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WHEN MINORITY GOVERNMENT WORKED: THE PEARSON LEGACY

Tom Kent

As senior policy adviser to the prime minister, our Founding Editor was closely involved in the minority governments of the tumultuous Pearson era from 1963 to 1968. After a bungled first year in office, as Tom Kent recalls here, the achievements of the next four years include the - Plan, , and others in this era of “co-operative federalism,” all of them adopted in a minority House. “The fundamentals that worked then,” he concludes, “firm objectives, sensitivity to the great needs of the times, co- operative federalism, cabinet government — are as necessary today.”

À titre de conseiller principal en politiques du premier ministre, notre rédacteur fondateur Tom Kent s’est trouvé de 1963 à 1968 aux premières loges de la période agitée des gouvernements minoritaires de Lester B. Pearson. Il rappelle ici qu’après une première année bousillée, les quatre suivantes ont produit des réalisations majeures, notamment le Régime de Canada-Québec, le programme universel de soins de santé et plusieurs autres mesures clés attribuables au « fédéralisme coopératif » cher à Pearson, toutes adoptées par un Parlement minoritaire. « Les principes fondamentaux qui ont inspiré ces actions — fermeté des objectifs, sensibilité aux grands besoins de l’époque, fédéralisme coopératif et gouvernement par l’exécutif — restent aujourd’hui tout aussi nécessaires », conclut-il.

he Pearson-led Liberals of the 1960s could not win a First, in the 1960s the Liberals had firm, coherent objec- parliamentary majority. In four years the two minor- tives. They knew what they wanted to do for Canada. T ity parliaments of L.B. Pearson’s government never- Second, the government’s aims were in tune with the theless transformed Canada. It did more than any, except underlying attitudes of the times. Policies were not shaped perhaps Wilfrid Laurier’s, which added rapid population of by shifting opinion polls and calculations of votes. Though the Prairies by immigration to John A. Macdonald’s original some were exposed to strident denunciation, particularly of tariffs and the railroad. from the business community, they served public needs that I say four years because the first of Pearson’s five years were widely felt. After all the controversy, provincial gov- in office — from 1963 to 1968 — was a learning experience ernments and opposition parties in the end became recon- marked by two shattering blunders. One came close to ciled, if not entirely to the desirability, then at least to the destroying the government when it had barely begun. The inevitability, of the doings of a minority government. The second put the Canadian state into peril. Yet, lesson learned, major items of Pearson’s legislation finally passed the minority government went on to forge a strengthened, Parliament with scarcely a vote against. more resilient national politics. The issue of the flag was the main exception. Today, both big parties would have us believe that Otherwise, parliamentary success was not the product of minority government is inherently bad for us. A majority is interparty negotiation and compromise. The NDP was in more comfortable for them. The public interest is another sympathy with many of the Pearson measures. It had mem- matter. The quality of government depends on much more bers on friendly terms with Liberals, including some closely than the number of its MPs. Apart from considerable luck, involved in the government. But, while the possibility was Pearson’s success was owed to strengths that good majority once entertained by a few people, there was never any part- government equally requires. nership, even any one-time arrangement of the kind that

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When minority government worked: the Pearson legacy sometimes enlivens media specula- co-operative nature of cabinet govern- of the St-Laurent government. Its tion. The process in federal politics was ment before it fell victim to prime- miserly addition of “six bucks” to Old one not of trade-offs but of finding ministerial dictatorship. It said: “Mr. Age Security was pilloried so merciless- common ground. Kent will work with committees of ly by Diefenbaker that it contributed Cabinet in the development of legisla- greatly to the 1957 election defeat. elations with the were tion and will assist the Prime Minister R a different matter. There was con- in liaison with the Ministers and national pension plan was there- fusion to repair. During the Second departments of government.” While A fore seized on as one social meas- World War, the extreme separatism of friendship with the Prime Minister was ure that could be spelled out in some jurisdictions had necessarily been essential, the main qualification for detail while in opposition. The draft replaced by extreme centralization. this role was my extensive involve- was politically highly attractive, espe- That could not continue, but equally, ment with the party’s membership cially because it would start with very low contribution rates. The The NDP was in sympathy with many of the Pearson proposal was, in other measures. It had members on friendly terms with Liberals, words, an unfunded, pay- including some closely involved in the government. But, while as-you-go plan. So were the the possibility was once entertained by a few people, there social security systems of the United States and many was never any partnership, even any one-time arrangement of other countries. In the cir- the kind that sometimes enlivens media speculation. The cumstances of the time, process in federal politics was one not of trade-offs but of when birth rates were high- finding common ground. er, this made good econom- ic sense. we could not return to the ways of the through the opposition years. The The new Pearson government 1930s. We had got through the 1950s Pearson government worked by co- made the drafting of legislation along by compromises, without devising a operation. I doubt that today’s control such lines an urgent priority. In its new way adequate for a different from the top, however great the parlia- enthusiasm it was blind to both the world. There was confusion and con- mentary majority backing it, could so constitution and the politics of flict, which Pearson the diplomat was well rise above weaknesses and mis- Quebec. The 1951 amendment had passionately concerned to replace takes, could achieve so much of public not transferred jurisdiction away from with a co-operative federalism. But in benefit, as cabinet government yield- the provinces but made it concurrent, 1963 neither he nor his close associ- ed, despite its minority. and still with provincial primacy. ates quite knew how to make such a The first of the two opening blun- Parliament could legislate on pen- relationship work. That it should do ders was the 1963 budget, the product sions, provided such legislation did so is the third essential for the good of overconfidence. It was corrected by not “affect the operation of any law . How the retreat; and the humiliation, of Walter present or future” of a . Pearson government learned co-oper- Gordon particularly, left a scar that pro- No provincial government was ative federalism is the main theme of longed the agony of the second, near- opposed to contributory pensions, this article. fatal blunder: the government clung but none had done anything about The success depended also on a hopelessly to the initial version of the them. Nine were not thinking of it. fourth factor, too little recognized. (CPP) long after it Quebec was. Pearson’s was genuinely a cabinet gov- had become plainly impracticable. I had known Jean Lesage when he ernment, rich in various talents, and The Pearson Liberal Party was was in . We had become friends Pearson was a superb chairman who committed to comprehensive health when working in close agreement clarified and reconciled viewpoints. He care and other social improvements. within the preparatory policy commit- was flexible, but when he knew what The purposes were firm. But since tee for the 1958 party convention. He he wanted, as he usually did, the meet- jurisdiction was provincial, program got in touch with me a few days after ing concluded with at least an accept- specifications were left for consulta- he became premier of Quebec, in the able approximation of his intent. tion and negotiation. The exception summer of 1960. There was soon to be In this style of government, minis- was pensions, on which Ottawa had a federal-provincial conference. He terial staffs, including the prime minis- the power to legislate, thanks to the wanted to use it to make a definitive ter’s, were miniscule. I was labelled 1951 amendment to the constitution. statement on the viewpoint of the new “co-ordinator of programming,” and Many in the party were keen to Quebec and its changed role in the the published job description is worth use this opening. They were still sore Canadian federation. He wanted my quoting, because it encapsulates the from the shame of one of the last acts input to help in making the document

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Tom Kent

compatible with progressive opinion They did not win. There followed in a manner appropriate to the elsewhere in the country. If I could months of desultory attempts to mod- respective responsibilities of federal spend a few days at Maison ify the plan enough, perhaps to gain and provincial authorities.” Provinces Montmorency, the Dominican retreat ’s acceptance. Premier John generally interpreted this to mean near presided over by the Robarts, cleverly, did not show his that an offer of some increase would great Father Lévesque, he and a few of hand, though there could be little be the main event of the Quebec con- his ministers would come there in the doubt that eventually it would be to ference. Lesage was relying on getting evenings to discuss the drafts of the wield an axe. We were stuck. The only some of what he had been demanding statement. question was what kind of disaster for four years. It was therefore my good fortune would follow. Nothing was offered. The cabinet to know Quebec’s stance when Ottawa The axe was Lesage’s. An unpre- had convinced itself that more tax room opinion, including that of the old-style pared delegation went from Ottawa to for the provinces would be pilloried as Quebec politicians there, had not made Quebec City for the April 1964 federal- another retreat. Lesage raged, with the adjustment. Soon after the federal provincial conference. Lesage deliv- skilled argument as well as histrionics. legislation was proposed, Lesage tele- ered his master stroke. He outlined, in Other provincial delegations listened phoned to warn me that he was calling confidence but in some detail, the with some pleasure, while the great men a special session of his legislature to funded pension plan he was going to of Ottawa had nothing to articulate authorize the preparation of Quebec’s present to the Quebec legislature. The except, belatedly, a suggestion that a pension plan. In company with committee review the problem. Gordon Robertson (the secre- The Pearson proposal of July 1965 The conference ended with tary to the cabinet), I met with hardly anything to announce, him privately, though of course was federal legislation defining basic in obvious disagreement. The with Pearson’s knowledge. principles for : universal, federal delegation returning to Lesage skillfully expounded the comprehensive, portable between Ottawa appeared to be, and was, financial necessities inherent in provinces, publicly administered. in a state of collapse. Quebec’s modernization. He The state of his govern- had to have a funded pension Provided provincial programs were ment was, however, the lesser plan to provide capital for all so based, Ottawa would share their of Pearson’s concerns. He saw the required infrastructure, for costs. Lesage responded warmly. the peril to Canada. Nationalist schools and roads and the rest. Other provincial politicians came to sentiment in Quebec was run- He had to have more income ning strong. The champi- tax revenue to pay for the pub- Medicare at various speeds and with onship of federalism lay solely lic services in which Quebec varying warmth. But they came. with Lesage. He had claimed had lagged so far behind most Public opinion, as well as federal that his was the way to win of Canada. cost-sharing, compelled them. progress for the new Quebec. But he had got no more from he consequence was plain. his Liberal friends than from T An unfunded pension plan was response of other premiers to his bril- . The programs of the dead. The needs of other provinces liant exposition was expressed by the could go on only were not as pressing as Quebec’s, but one who immediately said “Can we with the immediate imposition of they would grow, and their govern- join it?” “double taxation,” of special taxes on ments also would want pension funds. That was, however, the lesser part top of those paid elsewhere in Canada. There was no point in delay. The only of the federal discomforture. Personal There was every reason to fear that way to save the plan was to change it. and corporate income taxes were then Lesage would not long survive, and The PM, at least, saw the argument, levied at national rates. Ottawa kept that with him would go hope of a but the cabinet was desperate to avoid the lion’s share but transferred a per- modernized Quebec at home in a retreat like the one on the budget. It centage to all provinces. It was obvi- Canada. clutched at potential relief through ous to any realist that growing public Gordon Robertson and I prompt- Ontario provincial politics. In a gener- services would be increasingly provin- ly wrote memoranda to the PM al election there, the Liberal opposi- cial and would require a larger tax pleading the urgency of changed tion was campaigning for acceptance share. The prime minister fully under- policies. Mine suggested ways in of the pension plan as proposed. If stood this. In defining what we meant which Quebec could be given some they won, perhaps other provinces by co-operative federalism, we had immediate financial relief, and pro- would fall into line and the CPP as it previously said, “when certain tax posed commitment to substantial was would fly after all. fields are shared, this should be done increases in the tax share for all

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When minority government worked: the Pearson legacy

Montreal Gazette archives Three members of Prime Minister Pearson’s cabinet, , and Jean Chrétien, went on to become prime minis- ters in their own right, serving as PMs for a combined 25 years, between 1968 and 2003. This famous photograph was taken during a cabinet shuffle at Rideau Hall in 1967, near the end of Pearson’s remarkable five years of minority government. provinces over the following two fis- inal. That was its short maturity peri- storm of protest came into being with cal years. I believed that, with the od, which in effect provided a sub- hardly a dissent. inducement of such financial relief, sidy to the many people approaching With that, co-operative federalism Lesage would be willing to accept retirement who had been unable to moved from aspiration to reality. The some compromise on pensions. save in the years of depression and tax and pension settlements opened Pearson was dubious but authorized war. This meant less funding than in the way to the government’s other me to try. I met Lesage the next day. the original Quebec plan, but there social reforms. That minority status He did respond, warmly. A refreshed was still enough to yield substantial did not hamper it was due in large prime minister deployed all his per- capital available to all provinces. The part to the creativity and patience of suasive skills to change the minds of improvements, compared with the an unsung hero: Joe Willard, the his colleagues. Within eight days of original federal plan, included deputy minister of . intense negotiation, we had a settle- widened benefits made possible by all In the 1950s Ottawa had begun to ment agreed by both federal and the provinces agreeing to a further cost-share some categories of provin- Quebec cabinets and almost at once constitutional amendment. Thanks cial social assistance. The programs welcomed by other provinces. to close consultation between offi- were limited and their conditions Politically, criticism of a retreat was cials and lawyers of the two govern- tightly controlled by federal rules. hardly heard. Public sentiment gen- ments, identical Canada and Quebec Willard and his officials began to dis- erally shared the politicians’ relief plans were drafted in both languages. cuss, with their provincial counter- that a crisis had been averted. While there were some long commit- parts, provision of the same social The compromise on pensions tee hearings in Ottawa, legislation services and assistance to people in retained the distinctive and most followed easily. The public pensions need, irrespective of the varying causes important feature of the federal orig- that had first been greeted with a of the need. There would be defined

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Tom Kent

standards for the assessment of need; There were, however, other trou- kick, Pierre Trudeau, as well as but provided those were agreed, bles on the way. The proposed Gérard Pelletier. They reinvigorated provincial programs could vary in Canadian flag was fiercely filibus- the worn-out government. Of the their details and scales of assistance; tered by Diefenbaker, until a combi- unfinished items, post-secondary Ottawa would reimburse half of their nation of rebellion in his own ranks education went through, and the costs without requiring the close con- and Pearson’s flexibility produced ministers who wanted to withdraw trols of the old categorical programs. the simple red maple leaf. The from Medicare were held to a one- There was still enough hangover exhausting battle nevertheless did year delay of its implementation. of centralist attitudes for such an much harm. It worsened the govern- Positively, skills training was greatly extended, employment The voters were apparently pleased enough with what we services modernized, and were doing to give no credence to the plea that we needed a immigration revolution- ized. The economy contin- majority in order to continue. The November 1965 election ued to flourish. Industry left the parliamentary balance virtually unchanged. and trade policies, includ- ing the auto pact, yielded innovation to be strongly resisted in ment’s tendency to the kind of their anticipated benefits. The public Finance and some other departmental administrative ineptitude that has finances had been put into good strongholds. Nevertheless, the battle the impact of scandal and that, even order. Trudeau soon proved to be a was won. The Canada Assistance Plan if minor, disrupts morale. Worse, new breed of justice minister and an became a major item in the govern- ministers and party officials took the eloquent champion of federalism, ment’s program for 1965. Even more long impasse in Parliament as evi- and his leadership would for a time importantly, this demonstration of dence that their troubles lay in the galvanize the country. the new spirit in federal-provincial lack of a majority and could be Meantime, the centennial gave a relations paved the way for Medicare. removed by an election. battle-worn prime minister an appro- It was profoundly wishful priately celebratory final year, from or the hospital insurance of the thinking. “Strategy for Government: which he turned to make an important F 1950s, as for categorical social NOT Election Strategy” was the last contribution to the international assistance, cost-sharing required tight heading of my January 1965 memo- development that had been so large a federal monitoring of a kind that was randum on the program for the concern of his years before domestic impracticable for comprehensive year. It expressed fear that all the politics. physicians’ services and indeed unac- talk of an election would build In retrospect, of course, there is ceptable for any new programs in the expectations to the point where not much that could have been better spirit of the 1960s. The Pearson pro- to call it would be interpreted as done, much that should have been posal of July 1965 was federal legisla- frightened retreat. The prime minis- foreseen but was not. Co-operative tion defining basic principles for ter should stop the talk. He respond- federalism was crucial to the success- Medicare: universal, comprehensive, ed by writing at the top of the es, and the way we found to imple- portable between provinces, and pub- memo “I agree…and will make the ment it, the cost-shared way, was licly administered. Provided provincial situation clear” (underlined). But in essential for the times. Its day, how- programs were so based, Ottawa would fact the talk went on, and an elec- ever, is long done. To find a new way share their costs. Lesage responded tion became unavoidable, though is as crucial in 2009 as it was in warmly. Other provincial politicians Pearson was worse prepared than 1964. The fundamentals that worked came to Medicare at various speeds ever for the hustings, on which he then — firm objectives, sensitivity and with varying warmth. But they was never at home. to the great needs of the times, co- came. Public opinion, as well as feder- The voters were apparently operative federalism, cabinet gov- al cost-sharing, compelled them. pleased enough with what we were ernment — are as necessary today. The same style of financing was doing to give no credence to the plea The lesson from the Pearson period extended to post-secondary education, that we needed a majority in order to is that if a government has or soon not only in greatly expanded universi- continue. The November 1965 elec- develops those fundamentals, it may ties but in largely new community col- tion left the parliamentary balance do pretty well, whether or not it has leges. The Pearson government had virtually unchanged. Pearson was a parliamentary majority. found how co-operative federalism worn out and deeply dispirited. But could implement its promised purpos- he had contrived the rescue. He had Tom Kent, Founding Editor of Policy es. A new, more equal Canadian socie- induced to come to Options, was principal assistant to ty was being built. Ottawa, along with his (then) side- Prime Minister Pearson.

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