Annexure 2: Risk Assessment Document.
EXPANSION OF LPG & PROPANE, IMPORT AND STORAGE TERMINAL AND ASSOCIATED SHV ENERGY PVT. LTD. HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION ADDITIONAL STUDIES
7 ADDITIONAL STUDIES
7.1 Public Consultation
As this is B2 category project, public consultation is not required.
7.2 Hazard Identification and Consequence Analysis
The risk assessment process is intended to identify existing and probable hazards in all operations and work environment, to quantify the hazards and to access the risk levels of those hazards in order to prioritize those that need an immediate attention.
7.2.1 Methodology of Risk Assessment
The methodology includes,
Hazard identification, Selection of potential loss scenarios, Simulation of release source model on DNV’s PHAST 7.1, Plotting the damage contour on site map
These steps undertaken to carry out risk assessment for this project are described in following sections.
7.2.2 Hazard Identification
The project description, and other project related data provided by the client have been comprehensively reviewed to identify the hazardous operations. Also the information on the hazardous properties (MSDS) of all the chemicals handled at the site has been reviewed to identify the hazards associated with the same.
At present SHV is going to expand an isolated storage facility for LPG. This involves storage of some of LPG at the site which can lead to uncontrolled release of hazardous material causing hazard. On the basis of this, the important hazards that can lead to accident in the proposed project are described in Table 7-1.
Table 7-1: Important Hazardous Events Type of Event Explanation Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapor Explosion; may happen due to catastrophic failure of BLEVE refrigerated or pressurized gases or liquids stored above their boiling points, followed by early ignition of the same, typically leading to a fire ball Explosion A release of large amount of energy that form a blast wave Fire Fire The burning of a flammable gas cloud on being immediately ignited at the edge before Fireball forming a flammable/explosive mixture. Flash Fire A flammable gas release gets ignited at the farthest edge resulting in flash-back fire A jet fire occurs when flammable gas releases from the pipeline (or hole) and the Jet Fire released gas ignites immediately. Damage distance depends on the operating pressure and the diameter of the hole or opening flow rate. Pool fire is a turbulent diffusion fire burning above a horizontal pool of vaporizing Pool Fire hydrocarbon fuel, where the fuel has zero or low initial momentum Spill Release ‘Loss of containment’. Release of fluid or gas to the surroundings from unit’s own
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Type of Event Explanation equipment / tanks causing (potential) pollution and / or risk of explosion and / or fire Breakage or fatigue failures (mostly failures caused by weather but not necessarily) of Structural Damage structural support and direct structural failures Vapor Cloud Explosion resulting from vapor clouds formed from flashing liquids or non-flashing Explosion liquids and gases
7.2.2.1 Hazard and Damage Assessment
Toxic, flammable and explosive substances released from sources of storage as a result of failures or catastrophes, can cause losses in the surrounding area in the form of:
Toxic gas dispersion, resulting in toxic levels in ambient air, Fires, fireballs, and flash back fires, resulting in a heat wave (radiation), or Explosions (Vapours Cloud Explosions) resulting in blast waves (overpressure).
7.2.3 Consequences of Fire/Heat Wave
The effect of thermal radiation on people is mainly a function of intensity of radiation and exposure time. The effect is expressed in term of the probability of death and different degree of burn. The consequence effects studied to assess the impact of the events on the receptors are provided in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2: Damage due to Radiation Intensity Radiation (kW/m2) Damage to Equipment Damage to People Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 sec. 4.0 - But blistering is unlikely. Minimum energy to ignite wood 1% lethality in one minute. First degree burns 12.5 with a flame; melts plastic tubing. in 10 sec. 100% lethality in 1 min. 37.5 Severe damage to plant 50% lethality in 20 sec. 1% lethality in 10 sec.
7.2.3.1 Consequences of Overpressure
The effects of the shock wave vary depending on the characteristics of the material, the quantity involved and the degree of confinement of the vapor cloud. The peak pressures in an explosion therefore vary between a slight over-pressure and a few hundred kilopascals (kPa). Whereas dwelling are demolished and windows and doors broken at overpressures as low as 0.03- 0.1 bar. Direct injury to people occurs at greater pressures. The pressure of the shock wave decreases rapidly with the increase in distance from the source of the explosion. The overpressure damage is shown in Table 7-3.
Table 7-3: Overpressure Damage
Overpressure (bar) Damage
0.02068 Limited minor structural damage Corrugated asbestos shattered; corrugated steel or aluminum 0.068 to 0.136 panels, fastenings fail, followed by buckling, wood panels (standard housing) fastenings fail, panels blown in Frameless, self -framing steel panel building demolished; rupture of oil storage 0.204 to 0.272 tanks
Source: CCPS Consequence Analysis of Chemical Release
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7.2.4 Selection of Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLs’)
Following important points should be considered for the selection of release scenarios.
Flammability and the flash point of the material Phase of material i.e. liquid or gas Threshold quantity of the chemicals as prescribed in MSHIC Rule Operating temperature and pressure of the material Total inventory of the material
On the basis of study of chemical properties (MSDS) of the chemicals those are selected for simulation are presented in Table 7-4.
Scenarios selected for simulation is given in Table 7-5.
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Table 7-4: Chemicals selected for Simulation Specific Vapour Odour S. LEL, TLV LD50 IDLH Name State B. P. °C F. P. °C Gravity Density Threshold No UEL% ppm LC50 (ppm) (water=1) (air=1) Ppm or mg/l ~ 2500 ppm Not Applicable (Gas); Range: [Odorless (pure); Marketed 1 LPG Liquid > – 40 ~ – 100° C (Liquid 1000 - 0.53 – 0.58 1.45 - 2 2000 ~7 after addition of Mercaptan state, Closed-Cup) Odorizer (Pungent)] Not applicable Closed cup; Open 2.1 2 Propane Liquid -161.48 1000 LC50 = 280,000 0.51 1.6 NA 2100 cup: -104 9.5 ppm (Rat) 682 mg/kg oral- Ethyl 2.8 rat 3 Mercapt Liquid 35 -48.3 0.5 0.8453 2.14 0.001 500 18 4420 ppm/4 hr. an inhalation-rat
Table 7-5: Scenarios Selected for Simulation Mass Operating Condition S. Hazard Scenario Inventory Types of Failure Possible Consequences Studied No. involved Temperature (°C) Pressure (bar)
10, 25 mm dia hole leak in Jet Fire, Pool Fire & 1 LPG Storage Tank Flammable 1365 MT 30 8 tank and Catastrophic rupture Explosion of Storage tank 10, 25 mm dia hole leak in Jet Fire, Pool Fire & 2 LPG- Pump to Gantry Flammable 15 MT 30 16 tank Explosion 10, 25 mm dia hole leak in Jet Fire, Pool Fire & 3 LPG- Jetty to Terminal Flammable 203 MT 30 12 tank Explosion 10, 25 mm dia hole leak in Jet Fire, Pool Fire & 4 Propane Storage Tank Flammable 1280 MT 30 8 tank and Catastrophic rupture Explosion of Storage tank
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10, 25 mm dia hole leak in Jet Fire, Pool Fire & 5 Propane - Pump to Gantry Flammable 15 MT 30 16 tank Explosion 10, 25 mm dia hole leak in Jet Fire, Pool Fire & 6 Propane - Jetty to Terminal Flammable 203 MT 30 14 tank Explosion 10, 25 mm dia hole leak in Ethyl Mercaptan Storage Jet Fire, Pool Fire & 7 Flammable 2 MT 30 1 tank and Catastrophic rupture Tank Explosion of Storage tank
On the basis of the information provided in Table 7-4, and as discussed over failures sceneries given in publications like World Bank Technical Paper 55 and TNO Purple Book and the experience of the consultant, MCLs’.
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7.2.4.1 Failure Rates
A leak or rupture of a tank, release some or all of its content, can be caused by brittle failure of the tank wall, welds or connected pipework due to use of inadequate materials, combined with loading such as wind, earthquake or impact. Failure rates for selected MCLS’ are provided in Table 7-6.
Table 7-6: Failure Frequency for Storage Tanks Catastrophic Rupture Categories Frequency Leak Frequency (per year) (per tank per year) 1.2 × 10-5 (for Hole Size 3 to 10 mm) Pressure Vessels 4.7 × 10-7 7.1 × 10-6 (for Hole Size 10 to 50 mm)
Reference: International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP); Report No. 434-3, March 2010
Also, the risk assessment is considered using certain internationally recognized yardsticks for measuring risk. These first need to be explained, and this is done as Table 7-7.
Table 7-7: Broadly Accepted Frequency Annual Fatality risk Conclusion level per year Unacceptable to everyone. Immediate action shall be taken to reduce the 10-3 hazards Willing to spend public money to control hazards, such as traffic signs, fire 10-4 departments etc. People still recognize. Safety slogans have precautionary rings. Such as never 10-5 swim alone, never point a gun, avoid air travels Not of great concern to everyone. People are aware of these hazards but feel 10-6 that they cannot happen to them. Such as Lightning Never Strikes twice, or an Act of God.
7.2.5 Simulation of Release and Development of Contours
As the Scenarios were developed for the selected set of chemicals, the next step is to carry out the consequence analysis. The consequence analysis has been carried out for storage terminal and pipeline. The consequence analysis results along with their contours are presented in the following sections. Catastrophic rupture is considered as worst case scenario and leak is considered as credible scenario.
7.2.5.1 LPG
Radiation level and effect distance due to the release of LPG are presented in Table7-8&Table7-9, whereas the overpressure effect distance are presented in Table 7-10&Table 7-11.
Table7-8: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Release of LPG Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2.5/B 29 23 19 10 mm Jet fire 2.0/F 30 24 20 LPG Leak Storage 5.0/D 27 21 17 Tank 25 mm 2.5/B 68 53 44 Jet fire Leak 2.0/F 69 55 46
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Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 5.0/D 64 48 39
Table7-9: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Catastrophic Rupture (Worst Case) of LPG Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
LPG Catastrop 2.5/B 1800 977 351 Storage hic Fireball 2.0/F 1825 991 363 Tank Rupture 5.0/D 1825 991 363
Table 7-10: Overpressure Effect Distance Due to Release of LPG Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 56 35 32 10 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 70 46 42
LPG Storage 5.0/D 44 25 22 Tank 2.5/B 202 136 127 25 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 235 159 148 5.0/D 180 116 106
Table 7-11: Overpressure Effect Distance Due to Catastrophic Rupture (Worst Case)of LPG Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 3409 944 879 LPG Storage Catastrophic Late Ignition 2.0/F 3522 1201 1122 Tank Rupture 5.0/D 3550 1403 1342
In case of 10mm, 25mmleak& catastrophic rupture, the maximum effect distance will be 30, 69&1825 m for the radiation level of 4 kW/m2. In case of radiation level of 4 kW/m2 for the credible loss scenarios, the effect distance remains well within the plant boundary.
The maximum overpressure distance at 25 mm leak on0.02 bar pressure is 235 m at 2.0/F, which slightly going out from the plant boundary in W direction. It is extremely unlikely that any surrounding population will be exposed in that area.
The contours for effect distance generated for the release of LPG are presented in Figure 7-1 & Figure 7-2.
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Figure 7-1: Jet fire effect contour due to 25 mm leak in LPG Storage Tank at weather 2.0/F
Figure 7-2: Late Explosion-Overpressure Effect Distance due 25 mm Leak in LPG Storage Tank at 2.0/F
7.2.5.2 LPG- Long Pipeline
Radiation level and effect distance due to the release of Propane- pump to gantry are presented in Table7-12& Jetty to terminal given in Table7-13whereas the overpressure effect distance due to the release of Propane- pump to gantry& Jetty to terminal are presented in Table 7-14&Table 7-15.
Table7-12: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Release of LPG- Pump to Gantry Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2.5/B 22 13 10 Jet fire 2.0/F 22 14 11
10 mm 5.0/D 22 13 9 Leak 2.5/B 44 28 13 Late Pool Fire 2.0/F 46 28 13 LPG- Pump 5.0/D 44 29 16 to Gantry 2.5/B 52 31 25 Jet fire 2.0/F 52 31 26 25 mm 5.0/D 52 30 22 Leak 2.5/B 105 66 34 Late Pool Fire 2.0/F 108 66 33
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Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 5.0/D 106 69 40
Table7-13: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Release of LPG- Jetty to Terminal Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2.5/B 20 12 10 Jet fire 2.0/F 21 13 10
10 mm 5.0/D 20 12 9 Leak 2.5/B 41 25 12 Late Pool Fire 2.0/F 42 26 12 LPG- Jetty 5.0/D 41 27 14 to 2.5/B 49 29 23 Terminal Jet fire 2.0/F 49 30 24
25 mm 5.0/D 49 28 21 Leak 2.5/B 110 68 35 Late Pool Fire 2.0/F 114 70 35 5.0/D 109 71 42
Table 7-14: Overpressure Effect DistanceDue to Release of LPG- Pump to Gantry Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 127 65 56 10 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 184 85 70
LPG- Pump to 5.0/D 113 63 55 Gantry 2.5/B 306 157 135 25 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 417 187 153 5.0/D 258 139 122
Table 7-15: Overpressure Effect DistanceDue to Release of LPG- Jetty to Terminal Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 122 64 56 10 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 158 71 59
LPG -Jetty to 5.0/D 113 63 55 Pipeline 2.5/B 307 157 135 25 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 418 187 153 5.0/D 237 127 111
In case of breach, the maximum effect distance will be 118 m for the radiation level of 4 kW/m2.
The maximum overpressure distance at 0.02 bar is 445 m at 2.0/F.
The contours for effect distance generated for the release of LPG-long pipeline are presented inFigure 7-3&Figure 7-4.
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Figure 7-3: Late Pool Fire effect due to 25 mm leak of LPG from Pipeline- Pump to Gantry from at weather 2.0/F
Figure 7-4: Late Explosion effect due to 25 mm leak of LPG from Pipeline- Pump to Gantry from at weather 2.0/F
7.2.5.3 Propane
Radiation level and effect distance due to the release of Propane are presented in Table7-16&Table7-17,whereas the overpressure effect distance are presented in Table 7-18&Table 7-19.
Table7-16: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Release of Propane Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Failure Met Chemical Consequence Level Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2.5/B 6 NR NR 10 mm Leak Jet fire 2.0/F 6 NR NR 5.0/D 6 NR NR Propane 2.5/B 18 14 NR 25 mm Leak Jet fire 2.0/F 18 14 NR 5.0/D 18 15 NR
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Table7-17: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Release of Catastrophic Rupture (Worst Case)of Propane Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Failure Met Chemical Consequence Level Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2.5/B 1784 969 350 Catastrophic Propane Fireball 2.0/F 1807 982 361 Rupture 5.0/D 1807 982 361
Table 7-18: Overpressure Effect Distance Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 26 13 11 Propane 25 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 27 13 11 Storage Tank 5.0/D 24 13 11
Table 7-19: Overpressure Effect DistanceDue to Catastrophic Rupture (Worst Case) Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 3237 825 476 Propane Catastrophic Late Ignition 2.0/F 3334 872 576 Storage Tank Rupture 5.0/D 3346 887 627
In case of 25mm leak, the maximum effect distance will be 18 m for the radiation level of 4 kW/m2.In case of radiation level of 4 kW/m2, the effect distance remains well within the plant boundary.
The maximum overpressure distance at 0.02 bar is 3346 m at 2.0/F in catastrophic rupture.
The contours for effect distance generated for the release of Propane are presented inFigure 7-5&Figure 7-6.
Figure 7-5: Jet fire effect contour due to 25 mm leak in Propane Storage Tank at weather 2.0/F
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Figure 7-6: Late Explosion effect due to Catastrophic Rupture in Propane Storage Tank at weather 2.0/F
7.2.5.4 Propane – Long Pipeline
Radiation level and effect distance due to the release of Propane- pump to gantry are presented in Table7-20& Jetty to terminal given in Table7-21whereas the overpressure effect distance due to the release of Propane- pump to gantry& Jetty to terminal are presented in Table 7-22&Table 7-23.
Table7-20: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Release of Propane- Pump to Gantry Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2.5/B 20 13 10 Jet fire 2.0/F 20 13 10
10 mm 5.0/D 20 11 7 Leak 2.5/B 40 25 11 Late Pool Fire 2.0/F 41 25 11 Propane- 5.0/D 40 26 13 Pump to 2.5/B 49 29 24 Gantry Jet fire 2.0/F 49 30 25
25 mm 5.0/D 49 28 21 Leak 2.5/B 107 66 34 Late Pool Fire 2.0/F 109 67 33 5.0/D 107 69 40
Table7-21: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Release of Propane- Jetty to Terminal Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2.5/B 20 12 9 Jet fire 2.0/F 20 13 10
Propane- 10 mm 5.0/D 20 11 9 Jetty to Leak 2.5/B 38 24 11 Terminal Late Pool Fire 2.0/F 39 24 11 5.0/D 38 25 13 25 mm Jet fire 2.5/B 47 29 23
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Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 Leak 2.0/F 47 29 24 5.0/D 47 27 21 2.5/B 106 66 33 Late Pool Fire 2.0/F 109 67 22 5.0/D 105 68 39
Table 7-22: Overpressure Effect DistanceDue to Release of Propane- Pump to Gantry Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 126 65 56 10 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 183 84 70 Propane- 5.0/D 113 63 55 Pump to 2.5/B 304 156 135 Gantry 25 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 437 199 164 5.0/D 258 139 122
Table 7-23: Overpressure Effect DistanceDue to Release of Propane- Jetty to Terminal Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 123 65 56 10 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 160 72 59
Propane- Jetty 5.0/D 111 62 55 to Pipeline 2.5/B 311 158 135 25 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 436 199 164 5.0/D 252 138 121
In case of breach, the maximum effect distance will be 109 m for the radiation level of 4 kW/m2.
The maximum overpressure distance at 0.02 bar is 442 m at 2.0/F.
The contours for effect distance generated for the release of Propane-long pipeline are presented inFigure 7-7&Figure 7-8.
Figure 7-7: Late Pool Fire effect due to 25 mm leak of Propane from Pipeline- Pump to Gantryfrom at weather 2.0/F
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Figure 7-8: Late ExplosionEffect due to 25 mm leak of Propane from Pipeline- Pump to Gantry from at weather 2.0/F
7.2.5.5 Ethyl Mercaptan
Radiation level and effect distance due to the release of Ethyl Mercaptan are presented in Table7-16, whereas the overpressure effect distance are presented in Table 7-18&Table 7-19.
Table7-24: Radiation Level and Effect Distance Due to Release of Ethyl Mercaptan Failure Met Effective Distance in meter to Radiation Level Chemical Consequence Scenario Data 4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2 2.5/B 14 11 NR 10 mm Jet fire 2.0/F 15 12 NR Leak Ethyl 5.0/D 12 10 NR Mercaptan 2.5/B 32 26 22 25 mm Jet fire 2.0/F 33 27 22 Leak 5.0/D 28 23 19
Table 7-25: Overpressure Effect Distance Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 63 29 23 Ethyl 25 mm Leak Late Ignition 2.0/F 102 44 36 Mercaptan 5.0/D 53 27 23
Table 7-26: Overpressure Effect DistanceDue to Catastrophic Rupture (Worst Case) Failure Met Overpressure Distances in Meters Chemical Consequence Scenarios Data 0.02 bar 0.2 bar 1 bar 2.5/B 405 168 140 Ethyl Catastrophic Late Ignition 2.0/F 430 183 151 Mercaptan Rupture 5.0/D 394 159 137
In case of 25mm leak, the maximum effect distance will be 33 m for the radiation level of 4 kW/m2.In case of radiation level of 4 kW/m2, the effect distance remains well within the plant boundary.
The maximum overpressure distance at 0.02 bar is 430 m at 2.0/F in catastrophic rupture.
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The contours for effect distance generated for the release of Propane are presented inFigure 7-9&Figure 7-10.
Figure 7-9: Jet fire effect contour due to 25 mm leak in Ethyl MercaptanStorage Tank at weather 2.0/F
Figure 7-10: Late Explosion effect due to Catastrophic Rupture in Propane Storage Tank at weather 2.0/F
7.2.6 Conclusion
From the above study following conclusion can be made.
Table 7-27: Conclusion of Consequence Analysis Effect Distance in Meters at Weather Condition 5.0/D Chemical/ Scenario At Radiation Level 37.5 kW/m2 At Overpressure 0.20 bar LPG Tank, Worst Case Scenario 363 1403 (Catastrophic Rupture) Propane Tank, Worst Case Scenario (Catastrophic 361 887 Rupture) LPG Pipeline Jetty to Terminal, 42 127 25mm leak LPG Pipeline Pump to Gantry, 44 141 25mm leak Propane Pipeline Jetty to 39 138 Terminal, 25mm leak Propane Pipeline Pump to 40 138
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Effect Distance in Meters at Weather Condition 5.0/D Chemical/ Scenario At Radiation Level 37.5 kW/m2 At Overpressure 0.20 bar Gantry, 25mm leak Ethyl Mercaptan Tank, Worst 19 159 Case Scenario (25 mm leak)
7.2.7 Precaution during Storage of LPG
7.2.7.1 Siting of the tank
There will be minimum distance as per OISD Standard 144 between the tank and any building, boundary line or fixed source of ignition .These could be altering walls, building sheds or fences, installing electrical equipment near the tank or planting trees or shrubs nearby. These will not be any closer to the tank than this minimum distance. There will not be any drains or gullies near to the tank unless a water trap is provided to prevent gas entering the drains. This is because LPG is heavier than air and if a leak were to develop from the tank or its controls or pipework or when it is being filled then the vapour could accumulate in an untrapped drain or gully. Ignition of these vapours could then lead to fire/explosion.
7.2.7.2 Ventilation and Conditions around the Tank
In case of leaks there will be plenty of room around the tanks to ensure good air flow so that pockets of heavier-than-air LPG vapours cannot build up around them.
It is also very important to keep the area around the tank free of rubbish, particularly if it is combustible or could reduce the levels of ventilation. For similar reasons keep weeds and grass cut down around the tank.
7.2.7.3 Gantry
There will be a dedicated flat parking area for the tanker unloading LPG. This parking area will be clear on a delivery day and people should be kept away from the tank and tanker while the transfer of LPG is taking place. SHV will need to make sure that the tanker cannot drive away with the supply hose still connected, that there is no risk of an electrical spark being generated from static electricity or by other means. SHVwill ensure that their drivers are suitably trained and have the correct procedures to follow.
7.2.7.4 Security
People not involved with the installation, for example workers with no responsibility for the LPG or visitors to the site, should be kept well away from it. No one will smoke, use electrical equipment or park vehicles near the tank. ‘No smoking’ and other signs will be clearly displayed and maintained. Ignition sources, will not be allowed near the tank.
7.2.7.5 Cross country Pipe line (CCPL) Safety and Security Aspect
SHV have provided protection guard at CCPL where vehicle movement are observed also reflector install on protection guard for night visibility of vehicle movement. Safety slogan painted on CCPL at different location. Safety display board install for safety awareness at different location.
In each shift wise CCPL inspection and patrolling along through walk is done as continuous basis. Details inspection of CCPL done once in a week by Terminal Official.
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Figure 7-11: Photographs showing Pipeline Safety
7.2.8 Precautions during Handling of LPG
7.2.8.1 Bulk Tanker Loading
Pre-Operational Checks
Tanker Driver to ensure immediate reporting of the tanker to plant security on arrival at Terminal.
Security has to carry out all the Preliminary Checks as per the “Check list for Bulk Tank Trucks at Plant location.”
Vehicle fitted with CCOE approved spark arrestor. Any visible sign of LPG Leakage CCOE License available/ valid 2 Nos. of fire extinguishers available in good condition Safety instruction booklet (TREM CARD) available Explosive license, Safety certificate # Fitness certificate valid Visible dent on bullet Whether all junction boxes are sealed properly Any loose electrical wiring/ Terminal Electrical wiring is insulated and provided Fuel tank cap is locked Paint of bullet is not peeling off First Aid kit is available HAZCHEM sign is available Name of contractor with address and telephone no. displayed Bullet has no sign of external corrosion Tools for filling
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Emergency Kit is available Driver training certificate is available Whether there are any sources of ignition like candles etc. Whether the driver has valid driving license PUC Certificate is available/ valid up to Insurance certificate is available / valid up to
Operator/Plant Engineer work out the loading quantity % after verification of tanker R.T.O & CCOE permission
Empty Bulk Tanker Weighment
Track Tanker Gantry operator to place the tanker on weighbridge for Empty weighment.
Operator records the readings as per SOP.
Operation (Startup)
After tank truck is positioned at tank truck gantry, operator place wooden choke blocks behind the wheels to prevent accidental movement of tank truck during operation. Ensure that master switch of truck is switched off and fire extinguishers from the truck are taken out and kept ready nearby, for use in case of emergency. To connect earthing/bonding wires between the tank truck and unloading point with the flexible earthing with the TT at two points using the Crocodile clamps provided in the bay It should be ensured that bonding in always made to ensure continuity by removing any protective coating like paint, rust, dirt, oil scale Roto gauge reading (both right & left side), pressure and temperature of the contents of tank truck should be recorded. Connect both liquid and vapour hoses/unloading arms of the product line to the respective valves of the tank truck. Crack open valves of tank truck (both liquid and vapour) to check for leakages. If any leak appears, the valve should be immediately closed and take corrective measures. Slowly open the TTs outlet valve and charge the hose and close with the hose charged, open vent valve to release the entrapped air from the hose. Ensure that 4 way valve should be kept in liquid decantation position, compressor suction is taken from “tanker bullet” and compressor discharge line is connected to “product storage bullet” vapour line to transfer liquid using differential pressure. Ensure that pump suction is taken from bulk storage bullet and pump discharge line is connected to tank truck loading liquid line. Open valves of bullet and pipelines accordingly. Operator has to carry out all the Preliminary Checks as per the “Check list for Bulk Tank Trucks at Plant location.” which will be kept at the TT Gantry Area.
Vehicle engine and master switch being shut off Earthing connection properly made Roto gauge ,fixed level instrument working order Fitting as per CCOE File extinguishers are in easily accessible and removable Wheel chokes are available Housekeeping in order Bonding of flange connection given Proper earthing cable with clamps Master switch is readily accessible for switching off the engine.
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Plant Engineer to review the checklist and pass instructions for Loading, if found satisfactory.
Switch on the power supply of pump. Open both the valves of pump i.e., suction and delivery. Open the vent line provided on discharge of pump and release entrapped vapour, if any and wait till liquid LPG comes out of it. When liquid LPG comes out, close the vent valve. With the above exercise, it can be ensured that priming of pump is done prior to commencing operation. Start the pump and check roto gauge reading at regular intervals in the format “TTG LOG Sheet”
Operation (Shut-off)
On completion of loading, switch off the pump and close liquid and vapour valves of pipelines, loading arm and tank truck.
Thereafter, de-pressurized the loading arm by venting the liquid/vapour through the vent line provided near tank truck loading point.
Bulk Loading Operator to ensure that tanker is not loaded more than licensed capacity and 85% Roto-gauge reading.
Loaded Bulk Weighment
Take the printouts of the Net weighment slips from the computer in the Security cabin and enter the details of those documents as per SOP “Weighbridge Operation and readings”
Signing of Documents
Plant Engineer takes signature of Tanker Driver & handover the documents to Commercial Officer. after due verification and signature.
Commercial Officer make necessary enter in System (SAP) & generate Invoice acknowledge by signature and handovers to security.
Plant Security to verify the papers prior to handing over tanker driver and log the documents in gate register.
7.3 Disaster Management Plan/ Onsite Emergency Plan
7.3.1 Objective
The main considerations necessary in contingency planning are:
1. Identification of Potential Hazards 2. Knowledge of Properties of Hazardous Substances handled/stored 3. Inventories of Hazardous Substances (Main concentrations of hazardous materials to be identified). 4. Assessment of the Potential for release of Hazardous Substances 5. Consequences of release 6. Prevention of Major Accidents. 7. Control of Potential Hazards 8. Control of Ignition Sources 9. Management of Safety.
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7.3.2 Details of Terminal
Details of terminal is given as following;
Table 7-28: Terminal Details S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 LPG/ Propane Storage Terminal 8000 MT 9002 MT 2 LPG Storage Capacity 17.7 m dia Spheres x 3nos. 19 m dia Spheres x 3nos. 3 Propane Storage Capacity 18 m dia Spheres x 3nos. 19 m dia Spheres x 3nos. 4 Tanker Loading Gantry 4 nos. x 54 m³/h 4 nos. x 54 m³/h 2 x 5000 KL storage tanks 8 x 410 m³/h fire waterpumps Existing system is 5 Fire Water System 2 x 40 m³/h jockey pumps+ adequate fire water network
7.3.3 Safety Utilities
7.3.3.1 Safety Systems
The terminal is having a secured compound wall with a minimum height of 02 meter. Two gates for access on the north side of the plant. The main entrance is common for both LPG operations and normal traffic. In addition one emergency gate is provided for exit from hazardous Zone. Security personnel man the main gate round the clock. The security office is located near the main gate. In case of an emergency the emergency gate is opened by the security.
7.3.3.2 Special Safety Features
Detection System
09 nos. Fixed Gas sensors are provided in the LPG area to detect the formation of explosive mixture which will give audio & visual indication and alarm at the control room. In addition, Quartzite bulbs are provided which will break when the temperature reaches 79° C and the deluge valve will start operating automatically to cool the tank with the required flow rate of water.
Emergency Trip
Emergency trips are provided in the control room and the TLG, which facilitate in tripping all the LPG pumps and close the Remote Operated Valves. The GEB/DG supply breaker, located in the PMCC room is to be switched off to trip the electrical supply in case of emergency. All the ROV’s provided are quick closing type valves and can be operated from remote.
7.3.3.3 Fire Fighting System
The firewater system is designed as per OISD Norms with firewater ring main system pressurized at 7-kg/cm2. The LPG spheres are provided with Protection Spray System with Quartzite Bulb & Deluge system. 08 nos. Diesel driven engines of capacity 410 m3/hour are provided and 2nos. Jockey pumps to maintain the pressure in the ring main. Firewater reservoir of capacity 10000KL in two compartments is provided. The makeup water requirement is met through water tankers.
The list of fire fighting equipment available at Terminal and Jetty is as follows:
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Table 7-29: Details of Fire Fighting Equipments at Terminal S. Numbers Fire Fighting Equipments No. Existing Proposed Fire Extinguishers 1 DCP (10 kg.) 36 18 2 DCP (70 kg.)(Trolley mounted) 04 2 3 CO2 (4.5Kg.) 04 2 Fire Protection 1 Fire Hydrants (Double Hydrants) 30 15 2 Fire Hoses (02in each hose box)15 MTR 60 30 3 Fire Hose Boxes 30 15 4 Fire Nozzles (Jet) 30 15 5 Fire Water Monitors-(2580 LPM) 16 8 6 Fire Engines-(410cu.mtr/hr) 08 - 7 Jockey Pumps-(40cu.mtr/hr) 02 - Others 1 Explosive meters for Gas Testing 02 1 2 Safety Helmet 45 23
Table 7-30: Details of Fire Fighting Equipments available at Jetty S. No. Description Numbers available at Jetty Fire Extinguishers 1 DCP (10 kg.) 04 2 DCP (70 kg.)(Trolley mounted) 02 Fire Protection 1 Fire Hydrants (Double hydrant) 07 2 Fire Hoses (02in each hose box) 15 MTR 14 3 Fire Hose Boxes 07 4 Fire Nozzles (Jet) 07 5 Fire Water Monitors (Trolley3000LPM) 02 6 Fire Engines (410cu.mtr/hr) 02
7.3.3.4 Security
Round the clock security is provided at the terminal. The cross-country pipeline is also continuously subjected to security coverage through roving patrols.
The role of security personnel:
To prevent un-authorized entry into terminal. To regulate vehicle entry into and within the site and parking of tank trucks to be arranged. To maintain a record of tank trucks entering and leaving the site, their registration numbers and manes of tank truck crews. To prevent interference from external sources. To patrol the entire site area. To patrol cross-country pipeline along entire length from tank farm to the jetty. To inform duty officer/ TMby VHF/Telephone in case of any emergency.
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7.3.4 Emergency Plan
7.3.4.1 Emergency Management Plan
Hazards are unlikely to take place if the following safety systems are carried out strictly.
Avoid creation of flammable atmosphere (issue of hot work permits etc. in case of carrying out repairs) Detection of flammable atmosphere (for possibility of leaks from valve glands etc.)- Installation of gas monitors. Process monitoring (i.e. control by detection of any operating conditions which may lead to equipment damage, possible liquid or vapour leakage or other incidents) Process abnormality (i.e. alarm systems indicate process abnormality. Corrective action must always be taken whenever any alarm signal is activated). General incident reporting systems- All incidents including “near-misses” are to be registered. (Record progress and effectiveness of the measures taken to prevent recurrence.) Plant inspection: Regular inspection of the plant is to be carried out. Inspection personnel are to be independent of the operation personnel. Maintenance of recording, frequency, points of inspection, methods and accuracy, checklists may be helpful. Routine checking of safe functioning of equipment, accuracy of instruments used for monitoring, operation of the plant is necessary. Plant commissioning/modification system: Documented procedures to be available for commissioning the LPG operations. Operation & Emergency Manuals, Various Regulations and Drawings etc. in the terminal to be updated regularly and displayed in control rooms.
7.3.4.2 Emergency Preparedness Plan
The Control room is the incident control center and the first-aid room is located adjacent to the M I Room. In case of an incident, the sequence of operations to be performed from the control center (Control Room) which is manned round the clock, will be as follows:
Shut off valves etc. Mobilizing emergency support system. Arranging for mutual aid. Mobilizing outside emergency services. Evacuation of personnel if necessary to be arranged. Attending to the injured on with the First Aid Boxes which are provided in the control rooms, security posts and in the LPG tank farms. The telephone numbers of nearby hospitals are displayed in the control room, in case of necessity of medical aid. Maintain casualty list. Inform the family members/media, Public Relations Officer. External Authorities: Fire/Police/Hospitals – Assistance to be requested.
The Storage terminal handles & stores in their premises the following hazardous materials.
Liquefied Petroleum Gas/ Butane Propane
The physical and chemical characteristics, the hazards of the above hazardous materials, including the potential of fire, Explosion & relativity are documented and informed to every member at the terminal. Also, the health hazards including signs and symptoms of exposure and of any immediate medical help requirement have been informed.
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Emergency & First-aid measures in respect of each of the above materials or the materials likely to be handled are to be documented, displayed and brought to the notice of all employees at the tank farm.
The material safety data sheets are displayed in the control room for the information of all personnel. Protective equipment if necessary is to be compulsorily used. This is to be insured by all the In-charge officers.
7.3.4.3 Emergency Action Plan
Emergency plans/procedures within the Terminal are displayed in the following locations;
Security Office Control Room LPG loading bay Admin. Building Jetty Firewater Pump House.
Action to be taken in case of emergency is as follows:
Raise alarm (shout) Identify yourself and inform control room (VHF) Control room to press emergency trip push button On controlling emergency Office in charge will declare all clear signal. Invoke emergency procedure Security to open emergency Gate All personnel report to respective squad All tank trucks to await instruction Close Hydrocarbon release at the source In case of leak, contain the flow by forming a bund, spray water Do not use firewater on electrical fire till power is isolated. All activities regarding handling emergency will be directed by the “Man in-charge” Mutual aid is arranged from neighboring industries in consultation with the Collectorate
7.3.4.4 Minor Leakage at Terminal
Inform the control Room to suspend the operation through VHF or Telephone. If the emergency trip point is close by, the trip must be operated with advice to control Room through VHF. In case of major leak, to raise the alarm to attract help from other staff. If the leak is uncontrollable the information should be passed on to control room indicating as major leak. Action should be taken to treat as major leak.
7.3.4.5 Major Leakage at Terminal
Shut off the supply of product to leakage area from all directions Inform the control room to suspend the operation through VHF/Telephone/Public address system. Till the assistance of mutual aid arrives, use the fire fighting equipment to disperse the vapour clouds. If the vapour cloud is uncontrollable move to a safe place. District authorities to be informed.
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7.3.4.6 Action at Control Room
The operations should be stopped by stopping pumps and closing valves, ensuring stoppage of supply of product to the leakage area from all directions. In case of pipeline transfer, the jetty in-charge should be advised about the emergency and instruct them to stop the pumping operation from tanker. Inform the terminal in-charge about the emergency and raise the alarm in case of major leakage. Inform the fire coordinator about the emergency. Trip the electrical supply in case of major leakage. Operate the deluge valve system to cool the spheres if required under the advice of the fire coordinator. If the leakage of product is observed from the gas monitoring system panel, suspend the operations with advice to the terminal in-charge and field staff who in-turn will act to operate water spray system to displace vapor cloud.
7.3.4.7 Fire at Jetty (Minor & Major)
Advice the ship’s master to suspend the operation & put off the fire in case of minor fire with the fire-fighting equipments. Shut off the supply of product to the leakage area from all areas and put off the fire in case of minor fire with the fire-fighting equipments. Inform the control room at jetty & at site, port fire station and port control room about Fire. Disconnect the hose to facilitate the ship for immediate movement. Advise to suspend the operation in the neighbouring jetties. In case of major fire, provide necessary assistance to the fire fighters. Assistance from mutual aid members and agencies should be ensured.
7.3.4.8 Action at Control Room
On getting information of FIRE, all the operations should be stopped by stopping pumps and closing valves ensuring stoppage of supply of product to Fire area from all directions. Inform the shift in-charge about the emergency and raise the alarm indicating the type of emergency. Inform the fire coordinator about the emergency. Operate the deluge valve system to cool the spheres if required under the advice of the fire coordinator. Inform the mutual aid members, District Emergency Cell, Fire Brigade about fire requesting for assistance. Inform Head Office, about the emergency. Also seek assistance from Hospitals. Act as per the Fire order.
7.3.4.9 Explosion at Jetty (Minor & Major)
Inform the Control Room to suspend the operation through VHF or Telephone. If the emergency trip point is close-by, the trip must be operated with advice from the control room through VHF. Shut off the supply of product to the fire area from all directions. The above task should be performed if the individual safety is possible. However in case it is not approachable individual should move to safe area. Inform the mutual aid members and district authorities to seek their assistance.
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In case of damage of entire control room communication should be made to the above authorities either from neighbouring industries or from outside agencies.
7.3.4.10 Action at Control Room
On getting information of all the operations should be stopped by stopping pumps and closing valves ensuring stoppage of supply of product to the FIRE area from all directions. In case of pipeline transfer, the jetty in-charge should be advised about the emergency and instruct them to stop the pumping operation from tanker. Inform the shift in-charge about the emergency and raise the alarm indicating the type of emergency. Inform the fire coordinator about the emergency. Trip the electrical supply if required. Operate the deluge valve system to cool the spheres if required under the advice of the fire coordinator. Inform the mutual aid members, District Emergency Cell, Fire Brigade about the fire requesting for assistance. Inform the Head Office about the emergency. Also seek assistance from Hospitals. Act as per the Fire order.
7.3.5 Emergency At Cross Country Pipeline
First observer (at CCPL)
To contact the terminal and jetty and inform the incident. To warn surrounding population, if required. To instruct security to cordon off the area (no traffic and human movement especially downstream of wind direction) Ensure no ignition source is present downwind to leakage. Inform GEB to switch off power to effected area. Check with explosive meter and brief terminal regularly. Inform local authorities if required for mutual aid (Fire brigade, police etc.)
First observer at Jetty
Contact Jetty officer/ship gas tanker to stop discharge, and instruct isolation of CCPL valves. Intimate nearby authorities of incident as and when required Ask nearby fire brigade to assist in emergency Ensure jetty fire pump running and hydrant system is charged and under 7kg/sq. cm. Pressure Send out inspection /isolation team to inspect and isolate the leak or rectify it. If nothing can be done wait with F/F on hand and release gas into atmosphere, constantly monitoring area with explosive meter Follow off-site emergency plan Inform the ship’s master of incidents. Stop all pumping activities Disconnect hose from ship Isolate valves on operating pit Sound all alert from siren Receive instructions from terminal for further action. If necessary vent out excess gas into atmosphere in safe limits.
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Prepare ship to leave for anchorage at short notice. To follow emergency procedure laid down.
Other Emergencies at Jetty
Pipeline burst/ rupture Flange leak Bad Weather
7.3.5.1 First observer
Raise alarm by shouting on siren/walkie talkie Intimate the ships master & Inform pump man (ship crew) Contact the terminal Stop all discharge activities Isolate valves Start water curtain to dilute the air and preventing any ignition. Fire fighting team to be on alert and cordon off area downstream of wind direction. Prepare activities for the ship to leave the berth. Inform the incident to the General Manager and wait for further instructions.
At Terminal,
Prepare to remove /vent all gas in CCPL as soon as possible. Contact nearby authorities for help if required as per Off Site Emergency Plan. Constantly monitor pressure and temperature of CCPL. After removal of gas, isolate CCPL line or purge as soon as possible. Wait for further instruction from team leader / emergency controller / chief coordinator.
7.3.6 Monitoring&Control System
7.3.6.1 Control Panel
ON/OFF push button cum indication ROV (Remote operated valve) for Total 26 ROVS exiting and 20 ROVS proposed DV (Delouse valve TEST push button with indication Fire Engine ON/OFF indication Gantry Emergency relay reset PB Master Shutdown Really PB Siren Testing Switch EM Dossing Pump Indication Protection Relays i.e. earth fault, over current, over voltage, under voltage, under frequency, reverse power, synchronising relay. Annunciator for various fault Ampere, Voltage, frequency, Power factor, KW meter for all three power source i.e. (Electricity board incomer, DG1 & DG2) Syncroscope Circuit breaker ON/OFF switch with indicator
7.3.6.2 Monitoring panel
Details of monitoring panel is given below;
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Table 7-31: Monitoring Panel Details S. No. Description Existing Proposed Pressure Indicator for all sphere, Pump 1 8 nos. 6 nos. discharge & CCPL Temperature indicator for Pump discharge 2 2 nos. 1 no and CCPL 3 Temp. Scanner for all sphere 1 no 1 no Servo level Gauge interface unit with level 4 1 no 0 indicator 5 CGMS with LEL sensor’s feedback from field 9 nos. 10 nos.
7.3.6.3 Power Source
Power source details are given in Table 7-32.
Table 7-32: Details of Power Source S. No. Description Existing Proposed 10 KVA UPS with 32 nos. of 12VDC, 48 AH 1 1 no Existing facility is adequate Power Bank 5 KVA UPS with 16 Nos. of 12VDC, 48 AH 2 1 no Existing facility is adequate Power Bank 8 KVA, 230VAC / 110VAC Power transformer 3 1 no Existing facility is adequate for Control supply 24VDC, 10Amp SMPS for instrument supply 4 1 no Existing facility is adequate in field 5 230VAC distribution board with 10 feeder At Site Existing facility is adequate 6 110VAC Distribution board with 10 feeder At Site Existing facility is adequate
7.3.6.4 Communication
Details of existing facility of communication is given below and additional facility will developed for the proposed expansion.
Wireless base station with antenna on roof (VHF) Leased line gateway for intranet CCTV wireless gate way Radar level gauge gateway with antenna on the roof V-SET gateway and disc on the roof
7.3.6.5 Transformer
One transformer is already installed at site and one additional transformer of 250 kVA will installed for the proposed expansion. Details of existing transformer is given below;
Make: GEC Alsthom Capacity: 250 KVA Voltage ration: 11000/415 V Current: 13Amp at HT and 333Amp LT side Free space: current max demand 98 to 110 KVA
7.3.6.6 DG Sets
Details of DG Sets are given in following table;
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Table 7-33: Detail of DG Set S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 No of DG Set installed at site 1 1 2 Capacity of DG Set 250 kVA 250 kVA
7.3.6.7 Fire Fighting system
Details of fire fighting system is given in Table 7-34.
Table 7-34: Fire Fighting Details S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 Fire water tanker with 5000 KL capacity of each 2 nos. Existing is adequate 198 bhp Diesel engine driven pump with 410 m3/ hr. 2 8 nos. - capacity 22kw electrical power jockey pump with 40 m3/ hr. 3 2 nos. - Capacity 4 Water monitor 16 nos. 8 nos. 5 Double hydrant point with two hoses in hose box 30 nos. 15 nos. 6 10 KG DCP extinguisher 36 nos. 18 nos. 7 70 KG DCP extinguisher 04 nos. 2 nos. 8 5 KG CO2 Extinguisher 04 nos. 2 nos.
7.3.6.8 LPG Pump House
Details of pump provided at LPG pump house are given in Table 7-35.
Table 7-35: Details of Pump at LPG Pump House S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 170 m3 LPG pump 2 nos. - 2 100 m3 Propane pump 1 nos. - 3 220 m3 LPG/ Propone pump (Operating) - 2 nos. 4 220 m3 LPG/ Propone pump (Standby) - 2 nos.
7.3.6.9 Gas Compressor Protection Panel
Details of pump provided at LPG pump house are given below;
Table 7-36: Details of Gas Compressor Protection Panel(LPG/ Propane Pump Shed) S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 FLP Lights 5 nos. 2 nos. 2 LEL Gas Sensor 1 no. 2 nos. 3 Digital pump discharge line pressure & temp. indicator 2 Sets -
7.3.6.10 TTG with 4 loading bay capacity
Capacity of terminal tanker gantry is given in Table 7-37.
Table 7-37: Details of Loading Bay at Terminal Tanker Gantry S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 ROV for liquid line 4 nos. 4 nos. 2 ROV for Vapor line 4 nos. 4 nos. 3 LEL sensor 2 nos. 2 nos.
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S. No. Description Existing Proposed 4 FLP lighting 13 nos. 14 nos.
7.3.6.11 TTG automation Skid contains
Details of Automation Skid at TTG are given as following;
Table 7-38: Details of Automation Skid at TTG S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 Mass flow meter 4 4 2 Strainer cum vapour eliminator 4 4 3 Digital Pressure indicator cum transmitter 4 4 4 DCV 4 4 5 Batch controller 4 4 6 Earthing relay 4 4
7.3.6.12 Sphere’s instrument/equipment at Bottom
Details of instrument/equipment at sphere’s bottom is given as below;
Table 7-39: Details of Instrument/Equipment at Sphere’s Bottom S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 LEL Gas Sensor 6 6 2 10” ROV 6 12 3 6” ROV 6 6 4 4” ROV 6 6 5 10” out let Temp. indicator cum transmitter 6 6 6 Power JB for instrument power 6 4 7 Signal JB for instrument signal 6 4 8 Lighting JB for Sphere Top lighting 6 4 9 Radar Tank Hub 6 6 10 Radar isolation Switch 6 6
7.3.6.13 Sphere’s instrument/equipment system at Top
Details of instrument/equipment at sphere’s Top is given as below;
Table 7-40: Details of Instrument/Equipment at Sphere’s Top S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 Sphere TOP light 6 6 2 Servo level gauge 6 - 3 High level alarm switch 6 6 4 Digital pressure indicator cum transmitter 6 12 5 Signal JB 6 6 6 Radar level gauge with Pressure transmitter 6 12 7 Multi-level Temperature transmitter 6 6
7.3.6.14 Lightning Arrestor
Details of Lightning arrestor are given as below;
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Table 7-41: Details of Lightning Arrestor S. No. Description Existing Proposed lightning arrestors installed on along with CCTV Camera 1 4 Nos. 4 Nos. inside terminal 2 lightning arrestor install on RF tower 1 No. -
7.3.6.15 Air Compressor
Details of air compressor is given below;
Table 7-42: Details of Air Compressor S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 39CFM rated air compressor 2 nos. -
7.3.6.16 Weighbridge
Details of weighbridge is given below;
Table 7-43: Details of Weighbridge S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 50MT, 16m x 3m electronics weighbridge 2 nos. -
7.3.6.17 Dossing pump
Details of dossing pump is given below;
Table 7-44: Details of Dossing Pump S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 0.3 KW dossing pump 2 nos. 2 nos.
LPG/ Propane Pump House
Additional facility for LPG/ Propane pump house will be installed during proposed expansion. Details of LPG/Propane pump house is given in .
Table 7-45: Details of LPG/ Propane Pump House S. No. Description Existing Proposed 1 10’ ROV - 4 nos. 2 4” FCV( Flow control valve) - 4 Nos 3 4” FCV (for blending unit) - 2 Nos
7.3.7 Warning System
In an off-site management plant, one of the most important pre-requisites is a good “Warning System”. Efficient Warning System will save lives, prevent injuries and reduce losses. Site Coordinator will decide the appropriate Warning System and implement it.
The warning systems are of the following types
Disaster Warning (Maximum Credible Loss Scenario) High Pitched Continuous Wailing Siren Fire / Gas release Long Siren followed by short Siren All Clear Long continuous
Depending upon the nature of hazards and the area affected, other methods of warning may be used.
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7.3.8 Assembly Points
There are 3 following Assembly Points in the terminal;
1. At Culvert near SP-6 2. At Admin office 3. At SP-6 towards Fire Water Pump House
7.3.9 Training
Training is provided to the employee of SHV. Schedule of the training is given in Table 7-46.
Table 7-46: Training Schedule S. No. Schedule of the Training Frequency 1 New Employees (E-Learning Safety Modules) As and when required 2 Training for Operator Quarterly 3 Training for Bulk Tanker Crew Half Yearly 4 Training for Security Quarterly 5 Training for Contractual workmen Quarterly 6 Refreshment Training for engineer Bi monthly
7.3.10 First Aid Arrangement
7.3.10.1 LPG
Prompt medical attention is mandatory in all cases of overexposure to vaporized liquefied petroleum gas. Rescue personnel should be equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus. In the case of frostbite from contact with the liquid phase, place the frost bitten part in warm water, about 40 -42°C. If warm water is not available. Or is impractical to use, wrap the affected part gently in blankets. Encourage the patient to exercise the affected part whilst it is being warmed. Do not remove clothing whilst frosted. Conscious persons should be assisted to anuncontaminated area and inhale fresh air. Quick removal from the contaminated area is most important. Unconscious persons should be removed to an uncontaminated area, and given mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and supplemental oxygen.
Table 7-47: Details of Measures to be taken while Contacting with LPG S. No. Contact Measures Immediately flush with large quantities of tepid water, or with sterile saline 1 Eye solution. Seek medical attention Flush skin with water. In case of irritation or freeze burns, get medical 2 Skin attention. 3 Ingestion Get immediate medical attention. Remove to fresh air. If breathing ceases, administer artificial respiration. Seek 4 Inhalation medical attention.
7.3.10.2 Ethyl Mercaptan
Table 7-48: Details of Measures to be taken while Contacting with Ethyl Mercaptan S. No. Contact Measures Wash eyes immediately with large amounts of water or normal saline, 1 Eye occasionally lifting upper and lower lids, until no evidence of chemical remains. Get medical attention immediately. 2 Skin Remove contaminated clothing, jewelry, and shoes immediately. Wash with
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soap or mild detergent and large amounts of water until no evidence of chemical remains (at least 15-20 minutes). Get medical attention, if needed. Never make an unconscious person vomit or drink fluids. Give sodium bicarbonate solution. When vomiting occurs, keep head lower than hips to 3 Ingestion help prevent aspiration. If person is unconscious, turn head to side. Get medical attention immediately. Remove from exposure immediately. Use a bag valve mask or similar device to 4 Inhalation perform artificial respiration (rescue breathing) if needed. Get medical attention.
7.3.10.3 Antidotes
Table 7-49: Details of Antidotes S. No. Chemical Type of Antidote Existing 1 Snake bite A snake bite Lancet/ Snake Venom Proposed Inhalation: Amyl nitrite Intravenous: Sodium nitrite 2 EM Intravenous: Pyridoxine Intravenous: Urea
7.3.11 The Role of Key Personnel
General code of conduct of all SHV Energy Private Limited staff in an emergency.
The list of SHV Energy Pvt. Ltd. staff with their available telephone numbers at office/residence.
All the personnel shall meet at the designated assembly points. They shall attend to their duties as allocated and shall act accordingly.
The office staff shall meet at the designated muster points. All personnel without specific duties will be allocated duties by the Chief coordinator.
All the personnel are to maintain the following code of conduct.
Prevent panic Prevent spreading of rumors Not to issue statements to public/media. To act as per advice of the Chief coordinator. To guide the personnel of mutual aid emergencies that come to attend emergencies in the terminal.
7.3.11.1 Role of Chief Controller
As soon as he is notified about the incident, he shall proceed to emergency cell at terminal/ jetty. He has overall responsibilities for directing the operations and to control the situation Assess the situation & find out level of emergency from concerned emergency coordinator Ensure that key personnel are called in and convene an emergency meeting of all co-ordinates to discuss and develop plans for rescue operations & also plans to augment the emergency handling team. Direct all emergency operations within the affected area with following priorities:
Safety of public at large.
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Personnel Safety Property Minimum loss of gas supply/resume supply of gas at the earliest.
Continuously review & assess possible developments to determine most probable Cause of events. Get feedback from all co-coordinators at frequent intervals to decide on the future course ofaction. Direct the safe shutdown of system in consultation with emergency coordinator and key personnel, if necessary Check & ensure that all non-essential employees, contractors, consumers, visitors are Informed to leave the incident place. Give instructions to the safety personnel. If necessary, arrange for evacuation of neighbouring population. Ensure that search for causalities within the affected areas has been carried out & arrange for hospital, rescue, police, district emergency authorities etc. Ensure that concerned coordinators lease with outside agencies such as fire brigade, Hospital, rescue, police, district emergency authorities etc. Arrange for up-to-date recording of emergency Not to restart the plant/system unless it is declared safe to start by competent/Authority. Ensure that media / Government / local authorities are provided with adequate &factual information. Assess the magnitude of the situation and decide if the Staff is to be evacuated from their assembly points to identified safer places. Exercise direct operational control over areas other than those affected. Undertake a continuous review of possible developments and assess in consultation with key personnel as to whether shutting down of the plant or any section of the Possible effects on areas outside the factory premises. Liaison with senior officials of Police, Fire Brigade, Medical and Factories inspector and provide advice on possible effects on areas outside the factory Premises Issue authorized statements to news media and ensure that evidence is preserved forinquiries to be conducted by the statutory authorities. Provide advice and information to the Fire and Security Officers and the local fire Services
7.3.11.2 Role of Site Controller/ Isolation Team Leader
As soon as he is notified he should immediately proceed to the site. His primary duty is to take charge at the scene of incident. His responsibilities are as under.
Immediately assess the scale of emergency & take action as per the emergency as per the assessment of risk, if necessary inform Chief controller & other coordinators for activating the Hazard Management Plant. He may be required to take decisions whether to stop or continue Plant Operations Technical decision to control the incident. He must keep in touch/communicates with the chief controller/central office. He may have to execute following responsibilities till Chief controller arrives at the Site.
Direct for evacuation to site & other areas likely to be affected by the emergency. Ensure key persons are called in. Direct all operation within the affected area, stepwise, with the priorities. Secure the safety of personnel, minimize damage to property and environment, and minimize the stoppage of gas supply.
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Direct the search for casualties if any Evacuate non-essential persons from incident area Preserve evidence that will be necessary for subsequent inquiry into the cause of the Emergency and concluding preventive measures. Timely instruction to technical emergency crew. Planning of section isolation/repair works, if necessary All site coordinators must establish the communication link with the Central Office / Chief Controller Secure the safety of persons which may require evacuation to the assembly points in the event of escape of materials if the wind is from an adverse direction. Minimum damage to plant, property and the environment. Prevent spreading and damage to outside the premises
7.3.11.3 Role of Emergency Coordinator
He will be responsible for fire fighting. On hearing the fire alarm, he shall reach the incident scene immediatelyand advise fire and security staff in the terminal of the incident and cancel the alarm. He will also announce or convey through telephones or messengers or canteens to theCommunication Officer, Incident Controller and Site Controller about the incident zone. He will ensure opening of the gates nearest to the incident and stand by to direct the emergency services. Inform the Terminal Manager if there is any large escape of gas. He will assess the situation and in consultation with Chief Controller, release the alarm for emergency by wireless / telephone. He will assume full responsibility for all activities including organizing fire fighting manpower, fire fighting / safety equipment & appliances to control & extinguish the fire. Ensure that Crewmembers are provided with proper safety equipment for tackling the emergency. Guide the Safety & Fire fighting crew by giving clear-cut instructions. Monitoring the emergency actions at terminal / jetty. He will contact Chief Controller and keep in touch with following local authorities and nearby fire services for their help.
Fire Brigade, Porbandar Fire Brigade, Airport Fire Brigade, Navy Fire Brigade, Coast Guard Fire Brigade, Junagadh, Jamanagar & Rajkot Neighbouring industries (Saurashtra Chemicals)
7.3.11.4 Role of Communication & Media Coordinator
Over all in-charge for emergency communication from terminal and other internal communication required according to site situation. He will arrange the following & monitor their working:
VHF communication Telephone communication Instruct the telephone operator(designated) to cancel all call other than those pertaining to emergency
Coordinate with all the outside agencies i.e. State Government, District Authority, Press and Municipal Corporation authorities etc.
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Release written & approved information to those agencies and statutory bodies in consultation with and approval from the chief controller. Make all arrangements to take press & officials to a safer place close to the scene of emergency in order that the officials and photographers get accurate information & details. Deal with the queries of public and relatives of the persons involved. Arrange to inform/get assistance for police, if required. Recruit suitable staff to act as runners between the accident controller and himself if the telephone and other system of communication fall. Also maintain contact with congregation points like Canteen etc. Maintain prior agreed inventory in the Control Room Maintain a log of the incident on tape: and In case of prolonged emergency, involving risk to outside areas by wind-blown materials, contact local meteorological office to receive early notification of changes in weather conditions and inform the safety & fire in-charge accordingly. Set up communication points and establish contact with Emergency Control Center in the event of failure of electric supply and thereby Public Address System and Internal telephones
7.3.11.5 Role of Transport, Security, Police & Medical Coordinator
Transport requirements shall be looked after by the security officer/supervisor. He will mobilize the necessary required vehicles for the use of:
Site coordinator & his crew Other coordinator Police officials
Arrange vehicles to evacuate persons/casualties from incident place/plant to the hospital. In addition to our own vehicle, if necessary, arrange for hired vehicle. Depute the security guards for manning gates and traffic control at scene of emergency Prevent unauthorized entry in the plant/scene of incident Mobilize additional security force for help. Direct ambulance & emergency vehicles to the incident scene. He will contact immediately to chief emergency coordinator. He will arrange for necessary treatment as first aid/hospitals and call ambulance for emergency if required. Arrange for round the clock persons at hospitals to look after the need of the affected personnel. He will arrange for blood in co-ordination with blood bank, if necessary. Look after rehabilitation of affected persons on discontinuation of emergency Ensure that casualties receive adequate attention / Arrange additional help, if required and inform relatives When emergency is prolonged, arrange for the relief of personnel and organize refreshments / catering facility in consultation with Welfare/Finance Coordinator.
7.3.11.6 Role of Control Room Coordinator
The control room is manned round the clock; the operator is vigilant at all times. Continues monitoring of the gas detection system and any abnormality should be acted upon immediately. In case of heavy leakage inform PGVCL to switch off power supply to the area quickly. If any abnormality is known, (information from the first person) should act as follows:
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Isolate the area of emergency to stop flow of the product using ROV’s or by advising staff to close valves. Advise suspension of all activities at the terminal and jetty. Inform the in charge of the emergency. Seek assistance from mutual aid members. Inform Head office on instructions from Chief coordinator. He shall not leave the control room without the instructions from Chief coordinator. The operator shall log all activities in the logbook for record keeping.
7.3.12 Fire Order
1. Fire order is a plan, which clearly specifies the role of individuals to perform while handling any emergency situation, with the main aim of avoiding confusion and building confidence. 2. Main tasks to be performed:
To raise alarm on noticing any emergency to attract the attention of all personnel. To stop all on-going operations to curtail the level of emergency To communicate for necessary assistance To initiate immediate action for fire fighting operation To alert the surroundings for alertness To inform the media people about the events
3. On seeing/knowing any emergency, the alarm should be raised using the manual call points by breaking the glass and the siren will be automatically on. The person in the fire water pump should ensure the readiness of the pumps. All the operations like LPG lorry loading/all pipeline transfer operations etc. should be stopped immediately by the respective officers in charge. All the trucks inside the premises should be moved to safe location by the transport coordinator with the help of the security staff. 4. The fire coordinator advises the respective squad to take over the position depending on the situation. He also co-ordinates the communication for help from mutual aid members and fire services & medical aid. 5. The fire-fighting squad reaches the spot and initiates the fire fighting operation. The engineering squad ensures the operation of fire fighting equipments and systems and assists the fire fighting operation. The prime motto of fire fighting operation would be to curtail the fire and avoid its spreading to other areas through sprinkler system for cooling. After ensuring that, the putting off of fire will be done with the help of fire extinguishers. The cooling of the facilities should not be carried out in case of electrical fires. The supply should be put off and the equipments should be isolated first before initiating fire-fighting operation. 6. Meanwhile, the first aid squad with the help of fire fighting squad (for providing water curtain) will carry out rescue operation and remove the trapped persons to safe area. The fire pump room, fire fighting equipment response gear and the emergency control room are located outside the damage distance curves. 7. In addition to the main entry/exit gate, one other gate is provided for escape in case of emergencies. Escape routes from each area to the assembly point are to be used. The first aid treatment will be given and if it is necessary they will be moved to hospitals for further medical aid. 8. Communication squad will organize the assistance of mutual aid members and the fire services & medical aid. In addition the Statutory Authorities, like District Authorities etc. will be informed about the incident and for necessary assistance and also inform the press and higher authorities of the company. 9. Transport squad will arrange to shift the trucks to safe places and avoid congestion of the entrance for free access to fire services and medical aid. The team will also lead them away
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from the affected site to avoid accumulation of personnel near the entrance & arrange for regulation of traffic in/out of the terminal. 10. At the end of the operation the Fire Coordinator will declare the end of operation by giving all clear signal on siren and review the events with the colleagues and outside agencies. A detailed report will be submitted to the authorities regarding the incident and the action sequence for records. 11. For more effective operation, periodical drills will be conducted for familiarizing and to develop confidence and co-ordination between groups and outside agencies. Mock drills shall be carried out at least twice a year. The shortfall noticed would be reviewed by the Fire Coordinator and suggestions for improvement will be implemented. 12. The free space available, north of main gate is designated as common truck parking of all trucks. The number of trucks required for filling will be called for by using VHF communication system.
7.3.13 Terminal Fire Order
In case of fire at terminal following role is played by specific designated personnel.
Table 7-50: List of Key Personnel- Terminal Disaster Management Role Designation Chief Incident Controller Sr. Terminal Manager Site Controller/ Isolation Team Leader Project & Maintenance Manager Emergency Coordinator Sr. Safety Officer Control Room Coordinator Terminal Engineer/Shift In-charge Fire Fighting Team Fire Fighting Team Leader Shift In-charge Deluge Valve Operator SCBA Set/Fire Proximity Suit Operator Fire Extinguisher Operator Water Monitors Operator Fire Water Pump House Operator Hose ( Team -I ) 3 Operator Hose (Team–Ii) 3 Operator Communication, Transport & Welfare Commercial Officer First-Aid & Hospitalization Office Boy/Security Evacuation & Head Count Security Supervisor/Security In-charge
7.3.14 Jetty Fire Order
In case of fire at jetty following role is played by specific designated personnel.
Table 7-51: List of Key Personnel- Jetty Disaster Management Role Designation Chief Incident Controller Sr. Terminal Manager Site Controller/ Isolation Team Leader Project & Maintenance Manager Emergency Coordinator Sr. Safety Officer Fire Fighting Team Leader Jetty Engineer Engine Start Up Operator Trolley Monitors Operator
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Water Curtain Operator Double Hydrants Operator Security Security Zone/ Security Guards
7.3.15 Safety & Health Policy
Accidents are preventable if the safety policies and procedures laid out by the management are strictly complied/adhered to.
Safety & health of employees, safety of plant and safety of environment are of paramount importance.
The existing staffs at SHV Energy Pvt. Ltd. storage terminal consist of 32 persons.
A safety committee exists in the SHV Energy Pvt. Ltd. plant and consists of following members.
Figure 7-12: Safety Committee of SHV
The tenure of the above committee is 2 years and shall meet as often as necessary but at least once in a quarter.
The main functions of the safety committee include.
Compliance of SHV Gas Safety Standards. Creating safety awareness among workers. Dealing with all matters concerning health, safety and environment and to arrive at safe and practicable solutions. Undertaking educational, training and promotional activities.
The existing Safety, Health & Environment policy of SHV has been promulgated separately for compliance.
7.3.16 Emergency Contact Details11
Following telephone numbers are listed for the emergency;
Table 7-52: Emergency Telephone Numbers - Porbandar Name Of Office Office Tel. No. Fire Brigade 0286- 101,102, 2240918 2246443 Collector 0286-2243800
1
11 Telephone numbers need to be kept updated.
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Name Of Office Office Tel. No. D.S.P. 0286-2211222, 2240916 Dy.Collector 0286-2241085, 2251903 Police Station : Subhash Nagar 0286-2241006 Police Station: Kirti Mandir 0286-2240944 Police Station: Hanuman Gufa 0286-2242473 Police Station: Kamala Baug 0286-2240945 Mamalatdar-Porbandar 0286-2240915 Taluka Development Officer 0286-2242439 Gujarat Maritime Board Port Officer 0286-2242408 Traffic Officer 0286-2242438/ 2243005 Supt. Officer 0286-2247516 Model Gate 0286-2242525 Gujarat Electricity Board 0286-2220343, 2240931, 2246546, 2243009, Indian Navy 0286-2240954, 2242434 Indian Coast Guard 0286-2240958
Table 7-53: Emergency Telephone Numbers of Hospital - Porbandar Name Of Office Office Tel. No. Sahayog Hospital 0286-2245525 Orthopaedic Surgeon- Dr.Balat 0286-2245525 ENT Specialist- Dr. Mahendra Nadha 0286-2245525 Ladies Doctor 0286-2241955 Suruchi Hospital 0286-2247700 Surgeon, MS 0286-247700 Dr.Kirit. D. Devani Hospital 0286-2246650 Dr. N.U.Jadeja Hospital 0286-2241105 Dr. Krishna H. Rughani, Ladies Hospital 0286-2242596 Dr.Bhanukant Patel,E.N.T. Specialist 0286-2244984 Dr.Parvani Orthopaedic Hospital 0286-2246771 Dr.N.K.Lakhani’s Hospital 0286-2245778 Dr. Arun Shah, M.D. 0286-2245206 Dr. Suresh Gandhi Hosp.M.D. -Heart Spe. 0286-2242610 Dr.Katbamana Dental Surgeon 0286-2246309 Dr. Kargathara Dental Surgeon 0286-2246194 Dr. Divakar Nanavati D.G.O. 0286-2241082 Bhavsinghji Hospital 0286-2240923, 2242910 Rupariba Ladies Hospital 0286-2242542 Asha Children’s Hospital 0286-2246911 Siddhi Hospital (Dr. Modi) 0286-2246099 Royal Maternity Hospital 0286-2246269 Lion’s Medical Centre 0286-2246906 Lohana Mahajan Hospital 0286-2245248 V.V.Hospital 0286-2246900
Table 7-54: Emergency Telephone Numbers of Fire Brigade- Junagadh, Jamnagar & Rajkot
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S. No. Area Telephone No. 1 Junagadh 0285 -101 2 Jamnagar 0288 -101 3 Rajkot 0281 –101
Table 7-55: Emergency Telephone Nos.-Ambulance Porbandar S. No. Ambulance Providers Telephone No. 0286-2253159 (O) --Till 1300 Hrs 1 Sudama Travels 0286-2251034 (O) --After 1300 Hrs 2 Pbr. Chamber Of Commerce 0286-2244454 (O) 3 Sudama Seva Sarvajanic Trust 0286-2240920 (O) 0286-2247956 (O) 4 Sagar Shakti Sangh 0286-2212213 (O)
Table 7-56: List of Villages within 3 Km Radius of Factories Name of villages within 3 km Name of villages S.No. Name of the Factory Radius within 5 km 1 SHV Energy Private Limited Jawar, SubhashNagar Bokhira, Kuchhadi 2 Saurashtra Chemicals Limited Chhaya, Porbandar Ratanpar, Odadar 3 Saurashtra Cements Limited Ranavav, Adityana, Kajavadari NIL
Table 7-57: List of Factories in Porbandar District Category Type Storage Company Major Accident Hazard SHV Energy Private Limited, Jawar Village, I LPG (MAH) Porbandar Ammonia, Soda-ash Saurashtra Chemicals, Porbandar City II Major Industry Saurashtra Cement, Ranavav, Porbandar Cement Dist. Ammonia VXL Industries Limited Amar Cold Storage, Jawar village, Ammonia Porbandar Cham Ice & Cold Storage, Bokhira, Ammonia Porbandar III Minor Industry Ammonia Silver Sea Food, Jawar village, Porbandar Poonam Ice & Cold Storage, Nr. New Fish Ammonia Market,Porbandar Hodar Export Pvt.Ltd., Jawar village, Ammonia Porbandar Ammonia Rubicon Industries, GIDCPorbandar
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