WHEN MINORITY GOVERNMENT WORKED: THE PEARSON LEGACY Tom Kent As senior policy adviser to the prime minister, our Founding Editor was closely involved in the minority governments of the tumultuous Pearson era from 1963 to 1968. After a bungled first year in office, as Tom Kent recalls here, the achievements of the next four years include the Canada-Quebec Pension Plan, universal health care, and others in this era of “co-operative federalism,” all of them adopted in a minority House. “The fundamentals that worked then,” he concludes, “firm objectives, sensitivity to the great needs of the times, co- operative federalism, cabinet government — are as necessary today.” À titre de conseiller principal en politiques du premier ministre, notre rédacteur fondateur Tom Kent s’est trouvé de 1963 à 1968 aux premières loges de la période agitée des gouvernements minoritaires de Lester B. Pearson. Il rappelle ici qu’après une première année bousillée, les quatre suivantes ont produit des réalisations majeures, notamment le Régime de pensions Canada-Québec, le programme universel de soins de santé et plusieurs autres mesures clés attribuables au « fédéralisme coopératif » cher à Pearson, toutes adoptées par un Parlement minoritaire. « Les principes fondamentaux qui ont inspiré ces actions — fermeté des objectifs, sensibilité aux grands besoins de l’époque, fédéralisme coopératif et gouvernement par l’exécutif — restent aujourd’hui tout aussi nécessaires », conclut-il. he Pearson-led Liberals of the 1960s could not win a First, in the 1960s the Liberals had firm, coherent objec- parliamentary majority. In four years the two minor- tives. They knew what they wanted to do for Canada. T ity parliaments of L.B. Pearson’s government never- Second, the government’s aims were in tune with the theless transformed Canada. It did more than any, except underlying attitudes of the times. Policies were not shaped perhaps Wilfrid Laurier’s, which added rapid population of by shifting opinion polls and calculations of votes. Though the Prairies by immigration to John A. Macdonald’s original some were exposed to strident denunciation, particularly national policy of tariffs and the railroad. from the business community, they served public needs that I say four years because the first of Pearson’s five years were widely felt. After all the controversy, provincial gov- in office — from 1963 to 1968 — was a learning experience ernments and opposition parties in the end became recon- marked by two shattering blunders. One came close to ciled, if not entirely to the desirability, then at least to the destroying the government when it had barely begun. The inevitability, of the doings of a minority government. The second put the Canadian state into peril. Yet, lesson learned, major items of Pearson’s legislation finally passed the minority government went on to forge a strengthened, Parliament with scarcely a vote against. more resilient national politics. The issue of the flag was the main exception. Today, both big parties would have us believe that Otherwise, parliamentary success was not the product of minority government is inherently bad for us. A majority is interparty negotiation and compromise. The NDP was in more comfortable for them. The public interest is another sympathy with many of the Pearson measures. It had mem- matter. The quality of government depends on much more bers on friendly terms with Liberals, including some closely than the number of its MPs. Apart from considerable luck, involved in the government. But, while the possibility was Pearson’s success was owed to strengths that good majority once entertained by a few people, there was never any part- government equally requires. nership, even any one-time arrangement of the kind that 26 OPTIONS POLITIQUES OCTOBRE 2009 When minority government worked: the Pearson legacy sometimes enlivens media specula- co-operative nature of cabinet govern- of the St-Laurent government. Its tion. The process in federal politics was ment before it fell victim to prime- miserly addition of “six bucks” to Old one not of trade-offs but of finding ministerial dictatorship. It said: “Mr. Age Security was pilloried so merciless- common ground. Kent will work with committees of ly by Diefenbaker that it contributed Cabinet in the development of legisla- greatly to the 1957 election defeat. elations with the provinces were tion and will assist the Prime Minister R a different matter. There was con- in liaison with the Ministers and national pension plan was there- fusion to repair. During the Second departments of government.” While A fore seized on as one social meas- World War, the extreme separatism of friendship with the Prime Minister was ure that could be spelled out in some jurisdictions had necessarily been essential, the main qualification for detail while in opposition. The draft replaced by extreme centralization. this role was my extensive involve- was politically highly attractive, espe- That could not continue, but equally, ment with the party’s membership cially because it would start with very low contribution rates. The The NDP was in sympathy with many of the Pearson proposal was, in other measures. It had members on friendly terms with Liberals, words, an unfunded, pay- including some closely involved in the government. But, while as-you-go plan. So were the the possibility was once entertained by a few people, there social security systems of the United States and many was never any partnership, even any one-time arrangement of other countries. In the cir- the kind that sometimes enlivens media speculation. The cumstances of the time, process in federal politics was one not of trade-offs but of when birth rates were high- finding common ground. er, this made good econom- ic sense. we could not return to the ways of the through the opposition years. The The new Pearson government 1930s. We had got through the 1950s Pearson government worked by co- made the drafting of legislation along by compromises, without devising a operation. I doubt that today’s control such lines an urgent priority. In its new way adequate for a different from the top, however great the parlia- enthusiasm it was blind to both the world. There was confusion and con- mentary majority backing it, could so constitution and the politics of flict, which Pearson the diplomat was well rise above weaknesses and mis- Quebec. The 1951 amendment had passionately concerned to replace takes, could achieve so much of public not transferred jurisdiction away from with a co-operative federalism. But in benefit, as cabinet government yield- the provinces but made it concurrent, 1963 neither he nor his close associ- ed, despite its minority. and still with provincial primacy. ates quite knew how to make such a The first of the two opening blun- Parliament could legislate on pen- relationship work. That it should do ders was the 1963 budget, the product sions, provided such legislation did so is the third essential for the good of overconfidence. It was corrected by not “affect the operation of any law government of Canada. How the retreat; and the humiliation, of Walter present or future” of a province. Pearson government learned co-oper- Gordon particularly, left a scar that pro- No provincial government was ative federalism is the main theme of longed the agony of the second, near- opposed to contributory pensions, this article. fatal blunder: the government clung but none had done anything about The success depended also on a hopelessly to the initial version of the them. Nine were not thinking of it. fourth factor, too little recognized. Canada Pension Plan (CPP) long after it Quebec was. Pearson’s was genuinely a cabinet gov- had become plainly impracticable. I had known Jean Lesage when he ernment, rich in various talents, and The Pearson Liberal Party was was in Ottawa. We had become friends Pearson was a superb chairman who committed to comprehensive health when working in close agreement clarified and reconciled viewpoints. He care and other social improvements. within the preparatory policy commit- was flexible, but when he knew what The purposes were firm. But since tee for the 1958 party convention. He he wanted, as he usually did, the meet- jurisdiction was provincial, program got in touch with me a few days after ing concluded with at least an accept- specifications were left for consulta- he became premier of Quebec, in the able approximation of his intent. tion and negotiation. The exception summer of 1960. There was soon to be In this style of government, minis- was pensions, on which Ottawa had a federal-provincial conference. He terial staffs, including the prime minis- the power to legislate, thanks to the wanted to use it to make a definitive ter’s, were miniscule. I was labelled 1951 amendment to the constitution. statement on the viewpoint of the new “co-ordinator of programming,” and Many in the party were keen to Quebec and its changed role in the the published job description is worth use this opening. They were still sore Canadian federation. He wanted my quoting, because it encapsulates the from the shame of one of the last acts input to help in making the document POLICY OPTIONS 27 OCTOBER 2009 Tom Kent compatible with progressive opinion They did not win. There followed in a manner appropriate to the elsewhere in the country. If I could months of desultory attempts to mod- respective responsibilities of federal spend a few days at Maison ify the plan enough, perhaps to gain and provincial authorities.” Provinces Montmorency, the Dominican retreat Ontario’s acceptance. Premier John generally interpreted this to mean near Quebec City presided over by the Robarts, cleverly, did not show his that an offer of some increase would great Father Lévesque, he and a few of hand, though there could be little be the main event of the Quebec con- his ministers would come there in the doubt that eventually it would be to ference.