 210 High Speed B 02. T-4 &T-5 6986 850 > 30.0 150- 400 Diesel Oil Superior B 03. T-6,T-7& T-8 13146 800 35.0 193-293 Kerosene Oil T-9, T-10(U/G), A 04. Ethanol 140+2000 790 12.0 78.3 T-12, T-13 (A/G) B >61.5 °C 820- 05. T-14& T-15(A/G) Biodiesel 2000 (Closed 150-400 850 cup)

Table - 7.3 CALCULATIONS FOR DOW FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX General Special Unit Fire & Material Exposure Stored Process Process Hazard Explosion Degree of Tank No. Factor Radius Material Hazard Hazard Factor Index F&EI Hazard MF (ft.) Factor F1 Factor F2 F3 = F3xMF T-1, T-2 Motor 16.00 1.9 3.8 7.2 115.5 97.0 Intermediate & T-3 Spirit Superior T-4 &T-5 Kerosene 10.00 1.9 3.2 6.1 60.8 51.1 Moderate Oil High T-6,T-7& Speed 10.00 2.5 3.8 9.5 95.0 79.8 Intermediate T-8 Diesel Oil T-9, T- 10(U/G), Ethanol 16.00 1.9 2.3 4.4 69.9 58.7 Moderate T-12, T- 13 (A/G T-14& T- Biodiesel 10.00 1.9 2.9 5.5 55.1 46.3 Light 15(A/G)

7.9 RISK ANALYSIS 7.9.1 Properties of Materials Handled Petroleum products like, Motor Spirit (MS), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), High Speed Diesel (HSD), Ethanol and Biodiesel are handled in the Terminal. MS, SKO & HSD are a combination of hydrocarbons and are highly inflammable. Motor Spirit & Ethanol is a Class-A type petroleum liquid (Flash Point <23oC) and Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), Biodiesel & High Speed Diesel (HSD) are of Class B type according to convention. The products, when spilled from the containment will cause fire if they come in contact with an ignition source. Incomplete combustion of these hydrocarbons may generate carbon monoxide, which may cause toxicity as well as explosion. However, fire is the main hazard. Lower the flash point, higher is the possibility of ignition and hazard. The light hydrocarbons will evaporate from these petroleum oil liquids, which may catch fire if they get into contact with an ignition source.

7.9.2 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products The hazard from equipment/pipeline handling petroleum products is the potential loss of integrity of the containment with subsequent release of liquid causing fire. The pipelines carry large quantities of petroleum liquid. A rare pipeline fracture releases large quantities of hydrocarbons. The product gets collected in the neighborhood of the pipeline and may lead to a fire hazard if it gets source of ignition and proper precautions are not taken.

Catastrophic failure of the shell of a storage tank is a very rare phenomenon, which may occur due to earthquake or due to aerial bombardment during war. However, vapour coming out through the vent line of fixed roof tank or through vapour seal around the shell in floating roof tanks may be ignited through lightning. However, such cases are also very rare. In such cases the whole tank may be on fire. Corrosion in the tanks may cause small holes causing release of petroleum liquid from the tanks. However, in such cases the oil will be contained in the dyke. In case of oil spill collected on ground an oil pool will be formed. An ignited pool of oil is called Pool Fire. It creates long smoky flames. The wind may tilt the flame towards ground causing secondary fires and damages. Radiation from the flame can be very intense near the fire but falls off rapidly beyond 3-4 pool diameters. Such fires are very destructive within the plant area and near the source of generation. In case of release of considerable quantity of MS, explosion may occur.

In case of formation of small holes on the above ground pipeline the liquid may escape in the form of jet and may catch fire if it gets an ignition source. Damage due to heat radiation from such jets is mostly limited to objects in the path. However, the ignited jet can impinge on other vessels and the pipelines causing domino effect.

7.9.3 Brief Review of Safety Related Facilities 7.9.3.1 Because of the inherent hazard potential of the petroleum products handled in the installation, due care is to be taken in handling of the same in tanks, pipelines and other associated facilities e.g.

i) Well established code of practice in design and installation. ii) Well planned layout (as per guidelines of OISD 118). iii) Provision of weather resistant painting for protection of exposed areas of pipelines, valves and equipment. iv) Provision of dykes and fire walls around storage tanks. v) Well planned Fire Fighting Facilities. vi) Well trained manpower for operation and maintenance.

7.9.3.2 Fire Fighting Facilities i] Well planned Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities have been provided in the installation e.g. a)Fire Hydrants and Monitors Fire Hydrants and monitors have been provided around the dyke walls of storage tanks. They are also provided for Pump Manifold, Pump Bay & Road Tanker Loading Gantry and Tank Wagon Decantation place. Layout of fire hydrants & monitors and isolation valves have been made in such a way that Fire Tenders can approach to put out fire in any possible area. b) Spray Protection System Storage tanks containing MS have been provided with water spray protection. Perforated spray water pipes have been provided around the shell of the storage tanks and are located at the top of the shell.

Fire Fighting Systems has been designed as per guidelines of OISD-117 and TAC rules.

ii]Portable Fire Fighting Apparatus Fire Extinguishers and other fire fighting apparatus have been provided in vulnerable areas of the plant, administrative block; Fire Water Pump House. MCC etc. as per OISD guidelines.

7.9.3.3 Safety Valves Two numbers of pressure/vacuum valves have provided on the roof of the storage tanks containing MS to prevent failure of tanks due to pressure as well as vacuum.

7.10 RISK ASSESSMENT 7.10.1 Introduction The Agra Terminal of M/s IOCL, which includes the facilities for receipt, storage and despatch of petroleum products mainly poses fire hazard due to unwanted and accidental release of hydrocarbons. However, due safeguard has been taken in design, installation and operation of the system to prevent any unwanted release of hydrocarbons from their containment. However, in the event of release of hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire. The chances of explosion are less. This section deals with various failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios, analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis.

Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various failure scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason and purpose for consequence analysis are manifolds like -

 Computation of risk.  Aid better plant layout.  Evaluate damage and protective measures necessary for saving properties & human lives.  Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures.  Formulate safe design criteria and protection system.  Formulate effective Disaster Management Plan. The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all known and unknown effects that are of importance when failure scenarios occur and to get information about how to deal with possible catastrophic events. It also gives the plant authorities, workers, district authorities and the public living in the area an understanding of the hazard potential and remedial measures to be taken.

7.10.2 Modes of Failure There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any installation. The leakages may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of small diameter pipeline, leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, failure of loading arms, leakages due to wrong opening of valves & blinds, pipe bursting due to overpressure, pump mechanical seal failure and any other sources of leakage.

7.10.3 Damage Criteria The damage effect of all such failures mentioned above are mainly due to thermal radiation from pool fire or jet fire due to ignition of hydrocarbons released since the petroleum products are highly inflammable especially Motor sprit whose flash point is low. The petroleum products released accidentally due to any reason will normally spread on the ground as a pool or released in the form of jet in case of release from a pressurised pipeline through small openings. Light hydrocarbons present in the petroleum products will evaporate and may get ignited both in case of jet as well as liquid pool causing jet fire or pool fire. Accidental fire on the storage tanks due to ignition of vapour from the tanks or due to any other reason may also be regarded as pool fire. Thermal radiation due to pool fire or jet flame may cause various degrees of burns on human bodies. Also its effect on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects due to thermal radiation intensity are elaborated in Table - 7.4 & 7.5.

Table - 7.4 DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY Incident Thermal Casualty Radiation Intensity, Types of damage Probability kW/m2

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment 1.00 32 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on thermal protected 1.00 and pressurized storage tank 12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, 0.50 melting of plastic tubing etc. 8 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on thermally -- unprotected and pressurized storage tanks 4.5 1st degree burn 0.00 1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure 0.00 0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation 0.00

Table - 7.5 PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD THERMAL DOSES Dose Threshold kJ/m2 Effect 375 3rd Degree Burn. 250 2nd Degree Burn. 125 1st Degree Burn. 65 Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin caused.

1st Degree Burn  Involve only epidermis, blister may occur; example - sun burn. 2nd Degree Burn  Involve whole of epidermis over the area of burn plus some portion of dermis. 3rd Degree Burn  Involve whole of epidermis and dermis; subcutaneous tissues may also be damaged. In case of motor spirit having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a possibility of vapour cloud explosion. Damage effects due to blast over pressure are given in Table - 7.6. Table - 7.6 DAMAGE EFFECTS DUE TO BLAST OVER PRESSURE Casualty Blast Overpressure. (Bar) Damage Type Probability 0.30 Major damage to structures (assumed fatal to the 0.25 people inside structure) 0.17 Eardrum rupture 0.10 0.10 Repairable Damage 0.10 0.03 Glass Breakage 0.00 0.01 Crack of Windows 0.00

7.10.4 Dispersion and Stability Class In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons dispersion of vapour plays an important role as indicated earlier. The factors which govern dispersion are mainly Wind Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface roughness. One of the characteristics of atmosphere is stability, which plays an important role in dispersion of pollutants. Stability is essentially the extent to which it allows vertical motion by suppressing or assisting turbulence. It is generally a function of vertical temperature profile of the atmosphere. The stability factor directly influences the ability of the atmosphere to disperse pollutants emitted into it from sources in the plant. In most dispersion problems relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground. Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature profile. Temperature of the atmospheric air normally decreases with increase in height. The rate of decrease of temperature with height is known as the Lapse Rate. It varies from time to time and place to place. This rate of change of temperature with height under adiabatic or neutral condition is approximately 1oC per 100 metres. The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the lapse rate is less than, equal or greater than dry adiabatic lapse rate i.e. 1oC per 100 metres. Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F A = extremely unstable B = moderately unstable C = slightly unstable D = Neutral E = Stable F = highly stable

7.10.5 SELECTED FAILURE CASES The mode of approach adopted for consequence analysis is first to select the probable failure scenarios. The failure scenarios selected are indicated in Table - 7.7.

Table - 7.7 LIST OF FAILURE CASES Credible/ Sl.No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences Non Credible 1] All Storage Tanks including proposed Thermal radiation for MS, tanks (Catastrophic) on Fire with Domino SKO, HSD, Ethanol and also Partially Credible effect. explosion for MS 2] Vessel connection failure for tank outlet - do - Partially Credible lines of all tanks Credible/ Sl.No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences Non Credible 3] TLF/TLD Pump Discharge Line Rupture - do - Non Credible 4] Gasket Failure in TLF Pump Discharge Line - do - Credible 5] 3 inches dia. loading arm failure for Road - do - Partially Credible Tanker Loading 6] Pump Mechanical Seal Failure - do - Credible 7] Hole in TLF/TLD Pump Discharge Line - do - Credible (15mm) It will be seen that most of the probable cases of failures have been considered for Consequence Analysis.

7.11 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been done to evaluate and identify possible consequences as well as to incorporate suitable measures to prevent and mitigate such failure events. 7.11.1 Storage Tanks on Fire A tank is susceptible to fire hazard, if a static charge or a spark ignites the vapour being released from vent or rim seal (in case of FRVT) causes fire. If the fire is not controlled at the initial stage it can lead to collapse of the roof and total liquid becomes exposed to fire. The hazard posed by such failure and subsequent fire is intense thermal radiation. The thermal radiation emanating from such tank fire can cause damage to nearby tanks and persons' in the vicinity. As per IP Code, thermally protected facilities and storage tanks can withstand a thermal radiation of 32 kW/m2 while unprotected tanks and process facilities can withstand only up to 8 kW/m2. Normal persons can withstand an intensity of 1.6 kW/m2for a long duration. A radiation intensity of 4.5 kW/m2can cause 1st degree burn if a man is exposed for more than 20 seconds. All damage contour has been shown in Annexure no. XIII. Hazard distances due to thermal radiation as a result of fires in storage tanks are shown in Table - 7.8. Table - 7.8 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO POOL FIRE (Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation kW/m2 2F 2B 3D 5D MS TANK No.1/2/3 (Existing) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 22.56 22.28 22.89 23.55 8 33.65 32.15 34.62 37.97 4.5 56.75 54.38 60.63 69.28 SKO TANK No. 4/5 (Existing) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 27.50 27.50 27.83 28.40 8 39.65 37.73 40.65 44.75 4.5 63.81 61.72 67.71 75.38 HSD TANK No.- 6/7/8 (Existing) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 33.65 33.65 33.82 34.38 8 47.05 44.79 48.08 52.09 4.5 72.02 70.02 75.61 82.38 Biodiesel TANK No.-14/15 (Proposed) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 19.29 18.80 19.58 20.40 8 29.61 28.15 30.64 33.66 4.5 46.42 45.31 49.42 54.22 ETHANOL TANK No.16/17 (Proposed) 37.5 25.10 24.20 25.57 27.14 32 29.14 27.87 29.90 32.38 12.5 50.33 49.95 52.08 53.96 8 60.20 60.00 61.42 62.57 4.5 75.11 74.96 75.94 77.08 MS TANK No.1,2&3 (Domino effect) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 37.00 37.00 37.05 37.59 8 51.35 48.80 52.30 57.35 4.5 84.59 80.71 89.30 101.63

It is seen from the above table that in case of tank fires for MS (1/2/3, existing) the hazard distance for thermal radiation level for 8 kW/m2will extend up to a maximum distance of 39.97m respectively. It is also seen from the above table that in case of tank fire in Domino effect for MS tank (1,2 &3) the hazard distance for thermal radiation level for 8 kW/m2 will extend upto a maximum distance of 57.4m. In case of tank fire for SKO (existing), HSD (existing), Biodiesel (Proposed) & Ethanol distances to 8 kW/m2are 44.8 m, 52.1 m, 33.7 m & 62.3m respectively. Hence it is important that in case of fire in any storage tank, cooling of the tank on fire as well as other tanks by water spray should be started quickly through water sprinkler/ cooling water pipes to avoid failure of other tanks. However, such tank fires are very-very rare. Also the vapour pressure of SKO and HSD being much low at atmospheric temperature, the chances of ignition of vapour are very low and practically nil.

7.11.2 Vessel connection failure for tank outlet lines All the storage tanks have two lines (one inlet and another outlet) connected at bottom of the tank. The outlet dia. of storage tanks for MS, SKO, HSD, Biodiesel & Ethanol are 250 mm, 300 mm, 300mm, 75 mm & 75 mm with failure frequencies of vessel connection failure of 6.7 x 10-8, 7.2 x 10-8 , 5.8 x 10-8, 7.2 x 10-8 & 7.3x 10-9per m per year respectively.In case of failure of such nozzles liquid will spill inside the dyke and will form a pool. The liquid pool may get ignited if the vapours come into contact with an ignition source. Hazard distances for 37.5 kW/m2, 32 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2, 8 kW/m2and 4.5 kW/m2 are calculated and presented in Table - 7.9.

Table - 7.9 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO POOL FIRE (Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation kW/m2 2F 2B 3D 5D MS TANK No.1/2/3 (Existing) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 22.56 22.28 22.89 23.55 8 33.65 32.15 34.62 37.97 4.5 56.75 54.38 60.63 69.28 SKO TANK No. 4/5 (Existing) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 27.50 27.50 27.83 28.40 8 39.65 37.73 40.65 44.75 4.5 63.81 61.72 67.71 75.38 HSD TANK No.- 6/7/8 (Existing) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 33.65 33.65 33.82 34.38 8 47.05 44.79 48.08 52.09 4.5 72.02 70.02 75.61 82.38 Biodiesel TANK No.-14/15 (Proposed) 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 19.29 18.80 19.58 20.40 8 29.61 28.15 30.64 33.66 4.5 46.42 45.31 49.42 54.22 ETHANOL TANK No.12/13 (Proposed) 37.5 25.10 24.20 25.57 27.14 32 29.14 27.87 29.90 32.38 12.5 50.33 49.95 52.08 53.96 8 60.20 60.00 61.42 62.57 4.5 75.11 74.96 75.94 77.08 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate Ignition of the pool and pool fire will cause damage to tanks inside the dyke and nearby equipment/pipeline. As such action shall be taken immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam compound. In case of fire a quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent damage. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion in case of MS tank nozzle failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction along wind and may come into contact with some ignition source causing vapour cloud explosion. The hazard distances for UVCE under different wind speed and stability classes for MS is given in Table - 7.10. Table - 7.10 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (MS) Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS TANK No. 1/2/3 (Existing) 01. 2F 381.40 452.99 645.27 02. 2B 354.73 409.61 557.01 03. 3D 343.42 396.98 540.84 04. 5D 285.92 331.96 455.63 ETHANOL TANK No. 12/13 (Proposed) 01. 2F 13.86 17.74 28.15 02. 2B 13.74 17.49 27.57 03. 3D 13.86 17.73 28.12 04. 5D 13.90 17.81 28.32 It is evident that in case of vapour cloud explosion heavy damage may occur in nearby equipment and structures. The overpressure distances of 0.3 bar (heavy damage) for MS extends up to 381.4 meters for existing tank. The overpressure distances of 0.3 bar (heavy damage) for ethanol extends up to 13.86 metres for proposed tank. However, since the failure probability is very low, the occurrence is very rare.

7.11.3 TLF/TLD Pump Discharge Line Rupture The TLF/TLD pump discharge line in the Terminal is of sizes such as200mm, 250mm, 250mm, 75mm, 75mm for MS, SKO, HSD, Ethanol & Biodiesel and suction line is 250mm, 300mm, 300mm, 75mm, 75mm for the same products. Failure of these diameter lines is non-credible in nature. Consequence analysis has been conducted to evaluate the hazard distances and presented in Table No. - 7.11. Table - 7.11 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR TLF/TLD Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation kW/m2 2F 2B 3D 5D MS PUMP DISCH. LINE FAILURE, RR – 3.06 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 31.33 30.56 31.20 31.79 8 42.22 40.18 42.66 45.72 4.5 64.61 61.57 67.40 75.10 SKO PUMP DISCH. LINE FAILURE, RR – 4.80 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 39.20 39.34 39.50 88.54 8 51.58 49.74 52.76 56.96 4.5 76.51 74.48 80.64 40.22 HSD PUMP DISCH. LINE FAILURE, RR – 6.92 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 45.41 45.64 45.77 46.56 8 58.95 56.92 60.28 64.71 4.5 86.01 83.92 90.32 98.45 Bio diesel PUMP DISCH. LINE FAILURE, RR – 7.33 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 22.45 21.77 23.00 24.52 8 31.77 30.77 33.54 37.23 4.5 42.85 42.55 45.24 47.93 Ethanol-1 PUMP DISCH. LINE FAILURE, RR – 6.50 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 16.03 15.82 16.10 16.37 32 17.82 17.37 18.05 18.68 12.5 30.21 29.99 31.31 32.42 8 35.32 35.25 36.11 36.66 4.5 42.78 42.78 43.38 43.97 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate, RD- Release Duration

As evident from the above table that thermal radiation distances in case of TLF/TLD pump discharge line failure for a thermal radiation of 4.5 kW/m2forthe failure of MS, SKO, HSD, Biodiesel and Ethanol goes up to a distance of75.1m,80.6m, 98.5m, 47.9m, and 43.9 m respectively for full bore failure.

Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS line failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction and if any ignition source is found within its flammability limit, there may be UVCE. However, for MS pump discharge line rupture the overpressure distances due to explosion are calculated & presented in Table - 7.12.

Table - 7.12 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO MS AND ETHANOLPUMP DISCHARGE LINE RUPTURE Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS Pump 01. 2F 143.76 173.57 259.07 02. 2B 157.56 185.19 259.42 03. 3D 158.52 187.12 263.93 04. 5D 121.17 142.41 199.43 Ethanol pump 01 2F 10.99 11.98 14.63 02 2B 21.54 23.09 27.25 03 3D 11.08 12.17 15.09 04 5D 11.14 12.28 15.35

As evident from the above table that for 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) distances may travel up to 158.5/21.5 meters in both the cases for TLF/TLD pump discharge line Full-bore failure of MS and Ethanol pump.

7.11.4 Gasket Failure in TLF Pump Discharge Line TLF pump discharge lines sizes are of 200mm, 250mm, 250mm, 75mm & 75mm for MS, SKO, HSD ,Ethanol and Biodiesel respectively. Gasket failure is one of the credible failure scenarios in a plant. Failure area of 25% on the perimeter of the gaskets for these pipelines and 3 minutes release is considered for consequence estimation as it is assumed that action will be taken for stopping leakage by that time. Hazard distances for 37.5 kW/m2, 32 kW/m2,12.5 kW/m2, 8 kW/m2and 4.5 kW/m2 are calculated for TLF pump discharge line gasket failure and presented in Table - 7.13.

Table - 7.13 HAZARD DISTANCES TO POOL FIRE DUE TO FAILURE OF GASKETS IN TLF PUMP DISCHARGE LINES (Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation kW/m2) 2F 2B 3D 5D MS PUMP GASKET FAILURE, RR – 8.50 Kg/Sec. 37.5 25.42 NA NA NA 32 26.27 NA NA NA 12.5 33.51 NA NA NA 8 36.59 NA NA NA 4.5 40.72 NA NA NA SKO PUMP GASKET FAILURE, RR – 1.10 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 38.93 40.85 42.74 46.11 8 48.72 49.83 53.26 58.83 4.5 62.62 63.88 67.89 73.15 HSD PUMP GASKET FAILURE, RR – 1.56 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 41.88 44.07 45.67 48.61 8 51.85 53.26 56.49 61.49 4.5 67.43 69.26 73.77 79.81 ETHANOL PUMP GASKET FAILURE, RR – 2.44 Kg/Sec 37.5 19.50 20.17 20.65 22.43 32 19.50 20.17 20.65 22.43 12.5 27.13 26.43 27.37 28.84 8 30.09 29.12 29.70 30.56 4.5 34.20 32.72 32.95 33.40 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate It is seen that in case of failure of gaskets in TLF pump discharge lines pool fire thermal radiation distances for 4.5 kW/m2are 40.7m, 73.2m, 79.8mm & 34.2 m in case of MS, SKO, HSD and Ethanol respectively. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS line gasket failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction and if any ignition source in found within its flammability, there may be UVCE. However, for MS pump discharge line gasket rupture the overpressure distances due to explosion are calculated & presented in Table - 7.14.

Table - 7.14 HAZARD DISTANCES TO UVCE DUE TO MS PUMP (TLF) DISCHARGE LINE GASKET FAILURE Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS (TLF) 01. 2F 165.88 201.86 298.49 02. 2B 163.84 187.74 251.94 03. 3D 153.00 176.05 237.98 04. 5D 119.07 138.19 189.55

In case of vapour cloud explosion for MS pump discharge lines, the distances to 0.3 bar extends upto a distance of 166 m. Hence, immediate action has to be taken to prevent any fire/explosion in case of any failure of gasket and to put out the fire in case of any fire.

7.11.5 3 inches Dia. Loading Arm failure for Road Tanker Loading Failure probability of 3 inches dia. loading arm is in the order of 3x10-8 per hour of operation. Although the probability is very low, the failure scenario is taken for calculation of consequences due to failure of these loading arms for different products. The consequences have been calculated for 3 minutes release has been considered as it is assumed that action can be taken by the operators for stopping the pumps and closing the isolation valves immediately within this period. Hazard distances for fire due to snapping of loading arm and unloading hose for different products are presented in Table - 7.15 & 7.16. Table - 7.15 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO LOADING ARM FAILURE (TLF)

Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation kW/m2 2F 2B 3D 5D MS, LOADING ARM, RR – 7.22 Kg/Sec. 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 49.65 48.45 48.30 48.88 8 62.56 59.06 61.80 65.07 4.5 91.89 86.22 93.10 101.98 SKO, LOADING ARM, RR – 4.74 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 35.49 35.56 35.65 36.35 8 47.84 45.93 48.92 53.05 4.5 72.65 70.56 76.68 84.49 HSD, LOADING ARM, RR – 5.16 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR 12.5 34.95 35.13 35.23 35.79 8 46.81 45.14 48.01 51.43 4.5 68.41 67.09 71.99 77.81 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate

It is evident from the above table that in case of snapping of 3 inch dia. loading arm action has to be taken to stop outflow of liquid immediately as well as for prevention of fire. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion due to MS loading arm failure, if the evaporated vapour cloud moving in down wind direction, comes in the contact of an ignition source within its flammability limits. For such scenario the result of consequence analysis are presented in the following table. Table - 7.16 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (MS) Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS 01. 2F 263.81 317.75 462.66 02. 2B 285.98 332.08 455.91 03. 3D 271.55 313.21 431.50 04. 5D 229.38 268.87 374.92

The above table evident that overpressure distances may go up to 286 m for heavy damage i.e. 0.3 bar in case of loading arm failure. So, extreme care should be taken to avoid any such type of spillage & spilled liquid should be covered immediately with foam compound to avoid any further catastrophe.

7.11.6 Pump Mechanical Seal Failure The frequency of failure for mechanical seal of centrifugal pumps specially handling light hydrocarbons is quite high and poses risk due to fire and explosion. Failure of seals releases considerable quantity of hydrocarbons into atmosphere and creates a hazardous zone. Present thinking is to adopt double mechanical seal especially for light hydrocarbon services. This helps in reducing their frequency of hydrocarbon releases to atmosphere but still contribute to a great extent to the overall risk of the plant. However, the type of seal, single or double, does not affect their releases or the hazard and hazard distances. Hazard distances have been calculated for the pump mechanical seal failure. A shaft diameter of 40 mm and a seal gap of 2 mm have been assumed for release rate calculation. 3 minutes release of product has been considered in this case as it is assumed that action will be taken to stop the pump and close suction/ discharge line valves by the operator by that time. Provision of hydrocarbon detector in pump house will help to detect leakage through mechanical seal. The hazard distances to pool fire are given in Table - 7.17 below:

Table - 7.17 HAZARD DISTANCES TO THERMAL RADIATION DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR PUMP MECHANICAL SEAL FAILURE Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation kW/m2 2F 2B 3D 5D MS, PUMP, RR – 4.80 Kg/Sec. 37.5 38.31 38.03 35.37 32.35 32 39.32 39.01 36.36 33.32 12.5 46.63 46.15 43.55 40.49 8 51.23 50.61 48.08 45.04 4.5 58.67 57.80 55.39 52.41 SKO, PUMP, RR – 5.31 Kg/Sec. 37.5 NR NR NR 31.3117 32 27.42 28.80 29.43 31.31 12.5 34.67 35.88 38.23 42.63 8 43.25 44.24 47.64 52.65 4.5 53.16 54.19 56.92 60.45 HSD, PUMP, RR – 5.58Kg/Sec. 37.5 NR NR NR NR 32 28.28 30.03 30.69 32.62 12.5 34.86 35.90 38.06 41.71 8 43.44 44.49 47.88 53.13 4.5 53.23 54.74 57.63 61.65 Ethanol, PUMP, 37.5 18.36 18.75 19.16 20.57 32 18.42 18.75 19.16 20.57 12.5 26.40 25.87 26.93 28.50 8 29.49 28.84 29.54 30.56 4.5 18.36 18.75 19.16 20.57 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate The above table shows that the hazard distance of 1st degree burn i.e. 4.5 KW/m2 may extend up to distances of 59 m, 61 m, 62m and 21m max. For MS, SKO, HSD &Ethanol in case of pump mechanical seal failure. The UVCE distances for MS pump mechanical seal failure has been calculated & presented in the following Table - 7.18.

Table - 7.18 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (MS) Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar 01. 2F 126.60 153.27 224.91 02. 2B 117.59 135.24 182.62 03. 3D 106.82 123.68 168.98 04. 5D 83.96 97.96 135.55

The hazard distances for heavy damage may extends up to 127 m for 0.3 bar, so spilled liquid should be covered with foam to avoid further catastrophe.

7.11.7 Hole in TLF Pump Discharge Line (15mm) The pump discharge lines in the depot are of varying size. Formation of small holes in these diameter lines is credible in nature. Hence Consequence analysis has been conducted to evaluate the hazard distances for 3 minutes release and presented in Table No. 4.19. Table - 4.19 HAZARD DISTANCES TO POOL FIRE DUE TOHOLE IN PUMP DISCHAGE LINE (15 MM) Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation kW/m2 2F 2B 3D 5D MS PUMP 15mm dia hole, RR – 2.80 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 18.05 NA NA NA 32 18.89 NA NA NA 12.5 25.86 NA NA NA 8 28.81 NA NA NA 4.5 32.78 NA NA NA SKO PUMP, RR – 3.98 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 26.08 27.62 28.38 30.86 32 26.08 27.62 28.38 30.86 12.5 34.76 36.27 38.98 44.43 8 42.37 43.63 46.71 51.37 4.5 51.10 52.19 54.49 57.72 HSD PUMP, RR – 4.18 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 26.91 28.85 29.65 32.13 32 26.91 28.85 29.65 32.13 12.5 34.94 36.13 38.56 43.27 8 42.56 44.02 47.26 52.47 4.5 51.23 53.05 55.68 59.70 Bio diesel PUMP, RR – 3.70 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 24.13 25.51 26.10 27.98 32 24.13 25.51 26.10 27.98 12.5 32.71 33.32 35.64 39.69 8 39.88 40.84 43.75 48.16 4.5 48.16 49.47 51.75 55.02 Ethanol-1 PUMP, RR – 3.81 Kg/sec, RD-3 minutes 37.5 22.37 23.06 23.50 24.94 32 22.93 23.06 23.67 25.01 12.5 32.13 31.41 32.49 33.96 8 35.77 34.78 35.45 36.25 4.5 40.93 39.40 39.71 40.22 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate

As evident from the above table that thermal radiation distances for a thermal radiation of 4.5 kW/m2 for 15 mm dia. hole in MS, SKO, HSD, Biodiesel & Ethanol lines are goes up to a max. distance of 33 m, 58m, 60mm, 55m & 41 m respectively.

Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS line failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction and if any ignition source in found within its flammability limit, there may be UVCE. For MS pump discharge line hole the overpressure distances due to explosion (UVCE) are calculated & presented in Table - 7.20. Table - 7.20 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO MS PUMP DISCHARGE LINE HOLE (15MM) Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar

01. 2F 88.71 107.48 157.88 02. 2B 93.81 107.66 144.85 03. 3D 83.03 96.10 131.20 04. 5D 60.60 71.23 99.79

As evident from the above table that for 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) distances may travel upto 93.8 meters, which is inside the battery limit. 7.12 RISKS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any undesirable event as well as likelihood of harm or damage being caused to life, property and environment. This harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/accidental release of any hazardous material from the containment. This sudden/accidental release of hazardous material can occur due to failure of component systems. It is difficult to ascertain the failure probability of any system because it will depend on the components of the system. Even if failure occurs, the probability of fire/explosion and the extent of damage will depend on many factors like:

(a) Quantity and physical properties of material released. (b) Source of ignition. (c) Wind velocity, direction and atmospheric stability. (d) Presence of population, properties etc. nearby. Failure frequency of different components like pipes, valves, instruments, pressure vessels and other equipment manufactured in India are not available nor has any statutory authority tried to collect the information and form an acceptable data bank to be used under Indian condition.

Failure frequency data for some components accepted in U.S.A and European Countries are given in Table - 7.21.

Table - 7.21 FAILURE FREQUENCY DATA Sl. No. Item Failure Frequency / 106 Years 1] Shell Failure (a) Process/pressure vessel 3 (b) Pressurised Storage Vessel 1 2] Full Bore Vessel Connection Failure (Diameter mm) < 25 ...... 30 40 ...... 10 50 ...... 7.5 80 ...... 5 100 ...... 4 >150 ……. 3 3] Full Bore Process Pipeline Failure d <50 mm ...... 0.3 * 50 150 mm ...... 0.03 * 4] Articulated Loading / unloading arm 3x10-8** failure 5] Gasket Failure 0.5x10-6** 6] Mechanical Seal failure 5

* Failure frequency expressed in (/m/106 years) ** Failure frequency expressed in (/hr of operation)

7.13 RISK ASSESSMENT For the assessment of 'Individual Risk' due to the POL Depot at Jhansi, following has been taken into consideration:

a) The individual risk has been calculated as cumulative effect of all the scenario mentioned for selected failure case as listed in Table No. 4.7 for 2F, 2B, 3D, 5D where 2F, 2B, 3D & 5D are wind speed of 2 m/sec.& stable stability class, wind speed of 2 m/sec. & unstable stability class & wind speed of 3 and 5 m/sec. & neutral stability class atmospheric conditions respectively. b) Probability of wind directions has been taken from IMD data. c) No mitigation factors such as shelters, escape etc. are considered which will result in conservative risk estimation. d) During risk assessment population data and source of ignition has been considered.

7.14 ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK Risk evaluation is done in order to assess the impact the people being exposed both inside and outside the factory premises. The values is generally presented in terms of chances of death per million per year. Acceptability criteria for individual fatality risk are usually judged by comparing the values obtained in the risk analysis study to the statistical risk value of other normal human activities. Risk values of some of the familiar activities are given in Table - 4.22. The acceptability levels of risk for people employed within the organization are generally higher. This is because of the fact that those employed are well aware of the risk involved and have accepted voluntarily some amount of risk while accepting the job. This voluntary risk can be compared to the risk associated with other voluntary activities like rock climbing, motor vehicles accidents smoking etc. Table - 7.22 INDIVIDUAL RISK OF SOME HUMAN ACTIVITIES Activities Chance of Death/ Million/ Year Voluntary Risk: Rock Climbing (UK) 40 Smoking (20 cigarettes/day) 5000 Accident at work (UK) 33 Playing Football (UK) 40 Involuntary Risk: Railway Accident (India) 15 Road Accident (India)- risk in urban is much more 50 Motor Vehicle Accident (UK) 106 Lighting (in UK) 0.1 Meteorite strikes 0.00006 Aircraft Crash (In UK) 0.02 Data source: Loss prevention in Process Industries – FP Lees

Risk of death 1 per million per year or 1x10-6 per year inside the factory premises are generally accepted without concern and this risk in often seen to be lower than voluntary and involuntary risk of death from human activities and other cases an individual is exposed to. In case of Agra POL depot the acceptable risk of 1x10-6 per year remains confined within the factory boundary.

7.15 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 7.15.1 Conclusion a) It is observed from the Iso-Risk Contour (Drg. No. 2inAnnexure no. XII) that the acceptable limit of individual risk of 1.0x10-6 per year remains mainly confined within factory premises. All damage contour of all selected failure cases has been shown in Annexure no. XIII. b) Societal Risk (F/N Curve) developed for the plant remains mainly within the acceptable limit. c) The Hazard distances arrived from the consequence analysis reveals that in most of the cases hazard is confined within the plant premises. d) Disaster Management Plan has been prepared for POL Depot.

Hence, installation of POL Depot is safe from environmental risk point of view.

7.15.2 Recommendations The recommendations as revealed from Risk analysis Study are as follows: i) Instruments should be checked and calibrated at regular intervals to prevent any wrong signalling and consequent failures. ii) Lighting adequacy should be checked so that visibility is adequately ensured for the push bottom of the MOV. iii) Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances should always be kept in good working condition along with the Safety appliances. iv) Emergency procedures should be written and available to all persons in the installations outlining the actions to be taken by each person during a major incident. v) Mock Drills should be conducted at regular intervals and company should approach and co-ordinate with the district authority for conducting off-site emergency drill. Onsite Emergency Drill are to be conducted once in 6 months vi) The security supervisor at the gate should be provided with external telephone which will be useful in emergency during odd hours. The supervisor shall be provided with telephone numbers of all officers. A boarddisplaying the names, addresses and phone numbers of the emergency contact points of the company as well as the local authorities shall also be provided therein. 7.16DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 7.16.1 INTRODUCTION The objective of any plant should be safe and trouble free operation as well as smooth production. This is ensured by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of plant, equipment/pipeline as per standard codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/rules and instruments for safe operation of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating the plant by trained manpower. Inspite of all precautionary measures taken, accidents may happen due to human error or system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous material may cause loss of human lives & property and damage to environment. Industrial installations are vulnerable to various natural as well as manmade disasters. Examples of natural disasters are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are like major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases & liquids, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc. The damage caused by any disaster is determined by the potential for losses surrounding the event. It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might strike on undertaking. However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. pre-planned procedure involving proper utilisation of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimise the loss to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible.

7.16.2 STATUTORY REQUIREMENT Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for Agra Terminal at Agra (UP). The applicable regulations are: a)Factories Act, 1948 and as amended b) Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified under Environment Protection Act 1986andamended in 1994. c)Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents, 1996. d)Stipulations of OISD-168 e)Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.

The Disaster Management Plan has been prepared based primarily on Schedule-11 of Manufacture, storage and Import of HazardousChemicals Rules, 1989 and amended in 1994.

7.16.3 OBJECTIVE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and after disaster:

The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide organizational set up and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective action in any emergency situation in order to:

a) Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources b) Protect the personnel inside the Terminal as well as public outside. c) Safeguard the Terminal as well as outside property and environment. d) Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties. e) Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry f) Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions. The above objectives can be achieved by – i) Proper identification of possible hazards and evaluation of their hazard potential and identification of maximum credible hazard scenario. ii) Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment and manpower) iii) Evolving proper action plan with proper organizational set-up and communication facilities as well as warning procedure.

7.16.4 DEFINITIONS Disaster Disaster is a general term, which implies a hazardous situation created by an accidental release or spill of hazardous materials, which poses threat to the safety of workers, residents in the neighborhood, the environment or property. Emergency Emergency condition and Disaster Condition are synonymous.

ON-SITE Emergency/Disaster In an On-Site Emergency the effect of any hazard (fire/explosion/release of toxic gases) are confined within the factory premises. An accident taking place inside the Terminal and its effects are confined within the boundary wall.

OFF-SITE Emergency/Disaster In case of any hazard inside IOCL, Agra Terminal the effects that are also felt outside the boundary wall.

17.16.5 DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY Address of the person furnishing the information Incharge Agra POL Terminal, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd (MD), Agra Terminal, Etmadpur, Agra, Uttar Pradesh

a) Site Location The Agra POL Terminal is located in the state of Uttar Pradesh, at about 20Km from Agra city. Land measuring 52 acres of Agra POL Terminal and is strategically placed at 900m from NH 2 and 2.0 Km from Etmadpur railway station. M/s IOCL has acquired 52 Acres of land out of which 25 acres of land is in use and remaining of land is vacant and thus available for future expansion. The location is well connected with road and pipeline. b) Population around Site There is no major habitation around the Terminal. Villages & Population around the Terminal is as shown in the table: Village Distance & Direction from site Population Etmadpur 1.1 Km- NW 2,472 Bhikanpur 1.1 Km- SW 1287 Surehra 2.0 Km- S 5867 Satauli 2.1 Km- NNE 1900

c) Activities & Facilities A brief description the activities in Agra, POL Terminal are:

i) Receipt of the petroleum products e.g. MS, SKO, HSD and Ethanol through Pipelines. ii) Storage of these products in storage tanks

MS Tanks : 3x5203KL(FR) SKO Tanks : 2x2604KL (CR) HSD Tanks : 3x4382KL (CR) Ethanol Tank : 2x70KL(UG) + Proposed 2x1000 KL(A/G)

Biodiesel : Proposed 2x600KL(A/G)

iii) Pump House Electrical driven flame proof centrifugal pumps (MS, HSD and SKO) are there for the loading/unloading of Road tankers.

Head Product No. of Pumps Pump House Discharge (LPM) (M) HSD 4 TLF 4800 50 SKO 3 TLF 3600 50 MS 2 TLF 2400 50 Ethanol 2 TLF 400 26

iv) Tank Lorry Filling Tank Lorries are filled in filling bays by pumping products from storage tank to filling bays 14 Nos. of bays are provided for this purpose. The discharge pipeline branches are connected to tank Lorries by loading arm through a flow control valve and flow meter. The tank Lorries are properly earthed before receiving the petroleum products.

7.16.6 SAFETY RELATED UTILITIES i) Water Fire water requirement is as per norms of OISD-117. Water Storage Facilities: As per OISD-117 Facility available: Water Tanks (2 x 2600 KL)

Source of Water: Bore wells provided inside the Terminal. Fire hydrants/monitors are provided in all the vulnerable areas of the plant. Sprinkler system for water spray cooling is provided for MS storage tanks ii) Power The power requirement of the Terminal is supplied by SEB and Emergency power through DG Sets (2x380KVA).

7.16.7 DISASTER PLANNING Modern approach to disaster management plan involves

a) Risk analysis Study b) Action Plan Risk analysis study involves a) Risk Identification b) Risk Evaluation

Risk identification involves i) Identification of hazardous events in the installation, which can cause loss of capital equipment, loss of production, threaten health and safety of employees, threaten public health and damage to the environment.

ii) Identification of risk, important processes & areas to determine effective risk reduction measures Risk evaluation involves calculation of damage potential of the identified hazards with damage distances (which is termed as consequence analysis) as well as estimation of frequencies of the events.

Hazardous areas with different hazard scenarios and their damage potential with respect to fire & explosion have already been mentioned in the chapter on Risk Analysis. However, failure rate of different hazard scenarios has been discussed broadly based on data available for similar incidents outside India.

Probability of any hazardous incident and the consequent damage also depends on – a) Wind speed b) Wind direction c) Atmospheric stability d) Source of ignition and e) Presence of plant assets & population exposed in the direction of wind.

Action plan depends largely on results of risk analysis data and may include one or more of the following: a) Plan for preventive as well as predictive maintenance. b) Augment facilities for safety, fire fighting, medical (both equipment and manpower) as per requirements of risk analysis. c) Evolve emergency handling procedure both on-site and off-site. d) Practice mock drill for ascertaining preparedness for tackling hazards/emergencies at any time- day or night.

7.17 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS 17.17.1General Nature of Hazard In Agra Terminal petroleum products to be handled are highly inflammable and also have explosive properties.

Any small fire in the installation, if not extinguished at early stage can cause large scale damage and may have a cascading effect. Hence the terminal requires.

a) A quick responsive containment and control system requiring well planned safety and fire fighting system. b) Well organized trained manpower to handle the process equipment & systems safely. c) Well trained personnel to handle safety and firefighting equipment to extinguish fire inside the installation promptly as well as tackle any type of emergency. d) Well planned Disaster Management Plan.

7.17.2 Hazards Areas of the Plant The plant activities handling petroleum products can be subdivided into the following:

Activities Place a) Receipt of petroleum products i) Tanker Unloading Bay b) Petroleum products storage ii) Tank Farm Area c) Petroleum products pumping iii) Pump House d) Dispatch of petroleum products iv) Road Tanker Loading Bay e) Laboratory Work v) Laboratory

7.17.3 Hazard Scenarios and effects. This has been discussed in detail in the Chapter on Risk Analysis. However, a brief outline is given in the following table: Table No: 7.23 List of Failure cases Credible/ Sl.No. Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences Non Credible 1] All Storage Tanks including proposed Thermal radiation for MS, tanks (Catastrophic) on Fire with Domino SKO, HSD and also explosion Partially Credible effect. for MS 2] Vessel connection failure for tank outlet - do - Partially Credible lines of all tanks 3] TLF Pump Discharge Line Rupture - do - Non Credible 4] Gasket Failure in TLF Pump Discharge Line - do - Credible 5] 3 inches dia. loading arm failure for Road - do - Partially Credible Tanker Loading 6] Pump Mechanical Seal Failure - do - Credible 7] Hole in Pump Discharge Line (15mm) - do - Credible

All the scenarios are having damage potential to a different degree. However, maximum damage can happen due to storage tank pipeline connection failure or in case of tank fire.

In all the above cases fire/explosion can occur due to ignition of the vapour of petroleum products coming out from the containment. The sources of ignitions may be (i) Hot work in the vicinity, (ii) Smoking, (iii) Lightning, (iv) Generation of static electricity, (v) Radiant heat from outside, (v) deliberate ignition or sabotage, (vi) By the ignition of dry grass in the dyke area.

7.18 SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS PROVIDED IN THE TERMINAL Agra Terminal is being provided with safety related measures right in the design stage, which will minimise any accident e.g.

i) Use of proper material of construction for Storage, equipment and piping as per Indian Standards i.e. IS 2062. ii) All existing Storage tanks(MS,SKO, HSD and Ethanol) provided inside a dyke wall with sufficient height,1.9 m. All proposed storage tanks(Biodiesel and Ethanol) will provided inside a dyke wall with sufficient height. All existing tanks have been earthed effectively with GI strips. Capacity of each tanks shall be conspicuously marked. iii) Ethanol tank (proposed) construction will be of internal floating roof type with provision for foam injection. The tank will be provided with water spray sprinklers for cooling tanks in case of fire in the vicinity. iv) All SKO, HSD and Biodiesel tanks are of above ground cone roof & underground type. Vents on the cone roof tanks should be provided with flame arrestors to avoid fire in case of lightning. v) All electrical items have been carefully selected and are either flame proof/ intrinsic safety type in licensed area as per IS 2148. vi) Proper earthlings of all storage tanks, pipelines, structures and trucks for filling/dispatch of petroleum products. vii) Loading Arms are provided whose failure rate is much lower than loading hoses. viii) Provision of oil separation in Oil interceptors to avoid any oily water going out of the Terminal and spoiling ground water. ix) Arrangement of fire hydrants, monitors and hose boxes have been kept in all the hazardous areas and fire water storage tanks. x) Use of flow control devices and meters for tank truck filling to ensure that each compartment in the tank truck is filled to the desired level. xi) Provision of portable fire extinguishers at vulnerable places to extinguish fire. xii) The plant is properly guarded by a boundary wall of sufficient height. xiii) Licensed area is properly guarded for any unauthorized entry of personnel. xiv) All areas in the Terminal are properly illuminated through lighting. Requisite numbers of High Mast Towers have been proposed around the Terminal for better illumination. xv) Emergency Diesel Generator Sets are provided to ensure operation and illumination during power failure. xvi) Emergency shutdown switch is provided to stop all operations.

7.18.1 Other Safety Measures Some of the preventive & pre-emptive measures which are to be taken during operational phase are as follows: a) Safety measures Following safety tips should always be borne in mind while working in the plant to avoid emergency & hazardous situation. i) Follow specified procedures and instructions for start-up, shut down and any maintenance work. ii) Follow permit to work system. iii) Identify correctly the part of the plant in which work is to be done. iv) Isolate the part or machine properly on which work is to be done. v) Release pressure from the part of the plant on which work is to be done. vi) Remove flammable liquid/gases thoroughly, on which work is to be done. vii) Use non-sparking tools. b) Plant Inspection Apart from planned inspection, checks and tests should be carried out to reduce failure probability of containments. i) Storage Tanks and pipeline should be checked regularly during both their construction and operational phase. ii) Critical trips, interlocks & other instruments should be checked regularly to avoid fail danger situation. iii) Fire fighting system should be checked regularly to ensure proper functioning during emergency situation. iv) Proper lightning protection system should be provided and checked regularly to avoid lightning effect. c) Performance or Condition Monitoring A systematic monitoring of performance or condition should be carried out especially for large machines and equipment, which may be responsible for serious accidents/disaster in case the defined limits are crossed. i) Vibration, speed & torque measurements for pumps, DG sets etc. ii) Thickness and other flaw measurements in metals of storage vessels, Inlet & Outlet lines from storage vessels etc. Many types of non-destructive testing/condition monitoring techniques are available. X-ray radiography, acoustic emission testing, magnetic particle testing, eddy current inspection techniques etc. are used for detection of flaws & progression of cracks in metals. Testing equipments are also there for checking vibration, speed, torque etc. The above condition monitoring techniques should be applied regularly by internal/external agencies. Immediate corrective measures should be taken if any flaws are detected. d) Preventive Maintenance A schedule for preventive maintenance for moving machineries should be prepared based on experience in other similar plants as well as instruction of the suppliers. The schedule should be followed strictly during operation as well as planned shutdown period.

e) Entry of Personnel Entry of unauthorized personnel is strictly prohibited inside the premises. The persons entering the plant should not carry matches, lighters, mobile phone etc.

f) Hot work Hot workshould not be permitted except in-designated areas with utmost precaution and proper work permit.

7.18.2 Details of Fire Fighting Facilities Modern fire fighting facilities are provided in the Terminal in line with norms of OISD-117.

i] Fire Hydrant System The entire area is provided with a looped fire hydrant pipeline connected to fire engines on auto system and always kept under pressure to meet emergencies. Three numbers of fire water storage tanks are provided. The source of water is borewells provided inside the Terminal. The fire hydrant line is equipped with required numbers of single/double headed hydrant valves, monitors and hoses. The system can also be connected to foam making branches for generating foam for extinguishing the fire. Fire hydrant line has been provided in Tank Farm area and other(shown in Page No. 4 of Annexure-X) Fire hydrant line shall be been provided in the Proposed area.

ii]Sprinkler System Water sprinkler system with spray nozzles are proposed for MS storage tanks for cooling the tanks if required.

iii]Portable Fire Fighting Equipments and PPEs (shown in Annexure-XX) Following portable firefighting equipment are provided in the plant as per OISD-117:

S. No. Description Quantity 1 DCP Fire Extinguisher 10 KG 72 Nos. 2 DCP Fire Extinguisher 25 KG 10 Nos. S. No. Description Quantity 3 DCP Fire Extinguisher 75 KG 03 Nos. 4 CO2 Fire Extinguisher 6.5 KG 02 Nos. 5 CO2 Fire Extinguisher 4.5 KG 25 Nos. 6 CO2 Fire Extinguisher 2 KG 8 Nos. 7 Hose Boxes 20 Nos. 8 Fire Hoses 40 Nos. 9 Fog nozzles 04 Nos. 10 Jet Nozzles 25 Nos. 11 Foam Branch Pipe 04 Nos. 12 Universal Nozzle 04 Nos. 13 Water Curtain Nozzle 04 Nos. 14 Foam Branch Pipe 04 Nos. 15 Double Hydrant Point 25 Nos. 16 Water Cum Foam Monitor 19 Nos. 17 Water Monitor 06 Nos. 18 200/210 Foam Trolley 01 No. 19 500 GPM Trolley 01 No. 20 Fire water storage tank 02 Nos each of capacity 3006 KL 21 Source of water 02 tube well each of capacity 420 LPM. 22 AFFF in liters 12.5 KL Approx. 23 ATC Foam 01 Kl 24 Dry Chemical Powder 430 KG. 25 Hand Siren 07 Nos. 26 Electric Siren 01 Nos. 27 Sand Bucket 32 Nos. 28 Resuscitator 02 Nos. 29 Breathing Apparatus 02 Nos. 30 Fire Proximity Suit 02 Nos. 31 Medium Expansion Foam Generator (Fixed Type) 02 Nos. 32 Medium Expansion Foam Generator (Portable Type) 04 Nos. 33 High Volume Long Range Monitor (HVLR) 04 Nos. 34 Trailer Mounted HVLR 01 Nos. 35 PVC Suit 02 Nos. 36 Petroleum Product Clean up chemical 01 Nos. 37 Non Sparking Tools 01 Nos. 38 Mechanical Tool Kit 01 Nos. 39 Fire Fighting Trolley 01 Nos. 40 Emergency Kit Trolley 01 Nos. iv] Personal Protective Equipments (PPEs): Following PPEs have been provided in Sufficient Numbers: S. No. ACCESSORIES As per OISD-117 Provided in the plant 1. Sand drum with scoop 10 30 2. Safety helmet 26 100 3. First Aid box 6 6 4. Rubber hand glove 2 pair 2 5. Explosimeter 1 No 1 6. Fire proximity suit 1 suit 1 7. Resuscitator 1 1 8. Water jel blanket 1 1 9. Red & Green flag for fire drill: 2 Nos. in each colour. 2 2 SCBA Set (30 minute capacity): 1 set with spare 10. 1 1 cylinder.

7.18.3 Emergency Control Centre & Shelter Room The emergency control centre shall be situated in the office building. The office room of Terminal In- charge shall be designated as Emergency Control Centre. P&T telephones, Alarms, Emergency Control Manual and Safety and Personal Protective Appliances are to be arranged in sufficient numbers and kept in the room. Emergency Shelter The room has been proposed outside the licensed area for giving shelter to employees/ other personnel who are not involved in emergency control actions.

7.18.4 Alarm and Communication System

A] Alarm System i] One Electrical Siren and five Hand Sirens are provided in office building/Emergency Control Room for warning the public as well as employees inside. ii] The sound of electrical siren shall be audible upto 3 KMs. iii] For fire condition electrical siren will be wailing for minimum 2 minutes and for all clear signals it will be a straight run siren for 2 minutes. iv] For disaster condition the wailing sound shall be repeated with a minimum 10 seconds gap.

B] Communication System For communication with officers/employees VHF system is provided. For external communication, Mobile, landline telephone, fax and email facilities are provided.

7.18.5 Mutual Aid It is not possible to combat large scale fire/disaster single handed effectively by any organization. Assistance of resources of fire fighting and other services are of utmost importance during the hour of crisis. Following type of mutual aids are envisaged: i] Assistance by fire fighting teams & equipment. ii] Medical and first aid assistance. iii] Assistance of vehicles for any emergency requirement. iv] Help in liaisoning with police, District Collectorate, Fire Brigade and Hospitals.

Mutual aid agreement should be done with nearby industries & facilities available in the area. IOCL mutual aid minutes of Meeting has been shown in Annexure-XXI

7.19 DISASTER CONTROL PLAN The plan include three major plans – i] Equipment Plan ii] Organization Plan iii] Action Plan

7.19.1 Equipment Planning Equipment plan i.e. arrangement of fire fighting, safety, transport etc. has been discussed earlier.

7.19.2 Organization Plan The disaster management organization and action plan is made in such a way that it is capable of quick response at any time to meet emergency situation. The plan gives a detailed chain of command, area of responsibility of each personnel involved, information flow pattern and coordination activity required to meet the emergency. A typical Disaster Management Organization Chart is given below:

Organization Chart of Agra POL Terminal for On-Site Disaster Control Plan

Medical Affected Stake holders and Government Services and Authorities On-site incident Ambulance Controller (District

Municipal magistrate/Dist Fire Brigade transport rescue of Authority) Services and rehabilitation team

Police Services CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER Mutual Aid

SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLER

Fire Safety Operation Team, Support Administration and and Fire Technical team, etc. Services* Communication Coordinator Team/ HSE

On Site Disaster Management Organization Chart- Agra Terminal As Per OISD GDN-168

CHIEF Emergency CONTROLLER

ADMINISTRATION & SAFETY COORDINATOR COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR

SAFETY TEAM

KEY PERSONNEL CHART The senior officer in the POL Terminal is Terminal manager, who will be the Chief Emergency Controller. In pre Emergency period he will delegate responsibility to other officers as other Coordinators as per suitability and the job to be done by them. During emergency, if Terminal Manager is not present at site, the senior most officers in the Terminal will assume the responsibility of Chief Emergency Controller and inform Terminal Manager to be present at site at shortest possible time.

The duties and responsibilities of Chief Controller and other Coordinator are as follows:

DUTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY PERSONS & COORDINATORS • Chief Emergency Controller For On-Site Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP), the Location-in-Charge (Terminal Manager) shall be the Chief Emergency Controller to coordinate the execution of the plan during an emergency or a mock drill. He is responsible for preparation/updating of the plan, getting approval from the District authorities/Factory Inspectorate; and its implementation in the hour of need. His duties are -

a) Assess the magnitude of the situation and declare state of emergency. Activate EPP and ensure its implementation. b) Mobilize the Coordinators/Key Personnel and exercise direct operational control of areas, other than those affected. c) Declare danger zones and activate Emergency Control Centre. d) Ensure calling in Mutual aid members and District emergency agencies like Fire Brigade, Police, and Medical authorities. e) Maintain a speculative continuous review of possible developments and assess these to determine most probable course of events and appropriate response. f) Inform Area Office, Head Quarters, Police, Statutory authorities, District authorities about the magnitude of the emergency casualties and rescue operations. g) Ensure casualties are receiving required attention and their relatives are informed. h) Ensure accounting of personnel. i) Issue authorized statements to Press, Radio, TV etc., regarding the emergency and its possible impact on the surroundings. j) Authorize procurement of emergency material. k) Log important developments in chronological order and preserve material evidence for investigation. Direct isolation of power supply, plant shutdown, and evacuation of personnel inside the premises as deemed necessary. l) Advise Police, District authorities regarding evacuation of public in the near vicinity/vulnerable zone. Ensure raising the siren in EMERGENCY mode till All Clear Signal. m) When effects are likely to be felt outside, get in touch with District Authorities, who will take over the management and declare "Off-Site Emergency". n) Control rehabilitation of affected areas on cessation of emergency.

Administration & Communication Coordinator a) Liaise with Chief and other coordinators. b) Inform and coordinate with External agencies and Mutual aid members for agreed assistance. Direct them on arrival to the respective coordinators. c) In case communication means fail, send messengers to Mutual aid members/ Emergency departments. Coordinate with Police in controlling the traffic and mob outside the premises. d) Activate the medical centre and mobilize medical team. Arrange ambulance and transfer casualties to hospitals. Also coordinate with police in case of fatalities. e) Arrange for head count at the assembly points. f) Arrange procurement of spares for fire fighting and additional medical drugs/ appliances. g) Mobilize Transport as and when required by various coordinators. Arrange to provide spark arrestors to emergency vehicles entering the premises. h) Monitor entry/exit of personnel in the premises. Permit only authorized personnel/ vehicles inside the premises. i) Control and disperse crowd from the emergency site. Regulate traffic inside the location. j) Arrange food, beverages and drinking water for all those involved in execution of EPP in case the emergency prolongs. k) Communicate with relatives of casualties. l) Arrange evacuation of premises as directed by Chief Emergency controller. m) Coordinate with civil authorities for evacuating public from the danger zone and arrange for refreshments at the evacuation centre.

Safety Coordinator a) Ensure safe stoppage of the Operations, switching off main instruments, shut off valves on product lines, and isolation of affected area. b) Demarcate Danger and Safe zones by putting RED and GREEN flags. c) Mobilize the Fire fighting crew and direct the Fire Fighting operation. d) Effectively deploy manpower, both internal and external. e) Direct & utilize the Fire Brigade personnel. f) Arrange the replacement of various Fire Fighting Squads with the Mutual and External aid members on need basis. g) Ensure/maintain sufficient pressure in the Hydrant mains. h) Assess water level in the storage tank/reservoir and plan replenishment. i) Monitor the requirements of Fire equipment and coordinate for procurement of spares. j) Arrange for flood lighting of the affected areas and dewatering of the Fire fighting area, if required. k) Arrange to remove and park the tank Lorries (Bulk & Packed) to a safer place, as necessary.

In case of any leakage of petroleum products or fire anybody witnessing the same should take immediate necessary action to stop leakage and extinguish fire with the help of fire extinguishers as well as inform Terminal manager through VHF or through messenger or by shouting.

In case of any fire or explosion Terminal In-charge takes charge of the situation and controls it with a well organized plan.

If any accident e.g. fire occurs during night, shift/security personnel shall attend it and in case of emergency Terminal In-charge and others shall be informed / called from their residence.

7.19.3 Action Plan This gives guidelines to PREVENT, CONTROL AND TERMINATE AN EMERGENCY and consists of three parts. a) Pre-emergency action b) Action during emergency c) Post emergency actions a) Pre-Emergency Actions These are essentially PRE-EMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE measures and are extremely important. They include mock drills, checking of fire fighting facilities, keeping personal protective equipments in good condition in proper places, medical equipments, scheduled checking of safely devices, safety audits, preventive maintenance, good housekeeping, training of employees, education to the public and liaison with outside industries, State Fire Services, Police, district administration, hospitals, nursing homes etc.

Public Awareness In case of major accidents like large fire, explosion, effect of which may spread outside the plant boundary, people of the adjoining area may be panicky due to ignorance and may aggravate the problems. To avoid panic, the Terminal management will make easily understandable pamphlets in local language about the properties of petroleum products and actions to be taken by them during an Off-site Emergency. Training and education will also be imparted to the local public by audio-visual system with the help of local authorities. This will be done through Local Crisis Group consisting of District Administration.

Mock Drills This is periodic simulation of emergency condition, sometimes in consultation with District Crisis Group/Local Crisis Group. The sequence of operation undertaken by Disaster Management Team members and systems provided like alarm & communication system, information flow pattern etc. are carefully put into operation by competent officials and the deficiencies/problems are recorded. Based on this observation appropriate actions are taken to improve the efficiency of the plan.

Training of Employees Regular training will be conducted to educate the employees about safely, fire fighting and Disaster Management. A selected number will be given intensive training in first aid, evacuation and rescue operation so that they can be utilized as a part of Disaster Control Team.

Liaison with Police, District Administration & State Fire Services &Neighboring Industries Help of Police and District Authorities are essential for off-site Emergency such as evacuation, transportation and treatment of individuals etc. In case of On-Site Emergency help of Police, District Administration, local hospitals and also fire services at Agra district headquarter may be required depending on the severity of the situation.

PRE-EMERGENCY functions of Chief Emergency Controller are mainly a) Ensure implementation of Emergency Planning b) Ensure that all drafted for emergency are undergoing regular training. c) Ensure all disciplines are fully prepared for tackling emergency. d) Ensure that simulation of emergency condition is regularly arranged. e) Ensure preventive and pre-emptive measures. f) Keep liaison with outside agencies, police, district authorities, hospitals, nursing homes etc.

Pre-Emergency functions of other Emergency Controller and their team are a) Keep all the team members ready for tackling emergency. b) Ensure that all members understand their specific duties during emergency. c) Ensure regular participation of their team in mock drills. d) Ensure supply of adequate number of safety &firefighting equipment in proper place and in good working condition. b) Actions during Emergency Actions to be taken by Chief Emergency Controller and other Incident Controllers have been discussed in the Organization Plan. In short the actions are: a) Declare Emergency by electrical siren. b) Instruct total/partial shutdown. c) Arrange the team for tackling emergency. d) Ask for outside help, if necessary. e)Keep liaison with outside agencies and provide authoritative information to news media and others. c) Post Emergency Actions These are directed towards termination of emergency, restoration of normalcy and rehabilitation. It also includes identification of victims, information to their next of kin, notification to various government authorities, appointment of enquiry committee for identification of causes and suggestions to ensure that similar accident does not occur.

7.20 DISASTER COMBATING ACTION PLAN WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE TEAM As already stated number of officers and staff within plant are less and Terminal Manager has to prepare the plan with available officers & staff members only. Fire Organization chart of Agra Terminal has been shown in annexure-XVIII.

A] DURING GENERAL SHIFT ON WORKING DAYS (Chief Emergency Controller) : Terminal Manager (I/C) Agra Terminal

ROLE 1] Take overall charge of the situation. 2] Rush to the spot where fire/explosion has occurred. Issue instruction for speedy combating of the incident and preventing of damage to other areas. 3] Stop all operations locally/shut down complete plant. 4] Declare emergency and operate electrical siren to inform employees, authorities and public. 5] Inform nearby factory authorities over phone and ask for assistance. 6] Inform local Fire Brigade. 7] Inform higher authorities and seek assistance for coordination of civil authorities, Fire Tenders from State/other agencies. 8] Inform Chief Inspectorate of Factories & Boilers, Agra, Uttar Pradesh

B] FIRE COMBATING TEAM In-charge : HSE Coordinator Assisted By : i] Operation Officer (Fire) ii] Operator, TLD/ TLF iii] Security Supervisor & Guards on duty. Iv] Fire& Safety Team ROLE On hearing Fire Alarm – 1] Rush to the disaster spot and organize the team for combating fire as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. 2] Security supervisor to ensure starting of Fire Engine and pressurization of fire hydrant. 3] Pump House Operator to stop all pumps and close all valves of the pumps as well tank body valves and join the team. 4] Operator of TLD/ TLF section to stop loading/ unloading operations, remove loading arm and unloading hose properly and join the combating team as per directions of Terminal Manager.

Section In-Charge TLD/ TLF to ensure the above and act for combating emergency as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. Fire Combating Team has been shown in drawing no.

C] EMERGENCY RESCUE TEAM In-charge : Operation Incharge Assisted By : Security Guards on duty

ROLE On hearing the Fire Alarm –

1] In-charge to organize the team with office staff and other members as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. If needed the In-charge should seek assistance of outside agencies. 2] Remove the injured from the spot after taking proper safety and personal protective appliances. 3] Arrange for First Aid of the injured and hospitalization, if necessary as per instruction of Chief Emergency Controller.

D] EMERGENCY TEAM (TRANSPORT & SECURITY) In-charge : Administration & Communication Coordinator. Assisted By : Security Supervisor & Guards on duty

ROLE 1] Stop entry of all unauthorized personnel. 2] Arrange transport for taking the injured personnel for hospital. 3] Seek assistance for vehicles/ambulance from outside agencies & hospitals nearby as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller.

E] FIRE DURING NIGHT TIME AND ON HOLIDAYS In-charge : Terminal Manager Assisted by : Security supervisor on duty Security guards on duty Sr. Supervisor on duty ROLE 1] Security Guard on duty seeing the fire will shout Fire! Fire!! and shall need assistance from other guards on duty in different pockets and shall fight the fire with nearest available fire equipments. 2] Immediately telephone to Gwalior Fire Brigade and Police Station for assistance. 3] Subsequently, Security Supervisor on duty will telephone to the residence of Terminal Manager and Sr. Supervisor. 4] The Security Guards to control the gates and ensure that no unauthorized person enter the premises.

7.21 ROLE ORDERS FOR DISASTER COMBATING ACTION PLAN i]General Instructions (a) The In-charge of the section/sections (TLF) / Administrative Office etc. affected shall ensure to take immediate action to isolate, close valves and mobilize enough equipment from nearby places. (b) In-charge of stores shall keep the list of equipment available at various locations and coordinate with auxiliary team in-charge who mobilizes the materials. (c) Safety Coordinator shall ensure replenishment of water to fire water tanks from bore-well and nearby other sources. (d) After actions, Stores-in-charge to take inventory of all fire fighting items and to indent the shortfalls. e) All those moving towards scene of incident shall move with firefighting equipment available. ii] Pump House Role Orders – (a) Operator (Pump House) to stop all pumps. (b) Close all valves including those of main tanks. (c) Report combating team In-charge. iii] Administrative Block Role Orders – (a) Section officers to ensure stop all loading operations. (b) All T/Ts go out of TLF bays in orderly manner after closing T/T valves and manhole covers. All tank Lorries should also go out after closing valves and dome covers. (c) Closing of all valves atTLF manifold. (d) TLF officer to report to Fire Combating Team. (e) Others to report to Safety Coordinator with available firefighting equipment. iv] Generator Room Role Orders – (a) Operator to remain in Generator House for instructions from Chief Emergency Controller. (b) To switch off unwanted electrical connections as instructed by Chief Emergency Controller. v] Stores Role Orders – (a) In-charge to keep ready all fire fighting/first-aid/personal protective materials and arrange speedy disbursement to the combating crews. (b) To issue materials as per demand. (c) To liaise among in-charges. (d) To make proper inventory of all items and shortfall to be identified as early as possible. vi] Security Guards on Duty Role Orders – (a) To control the gate by allowing contract labourers to go out, ordering, moving out of vehicles as instructed by Chief Emergency Controller with valid document. (b) To prevent unauthorized entry of outsiders. (c) Security Guard posted at the main entrance gate to ensure proper control of traffic so that approach road is not blocked. Other security guards posted other than the gates, to report to their in-charge for further instruction.

7.22 ACTION PLAN FOR SPECIFIC CASES (A) FIRE/EXPLOSION IN TLD/TLF SHED Facilities: 14 nos. (Existing) of Filling Bays with multi-product filling points and 4 nos. of Tank Lorry decantation with Ethanol and Biodiesel points provided. Products handled: MS, SKO, HSD, Ethanol and Biodiesel. Structure: Entire TLF/TLD structure is of elevated iron structures with proper roof, iron platforms and iron ladders. HAZARD MINIMISER (a) TLF in-charge with his officers and staff (b) Fire Extinguishers (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Jel Blankets (g) Alarm (h) COMBATING AS PER DISASTER ORGANISATION CHART SPECIAL REFERENCES (a) Fire in filling shed should be attacked promptly with fire extinguishers. (b) Close all valves promptly. (c) Ensure orderly removal of TTs. (d) Stop spreading over of fire and call for help. (e) Put sand on small oil spills of fire to put off the fire by preventing source of O2. (f) Apply foam on burning oil on the floor. Apply foam gently so as not to scatter the burning oil and spread the fire. Apply foam from one side of the fire and with the foam blanket from that side across the oil pool. Remember that water destroys foam and water streams must not be turn on fire which is blanketed with foam. (g) Apply water cooling to neighbouring T/Ts. (h) Remove records/documents to safe place. (i) When oil is burning under the truck and tank is not leaking, remove the vehicle away from fire, if possible or cover the oil with sand. Use water to cool the vehicle & the container. (j) Use foam or sand to fight fire around engine, raise the hood direct the stream of fluid at the base of fire. (k) Use water or foam to fight fire in the cabin. (l) Use water to fight fire on the tyres. (m) Whenever the leak is seen in the bottom of tank, try to fill water into the tank & container so that oil level will be above the leak. (n) In case of dome fire, close the dome cover immediately.

(B) FIRE IN TLD/ TLF PUMP HOUSE Facilities: Electric power/diesel engine driven pumps. HAZARD MINIMISER (a) Staff members assigned to the pump house (b) Fire Extinguishers (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Jell Blankets (g) Main Switches in the Switch Room (h) Alarm (i) Fire Resistant Asbestos Suit (j) TLD & TLF pump

ACTION PLAN AS PER DISASTER ORGANISATION CHART Special References –

(a) Discharge DCP to prevent fire from spreading. (b) Shut down the pumps by cutting off power supply. (c) Remove any person who is working in the manifold. (d) Close all tank lorry filling valves and manifold valves. (e) Put foam on burning oil spills. (f) Do not splash burning oil. (g) Use DCP or CO2 fire extinguisher on electrical fire. (h) Cool the manifold with water. (i) Wet down the structure close to the fire with water. (j) When burning oil is running from the pump house or out of a broken connection in the manifold, check the flow or direct it to the points where it will not endanger structures and the surrounding properties. (C) FIRE AT SMALL LEAK IN PIPELINE 1] Fire at a small leak in pipeline must be attacked promptly with the nearest fire extinguishers. 2] Shut off the flow of oil in the line by closing valves and by stopping pumping. 3] Cover the oil pool with sand and build up the sand so as to cover the leak or Put foam on the burning oil pool. 4] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil. 5] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the same in containers. 6] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool. (D) BURSTING OF GASKET/LEAKAGE THROUGH JOINTS 1] Stop pumping. 2] Stop flow of oil through drain. Keep oil within limited area. 3] Close line valves. 4] Dig pits to collect oil. 5] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil. 6] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the oil in containers. 7] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool. 8] Take action for replacement of gasket/repair leak with due care.

(E) FIRE IN ELECTRIC SUB-STATION/TRANSFORMER ROOM/SWITCH ROOM Facilities: HT Switch, FUSE UNITGENSETS, PANEL, SWITCH ROOM, CONNECTION CABLES

HAZARD MINIMISERS (a) Generator operators and other employees (b) Fire extinguishers (c) Sand buckets (d) Main switches (e) Alarm (f) Earthing

ACTION PLAN AS PER DISASTER ORGANISATION CHART Special Reference –

(a) Cut off power supply by switching off the mains (b) Apply DCP/CO2 extinguisher or dry sand. (c) Call for outside help if required. (d) Do not allow anybody to touch any electrical appliances. (e) Take action to prevent spreading of fire. (f) If fire is not extinguished, extinguish by spreading water with fog nozzle only after ensuring complete isolation of electrical supply. (F) FIRE IN TANK FARM Facilities: Storage Tank: MS Tanks : 3x5203 KL (FRVT) SKO Tanks : 2x2600KL (CRVT) HSD Tanks : 3x4382 KL (CRVT) Ethanol Tanks : 2x70 KL (U/G) + 1x20 KL (U/G)+ Proposed -2x1000 KL (IFRVT) Proposed Biodiesel Tanks : 2x600 KL (VCR)

(a) All employees particularly the employees of loading/receipt section (b) Fire Extinguishers (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Sprinklers (g) Asbestos Suit (h) Alarm

DISASTER COMBATING PLAN: As per Disaster Organization Chart Special Reference –

(a) A fire burning at the vent will not normally flash back into tank and explode if the tank contains product since flame arrestors are provided. (b) Start cooling of tanks by using water sprinklers provided on tanks as well by wet jets. (c) Close all valves since any removal of product will result in air being sucked inside, with the resultant flash back and explosion. (d) Close manhole covers of other tanks if they are open. Also stop loading/receipt of oil in tanks. (e) Use foam to extinguish fire. Small fire can be handled with portable fire extinguishers. (f) Call for help from outside agencies before fire is aggravated with the instruction of Chief Emergency Controller. (G) FIRE IN TANK (a) Fire in tank will normally burn quietly till the oxygen inside is consumed unless temperature of the product is allowed to increase uncontrolled. Hence, care must be taken to ensure that product temperature does not go high by cooling with water sprinklers and jets. This also avoids possibility of tank rupture due to hydrostatic Pressure. (b) Care should be taken to ensure that the fire does not spread to other areas. If there is product spill to outside, foam should be used to cover the same. (c)In case of fire inside tank, foam should be pumped inside the tank for blanketing the fire simultaneously taking action to cool the tank shell with water and also removing the product by pumping it out to some other tank. (d) Uncontrolled use of water on the burning product will result in product spill over and spread of fire. In the case of heavy ends this will result in boil over and frothing at the surface. (e) When heavy ends like HSD burn, a layer of hot oil is formed below the surface, which extends towards the bottom. Temperature of this layer is of the order of 250o C to 300oC much above the boiling point of water. When water turns into steam, it expands approx. 1600 times and this results in boil over. The boil over may overflow the tank resulting in spreading of fire. Hence, in such fires, cool down the tank by water sprinkler and also by continuous water jet on the tank shell, transfer the product to other tanks and judiciously use foam to smoothen fire. (f) In case of F/R tanks, fires normally occur at F/R seals. Efforts should be made to put foam in the correct place simultaneously cooling the tank shell from outside. (g) Do not waste foam by using it for cooling. (h) Usage of water also should be in a controlled manner so that maximum benefit can be obtained.

(H) FIRE IN LABORATORY (a) In case of small fires from the chemicals present in laboratory, portable fire extinguishers can be used for fire fighting. (b) If the aggravates, Foam monitors should be used.

(I) NATURAL CALAMITIES (i) Heavy Rain All structures/buildings in the Terminal have been designed to withstand heavy rain and hence not much of damage is anticipated. Action Plan (a) Switch of all industrial electrical connections. (b) Ensure immediate closing of oil/water separator outlet (conventional) if any tank collapse happens. (c) Inform Chief Emergency Controller. (d) Keep constant touch with local authorities - District Magistrate, Agra and Police authorities. (e) Stop all operations and do not resume it till clearance is given by Chief Emergency Controller. (f) Bring all vehicles to a halt and ensure that hand brake is applied. (g) Evacuate persons from damaged buildings/structures. (h) Avoid going on top of high structures/storage tanks. (i) After the cyclone has struck, assess the situation and take necessary action as per the direction of Chief Emergency Controller.

(ii) Lightning In the event of lightning strike, any of the following or all emergencies may occur: (a) Fire in the tanks Action Plan: Already described under the topic of tank fire.

(iii) Earthquakes Agra is located in Seismic Zone -III and has been shown in Annexure-XIX. All buildings/equipment are designed to withstand earthquakes and therefore, major disaster is not expected. However in case of an earthquake of much heavier scale may lead to –

(a) Fall of structures/buildings (b) Subsequent fire/explosion (c) Release of petroleum products

Action Plan: Already described under the topic of fire at various locations.

(J) RIOTS / SABOTAGE / WAR Action Plan (a) Close all gates. (b) Maintain tight security. (c) Chief Emergency Controller to keep contact with local authorities. (d) Keep round the clock patrolling. (e) Alert all employees of disaster control action plan and activate in case of requirement.

(K) SECURITY THREAT/ BOMB THREAT Telephone Threat

When a bomb threat is received by telephone, the person receiving the call is to attempt to collect as much information as possible including a) All information about the device itself, including set time, type, description, location etc. b) Reasons for making call (angry with the company, extortion etc.) c) Any information about the caller (apparent age, voice characteristics, speech, language, accent, manner and use of unusual terms). d) Any information of the location of the caller (inside or outside a building, background noise etc.) The person then contacts the Terminal Incharge/ Safety Officer.

Terminal Incharge’s Responsibility: The Terminal incharge will contact the police department immediately. The police will advice on the next course of action. Possible actions may include a) Inform operation officers but do not search or evacuate. b) Initiate search but do not evacuate. c) Evacuate specific area and search. d) Search and then full evacuation immediately prior to target time. e) Immediate evacuation Searches are to be conducted by police with assistance of department personnel who are most able to spot “pit of place" items. Only bomb squad personnel are to handle suspected device.

Emergency Brigade: The emergency brigade is to be on standby to facilitate immediate response to an actual emergency (fire, explosion etc) Emergency Actions: a) The persons inside the plant except emergency brigade should be evacuated. b) All vehicles in the plant premises should be evacuated to safer places. c) Any new or doubtful object should not be touched. d) All pipelines and tank valves should be closed and all operations inside the plant should be stopped. e) In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called. f) If during searching, a bomb is found it should be defused by bomb squad immediately.

7.23 IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS: Table No 7.24 : List of Important Telephone Numbers

Sr. No. Designation Phone No. / Mobile No. Agra Terminal 1. Chief. Terminal Manager 0562-2390149, 9412268555 2. Manager (Terminal) 05612-294049, 09997746699 3. Dy. Manager(Terminal) 05612-294440, 4. Dy. Manager(Finance) 0562-2390160 5. Astt. Manager(Terminal) 05612-294440 6. Astt. Manager (Lab) 05612-294440 7. Asst. Manager(Terminal) 05612-294049, 09414030126 8. Ops Office-1 05612-294049,8050007900 9. HSE officer 05612-294049,09720061187 10. Security(Main Gate) 05612-294440 Other outside Help 1. District Magistrate, Agra 0562-2260184,9454417509 2. CO, Etmadpur 0562-2390354, 9454401231 3. SDM, Etmadpur 0562-2390250,9415906430 4. Police Control Room, Agra 100/0562-2150421 5. Bomb Disposal Team, Agra 9412810193 Fire Station at Agra 6. Fire Brigade Control Room, Agra 100/0562-2362698 7. Fire Brigade, Berhan 0562-2755493,09454418454 8. Chief Fire Officer, Agra 9454418338,9412171996 Hospitals at Agra 9. Emergency, S.N Medical 0562-2250353,9412171996 10. CMO Agra 9456812777 11. Ambulance, Agra/Blood Bank 102/0562-2262122,2260843