Ostpolitik Reborn Earlier this year, the German SPD suffered a serious election defeat. Like the British Left it is rethinking. In this interview with Eric Hobsbawm, Peter Glotz, until recently general secretary of the SPD, assesses the prospects for the Left

Peter Glotz was general secretary of the SPD from 1980 until June of this year. During the early 80s he played a key role in establishing contact between the SPD and the burgeoning social movements. He is the author of several important articles on the state of the European Left. He was born in Bohemia in 1939 and is presently a member of the Bundestag and its foreign relations committee.

You have written a good deal about the out. relations between Eastern and Western Secondly, intensified economic con- Glotz (left) and Hobsbawm Europe, though it is not very well-known tacts. There are now initiatives, again in Britain. How do you see the relations coming from Gorbachev, which we years the SPD has discarded its quite between the Western socialist movements should seize - for example, proposed understandable fear, which goes back and the Eastern bloc countries, or the joint ventures between East and West. several decades, of contact with the movements within the Eastern bloc? We should not allow the Americans to communist parties of the Eastern bloc Well, I start from a concept which is force us into curbing the transfer of and now has what are cautiously highly controversial, namely Central technology between West and East. termed information contacts but which Europe. I believe that it still exists. Rather, it is in the interests of peace as nevertheless amount to regular rela- Now this is highly controversial, and I well as common development that tions. Not in the sense that we conduct come in for a lot of flak in my own modern Western technology reaches government negotiations, but in the party, because there is always the risk the East, and in a good many instances sense that we try to promote develop- that 'Central Europe' will be inter- the reverse will hold true. ments in the economic and cultural preted as a German hegemony or a Thirdly, I think that cultural discus- sectors in particular, and also to German-Austrian hegemony over Hun- sion should play a much larger and discuss disarmament questions. And at gary, Czechoslovakia and all the other more crucial part than it does today, the same time we maintain contact with small states of Central and Eastern along with the mutual exchange of our the oppositional movements there, in so Europe. That is not the idea at all. intimately related European cultures. far as these things are compatible and Today we are in a situation in which it Even in the head of an average German feasible. And that gives us quite a is not possible to dissolve the two blocs Social Democrat, Warsaw today is different perspective. We have to in the short term, and which therefore basically a city on the other side of the create what I call a second Ostpolitik. offers us no chance of going our own Iron Curtain; the fact that Warsaw, ways. For this reason I am also rather Prague and Budapest are profoundly And how does this second 'Eastern policy' critical of the ideas put forward for a European cities, just as European as differ from the first? restoration of the small-German Bis- Paris, London or Berlin, is simply Fundamentally, the first Ostpolitik re- marckian empire in the name of suppressed and forgotten. We lean our moved the legacy of the war and reunification; I put more faith in a real backs against the Wall, facing Portugal, restored normal relations. We as the European solution, and I believe that it discussing the question of olive imports government then were proud, and quite must proceed from the present-day or wine exports. There's no longer a rightly so, of bringing about a four- blocs, the present-day bloc situation, dialogue, and the Slavs are behind us - party agreement on Berlin, so that we and must try to overcome it - in three Attila the Hun is at our backs, so to were not forced to use airlifts to feed areas in particular. speak. That is an absurd position and it people. Khrushchev still used to send Firstly, I believe that we can make must be broken down; not by confronta- up aeroplanes when the German feder- Central Europe a disarmament zone, tion but through intensified cultural al parliament met in Berlin. That is all and here we are talking about a contacts. For someone like me, coming over. But in addition we had to secure chemical weapon-free zone, about a from the Austro-Hungarian empire in a the borders - a de facto recognition of nuclear-free corridor or indeed the manner of speaking, from Bohemia, the existing demarcation. That was Gorbachev proposals, which are now where Czechs and Germans have lived necessary too. But now we must go addressing the question of middle- alongside one another for a thousand further and really develop these rela- range missiles and which originally years, it is a matter of special signi- tions with regard to content. One aspect came from the West, and might favour ficance. But it really should be intelligi- of this is tourism in either direction; this trend. Demilitarisation, then, not in ble to others, too. another is that we must encourage the sense of a complete shedding of all Let me say now, on quite a practical these countries to let their people out. troops, but still a very marked thinning level, that in the past three or four The GDR still retains the fig-leaf that

14 MARXISM TODAY AUGUST 1987 slowly he will not get into orbit; if he is quite true that we encounter a great proceeds too swiftly he will be pushed deal of misunderstanding and many off course. And when it comes down to questions from some of our friends, it, none of us can gauge exactly the particularly in France, and notably the balance of power in such a country French Socialists. after 60 years of that kind of socialism, of petrified and dogmatised socialism. Yes, I think that we must unfortunately He also faces all kinds of fearsome admit frankly that the French - including resistance from the middle-ranking the French Left - have somehow worked officials, and in the economy. And even themselves up into a new Cold War mood. if there is no organised political opposi- It's what I always call the Yves tion at present, it is still tremendously Montand effect. In France there is the difficult to push through reforms. He problem that they regard a Germany needs successes. The question is divided and turned against itself as whether the West is clever enough to more predictable than a Germany that give him these successes, or whether it is admittedly divided but still working will speculate that it would be better if together within the policy of coexist- he failed. ence.

Obviously the Americans are hoping he will Yes, that's right. But it is not a purely fail. German thing. For instance, I would say Yes they are, quite clearly, and so are a that it is also very noticeable in the good many circles in West Germany attitude of the French to Poland and to the and other conservative circles in West- Soviet Union. The fact is that the French ern Europe. They are virtually longing find it extremely difficult to digest the for the return of old Brezhnev. He did Gorbachev phenomenon in any way - even not come up with any surprises, nor did many people in the French Left. In the last he force us to adapt to change. He five years they have simply dismissed maintained the old concept of the everything with the word 'Gulag'. There enemy. To that extent it is a was no need to analyse... 'Oh, they're all tremendously interesting but also a just totalitarian societies, there's nothing tremendously ambivalent and vulner- going on, nothing ever happens there.' I able process, and no-one can say must say quite frankly that I find this exactly what will come out of it. The attitude incomprehensible nowadays, in only hope we have is that he derives a the 1980s. people are only allowed out for family 'The SPD has great deal of his support from The term totalitarianism may have reasons. But in the meantime it has academics, the KGB, and also from the been applicable to the society which been extended so much that, on the discarded its higher echelons of the army. These are, Stalin set up in the 1930s and 1940s, and whole, opportunities for travel are quite after all, relatively strong groups in to that extent analyses like Hanna already very much better, though still understand- such an organised society. Arendt's and many others do have not good enough. But much better than able fear of certain plausibility. But today I would 10 years ago. And the same goes for contact with But it is still interesting and welcome and no longer employ the concept of countries like Hungary. In my opinion unexpected that a man like Gorbachev rose totalitarianism as it is employed by the the further development of this pro- the to the top of a party which everyone French and by a section of the German cess, with the three elements of dis- communist regarded as a bureaucratic structure, Right. armament, culture and economics, completely immobile and immune to any would definitely mark a qualitative parties of the Eastern bloc' attempt at reform. I would like to ask you how you see the change; it is going further than the And I want to say, incidentally, that I prospects of the SPD in Germany, mere restoration of normal relations greatly welcome your attitude to the including governmental prospects. What under the first Ostpolitik. European problem of East-West relations. possibilities are there? I believe that for us in the West, in Britain Basically it is necessary for the SPD to And how do you view the chances of this and in the other countries, Germany, the make a great leap forward once again, process? For instance, how do you assess German problem and particularly the as it did at the end of the 1950s with the the new Gorbachev era in the Soviet Union policy of the SPD in this respect is a vitally Godesberg programme, and we are in in relation to these problems? important matter. For it is by way of fact in the process of working out a new I think that if Gorbachev holds out it internal German policy, the West-East programme, the first draft of which is will exert a tremendous influence on policy if you like, that the cold war will be already completed. Western Europe. If, for example, we dismantled. The fact that you are already There are a whole series of points really do manage to get rid of the succeeding in Germany in radically chang- which really are fundamentally diffe- Pershings, which we installed, and the ing the relations between East and West rent from the 1950s. The programme SS 20s, which Brezhnev installed, then must have a positive effect on the situation will be more feminist, and must be. The Kohl, Thatcher and Chirac will not be all over Europe, perhaps even throughout programme will give a new and diffe- able to carry on as before in their arms the world. And I think it is tremendously rent emphasis to the entire field of policies. It will provide an impulse. It important that you are proposing this ecology, ecological modernisation and will change our concept of the enemy. second 'Eastern policy', whether or not it renewal, an emphasis which was still But the most far-reaching aspect is gets any further. quite unrecognisable in the 1950s, certainly economic reform; as far as It has even affected the Conservatives intellectually. And out of this new that is concerned, it would be an in Germany. The normalisation of internationalism which I mentioned illusion to imagine that it will not have internal German relations was certain- earlier, together with the second Ostpo- ideological and cultural effects. The ly initiated by us, the Social Democrats; litik, we will develop a plan which I restriction of reforms, of glasnost and but there are also strong forces in the really believe can gain cultural perestroika to the economy alone will CDU/CSU which are carrying on the hegemony for us in this field, because not work. talks and which can no longer cling to there is hardly any relevant response Now the fundamental question is the old image of Ulbricht the enemy in from the other side. whether Gorbachev is proceeding too the same way. To this extent, then, we I think it is important to acknowledge rapidly in all this. He is faced with a very much hope that this second the necessity of shortening working colossal problem. If he proceeds too Ostpolitik will become a reality. But it hours - not only as a technocratic

15 MARXISM TODAY AUGUST 1987 measure for combating unemployment, degeneration. You lose the habit of What is being denied are the profound but also as the old Marxian Utopia of power and even the aspiration to changes in the social and economic time at one's disposal; and linked with power. You become content with the structure of modern society, whether this a new cultural policy, which I positions of power which you are able individualising or not. regard as the most seriously neglected to seize below the level of real power, if Now a further thing which strikes me area, at least as far as German social I may put it like that, and that too about the British Left is the particular democracy is concerned. After all, we constitutes a great danger. difficulty it has in finding its way to a started as a combination of workers' European idea, which I consider un- educational associations, and today we And how do you see the position and the avoidable. We also notice this in our are a movement in which culture has prospects in Britain, from the German contacts in the European parliament, played practically no part at all for point of view? which of course at the moment does not decades, and that has weakened us I see developments in Britain as play a major part, but at least it is a considerably. determined in a similar way to those in meeting point. It is easier to engage in a These are the questions on which Germany: by a split in the labour European debate with the Italian Com- social democracy must summon up new movement and a split in the Left. Even munists than with comrades from the strength; it is the precondition for 'labour movement' is really too narrow Labour Party. There is no doubt about success at the polls. At the moment our a concept. Basically the difference that. political discussion is determined by between Kohl and Thatcher is that There is also a difference between the gossip about alliances. All we discuss is Thatcher is more decisive and takes a German and the British Left in their more definite line than Kohl, and she is attitude towards the theme of the more radical and more brutal. It is technical and ecological modernisation astonishing that even in the face of of industrial society, in the trend such brutal policies, in which the class towards 'tertiarisation', towards the differences are a very great deal service economy, towards that sort of harsher than in West Germany, the merging of micro-electronics, informa- two-thirds society is entrenching itself tion technology and computers. We so firmly that she has now won three must take great care that we do not successive general elections. leave all this and everything connected with it to the Right. We must organise it What do you mean by a two-thirds society? from the Left. Basically it is a modern-day version of You cannot make a stand again- Disraeli's theory of the two nations. st economic developments of this The problem is that a minority in kind with rhetoric. They will come society - the unemployed and their anyway - that much at least I hope we families, poor pensioners, single have remembered from Marx. So it is mothers who are forced on to sup- futile if one does not try to organise it. plementary benefit, casual workers And there I see certain problems and who are liable to be made redundant difficulties. again and again - are all forced downwards; but a majority in society In the British Labour Party? (including many skilled workers) enjoy Yes. secure jobs. There is a danger that the upper stratum simply 'co-opts' this Nay I put another question to you, about whether we should go with the Greens section of the working class and the collaboration of the Left, the European or with somebody else. There is no secures its loyalty. collaboration of the Left, the so-called political discussion any more, there is We are faced with a number of Euro-Left. I assume that you have no direction to our struggle, nothing circumstances related to this which at supported it for a long time. I also assume but tactical bickering which is of no the moment we, as a labour movement that in this respect you no longer observe interest to the normal citizen, only to or a political party, fail to grasp. I think the old differences between, let us say, the the political class. And in that situation, we are faced with a trend towards communist and social democratic parties with a tactical debate of that nature, it individualisation. It is more noticeable to quite the same extent as in the past - in is impossible to get out of one's in West Germany than in Great Britain; other words, that collaboration is possible. enclosure. And if we don't we will stay but I think it is a general European Though of course we make clear in a ghetto: unable to work with the development. Incomes have risen con- distinctions between the various com- Greens while the FDP (the Liberals) siderably in the last three decades, as munist parties. The Italian Communists and the CDU are still strong enough to have the educational opportunities of are simply quite different from the govern together, at least on a national the lower strata. There are trends French, as they always have been. level. So that's what we have to get out towards the decentralisation of the of. We can only do it if we have goals of workplace and increasing flexibility in But the French Socialists are also quite our own, and these goals must be given working hours. This all leads to the different. a much sharper profile than is the case individual being wrenched away from I would be happy to go along with that, at present. former class loyalties and responsibili- but to my way of thinking there are still I believe that we must now follow a ties for the welfare of others; but on the communist parties - the German Com- strategy that is strongly based on other hand new dependencies devolve munist Party (DKP) is undoubtedly one success in regional and local govern- upon people through their dependence of them - with whom there is not a ment. We have a broad base of elected on the labour market and their consum- great deal of point in talking. But on the representatives - mayors, members er existence. The individual now has other hand there are a whole lot of and majorities in the state parliaments more options, and also more ties. I groupings with whom it is most in- - then in 1990 we have to resume the believe that the German Social Demo- teresting to talk, and I think that for struggle for power in the Bundestag. At crats - and the Labour Party - must this reason we must make a distinction. the moment it is impossible to predict adapt to differing lifestyles and differ- the outcome, but we are old enough to ing income levels to a greater extent Fine, but we are not just talking about be able to survive, as it were, another than they have done in their culture conversations, are we? How do you view period until 1994 if need be. But of hitherto. It is my impression that the the collaboration between the various course, the longer the period in opposi- Left reacts to this trend towards European Lefts practically, outside the tion, the greater the risk of the activists individualisation by trying to deny that European parliament? becoming isolated and the risk of it exists. Well, to be quite realistic about it I have

17 MARXISM TODAY AUGUST 1987 to say that at the present time this only moving very slowly. Absolutely. I have the impression that collaboration exists at best in the form people are noticing more and more that of personal contacts. In an institutional- What you have to say about the trade we are not able to serve their interests ised form it hardly exists at all. There unions seems to me to be right and very with our programmes, that we are is a federation of European social important. The labour movements have unable to reach them. democratic parties, which is an address historically been completely built to I will give you two examples. There is rather than an organisation. And there operate within national frontiers. Today a globalisation of risk. Take Chernobyl are almost no contacts between the that is increasingly unrealistic. Of course as an example. That is something which trade unions. This seems to me to be the in practice it is impossible to operate can no longer be dealt with on a most important point. If we do not effectively on a worldwide scale against the national scale; it cannot be affected. succeed in bringing the European trade transnational firms that control us to an And in economic policy, too, it is a unions closer together and establishing 'A good ever-growing extent. Nevertheless we sheer illusion to imagine that with practical communication between many must somehow transcend the limitations of classical employment programmes of them, then quite simply we shall be conservative the trade union movement, particularly of the Keynesian type, on which socialists defeated by the European entrep- the trade unions on the national level, had based their economic policy for reneurs in a confrontation in which circles in within the national borders. And the best decades, one might easily combat social struggles are increasingly co- Western chance of achieving this is within Europe. unemployment in the face of American ordinated. Europe are And that is also possible if the national interest rates and Euro-dollar market, Secondly I believe we must bring the virtually party leaderships desire it more in the face of the international circula- discussions in our various countries longing for strongly, and I believe it is vital that we tion of capital and the goings-on into closer contact. So I have been fight for it. In our party, the SPD, there associated with it. There are so many campaigning for some time now for a the return of is a very strong move in this direction, international determinants that one is journal, a magazine, a yearbook in old and I must add that the European no longer capable of taking action which the intellectual discussions of Brezhnev' parliament has had favourable con- nationally. the French or the British are brought sequences for us. From this I draw the conclusion that if into contact with those of the Germans, we do not achieve a Europeanisation of or the Italians. For at the moment there I think the intellectual connection is easier politics, but go on cherishing the is a very strong national isolation. In to establish than the trade union connec- illusion that we can overcome the actual fact, we live separately side by tion, for in the latter case we are dealing problems within the framework of the side and I think we must take the first with more than just a conversation. It old national state, then we shall in- steps in two areas: firstly, in the must somehow be made operational. creasingly lack credibility, because intellectual sphere, so that the discus- I think a good deal of the union contact people will sense that we are only sions contribute to each other, so that must be initiated bilaterally, and once talking, and in the final analysis no we at least arouse a mutual interest this network is in place it can be longer possess the instruments with among the elites; secondly, in the field developed further multilaterally. which to effectively influence of trade union organisation, which politics. • incidentally might finance what would Clearly we are both very much in favour of have to be done. Unfortunately it is European collaboration on the Left. Translated from the German by Barrie Selman.

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