The Impossible Deal

THE IMPOSSIBLE DEAL

Robin V. Sears

Based on historical evidence, political prospects for free trade between Canada and the United States were not very promising. In the nineteenth century, Macdonald’s protectionist National Policy won him four consecutive elections from 1878 to 1891. In the twentieth century, Laurier’s Reciprocity Accord with the US cost him the 1911 election. In the 1940s, Mackenzie King negotiated with the US, but only in secret. But then in the 1980s, along came the Macdonald Commission, recommending a “leap of faith” and Brian Mulroney willing to make it. Robin Sears, who was a senior adviser to Ed Broadbent in the NDP’s campaign against free trade, recalls the powerful emotions and the political undercurrents, shaping the tumultuous events that began with the FTA in October 1987, on into the historic free trade election campaign of 1988.

Si on remonte dans l’histoire, les perspectives politiques de libre-échange entre le Canada et les États-Unis n’étaient guère prometteuses. Au XIXe siècle, la politique protectionniste de John Macdonald lui vaudra quatre victoires électorales consécutives entre 1878 et 1891. Au début du XXe siècle, l’Accord de réciprocité avec les États-Unis coûtera à Wilfrid Laurier les élections de 1911. Puis dans les années 1940, Mackenzie King négociera avec les États-Unis mais dans le plus grand secret. Viennent enfin les années 1980 et la Commission Macdonald, qui recommande de faire un « acte de foi », de même qu’un Brian Mulroney prêt à franchir le pas. Robin Sears était conseiller principal d’Ed Broadbent pendant la campagne du NPD contre le libre-échange. Il évoque l’extrême émotivité et les dessous politiques des événements orageux qui ont suivi la conclusion de l’Accord en octobre 1987 et qui se sont poursuivis jusqu’en 1988, pendant la campagne historique des élections sur le libre-échange.

n the fall of 1975, in a small, private Ottawa hotel dining Full disclosure. I am quoting myself. room, two senior American political consultants were A decade later, “never” did arrive. I chatting amiably with three Canadians party officials. A The debate that divided Canada more bitterly than any Liberal, a Tory and a New Democrat party hack had been since the Conscription Act a half-century earlier crept slow- invited by the US Embassy to meet the two men who were to ly on to the national stage, before erupting into an often lead Ronald Reagan to the Republican party’s biggest election vicious battle that echoed through national politics for more victory in half a century. The small group shared war stories than a decade. It was the Liberal Party that initiated the pub- and predictions for their countries’ political futures. Near the lic debate in 1982 with the creation of the Macdonald end of the lunch, one of the Americans, Ed Meese, who later Commission under the chairmanship of former Finance became Counsellor to the President in Reagan’s White House Minister Donald Macdonald. A well-connected former Bay in 1981, stunned the group into silence. Street corporate lawyer with left-leaning social values and a What would you say if I told you that if Ronald mildly economic nationalist bent, Macdonald was a popular Reagan wins the nomination, he is going to campaign choice for the task of painting a new direction for Canada. on creating a North American free trade zone from Canada to Mexico? he asked. he debate about the merits of greater continental eco- The Canadians glanced furtively at each other before T nomic integration had been bubbling under the surface responding, not wanting to give offence, each hoping that of Canadian politics for some years, the enthusiasm of policy someone else would be first to deliver the news to the naïve wonks and some bank economists. The percentage of Americans. Finally, the most junior Canadian said simply, American ownership of Canadian industry had been rising “Uh, that would be an impossible deal, politically. That will since the 1960s and some saw guaranteeing better access to US never happen in this country.” markets as an obvious policy response. The more convention-

32 OPTIONS POLITIQUES OCTOBRE 2007 The impossible deal al response, among all three of Canada’s the early speculations about a free trade increasingly aligned north-south, and national political parties, was to call for deal were mildly positive was addition- not with central Canada anyway. It was a greater degree of economic national- ally wounding to English Canadian similarly appealing to many Atlantic ism and for protectionist defences. nationalist sensibilities. Canadians, who, bitter at what they Few national economies have the saw as the bad deal they had in terms of strange mix of advantages and disad- arly private polling done by the trade with Ontario and Quebec, were vantages that Canada’s does vis-à-vis its E government and some of the polit- prepared to believe they could get a bet- neighbour. Not only is the US our best ical parties and business groups was ter deal with the US. Quebecers often friend, whether we like it or not, it also surprisingly mixed, and in some cases said they saw their province and its inevitably drags nearly all of our eco- even enthusiastic about a deal. As one resource economy increasingly as a nomic attention in its direction. Other pollster put it to a highly disgruntled, player on a global stage, and access to a small economies sit on the bor- free trade deal would provide der of large global competitors. Few national economies have the good leverage. Some economies have even Sir John A. Macdonald’s greater degrees of economic strange mix of advantages and National Policy of protection for integration with their neigh- disadvantages that Canada’s does Canadian manufacturing, bour than Canada and the US, vis-à-vis its neighbour. Not only is opposed by the continentalist but none in the G8. Some large the US our best friend, whether we vision of Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s economies have deep trade and Liberals, had been highly success- investment links, but none have like it or not, it also inevitably drags ful politically, securing his elec- a majority population that share nearly all of our economic attention tion and re-election from 1878 to the same language and culture. in its direction. Other small 1891. In the great Reciprocity Nowhere are the social, cultural, economies sit on the border of large Election of 1911, the Liberals historical and economic sinews again fought for free trade and of two sovereign and fiercely global competitors. Some “open reciprocity.” Robert independent neighbours so economies have even greater Borden’s anti-free trade rhetoric inextricably enmeshed. degrees of economic integration foreshadowed the language of This uniquely intertwined with their neighbour than Canada the debate nearly 70 years later: — and often combative — rela- We are opposed to this tionship between the two coun- and the US, but none in the G8. agreement because its ten- tries was what made the free Some large economies have deep dency is to disintegrate this trade debate so bitter and so trade and investment links, but none Dominion… to check inter- ferocious when it erupted. have a majority population that course and commerce Americans might own three- between the provinces and quarters of Canada’s oil and gas share the same language and between east and west. The industry, but it was our energy culture. Nowhere are the social, Dominion of Canada was and we would sell it to whomev- cultural, historical and economic conceived in audacity! er we liked was a common sinews of two sovereign and fiercely He won a thumping majority. Canadian claim. We let you sell 90 percent of the cars you make independent neighbours so f course, the freedom to in Canada, duty-free, in our mar- inextricably enmeshed. O trade — to do away with ket — What’s your problem? was the duties that encumbered an American politician’s typical rejoin- anti-free trade client, incredulous and trade on both sides of the border — der to Canadian trade complaints. unhappy with these results: “Look, was never really what the modern free The English Canadian electorate when you put ‘free’ and ‘trade’, one of trade debate was about. Since the was especially sensitized to nationalist the most popular with one of the most Tokyo Round of the GATT (General grievance in the early 1980s. The elec- positive words in the English lan- Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in the tion of a separatist government, the guage, together in a question, what did 1960s, ordinary duties and tariffs have corrosive effects of the first referendum you expect people to say?” been coming down among the indus- in 1980, followed by a bitter debate Considered in the abstract, the trial economies at an increasing rate. over Canadian identity in the Charter concept of greater freedom to trade, By the late 1970s, tariff barriers to of Rights battle in 1981 and later reducing the barriers for everyone to trade were a small component of trade Meech Lake in 1987, left a lot of politi- sell internationally, was attractive. It frictions between economies as inte- cal wounds open or barely healed. That was especially attractive to Western grated as Canada and the United French Canadian popular reactions to Canadians whose economies were States. As a “price taker” in interna-

POLICY OPTIONS 33 OCTOBER 2007 Robin V. Sears

CP Photo In the defining moment of the 1988 leaders’ debate, John Turner tells Brian Mulroney: “I believe you have sold us out” to the United States over the Free Trade Agreement. Turner’s performance earned him “the silver medal” of the campaign, writes Robin Sears, but in the end Mulroney rallied to win the gold.

tional resource markets, Canada had, country “because Japanese snow was “national treatment” in subsequent in any event, never had a great ability different than European snow…”). debates — was one of the biggest bones to dictate its terms of trade. It had the Increasingly more important to in the throat of Canadian nationalists. advantage of propinquity and reliabili- multinationals than trade, however, “How could a small Canadian ty where its rocks and logs and oil and was the freedom to invest in and company compete in its own national gas deliveries to the United States were acquire businesses in the others’ mar- market against US giants, given all concerned. American tariffs were an kets. As continental integration and their advantages of scale and market- irritation, at worst, to most sectors. globalization developed their early ing?” was the frequent angry demand The real issues were in the soon-to- momentum, first American, then of the anti-free trade community. be-famous non-tariff barriers that European and Asian multinationals Underneath the shoving and push- nations increasingly used to channel recognized that they needed to be clos- ing of economic and political rhetoric and shape trade flows: regulations on er to their end markets and end con- about trade and investment lay a far health and safety standards, inspection sumers. Automotive, pharmaceutical more powerful political current. From and liability regimes, competitiveness and consumer goods manufacturers the days of the United Empire Loyalists’ and anti-monopoly legislation, anti- wanted the ability to tweak global challenge to the comfortable oligarchy dumping protections, and simple obfus- brands to local preference, to source of the Family Compact, many cation and delay. (High on the list of the local inputs for local assembly and Canadian opinion leaders had an abid- foolishnesses that national politicians manufacture, to produce on a large ing fear of being overwhelmed by indulged in during these years, attempt- scale and, most importantly, to com- American cultural values — and money. ing to defend alternatives to the now pete on a level playing field. This This anxiety ran the gamut from a unfashionable duties and tariffs, was the demand that foreign companies be somewhat defensible concern about Japanese minister who explained that it treated as local competitors in all the ability of Canada to preserve and was not safe to use French skis in his respects — what became known as tell its own stories, grounded in a dif-

34 OPTIONS POLITIQUES OCTOBRE 2007 The impossible deal ferent set of traditions than the was the left that saw the merit for basically that Canada needed to make American national narrative, to a bla- working people in breaking down this deal or the door would slam shut tantly offensive and near racist view of national oligarchies and stimulating on access to the US market. Where Americans and their culture. The free price competition across all markets. Americans were going to buy their trade debate touched all points along Part of their success was winning cars, natural gas and softwood lumber that arc, ending embarrassingly close tough social protection measures for from was never entirely clear. They to the “Americans are vulgar, warlike the weakest in any country, and for the painted a vision of a conflict-free eco- and racist” end of the continuum. weakest national economies in Europe. nomic colossus, taking on the world, It was, needless to say, a little com- locked arm-in-arm. n the interests of full disclosure, I plicated to explain to former European Each side conveyed improbable I was a senior campaign executive in colleagues why a Canada-US Free Trade horror stories about the consequences two of the most highly charged elec- Agreement was a threat to social democ- of accepting or rejecting the deal that, one suspects, left most Underneath the shoving and pushing of economic and political Canadians bemused. The rhetoric about trade and investment lay a far more powerful height of the tit-for-tat fool- political current. From the days of the United Empire Loyalists’ ishness was a Liberal TV ad challenge to the comfortable oligarchy of the Family Compact, showing the Canadian border being erased. The many Canadian opinion leaders had an abiding fear of being Conservatives reversed the overwhelmed by American cultural values — and money. blip in momentum Turner received from his TV debate tions on the debate, Bob Rae’s 1987 racy, sovereignty and our way of life. performance by succeeding where the Ontario campaign and Ed Broadbent’s Like most Canadians who paid any New Democrats failed: they moved the national battle a year later. As the rhet- attention to the detail of the FTA, I fixat- ballot question from free trade to oric on each side escalated to the ed, along with most Liberals and New Turner’s credibility vs. the Mulroney absurd, the atmosphere in each election Democrats, on the sovereign risk parts of government’s record. became as poisonous as any since the the deal: the apparently weak protections John Turner admitted, on the 10th conscription battles of the First and for our cultural independence, the anniversary of the FTA’s implementa- Second World Wars. Some friendships ambiguous defence of the ability of tion, that his 1988 campaign pledge to have never recovered from the insults Canadian governments to purchase pri- “rip up” the deal if elected was “per- and wounds of that period. For many vate assets, the doubts that hung over our haps a flamboyant phrase. It’s a lot partisans on the losing side especially, ability to resist pressure to sell resources harder to get out of this kind of agree- the 1988 federal election is still regard- — most troubling being an apparent ment than it is to sign it” he told the ed as the most painful defeat of their power to demand Canadian freshwater Financial Post in 1999.We will never lives. With the benefit of two decades of exports, etc. We attacked the weakness of know what might have happened if reflection it is hard to recreate the emo- the environmental provisions and the the FTA and NAFTA had not been con- tional sturm und drang of those times. absence of labour protections. The core summated, but we do know that I had recently returned from sever- of the deals — the Canada-US Free Trade despite the deals the demise of Canada al years’ working with the senior lead- Agreement of 1987 and the subsequent was avoided. Like Turner, Jean ership of Europe’s social democratic addition of Mexico in the North Chrétien promised to “walk away” parties. For many of them the key bat- American Free Trade Agreement of 1992 from the NAFTA agreement in his lead- tle, the greatest achievement of the — were mechanisms to facilitate eco- ership battle, only to have to eat his early 1980s, was winning the fight to nomic integration through easier trade words in the 1993 election. create a common economic zone with- and investment rules, backed by Canadians had had a long and in what was then the European unprecedented supra-national remedy mostly successful experience with Community — in other words, a panels. Curiously, these unprecedented managed trade — or, as its proponents European free trade agreement. concessions of sovereignty took a back preferred, fair trade — with the United seat in the debate, on both sides. States. The system of Imperial n Europe, it was French and British Preferences encouraged American I Conservatives who led the resist- obby groups such as the Business giants as diverse as General Electric ance to breaking down national barri- L Council on National Issues, now and the Ford Motor Company to begin ers to continental trade and the Canadian Council of Chief manufacturing in Canada in order to investment. It was the small countries Executives, rang alarums of doom on sell into Britain and the rest of its who fought for equal access to the national television and in full-page empire duty-free. The Autopact, nego- markets of the European giants. And it newspaper ads. Their message was tiated by the Liberals in the 1960s,

POLICY OPTIONS 35 OCTOBER 2007 Robin V. Sears

secured Canadian access to US markets Economists differ, inevitably, Progressive Conservative Party were and blocked access to Canada by the about the extent of the victory, but sown in these years. The division Europeans then, and the Asians later. there is agreement that it was an between the NDP and its labour allies Even the various controversial employment generator, producing became unmanageable as a result of Softwood Lumber Agreements, won by between 2 and 3 million jobs in the the attacks launched in this fight. And Liberal and Conservative ministers, first decade. It was a massive trade and the Liberal Party’s vicious civil war were negotiated settlements between export generator, with Canadian throughout the nineties got a new governments acting on behalf of their exports doubling both as a percentage injection of venom as a result of inter- most powerful business competitors to of GDP and in absolute dollars. nal divisions and acrimony over its divide the North American market NAFTA did have the impact of management of the debate. between them. Free trade agreements shifting trade from east-west, and The Conservative Party should they never were. internationally from Europe and Asia, have been the beneficiaries of the Indeed, some purist free trade crit- to north-south. Again, economists dis- debate, having had the guts to seize on ics point to the various restrictions on agree about the improvement in the the Macdonald Commission recom- market access that NAFTA imposes on value of the terms of trade this repre- mendations, fight a tough battle with a international competitors, the some- sented for Canadians, but it did serve series of American negotiators and then what opaque dispute settlement mech- to limit Canadian business horizons force passage of the bill. But it was Brian anisms, and the exclusions such as the from a global to a continental perspec- Mulroney’s too-triumphalist defence of cultural industries and national securi- tive, if, hopefully, temporarily. the deal, combined with his bosom-pal ty provisions of first the Canada-US Whether the Americanization of partner relationship with an American FTA and then NAFTA, and say that the the Canadian market for television president many Canadians found con- deals were far closer to bilateral agree- drama and cinema would have been temptible, that helped lead to the ments on the management of trade different is unknowable. It is interest- party’s near destruction in the 1993 and investment than they were any- ing that Canadian popular music, campaign. While the Reform Party dis- thing like free trade. books and the performing arts all blos- sidents who triggered the party’s somed at the same time. The predicted destruction were mostly free traders, n the view of many international constraint on publicly delivered health Ontario Red Tories were divided. Many I trade specialists, champions of glob- care never happened, and indeed all of defected in droves in 1993, and some al multilateral deals such as the one American public opinion appears to be had already left their natural home to now stuck undelivered in the Doha Round of the WTO Those few Canadians who took the time to read even the are far preferable to the summaries of the original deal, the October 1987 draft free mushrooming regime of trade agreement between Canada and the United States, bilateral national deals now sweeping the world. NAFTA- would have been hard-pressed to see vindication for the like deals, their argument inflamed claims and counter-claims of either side. And as goes, leave out developing painful as it may be for the opponents to acknowledge, the nations and distort trade and economic outcome is clear: Canada won. It was always the investment decisions in the developed world. social and cultural impacts that were the real drivers of Those few Canadians opposition, however, and here the outcomes are more mixed. who took the time to read even the summaries of the original moving closer to support for a vote Liberal in the 1987 Ontario elec- deal, the October 1987 draft free trade Canadian-style medicare system. tion, partly out of anxiety over free agreement between Canada and the The threatened dumbing down of trade. While the integrated and more United States, would have been hard- environmental and health and safety competitive North American economy pressed to see vindication for the regulations was a non-starter as well. is probably Brian Mulroney’s greatest inflamed claims and counter-claims of The Clinton administration toughened historical achievement, more than any either side. And as painful as it may be them, and the Bush regime knocked other political decision, it cost his party for the opponents to acknowledge, the them back down. Canadian regulation dearly in the 1993 election. economic outcome is clear: Canada was and continues to be stronger in John Turner got the silver medal in won. It was always the social and cul- some areas, and weaker in others. the 1988 campaign for his late but vigor- tural impacts that were the real drivers The partisan legacy of the debate ous attack on free trade. After a lacklustre of opposition, however, and here the for each of Canada’s political parties term as opposition leader, and a weak outcomes are more mixed. was grim. The seeds of the split in the campaign opening, he redeemed himself

36 OPTIONS POLITIQUES OCTOBRE 2007

Robin V. Sears

in the televised debates and won the employers of the CAW, Steel was regular- attack Liberal hypocrisy. The party held crown as the defender of Canada in the ly denigrated as not being “really on to Opposition in Ontario and won eyes of many Canadian nationalists. But Canadian.” That the CAW members were power three years later. The federal New this too was a Phyrric victory, as he was beneficiaries of a previous generation’s Democrats had never won so many forced out of office in less than two managed trade agreement, the Autopact, votes, or elected such a large caucus, as years, bequeathing a party bitter over its was turned magically into a virtue. The the 1988 election delivered — and have inability to block the deal, then forced to CAW’s pretzel logic was that the never come close since. acknowledge it would need to maintain Autopact was good and its successor was Yet in each case Bob Rae and Ed it in government. Many of John Turner’s by definition bad. Broadbent were roundly attacked by Bay street colleagues, including Donald Former Liberals, aging academic the anti-deal coalition as “traitors” and Macdonald, had cautioned him against a Marxists and even some New Democrats “opportunists” for not encouraging scorched earth attack on the deal, pre- joined social activists and cultural their supporters to vote Liberal in a cisely because it would be impossible to nationalists in an anti-free trade coalition strategic voting act of political hara-kiri, revoke following passage. The bitterness whose beneficiary —intentionally or not to save Canada from national humilia- that marked the Chrétien-Martin years — was, initially, the Liberal Party. In both tion. Exhausted, and partly in disgust at had it roots in the personal animosity the 1987 Ontario election, where David the post-election finger pointing by between the two leaders, and erstwhile friends, Broadbent their very different view about Many of John Turner’s Bay street quit the following year. how to manage the national colleagues, including Donald question. The field of distrust Macdonald, had cautioned him he party was seen to have and suspicion that was the land- T abandoned its friends in scape of the Liberal Party was, against a scorched earth attack on the social movements, cap- nonetheless, tilled by the earlier the deal, precisely because it would tured by political consultants divisions over free trade. be impossible to revoke following and backroom boys more inter- New Democrats arguably ested in power than in defend- suffered the most serious and passage. The bitterness that marked ing Canada, and therefore lingering consequences of this the Chrétien-Martin years had it deserving of punishment. The political civil war. The Canadian roots in the personal animosity failure of the British Columbia Auto-Workers Union, reliably between the two leaders, and their and especially the Ontario NDP the most hypocritical player on governments to understand the left’s political stage, per- very different view about how to the disciplines of power con- formed its self-anointed role as manage the national question. The tributed heavily to the federal national saviour with passion field of distrust and suspicion that party’s ignominy in the and muscle. Pouring money was the landscape of the Liberal nineties, as did two federal into Liberal-affiliated anti-free leaders promoted way above trade groups, denouncing the Party was nonetheless, tilled by the their level of competence, but NDP as weak sisters in the battle earlier divisions over free trade. the seeds of the federal party’s and consuming so much politi- fall from the heights to which cal oxygen that a foreign observer could Peterson could barely conceal his Ed Broadbent had guided it were laid be forgiven for thinking that he was the ambivalence about the deal, and in the mainly by its friends in the anti-free Leader of the Opposition, Bob White federal election a year later, when John trade movement. and the powerful machine that is the Turner was transmogrified from a busi- Punished it was, falling to 9 per- CAW in battle demoralized NDP work- ness Liberal lawyer to Captain Canada, cent in popular support, a low not ers and supporters and pumped new life the anti-free trade forces laid the seeds for seen since the Diefenbaker sweep near- into the Liberal campaign. the NDP’s destruction in the nineties. ly a half a century before. The problem for the NDP then was Given the hilariously inflated he hypocrisy operated on several similar to its strategic nightmare today. claims about the impact of free trade, T levels. The CAW’s perennial enemy Carving votes away from support for it should not be surprising, perhaps, in the battle for leadership of the the deal was more likely to deliver them that few of its proponents’, or its ene- Canadian labour movement, the United to the Liberals, as the larger stronger mies’, more impassioned predictions Steel Workers, is an international — “you opposing party, than it was to elect New came to pass. The English Canadian mean American,” sneer CAW activists — Democrats. Not surprisingly, therefore, cultural sector became stronger and union. Though most of its Canadian the leaders and their strategists attempt- more vibrant than ever in the coun- members worked for Canadian employ- ed to deliver a broader agenda as a bal- try’s history, instead of drowning ers, unlike the overwhelmingly American lot choice in those campaigns and to under the predicted wave of vulgar

38 OPTIONS POLITIQUES OCTOBRE 2007 The impossible deal

The White House Brian Mulorney and Ronald Reagan in the Rose Garden at the White House in 1984. it was Reagan who proposed a vision of North American free trade in the 1980 election, and was talking about it as early as his unsuccessful run for the Republican nomination in 1976. “That will never happen in this country,” author Robin Sears told Reagan adviser Ed Meese in 1975. In 1987, Sears writes, “‘never’ did arrive.”

Americana. The level of Canadian adjustment assistance and the nineties’ By the fifth anniversary of the investment in the US outpaced the waves of globalization. NAFTA in 1999, Canadian exports to the flows northward. The balance of trade US had doubled but domestic demand between the two economies was tilted either the laws of gravity nor of had risen only 20 percent. US invest- so strongly in Canada’s favour by the N politics were repealed by the deals, ment in Canada reached nearly $150 end of the 1990s that some American however. American special interests billion, while Canadian southbound commentators were complaining continued to attempt to twist the dis- investment was more than $270 billion about the persistent imbalance. pute regimes to secure their advantage. to the US and only $1.4 billion to The Canadian resource sector The latest softwood lumber deal, labori- Mexico. Five years later, on the tenth boomed, and Canadian players grew to ously negotiated by Liberal and anniversary in 2004, the statistics were be first North American and then global Conservative governments over a even more compelling: trade among the leaders in oil and gas, gold, uranium and decade, lasted ten months before US three countries had more than doubled. diamonds. The Ontario auto sector producers cried, “Foul!” and demanded On that anniversary, Brian thrived, ironically not as a result of the countervailing action. Canada’s rivers Mulroney acknowledged another rea- American Big Three (who were privi- were not diverted to flow south into son that the deal was so provocative to leged by the two deals for nearly a parched American farms. Canada con- Canadians on the liberal left. decade after their implementation) but tinued to protect its national banking Commenting on the impact of the by savvier Asian competitors who upped oligopoly, its phone monopolies and its deal, he said, “It was a package of atti- their investment in Canada, assured of rich-as-Croesus cable barons from tudes: free trade, getting rid of FIRA, US access by the agreements. Canadian American investors’ claws. Washington getting rid of the National Energy retailers, small manufacturers and some continued to fight off attempts to Program, privatizing Air Canada, agricultural producers were sideswiped undermine its national economic secu- Canadair, Petro-Canada and so on. not only by the agreements, but also by rity by ensuring that neither Brazilian Deregulation and all of those things.” the Liberal government’s failure to sugar nor Canadian corn could breach It’s debatable whether that conserva- deliver on the promised economic their massive farm subsidy walls. tive political menu was necessarily part of

POLICY OPTIONS 39 OCTOBER 2007 Robin V. Sears

a free trade agenda; Mexico certainly did- passivity,” then ape it when returned Prosperity Partnership.” Such silly n’t buy the whole package as part of its to power. Conservatives will denounce newspeak does cause a reasonable per- agreement. But constraints on the gov- Liberal hypocrisy to no avail. New son to wonder what is hidden behind ernment’s decision-making freedom Democrats will claim to be wrapped in the bland bureaucratese. around the economy, feared by many a bigger, more patriotic flag, blushing In reality, the SPP is widely dispar- progressives, was far less than advertised. only mildly while their provincial gov- aged by friends and foes as a meaning- Even the controversial Chapter 11 ernments aggressively compete for less talk shop, whose lack of political provisions of NAFTA, giving corporations more US investment. capital is embarrassing to the partici- in the signatory countries the right to sue No matter what version of our pants. It is, as a former adviser to the any of the governments involved, turned nationalist longings we indulge 10 Department of Foreign Affairs, David out to be a rather toothless tiger. Indeed, years from now, the free trade deals Dyment, observed, “much less than its this year the US Supreme Court struck will likely remain our number one boosters want and its detractors fear.” The kinds of concessions Given the hilariously inflated claims about the impact of free required of each country to trade, it should not be surprising, perhaps, that few of its move to a higher level of eco- proponents’ or its enemies’ more impassioned predictions nomic, political and military came to pass. The English Canadian cultural sector became integration can only happen at the level of first ministers. stronger and more vibrant than ever in the country’s history, None of the member coun- instead of drowning under the predicted wave of vulgar tries’ leaders has been willing Americana. The level of Canadian investment in the US to risk any of their political outpaced the flows northward. The balance of trade between capital yet on such a risky new enterprise. the two economies was tilted so strongly in Canada’s favour by the end of the 1990s that some American commentators ronically, free trade con- were complaining about the persistent imbalance. I tinues to divide the American Liberal left far down a UPS claim that Canada Post was bogey to many. Veterans of the great more than Canada’s. “Rewriting” an unfairly subsidized competitor, after a battle of 1980s Canadian politics will NAFTA has become a clarion call again seven-year battle by the American continue to appear, older and greyer, among many of the Democratic presi- express freight industry to attack the on TV panels, asked to comment on dential candidates. Canadian public postal monopoly. the latest outrageous American Younger Canadians still basking in undermining of our national sover- the rewards of privileged access to the nce a decade or so, when we are not eignty, or the sale of one more world’s economic engine in 2017 will O scratching our perennial constitu- national icon. For the CAW, Maude be puzzled by this overheated rhetoric. tional itch, we revisit our nationalist angst Barlow and the Council of Their parents will smile with bemused about the United States. In 1963 it was the Canadians, La luta continua! nostalgia at reminders of this rare Bomarc crisis about basing American With the same hysterical rhetoric Canadian political rage. For neither nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. In the of the original battles, Barlow’s council Tom D’Aquino’s trade conflict-free nir- 1970s, it was Canadian economic nation- this summer attacked the ongoing eco- vana nor Maude Barlow’s humiliating alism and foreign investment, with the nomic and security integration talks colonial hell was delivered. Liberals again successfully seizing the role among Canada, Mexico and the US as a For Canada, “the impossible deal” of defender against the sale of Canada. process committed to “eliminating delivered a far more Canadian out- The 1980s saw the free trade debate first Canada’s ability to set its own inde- come: mildly beneficial long-term eco- empower and then destabilize the Tories. pendent regulatory standards, environ- nomic benefits, irritating short-term Jean Chrétien regularly tweaked the mental protection measures, energy side effects, and just enough continuing American eagle’s tail feathers, triumphant- security, foreign, military, immigration trade friction to satisfy grumpy nation- ly returning to the anti-American well, in and a frighteningly wide range of other alists about the perfidy of free trade. campaign after campaign. policies.” (Given that comprehensive Today it appears that we will list of treacheries, one wonders what Contributing Writer Robin V. Sears, return to the old favourite — who sold would be left to sell out...) national campaign director of the NDP Canada? — as one national champion The process which grants Mexico’s during the Broadbent years, is a principal after another falls to an American and Canada’s treasonous leaders this of Navigator Ltd., a Toronto-based com- predator. The Liberals in opposition opportunity does have a curiously munications consulting and government will bewail Conservative “treacherous Orwellian moniker: “The Security and relations firm. [email protected]

40 OPTIONS POLITIQUES OCTOBRE 2007