The EU-China Climate Agreement: Building Success at the Crucial Glasgow Summit
Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) 28 October 2020
The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit
Antxon Olabe Egaña
The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit
Antxon Olabe Egaña | Environmental economist and writer, author of the book ‘Crisis climática-ambiental. La hora de la responsabilidad’ (Galaxia Gutenberg, 2016) and adviser on climate change and the energy transition to the Cabinet of the Vice- President and Minister for Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge of the Government of Spain.
Contents (1) Introduction...... 2 (2) Impacts of the climate crisis on China ...... 6 (3) China’s responsibility for global emissions ...... 8 (4) China and the Paris Agreement...... 11 (5) The US and China...... 14 (6) Europe and China ...... 16 (7) The turning point for the EU ...... 18 (8) The EU–China climate agreement ...... 19 (9) Conclusions ...... 20
(1) Introduction Governments around the world have reacted to the COVID-19 pandemic by placing 4 billion people in lockdown. The crisis has resulted in the biggest contraction to the global economy since the Great Depression in the run-up to the Second World War. Governments have mobilised US$9 trillion for the economic recovery.1
Yet so far, the response to the climate crisis has not been of the same scale in terms of its seriousness and the mobilisation of resources. Faced with a systemic crisis over the short, medium and long term as a result of the destabilisation of the climate system and the degradation of the biosphere, we are worse prepared. The response to this crisis has been an uphill struggle. It is three decades since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its first synthesis report in 1990 and the situation has worsened significantly. We run the risk of losing control of the climate crisis altogether, resulting in an inhospitable planet, a scenario described as ‘Hothouse Earth’.2 Against the backdrop of an unpredictable US presidential election, an ambitious climate
1 International Energy Agency (2020), Sustainable Recovery: World Energy Outlook Special Report, Paris, https://www.iea.org/reports/sustainable-recovery. 2 Will Steffen, Johan Rockström, Katherine Richardson, Timothy M. Lenton, Carl Folke, Diana Liverman et al. (2018), ‘Trajectories of the earth system in the anthropocene’, PNAS, vol. 115, nr 33, p. 8252–8259, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1810141115.
2 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
agreement between Europe and China will be key to building a renewed response from the international community.
This working paper highlights the importance of such an agreement. Given the current international outlook, it provides a credible lever to activate the rest of the international community to ensure the success of the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26), keeping the Paris Agreement alive and ensuring its credibility. COP26, which will take place in the Scottish city of Glasgow in November 2021, will be the most important since 2015. In the intervening 5+1 years, the messages of the scientific community on climate have taken on an increasingly alarming tone. We are now talking about a climate emergency. In the wake of the dramatic experience of COVID-19, this word has taken on specific connotations.
This paper explicitly acknowledges the many difficulties in key areas of the current relationship between the EU and China. Its message is simple and direct: there is currently nothing more urgent and important on the EU’s international agenda than raising the climate ambitions of the international community, particularly China, which is responsible for a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions.
In its special report on the 1.5°C scenario, the IPCC argues that global emissions must fall by at least a quarter by 2030.3 This is the ambition that needs to crystallise in Glasgow. The climate emergency we are facing requires us to emerge from the Scottish summit with the hope of being able to bring it under control.
The economic context created by the COVID-19 crisis and the financial risks emerging from the energy system as a consequence of climate change and the energy transition both influence this priority. In terms of the economic context, the fundamental reference is the Sustainable Recovery report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), published in June 2020.4 Describing the pandemic as the biggest economic shock since the 1930s, the agencies calculate that around 300 million people lost their jobs in the first half of 2020 and estimate that GDP will contract by around 6% this year. The expansive waves of this shock have had a systemic effect on the economy as a whole, including the energy sector, where investments in fossil technologies are expected to fall by 20%.
In response to this contraction, the IEA and IMF published their Sustainable Recovery report, setting out a plan for the next three years (2021-23). The plan is based on six priorities: electricity, transport, buildings, industry, fuel and emerging technologies. The IEA estimates it will create or preserve 9 million jobs, requiring an additional US$1 trillion investment each year. However, more importantly in the context of this paper the IEA argues that applying the measures in the plan would mean global CO₂ emissions will peak in 2019 before beginning a structural decline.
3 IPCC (2018), ‘Summary for policymakers’, in V. Masson-Delmotte et al. (Eds.), Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, World Meteorological Organisation, Geneva, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/. 4 IEA (2020), Sustainable Recovery, https://www.iea.org/reports/sustainable-recovery.
3 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
First, the plan includes measures to promote mature renewable technologies like solar and wind and accelerate the expansion of electricity transmission and distribution grids. To address the second priority, the plan advocates zero-emissions mobility, using both electric vehicles and rail transport. The third priority is based around systematically improving the efficiency of buildings. Fourthly, there is a call for more efficient manufacturing, textiles and food industries. In fifth place, the report advocates the production and use of cleaner fuels. Finally, it calls for innovation in areas such as hydrogen power, batteries and carbon capture and use.
The risks of the financial system have been comprehensively analysed by Carbon Tracker.5 Its report argues that the energy transition is already having a disruptive impact on the fossil energy system, with far-reaching consequences for the stability of financial markets (and international geopolitics), given the value of the assets involved. Carbon Tracker calculates the value of shares in the fossil sector traded on international financial markets to be US$18 trillion (a quarter of the total), in addition to US$8 trillion of bonds (half the total value).
The risk to the financial system comes from its exposure to a fossil system that is suffering from the market forces created by increasingly competitive and efficient renewable technologies and advances in public policy on climate, particularly in Europe. This means a growing number of subsectors of the fossil system are reaching peak demand, resulting in a structural decline in prices and profits and the appearance of stranded assets.6 The economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has severely affected global transport and mobility (oil), have aggravated the underlying trends. For example, following losses of US$7 billion in the second quarter of 2020 and after cutting its dividend by half for the first time in a decade, the multinational BP has announced as part of its strategy to achieve zero net emissions by 2050 that it will reduce oil and gas production by 40% by 2030 and is embarking on a migration towards renewable energy.
Carbon Tracker estimates the difference in the value of the fossil system, as calculated by states with large oil and gas reserves (and to a lesser extent coal), and a scenario in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement, which will see the majority of these assets (oil, gas and coal) remain in the ground, to be around US$100 trillion (to give a sense of scale, the World Bank estimated global GDP to be US$87.7 trillion in 2019). 7 This enormous sum reflects the importance of an ordered and prudent energy transition. There are increasingly urgent demands from the regulatory and supervisory authorities of the financial system for its agents to analyse their exposure and associated risk and
5 Carbon Tracker (2020), Decline and Fall: The Size & Vulnerability of the Fossil Fuel System, https://carbontracker.org/reports/decline-and-fall/. 6 Total aggregate demand for fossil fuels in OECD countries peaked in 2005; in Europe, power generation from fossil fuels peaked in 2006; global demand for carbon in 2013; investment in exploration and production in 2014; demand for internal combustion vehicles in 2017; and global power generation from fossil fuels in 2018. Global aggregate demand for fossil fuels may have peaked in 2019. 7 World Bank Open Data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
4 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
gradually prepare for an inevitable transition, avoiding the sudden bursting of the ‘carbon bubble’ and the systemic damage this would cause.
The EU would also like to see the vast sums of money mobilised as part of the recovery from COVID-19 pandemic aligned with the European Green Deal, which means supporting efficiency and renewable energy. 8 In specific terms, the EU wants the distribution of resources to support the objectives of decarbonisation by 2030, reaching 50% to 55% of 1990 levels, instead of the current reduction of 40%. This forms part of the long-term strategic objective for the continent to be climate neutral by 2050.
The EU is at a critical juncture at which a number of major trends converge, involving a number of critical aspects. On the one hand, there is the acceleration of the climate crisis and the urgent demands from climate science to bring forward decarbonisation to ensure the objectives of the Paris Agreement remain viable. On the other, there is the need to reduce the exposure of the European and international financial system to risk. This comes against the backdrop of the European Council agreement to inject €1.8 trillion into the economy to modernise the productive and industrial base of the EU.
All this means that the climate agreement between the EU and China will be key to the success of COP26 in Glasgow in November 2021. The mitigation proposals presented at the summit by the various countries must allow the emissions trajectory to be reduced by at least 25% of the current level by 2030.
There will not be another climate summit at this level (involving heads of state and government from the majority of the international community) until 2025. As such, failure to deliver at the summit will endanger the emissions trajectory for the coming decade, since the time lag between decisions being adopted and their practical implementation on the ground leaves little room for manoeuvre at the next summit in 2025. And all the while the time available to bring the climate emergency under control is running out…
This paper begins with a synthesis of the main impacts of the climate crisis on the People’s Republic of China, based on studies by Chinese scientists. It also analyses China’s responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions. With 21.5% of the cumulative total between 1990 and 2019, the Asian country has been the largest emitter of CO₂ since the IPCC issued its first synthesis report. At present (based on data from 2018), it is responsible for 25% of global greenhouse gas emissions.
8 The significance for both the EU and Spain of the historic European Council summit in July 2020 should also be highlighted. The importance of the economic and financial outcomes ranks alongside the approval of the single currency. As of the autumn of 2020, the EU had already allocated €420 billion to the most urgent measures to combat the recession triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. The summit approved additional funding of €750 billion (€390 billion in grants and €360 billion in loans) funded by bonds issued by the European Commission. The Recovery and Resilience Facility will receive 90% of these funds. In terms of their disbursement, 70% are earmarked for the first two years (2021 and 2022) and 30% for 2023. This sum is supplemented by the EU budget for 2021-27 of €1 trillion, 30% of which will go towards the response to the climate emergency. The measures planned by the European Council for repayment of the funds raised by the joint issue of bonds include taxes on single-use plastics and carbon border adjustments, as well as extending the emissions trading system for international air and sea transport.
5 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
The paper then reflects on the geopolitical context created by the current US Administration’s strategy of containment towards China. It then analyses the key events and documents that have defined the relationship between the EU and China in recent years. After highlighting the turning point in the climate ambitions of the EU (the goal of a climate-neutral continent by 2050), the paper ends by setting out some minimums the EU must require of China for the mitigation of emissions as part of a broad and comprehensive agreement between the two powers.
This last aspect is especially relevant given the clash of narratives for the ‘green exit’ from the crisis after the pandemic. Some Chinese and European think tanks have argued that the most important aspect at present is not insisting on specific mitigation measures for the 2030 horizon but influencing the economic recovery and the creation of jobs, ensuring a push for renewable technologies.9
However, this approach is not enough to respond to the climate emergency. The EU must avoid adhering to a vague narrative that hides specific commitments: it is not enough to defend the ‘green character’ of the post-COVID economic recovery. The Glasgow summit must deliver specific goals for 2030 and long-term commitments to decarbonisation.
(2) Impacts of the climate crisis on China China is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The environmental crisis created by its model of development over the last four decades has become an obstacle to economic progress and social prosperity over the coming decades. The problems facing the country include air pollution in cities, desertification, its extraordinarily high population density in the fertile zones of rivers and deltas, pockets of poverty that persist in the interior and the complex assimilation of its immense internal migration.
Its political leaders are aware that the ‘great leap forward’ following the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping in 1979 has come at a price, seriously damaging the environment and the country’s natural systems, endangering the viability of its future development. As early as 2012, the Chinese Communist Party coined the slogan ‘building an ecological civilisation’ and incorporated it into the country’s Constitution. The country understands that economic development is meaningless if it fails to preserve its natural capital and environmental quality in the long term. Climate change and air pollution were declared national security problems in 2014 in the first National Security Bluebook, presented to the National Security Council.
Similarly, a speech by President Xi Jinping at the National Conference on Environmental Protection in May 2018 set out a detailed programme to preserve the country’s natural capital while issuing a stark warning: ‘The natural environment is the basis of human
9 Rachel Waldholz (2020), ‘Hopes for EU-China climate deal centre on a green recovery’, China Dialogue, 17/VI/2020, https://chinadialogue.net/en/climate/hopes-for-eu-china-climate-deal-centre-on-a-green- recovery/.
6 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
survival and development, and changes to it directly impact the rise and fall of civilisations’.10
The Chinese authorities have published various reports on the impact of climate change on the country. The third national assessment report on climate change in 2015 included contributions from over 500 Chinese scientists. It found that under the scenario of an average global atmospheric temperature increase of 2°C, average temperatures in China would rise between 2.7°C and 2.9°C. Moreover, worsening droughts will intensify the degradation of soils, a major issue in Inner Mongolia and the Beijing region.11 The progressive retreat of glaciers,12 the increased frequency and severity of droughts and the fall in precipitation and its increased variability all create uncertainty regarding the availability of water in the second half of the twenty-first century. China has just 2,310 m³ of natural water available per capita per year, a quarter of the global average. In the dry zones of the north, this figure is just 785 m³, well below the United Nations severe water stress threshold of 1,000 m³, at which the probability of cuts and interruptions to supplies increases significantly.
Rising sea levels and the accompanying risk of wide-scale flooding in coastal areas is also cause for concern.13 July 2020 saw the worst floods since 1998, with 33 rivers breaching their historic records and requiring the authorities to adopt ‘wartime’ measures. In the province of Jiangxi, 400,000 people were evacuated due to the risk of a large dam collapsing. An estimated 27 million people have been affected, around 150 have lost their lives and the army has been widely mobilised.14
According to reports by the IPCC, over 80 million people are exposed to rising sea levels and the penetration of storms, making China one of the world’s most at-risk countries. In specific terms, the Yangtze river delta is one of the regions at greatest risk, due to its high economic value and large population. Other areas affected by this issue include the central and south-east coast, especially major cities around Liaoning, Beijing-Tianjin- Hebei, the Shandong Peninsula and the Pearl River Delta.
Another cause for concern is the potential for climate change to impact the large-scale hydraulic engineering works of recent years, especially the Three Gorges Dam, which was completed in 2011 after 18 years of construction, and the South-North Water
10 Xi Jinping (2019), ‘Pushing China’s development of an ecological civilization to a new stage’, Qiushi Journal: Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, vol. 11, nr 2, http://english.qstheory.cn/2019-09/17/c_1124932126.htm. 11 Frequent sand and dust storms are the consequences of the deterioration in the integrity of soils. Combined with atmospheric pollution, these have caused serious problems in many Chinese cities in recent years. 12 Glaciers are retreating at an alarming pace. There are 46,377 glaciers in the Tian Shan, Karakorum, Kunlun and Himalaya mountains, 80% of which have seen their surface shrink over the last few decades. The zones of the south west and west are extremely vulnerable to reductions in water flows as a result of this contraction. According to the World Bank, glaciers could lose up to 45% of their volume by the end of the 21st century. See C. Sall (2013), ‘Climate trends and impacts on China’, World Bank. 13 China’s coast makes up 17% of the country’s surface area but is responsible for three-quarters of its GDP. 14 Lily Kuo (2020), ‘China floods: “wartime” measures brought in to tackle worst deluge in decades’, The Guardian, 13/VII/2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/13/china-floods-wartime-measures- brought-in-to-tackle-worst-deluge-in-decades.
7 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
Transport Project, a huge canal whose construction is now under way and scheduled for completion in 2050.15 Given the scenarios created by climate change, the size of both infrastructure projects casts doubts over the long-term sustainability of flows at the mouth of the Yangtze River in the Shanghai region, one of the country’s economic powerhouses.
Finally, climate change will reduce the lack of arable land. China feeds 18% of the world’s population with just 7% of its arable land. Approximately 60% of harvests come from the cereal plains of the north (wheat and sorghum), a region characterised by a relative scarcity of water, while the main crop in the south-east is rice. The government has prioritised food security in response to the political and social risk of continued dependency on other countries for food imports. Chinese leaders are all too aware that rural famines have caused the majority of social uprisings in the country’s history, resulting in various dynasties losing their ‘Mandate of Heaven’.16
Ensuring the population has enough to eat has thus been the cornerstone of the Chinese Communist Party’s policies since the constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Aware of the growing difficulty of full self-sufficiency in terms of food and the disruptive scenarios of climate change, for some years now, the Chinese government has been acquiring fertile land in Africa and Latin America.
(3) China’s responsibility for global emissions According to the IEA, global GDP increased by 2.9% in 2019, while CO₂ emissions from energy and cement production remained the same as in 2018 (33 billion tonnes), following slight increases in 2017 and 2018. The stabilisation was due to the fall in emissions from power generation in developed countries as a result of the advance of renewable technologies and switching from coal to gas.
The IEA estimates that CO₂ emissions could fall by around 8% in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying contraction in global GDP, the largest annual fall since the Second World War. However, what really matters is not the figure for an exceptional year but the long-term dynamics of emissions to identify the underlying trends.
15 The scheme will allow the Chinese government to transfer 44 billion m³ of water a year from the Yangtze River to the arid north through a network of three enormous canals. The cost of the scheme has been estimated at US$62 billion. 16 A characteristic feature of the Chinese model distilled throughout its history is the supremacy of the State. In Chinese culture, the State has always been at the heart of power as an expression of the extension of the Emperor’s ‘Mandate of Heaven’. It was the Confucian Mencius (379-289 BC) who first established the doctrine that the state should ensure the education, prosperity and well-being of all, avoiding hardship and misery insofar as possible. Failure to do so would mean the Emperor losing his ‘Mandate of Heaven’, which would justify the people rising up against his authority and imposing a new dynasty. The legitimacy derived from the secular tradition of China is thus based on the ability to generate prosperity. The government must improve standards of living, starting with access to food. In contrast, concepts like ‘popular sovereignty’, the ‘social contract’ and ‘constitutional democracy’ fail to resonate in Chinese political culture. See David M. Lampon (2015), Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, University of California Press, Berkeley.
8 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
For historic reasons, the baseline for this analysis is 1990. One of the recurring themes in international climate negotiations over the last 30 years has been the responsibility for historic emissions, taking into account the fact that developed economies have emitted far more than other countries since the times of the Industrial Revolution. This argument is undeniable.
According to the most reliable estimates, the breakdown of CO₂e emissions between 1850 and 2010 is roughly as follows:17
• US: 482 GtCO₂e (18.6% of the total) • EU-27: 443 GtCO₂e (17.1% of the total) • China: 299 GtCO₂e (11.6%) • Russia: 186 GtCO₂e (7.2%) • Indonesia: 123 GtCO₂e (4.7%) • India: 108 GtCO₂e (4.2%) • Brazil: 101 GtCO₂e (3.9%) • Japan: 73 GtCO₂e (2.8%) • Global total: 2,585 GtCO₂e
However, prior to 1990, the lack of robust knowledge on climate change meant the issue had not yet decisively influenced public policy and international agreements. Nonetheless, since 1965, at least in the US, there has been awareness of the foreseeable impact of CO₂ emissions on the atmosphere, for example in speeches by President Lyndon B. Johnson. However, this knowledge was not yet mature.
The first synthesis report of the IPCC marked a turning point. Published in 1990, it heralded the start of systematic knowledge produced by an independent international scientific authority. The standard baseline for IPCC publications is 1990.
This is not to belittle the significance of emissions prior to this date, it merely reflects that climate science had not yet established the cognitive foundations of the problem in a sufficiently robust manner. As such, emissions by countries during the first half of the twentieth century do not have the same ‘responsibility’ as those during the twenty-first century, given the increased awareness of the issues at stake.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the cumulative emissions of the biggest emitters from 1990 to 2019.
17 Michel G.J. den Elzen, J.G.J. Olivier, Niklas Höhne & Greet Janssens-Maenhout (2013), ‘Countries’ contribution to climate change. Effect of accounting for all greenhouse gases, recent trends, basic needs and technological progress’, Climatic Change, nr 121, p. 397–412, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013- 0865-6.
9 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
Figure 1. Total cumulative CO₂ emissions from energy and the manufacture of cement by time period (millions of tonnes; percentage of the global total for the period)
1990-2019 2000-19 2010-019
Gt % Gt % Gt %
China 180.82 21.5 150.75 24.9 96.47 30.0
US 168.15 20.0 113.62 18.7 53.96 16.9
EU-28 120.56 14.0 77.70 12.8 35.50 11.1
Russia 49.998 5.9 31.96 5.3 16.51 5.1
India 42.76 5.0 34.67 5.7 22.17 6.9
World 840.47 100.0 606.19 100.0 319.55 100.0
Source: the authors, based on data from the Global Carbon Atlas (Global Carbon Project 2020) and the IEA 2020.
Approximately 56% of CO₂ emissions (from energy and cement) since the second half of the eighteenth century are concentrated in the last 30 years.18 This means that the climate crisis has largely been caused by emissions generated after the establishment of the IPCC and the approval of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the cornerstone of the international climate system.
There are a number of factors to consider when evaluating the responsibility of China for these emissions:19
(1) The proportion of CO₂ emissions from China has been highest during the period 1990-2019. Moreover, it has been increasing over time. While China has generated 21.5% of emissions over the 30-year period, during the last two decades this figure has risen to 24.9% and 30% for the last decade (Figure 1).
(2) At present, the United States has the highest per capita emissions among large emitters, followed by Russia. China’s emissions have been higher than the EU since 2013. The current annual per capita CO₂ emissions of the EU are 7 tonnes a year, compared to 7.5 tonnes in China. China is also set to overtake Japan (Figure 2).
18 Figures from Our World in Data: https://ourworldindata.org/. 19 The argument that China (or other countries) should not take ‘responsibility’ for emissions associated with exports to other economies but that this responsibility should instead fall to the countries that import and consume the products goes against the IPCC recommendation. Citizens of a country cannot take responsibility for the emissions of an energy system over which they have no control and no decision- making power. For example, while the EU imports products manufactured in China, it lacks the real power to decide if these products are manufactured under a system based on coal or renewable energies. It is the Chinese government that makes this decision and it alone is responsible for the country’s direct emissions. It is meaningless to argue otherwise and the counterargument can be used as a smokescreen to hide responsibility associated with the decisions of individual countries.
10 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
Figure 2. Per capita emissions of the biggest emitters, 1990-2018
Source: UNPD; EDGAR v5.0 (EC-JRC/PBL, 2019) FT2018; incl. Savannah fires FAO; F-gas: EDGAR v4.2 FT2018.
(3) Global greenhouse gas emissions for 2018 (the last year available) totalled 55.3 GtCO₂e. According to United Nations reports, China was responsible for 25% of this total, followed by the United States with 12.5%, the EU with 7.9%, India with 7.1%, Russia with 4.3% and Japan with 2.9%.20
The report found that global emissions must be reduced from 55.3 GtCO₂e in 2018, to 40 GtCO₂e in 2030 to ensure the trajectory is compatible with the goal to limit the average increase in the temperature of the atmosphere to 2°C (the corresponding figure for the 1.5°C scenario is 25 GtCO₂e). This requires a reduction of at least 15 GtCO₂e with respect to 2018 levels, impossible without a major commitment by China.
(4) China and the Paris Agreement President Xi Jinping has afforded the concept of an ecological civilisation a prominent place in his strategic vision. In a speech titled ‘Pushing China’s Development of an Ecological Civilisation to a New Stage’, after citing the classics of Chinese culture –I Ching, Tao Te Ching, Mencius and Xun Kuang– the President set out a series of inspiring principles to guide the advance towards an ecological civilisation: ‘These concepts all stress the importance of uniting heaven, earth, and man, following the rules of nature, and using what nature has to offer with patience and restraint, and show that our ancestors well understood the need to properly handle the relationship between man and nature. [...] Humanity is a community with a shared future’.21
20 United Nations Environment Programme (2019), Emissions Gap Report, Nairobi, https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2019. 21 Xi Jinping (2019), ‘Pushing China’s development of an ecological civilization to a new stage’, Qiushi Journal: Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, vol. 11, nr 2, http://english.qstheory.cn/2019-09/17/c_1124932126.htm.
11 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
There are a number of fundamental reasons why China must be involved in bringing the climate crisis under control: the need to preserve the natural capital of the country, the sustainability of its agriculture (essential to ‘feed the people’) and preventing the destabilisation of the climate from undoing the progress and stability of the last 40 years, which could jeopardise China’s re-emergence on the international stage.
Chinese leaders are aware that their country is facing the 21st century with a favourable tailwind. In just four decades, it has led the largest economic development in history, lifting millions of people out of poverty. On the world stage, it has gone from being on the sidelines to vying with the US to be the major power of the 21st century. The reforms of Deng Xiaoping after the death of Mao Zedong ended a period of three decades from 1949 to 1979 in which, even if China found its footing on the international stage, it had to overcome a series of political and economic disasters at home, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, which led the country into an alleyway of poverty and a crisis of confidence.
The tradition for strategic thought provides Chinese political leadership with a formidable toolkit to tackle the geopolitical challenges faced by a rising power. Climate change, however, is a game changer: traditional strategic thought developed to tackle conventional enemies is no longer enough. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War remains a classic but climate change –for which China shoulders significant responsibility– requires a different approach, since there is no ‘outside enemy’ to be defeated. The enemy –if we can speak of an enemy– is the fossil energy system, which has provided the foundations for China’s formidable economic and industrial rise.
Bringing the climate crisis under control requires a profound global technological transition in a relatively short period of time. This can only be done with a strong push from governments, civil society, the scientific community, businesses and the international financial sector. It requires the motivating force of a new vision and a new way of capturing emerging scientific knowledge on the ecological relationship between humans and the biosphere. The holistic nature of Chinese civilisation means it is well- equipped to address the new way of ‘thinking the world’ required by the climate emergency and the environmental crisis. The concept of an ecological civilisation advocated by president Xi Jinping and incorporated into the country’s Constitution is a key example of this conceptual renewal.
China has also become a major supporter of the United Nations Environment Programme, making environmental protection –both inside and outside its borders– a major part of its international soft power. The 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD15), which will take place in China in 2021, will mark the country’s debut in a global forum for nature-based solutions to counteract the loss of ecological diversity and functions of natural systems, an area in which it has become an international leader in recent years.
The country is also in the process of adapting its economic model to avoid the ‘middle income trap’. This requires transitioning to a macroeconomic model focused more on internal demand and exports, positioning its production chains in industrial segments
12 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
with high added value, focused on the knowledge and innovation economy. This means moving beyond a highly energy-intensive model of industrial manufacturing.
The desire of China to lead in ten advanced technology sectors by 2025 (including renewable energies and electric mobility) has set alarm bells ringing in various areas of US national security and foreign policy. The decision has been perceived as a harbinger of a shift in economic and technological power relations, not just in East Asia but globally.
Moreover, while China possesses significant coal reserves, it depends on other countries for its supply of oil and gas (and to a lesser extent coal, which it also imports). This means that increasing its energy self-sufficiency through efficiency and renewables is clearly in its strategic –and economic– interests.
Against this backdrop, China’s position on climate change has seen major changes in the last decade. The country has gone from being the main obstacle to international agreements at the Copenhagen summit to one of the architects of the Paris Agreement. Indeed, the bilateral summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Barack Obama in 2014 made a decisive contribution to the success of COP 2015.
Following the election of a negationist/obstructionist Republican Administration, over the last three and a half years, China has shown its firm support for the Paris Agreement while maintaining an ambiguous course when it comes to the development of its energy system. It has invested heavily in renewable energy while maintaining a major construction programme for coal power.
Similarly, the Belt and Road Initiative, its flagship geopolitical project, whose backbone is a panoply of infrastructure connecting China to much of Eurasia, has lacked significant conditions related to the project’s carbon footprint, at least between 2013 and 2019. Significant pressure from the United Nations has forced China to reconsider the criteria for the design and implementation of projects, even if there is still no evidence to show a change taking place on the ground.
According to the United Nations Environment Programme, China invested US$758 billion in renewables between 2010 and the second half of 2019, equivalent to 29% of the global total. A recent joint report by Global Energy Monitor and the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA),22 estimates that, despite the impact of the pandemic, there could be an investment in an additional 70 GW of renewables in 2020, largely evenly split between solar and wind.
However, emissions in China have increased over the last three years (2017, 2018 and 2019), with coal remaining the cornerstone of its energy model. In 2019 coal made up 58% of China’s mix, with 66% of its electricity generated from coal (15 points less than the figure of 81% for 2007).23
22 Global Energy Monitor & CREA (2020), A New Coal Boom in China, https://globalenergymonitor.org/wp- content/uploads/2020/06/China-coal-plant-brief-June-2020v2.pdf. 23 In fact, China’s coal generating capacity has increased by 40 GW in 2019 (4%), despite average use of coal generating capacity being below 50%.
13 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
As noted in the Global Energy Monitor and CREA report, 249.6 GW of coal power is currently under development in China (97.8 GW under construction and 151.8 GW in planning). This figure is higher than both the US (246.2 GW) and India (229 GW). Moreover, in the first half of 2020, Chinese authorities proposed the construction of a further 40.8 GW and approved the start of construction work for 17 GW.
Similarly, Lauri Myllyvirta, an expert at CREA, notes that the China Electricity Council, an umbrella body representing the main companies in the sector, has requested the current cap on the installed capacity for coal of 1,100 GW to be increased to 1,300 GW by 2030, arguing that if the country fails to do so it will face problems accessing energy.24
In the wake of the recession caused by the pandemic, the narrative proposed by Chinese officials and think tanks accepts that the recovery will take place in line with green criteria but shies away from specific commitments on emissions and mitigation for the 2030 horizon, as well as explicit commitments to climate neutrality within a reasonable time frame.25 In other words, China is sounding out the possibility of diluting the formulation of more ambitious binding commitments for the 2030 horizon while avoiding giving the impression of shirking responsibility in its response to the climate emergency.
Finally, at the start of 2021, the Chinese Communist Party will approve the country’s five- year plan for 2021-25, setting out the major economic decisions over the coming years, including energy policy and, as a consequence, the emissions from the energy system. This is by far the most important document in the Chinese planning system, since it is the backbone around which the strategy and planning documents of all the other sectors of the economy fit.
(5) The US and China We know the current White House Administration has formally requested the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement. This marks the country’s second climate ‘default’, following its withdrawal from the Kyoto protocol in 2001, and has damaged its international leadership in this key area. The other countries have seen how the Republican party has been held captive to the extremist and anti-scientific views of its
24 Lauri Myllyvirta, Shuwei Zhang & Xinyi Shen (2020), ‘Will China build hundreds of new coal plants in the 2020s?’, Carbon Brief, 24/III/2020, https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-will-china-build-hundreds-of-new- coal-plants-in-the-2020s. In contrast, academics have presented proposals to align the Chinese energy system with the requirements of the Paris Agreement. Kejun Jiang et al. note that emissions from the electricity sector could peak before 2025 to allow a trajectory that will meet the global objective of 2°C. See Kejun Jiang, Chenmin He, Xiangyang Xu, Weiyi Jiang, Pianpian Xiang et al. (2018), ‘Transition scenarios of power generation in China under global 2°C and 1.5°C targets’, Global Energy Interconnection, vol. 1, nr 4, p. 477-486, https://doi.org/10.14171/j.2096-5117.gei.2018.04.008. 25 President Xi Jinping used the United Nations Assembly in September 2020 to announce his country’s commitment to carbon neutrality (understood here as all greenhouse gases, not just CO₂) before 2060 and ensuring Chinese emissions peak by 2030. China’s commitment to climate neutrality is a game changer and represents the biggest shift in climate geopolitics since the Paris Agreement. However, two decisive aspects –when the country’s greenhouse gas emissions will peak and its level of climate ambition for 2030– have yet to be defined. As the analysis in this paper shows, China would need to commit to a reduction of at least 25% of current emissions by 2030 as the only realistic way to reduce global emissions by at least 15 GtCO₂e. These crucial issues must form the crux of any major EU-China climate agreement that could be approved in 2020, regardless of the US presidential elections.
14 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
most radical wing, a situation that could persist for quite some time. The last bipartisan agreement on climate change –the ratification of the UNFCCC under the presidency of George H.W. Bush– goes back to 1994, an altogether different era.
The Democrats have prepared a comprehensive strategy to address the climate crisis if they win the 2020 election. Joe Biden, the presidential challenger, has set out a plan that would mobilise US$2 trillion as part of a Green Deal to promote the energy transition, create jobs and make significant progress towards decarbonising the US economy.
Equally important is an article by two leading Democrats, John Podesta and Todd Stern, arguing that ‘abroad, the United States must devise a climate-centred foreign policy that uses the country’s political capital and economic resources to drive the decarbonisation of the global economy’.26
A Democrat presidency would clearly restore positive momentum to the international climate agenda. However, after three decades of largely unsuccessful climate diplomacy due to poor US leadership, it is important not to get carried away, since the tables could turn again in another four years. Nonetheless, the most liberal and progressive states and cities, corporate America, Silicon Valley, the North American scientific community and a significant proportion of society all firmly support the Paris climate agenda. Moreover, this support does not depend on the results of presidential elections.
In addition to its withdrawal from the international climate system, North American foreign policy in recent years has seen a major change in its position towards China, based around the concept of ‘containment’. This has resulted in competition between the two major powers, as part of a new geopolitical scenario. The trade war and the conflict on 5G technology are just the tip of the iceberg in a comprehensive strategy designed to create obstacles to –even if not directly preventing– the Asian country challenging US hegemony over the coming years.
The shift in foreign policy towards China (and Russia) can clearly be seen in official documents at the highest level, including the National Security Strategy (2017) and the National Defense Strategy (2018).27,28
In a recent essay, Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell argue that ‘the nature of the challenge, as an empirical fact, should be clear: the United States today faces rivals stronger and far more ambitious than at any time in recent history. China –seeking
26 John Podesta & Todd Stern (2020), ‘A foreign policy for the climate: how American leadership can avert catastrophe’, Foreign Affairs, May-June, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04- 13/foreign-policy-climate. 27 The White House (2017), National Security Strategy of the United States of America, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 28 United States Department of Defense (2018), Summary of the National Defese Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
15 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region first and global pre-eminence thereafter– is likely to become the most powerful rival that the United States has ever faced in its history’.29
If the November presidential elections result in a change of government, the policy of containment towards China will need to be toned down if the Democrat Administration is serious about placing climate change at the heart of its international agenda. China is a key geopolitical player on the issue of climate change and the US will need to adopt a constructive approach based on cooperation, similar to under the second term of the Obama Administration.
Regardless, if China believes the containment strategy remains in place, it will have a special interest in reaching a comprehensive agreement with the EU, in which climate change will play a fundamental role. The agreement would allow China to expand its strategic flexibility and weaken the US containment policy.
(6) Europe and China For its part, in 2019, the EU published an update to its reference framework for relations with China.30 The joint document produced by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy introduces significant conceptual changes to EU-China relations. These include no longer classifying China as a developing country, reflecting the size of its economy and its level of technological progress. The classification of relations will also be more complex and subtle: ‘China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance’.
The climate agenda corresponds to the first of these categories. In fact, China and the EU both need each other in order to address the climate emergency, since neither alone is able to resolve a problem whose causes and consequences are global. The new EU reference framework notes that ‘China is a strategic partner on climate change and the clean energy transition’ and that ‘[o]ur partnership is essential for the success of global climate action, clean energy transition efforts and ocean governance’.
Under the new framework, the European Commission and the High Representative issued a joint communication titled Elements for a New EU Strategy on China,31 reflecting the new international context created by the containment of China discussed in the
29 Elbridge A. Colby & A. Wess Mitchell (2020), ‘The age of great power competition. How the Trump Administration refashioned American strategy, Foreign Affairs, January-February, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-12-10/age-great-power-competition. 30 European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2019), EU-China – A strategic outlook, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta- political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf. 31 European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2016), Elements for a new EU strategy on China, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_counci l_-_elements_for_a_new_eu_strategy_on_china.pdf.
16 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
previous section. In a world in which relations are increasingly characterised by realpolitik, the EU must reaffirm its strategic autonomy while defending the multilateral rules-based system centred on the United Nations.
The EU has become more assertive on issues like the need for economic relations based on a level playing field, directly alluding to the subsidies received by Chinese public companies or the Chinese requirement for technology transfer to allow European companies to operate in the country, as well as the state subsidies received by Chinese companies operating inside the EU single market. The EU is open about the fact that relations in this and other sectors must be brought up to date by establishing a level playing field with fair, transparent and more balanced rules.
In the area of climate change, the reference standard remains the EU-China Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change and Clean Energy, approved in July 2018, which states that ‘The EU and China are confident that their collaboration on climate change and clean energy will become a main pillar of their bilateral partnership, including in their economic relations’.32
The document establishes an agenda of collaboration in the following areas:
• Long-term decarbonisation strategies, committing both countries to submitting strategies to the United Nations in 2020, in line with the Paris Agreement. • Emissions trading. • Energy efficiency. • Clean energy. • Low-emissions transport. • Low-carbon cities. • Climate-related technology. • Investment in climate and clean energy. • Cooperation with developing countries.
In January 2020, the European Council published its Draft Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, a short document on the topic in the context of in the run-up to COP26 (now postponed until November 2021), expressing its position that ‘Climate change is an existential threat to humanity and biodiversity across all countries and regions and requires an urgent collective response’ and calling on all parties to ‘update their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in line with the Paris Agreement and to increase clarity, transparency and understanding (ICTU) of their NDCs’.33
32 European Commission (2018), EU and China step up cooperation on climate change and clean energy, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/news/20180713_statement_en.pdf. 33 European Council (2020), Draft Council conclusions on Climate Diplomacy, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5033-2020-INIT/en/pdf.
17 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
(7) The turning point for the EU Following the approval of the declaration of a climate emergency by the European Parliament on 28 November 2019,34 the EU institutions have sought to lead by example. Significant progress has been made, with the adoption of a number of important decisions, including:
• Achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and submitting its long-term decarbonisation strategy to the United Nations in 2020.
• Increasing the target for the mitigation of emissions by 2030 from the current 40% target to between 50% and 55% (with respect to 1990). This decision, which was formalised in September 2020 after corresponding technical analysis, means withdrawing around 35% of total gross greenhouse gas emissions with respect to 2018 (the last year for which information is available). • Making a meaningful contribution to mobilising US$100 billion a year to help countries in the Global South, in line with the Paris Agreement. Based on data provided by the European Commission for COP25, held in Madrid under the presidency of Chile, the EU provided €21.7 billion to developing countries in 2018, double its contribution in 2013.35
• Implementing a package of policies, programmes and projects as part of the European Green Deal, which, together with the pandemic recovery programmes, will mobilise a significant sum of money over the next decade to promote the decarbonisation of the European economy.
• Placing the ecological transition of the EU economy (especially the energy transformation) and the digital revolution at the heart of its economic recovery programme. An IPSOS opinion poll of 28,000 people in 14 countries in April 2020 found that two-thirds of the world’s population believe the climate crisis is just a serious as COVID-19.
Taken together, this package of measures marks a milestone in European climate ambition. Before the pandemic, climate change was already one of the main priorities of the EU (alongside digitalisation), with widespread support reaching 90% in some member states (including Spain).36
Following the COVID-19 crisis, civil society, the main political parties and the highest- level institutions in the EU (the Council, the Commission and the Parliament) all agree
34 European Parliament (2019), The European Parliament declares climate emergency, 29/XI/2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/es/press-room/20191121IPR67110/el-parlamento-europeo-declara- la-emergencia-climatica. 35 European Council (2019), Climate finance: EU and member states’ contributions up to €21.7 billion in 2018, 8/XI/2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/press/press-releases/2019/11/08/climate-finance-eu- and-member-states-contributions-up-to-21-7-billion-in-2018/. 36 In Spain the regular opinion polls by the Elcano Royal Institute are a leading source of information on climate change.
18 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
on the need to harness the potential of the economic reconstruction to make significant progress in the response to the climate emergency.
(8) The EU–China climate agreement The most favourable scenario would clearly be for the Democrats to win the US presidential election in November 2020 and overturn the country’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. However, we must prepare for the worst: a second term under President Donald Trump and the follow through on the US withdrawal.
Regardless, EU-China cooperation, with a significant contribution from the UK, which is presiding over COP26 and is one of the countries with the most advanced climate policies, provides the basis for consolidating a core of climate responsibility able to mobilise the rest of the international community and deliver real progress on the Paris Agenda, preserving and strengthening the multilateral climate system.
Both powers have large economies, broad demographics and are key players in international trade. They are also leaders in key areas of technology and provide significant assistance to the Global South. At the deepest level, the EU and China are two ancient civilisations, with historic experience of the rise and fall of empires, dynasties and regimes in their own territories. In addition to the impacts of climate change for both, they are aware of the international instability an uncontrolled climate crisis would create. This would jeopardise the European project and the peaceful economic rise of China in the 21st century.
All this makes it essential for the EU to achieve an ambitious climate agreement with China for a successful COP26 in Glasgow. With this priority in mind, the EU should present China with a comprehensive proposal that reflects its own strategic interests and includes the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which dates back to 2013 and a new EU-China cooperation agenda to replace the current agenda established in 2013, as well as the joint defence of the multilateral trade system and the role of the World Trade Organisation.
To ensure the combined success of COP26 and CBD15, the EU should also align the climate agenda with biodiversity as part of a common conceptual framework, which could be described as working towards a ‘global ecological transition’ or ‘global ecological civilisation’. The climate crisis and the destruction of biodiversity are the two biggest global issues driving the systemic ecological crisis we are living through. It is not a matter of merging the two agendas but of integrating them into a single conceptual framework, ensuring progress is made together and that they reinforce each other.
As part of a comprehensive agreement of this nature and as a specific counterpart on climate, the EU must request an increase in China’s ambition for 2030 as an essential condition, with a commitment in the country’s nationally determined contribution along the following or similar terms:37
37 The logic and internal consistency of the various proposals is as follows. First, global climate neutrality (cont.)
19 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
• Ensuring its total gross emissions peak in 2020, taking advantage of the de facto containment as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and implementing a post-COVID economic recovery that moves away from coal.
• Submitting China’s long-term strategy for climate neutrality by 2060 to the United Nations in 2020-21.
Reducing total gross greenhouse gas emissions by 20% with respect to 2018 levels by 2030. This would mean reducing the 13.7 GtCO₂e emitted in 2018 by approximately 3 GtCO₂e. The level of effort would be proportionally less than that of the EU (35%) but nonetheless significant, given the specific circumstances of China.
(9) Conclusions Global emissions must be cut by at least 25% between 2021 and 2030 to ensure a trajectory compatible with the 2°C scenario (a much bigger reduction would be required to achieve 1.5°C).
The European Parliament has declared a climate emergency. This means that we cannot continue with business-as-usual policies and approaches. Europe must use its economic, trade, diplomatic and financial clout to ensure Chinese involvement in this crucial objective.
The EU should be congratulated for its decision to implement a border adjustment policy for developed and emerging countries that do not make a serious commitment to climate neutrality and do not include targets for 2030 in this area in their intended nationally determined contribution.38
The challenge for the EU is not just doing things correctly at home but ensuring that other major economies make substantial progress towards decarbonisation. In this respect, the experience of the last 30 years, during which global emissions have seen an extraordinary increase, resulting in the current climate emergency, serves as a harsh lesson.
must be achieved by 2070 to meet the requirements of climate science (IPCC 2018). The most developed economies must achieve this target by 2050, while the biggest emerging economies, such as China (whose per capita level of development has not even reached the most advanced level of developing countries) should occupy an intermediate position by the year 2060. In second place, to ensure a relatively balanced emissions mitigation trajectory over the four decades 2021-2060, emissions must be reduced by at least 20% of their 2018 level between 2021 and 2030 (the latest available figures). This will ensure an emissions trajectory compatible with climate neutrality by 2060. Thirdly, mitigation efforts in the four decades 2021-2060 must be relatively proportional, which means avoiding two types of errors. First, it is important to avoid leaving mitigation to the end of the period and delaying action now. This position would fail to address the requirements of the climate emergency. The second error would be for mitigation in the first decade to be so extreme that the economy would be unable to cope, leading to social and economic instability, rendering any measures politically unviable. 38 ‘Should differences in ambition around the world persist, the Commission will propose a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism in 2021 to reduce the risk of carbon leakage, in full compatibility with WTO rules’. See European Commission (2020), A New Industrial Strategy for Europe, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-eu-industrial-strategy-march-2020_en.pdf.
20 The EU-China climate agreement: building success at the crucial Glasgow summit Working Paper 20/2020 (English version) - 28/10/2020 - Elcano Royal Institute
The EU needs to adopt bolder and more disruptive policies that change the dynamic of incentives and disincentives for other countries to continue emitting. The ‘Hothouse Earth’ scenario is not an option: we must wake up!
Elcano Royal Institute Príncipe de Vergara, 51. 28006 Madrid (Spain) www.realinstitutoelcano.org @rielcano