R E P O R T
ON
RISK ANALYSIS & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR POL TERMINAL AT ALINAGAR MUGHALSARAI (U.P)
OF
M/s INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED
Prepared By
An ISO 9001:2015, OHSAS 18001:2007 Certified & ISO/IEC 17020:2012 Accredited Co. PROJECTS & DEVELOPMENT INDIA LIMITED (A Govt. of India Undertaking) PO: Sindri, Pin - 828122, Dist: Dhanbad (Jharkhand) NABET Accredited Sl. No. 119; Dated: 5/03/2018
PDIL JOB NO: 9725 MARCH, 2018 9725-RA-MUGHALSARAI 1 PROJECTS & DEVELOPMENT INDIA LTD. DOCUMENT NO. REV SHEET 1 OF 2
RISK ANALYSIS & DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
FOR POL TERMINAL AT ALINAGAR MUGHALSARAI (U.P)
OF
M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED
0 January, 2018 RA REPORT GB DKC AKS REV DATE PURPOSE PREPARED REVIEWED APPROVED FORM NO. 02-0000-0021 F1 REV 1 All rights reserved 9725-RA-MUGHALSARAI-161 1 RA FOR POL TERMINAL AT MUGHALSARAI, (U.P) OF M/S IOCL DOCUMENT NO. REV SHEET 2 OF 2
C O N T E N T S
CHAPTER DESCRIPTION PAGE 1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 - 5 2.0 INTRODUCTION 1-2 3.0 PROJECT DETAILS 1-3 3.0 RISK ANALYSIS 1-27 4.0 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN 1 - 33
ATTACHMENT
DESCRIPTION PAGE DRG. NO. 1 LAYOUT PLAN OF POL TERMINAL AT MUGHALSARAI, M/S IOCL 01 DRG. NO. 2 ISO-RISK CONTOUR FOR POL TERMINAL AT MUGHALSARAI, M/S IOCL 01 DRG. NO. 3 F/N CURVE FOR POL TERMINAL AT MUGHALSARAI, M/S IOCL 01 THERMAL RADIATION DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR MS TANK (T- DRG. NO. 4 01 21) ON FIRE THERMAL RADIATION DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR SKO TANK (T DRG. NO. 5 01 -23) ON FIRE THERMAL RADIATION DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR HSD TANK DRG. NO. 6 01 (T-16) ON FIRE OVERPRESSURE DISTANCE DUE TO UVCE FOR MS TANK (T-21) ON DRG. NO. 7 01 FIRE THERMAL RADIATION DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR MS TANK (T- DRG. NO. 8 01 21) VESSEL CONNECTION FAILURE OVERPRESSURE DISTANCE DUE TO UVCE FOR MS TANK (T-21) DRG. NO. 9 01 VESSEL CONNECTION FAILURE THERMAL RADIATION DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR MS PUMP DRG. NO. 10 01 DISCHARGE LINE FULL-BORE FAILURE OVERPRESSURE DISTANCE DUE TO UVCE FOR MS PUMP DISCHARGE DRG. NO. 11 01 LINE FULL-BORE FAILURE THERMAL RADIATION DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR MS PUMP DRG. NO. 12 01 DISCHARGE LINE 15 MM DIA. HOLE OVERPRESSURE DISTANCE DUE TO UVCE FOR MS PUMP DISCHARGE DRG. NO. 13 01 LINE 15 MM DIA. HOLE THERMAL RADIATION DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR MS PUMP DRG. NO. 14 01 MECHANICAL SEAL FAILURE OVERPRESSURE DISTANCE DUE TO UVCE FOR MS PUMP DRG. NO. 15 01 MECHANICAL SEAL FAILURE THERMAL RADIATION DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE FOR MS PUMP DRG. NO. 16 01 DISCHARGE LINE 25% GASKET FAILURE OVERPRESSURE DISTANCE DUE TO UVCE FOR MS PUMP DISCHARGE DRG. NO. 17 01 LINE 25% GASKET FAILURE
FORM NO: 02-0000-0021 F2 REV 1 All rights reserved
RA REPORT FOR BULK PETROLEUM TERMINAL AT ALINAGAR, MUGHALSARAI OF M/S IOCL
Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PREAMBLE Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) is one of the Largest Commercial Enterprise in India, with a net profit of Rs. 103.99 billion (US$1.5 billion) for the financial year 2015-16. With the growth of population, industrialization, urbanization and modernization, the demand of petroleum products, such as MS, SKO, HSD and Ethanol is increasing at a very rapid pace. In view of this, the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas has been encouraging Oil Companies to augment their existing facilities and/ or construct new facilities to bridge the gap between demand and supply. Accordingly, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) has proposed to construct additional IFR tank for Ethanol (Cap.: 1600KL) at Alinagar, Mughalsarai (UP) POL Terminal. All products except Ethanol are received by Barauni-Kanpur Pipeline (BKPL) and Ethanol by road tankers. All the distributions and activities carried out at the terminal can be grouped into two parts. a. BKPL receipt in storage tanks b. Filling and distribution through tank trucks. Ethanol is proposed to be received through road tankers.
OBJECTIVE As the terminal handles various petroleum products which have got potential of fire/ explosion hazard, hence it is necessary to evaluate the Risk from the facilities of the terminal. Accordingly, M/s Projects & Development India Limited (PDIL) have been retained by M/s IOCL as consultant to carryout Risk Analysis Study for the terminal.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY The risk assessment has been carried out in line with the requirements of various statutory bodies for similar type of projects: The scope of Risk Analysis Study will be as follows: Identification of potential hazard areas; Identification of representative failure cases; Identification of possible initiating events; Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the impact zones from the accidental scenarios;
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Executive Summary
Assessment of total individual risk for activities in the plant. Assessment of societal risk due to the plant. Recommendation to reduce risk. Disaster Management Plan
PROJECT FACILITIES The proposed main facility includes only one tank of Ethanol: a) Storage Facilities at the site
Storage Capacity Diameter Height Tank Products Tank No. (KL) (m) (m) Type T001 HSD 7156 30.5 10 VCR T002 HSD 1369 12.9 10.6 VCR T003 HSD 2377 15.2 13 VCR T005 SKO 1574 15.2 9.1 VCR T014 MS 4213 23.9 11.3 FR T015 SKO 3778 20 12.6 VCR T016 HSD 9522 32 12.4 VCR T017 MS 2424 15.9 13.8 FR T018 SKO 4500 20 15 VCR T019 HSD 9000 28 15 VCR T020 HSD 9000 28 15 VCR T021 MS 8350 28 15 FR T022 HSD 7515 30 20 VCR T023 SKO 4959 18 20 VCR T024 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG T025 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG T027 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG T028 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG Ethanol-1 Ethanol 1600 16.0 11.0 IFR(A/G) (proposed)
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Executive Summary
Total No. of Tanks : 19 Storage Capacity of Depot: Existing: 76017 KL; Proposed: 1600 KL (Ethanol) (b) TLF : 26 Bays (c) Fire Fighting system. (d) Oil Water Separator. (e) Electricity Supply System. (f) Instrument Air System etc.
CLIMATE AND METEOROLOGY Maximum & Minimum Temperature (Avg.): 34.40C & 16.70C Average Annual Rainfall: 995 mm Average Daily Relative Humidity: 70 % Annual Mean Wind Speed: 3.6 km/h Predominant wind Direction: West – East Direction
RISK ANALYSIS Risk analysis of the plant includes identification of various credible and non- credible failure scenarios and consequences of those scenarios leading to various phenomena like dispersion, pool fire, jet fire, unconfined vapor cloud explosion etc. Frequency of the failure cases, magnitude of hazards and hazard distances has also been dealt with. The principal conclusions drawn from the risk analysis and recommendations based thereon are summarized below.
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions a) It is observed from the Iso-Risk Contour (Drg. No. 02) that the acceptable limit of individual risk of 1.0x10-6 per year remains mainly confined within factory premises except a distance of around 47m towards the southern direction. b) Societal Risk (F/N Curve) (Drg. No. 03) developed for the plant remains mainly within the acceptable limit. c) The Hazard distances arrived from the consequence analysis reveals that in most of the cases hazard is confined within the plant premises. d) Disaster Management Plan has been prepared for POL Depot.
Hence, the installation of POL Terminal is safe from environmental risk point of view.
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Executive Summary
Recommendations The recommendations as revealed from Risk analysis Study are as follows:
i) Instruments should be checked and calibrated at regular intervals to prevent any wrong signalling and consequent failures. ii) Lighting adequacy should be checked so that visibility is adequately ensured for the push bottom of the MOV. iii) Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances should always be kept in good working condition along with the Safety appliances. iv) Emergency procedures should be written and available to all persons in the installations outlining the actions to be taken by each person during a major incident. v) Mock Drills should be conducted at regular intervals. Mock drill for on- site emergency should be done once in 6 months and company should approach and co-ordinate with the district authority for conducting off-site emergency drill. vi) The security supervisor at the gate should be provided with external telephone which will be useful in emergency during odd hours. The supervisor shall be provided with telephone numbers of all officers. A board displaying the names, addresses and phone numbers of the emergency contact points of the company as well as the local authorities shall be provided therein. vii) All terminal operating personnel including regular contractors and security personnel should be given safety and fire fighting training with the help of reputed training institutes. viii) The security staff should be trained as first responders for fire fighting and rescue operations along with plant operating personnel. ix) Regular inspection of pipelines including thickness survey and pipeline support systems shall be carried out and records maintained. x) Near miss reporting system should be immediately implemented. xi) Smoking should be strictly prohibited inside the installation. xii) Non -sparking tools should be used for maintenance to avoid any spark.
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Executive Summary
xiii) The storage tanks, pipelines and facilities in TLF Shed should be properly earthed to avoid accumulation of static electricity. xiv) Entry of personnel should be restricted inside the licensed area. xv) Good liaison should be maintained with outside organisation (mutual aid partners) and District Administration as well as Hospitals and Nursing Homes so that help may be available in case of emergency. xvi) Health check and maintenance of the equipments and pipelines should be done at regular intervals to avoid any major failure xvii) VHF handset should be provided for each of the operating crew. xviii) Vehicles with flame arrester should only be allowed inside the installation. xix) Personal Protective Equipments should be easily available at location and easily identified. They should be kept in good working condition. xx) Proper PPEs such as safety glasses must be worn while carrying out all operations. xxi) In case transformer fire: a) Inform SEB and cut off electricity to the plant.
b) Put off power by use CO2 extinguishers c) Clean the area and replenish transformer oil. d) Ask SEB to connect transformer with power. xxii) Safety audit should be done at regular intervals.
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Introduction
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND 1.1.1 IOCL's business interests overlap the entire hydrocarbon value-chain, including refining, pipeline transportation, marketing of petroleum products, exploration & production of crude oil, natural gas and petrochemicals. It has also ventured into alternative energy and globalization of downstream operations. With subsidiaries in Sri Lanka, Mauritius and UAE, IOCL is scouting for new business opportunities in the energy markets across Asia and Africa. It has also formed about 20 joint ventures with reputed business partners from India and abroad to pursue diverse business interests. M/s. IOCL (A Govt. of India Enterprise), working under the aegis of Ministry of Petroleum, is having an establishment for Receipt, Storage and Distribution of petroleum products at Village- Alinagar, Tehsil: Sakaldiha, Distt.: Chandauli, Uttar Pradesh. The Terminal, presently, is engaged in loading of petroleum products (HSD, MS, SKO & Ethanol) into tank trucks and fulfills the requirements of the nearby Districts. The demand of petroleum products is increasing in the command area of Mughalsarai Terminal and as per assessment; the existing storage is inadequate to fulfill the requirement. Hence, IOCL proposes to augment the existing facilities for storage & dispatch. The proposal relates to construction of additional tank of Ethanol in the existing premises of POL Terminal.
1.2 PROJECT DETAILS 1.2.1 Facilities The POL terminal has been installed mainly for receipt, storage and dispatch of Motor Spirit (MS), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Ethanol. The facilities in the installations are as under: (i) Receipt of products through BKPL & road tankers; (ii) Storage tanks of adequate capacities for storage of products; (iii) Facilities for loading of products into tank lorries, through loading arms; (iv) Fire fighting facilities; (v) Off - site facilities;
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Introduction
The facilities conform to OISD - 117 & 118, and have been designed for safe and environmental friendly operation.
1.2.2 Project at a glance SI. No. Particulars Details 1. Proposed Project Construction of Additional Tank at POL Terminal Mughalsarai, Chandauli for storage of Ethanol 2. Project Location Mughalsarai, Distt.- Chandauli (U.P). 3. Geo-Coordinate 25.1647" N, 83.822" E 4. Constitution of the Public Sector under Ministry of organization Petroleum 5. Source & Quantity of Water 05 nos. of Bore-wells within plant premises, 30 KL 6. Project Cost Approx. Rs.9 Crores
1.2.3 Sources of raw materials & utilities (a) The main raw material, refined petroleum products (MS, SKO & HSD) are received at the terminal through BKPL & road tankers (for ethanol). (b) Power for operating the facilities is received from State Electricity Board. For emergency power generation, 2 Nos. of DG sets of cap. 500 KVA each are also provided. (c) HSD for operating the DG Sets is available at the site from the storage tanks. (d) Water requirement of the plant is met from 2 nos. of Bore Well within the site.
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Project Description
2.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
2.1 Product Receipt Facilities All the petroleum products except Ethanol are received through BKPL. Ethanol is received through road tankers. (a) The product storage capacities are as below:
Capacity Diameter Height Tank Tank No. Product (KL) (m) (m) Type
T001 HSD 7156 30.5 10 VCR T002 HSD 1369 12.9 10.6 VCR T003 HSD 2377 15.2 13 VCR T005 SKO 1574 15.2 9.1 VCR T014 MS 4213 23.9 11.3 FR T015 SKO 3778 20 12.6 VCR T016 HSD 9522 32 12.4 VCR T017 MS 2424 15.9 13.8 FR T018 SKO 4500 20 15 VCR T019 HSD 9000 28 15 VCR T020 HSD 9000 28 15 VCR T021 MS 8350 28 15 FR T022 HSD 7515 30 20 VCR T023 SKO 4959 18 20 VCR T024 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG T025 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG T027 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG T028 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG Ethanol-1 Ethanol 1600 16.0 11.0 IFR(A/G) (proposed)
Total No. of Tanks : 19 Storage Capacity of Depot: Existing: 76017 KL; Proposed: 1600 KL (Ethanol) (b) TLF : 26 Bays (c) Fire Fighting system. (d) Oil Water Separator. (e) Electricity Supply System. (f) Instrument Air System etc.
2.2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION 2.2.1 Land The total area of the terminal is approx. 32 acres. It is connected to National Highway (NH-19).
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Project Description
2.2.2 Receipt All products except Ethanol are received by BKPL Pipeline. All the distribution and activities carried out at the Terminal can be grouped into two parts. 1. BKPL receipt in storage tanks 2. Filling and distribution through tank trucks Ethanol is proposed to be received through Road tankers.
2.2.3 Storage MS is stored in floating roof tank (FRT) and other class B products (SKO and HSD) are stored in Cone roof tanks (CRT). Ethanol is stored in underground tanks already provided and one IFR tank for Ethanol is proposed. Existing storage tanks are provided with separate dykes based on product classification. All the existing tanks are provided with CC/ brick pitching to the apron and foundations. All the storage tanks are provided with 2 Nos. of ROSOV & Double Block & Bleed Valve (DBBV) for safety reasons. All tanks have been provided with adequate fire protection systems. The proposed additional Ethanol tank of 1X1600 KL capacity would be constructed in vacant area with SKO, HSD & Ethanol. The storage tanks for Class-A product shall be provided with water sprinkler system and fixed foam system.
2.2.4 Distribution/ loading by tank trucks: All the products are dispatched to various Retail Outlets, Consumer outlets etc. within Chandauli District and other adjoining districts of Uttar Pradesh by TTs. for which 26 Nos. of loading bays have been provided for MS, SKO & HSD. There is pump house with facility for loading of products separately.
2.2.5 Pipeline Network: There are independent pipelines for receiving different products from BKPL. Dedicated pipelines are provided from the BKPL manifold to individual storage tanks for receipt of the product. Similarly, dedicated pipelines are provided from the storage tanks to the pump house for delivery to TLF shed.
2.2.6 Utilities: The Terminal is provided with the following utility facilities: 1. Receipt, storage and distribution network of water for general use and fire fighting purpose 2. HT electrical power for the Terminal operation and lighting
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Project Description
3. DG sets as stand-by power supply source (02 x 500 KVA) 4. Other infrastructures such as storm water drain, Oil Water Drain and Oil Water Separators.
2.2.7 Fire Protection: Fire protection facilities are designed to fight one major fire (single largest risk) as per design philosophy given in OISD 117 & 244. Water spray system and fixed foam monitor are provided for Class A & B storage tanks. Safety distances between facilities are provided as per PESO/ OISD norms. Fire water tanks and pumps are located more than 30 m away from risk area (including proposed tank) as stipulated by OISD 117. Required number of firewater pumps (6 Nos., Cap.:616 KL/Hr each) and jockey pumps (2 Nos., Cap: 74 M3/Hr each) are provided to take care of the fire hydrants. Four hours pumping capacity are provided for fire water storage in 3 nos. of storage tanks of total capacity 10414 KL. There is a well laid out ring main system around the hazardous area which is provided with fire hydrant points and monitors as per requirements of OISD-117. In addition, adequate numbers of portable fire extinguishers of Dry Chemical type e.g. DCPs are also provided. The proposed additional tanks will also be provided with fire hydrant system all around and water sprinkler system as per requirements of norms. Fire drills are conducted at regular intervals and the observations recorded. Personnel intended to operate the Terminal are well qualified and well trained. Terminal operations are supervised by a responsible Officer (Deputy General Manager). The Terminal personnel are well informed and well trained in combating fire hazards/ fire fighting. Terminal security system has been so envisaged to ensure strict compliance of safety requirements and to take up prompt and proper action in case of any emergency.
2.2.8 Oil Water Separator Sources of effluent generation are limited to storage area, pump house and loading gantries. All these areas are provided with enclosure walls to contain the spillage (if any). Occasional washings from these areas are sent to the Oil - Water Separator, where the oil contents are reduced as per norms. Practically, no effluent is generated. However, it has been provided as a pollution control measures. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 3 of 3
RA REPORT FOR BULK PETROLEUM TERMINAL AT ALINAGAR, MUGHALSARAI OF M/S IOCL
Risk Analysis
3.0 RISK ANALYSIS 3.1 GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN RISK ASSESSMENT The common terms used in Risk Assessment and Disaster Management are elaborated below: “Risk” is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death) occurring within a specified period or under specified circumstances. This may be either a frequency or a probability depending on the circumstances. “Hazard” is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury/death, damage to property or the environment or some combination of these criteria. “Hazardous Substance” means any substance or preparation, which by reason of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the environment. “Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an industry, which may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or connected therewith or which may result in pollution of the general environment. “Disaster” is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic disruptions, loss of human life and deterioration of health and health services on a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected area or community. Disaster occasioned by man is factory fire, explosions and release of toxic gases or chemical substances etc. “Accident” is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal injury/death or property damage or both. “Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the resources. This highlights the typical nature of emergency “It will be after experience that enough is not enough in emergency situations. Situations of this nature are avoidable but it is not possible to avoid them always.” “Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall Management. Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capability of the persons engaged in direct action, will require support from others in the organization before, during and after an emergency.
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Risk Analysis
3.2 RISK ANALYSIS 3.2.1 Properties of Materials Handled Petroleum products like, Motor Spirit (MS), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), High Speed Diesel (HSD) and Ethanol are handled in the terminal. MS, SKO, HSD & Ethanol are a combination of hydrocarbons and are highly inflammable. MS & Ethanol is a class-A type petroleum liquid (Flash Point <23oC) whereas Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO) & High Speed Diesel (HSD) are of Class B type according to convention. The products, when spilled from the containment will cause fire if they come in contact with an ignition source. Incomplete combustion of these hydrocarbons may generate carbon monoxide, which may cause toxicity as well as explosion. However, fire is the main hazard. Lower the flash point, higher is the possibility of ignition & hazard. The light hydrocarbons will evaporate from these petroleum oil liquids, which may catch fire if they get into contact with an ignition source. In case of MS & Ethanol, explosion may occur if sufficient quantity of MS & Ethanol is spilled and ignition takes place. Some properties of material handled and proposed to handle are listed below: Table - 3.1 PROPERTIES OF MS, SKO, HSD AND ETHANOL Sr. No. Stored Material Density Kg/m3 Flash Point oC, max Boiling Point oC, max 01. MS 750 <18.0 50 - 215 02. SKO 800 > 32.0 150 - 300 03. HSD 810 > 35.0 260 – 380 04. ETHANOL 789 <18.0 78.37
3.2.2 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products 3.2.2.1 The hazard of equipment/pipeline handling petroleum products is the potential loss of integrity of the containment with subsequent release of liquid causing fire. Since the pipelines carry large quantities of petroleum liquid, a rare pipeline fracture releases large quantities of hydrocarbons. The product gets collected in the neighbourhood of the pipeline and may lead to a fire hazard if it gets source of ignition and proper precautions are not taken. Catastrophic failure of the shell of a storage tank is a very rare phenomenon, which may occur due to earthquake or due to aerial bombardment during war. However, vapour coming out through the vent line of fixed roof tank or through vapour seal around the shell of floating roof tanks may be ignited through lightning. Although such cases are very rare, but in that situation, the whole tank
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Risk Analysis
may be engulfed with fire. Corrosion in the tanks may cause small holes causing release of petroleum liquid from the tanks. However, in such cases the oil will be contained in the dyke. In case of oil spill collected on ground an oil pool will be formed. An ignited pool of oil is called Pool Fire. It creates long smoky flames. The wind may tilt the flame towards ground causing secondary fires and damages. Radiation from the flame can be very intense near the fire but falls off rapidly beyond 3-4 pool diameters. Such fires are very destructive within the plant area and near the source of generation. In case of release of considerable quantity of MS, explosion may occur. In case of formation of small holes on the above ground pipeline the liquid may escape in the form of jet and may catch fire if it gets an ignition source. Damage due to heat radiation from such jets is mostly limited to objects in the path. However, the ignited jet can impinge on other vessels and the pipelines causing domino effect.
3.3 DOW INDEX 3.3.1 Fire Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE & TI) Approach Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Indexing (FE & TI) is a rapid ranking method for identifying the degree of hazard. The application of FE&TI would help to make a quick assessment of the nature and quantification of the hazard in these areas. However, this does not provide precise information. Respective Material Factor (RMF), General Hazard Factors (GHF) and Special Process Hazard Factors (SPHF) are computed using standard procedure of awarding penalties based on storage, handling and reaction parameters. Before hazard indexing can be applied, the installation in question should be subdivided into logical, independent elements or units. In general, a unit can logically be characterized by the nature of the process that takes place in it. In some cases, the unit may consist of a plant element separated from the other elements by space or by protective walls. A plant element may also be an apparatus, instrument, section or system that can cause a specific hazard. For each separate plant process, which contains flammable or toxic substances, a Fire and Explosion Index (FE) and/or a Toxicity Index (TI) may be determined in a manner derived from the method for determining a fire and explosion index developed by the Dow Chemical Company.
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Risk Analysis
3.3.2 FE and TI Methodology Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index (F and E) is a product of Material Factor (MF) and Hazard Factor (F3) while MF represents the flammability and reactivity of the substances, the hazard factor (F3), is itself a product of General Process Hazards (GPH) and Special Process Hazards (SPH). An accurate plot plan of the plant, a process flow sheet and Fire and Explosion Index and Hazard Classification Guide published by Dow Chemical Company are required to estimate the FE & TI of any process plant or a storage unit.
3.3.3 Computations and Evaluation of Fire and Explosion Index The Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) is calculated from the following formula:
F & EI = MF x (GPH) x (SPH)
The degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of F&EI as per the criteria given below: F & EI Range Degree of Hazard 0 – 60 Light 61 – 96 Moderate 97 – 127 Intermediate 128 – 158 Heavy 159 – Up Severe 3.3.4 Toxicity Index (TI) The toxicity index is primarily based on the index figures for health hazards established by the NFPA in Codes NFPA 704, NFPA 49 and NFPA 345 m. However, the products handled are not toxic.
3.3.5 Classification of Hazard Categories By comparing the indices F&EI and TI, the unit in question is classified into one of the following three categories established for the purpose (Table - 3.2). Table - 3.2 FIRE, EXPLOSION AND TOXICITY INDEX Category Fire & Explosion Index (F&EI) Toxicity Index (TI) I F&EI, 65 TI < 6 II 65 < or = F&EI < 95 6 < or = TI < 10 III F&EI > or = 95 TI > or = 10
Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended
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Risk Analysis
3.3.6 Comments The recommended minimum features, according to DOW Fire and Explosion Index have been given at Table - 3.3 Based on these features and the various values obtained, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1] The Radii of Exposure for the MS Storage Tanks is 121 ft. and the hazard potential is “HEAVY”. 2] The SKO and HSD Storage Tanks pose a “MODERATE” hazard, with an exposure radius of about 65 ft. each. 3] The Radius of Exposure for the ETHANOL Storage Tanks is 86 ft. and the hazard potential is “INTERMEDIATE”.
Table - 3.3 CALCULATIONS FOR DOW FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX General Special Fire & Unit Total Material Process Process Explosion Exposure Hazard Degree of Product Content Factor Hazard Hazard Index Radius Factor Hazard (KL) MF Factor Factor F&EI = (ft.) F3 F1 F2 F3xMF MS 12850 16.00 2.1 4.27 8.967 143.5 121 Heavy SKO 14910 10.00 2.1 3.67 7.706 77 65 Moderate HSD 50060 10.00 2.1 3.67 7.707 77 65 Moderate Ethanol 1880 16.00 2.1 3.07 6.447 103 86 Intermediate
3.3.6.1 Brief Review of Safety Related Facilities Because of the inherent hazard potential of the petroleum products handled in the installation, due care is to be taken in handling of the same in tanks, pipelines and other associated facilities e.g. i) Well established code of practice in design and installation. ii) Well planned layout (as per guidelines of OISD 118). iii) Provision of weather resistant painting for protection of exposed areas of pipelines, valves and equipment. iv) Provision of dykes and fire walls around storage tanks. v) Well planned Fire Fighting Facilities. vi) Well trained manpower for operation and maintenance.
3.3.6.2 Fire Fighting Facilities i] Well planned Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities have been provided in the installation e.g.
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Risk Analysis
a) Fire Hydrants and Monitors Fire Hydrants and monitors have been provided around the dyke walls of storage tanks. They are also provided for Pump Manifold, Pump Bays and Road Tanker Loading Gantry. Layout of fire hydrants & monitors and isolation valves have been made in such a way that Fire Tenders can approach to put out fire in any possible area.
b) Spray Protection System Storage tanks containing MS, have been provided with water spray protection. Special fire fighting arrangements for MS are: (1) HVLR (High Volume Long Range Monitor) (2) RSFPS (Rim Seal Fire Protection System)
Perforated spray water pipes have been provided around the shell of the storage tanks and are located at the top of the shell. Safety and Fire Fighting Systems has been designed as per guidelines of OISD-117, 244 and TAC rules.
ii] Portable Fire Fighting Apparatus Fire Extinguishers and other fire fighting apparatus have been provided in the vulnerable sections of the plant, administrative block; Fire Water Pump House. MCC etc. as per std. norms.
3.3.6.3 Safety Valves Two numbers of pressure/vacuum valves have provided on the roof of the storage tanks containing MS to prevent failure of tanks due to pressure as well as vacuum.
3.4 RISK ASSESSMENT 3.4.1 Introduction The Mughalsarai terminal of M/s IOCL, which includes the facilities for receipt, storage and despatch of petroleum products mainly poses fire hazards due to unwanted and accidental release of hydrocarbons. However, due safeguards has been taken in design, installation and operation of the system to prevent any unwanted release of hydrocarbons from their containment. In the event of release of hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire. The
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chances of explosion are less. This section deals with various failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios, analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis. Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various failure scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to determine the distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason and purpose for consequence analysis are manifolds like - Computation of risk. Aid better plant layout. Evaluate damage and protective measures necessary for saving properties & human lives. Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures. Formulate safe design criteria and protection system. Formulate effective Disaster Management Plan. The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all known and unknown effects that are of importance when failure scenarios occur and to get information about how to deal with possible catastrophic events. It also gives the plant authorities, workers, district authorities and the public living in the area an understanding of the hazard potential and remedial measures to be taken. Risk Analysis study of the terminal has been conducted with the help of latest PHAST software of M/s DNVGL.
3.4.2 Modes of Failure There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any installation. The leakages may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of small diameter pipeline, leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, failure of loading arms, leakages due to wrong opening of valves & blinds, pipe bursting due to overpressure, pump mechanical seal failure and any other sources of leakage.
3.4.3 Damage Criteria The damage effect of all such failures mentioned above are mainly due to thermal radiation from pool fire or jet fire due to ignition of hydrocarbons released since the petroleum products are highly inflammable especially Motor sprit & ethanol whose flash point is low.
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The petroleum products released accidentally due to any reason will normally spread on the ground as a pool or released in the form of jet in case of release from a pressurised pipeline through small openings. Light hydrocarbons present in the petroleum products will evaporate and may get ignited both in case of jet as well as liquid pool causing jet fire or pool fire. Accidental fire on the storage tanks due to ignition of vapour from the tanks or due to any other reason may also be regarded as pool fire. Thermal radiation due to pool fire or jet flame may cause various degrees of burns on human bodies. Also its effect on inanimate objects like equipment, piping, building and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects due to thermal radiation intensity are elaborated in Table - 3.2 & 3.3.
Table - 3.2 DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY Incident Thermal Casualty Radiation Types of damage Probability Intensity, KW/m2 37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process 1.00 equipment 32 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on 1.00 thermal protected and pressurized storage tank 12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition 0.50 of wood, melting of plastic tubing etc. 8 Maximum allowable radiation intensity on -- thermally unprotected and pressurized storage tanks 4.5 1st degree burn 0.00 1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure 0.00 0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation 0.00
Table - 3.3 PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD THERMAL DOSES Dose Threshold Effect KJ/M2 375 3rd Degree Burn. 250 2nd Degree Burn. 125 1st Degree Burn. Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin 65 caused.
1st Degree Burn Involve only epidermis, blister may occur; example - sun burn.
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2nd Degree Burn Involve whole of epidermis over the area of burn plus some portion of dermis. 3rd Degree Burn Involve whole of epidermis and dermis; subcutaneous tissues may also be damaged. In case of motor spirit having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a possibility of vapour cloud explosion. Damage effects due to blast over pressure are given in Table - 3.4. Table - 3.4 DAMAGE EFFECTS DUE TO BLAST OVER PRESSURE Blast Overpressure Casualty Damage Type (Bar) Probability 0.30 Major damage to structures (assumed 0.25 fatal to the people inside structure) 0.17 Eardrum rupture 0.10 0.10 Repairable Damage 0.10 0.03 Glass Breakage 0.00 0.01 Crack of Windows 0.00
3.4.4 Dispersion and Stability Class In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons, dispersion of vapour plays an important role as indicated earlier. The factors which govern dispersion are mainly Wind Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface roughness. One of the characteristics of atmosphere is stability, which plays an important role in dispersion of pollutants. Stability is essentially the extent to which it allows vertical motion by suppressing or assisting turbulence. It is generally a function of vertical temperature profile of the atmosphere. The stability factor directly influences the ability of the atmosphere to disperse pollutants emitted into it from sources in the plant. In most dispersion problems relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground. Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature profile.
Temperature of the atmospheric air normally decreases with increase in height. The rate of decrease of temperature with height is known as the Lapse Rate. It varies from time to time and place to place. This rate of change of temperature with height under adiabatic, or neutral condition is approximately 1oC per 100
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metres. The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the lapse rate is less than, equal or greater than dry adiabatic lapse rate i.e. 1oC per 100 metres. Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F
A = Extremely unstable B = Moderately unstable C = Slightly unstable D = Neutral E = Stable F = Highly stable
3.4.5 Selected Failure Cases The mode of approach adopted for consequence analysis is first to select the probable failure scenarios. The failure scenarios selected are indicated in Table - 3.5. Table - 3.5 LIST OF FAILURE CASES Sl. Likely Credible/ Failure Scenarios No. Consequences Non Credible 1] Unloading hose failure for Pool Fire & UVCE Credible Tank Lorry Decantation (TLD) 2] Storage Tanks on Fire - do - Partially Credible 3] Vessel connection failure for - do - Partially Credible tank outlet lines 4] Pump Mechanical Seal Failure - do - Partially Credible 5] TLF Pump Discharge Line - do - Non Credible Rupture 6] 15 mm dia. hole in TLF Pump - do - Credible Discharge Line 7] Gasket Failure in TLF Pump - do - Credible Discharge Line 8] 3 inches dia. Loading arm failure for Road Tanker - do - Partially Credible Loading
It will be seen that most of the probable cases of failures have been considered for Consequence Analysis.
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3.5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been done to evaluate and identify possible consequences as well as to incorporate suitable measures to prevent and mitigate such failure events
3.5.1 Unloading hose failure for Tank Lorry Decantation (TLD) Road Tanker Unloading Details: Material Pump Capacity Differential Pr. (Kg/Cm2) Dis. Line Size (") (LPM) Ethanol 900 5 to 5.5 8
The failure probability of road tanker unloading hose is in the order of 1.584x10-1 per hour of operation for unloading hose. Since the probability is very high, the failure scenario is taken for calculation of consequences due to failure of these unloading hoses for ethanol. The consequences have been calculated for 3 minutes release has been considered as it is assumed that action will be taken by the operators for stopping the pumps and closing the isolation valves immediately within this period. Hazard distances for fire due to snapping of unloading hose for ethanol are presented in Table - 3.6 & 3.7. Table - 3.6 HAZARD DISTANCES TO POOL FIRE
Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation KW/M2 2F 2B 3D 5D 7D Ethanol; RR – 11.85 Kg/Sec. 37.5 17 16 18 17 19 32 20 19 20 22 22 12.5 35 34 37 38 38 8 42 41 43 44 44 4.5 52 51 52 53 53 NR - Not Reached, RR – Release rate
It is evident from the above table that in case of rupture of unloading hoses, 4.5 kW/M2 thermal radiations goes upto a distance of 53m. Proper action needs to be taken to stop leakage immediately as well as for prevention of fire. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion due to ethanol road tanker unloading hose failure, if the evaporated vapour cloud moving in down wind direction, comes in the contact of an ignition source within its flammability limits. For such scenario the result of consequence analysis are presented in the following table.
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Table - 3.7 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar Ethanol 01. 2F 13 16 23 02. 2B 12 14 20 03. 3D 12 14 19 04. 5D 11 12 15 05. 7D 12 14 20
The above table evident that overpressure distances may go up to 13 m for heavy damage i.e. 0.3 bar in case of unloading hose failure. So, extreme care should be taken to avoid any such type of spillage & spilled liquid should be covered immediately with foam compound to avoid any further catastrophe.
3.5.2 Storage Tanks on Fire Few Tank Details: Tank No. Material Capacity (KL) Dia. (m) X Ht. (m) T-16 HSD 9530 32.0 x 12.4 T-21 MS 8620 28.0 x 15.0 T-23 SKO 5000 18.0 x 20.0 T- (Proposed) Ethanol 1600 16.0 x 11.0
A tank is susceptible to fire hazard, if a static charge or a spark ignites the vapour being released from vent or rim seal (in case of FRVT) causes fire. If the fire is not controlled at the initial stage it can lead to collapse of the roof and total liquid becomes exposed to fire. The hazard posed by such failure and subsequent fire is intense thermal radiation. The thermal radiation emanating from such tank fire can cause damage to nearby tanks and persons' in the vicinity. As per IP Code, thermally protected facilities and storage tanks can withstand a thermal radiation of 32 KW/M2 while unprotected tanks & process facilities can withstand only up to 8 KW/M2. Normal persons can withstand an intensity of 1.6 KW/M2 for a long duration. A radiation intensity of 4.5 KW/M2 can cause 1st degree burn if a man is exposed for more than 20 seconds. Hazard distances due to thermal radiation as a result of fires in storage tanks are shown in Table - 3.8.
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Table - 3.8 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO POOL FIRE
(Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation KW/M2 2F 2B 3D 5D 7D MS TANK No. 21 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 17 16 18 20 21 8 26 25 29 32 33 4.5 44 43 49 55 59 SKO TANK No. 23 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 17 16 18 19 20 8 25 24 28 32 34 4.5 37 36 39 42 43 HSD TANK No.-16 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 18 17 19 20 21 8 28 27 30 33 35 4.5 44 43 48 52 54 ETHANOL TANK (Proposed) 37.5 9 9 9 9 9 32 10 10 10 11 11 12.5 21 21 22 23 24 8 26 26 26 27 28 4.5 32 32 33 33 33
It is seen from the above table that in case of tank fire for MS, the hazard distance for thermal radiation level for 4.5 KW/M2 will extend up to a maximum distance of 59 m. In case of tank fire for SKO, HSD & Ethanol, distances to 4.5 KW/M2 are 43 m, 54 m & 33 m respectively. Hence it is important that in case of fire in any storage tank, cooling of the tank on fire as well as other tanks by water spray should be started quickly through cooling water pipes to avoid failure of other tanks. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion in case of MS & Ethanol tank nozzle failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction along with wind and may come into contact with some ignition source causing vapour cloud explosion. The hazard distances for UVCE under different wind speed and stability classes for MS is given in Table - 3.9.
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Table -3.9 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS TANK No. 21 01. 2F 380 450 661 02. 2B 379 449 660 03. 3D 399 473 705 04. 5D 441 523 795 05 7D 480 562 861 ETHANOL TANK (Proposed) 01. 2F 70 81 120 02. 2B 83 89 125 03. 3D 91 100 142 04. 5D 93 107 163 05. 7D 93 109 177
It is evident that in case of vapour cloud explosion heavy damage may occur in nearby equipment and structures. The overpressure distances of 0.3 bar (heavy damage) for MS & Ethanol extends up to 480m & 93m respectively. However, since the failure probability is very low, the occurrence is very rare. However, such tank fires are very-very rare. Also the vapour pressure of SKO and HSD being much low at atmospheric temperature, the chances of ignition of vapour are very low and practically nil.
3.5.3 Vessel connection failure for tank outlet lines Vessel & Connection Details: Tank No. Material Capacity (KL) Line Size (mm) T-21 MS 8620 200 T-18 SKO 4500 300 T-16 HSD 9530 250 T- (Proposed) Ethanol 1600 200
All the storage tanks have two lines (one inlet and another outlet) connected at bottom of the tank. The outlet dia. of storage tanks for MS, SKO, HSD & Ethanol (proposed) are 200 mm, 300 mm, 250 mm & 200 mm respectively with failure frequency of 5.0 x 10-6 per year. In case of failure of such nozzles, liquid will spill inside the dyke and will form a pool. The liquid pool may get ignited if the vapours come into contact with an ignition source. Hazard distances for 37.5 KW/M2, 32
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KW/M2, 12.5 KW/M2, 8 KW/M2 and 4.5 KW/M2 are calculated and presented in Table - 3.10. Table - 3.10 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO POOL FIRE
(Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation KW/M2 2F 2B 3D 5D 7D MS TANK No. 21; RR: 215.17 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 26 26 26 27 28 8 37 36 39 43 45 4.5 62 61 68 78 84 SKO TANK No. 18; RR: 543.60 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 23 23 24 24 25 8 34 33 36 39 42 4.5 55 54 59 66 70 HSD TANK No.-16; RR: 363.80 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 36 36 36 36 37 8 48 48 51 56 59 4.5 77 76 82 91 95 ETHANOL TANK (Proposed) ; RR: 230.75 Kg/Sec 37.5 28 28 29 31 32 32 32 32 34 37 39 12.5 56 56 58 60 60 8 67 67 68 69 70 4.5 87 87 88 89 89 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate
Ignition of the pool and subsequent pool fire will cause damage to tanks inside the dyke and nearby equipment/pipeline. The hazard distance for thermal radiation level for 4.5 KW/M2 will extend up to a maximum distance of 84m, 70m, 95m & 89m for MS, SKO, HSD & ethanol respectively. As such action shall be taken immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam compound. In case of fire a quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent damage. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion in case of MS & Ethanol tank nozzle failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction along with wind and may come into contact with some ignition source causing vapour cloud
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explosion. The hazard distances for UVCE under different wind speed and stability classes for MS is given in Table - 3.11.
Table -3.11 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION
Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS TANK No. 21 01. 2F 195 250 397 02. 2B 180 221 329 03. 3D 167 204 303 04. 5D 139 169 247 05 7D 124 147 211 ETHANOL TANK (Proposed) 01. 2F 53 66 100 02. 2B 47 55 74 03. 3D 37 44 64 04. 5D 37 44 62 05 7D 37 43 61
It is evident that in case of vapour cloud explosion heavy damage may occur in nearby equipment and structures. The overpressure distances of 0.3 bar (heavy damage) for MS extends up to 195 m & for Ethanol extends upto 53 m. However, since the failure probability is very low, such occurrences are very rare.
3.5.4 Pump Mechanical Seal Failure Pump Details: Material Dis. Line (mm) Dis. Rate (m3/hr) MS 200 216 SKO 200 432 HSD 250 432 Ethanol 200 530
The frequency of failure for single mechanical seal of centrifugal pumps specially handling light hydrocarbons is quite high i.e. 5x10-4 per pump per year and poses risk due to fire and explosion. Failure of seals releases considerable quantity of hydrocarbons into atmosphere and creates a hazardous zone. Present thinking is to adopt double mechanical seal especially for light hydrocarbon services. This helps in reducing their frequency of hydrocarbon releases to atmosphere but still contribute to a great extent to the overall risk of the plant. However, the type of
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seal, single or double, does not affect their release rates or the hazard distances. Hazard distances have been calculated for the pump mechanical seal failure. A shaft diameter of 40 mm and a seal gap of 2 mm have been assumed for release rate calculation. 3 minutes release of product has been considered in this case as it is assumed that action will be taken to stop the pump and close suction/ discharge line valves by the operators in that time. Provision of hydrocarbon detector in pump house will help to detect leakage through mechanical seal. The hazard distances to pool fire are given in Table - 3.12 below:
Table - 3.12 HAZARD DISTANCES TO THERMAL RADIATION DUE TO POOL FIRE
Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation KW/M2 2F 2B 3D 5D 7D MS; RR – 1.58 Kg/Sec. 37.5 14 14 15 16 - 32 15 15 16 17 - 12.5 24 23 24 24 - 8 28 27 28 26 - 4.5 33 32 32 29 - SKO; RR – 1.69 Kg/Sec. 37.5 13 14 14 15 16 32 14 15 185 16 17 12.5 25 25 27 30 32 8 30 30 32 34 35 4.5 37 37 38 40 41 HSD; RR – 1.76 Kg/Sec. 37.5 13 14 14 15 15 32 14 15 15 16 16 12.5 24 25 27 29 31 8 30 30 31 33 35 4.5 36 36 37 39 40 Ethanol; RR – 1.79 Kg/Sec. 37.5 13 13 13 13 13 32 14 14 14 14 14 12.5 21 21 22 23 24 8 24 24 24 25 26 4.5 28 29 29 30 30 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate
The above table shows that the hazard distance of 1st degree burn i.e. 4.5 KW/m2 may extends up to a maximum distances of 33 m, 41 m, 40 m & 30m max. for MS, SKO, HSD & Ethanol respectively in case of pump mechanical seal failure.
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The UVCE distances for MS & Ethanol pump mechanical seal failure has been calculated & presented in the following Table – 3.13. Table – 3.13 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS 01. 2F 61 71 100 02. 2B 58 67 89 03. 3D 48 56 78 04. 5D 47 55 75 05. 7D 37 43 61 Ethanol 01. 2F - - - 02. 2B - - - 03. 3D - - - 04. 5D - - - 05. 7D - - -
The hazard distances for heavy damage may extends up to 61 m for 0.3 bar in case of MS, so spilled liquid should be covered with foam to avoid further catastrophe.
3.5.5 TLF Pump Discharge Line Rupture Pump Discharge Line Details: Material Dis. Line (mm) Dis. Rate (m3/hr) MS 200 216 SKO 200 432 HSD 250 432 Ethanol 200 530
The TLF pump discharge lines in the depot are of varying sizes. Failures of these diameter lines are non-credible in nature. However, consequence analysis has been conducted to evaluate the hazard distances and presented in Table No. - 3.14. Table - 3.14 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO POOL FIRE Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation KW/M2 2F 2B 3D 5D 7D MS; RR – 45.21 Kg/Sec. 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 33 33 33 34 34 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 18 of 27
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8 44 43 46 49 51 4.5 70 68 75 84 89 SKO ; RR – 95.58 Kg/Sec. 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 48 48 48 49 49 8 61 61 64 70 73 4.5 93 92 100 110 116 HSD ; RR – 96.02 Kg/Sec. 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 47 47 47 48 48 8 60 60 64 69 72 4.5 91 90 97 106 111 Ethanol ; RR – 115 Kg/Sec. 37.5 58 57 61 64 67 32 65 64 69 74 78 12.5 100 99 103 105 106 8 118 117 120 121 122 4.5 151 150 152 153 153 NR - Not Reached, RR – Release rate
As evident from the above table that in case of TLF pump discharge line failure for a thermal radiation of 4.5 KW/M2, hazard distances of MS, SKO, HSD & Ethanol goes up to a distance of 89 m, 116 m, 111m & 153 m respectively for full bore failure. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS & Ethanol line failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction and if any ignition source is found within its flammability limit, there may be UVCE. However, for MS & Ethanol pump discharge line rupture the overpressure distances due to explosion are calculated & presented in Table – 3.15.
Table – 3.15 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO PUMP DISCHARGE LINE RUPTURE Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS 01. 2F 148 187 289 02. 2B 154 188 280 03. 3D 142 168 246 04. 5D 113 135 196 05. 7D 112 133 192 Ethanol 01. 2F 72 84 116 02. 2B 55 61 75 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 19 of 27
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03. 3D 58 66 88 04. 5D 46 51 67 05. 7D 45 50 66
As evident from the above table that for 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) distances may travel up to 154m for MS & 72m for Ethanol TLF pump discharge line Full-bore failure respectively. So proper care and perfect instrumentation needs to be taken to avoid such type of failure cases. Pipeline should be checked with NDT periodically.
3.5.6 15 mm dia. hole in TLF Pump Discharge Line Pump Discharge Line Details: Material Dis. Line (mm) Dis. Rate (m3/hr) MS 200 216 SKO 200 432 HSD 250 432 Ethanol 200 530
The pump discharge lines in the depot are of varying sizes. Formation of small holes in these diameter lines is credible in nature. Hence Consequence analysis has been conducted to evaluate the hazard distances for 3 minutes release and presented in Table No. 3.16. Table - 3.16 HAZARD DISTANCES TO POOL FIRE Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation KW/M2 2F 2B 3D 5D 7D MS; RR – 2.22 Kg/Sec. 37.5 15 15 16 17 19 32 16 16 17 18 20 12.5 25 25 27 28 26 8 31 36 36 35 30 4.5 37 36 36 35 30 SKO; RR – 2.38 Kg/Sec. 37.5 15 15 15 16 16 32 16 16 16 17 17 12.5 26 26 28 31 33 8 31 32 34 37 38 4.5 39 40 41 43 44 HSD; RR – 2.47 Kg/Sec. 37.5 15 15 16 16 16 32 16 16 17 17 17 12.5 25 26 28 31 33 8 31 32 34 36 37 4.5 39 39 40 42 43 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 20 of 27
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Ethanol; RR – 2.51 Kg/Sec. 37.5 14 14 14 14 15 32 15 15 15 16 17 12.5 23 24 25 26 26 8 27 27 28 27 29 4.5 33 33 33 34 34 NR - Not Reached, RR – Release rate
As evident from the above table, hazard distances for a thermal radiation of 4.5 KW/M2 for 15 mm dia. Hole in MS, SKO, HSD & Ethanol lines may goes up to a max. distance of 37m, 44m, 43m & 34m respectively. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS & Ethanol line failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction and if any ignition source in found within its flammability limits, there may be UVCE. For MS & Ethanol pump discharge line 15mm dia. Hole, the overpressure distances due to explosion (UVCE) are calculated & presented in Table – 3.17. Table – 3.17 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UVCE
Sl. Wind Speed (m/sec.)/ Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS 01. 2F 73 87 123 02. 2B 70 80 106 03. 3D 60 69 96 04. 5D 49 58 81 05. 7D 48 56 78 Ethanol 01. 2F - - - 02. 2B - - - 03. 3D - - - 04. 5D - - - 05. 7D - - -
As evident from the above table that for 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage) distances may travel upto 73 meters for MS. Hence, proper care of pump discharge lines needs to be taken to avoid such type of failure cases.
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3.5.7 Gasket Failure in TLF Pump Discharge Line Pump Discharge Line Details: Material Dis. Line (mm) Dis. Rate (m3/hr) MS 200 216 SKO 200 432 HSD 250 432 Ethanol 200 530
TLF pump discharge lines sizes. Gasket failure is one of the credible failure scenarios in a plant. Failure area of 25% on the perimeter of the gaskets for these pipelines and 3 minutes release is considered for consequence estimation as it is assumed that action will be taken for stopping leakage by that time. Hazard distances for 37.5 KW/M2, 32 KW/M2, 12.5 KW/M2, 8 KW/M2 and 4.5 KW/M2 are calculated for TLF pump discharge line gasket failure and presented in Table - 3.18. Table - 3.18 HAZARD DISTANCES TO POOL FIRE
(Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) Radiation KW/M2) 2F 2B 3D 5D 7D MS; RR – 3.94 Kg/Sec. 37.5 17 16 17 18 20 32 18 17 18 20 22 12.5 28 27 30 33 34 8 35 34 37 38 37 4.5 43 42 44 44 42 SKO; RR – 4.24 Kg/Sec 37.5 18 18 18 19 19 32 19 19 19 20 20 12.5 26 26 28 31 33 8 35 35 37 41 43 4.5 44 44 47 49 50 HSD; RR – 5.46 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 20 21 21 21 22 12.5 27 27 28 30 32 8 35 35 38 42 4 4.5 45 45 48 50 51 Ethanol; RR – 4.47 Kg/Sec 37.5 18 18 18 18 19 32 19 19 19 20 21 12.5 29 29 30 32 32 8 34 34 34 35 36 4.5 41 41 42 42 42 NR - Not Reached, RR – Release rate
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It is seen that in case of failure of gaskets in TLF pump discharge lines, pool fire thermal radiation distances for 4.5 KW/M2 are 44 m, 50 m, 51m & 42 m in case of MS, SKO, HSD & Ethanol respectively. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion for MS & Ethanol line gasket failure. The vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction and if any ignition source in found within its flammability limits, there may be UVCE. However, for MS & Ethanol pump discharge line gasket rupture the overpressure distances due to explosion are calculated & presented in Table - 3.19.
Table - 3.19 HAZARD DISTANCES TO UVCE
Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS 01. 2F 87 104 150 02. 2B 94 108 145 03. 3D 83 96 130 04. 5D 71 83 114 05. 7D 61 72 101 Ethanol 01. 2F 13 16 25 02. 2B 13 17 26 03. 3D 13 17 26 04. 5D 13 17 26 05. 7D 13 17 26
In case of vapour cloud explosion for MS & Ethanol pump discharge lines, the distances to 0.3 bar extends upto a distance of 94m & 13m respectively. Hence, immediate action has to be taken to prevent any fire/explosion in case of any failure of gasket and to put out the fire in case of any emergency.
3.5.8 3 inches dia. Loading arm failure for Road Tanker Loading Unloading Hose Details: Material Hose Size (") Dis. Rate (m3/hr) MS 3 216 SKO 3 432 HSD 3 432
Failure probability of 3 inches dia. loading arm is in the order of 3x10-8 per hour of operation. Although the probability is very low, the failure scenario is taken for calculation of consequences due to failure of these loading arms for different products. The consequences calculated for 3 minutes release has been Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 23 of 27
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considered as it is assumed that action can be taken by the operators for stopping the pumps and closing the isolation valves immediately within this period. Hazard distances for fire due to snapping of loading arm for different products are presented in Table – 3.20 & 3.21.
Table – 3. 20 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO POOL FIRE
Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) for Radiation KW/M2 2F 2B 3D 5D 7D MS; RR – 18.71 Kg/Sec. 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 27 27 27 28 29 8 37 36 38 42 44 4.5 56 55 60 67 70 SKO; RR – 19.54 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 28 28 29 29 30 8 38 37 40 43 45 4.5 56 56 60 65 69 HSD; RR – 20.75 Kg/Sec 37.5 NR NR NR NR NR 32 NR NR NR NR NR 12.5 28 28 29 30 30 8 38 38 40 43 46 4.5 56 55 60 64 67 NR = Not Reached, RR – Release rate
It is evident from the above table that in case of snapping of 3 inch dia. loading arm, thermal radiation distances for pool fire of 4.5 KW/M2 are 70 m, 69 m & 67m in case of MS, SKO & HSD respectively action has to be taken to stop leakage immediately as well as for prevention of fire. Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion due to MS loading arm failure, if the evaporated vapour cloud moving in down wind direction, comes in contact with any ignition source within its flammability limits. For such scenario the result of consequence analysis are presented in the following table.
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Table – 3.21 HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION Sl. Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure of No. m/sec./Stability Class 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar MS 01. 2F 119 149 227 02. 2B 122 144 202 03. 3D 109 127 177 04. 5D 96 113 157 05. 7D 84 97 134
The above table evident that overpressure distances for heavy damage i.e. 0.3 bar may go up to a maximum distance of 122 m in case of loading arm failure. So, extreme care should be taken to avoid any such type of spillage & spilled liquid should be covered immediately with foam compound to avoid any further catastrophe.
3.6 RISKS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any undesirable event as well as likelihood of harm or damage being caused to life, property and environment. This harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/accidental release of any hazardous material from the containment. This sudden/accidental release of hazardous material can occur due to failure of component systems. It is difficult to ascertain the failure probability of any system because it will depend on the components of the system. Even if failure occurs, the probability of fire/explosion and the extent of damage will depend on many factors like: (a) Quantity and physical properties of material released. (b) Source of ignition. (c) Wind velocity, direction and atmospheric stability. (d) Presence of population, properties etc. nearby. Failure frequency of different components like pipes, valves, instruments, pressure vessels and other equipment manufactured in India are not available nor has any statutory authority tried to collect the information and form an acceptable data bank to be used under Indian condition. Failure frequency data for some components accepted in U.S.A and European Countries are given in Table - 3.22.
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Table - 3.22 FAILURE FREQUENCY DATA Sl. No. Item Failure Frequency/ 106 Years 1] Shell Failure (a) Process/pressure vessel 3 (b) Pressurised Storage Vessel 1 2] Full Bore Vessel Connection Failure (Diameter mm) < 25 ...... 30 40 ...... 10 50 ...... 7.5 80 ...... 5 100 ...... 4 >150 ……. 3 3] Full Bore Process Pipeline Failure d <50 mm ...... 0.3 * 50
* Failure frequency expressed in (/m/106 years) ** Failure frequency expressed in (/hr of operation)
3.7 RISK ASSESSMENT For the assessment of 'Individual Risk' due to the POL Terminal at Mughalsarai, following has been taken into consideration: a) The individual risk has been calculated as cumulative effect of all the scenario mentioned for selected failure case as listed in Table No. 3.7 for 2F, 2B, 3D, 5D & 7D where 2F, 2B, 3D, 5D & 7D are wind speed of 2 m/sec. & stable stability class, wind speed of 2 m/sec. & unstable stability class and wind speed of 3, 5 and 7 m/sec. & neutral stability class atmospheric conditions respectively. b) Probability of wind directions has been taken from IMD data. c) No mitigation factors such as shelters, escape etc. are considered which will result in conservative risk estimation. d) During risk assessment population data and source of ignition has been considered.
3.8 ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK Risk evaluation is done in order to assess the impact the people being exposed both inside and outside the factory premises. The values is generally presented
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in terms of chances of death per million per year. Acceptability criteria for individual fatality risk are usually judged by comparing the values obtained in the risk analysis study to the statistical risk value of other normal human activities. Risk values of some of the familiar activities are given in Table - 3.23. The acceptability levels of risk for people employed within the organization are generally higher. This is because of the fact that those employed are well aware of the risk involved and have accepted voluntarily some amount of risk while accepting the job. This voluntary risk can be compared to the risk associated with other voluntary activities like rock climbing, motor vehicles accidents smoking etc. Table - 3.23 INDIVIDUAL RISK OF SOME HUMAN ACTIVITIES Activities Chance of Death/ Million/ Year Voluntary Risk: Rock Climbing (UK) 40 Smoking (20 cigarettes/day) 5000 Accident at work (UK) 33 Playing Football (UK) 40 Involuntary Risk: Railway Accident (India) 15 Road Accident (India)- risk in urban is much 50 more Motor Vehicle Accident (UK) 106 Lighting (UK) 0.1 Meteorite strikes 0.00006 Aircraft Crash (UK) 0.02 Data source: Loss prevention in Process Industries – FP Lees
Risk of death 1 per million per year or 1x10-6 per year inside the factory premises are generally accepted without concern and this risk in often seen to be lower than voluntary and involuntary risk of death from human activities and other cases an individual is exposed to. In case of Mughalsarai POL terminal, the acceptable risk of 1x10-6 per year remains mainly confined within the factory boundary except a distance of around 47m towards the southern direction.
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4.0 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
4.1 INTRODUCTION The objective of any plant should be safe and trouble free operation as well as smooth production. This is ensured by taking precautions right from design stage i.e. design of plant, equipment/pipeline as per standard codes, ensuring selection of proper material of construction, well designed codes/rules and instruments for safe operation of the plant. Safety should be ensured afterwards by operating the plant with trained manpower. Inspite of all precautionary measures taken, accidents may happen due to human error or system malfunction. Any accident involving release of hazardous material may cause loss of human lives & property and damage to the environment. Industrial installations are vulnerable to various natural as well as man made disasters. Examples of natural disasters are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightening etc. and manmade disasters are like major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic and poisonous gases or liquids, civil war, nuclear attacks, terrorist activities etc. The damage caused by any disaster is determined by the potential for losses surrounding the event. It is impossible to predict the time and nature of disaster, which might strike on undertaking. However, an effective disaster management plan i.e. pre-planned procedure involving proper utilisation of in-house as well as outside resources helps to minimise the loss to a minimum and resume the working condition as soon as possible.
4.2 STATUTORY REQUIREMENT Disaster Management Plan is a statutory requirement for IOCL Mughalsarai terminal. The applicable regulations are: a) Factories Act, 1948 and as amended b) Manufacture, Storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified under Environment Protection Act 1986 and amended in 1994. c) Rules on Emergency Planning Preparedness and Response for Chemical Accidents, 1996. d) Stipulations of OISD-168 e) Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991.
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The Disaster Management Plan has been prepared based primarily on Schedule-11 of Manufacture, storage and Import of hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 and amended in 1994.
4.3 OBJECTIVE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN Disaster Management Plan is basically a containment, Control & mitigation Plan. The plan includes activities before disaster, during disaster and after disaster: The objective of disaster management plan is to formulate and provide organizational set up and arrange proper facilities capable of taking part and effective actions for any emergency situation in order to: a) Brief the incident under control making full use of inside and outside resources b) Protect the personnel inside the terminal as well as public outside. c) Safeguard the terminal as well as outside property and environment. d) Carry out rescue operation and treatment of casualties. e) Preserve relevant records and evidences for subsequent enquiry f) Ensure rapid return to normal operating conditions. The above objectives can be achieved by – i) Proper identification of possible hazards, evaluation of their hazard potential and identification of maximum credible hazard scenario. ii) Arrange/augment facilities for fire fighting, safety, medical (both equipment and manpower). iii) Evolving proper action plan with proper organizational set-up and communication facilities as well as warning procedure.
4.4 DEFINITIONS Disaster Disaster is a general term, which implies a hazardous situation created by an accidental release or spill of hazardous materials, which poses threat to the safety of workers, residents in the neighborhood, the environment or property. Emergency Emergency condition and Disaster Condition are synonymous.
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ON-SITE Emergency/Disaster
In an On-Site Emergency the effect of any hazard (fire/explosion/release of toxic gases) are confined within the factory premises. An accident taking place inside the terminal and its effects are confined within the boundary wall. OFF-SITE Emergency/Disaster In case of any hazard inside IOCL, Mughalsarai Terminal, the effects that are also felt outside the boundary wall.
4.5 DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY Address of the person furnishing the information IOCL Bulk Petroleum Depot- Alinagar, Mughalsarai, GT Road, Tehsil: Sakaldiha Distt - Chandauli, Uttar Pradesh Pin Code: 232101
a) Site Location M/s IOCL has acquired 32 Acres of land and the location is well connected with road and rail. NH-19 is the nearest national highway. Nearest Railway station i.e. Mughalsarai railway station is at a distance of approx. 2.5 km in western direction. The Ganges River is at a 5 Km distance from the Terminal in North direction. Nearest Hospital is Railways Loco Hospital at approx. 2 Km distance and nearest school is Kendriya Vidyalaya, Mughalsarai at 1 Km distance.
b) Population around Site There are few habitations around the terminal.
b) Activities & Facilities
A brief description the activities in Mughalsarai, terminal are:
i) Receipt of the petroleum products e.g. MS, SKO & HSD by cross- country pipeline and Ethanol through road tankers. ii) Storage of these products in storage tanks. Details are as follows:
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Storage Capacity Diameter Height Tank Products Tank No. (KL) (m) (m) Type
T001 HSD 7156 30.5 10 VCR
T002 HSD 1369 12.9 10.6 VCR
T003 HSD 2377 15.2 13 VCR T005 SKO 1574 15.2 9.1 VCR T014 MS 4213 23.9 11.3 FR T015 SKO 3778 20 12.6 VCR T016 HSD 9522 32 12.4 VCR
T017 MS 2424 15.9 13.8 FR
T018 SKO 4500 20 15 VCR
T019 HSD 9000 28 15 VCR
T020 HSD 9000 28 15 VCR
T021 MS 8350 28 15 FR T022 HSD 7515 30 20 VCR I T023 SKO 4959 18 20 VCR i T024 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG T025 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG T027 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG
T028 Ethanol 70 2.9 3.9 HUG
Ethanol-1 Ethanol 1600 16.0 11.0 IFR(A/G) (proposed)
iii) Pump House Electrical driven centrifugal pumps are there for loading/ unloading of Road tankers
Product No. of Pumps Dis. Rate (M3/Hr.) Head (m) MS 2+1 216 & 318 33 & 33.5 SKO 2+1 432 & 218 40 & 25 HSD 4+1 432 & 318 40 & 33.5
iv) Tank Lorry Filling Tank Lorries are filled in filling bays by pumping products from storage tank to filling bays. 26 Nos. of bays are provided for this purpose. The
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discharge pipeline branches are connected to tank Lorries by loading arm through a flow control valve and flow meter. The tank Lorries are properly earthed before receiving the petroleum products.
4.6 SAFETY RELATED UTILITIES i) Water Fire water requirement is as per norms of OISD-117. Water Storage Facilities: As per OISD-117 Facility available: Water Tanks (3 Nos. Cap: 10414 KL total) Source of Water: 2 Nos. of Bore wells provided inside the terminal. Fire hydrants/monitors are provided in all the vulnerable areas of the plant. Sprinkler system for water spray cooling is provided for MS storage tanks ii) Power The power requirement of the Terminal is supplied by PVVNL (Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd) and Emergency power through DG Sets (2 Nos. of 500 KVA).
4.7 DISASTER PLANNING Modern approach to disaster management plan involves a) Risk analysis Study b) Action Plan Risk analysis study involves a) Risk Identification b) Risk Evaluation
Risk identification involves i) Identification of hazardous events in the installation, which can cause loss of capital equipment, loss of production, threaten health and safety of employees, threaten public health and damage to the environment.
ii) Identification of risk, important processes & areas to determine effective risk reduction measures Risk evaluation involves calculation of damage potential of the identified hazards with damage distances (which is termed as consequence analysis) as well as estimation of frequencies of the events.
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Hazardous areas with different hazard scenarios and their damage potential with respect to fire & explosion have already been mentioned in the chapter on Risk Analysis. However, failure rate of different hazard scenarios has been discussed broadly based on data available for similar incidents outside India. Probability of any hazardous incident and the consequent damage also depends on –
a) Wind speed b) Wind direction c) Atmospheric stability d) Source of ignition and e) Presence of plant assets & population exposed in the direction of wind.
Action plan depends largely on results of risk analysis data and may include one or more of the following:
a) Plan for preventive as well as predictive maintenance. b) Augment facilities for safety, fire fighting, medical (both equipment and manpower) as per requirements of risk analysis. c) Evolve emergency handling procedure both on-site and off-site. d) Practice mock drill for ascertaining preparedness for tackling hazards/emergencies at any time- day or night.
4.8 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS 4.8.1 General Nature of Hazard In Mughalsarai terminal, petroleum products which are handled are highly inflammable and also have explosive properties. Any small fire in the installation, if not extinguished at early stage can cause large scale damage and may have cascading effect. Hence the terminal requires: a) A quick responsive containment and control system requiring well planned safety and fire fighting system. b) Well organized trained manpower to handle the process equipment & systems safely. c) Well trained personnel to handle safety and fire fighting equipment to extinguish fire inside the installation promptly as well as tackle any type of emergency. d) Well planned Disaster Management Plan. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 6 of 32
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4.8.2 Hazards Areas of the Plant The plant activities handling petroleum products can be subdivided into the following:
Activities Place a) Receipt of petroleum products i) Pipelines & Road Tanker Unloading Point b) Petroleum products storage ii) Tank Farm Area c) Petroleum products pumping iii) Pump House d) Dispatch of petroleum products iv) Road Tanker Loading Bay e) Laboratory Work v) Laboratory
4.8.3 Hazard Scenarios and effects. This has been discussed in detail in the Chapter of Risk Analysis. However, a brief outline is given in the following table:
Sl. Likely Credible/ Failure Scenarios No. Consequences Non Credible 1] Unloading hose failure for Pool Fire & UVCE Credible Tank Lorry Decantation (TLD) 2] Storage Tanks on Fire - do - Partially Credible 3] Vessel connection failure for - do - Partially Credible tank outlet lines 4] Pump Mechanical Seal Failure - do - Partially Credible 5] TLF Pump Discharge Line - do - Non Credible Rupture 6] 15 mm dia. hole in TLF Pump - do - Credible Discharge Line 7] Gasket Failure in TLF Pump - do - Credible Discharge Line 8] 3 inches dia. Loading arm failure for Road Tanker - do - Partially Credible Loading
All the scenarios are having damage potential to a different degree. However, maximum damage can happen due to storage tank vessel connection failure or in case of tank fire.
In all the above cases fire/explosion can occur due to ignition of the vapour of petroleum products coming out from the containment. The sources of ignitions may be (i) Hot work in the vicinity, (ii) Smoking, (iii) Lightning, (iv) Generation of static electricity, (v) Radiant heat from outside, (v) Deliberate ignition or sabotage, (vi) By the ignition of dry grass in the dyke area.
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4.9 SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS PROVIDED IN THE TERMINAL 4.9.1 Mughalsarai terminal has been provided with safety related measures right from the design stage, which can minimize any shorts of accident e.g. a) Use of proper material of construction for equipment and piping b) Storage tanks provided inside a dyke wall with sufficient height. c) MS & Ethanol (proposed) tanks constructions are of internal floating roof type with provision for foam injection. The tanks are provided with water spray sprinklers for cooling in case of fire in the vicinity. d) SKO & HSD tanks are of above ground cone roof and Ethanol tanks (existing) are of underground type. Vents on the cone roof tanks are provided with flame arrestors to avoid fire in case of lightning. e) All electrical items have been carefully selected and are either flame proof/ intrinsic safety type in licensed area. f) Proper earthing of all storage tanks, pipelines, structures and trucks for filling/despatch of petroleum products. g) Loading Arms are provided for filling Tank Lorries whose failure rate is much lower than loading hoses. h) Provision of oil separation in Oil interceptors to avoid any oily water going out of the terminal and spoiling ground water. i) Arrangement of fire hydrants, monitors and hose boxes have been kept in all the hazardous areas and fire water storage tanks. j) Use of flow control devices and meters for tank truck filling to ensure that each compartment in the tank truck is filled to the desired level. k) Provision of portable fire extinguishers at vulnerable places to extinguish fire. l) The plant is properly guarded by a boundary wall of sufficient height. m) Licensed area is properly guarded for any unauthorized entry of personnel. n) All areas in the terminal are properly illuminated through lighting. Requisite numbers of High Mast Towers have been proposed around the terminal for better illumination. o) Emergency Diesel Generator Sets are provided to ensure operation and illumination during power failure. p) Emergency shutdown switch is provided to stop all operations. q) Remote Operated Motorized Valves are provided at inlet & outlet lines of above ground storage tanks for MS, SKO, HSD & Ethanol (proposed)
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4.9.2 Other Safety Measures Some of the preventive & pre-emptive measures which are to be taken during operational phase are as follows: a) Safety measures Following safety tips should always be borne in mind while working in the plant to avoid emergency & hazardous situation. i) Follow specified procedures and instructions for start-up, shut down and any maintenance work. ii) Follow permit to work system. iii) Identify correctly the part of the plant in which work is to be done. iv) Isolate the part or machine properly on which work is to be done. v) Release pressure from the part of the plant on which work is to be done. vi) Remove flammable liquid/gases thoroughly, on which work is to be done. vii) Use non-sparking tools. b) Plant Inspection Apart from planned inspection, checks and tests should be carried out to reduce failure probability of containments. i) Storage vessels and pipeline should be checked regularly during both their construction and operational phase. ii) Critical trips, interlocks & other instruments should be checked regularly to avoid fail danger situation. iii) Fire fighting system should be checked regularly to ensure proper functioning during emergency situation. iv) Proper lightning protection system should be provided and checked regularly to avoid lightning effect. c) Performance or Condition Monitoring A systematic monitoring of performance or condition should be carried out especially for large machines and equipment, which may be responsible for serious accidents/disaster in case the defined limits are crossed. i) Vibration, speed & torque measurements for pumps, DG sets etc. ii) Thickness and other flaw measurements in metals of storage vessels, Inlet & Outlet lines from storage vessels etc.
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Many types of non-destructive testing/condition monitoring techniques are available. X-ray radiography, acoustic emission testing, magnetic particle testing, eddy current inspection techniques etc. are used for detection of flaws & progression of cracks in metals. Testing equipments are also there for checking vibration, speed, torque etc. The above condition monitoring techniques should be applied regularly by internal/ external agencies. Immediate corrective measures should be taken if any flaws are detected.
d) Preventive Maintenance A schedule for preventive maintenance for moving machineries should be prepared based on experience in other similar plants as well as instruction of the suppliers. The schedule should be followed strictly during operation as well as planned shutdown period.
e) Entry of Personnel Entry of unauthorized personnel is strictly prohibited inside the premises. The persons entering the plant should not carry matches, lighters, mobile phone etc.
f) Hot work Hot work should not be permitted except in-designated areas with utmost precaution and proper work permit.
4.9.3 Details of Fire Fighting Facilities Modern fire fighting facilities are provided in the terminal & are in line with norms of OISD.
i] Fire Hydrant System The entire area is provided with a looped fire hydrant pipeline connected to fire engines on auto system and always kept under pressure to meet emergencies. Three numbers of fire water storage tanks are provided. The source of water is two nos. of borewells provided inside the terminal. The fire hydrant line is equipped with required numbers of single/double headed hydrant valves, monitors and hoses. The system can also be connected to foam making branches for generating foam for extinguishing the fire.
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ii] Sprinkler System Water sprinkler system with spray nozzles are provided for MS storage tanks for cooling the tanks if required. Proposed Ethanol tank (A/G) will also be provided with water sprinkler. iii] Fire Fighting Equipments Following firefighting equipment are provided in the plant as per OISD-117: Detail of firefighting equipment Location Quantity 10 Kg DCP Fire Extinguisher 119 25 Kg DCP Fire Extinguisher 22 75 Kg DCP Fire Extinguisher 6 CO2 fire extinguisher (2 Admin building, PMCC , 30/9/1 kg/4.5kg/6.5kg) Battery room WCFM (Water Cum Foam 32 Monitor) Water Monitor Hydrant line at 30 M 17 distance Portable foam monitor 4 Fixed type HVLR (High Volume TFA (Near TK-14,TK- 7 Long Range Monitor) 17,TK21,TK-02,TK-19) Portable HVLR (High Volume 2 Long Range Monitor) TLF Gantry Fixed type MEFG (Medium 4 Expansion Foam Generator) Portable MEFG (Medium 3 Expansion Foam Generator) Foam Pourer System (Installed in Each Tank CR & FR TANK) except SKO TK- 23 Water Sprinkler System Each Tank except SKO TK- 23 Fire Water Pump (Capacity: 616 Main=4, Stand m3/hr, Head: 105M) by: 2 Jockey Pump (Capacity- 74 Main-1, KL/.Hr) Standby-1
RSFPS (Rim Seal Fire Protection FR Tank-14, TK-17,TK- 3 System) 21 Leak Control Kit Near TK-02 1 Non Sparking tools TFA & Admin Building 2 Fireman Axe Emergency Kit trolley, 1 Behind TLF Gantry Mechanical Tool Kit Mechanical Store 1 Flame proof Mega phone (Public 1 Announcement system) LIC room SCABA (Self Contained Breathing Emergency Kit trolley, 2 Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 11 of 32
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Apparatus) Behind TLF Gantry Emergency Kit trolley, 2 PVC Suit Behind TLF Gantry AFFF (Aqueous Film Forming TFA, Store near PPE 22 KL Foam) room ATC Foam Near Ethanol Tank and 1 KL store near PPE room Hydrant Point Hydrant line at 30 M 47 distance Hose Box (with 2 nos. fire hose & 23 1 jet nozzle) In b/w two hydrant point Fire Water Storage 3 tanks in south side of 10414 KL terminal ESD (Emergency Shut Down ) TFA-03,Product Pump House-01, TLF Gantry- 9 03,Security Gate-01 Smoke Detector Control Room 15 MCP (Manual Call Point) Control Room, Near DG 10 and entrance gate TFA (Tank Farm Area), Hand Operated Siren Lab & Product Pump 7 House Explosive Meter Emergency Kit trolley, 2 Behind TLF Gantry Fire Proximity Suit Emergency Kit trolley, 2 Behind TLF Gantry Resuscitators Emergency Kit trolley, 1 Behind TLF Gantry Electric Siren 3 KM Range Entry gate of terminal 1 Electric Siren 1 KM Range Entry gate of terminal 0 Jet Nozzles Each hose box & PPE 36 room Fog Nozzles PPE Room 5 Universal Nozzles First Aid Trolley and 8 PPE room Foam Branch Pipe 3% Emergency Kit trolley, 6 Behind TLF Gantry Water Curtain Nozzles Emergency Kit trolley, 2 Behind TLF Gantry Foam Branch Pipe 6% Emergency Kit trolley, 2 Behind TLF Gantry Tube Well Near water tank and 3 (Flow Rate: 9 product pump house LPS) Flame proof search light for In emergency trolley 1 emergency trolley near Tank-2 Water jel blanket In emergency trolley 1 near Tank-2 15 minutes escape SCABA set In emergency trolley 1 near Tank-2
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Control Room, First Aid Box Laboratory, TLF, 4 Security cabin Stretcher In emergency trolley 2 near Tank-2, Laboratory
iv] Personal Protective Equipments (PPEs): Following PPEs have been provided in Sufficient Numbers: Sr.No. Details of PPEs Location Quantity RESPIRATORY PPE 1 SCABA PPE Room-2 Nos., 3 Emergency Kit Trolley-1 Nos. 2 15 Mins. Escape Emergency Kit Trolley 2 Breathing Apparatus 3 Manual Resuscitator Emergency Kit Trolley 1 NON- RESPIRATORY PPE 1 Helmet PPE Room - 22, Issued To 60 The Employees-38 2 Safety Shoes Admin Building For Visitors 6 Pairs 3 Gum Boots PPE Room 2 Chemical Splash Proof Security Room, TLF & PPE 60 4 Goggles Room 5 PVC Suit Emergency Kit Trolley 2 6 Fire Proximity Suit Emergency Kit Trolley 1 7 Leather Hand Gloves PPE Room 2 Pairs 8 Nitrile Rubber Hand Control Room 2 Pairs Gloves 9 Electrical Rubber Hand PMCC and Electrical Panel 4 Pairs Gloves Room 10 Cotton Doted Hand PPE Room 80 Gloves 11 Mouth Mast PPE Room 120 12 Full Body Safety Harness TLF- 40, PPE Room - 2 42 With Retractable Fall Arrestor 13 Ear Muff PPE Room 21 14 Gel Blanket Emergency Kit Trolley 2 15 Safety Net PPE Room 1
4.9.4 Emergency Control Centre & Shelter Room The emergency control centre is situated in the office building. The office room of Terminal In-charge is designated as Emergency Control Centre. P&T telephones, Alarms, Emergency Control Manual & Safety and Personal Protective Appliances are to be arranged in sufficient numbers and kept in the room.
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Emergency Shelter The room has been proposed outside the licensed area for giving shelter to employees/ other personnel who are not involved in emergency control actions.
4.9.5 Alarm and Communication System A] Alarm System i] Electrical Sirens and Hand Sirens are provided in office building/Emergency Control Room for warning the public as well as employees inside. ii] The sound of electrical siren shall be audible upto 3 KMs. iii] For fire condition electrical siren will be wailing for minimum 2 minutes and for all clear signals it will be a straight run siren for 2 minutes. iv] For disaster condition the wailing sound shall be repeated with a minimum 10 seconds gap. B] Communication System For communication with officers/ employees, Motorola Walki-Talki, Inter Come System & BSNL Landlines facilities are provided. 4.9.6 Mutual Aid It is not possible to combat large scale fire/disaster single handed effectively by any organization. Assistance of resources of fire fighting and other services are of utmost importance during the hour of crisis. Following type of mutual aids are envisaged: i] Assistance by fire fighting teams & equipment. ii] Medical and first aid assistance. iii] Assistance of vehicles for any emergency requirement. iv] Help in liaisoning with police, District Collectorate, Fire Brigade and Hospitals. Mutual aid agreement should be done with nearby industries & facilities available in the area. Here it has been done between HPCL (300m from site), BPCL (600m from site) & IOCL’s BKPL Station (65m from site)
4.10 DISASTER CONTROL PLAN The plan include three major plans – i] Equipment Plan ii] Organization Plan iii] Action Plan
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4.10.1 Equipment Planning Equipment plan i.e. arrangement of fire fighting, safety, transport etc. has been discussed earlier.
4.10.2 Organization Plan The disaster management organization and action plan is made in such a way that it is capable of quick response at any time to meet emergency situation. The plan gives a detailed chain of command, area of responsibility of each personnel involved, information flow pattern and coordination activity required to meet the emergency. A typical Disaster Management Organization Chart is shown:
Organization Chart of Mughalsarai POL Terminal For On-Site Disaster Control Plan
Affected Stake Medical holders and Services and Government Authorities On-site incident Ambulance Controller (District magistrate/Dist of Authority) Municipal transport rescue Fire Brigade and Services rehabilitation team
Police Services CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER Mutual Aid
SITE INCIDENT CONTROLLER
Operation Team, Support Administration and Fire Safety and Fire Team/ Technical team, etc. Services* Communication Coordinator HSE Coordinator
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On-Site Disaster Management Organization Chart- Mughalsarai Terminal As Per OISD GDN-168
MAIN FIRE IN-CHARGE
FIRE COMBAT TEAM AUXILIARY TEAM SAFETY TEAM SECURITY
KEY PERSONNEL CHART The senior most officer in the POL Terminal is Terminal manager, who will be the Chief Emergency Controller. In pre Emergency period he will delegate responsibility to other officers as other Coordinators as per suitability and the job to be done by them. During emergency, if Terminal manager is not present at site, the next senior most officer in the Terminal will assume the responsibility of Chief Emergency Controller and inform him to be present at site at shortest possible time. The duties and responsibilities of Chief Controller and other Coordinator are as follows:
DUTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY PERSONS & COORDINATORS Chief Emergency Controller For On-Site Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP), the Location-in-Charge (Terminal Manager) shall be the Chief Emergency Controller to coordinate the execution of the plan during an emergency or a mock drill. He is responsible for preparation/ updating of the plan, getting approval from the District authorities/ Factory Inspectorate; and its implementation in the hour of need. His duties are - a) Assess the magnitude of the situation and declare state of emergency. Activate EPP and ensure its implementation. b) Mobilize the Coordinators/ Key Personnel and exercise direct operational control of areas, other than those affected. c) Declare danger zones and activate Emergency Control Centre. d) Ensure calling in Mutual aid members and District emergency agencies like Fire Brigade, Police, and Medical authorities. e) Maintain a speculative continuous review of possible developments and assess these to determine most probable course of events and appropriate response.
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f) Inform Area Office, Head Quarters, Police, Statutory authorities, District authorities about the magnitude of the emergency casualties and rescue operations. g) Ensure casualties are receiving required attention and their relatives are informed. h) Ensure accounting of personnel. i) Issue authorized statements to Press, Radio, TV etc., regarding the emergency and its possible impact on the surroundings. j) Authorize procurement of emergency material. k) Log important developments in chronological order and preserve material evidence for investigation. Direct isolation of power supply, plant shutdown, and evacuation of personnel inside the premises as deemed necessary. l) Advise Police, District authorities regarding evacuation of public in the near vicinity/vulnerable zone. Ensure raising the siren in EMERGENCY mode till All Clear Signal. m) When effects are likely to be felt outside, get in touch with District Authorities, who will take over the management and declare "Off-Site Emergency". n) Control rehabilitation of affected areas on cessation of emergency.
Administration & Communication Coordinator a) Liaise with Chief and other coordinators. b) Inform and coordinate with External agencies and Mutual aid members for agreed assistance. Direct them on arrival to the respective coordinators. c) In case communication means fail, send messengers to Mutual aid members/ Emergency departments. Coordinate with Police in controlling the traffic and mob outside the premises. d) Activate the medical centre and mobilize medical team. Arrange ambulance and transfer casualties to hospitals. Also coordinate with police in case of fatalities. e) Arrange for head count at the assembly points. f) Arrange procurement of spares for fire fighting and additional medical drugs/ appliances. g) Mobilize Transport as and when required by various coordinators. Arrange to provide spark arrestors to emergency vehicles entering the premises.
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Disaster Management Plan
h) Monitor entry/exit of personnel in the premises. Permit only authorized personnel/ vehicles inside the premises. i) Control and disperse crowd from the emergency site. Regulate traffic inside the location. j) Arrange food, beverages and drinking water for all those involved in execution of EPP in case the emergency prolongs. k) Communicate with relatives of casualties. l) Arrange evacuation of premises as directed by Chief Emergency controller. Coordinate with civil authorities for evacuating public from the danger zone and arrange for refreshments at the evacuation center.
Safety Coordinator a) Ensure safe stoppage of the Operations, switching off main instruments, shut off valves on product lines, and isolation of affected area. b) Demarcate Danger and Safe zones by putting RED and GREEN flags. c) Mobilize the Fire fighting crew and direct the Fire Fighting operation. d) Effectively deploy manpower, both internal and external. e) Direct & utilize the Fire Brigade personnel. f) Arrange the replacement of various Fire Fighting Squads with the Mutual and External aid members on need basis. g) Ensure/maintain sufficient pressure in the Hydrant mains. h) Assess water level in the storage tank/reservoir and plan replenishment. i) Monitor the requirements of Fire equipment and coordinate for procurement of spares. j) Arrange for flood lighting of the affected areas and dewatering of the Fire fighting area, if required. k) Arrange to remove and park the tank Lorries (Bulk & Packed) to a safer place, as necessary.
In case of any leakage of petroleum products or fire, anybody witnessing the same should take immediate necessary action to stop leakage and extinguish fire with the help of fire extinguishers as well as inform Terminal manager through VHF or through messenger or by simply shouting at the top of his/her voice. In case of any fire or explosion Terminal In-charge takes charge of the situation and controls it with a well organized plan.
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If any accident occurs, e.g. fire during night, shift/security personnel shall attend it and in case of emergency Terminal In-charge and others shall be informed/ called from their residence.
4.10.3 Action Plan This gives guidelines to PREVENT, CONTROL & TERMINATE an EMERGENCY, consists of three parts. a) Pre-emergency action b) Action during emergency c) Post emergency actions
a) Pre-Emergency Actions These are essentially PRE-EMPTIVE and PREVENTIVE measures and are extremely important. They include mock drills, checking of fire fighting facilities, keeping personal protective equipments in good condition in proper places, medical equipments, scheduled checking of safety devices, safety audits, preventive maintenance, good housekeeping, training of employees, education to the public and liaison with outside industries, State Fire Services, Police, district administration, hospitals, nursing homes etc.
Public Awareness In case of major accidents like large fire, explosion, effect of which may spread outside the plant boundary, people of the adjoining areas may be panicky due to ignorance and may aggravate the problems. To avoid panic, the Terminal management will make easily understandable pamphlets in local language about the properties of petroleum products and actions to be taken by them during an Off-site Emergency. Training and education will also be imparted to the local public by audio-visual system with the help of local authorities. This will be done through Local Crisis Group consisting of District Administration.
Mock Drills This is periodic simulation of emergency condition, sometimes in consultation with District Crisis Group/Local Crisis Group. The sequence of operation undertaken by Disaster Management Team members and systems provided like alarm & communication system, information flow pattern etc. are carefully put into operation by competent officials and the deficiencies/ problems are recorded. Based on this observation appropriate actions are taken to improve the efficiency of the plan. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 19 of 32
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Training of Employees Regular training must be conducted to educate the employees about safety, fire fighting and Disaster Management. A selected numbers to be given intensive training in first aid, evacuation and rescue operation so that they can be utilized as a part of Disaster Control Team.
Liaison with Police, District Administration & State Fire Services & Neighbouring Industries Help of Police and District Authorities are essential for off-site Emergency such as evacuation, transportation and treatment of individuals etc. In case of On-Site Emergency help of Police, District Administration, local hospitals and also fire services at Gwalior district headquarter may be required depending on the severity of the situation.
PRE-EMERGENCY functions of Chief Emergency Controller are mainly i) Ensure implementation of Emergency Planning ii) Ensure that all drafted for emergency are undergoing regular training. iii) Ensure all disciplines are fully prepared for tackling emergency. iv) Ensure that simulation of emergency condition is regularly arranged. v) Ensure preventive and pre-emptive measures. vi) Keep liaison with outside agencies, police, district authorities, hospitals, nursing homes etc.
Pre-Emergency functions of other Emergency Controller and their team are i) Keep all the team members ready for tackling emergency. ii) Ensure that all members understand their specific duties during emergency. iii) Ensure regular participation of their team in mock drills. iv) Ensure supply of adequate number of safety & fire fighting equipment in proper place and in good working condition.
b) Actions during Emergency Actions to be taken by Chief Emergency Controller and other Incident Controllers have been discussed in the Organization Plan. In short the actions are: i) Declare Emergency by electrical siren. ii) Instruct total/partial shutdown. iii) Arrange the team for tackling emergency. iv) Ask for outside help, if necessary.
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Disaster Management Plan
v) Keep liaison with outside agencies and provide authoritative information to news media and others.
c) Post Emergency Actions These are directed towards termination of emergency, restoration of normalcy and rehabilitation. It also includes identification of victims, information to their next of kin, notification to various government authorities, appointment of enquiry committee for identification of causes and suggestions to ensure that similar accident does not occur in future.
4.11 DISASTER COMBATING ACTION PLAN WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE TEAM
As number of officers and staff within plant are not too much, Terminal Manager has to prepare the plan with available officers & staff members only.
A] DURING GENERAL SHIFT ON WORKING DAYS (Chief Emergency Controller) : Terminal Manager (I/C) Mughalsarai Terminal
ROLE 1] Take overall charge of the situation. 2] Rush to the spot where fire/explosion has occurred. Issue instructions for speedy combating of the incident and prevention of damage to other areas. 3] Stop all operations locally/ shut down complete plant. 4] Declare emergency and operate electrical siren to inform employees, authorities and public. 5] Inform nearby factory authorities over phone and ask for assistance. 6] Inform local Fire Brigade. 7] Inform higher authorities and seek assistance for coordination of civil authorities, Fire Tenders from State/other agencies. 8] Inform Chief Inspectorate of Factories & Boilers, Mughalsarai.
B] FIRE COMBATING TEAM
In-charge : HSE Coordinator Assisted By : i] Operation Officer (Fire) ii] Operator, TLF iii] Security Supervisor & Guards on duty.
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Disaster Management Plan
Iv] Fire & Safety Team ROLE On hearing Fire Alarm –
1] Rush to the disaster spot and organize the team for combating fire as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. 2] Security supervisor to ensure starting of Fire Engine and pressurization of fire hydrant. 3] Pump House Operator to stop all pumps and close all valves of the pumps as well as tank body valves and join the team. 4] Operator of TLF section to stop loading/ unloading operations, remove loading arm and unloading hose properly and join the combating team as per directions of Terminal Manager. Section In-Charge TLF to ensure the above and act for combating emergency as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller.
C] EMERGENCY RESCUE TEAM In-charge : Operation In-charge Assisted By : Security Guards on duty
ROLE On hearing the Fire Alarm –
1] In-charge to organize the team with office staff and other members as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller. If needed the In-charge should seek assistance of outside agencies. 2] Remove the injured from the spot after taking proper safety and personal protective appliances. 3] Arrange for First Aid of the injured and hospitalization, if necessary as per instruction of Chief Emergency Controller.
D] EMERGENCY TEAM (TRANSPORT & SECURITY) In-charge : Administration & Communication Coordinator. Assisted By : Security Supervisor & Guards on duty
ROLE 1] Stop entry of all unauthorized personnel. 2] Arrange transport for taking the injured personnel for hospital.
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3] Seek assistance for vehicles/ambulance from outside agencies & hospitals nearby as per direction of Chief Emergency Controller.
E] FIRE DURING NIGHT TIME AND ON HOLIDAYS In-charge : Terminal Manager Assisted by : Security supervisor on duty, Security guards on duty & Sr. Supervisor on duty ROLE 1] Security Guard on duty seeing the fire, will shout Fire Fire and shall need assistance from other guards on duty in different pockets and shall fight the fire with nearest available fire fighting equipments. 2] Immediately telephone to Mughalsarai Fire Brigade and Police Station for assistance. 3] Subsequently, Security Supervisor on duty will telephone to the residence of Terminal Manager and Sr. Supervisor. 4] The Security Guards to control the gates and ensure that no unauthorized person enter the premises.
4.12 ROLE ORDERS FOR DISASTER COMBATING ACTION PLAN i] General Instructions (a) The In-charge of the section/sections (TLF)/ Administrative Office etc. affected shall ensure to take immediate action to isolate, close valves and mobilize enough equipment from nearby places. (b) In-charge of stores shall keep the list of equipment available at various locations and coordinate with auxiliary team in-charge who mobilizes the materials. (c) Safety Coordinator shall ensure replenishment of water to fire water tanks from bore-well and nearby other sources. (d) After actions, Stores-in-charge to take inventory of all fire fighting items and to indent the shortfalls. (e) All those moving towards scene of incident shall move with firefighting equipment available.
ii] Pump House Role Orders – (a) Operator (Pump House) to stop all pumps. (b) Close all valves including those of main tanks.
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Disaster Management Plan
(c) Report combating team In-charge.
iii] Administrative Block Role Orders – (a) Section officers to ensure stop all loading operations. (b) All T/Ts go out of TLF bays in orderly manner after closing T/T valves and manhole covers. All tank lorries should also go out after closing valves and dome covers. (c) Closing of all valves at TLF manifold. (d) Duty officer to report to Fire Combating Team. (e) Others to report to Safety Coordinator with available firefighting equipment. iv] Generator Room Role Orders – (a) Operator to remain in Generator House for instructions from Chief Emergency Controller. (b) To switch off unwanted electrical connections as instructed by Chief Emergency Controller. v] Stores Role Orders – (a) In-charge to keep ready all fire fighting/ first-aid/ personal protective materials and arrange speedy disbursement to the combating crews. (b) To issue materials as per demand. (c) To liaise among in-charges. (d) To make proper inventory of all items and shortfall to be identified as early as possible.
vi] Security Guards on Duty Role Orders – (a) To control the gate by allowing contract labourers to go out, ordering, moving out of vehicles as instructed by Chief Emergency Controller with valid document. (b) To prevent unauthorized entry of outsiders. (c) Security Guard posted at the main entrance gate to ensure proper control of traffic so that approach road is not blocked. Other security
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Disaster Management Plan
guards posted other than the gates, to report to their in-charge for further instruction.
4.13 ACTION PLAN FOR SPECIFIC CASES (A) FIRE/EXPLOSION IN TLF SHED Facilities: 26 nos. (Existing) of Filling Bays with multi-product filling points. Products handled: MS, SKO, HSD and Ethanol Structure: Entire TLF structure is of elevated iron structures with proper roof, iron platforms and iron ladders. HAZARD MINIMISER (a) TLF in-charge with his officers and staff (b) Fire Extinguishers (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Jel Blankets (g) Alarm (h) COMBATING AS PER DISASTER ORGANISATION CHART
SPECIAL REFERENCES (a) Fire in filling shed should be attacked promptly with fire extinguishers. (b) Close all valves promptly. (c) Ensure orderly removal of TTs. (d) Stop spreading over of fire and call for help. (e) Put sand on small oil spills of fire to put off the fire by preventing
source of O2. (f) Apply foam on burning oil on the floor. Apply foam gently so as not to scatter the burning oil and spread the fire. Apply foam from one side of the fire and with the foam blanket from that side across the oil pool. Remember that water destroys foam and water streams must not be turn on fire which is blanketed with foam. (g) Apply water cooling to neighbouring T/Ts. (h) Remove records/ documents to safe places.
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Disaster Management Plan
(i) When oil is burning under the truck and tank is not leaking, remove the vehicle away from fire, if possible or cover the oil with sand. Use water to cool the vehicle & the container. (j) Use foam or sand to fight fire around engine, raise the hood direct the stream of fluid at the base of fire. (k) Use water or foam to fight fire in the cabin. (l) Use water to fight fire on the tyres. (m) Whenever the leak is seen in the bottom of tank, try to fill water into the tank & container so that oil level will be above the leak. (n) In case of dome fire, close the dome cover immediately.
(B) FIRE IN TLF PUMP HOUSE Facilities: Electric power driven pumps.
HAZARD MINIMISER (a) Staff members assigned to the pump house (b) Fire Extinguishers (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Jel Blankets (g) Main Switches in the Switch Room (h) Alarm (i) Fire Resistant Asbestos Suit
ACTION PLAN AS PER DISASTER ORGANISATION CHART Special References –
(a) Discharge DCP to prevent fire from spreading. (b) Shut down the pumps by cutting off power supply. (c) Remove any person who is working in the manifold. (d) Close all tank lorry filling valves and manifold valves. (e) Put foam on burning oil spills. (f) Do not splash burning oil.
(g) Use DCP or CO2 fire extinguisher on electrical fire. (h) Cool the manifold with water. (i) Wet down the structure close to the fire with water. Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 26 of 32
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(j) When burning oil is running from the pump house or out of a broken connection in the manifold, check the flow or direct it to the points where it will not endanger structures and the surrounding properties.
(C) FIRE AT SMALL LEAK IN PIPELINE 1] Fire at a small leak in pipeline must be attacked promptly with the nearest fire extinguishers. 2] Shut off the flow of oil in the line by closing valves and by stopping pumping. 3] Cover the oil pool with sand and build up the sand so as to cover the leak or Put foam on the burning oil pool. 4] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil. 5] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the same in containers. 6] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool.
(D) BURSTING OF GASKET/LEAKAGE THROUGH JOINTS 1] Stop pumping. 2] Stop flow of oil through drain. Keep oil within limited area. 3] Close line valves. 4] Dig pits to collect oil. 5] Build earth dykes around the oil pool to prevent spreading of burning oil. 6] Take care of the oil dropping from the leak even after extinguishing fire as fire may occur again due to heating of oil dropped. Try to collect the oil in containers. 7] Wet down the adjacent structures to keep them cool. 8] Take action for replacement of gasket/repair leak with due care.
(E) FIRE IN ELECTRIC SUB-STATION/TRANSFORMER ROOM/ SWITCH ROOM Facilities: HT Switch, FUSE UNIT GENSETS, PANEL, SWITCH ROOM, CONNECTION CABLES
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HAZARD MINIMISERS (a) Generator operators and other employees (b) Fire extinguishers (c) Sand buckets (d) Main switches (e) Alarm (f) Earthing
ACTION PLAN AS PER DISASTER ORGANISATION CHART Special Reference – (a) Cut off power supply by switching off the mains
(b) Apply DCP/CO2 extinguisher or dry sand. (c) Call for outside help if required. (d) Do not allow anybody to touch any electrical appliances. (e) Take action to prevent spreading of fire. (f) If fire is not extinguished, extinguish by spreading water with fog nozzle only after ensuring complete isolation of electrical supply.
(F) FIRE IN TANK FARM Facilities: Storage Tanks: MS, SKO, HSD & Ethanol HAZARD MINIMISER (a) All employees particularly the employees of loading/receipt section (b) Fire Extinguishers (c) Fire Hydrant Points (d) Foam (e) Water Jet (f) Water Sprinklers (g) Asbestos Suit (h) Alarm DISASTER COMBATING PLAN: As per Disaster Organization Chart Special Reference –
(a) A fire burning at the vent will not normally flash back into tank and explode if the tank contains product since flame arrestors are provided. (b) Start cooling of tanks by using water sprinklers provided on tanks as well by wet jets.
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(c) Close all valves since any removal of product will result in air being sucked inside, with the resultant flash back and explosion. (d) Close manhole covers of other tanks if they are open. Also stop loading/receipt of oil in tank. (e) Use foam to extinguish fire. Small fire can be handled with portable fire extinguishers. (f) Call for help from outside agencies before fire is aggravated with the instruction of Chief Emergency Controller.
(G) FIRE IN TANK (a) Fire in tank will normally burn quietly till the oxygen inside is consumed unless temperature of the product is allowed to increase uncontrolled. Hence, care must be taken to ensure that product temperature does not go high by cooling with water sprinklers and jets. This also avoids possibility of tank rupture due to hydrostatic Pressure. (b) Care should be taken to ensure that the fire does not spread to other areas. If there is product spill to outside, foam should be used to cover the same. (c) In case of fire inside tank, foam should be pumped inside the tank for blanketing the fire simultaneously taking action to cool the tank shell with water and also removing the product by pumping it out to some other tank. (d) Uncontrolled use of water on the burning product will result in product spill over and spread of fire. In the case of heavy ends this will result in boil over and frothing at the surface. (e) When heavy ends like HSD burn, a layer of hot oil is formed below the surface, which extends towards the bottom. Temperature of this layer is of the order of 250oC to 300oC much above the boiling point of water. When water turns into steam, it expands approx. 1600 times and this results in boil over. The boil over may overflow the tank resulting in spreading of fire. Hence, in such fires, cool down the tank by water sprinkler and also by continuous water jet on the tank shell, transfer the product to other tanks and judiciously use foam to smoothen fire.
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Disaster Management Plan
(f) In case of F/R tanks, fires normally occur at F/R seals. Efforts should be made to put foam in the correct place simultaneously cooling the tank shell from outside. (g) Do not waste foam by using it for cooling. (h) Usage of water also should be in a controlled manner so that maximum benefit can be obtained.
(H) FIRE IN LABORATORY (a) In case of small fires from the chemicals present in laboratory, portable fire extinguishers can be used for fire fighting. (b) If the fire aggravates, Foam monitors should be used.
(I) NATURAL CALAMITIES (i) Heavy Rain All structures/buildings in the Terminal have been designed to withstand heavy rain and hence not much of damage is anticipated. Action Plan (a) Switch of all industrial electrical connections. (b) Ensure immediate closing of oil/water separator outlet (conventional) if any tank collapse happens. (c) Inform Chief Emergency Controller. (d) Keep constant touch with local authorities - District Magistrate, Chandauli and Police authorities. (e) Stop all operations and do not resume it till clearance is given by Chief Emergency Controller. (f) Bring all vehicles to a halt and ensure that hand brake is applied. (g) Evacuate persons from damaged buildings/structures. (h) Avoid going on top of high structures/storage tanks. (i) After the cyclone has struck, assess the situation and take necessary action as per the direction of Chief Emergency Controller.
(ii) Lightning In the event of lightning strike, any of the following or all emergencies may occur: (a) Fire in the tanks
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Action Plan: Already described under the topic of tank fire.
(iii) Earthquakes All buildings/equipment are designed to withstand earthquakes and therefore, major disaster is not expected. However in case of an earthquake of much heavier scale may lead to – (a) Fall of structures/buildings (b) Subsequent fire/explosion (c) Release of petroleum products Action Plan: Already described under the topic of fire at various locations.
(J) RIOTS / SABOTAGE / WAR Action Plan (a) Close all gates. (b) Maintain tight security. (c) Chief Emergency Controller to keep contact with local authorities. (d) Keep round the clock patrolling. (e) Alert all employees of disaster control action plan and activate in case of requirement.
(K) SECURITY THREAT/ BOMB THREAT Telephone Threat When a bomb threat is received by telephone, the person receiving the call is to attempt can get as much information possible including- (a) All information about the device itself, including set time, type, description, location etc. (b) Reasons for making call (angry with the company, extortion etc.) (c) Any information about the caller (apparent age, voice characteristics, speech, language, accent, manner and use of unusual terms). (d) Any information of the location of the caller (inside or outside a building, background noise etc.) The person then contacts the Terminal In-charge/ Safety Officer. Terminal Incharge’s Responsibility: The Terminal in-charge will contact the police department immediately. The police will advice on the next course of action. Possible actions may include (a) Inform operation officers but do not search or evacuate.
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(b) Initiate search but do not evacuate. (c) Evacuate specific area and search. (d) Search and then full evacuation immediately prior to target time. (e) Immediate evacuation Searches are to be conducted by police with assistance of department personnel who are most able to spot “pit of place" items. Only bomb squad personnel are to handle suspected device. Emergency Brigade: The emergency brigade is to be on standby to facilitate immediate response to an actual emergency (fire, explosion etc) Emergency Actions: (a) The persons inside the plant except emergency brigade should be evacuated. (b) All vehicles in the plant premises should be evacuated to safer places. (c) Any new or doubtful object should not be touched. (d) All pipelines and tank valves should be closed and all operations inside the plant should be stopped. (e) In case of fire, city fire brigade should be called. (f) If during searching, a bomb is found it should be defused by bomb squad immediately. 4.14 IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS: Plant Manager 9415019103 Police Station 0512255927, 9454403178 Railway Station 05412-255298, 9415225491 Hospitals Nearby 9415227524, 9335314858 Fire Brigade 9451137699, 9415376397 Pollution control Board 0542-2275951 Factory Inspectorate 9198423974 District Collectorate 0512-262557, 0512-2622500 Other Companies BPCL 9977244449, 8608374973, 7510001497 HPCL 9918293399, 9771424214 IOCL Pipeline Station 9453047148, 9670090097
Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 32 of 32 212.75M SCHEDULE OF FACILITIES
SL.NO. NAME SIZE NOS 1 WAREHOUSE 12M X 22M 1 53.62M DILDAR NAGAR PUMPING PUMPING 2 RECORD ROOM 12.2M X 9M 1 STATION AREA STATION AREA 3 CANTEEN 6M X 9M 1 4 WORKER'S ROOM 6M X 9M 1 5 TOILET 6M X 3M 1 6 LABORATORY 27.4M X 6M 1
DRAIN 7 OFFICE(DOUBLE STOREY) 24M X 6M ALLAHABAD INDIAN OIL SPACE FOR R & P DIVISION 8 CAR PARKING 6M X 3.6M 1 R&P DIVISION 9 CYCLE / SCOOTER SHED 12M X 18M 1 155.48 FIELD AREA PIPE LINE 10 GENERATOR ROOM 6M X 8.6M 1 11 SWITCH ROOM 5.5M X 4.85M 1 12 TRANSFORMER ROOM 8.65M X 9M 1 561.44M (1842') 13 SUB STATION( 11 KV ODR) 3M X 3M 1 14 SECURITY ROOM 1 15 SECURITY ROOM 4.5M X 7.8M 1 N
TO CHANDER BRAHAN DAM 45 16 QUARTERS 14 MOGHAL 18M (60') WIDE CHARK APPROACH ROAD
F BOUNDARY WALL 17 ESD(EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN) 9 PIPELINE DIVISION WICKET GATE INLET TO TANKS FROM F 26 18 DYKE VALVE 5 40 27 TO G.T. ROAD WM/T TO ALLAHABAD 44 50 50 50 19 MAINGATE 1 20.0M ROAD KEY PLAN 27 27 26 SITE PLAN 62 42 WM/T 20 SAMPLE ROOM 7.6M X 3.8M 1 CULVERT SCALE 1:10,000
10M DYKE -B 55 50 50 50 3M HIGH WALL AND 0.6M HIGH 21 ASSEMBLY POINT 2 FENCING45 ABOVEIT 53 44.77M 55 18 10M DYKE -C 22 ETHANOL DECANTATION POINT 2.5M X 2.5M 1 TK-18 13M 63 92.1M 55 SKO 5.0M 24 SLUDGE PIT 3 TANK SCHEDULE ASPHALTED ROAD TO P/L DIVISION 63 26 W / M TOWER 6M HT. 4 18 12M TK-22 45 DYKE WALL SL.NO. TANK NO. SIZE CAPACITY PRODUCTS CLASS TYPE 12M TANK HSD FIRE BREAK WALL 27 HIGH MAST TOWER 10
16M SLUDGE PIT FARM-A 1 TK - 1 ;0 7160 KL HSD B A/G - CR 63 TK-17 16M 24 31 MCC ROOM 18M X 14M 1 MS 2 TK - 2 ;0+7 1370 KL HSD B A/G - CR FIRE BREAK WALL 32 F.F PUMP HOUSE 18M X 8M 1 TK-19 3 TK - 3 ;0+7 2320 KL HSD B A/G - CR 63 15M X 8M HSD FIRE BREAK WALL TK-16 21M 63 33 CALIBRATION TOWER 1 63 27 4 TK - 5 ; 0+7 1630 KL SKO B A/G - CR 40 HSD TK-23 34 TLF ( 26 BAYS ) 10M X 4.5M(PER BAY) 1 18 TK-15 SKO 5 TK - 14 ;0 4720 KL MS A A/G - FR TANK 13.0M 35 MANIFOLD 45M X 15M 1 FROM-B 24 SKO 63 6 TK - 15 ;0 3780 KL SKO B A/G - CR ENCL. WALL DRAIN 36 PUMP HOUSE 45M X 6M 1 CAP. 9040 WATER 25 PUMP/ 18 0;0+7 7 TK - 16 ;0 9530 KL HSD B A/G - CR 27 KL MOTOR 56 DYKE -A 37 WATER TANKS CAPACITY 3006 KL 2 TK - 17 ;0 A 54 8.8M 8 2600 KL MS A/G - FR TK-20 TK-5 TK-3 ENCL. WALL 38 BLUE DYE STORE 3M X 3M 1 HSD 63 HSD 63 CAP. 9 TK -18 ;0 4500 KL SKO B A/G - CR SKO 39 ADDITIVE STORE 3M X 3M 1 FIRE BREAK WALL 14118 KL 63 10 TK - 19 ;0 9000 KL HSD B A/G - CR 40 OIL WATER SEPARATOR 10M X 2M 1+4 TK-1 63 11 TK - 20 ;0 9000 KL HSD B A/G - CR HSD TANK FARM-C 41 O/H WATER TANK 50 KL 1
487.68M ETHANOL TANK 12 TK - 21 ;0 8620 KL MS A A/G - FR 42 TUBE WELL 6 TK-27 13 TK - 22 ;0 B A/G - CR FIRE BREAK WALL 14000 KL HSD FIRE SHED TK-26 43 CONTROL ROOM 1 TK-21 60 14 TK - 23 ;0 5000 KL SKO B A/G - CR TK-14 2X70 KL 44 FOAM P/H 12M X 8M 1 WALL MS ETHANOL TANK TK-24 [0 ETHANOL A 24 FR TO TLF 15 70 KL. U/G 45 DRAIN SUMP 8 TANK INCLOSURE 63 63 TK-2 MS 16 TK-25 [0 70 KL. ETHANOL A U/G F HSD FIRE BREAK WALL 18 FIRE BREAK WALL 46 ADDITIVE PUMP 1 17 TK-27 [0 70 KL. ETHANOL A U/G DYKE WALL ENCL WALL DYKE WALL TK-24 45 TK-28 [0 70 KL. ETHANOL A U/G 17 CAP. 10810 KL TK-25 47 DG SET 2X500 KVA 2 18 ESD ESD17 63 F 56 60 53 17 ESD 63 46 DEC POINT 22 60 48 WATER TANKS 0;0+7 1 63 STATIC WATER TANK ROAD 27 9M X 6M 15.0M 10MX20M 49 U/G WATER SUMP 1 38 70 KL.
8.0M 63 50 MASS FLOW METER 6 LEGEND: 39 55 73.0M 27 63 66 CABLE BRIDGE CUM 66 52.35M PIPE LINE BRIDGE 51 ------C.C.T.V. CAMERA 36 35 DOUBLE HEADED HYDRANT 55 55 63 63 42 52 MAINTENANCE ROOM 9.5M X 4M --- 48 DECANTATION POINT FOR 49.9M SYMBEL DESCRIPTION NOS. T.T.& EXCESS PRODUCT DOUBLE HEADED HYDRANT 21 WATER 63 BRIDGE 53 CULVERT 4 ASSEMBLY TANK 8.0M 42 55 17 17 17 17 PTZ/HSD TYPE CAMERA POINT F ESD ESD ESD ESD 8 1 7 8 1817161514131211109 54 9M X 21M FF 63 63 63 26 2425 23 22 2021 19 2 3 4 5 6 BIO REMEDATION PIT 1 SINGLE HEADED HYDRANT EMERGENCY EXIT 53 TO TLF 15.0M HIGH VOLUME LONG RANGE FF FF 9.4M FF 55 2.5M X 2.5M 7 MONITOR 42 33 FF FF SHED (HVLRS) FIXED TYPE CAMERA 13 106.5M 34 26 F HO MM PIPE LINE 56 FOAM TANK 2KL. 2 37 37 32 R.C.C. DRIVEWAY FROM ETHANOL TANK MS BS III WATER 6.0M WATER FLAME FIXED TYPE CAMERA 6 TANK 57 FF TANK 49 35.0M NEW FIRE PUMP HOUSE 8.5M X 35M 1 26 41 HSD BS III 42 58
5.0M FIRE TROLLY SHED 1 O.H.WATER TANK 20 76.0M SKO 59 58 27 SAND PIT SHED 1 7. CHANGE MADE IN LAYOUT 28.01.2011 A.S MR.S.K STRUCTURAL STEEL BRIDGE FOR BARRIER PPE ROOM
53 ESD17 ETHANOL 6. HYDRANT LINE AND CABLE 59 60 FOAM SHED 3 PROP.EXT.OF 8 TLF BAYS & PIPE BRIDGE 23.06.2009 A.S MR.K.G LOCK ROOM 43 U/G TANK FS FOAM SHED 5. PROPOSED CHANGES IN HYDRANT SYS. 23.07.2005 31 70 KL 26 61 T.T. OUT ROOM 10M X 5M 1 4. PROPOSED ETHANOL FACILITY 07.05.02 57 67 ROAD 4M WIDE SCRAP YARD LICENSE AREA 3.65 M WIDE ROAD C1/C2 27 16 62 MECHANIZED OWS 10M X 10M 1 3. TANK ENCL. WALL REVISED 27.05.98 C.G. GATE -2 27 DE-LICENSE AREA 2. LAYOUT REVISED 10.07.97 C.G. O.H.WATER TANK 63 LIGHTING POLE 24 (10+10KL) 16 D5/D6 8 1. TANK POS. REV., W.TANK REV. 17.03.97 C.G. 64 B4 B5 27 64 REV.NO. DESCRIPTION REV. BY APPR. BY 3.65 M WIDE ROAD T.T. CHECK SHED 8M X1.5M 1 DATE 27 DG SET B6 B7 27 61 65 65 EXISTING HYDRANT SYSTEM DOUBLE STORY 16A1 ELECTRICIAN ROOM 4M X 8M 1 47 66.0M
STAFF QUARTERS C3/C4 D3/D4 42 66 HYDRANT SYSTEM 3.75 M SAND STORE 3M X 3M 2 R O A D R O A D (SPRINKLER SYSTEM) INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED 27 WIDE GATE ASSEMBLY F 17 POINT 21 67 NEW CALIBRATION TOWER 8M X 6M 1 (MARKETING DIVISION) ADDITIVE EXISTING CAMERA POSITION ESD STORE 13 3.65 M WIDE ROAD 17 ESD 27 2 52 3 4 5 6 7 9 F D1/D2 1 16B1 UTTAR PRADESH STATE OFFICE-I,LUCKNOW GATE 27 6 M WIDE 11 12 SHOWN THUS F 16 EXPLOSIVE LICENSE NO 5452/P-12(17)548 10 16 16B2 Indian Oil 9.0 M WIDE ROAD 13 A2 B3 ROAD PROJECT 15 F F F F F 1.THE DIA OF FIAR HYDRANT FOR EXISTING TANK FARM IS 200MM. 2.THE DIA OF FIAR HYDRANT FOR PROPOSED TANK FARM IS 300MM. MUGAL SARAI TERMINAL 112.77M 51.8M 3.WORK APPROVED BUT NOT CONSTRUCTED/DEMOLISED
SHOWN IN GREEN COLOUR (TO BE DEMOLISHED) ROAD APPROACH 115.8M LICENCE
MS - 16220 LAYOUT PLAN H.S.D -52380 SKO -14910 LICENCE NO. UP 5452/P-12(17)548
DRAWN BY : Mr. BRAHMPAL SINGH DRG. NO. GEN/MSR/EPL-11
EXISTING FACILITY SHOWN IN BLACK. CHKD BY : Mr. PRANAV DATE 11.02.2016
APPRD BY : Mr. K. SARKAR SCALE 1:1000 PROPOSED FACILITY SHOWN IN RED. GENESIS PREPARED BY: FACILITY TO BE DISMANTLED ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS & DESIGNERS SECOND FLOOR, GYAN BHAWAN, KAPOORTHALA SHOWN IN YELLOW COMPLEX, ALIGANJ, LUCKNOW. PH:0522-4007145, 2324688(O) FACILTY UNDER CONSTRUCTION 0522-2786259, 2789817(R) LICENCE NO. P/HQ/UP/15/116(P759) SHOWN IN GREEN. 9839015763, 9335280018 (M) DATE 11.04.12
Drawing No. 02 (Iso -Risk Contour for Mughalsarai POL Terminal of M/s IOCL)
Drawing No. 03 (F/N Curve for Mughalsarai POL Terminal of M/s IOCL)
Drawing No. 04 (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for MS Tank (T-21) on Fire)
Drawing No. 05 (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for SKO Tank (T -23) on Fire)
Drawing No. 06 (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for HSD Tank (T-16) on Fire)
Drawing No. 07 (Overpressure Distance Due To UVCE for MS Tank (T-21) on Fire)
Drawing No. 08 (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for MS Tank (T-21) Vessel Connection Failure)
Drawing No. 09 (Overpressure Distance Due To UVCE for MS Tank (T-21) Vessel Connection Failure)
Drawing No. 10 (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for MS Pump Discharge Line Full-Bore Failure)
Drawing No. 11 (Overpressure Distance Due To UVCE for MS Pump Discharge Line Full-Bore Failure)
Drawing No. 12 (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for MS Pump Discharge Line 15 mm dia. hole)
Drawing No. 13 (Overpressure Distance Due To UVCE for MS Pump Discharge Line 15 mm dia. hole)
Drawing No. 14 (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for MS Pump Mechanical Seal Failure)
Drawing No. 15 (Overpressure Distance Due To UVCE for MS Pump Mechanical Seal Failure)
Drawing No. 16 (Thermal Radiation Distance Due To Pool Fire for MS Pump Discharge Line 25% Gasket Failure)
Drawing No. 17 (Overpressure Distance Due To UVCE for MS Pump Discharge Line 25% Gasket Failure)