Daf Ditty Pesachim 50: “Indolent but Rewarded" Women of Machoza

Daf Ditty Pesachim 50: “indolent but rewarded" women of Machoza

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MISHNA: In a place where the people were accustomed to perform labor on Passover eve until midday, one may do so on that day. In a place where the people were accustomed not to perform labor, one may not do so. The performance of labor on the eve of Passover is not prohibited by Torah law but is dependent on local custom.

If one travels from a place where people perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people do not perform labor, or from a place where people do not perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people perform labor, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of both the place from which he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went. In both cases, he may not perform labor.

The Sages stated a principle: And a person may not deviate from the local custom, due to potential dispute. Similarly, one who transports Sabbatical Year produce from a place where a crop has ceased in the fields to a place where it has not yet ceased or from a place where it has not yet ceased to a place where it has already ceased is obligated to remove the produce from his possession, in accordance with the stringencies of both locations. It is permitted for homeowners to eat Sabbatical Year produce in their houses only as long as that species of fruit remains in the field as ownerless property. However, once that particular fruit is no longer available for animals in the fields, one is required to remove what remains of that species from his home.

3 The statement in the mishna is referring to one who transported fruit from a location where it ceased in the fields to one where it did not, and vice versa. Rabbi Yehuda says that he need not remove the produce, as he can say to a local resident: You, too, go out and bring this produce from a place where it remains in the field.

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GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why discuss this prohibition particularly with regard to Passover eves? It is prohibited to perform labor even on Shabbat eves and Festival eves as well, as it was taught in a baraita: One who performs labor on Shabbat eves and Festival eves from minḥa time onward never sees a sign of blessing from this work.

The Gemara answers that there is a difference between the two situations: There, in the case of Shabbat and Festivals, performing labor is prohibited from minḥa time onward; it is not prohibited adjacent to minḥa time, i.e., just before it. Here, in the case of Passover eve, it is prohibited from midday.

Alternatively, there, on Shabbat eve and Festival eve, it is a sign of blessing that he does not see; however, the Sages do not excommunicate him for performing labor. Here, in the case of Passover eve, the Sages also excommunicate him for performing labor, as it is explicitly prohibited.

The Gemara cites the source of the matter itself in its entirety: One who performs labor on Shabbat eves or on Festival eves from minḥa time onward, and similarly one who works immediately upon the conclusion of Shabbat, or the conclusion of a Festival, or the conclusion of Yom Kippur, or on any occasion where there is a trace of sin, which comes to include a communal fast, e.g., the Ninth of Av or a fast for rain, when it is prohibited to perform labor, never sees a sign of blessing from this work. If one performs labor just before Shabbat or

5 immediately after Shabbat, the concern is that even a slight miscalculation could lead to performance of labor on Shabbat itself, when it is prohibited.

Apropos reward or lack thereof, the Gemara cites the Tosefta in which the Sages taught: There is one who is diligent and rewarded for his diligence; and there is one who is diligent and penalized due to his diligence; there is one who is lazy and rewarded; and there is one who is lazy and penalized. How so? Diligent and rewarded is referring to one who works the entire week and does not work on Shabbat eve. Diligent and penalized is one who works all week and works on Shabbat eve. Lazy and rewarded is one who does not work the entire week and does not work on Shabbat eve. Lazy and penalized is one who does not work the entire week and works on Shabbat eve to complete the work he neglected to perform during the week. Rava said:

With regard to those women of Meḥoza, even though they do not perform labor on Shabbat eve, it is due to excessive pampering, as neither do they work on any other day. Even so, we call them lazy and rewarded. Despite the fact that their laziness is not motivated by piety, their inactivity has a positive aspect to it.

RASHI

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On the topic of reward for a mitzva fulfilled without intent, Rava raised a contradiction: It is written:

For Thy mercy is great unto the heavens, and Thy truth 11 אי יִכּ - לֹדָג דַﬠ - יַמָשׁ םִ ;ֶדְּסַח דַﬠְו - .unto the skies ְשׁ םיִקָח .ֶתִּמֲא םיִקָח Ps 57:11

“For Your mercy is great unto the heavens, and Your truth reaches the skies” and it is written elsewhere:

For Thy mercy is great above the heavens, and Thy truth 5 ה יִכּ - לוֹדָג לַﬠֵמ - יַמָשׁ םִ ;ֶדְּסַח דַﬠְו - .reacheth unto the skies ְשׁ םיִקָח .ֶתִּמֲא םיִקָח Ps 108:5

“For Your mercy is great above the heavens, and Your truth reaches the skies”

How so? How can these verses be reconciled?

The Gemara explains: Here, where the verse says that God’s mercy is above the heavens, it is referring to a case where one performs a mitzva for its own sake; and here, where the verse says that God’s mercy reaches the heavens, it is referring to a case where one performs a mitzva not for its own sake.

Even a mitzva performed with ulterior motives garners reward, as Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A person should always engage in Torah study and performance of mitzvot, even if he does so not for their own sake, as through the performance of mitzvot not for their own sake, one gains understanding and comes to perform them for their own sake.

RASHI

8 TOSAFOS

'סות ה"ד ןאכו םישועב אלש המשל ברדכו הדוהי בדו מל ל יוב או "

Tosfos reconciles this statement of Rava with another statement of his in B'rachos.

,המית אברד ג היפו רמא ב"פב תוכרבד 'ד( י ז . ) לכ' קסועה הרותב אלש ,המשל נ חו ול אלש ?'ארבנ אש ל ונ ,מל ל רת סע ל' ).זי '( ורדבפ מ יוג בד הי

Rava himself says in the second Perek of B'rachos (Daf 17.) that whoever studies Torah 'she'Lo li'Shemah' (for the wrong motives), it would have been better had he not been born?

י"רואו , םתהד ימ ירי גכ ו ן דמולש ידכ רהיתהל רטנקלו חפקלו תא יריבח ו ,הכלהב יאו נ ו דמול מ"ע .תושעל מ"ע דמול

The Ri explains that it speaks there about someone who learns in order to boast, and to chide his colleagues and to prove them wrong, rather than to fulfil the Mitzvos.

לבא אכה ימ ירי אימוד איההד ליעלד ' שי לפש ו 'רכשנ - אלד דיבע כ ו ל הי בש את ו ל א ב עמ ל י בש את .א ש ילע תב

Whereas here it is speaking in a case similar to what we learned earlier 'There are some who are laid back and benefit' - with reference to someone who does not work the entire week and who does not work on erev Shabbos either.

אש י ן מ ת וכ ןו םושל הער אלא ךותמ ,תולצע ה"פא לודג' דע םימש ךדסח ' .' דחםמ עלד' "א תלעךת ל ע ול וו

They intend no evil, and what they do is based on laziness. Nevertheless "Your kindness reaches up to the Heaven!" Summary

Mark Kerzner writes:1

In the times of the Temple, people did not work on the day before Passover: this was a day of bringing a Passover sacrifice, and it had a character of a holiday. Later, some people adopted a custom to refrain from work on this day, while others did not. Therefore, if one is from a town where they work on this day, and he comes to a town where they donated - he, too, should not do any work. In general, one should follow the local custom, in order to avoid disagreements. Moreover, if he comes from a town with a more stringent custom, he is bound by it too. Therefore, one receives the stringencies of the place he left and the stringencies of the place he came to.

1 http://talmudilluminated.com/pesachim/pesachim50.html

9 Similarly, on the Shmita year, one has to remove from his possession the fruit he has collected, once they are finished in the fields, and leave it for everyone to use. If he comes to a place where they are already putting the fruit into the streets for everyone’s enjoyment, he too has to do it too, even if in his hometown the time to remove the fruit has not come yet and vice versa.

Rav Avrohom Adler writes:2

Doing work before midday on Erev Pesach is prohibited in a place where the custom is not to do work.

The Mishna explains that whether or not one can do work on Erev Pesach before midday is dependent on the custom of the place. Rashi explains that the reason that there was a custom in some places not to do work was in order that people should not forget to do the many things that they need to do that morning. These include burning their chametz, preparing to slaughter their korban pesach, and preparing their matzah for Pesach night (among other basic pesach preparations done on Erev Pesach). Rashi comments that it was especially prudent to be ready, in order that on Pesach night everything will be set so that the seder can begin quickly, and the children will not fall asleep.

A person is rewarded by Hashem if he abstains from working when he is not supposed to work, even if he would not have worked anyway. The Gemora cites four types of people who either work or do not work at certain times. One of them is “the unemployed person who receives reward.” This refers, Rava explains, to the women of Mechoza. They did not work the whole week, nor on Erev Shabbos, because they simply never worked.

Although they did not abstain from working on Erev Shabbos because it was Erev Shabbos, they still receive some reward for abstaining from working on Erev Shabbos. Rava explains that this fits with the comment of Rav Yehudah, that a person should always do the mitzvos even if he does not do them for the sake of the mitzvah alone. [He will still be rewarded, though certainly he will receive less reward than one who does the mitzvah because it is a mitzvah.]

A MITZVAH PERFORMED "SHE'LO LISHMAH"

Rav Mordechai Kornfeld writes:3

The Gemara quotes a Beraisa that teaches that one who works on Erev Shabbos after Minchah time will see no blessing from his labor. The Gemara quotes a second Beraisa that teaches a similar lesson. "There is one who toils and gains, one who toils and loses, one who is lazy and gains, and one who is lazy and loses. The one who toils and gains is the one who works all week except for Erev Shabbos. The one who toils and loses is the one who works all week and on Erev Shabbos. The one who is lazy and gains is the one who does not work all week, and he does not work on

2 3 https://www.dafyomi.co.il/pesachim/insites/ps-dt-050.htm

10 Erev Shabbos either. The one who is lazy and loses is the one who does not work all week, but he works on Erev Shabbos."

Rava adds that the women of Mechoza are considered like the "one who is lazy and gains." Even though they do not work during the week because they are lazy and indulgent, they also do not work on Erev Shabbos.

What lesson does Rava want to teach that is not included in the Beraisa? (RIF in Ein Yakov)

The RIF explains that the Beraisa teaches that even a Mitzvah she'Lo Lishmah is considered a Mitzvah. That is why one who refrains from work on Erev Shabbos because of his laziness, and not because of the Mitzvah to refrain from work at that time, is considered to have "gained" the Mitzvah nonetheless.

However, we might have thought that he is credited with the Mitzvah she'Lo Lishmah only when he has no motive at all behind his idleness. He does not intend to fulfill the Mitzvah by refraining from work, but he also has no other motive in refraining from work. If, however, he has another motive in refraining from work, perhaps he is not considered to have done any Mitzvah at all.

Therefore, Rava adds that even the women of Mechoza, who refrain from work because they like to indulge in pleasure, are still credited with the Mitzvah. Rava teaches that when the Beraisa says that a Mitzvah done she'Lo Lishmah is considered a Mitzvah, that is true not only when one does the act of the Mitzvah without intention to fulfill the Mitzvah, but even when one does the act of the Mitzvah with specific intention to accomplish something else with the act.

Following Local Custom

Steinzaltz (OBM) writes:4

The fourth perek of Massekhet Pesahim begins on our daf. It opens with a continuation of the discussion about preparations for the Passover holiday, specifically whether or not one can engage in mundane activities on erev Pesah. Must one dedicate the day before the holiday to the many necessary pre-Pesah preparations, like destroying hametz, baking matzot, arranging the Passover sacrifice, etc.? The Sages did not rule that erev Pesah need be a day of complete cessation of everyday matters; they left it to the discretion of each community – minhag ha-makom – to establish to what extent members of the community should refrain from work.

In fact, the majority of this chapter focuses not so much on Pesah matters as it does on the general approach that the halakha takes towards minhag, towards community custom and practice. What is the significance of minhag in Jewish law? What are the sources that obligate Jews to follow the local minhag? Can an established minhag change, if there is a change in circumstance? Which minhag should a traveler follow – the minhag of the place that he left, or the accepted

4 https://steinsaltz.org/daf/pesahim50/

11 practices of his new community? These are the issues dealt with in the fourth chapter, appropriately titled Makom She-Nahagu – “The place where they kept the custom.”

Mishna: In a place where the people were accustomed to perform labor on Passover eve until midday, one may do so on that day. In a place where the people were accustomed not to perform labor, one may not do so. The performance of labor on the eve of Passover is not prohibited by Torah law but is dependent on local custom. If one travels from a place where people perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people do not perform labor, or from a place where people do not perform labor on Passover eve to a place where people perform labor, the Sages impose upon him the stringencies of both the place from which he left and the stringencies of the place to which he went. In both cases, he may not perform labor.

The rishonim ask why a person would be obligated to accept the stringencies of both communities. Would it not make more sense to say that a person who travels to a new community and intends to remain there would have to accept the local minhagim, but if he planned to stay only a short time and return to his hometown, he should follow the traditions of his home?

Rabbenu Yehonatan argues that this, in fact, is the intention of the Mishna in saying that he must keep the stringencies of the place that he is from – if he intends to return, and the stringencies of the place to which he arrived – if he intends to remain there.

The Ramban understands the Mishna to be discussing a case where the man plans to return home, and the ruling that he must accept the customs of the new place is a temporary measure to avoid disagreements.

According to the Rashba, we are discussing a case where the individual is visiting Israel from Babylon, and he is obligated to accept the minhagim of Israel because halakha perceived the Babylonian community as being subservient to the Jewish community in Israel.

The Wrong Reason

Rabbi Jay Kelman writes:5

Our tradition has long taught that it is a great mitzvah to do the right thing, even if for the wrong reason. “A person should, leolam, always be engaged in Torah and mitzvoth even if sheloh lishma, not for its own sake; as from doing them not for their sake, one will come to do them lishma, for their own sake” (our daf)

This teaching, quoted in the name of Rav, the founder of the great Babylonian academy in Sura, appears in numerous places in the Talmud. He understood that it is actions, more than motives,

5 https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/pesachim-50b-wrong-reason

12 that matter. This is especially true in the case of mitzvoth between man and man, where the purpose is to help others (even if it’s done somewhat grudgingly). It is also true in our relationship to G-d, where one might have thought that intent is more important—God, after all, does not need our actions.

As the Sefer Hachinuch noted a thousand years later and in a different context, it is actions that mold character; and acting out mitzvoth will influence our mindset, slowly but surely moving us towards doing mitzvoth for their own sake. In fact, it is next to impossible for a human to be purely motivated. We are a scheming species, and often do not even know ourselves what motivates us. The operative word is leolam, always. There is always an element of shelo lishma in our mitzvoth, but our goal is to limit this over time and by repeated performance of mitzvoth, so that we are moving in the right direction towards the (possibly unattainable) goal of totally acting for the sake of the mitzvah. Our job is to do what is right—not to philosophize about why we act the way we do.

Yet, at the same time, we have a contradictory teaching “that whoever is engaged in Torah for ulterior motives, it would have been better had he not been created”. The true essence of a person is what lies in his heart, what motivates him to act. At times, it may be difficult to translate our true desires to action, but having a pure heart is the most important prerequisite to creating a good person. “G-d desires the heart”, and it is from the heart that actions will flow.

One could argue that we have a fundamental disagreement—is it the heart or the hand that matter most?6. Yet our commentaries felt that these two views can and should be reconciled. Tosafot, in a number of places, distinguishes between two types of “ulterior motives”. The first is when one is acting for honour, or for monetary gain and the like. While not ideal, doing mitzvoth—even for personal gain—is most laudatory. On the other hand, one may learn in order to know just enough so he can attack our tradition, or to try to stump and thereby embarrass his teacher. Here, the learning is harmful; and one who engages in such is compounding his sin by using Torah as a means towards that end. That is not why we were created.

The Netziv (Responsa Mesheev Davar #46) offers an alternative—and what can only be described as a frightening—solution. He explains that the determining factor here is whether one is following precedent or innovating. In the former case, one is doing what Jewish law demands—and we cannot fault one for his feelings towards such obligations. I may not want to sit in a sukkah or keep kosher, and I may do so for all kinds of reasons—but I am doing what I must do, and am thus rewarded, regardless of motive. But when one introduces new practices to Judaism that that are not truly required, one must be certain, the Netziv claims, to ensure that one is acting for the sake of heaven.

Innovation, hiddush, in understanding a piece of Gemara or dealing with new social realities can be wonderful and necessary. But the sole motivation for such must be to make Torah greater and

6 This “debate” seems to me to somewhat parallel the debate as to whether we should follow the Rambam’s view that the one’s inclusion in the Jewish community is dependent on proper belief. Even those whose actions are full of sin can merit the World to Come if they follow the thirteen principles of faith, whereas a wonderful person who does not accept such loses their share in the next world.

13 even more beautiful. And while man can see what others do, only G-d can know what truly motivates us.

What’s on your mind?7

One of the classic debates of the Talmud – and one with no clear resolution – is whether or not mitzvoth tzreechot kavanah. The term kavanah, which literally means “direction”, is not easy to translate into precise halachic terminology, but is generally understood to mean focus and concentration on what one is doing.

In numerous discussions in the Talmud (see, for example, Brachot 13a) and later authorities, our Sages debate whether those who do the act of a mitzvah but do so without kavanah have fulfilled their religious obligation. Some distinguish between biblical mitzvoth (that require kavanah) and rabbinic ones (that do not). Thus, building a fence on one’s roof would require kavanah for the mitzvah, whereas lighting Chanukah candles would not[1].

Others distinguish between those mitzvoth fulfilled through speech and those fulfilled by performing a tangible act. Saying something without focusing on what it means is of little value. On the other hand with actions speaking louder than words, what we do is of great significance— regardless of our intent[2]. Thus, prayer without kavanah could not be classified as avodah shebalev, worship of the heart, which is the essence of prayer. However, one who ate matzah solely because of enjoyment – perhaps even if he or she did not realize it was Pesach – would, technically, fulfill a mitzvah obligation.

Nonetheless, there are certain actions that have little meaning if done without the proper intent. In his commentary on the Tur (Orach Chaim # 425), the Bach notes three mitzvoth where the Torah states that the mitzvah must be performed for a specific purpose. With the Torah most specific about why the mitzvah is to be done, unless one has this goal in mind, one cannot properly fulfil the mitzvah. These three mitzvoth (and the reasoning behind them) are:

• Sukkah, “that your generations may know that I made the children of Israel to dwell in booths, when I brought them out of the land of Egypt” (Vayikra 23:44);

• Tzizit, “that you may remember and do all My commandments, and be holy unto your G- d” (Bamidbar 15:40); and

• Tefillin, “that the law of the Lord may be in thy mouth, for with a strong hand hath the Lord brought you out of Egypt” (Shemot 13:9)[3].

Others distinguish mitzvoth between man and G-d from those between man and man. When we help others, the fact that such may not be our intent matters little; we have still helped a fellow

7 https://www.torahinmotion.org/discussions-and-blogs/zevachim-46-whats-on-your-mind

14 human being. But G-d has no need for our mitzvoth, and if we are not focused on the mitzvah, what purpose can doing it possibly serve?

While there is much debate regarding when and what type of kavanah one might need, there is one area where there is no room for debate. “The slaughtered offering is slaughtered for the sake of six matters: for the sake of the offering; for the sake of the one who sacrifices; for the sake of G-d; for the sake of fires; for the sake of the aroma; for the sake of the pleasing; and in the cases of a sin offering and a guilt offering, for the sake of atonement for the sin” (Zevachim 46b).

A korban is a vehicle—in Temple times, the primary vehicle—to come closer to G-d. One dares not approach G-d unless one is properly focused on the task at hand. No encounter is better than a failed one. While there is little damage done by sitting in a sukkah because it’s hot outside, or keeping Shabbat because one values a day of quiet, bringing a korban without a focus on the mitzvah can be most detrimental, especially if one thinks atonement can be attained by bringing this korban[4].

The concept of kavanah should not be confused with a related concept, that of lishma, motivation. While kavanah focuses on what one is doing, lishma focuses on why one is doing something. Is it to fulfill G-d’s command or is it to impress a neighbour? Here, there is universal agreement that even improperly motivated mitzvoth are most meaningful[5]. "One should always involve oneself in Torah and mitzvoth shelo lishma, not for the name of G-d, for from doing it shelo lishma, one will [eventually] come to do it lishma, for the name of G-d" (Our Daf).

One can have much kavanah and be fully focused on the task at hand but be doing it for less-than- pure reasons; conversely, one might have the greatest of motivation but nonetheless find oneself unable to focus on the mitzvah one is doing. One may be truly motivated to pray—fully internalizing the fact that G-d is the determinant of how successful our efforts will be—but nonetheless, find focusing on prayer most difficult. Or one might go to shul only because one is forced to by one’s parents, but once there, actually be inspired by the words of prayer – even if one finds the concept of tefilla to be of little value.

Fortunate are those who can do mitzvoth lishma and with great kavanah[6].

Notes

[1] Perhaps the explanation for such a distinction lies in the fact that rabbinic mitzvoth are not inherently obligatory. Rather, their authority is derived from the fact that the Torah tells us to listen to the Sages. Thus, when we light Chanukah candles, we are fulfilling the Biblical mitzvah to listen to the Sages – hence, we recite the blessing, “Who commanded us in His mitzvoth” – and the candles are just a means to that end.

[2] Of course, this works both ways, and one who unintentionally sins must still do teshuva if one wants to be forgiven for one's sin.

[3] The Rosh expresses a similar idea in noting why the mitzvah to write a sefer Torah no longer applies. As the Torah explicitly states that the reason for the mitzvah is to teach—“Now therefore write this song (the Torah) for you, and teach it to the children of Israel” (Devarim 31:19)—that reason becomes an integral part of the mitzvah. As nowadays, we use books to learn, rather than

15 learning from a written sefer Torah, the mitzvah to write a sefer Torah today consists of buying sefarim, of having a library of Jewish books (and using them).

[4] It is for this reason that the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim #98:1-2) rules that one should not daven if one knows that one will be unable to have proper kavanah. As we discussed in our last post, the only reason we allow such today is due to the fear that, if we waited until we had proper kavanah, we might never daven. Davening without kavanah is not quite the same as a meaningless korban.

[5] One can, however, have such negative motivation that not only is the mitzvah rendered meaningless, the person is, too. If one performs a mitzvah for the purpose of hurting another—i.e., studying Torah to find a way to embarrass one’s teacher—“it would have been better had one not been born” (Brachot 17a).

[6] As discussed here our Sages understood that it is never possible to be 100% purely motivated. Interestingly, we find no teaching to the effect that proper kavanah is beyond our reach. While the human condition is such that we always have some ulterior motives mixed in, total focus is possible—with great effort.

R. Sari Laufer writes:8

As this new chapter begins, the mishnah opens with a question about working on Erev Passover. While you might think, from the mishnah, that we are headed for a deep dive into what constitutes work, Erev Passover, and local custom, the conversation is even more nuanced. From this mishnah, we'll get to questions of fair compensation, laziness and industriousness, and even a topic near and dear to the heart of the modern non-profit staffer: the value of work beyond money.

As the rabbis ease into that conversation — working "for love of the game" — they circle back to a theme that we find throughout the Talmud: the tension, or perhaps the relationship, between intention and action. Does fulfilling a mitzvah still “count,” the rabbis ponder, if you have an ulterior motive — like financial gain?

One answer is that a person receives due credit for performing a mitzvah, whatever her motivation. This is cleverly proven by Rava who draws together two nearly identical verses from Psalms to do it:

It is written: For Your mercy is great up to the heavens.(Ps 57:11)

And it is written: For Your mercy is great above the heavens. (Ps 108:5)

The latter verse is referring to a case where one performs a mitzvah for its own sake.

And the former, (Ps 57:11) it is referring to a case where one performs a mitzvah not for its own sake. As Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: A person should always engage in Torah study and performance of mitzvot, even if he does so not for their own sake, as through the

8 Myjewishlearning.com

16 performance of mitzvot not for their own sake one gains understanding and comes to perform them for their own sake.

For Rava, even if your performance of the mitzvah is not purely for the sake of the commandment, it still “counts.” But more than that, Rav (via Rava) suggests, the more you fulfill mitzvot for the self-interested “wrong” reasons, the more you will learn about them, and the more inspired you will become to follow the commandments for their own sake. A classic win/win.

But what about the other end of the spectrum? What happens when fulfilling a mitzvah is part of your job description — and therefore you always have a monetary motive for fulfilling it? The Gemara brings the example of scribes (sofrim): men (and today also women) who have the skill and authority to write Torah scrolls, mezuzot and the parchments inside tefillin. Does the fact that they make their living by performing God’s holy work corrupt the beauty of that work? The answer is that it doesn’t, as long as they don’t make too much money. Here’s the Gemara again:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The members of the Great Assembly observed 24 fasts, for scribes who write Torah scrolls, tefillin, and mezuzot, so that they will not become wealthy from their craft, for were they to become wealthy, they would no longer write these sacred items.

Similarly, the sages taught: Scribes who write scrolls, tefillin, and mezuzot; and their merchants and their merchants’ merchants and all those engaged in the work of Heaven as a profession which includes those who sell the sky-blue dye for ritual fringes, never see a sign of blessing from their labor. But if they engage in these activities for their own sake, they do see blessing from their labor.

Overworked, underpaid and committed to their mission — it seems that the scribes are the nonprofit staff of Talmudic times. Engaging in the work of Heaven, the rabbis seem to understand, is a reward unto itself, but money, as it does so often, threatens to complicate and corrupt the work. Further, unlike regular folk, who earn their reward regardless of how or why they fulfill the mitzvah, those whose employment is fulfilling mitzvot only receive a reward for the “pure” fulfillment of the commandment — unsullied by ulterior motives or financial compensation.

I recently saw a comic strip about nonprofit compensation: “Benjamins? We are paid in children’s laughter.” Or, it would seem, in the service of Heaven itself.

Torah Study for its Own Sake

Harav Baruch Gigi writes:9

I. Torah for its own sake – for the sake of fulfilling it

9 (Translated by David Strauss) https://www.etzion.org.il/en/shiur-40-torah-study-its-own-sake

17

In many places, Chazal greatly emphasized the need to study Torah for its own sake.[1] However, they did not directly clarify the meaning of this concept, and therefore the Rishonim and Acharonim offer many different explanations. What is the meaning of this requirement to study Torah for its own sake?

As a first step, we will trace the words of Chazal in various contexts where we find the requirement to study Torah for its own sake.

In the beginning of chapter Kinyan Torah in tractate Avot, we read:

Rabbi Meir says: Whoever occupies himself with the Torah for its own sake, merits to acquire many things. (Avot 6:1)

In tractate Kalla Rabbati, we find an objection against Rabbi Meir’s words:

According to Rabbi Meir, rather than teach: Whoever occupies himself with the Torah for its own sake, should he not teach what Rabbi Yochanan said: "And the Lord says: Because they have forsaken My law" (Jer 9:12) – not because of idol worship, nor because of forbidden sexual relations or bloodshed. The Holy One, blessed is He, said: I sent Israel into exile only because they have forsaken the Torah, as it is stated: "And they have forsaken Me, and have not kept My law" (Jer 16:11). If they have forsaken Me, what is the need to add "and have not kept My law"? From here the Sages said: A person should always occupy himself with Torah and mitzvot,[2] even if not for the sake of learning itself, for from [study] not for its own sake, one comes to [study] for its own sake. (Kalla Rabbati 5:1).

And they answer there:

When Rabbi Meir spoke, he was speaking according to Rabbi Akiva’s opinion, as it was taught: Rabbi Akiva says: Whoever reads [from the Torah] not for its own sake, it would have been better for him had the afterbirth in which he lay been turned over his face, as it is stated: "And you shall keep My commandments and do them." I gave them to be done, and not for any other purpose. (ibid.)

According to tractate Kalla, Rabbi Meir follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva who emphasizes that the primary objective of Torah study is fulfilling the mitzvot. One who studies "Torah for its own sake" studies Torah in order to fulfill it.

In earlier shiurim we brought the words of the Yerushalmi in Berakhot (2, 1), according to which it would have been better for one who studies "not in order to fulfill," had the after-birth been turned over his face, preventing him from entering the world. This is the same formulation used here by Rabbi Akiva in connection with one who studies not for its own sake.[3]

II. Rabbi Yehuda he-Chasid and the demand that one learns in order to do

18 According to this, one who studies Torah for its own sake directs his study to the Torah's actualization and fulfillment in the world of actions. Rabbi Yehuda he-Chasid emphasizes this idea in his book, Sefer Chasidim:

If a person wishes to study for its own sake, how does he do this? When he learns, he should think in his heart: Whatever I learn, I will fulfill. He who discontinues [learning] words of Torah and indulges in idle gossip will be made to eat glowing coals of juniper, as it is stated (Job 30:4): "They pluck salt-wort with wormwood; and the roots of juniper are their food." And if he fulfills them, it is for its own sake. Even if he learns: "He who pays money to a woman, counting from his hand to her hand for the sake of gazing at her," he will not be saved from the judgment of Gehinom, but if he does not gaze at women it is for its own sake. But if he discontinues [learning] words of Torah and occupies himself with idle gossip, and similarly if he gazes at women, he will be punished even for that which he has already learned. This is similar to the prophet who transgressed that which was told to him, or like the person who heard the words of a prophet and transgressed them, and a lion attacked him. So too one who studies and does not fulfill. (Sefer Chasidim, ed. Margoliyot, 944)

Rabbi Yehuda he-Chasid does not content himself with the demand that one study in order to fulfill. He is not willing to accept meticulous fulfillment of only the laws of Shabbat and forbidden interest. He requires internalization of all the material studied, and its full actualization in the world of action. If what he studied is not actualized in this manner, the study for its own sake is blemished.

Sefer Chasidim compares between one who studies the words of Chazal and a prophet who receives a prophecy but denies it. He relates to the words of Chazal as the word of God in the mouths of His Sages (which parallel words of prophecy). Thus, one who denies these words is like one who denies God's word in His Torah.

These words echo and penetrate exceedingly deeply. The duty upon one who studies Torah for its own sake is to fulfill the Torah that he learned in close connection to the words that he studied, and to see them as if he had heard them from the mouth of God. This is the deeper meaning of the comparison drawn between Torah study and words of prophecy. They are both the words of the living God, and when one denies them it is as if he removed his ear from listening to the words of God. On the other hand, one who obeys them and actualizes them cleaves to the living God.

III. Tosafot: Three levels in Torah study

This point which we learned from the words of Rabbi Yehuda he-Chasid is emphasized and intensified in the wake of the words of Tosafot, who struggle with a certain tension between a passage in Berakhot (17b) and a passage in Pesachim (3b).

The Tosafot in Pesachim distinguish between two levels of Torah study not for its own sake:

The Ri says: We are dealing with a case where he studies in order to brag, or to rebuke or to overwhelm his colleagues with [quoting] halakhot, and he does not study in order to do. But here

19 we are dealing with a case… where he has no bad intentions, but he is lazy. Even so, "Your mercy is great unto the heavens." (Pesachim 50b, s.v. ve-kan be-osin)

One who does not study in order to fulfill the mitzvot, but rather in order to rebuke others with what he has learned, would have been better off had he not been born. However, one who studies but does not fulfill the mitzvot out of laziness, even though he studies Torah not for its own sake, will nevertheless receive great reward. Of course, his reward will not be equal to that of one who studies Torah for its own sake, for God's mercy is great above the heavens.[4]

The words of the Tosafot expose us to an important principle regarding Torah study for its own sake. It is not only the question of the objective – fulfilling the mitzvot or not fulfilling the mitzvot – which concerns us. The explanation offered by the Tosafot emphasizes the great importance of the forces that operate deep inside a person and lead to the non-actualization of a person's study in the world of actions.

One who studies Torah and deeply identifies with the subject matter of his study; one who internalizes that he is occupied with God's Torah that shows him how to build a life of service to God; will want and aspire to fulfill all that he has learned. On the other hand, the more partial and superficial a person's identification with the material that he is studying, the less he will aspire to actualize this study in practice. He will be too lazy to fulfil the more difficult and demanding mitzvot, he will be less meticulous about the details and minutiae, and he will content himself with the general principles. The quality of his execution of the mitzvot will also lessen, the intention that accompanies his action will be reduced, and the joy of performing the mitzvot will weaken.

In a case where there is no identification whatsoever, and there may be alienation instead, there might even develop rebuke and scorn.

As stated, the words of Tosafot are based on a contradiction between a passage in Berakhot and a passage in Pesachim. This is what is stated in the Gemara in Berakhot:

One of Rava’s favorite sayings was: The goal of wisdom is repentance and good deeds, so a man should not study Torah and Mishna and then despise his father and mother and teacher and his superior in wisdom and rank, as it is stated: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, a good understanding have all they that do thereafter" (Tehilim 111:10). It does not say: "that do," but: "that do thereafter," which implies, that do them for their own sake and not for other motives. If one does them for other motives, it was better that he had not been created. (Berakhot 17a)

One who studies Torah based on negative motives is liable to exploit the knowledge that he acquires to rebuke and to reject. As Rava often said, one who studies Torah and whose internal world seeks to identify with the Torah and wisdom that he learns, has a strong basis for all study. The test for such a foundation lies in the practical consequence of observance of mitzvot.

From the words of the Tosafot, it appears that there are three levels:

20 1. One who studies out of identification – in order to fulfill the mitzvot. The first level is a person who studies Torah in order to fulfill, based on full identification with the word of God and His mitzvot. Such a person, who wishes to understand the roots of the words of the Torah, their details and minutiae, merits connection and communion with God. He merits the level mentioned in the passage in Pesachim: "Your mercy is great unto the heavens." He acquires an inheritance that has no boundaries, that bursts forth above the heavens, above the uppermost barrier.

2. One who studies Torah out of partial identification – laziness. The middle level is one who studies Torah out of partial identification, and as a result he is lazy about fulfilling some of the mitzvot. He lacks the aspiration to achieve full actualization, but there is still hope that his partial identification will broaden, deepen, spread and conquer his heart in all areas of action. As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav in the Gemara in Pesachim (ibid.): "A man should always occupy himself with Torah and good deeds, though it is not for their own sake, for out of doing good with an ulterior motive there comes doing good for its own sake." For the time being, such a person merits the important worldly level of "Your mercy is great unto the heavens," with the hope that he will breach this barrier.

3. One who studies Torah with no identification – not in order to fulfill the mitzvot. The lowest level is one who learns not in order to fulfill, without identifying at all. Such a person is filled with a sense of self-importance and rejects everything that is not a part of himself. About such a person it was stated: "It would have been better had he not been born," because he is totally unaware of his mission in the world.

The Tosafot in Berakhot propose a different solution regarding the relationship between the two passages:

It may be suggested that here we are dealing with one who studies Torah in order to rebuke his colleagues, whereas there we are dealing with one who studies so that others will honor him. (Tosafot, Berakhot 17a, s.v. ha-oseh)

According to this understanding as well, the highest level is that reached by one who studies Torah with total identification, one who nullifies himself and his personality before God, His Torah and His mitzvot. Here too, the other extreme is one whose entire experience is his personal position, one who feels no obligation to external commands or instruction.

In the middle, according to the Tosafot in Berakhot, stands a person who wishes to fulfill God's commands, but has not yet reached the level of self-effacement and cleaving to the will of God. We are dealing with a person who studies Torah so that others who see him while he is engaged in study or fulfilling mitzvot will honor him. There is hope for such a person, and about him it is stated: "For out of doing good with an ulterior motive there comes doing good for its own sake," and that "the light within it will bring him back for the better." The light of the Torah will shine for him on the pure truth, and he will understand that his imagined honor is a lie, and that he will achieve true honor by honoring his Maker.

21 This combination of aspiring to fulfill God's mitzvot as the objective of Torah study ("one who learns in order to do") together with the desire for identification which spurs a person to action places Torah study in the center. Torah study is what creates and deepens one's connection and experience, which in the end is expressed through the practical fulfillment of the mitzvot with all their particulars and minutiae.

IV. The Ideal course of study

The combined objective that we have presented dictates a course of study with a twofold goal. Torah study must include two fundamental components: practical halakha and deepening one's sense of identification and personal connection.

A person must study material related to practical halakha. But at the same time, he must delve into material that intensifies his identification and personal connection, and thus this can include the entire expanse of the word of God.

It seems, then, that a course of study which combines material concerning concrete and practical issues, together with material that expresses God's word as reflected in the entire expanse of the Torah (e.g., Kodshim and Taharot) will magnify, expand and deepen the word of God and lead to broad and comprehensive identification.

Such a course of study will develop a personality who spreads its wings over the word of God in its entirety, and whose fiercest aspiration is to fulfill God's demands and commandments at all times and in all places. The living spirit that fills such a personality, by virtue of the grand and broad Torah that flows vitally through his arteries, aspires to fulfill God's will and commandments wholeheartedly. "All of my bones shall say," all of my bones shall do, "Let everything that has breathe praise God."

In light of this, one should not restrict his Torah study to practical matters. The expanse that is required to develop a deep connection to the word of God, which will in turn develop a strong yearning to fulfill the mitzvot in this world, necessitates a broader and deeper spectrum of study.

In his introduction to the first volume of Yabi'a Omer, Rav Ovadya Yosef, ztz"l has sharp things to say about this matter:

There is a holy obligation upon the Torah authorities of Israel and on the Roshei Yeshiva everywhere to guide those studying in Yeshivot about the course of their studies, and to train them in the paths of ruling, and the way of upright examination, to understand and to rule, for now and for future generations. About this Chazal said (Kiddushin 40b): "Great is Torah study that leads to practice." And to occupy themselves with the halakhot about which every Rabbi in Israel is asked.

How painful it is to see so many young men of Israel spending all their time in vain sophistry, without examining whether their words accord with the Halakha and simple logic. It is a great pity that their glowing talent, which could have been used for understanding and clarifying real-life

22 problems, is instead invested in sophistry, which provides them with fleeting spiritual joy. About them it is fitting to say: "They forsake eternal life, and occupy themselves with ephemeral life" (Shabbat 10a). Such a person, even when he has to rule on a matter, will follow a crooked path…

The objective and essence of Torah study is to infer practical halakhic ramifications. As Chazal wrote: "Great is Torah study, for it leads to practice." Therefore, the main part of one's learning must be in matters relating to Orach Chayyim and Yoreh De'ah, which apply even in our time, so that one knows how to fulfill the mitzvot properly, and will also avoid transgressing Torah and rabbinic prohibitions.

This is not like the practice of certain Torah students in certain Yeshivot, who spend all their time on sophistry connected to the orders of Kodshim and Taharot, which do not apply at this time, but are halakhot for the Messianic period, which are in the category of "study in order to receive reward" (as is explained in Zevachim 45). Whereas they show no interest in matters that apply in our time, and they are not even proficient in the laws of Shabbat and the laws of prayer and blessings, which are matters that apply all the time. Often, they stumble in matters known even to ordinary Jews who set aside time for Torah study in the areas of Orach Chayyim and Yoreh De'a. (Yabi'a Omer, vol. 1, Introduction)

This approach, which restricts Torah study to practical matters, exhausts the objective of study, in order to do, in the most direct manner. It does not, however, take into account the second principle which we mentioned (based on the words of Rava in Berakhot), according to which it is necessary to develop the connection and the appropriate traits to be counted among those who study and do. In order to fulfill this goal, a broader course of Torah study is necessary.

At the beginning of this shiur, we mentioned the expression, "it would have been better for him had the after-birth in which he lay been turned over his face," stated with respect to one who studies Torah not in order to do. As may be recalled, this expression is found in the Yerushalmi, tractate Berakhot, and in the words of Rabbi Akiva in Kalla Rabbati. Despite the identical expression, the point of departure and the message conveyed are different in the two cases.

The Yerushalmi concerns Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, who did not want to interrupt his learning for the sake of fulfilling the mitzvot of Keri'at Shema and prayer. The Yerushalmi objects that Torah study must lead to actualization and fulfillment of mitzvot in the world of action, and cannot remain in the world of connection to God.[5] The full spiritual connection that Rabbi Shimon felt when he occupied himself with God's Torah with unique and unparalleled intensity must find concrete expression in earthly life.[6]

Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, speaks of a person who studies Torah not in order to fulfill, but in order to rebuke others, as his words were understood by the Tosafot.

The common denominator between these two perspectives is that with respect to Torah that remains in heaven and is not actualized on earth,[7] like Torah that is used as a tool to taunt those who toil in study, it would be better if the bearers of this Torah not exist, and that they not have been born in the first place. Only Torah that connects man to the word of God, and purifies

23 him, and together with that is actualized and fulfilled in practice on earth, is Torah for its own sake. This Torah purifies the body and actualizes its ideas in the world of action.

NOTES

[1] It is not our intention to exhaust this broad topic in this framework. We will emphasize certain principles which in our opinion are important for the service of God in the context of Torah study. A comprehensive study of the issue is found in Rabbi Norman Lamm’s important work Torah li-Shema and elsewhere. [2] Here, emphasis is placed on the phrase, "Torah and mitzvot." At this stage we are discussing studying Torah for its own sake. As for fulfilling the mitzvot not for their own sake, see below. [3] At the end of this shiur, we will discuss the significance of this formulation. [4] See Pesachim, ibid. [5] Regarding this point, I once heard in the name of a certain Chassidic master (I don't remember which one) with respect to the verse in Parashat Tetzaveh, regarding the High Priest who enters the Holy with his robe, on the skirt of which hang golden bells and pomegranates. The verse states: "And the sound thereof shall be heard when he goes in unto the holy place before the Lord, and when he comes out, that he die not" (Ex 28:35). According to this Chassidic master, while entry into the Holy is exceedingly important, the sounds remind the High Priest that he must leave the Holy and return to the earthly plain. It is there that man's true mission is found. If a person remains in the Holy, he will die. Therefore, the verse emphasizes: "And when he comes out, that he die not." [6] See the Yerushalmi (ad loc.) which explains that Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai actualized his study in the practical world, and that his position related exclusively to Keriat Shema, as both Keriat Shema and Torah study involve reading words of Torah, and we do not set aside one reading for another. [7] As the Kotzker Rebbe said about the verse: "And you shall be holy men unto me" (Shemot 22:30) – God wants us to be holy men, as He created enough angels in heaven.

Intentions and Morality

S.H. Parker writes:10

When asked "Is the right thing done for the wrong reason moral?" most Americans answer that it is not.

I'm not guessing about this. When I taught Ethics, I would start by asking students whether that which is not moral should be avoided. Students uniformly agreed to this proposition.

Then I asked them if the right thing done for the wrong reason was not moral. Again, students (with rare exception, those, mostly Jewish students) uniformly agreed to this proposition.

While uncomfortable, they likewise accepted the logical inference, it's a classic syllogism, that the right thing done for the wrong reason was immoral and should, therefore, be avoided.

Of course, believing that doing the right thing for the wrong reason is not moral and must, therefore, be avoided has the absurd consequence that a person seeing a child drowning and

10 http://www.par2.com/pesachim%2050b.htm

24 recognizing the child as belonging to a wealthy family who will, without doubt, reward you, should not save the child.

I was happy to observe that few students were willing to accept this logical consequence of their initial beliefs (though, in fact, a few did). However, neither did they easily abandon the belief that the right thing done for the wrong reason is not moral. (Can you say, "cognitive dissonance?")

Asked the same question, most Jews will stare at you, at least briefly, like you're from another planet. The question borders on making no sense at all to people with a background in Torah.

The Pentateuch seems almost completely unconcerned with motives, with the reason for which we act. On this premise, the idea of "the wrong reason" is essentially meaningless.

Many learned people will tell you that Judaism is "behavior based" not "belief based." Nothing could be further from the truth, understanding "belief" as a reference to internal, psychological states. While the mitzvot appear to talk only about our actions, while the statements of mitzvot are about concrete observable behaviors, the Torah rarely discusses higher principles, but, unlike other near east law codes, the Torah does state those "higher principles." The Hammurabi Code, for example, never makes any statement of principle, it just lists judgments, leaving us to discern the principles, if any. In fact, as we shall shortly see, Torah is concerned almost exclusively with our motives, our psyches, our internal mental states. Our character.

Torah has hundreds of "thou shalts" and "thou shall nots." Of these hundreds of commandments, only three refer to inner psychological states (a "motive" is certainly a "psychological state").

• "You will love the Lord your God with all your heart ..." (this one occurs a number of times)

• "You will not covet ..." (Torah does not teach that you shouldn't want an ox like your neighbor's; it teaches that you shouldn't want and, therefore, act so as to get. the specific ox that your neighbor already has (so, this may not really be about a psychological state, after all))

• "You will not bear a grudge against your neighbor, but you will love your neighbor as yourself"

No other mitzvot talk about what goes on inside our heads. Not a one. (Maybe these aren't really mitzvot but statements of higher principles - I would certainly be willing to argue that with "you will love your neighbor as yourself.")

There is a gemara (Pesachim 50b) that addresses this, introducing the principle of "Lishmah," acting for the sake of God's name:

25 Psalms 57:11 - “For] יִכּ - לֹדָג דַﬠ - יַמָשׁ םִ ֶדְּסַח ,Rava contrasted: It is written יִכּ - לוֹדָג ,your mercy is great up to the heavens”]; whereas it is also written Psalms 108:5 - “For your mercy is great beyond the ] לַﬠֵמ - יַמָשׁ םִ ֶדְּסַח heavens.”]. How is this [explained]? Here [Psalm 108] it refers to those who perform [a Mitzvah] for its own sake; there [Psalm 57] it refers to those who perform [a mitzvah] with an ulterior motive. And [this is] in accordance with Rav Judah. For Rav Judah said in Rav’s name: “A man should always occupy himself with Torah and good deeds, though it is not for their own sake, for out of [doing mitzvot] with an ulterior motive there comes [doing them] for its own sake.”

Rabbi Avigdor Nebenzahl offers this expanded version of this gemara:

The Gemara cites a contradiction in psukim: "ki gadol ad shamayim chasdecha" "for great until the very heavens is Your kindness" (Tehillim 57:11), and "ki gadol me-al shamayim chasdecha" "For great above the very heavens is Your kindness" (Tehillim 108:5). The resolution to this contradiction ["up to" in the first Psalm; "beyond" in the second] is: "kan beosin lishma, vekan beosin shelo lishma" "Here [the second Psalm] it speaks of those who perform a Mitzvah for its own sake, and there [the first] it speaks of those who perform a Mitzvah not for its own sake" (Pesachim 50b), when one truly desires to increase Hashem's honor, the reward awaiting him is beyond the heavens - the spiritual world. One whose motives are not as sincere will be rewarded but only up to the heavens - in the physical realm. I once heard the analogy: Two people journeyed on a boat to America both, traveling first class and receiving the finest service. When they reached the shores, one was allowed entry, for his passport was in order, whereas the other's passport was invalid thus he was denied entry. The one allowed entry reached "me-al", beyond, into America, while the other only reached "ad", until America (in reality the second one actually benefited more, for he was able to return to the Land of Israel - though this was not his initial intent). The same may be said with regard to heaven, one who performs Mitzvot "lishma" is allowed entry into heaven, whereas one whose Mitzvot are only "shelo lishma" is denied entry. Despite the fact that one cannot reach beyond heaven when performing Mitzvot "shelo lishma", one should nevertheless perform the Mitzvot because: "mitoch shelo lishma ba lishma" "for doing it without proper intent will lead to doing with proper intent" (Pesachim 50b).

26 This gemara uses a minor grammatical difference between two Psalms to make several important points (in other words, the "conflict" between the two passages really isn't the point):

1. The right thing, done for the wrong reason is still the right thing (and is rewarded)

2. The right thing, done for the right reason is the right thing (and is rewarded but more so)

3. The right reason is "lishmah," to increase God's honor, "for the sake of The Name (of God)"

4. The best reason is "for its own sake"

"For its own sake?" As my teacher, Rabbi Radinsky (of Blessed Memory), explained this: without even thinking about it, without even realizing its a mitzvah, that is, as a matter of character.

"Without even realizing an act is a mitzvah, a holy deed, something God wants us to do?"

Ever heard of a person, walking along the street, rushing into a burning building to save the people still inside? Recall interviews with these people? "I'm not a hero." "I did what anyone else would have done if they were here." Or they simply look back at the camera blankly, not understanding what the big deal is.

That's what we're talking about here.

And the final point in the gemara:

5. Do the right thing, whatever your reason; if you do it for the wrong reason long enough, you'll come to do it for the right reason.

That is called "habit."

I have, though I don't remember where, heard this described as "naive psychology." Yet, it sounds exactly like the predictions of Cognitive Dissonance theory: as a person performs a behavior that they are not necessarily comfortable with, they will, to reduce the dissonance between "I'm doing this" and "I want that," begin to rationalize that they really want to do it. Simple example: quitting smoking.

The gemara is, yes, suggesting that being a habitual do-gooder is a desirable thing.

27

Artwork: Seedtime, by Rebecca Guay

The Limits of she'Lo Lishmah11

The Question

The highest level of learning Torah and doing mitzvos is lishmah. Nevertheless, Chazal urged us to be involved in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah. Why? Because "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah - from she'lo lishmah, one will come to lishmah." [1]

A couple of years ago my chavrusa and I took up the question: What are the limits of she'lo lishmah? How far removed from "the ideal motives" for Torah and mitzvos would still be considered she'lo lishmah such that the aforementioned statement of Chazal would apply?

The examples of she'lo lishmah in the Rambam's parable are fairly straightforward: • learning Torah in order to get a piece of candy or a fig • learning Torah in order to get a fancy pair of shoes or item of clothing

11 https://kolhaseridim.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-limits-of-shelo-lishmah.html, Rabbi Matt Schneeweiss

28 • learning Torah in order to get money • learning Torah in order to become a rabbi who receives honor from other people

In all four cases the student is learning Torah in order to obtain some good other than the learning itself. Presumably, the child is aware that he is learning Torah, and that learning Torah is a mitzvah, but he is simply not motivated by the learning itself. It's easy to see how this type of she'lo lishmah might naturally lead to lishmah, especially when it comes to learning. Doing mitzvos she'lo lishmah is bit trickier, but it's still conceivable that a mitzvah she'lo lishmah would lend itself to development towards lishmah.

But how far can this principle be extended? Compare the Rambam's examples with the following questionable cases: • Case #1: a person is forced to do a mitzvah without any awareness at all about the nature of what he is doing. For example, imagine an immigrant from a repressive regime who is forced by a Chabad emissary to put on tefillin, and has no idea what's going on because he doesn't speak English and he's neither seen nor heard of tefillin in his life. [Note: for the purposes of this example, and this post, I am assuming we hold "mitzvos ein tzrichos kavanah" ("mitzvos do not require intention") from a halachic standpoint.] • Case #2: a person has a completely warped notion of the nature of what he's doing. For instance, imagine a person who shakes a lulav believing that he's drawing upon spiritual earth-energy in order to "realign his chakras," or a person who avoids eating non- kosher food because he thinks it will literally kill him. These individuals definitely fulfill their halachic obligations, but will they naturally come to lishmah in the same way as the child in the Rambam's example? • Case #3: a person does a mitzvah in an entirely incidental or accidental manner, with absolutely no intention for the mitzvah at all. For example, it would be entirely possible for someone who is allergic to gluten to neither eat nor own chametz on Pesach by default, without taking any special effort to do so for mitzvah reasons. It's even easier to observe mishpatim (i.e. mitzvos whose reasons are obvious) out of sheer common sense, without any mitzvah motives whatsoever. Building a maakeh (parapet) around one's roof so people don't fall and injure themselves, helping an elderly person cross the street, using accurate weights and measures, refraining from murder, kidnapping, and lying under oath - there are dozens of mitzvos that people keep every day without any awareness that they're observing halacha. Are these cases still within the scope of "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah" or would we say that although these individuals might fulfill a technical halachic obligation, they would not fall within this category?

The Indolent Women of Machoza

29 In searching for an answer to this question, my chavrusa and I stumbled upon an important Gemara which sheds a great deal of light on the topic. The Mishnah in Pesachim 4:1 (50a) states: In a place where [the people] were accustomed to work on Erev Pesach (Passover eve) until midday, one may do so. In a place where the people were accustomed not to work, one may not do so.

Our Daf discusses the parallel halachos (laws) which pertain to the eves and conclusions of other special days:

One who performs labor on Erev Shabbos (Sabbath eve) or Erev Yom Tov from minchah-time onward, and on Motzai Shabbos (the conclusion of the Sabbath), on Motzai Yom Tov, or Motzai Yom ha'Kippurim ... [such a person] will never see a sign of blessing [from this work]. The Gemara then classifies the types of people who receive this aforementioned blessing and those who don't:

The Sages taught [in a Tosefta]: "There is one who is diligent and rewarded; and there is one who is diligent but suffers a loss; there is one who is indolent but rewarded; and there is one who is indolent and suffers a loss. [How so?] 'Diligent and rewarded' is one who works the entire week and does not work on Erev Shabbos. 'Diligent but suffers a loss' is one who works all week and works on Erev Shabbos. 'Indolent but rewarded' is one who does not work the entire week and does not work on Erev Shabbos. 'Indolent and suffers a loss' is one who does not work the entire week and works on Erev Shabbos."

Rava said: "With regard to those women of Machoza, even though they do not work on Erev Shabbos, it is due to excessive pampering, because they don't work on any other day [either]. Even so, we call them 'indolent but rewarded.'"

Rava brought up a contradiction: "It is written: 'for Your mercy is great unto the heavens' (Tehilim 57:11) and it is [also] written: 'for Your mercy is great above the heavens' (ibid. 108:5). How [can this contradiction be resolved]? [The pasuk which describes His mercy as above the heavens refers to a case where] one does [a mitzvah] lishmah, [whereas the pasuk which describes His mercy as merely reaching the heavens refers to a case where] one does [a mitzvah] she'lo lishmah."

[This teaching of Rava] accords with what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: "a person should always engage in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because from she'lo lishmah one will come to lishmah." The salient point here is Rava's statement about the women of Machoza. These "pampered" women never work, and yet the Gemara places them in the category of "indolent but rewarded" for their abstaining from work on Erev Shabbos.

One might read Rava's remark about the women of Machoza as pertaining solely to the passage that preceded it, regarding the fourfold classification of people who are diligent, indolent, rewarded, and who suffer a loss. Rashi, however, connects the women of Machoza case to the statements that follow, regarding the virtue of learning and doing mitzvos she'lo lishmah. Rashi explains:

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"indolent but rewarded" is one who didn't work all week and also [didn't work] on Erev Shabbos - and even though they didn't intend [to abstain from work] for the sake of a mitzvah, it is nevertheless a mitzvah she'lo lishmah, as they say later on: "a person should always be involved in a mitzvah even she'lo lishmah."

The Ran echoes this reading of the Gemara in his comments on Rava's explanation of the contradiction in Tehilim:

If you'll pose a challenge from Rav Yehuda himself who said in the Perek Haya Korei (Berachos 17a) about anyone who engages [in a mitzvah] she'lo lishmah that it's better if they were never created. [How can we reconcile Rav Yehuda's condemnation of she'lo lishmah with Rava's approbation of she'lo lishmah in our Gemara?]

The answer is: there are many types of she'lo lishmah.12

According to Rashi and the Ran, the "indolent but rewarded" individuals who abstain from working on Erev Shabbos have absolutely no intention whatsoever to fulfill any mitzvah, but because their laziness just "happens" to result in the observance of a mitzvah [3], then they are rewarded for their she'lo lishmah observance. In other words, the women of Machoza fit perfectly into the Case #3 scenario mentioned above: their actions incidentally align with a mitzvah, even though their motives have nothing to do with Torah whatsoever. Rashi even goes so far as to explicitly state that their she'lo lishmah observance will (or at least can) lead to lishmah.

The question is: How can this be?! Is it really true that these lazy women of Machoza will eventually come around to refraining from work on Erev Shabbos lishmah simply because they kept this mitzvah by default, due to their pampered lifestyle?

Consider, as a sort of thought experiment, two groups within the women of Machoza: those who are Jewish and those who are non-Jewish. The women in both groups are indolent and pampered. Neither group does any work during any day of the week. They just sit there, lounging around, drinking their "Machoza Mimosas" [4] and gossiping about their fancy jewelry and fancy drinking-water. And yet, the Jewish women of Machoza are rewarded for their indolence simply because their lazy behavior coincides with a halacha. How does that make any sense?

A Possible Answer

If memory serves, my chavrusa and I initially arrived at the conclusion that the Gemara must have been assuming that the women of Machoza had at least some awareness of the fact that their

12Rav Yehuda's statement condemning she'lo lishmah] pertains to those who engage in Torah in order to be contrarian and to provoke: since his intention is for an aveirah (transgression), then it would be better if he were never created. [2] [In contrast, Rava's statement in our Gemara] is dealing with a case in which his intention is neither for a sinful matter nor for a mitzvah, and instead is like that of the indolent person who is rewarded [and thus, like the women of Machoza.

31 abstention from work qualified as a mitzvah. Otherwise, how would it be possible to say that they'd be rewarded for their behavior?

When I revisited the question this year while writing this blog post I realized that our assumption wasn't warranted. We posited this because we felt compelled to by the strength of the question, but a straightforward reading of the Gemara wouldn't naturally lead to this conclusion.

Instead, I would like to answer as follows: even the she'lo lishmah behavior of the women of Machoza can lead to lishmah insofar as it contributes to the observance of that mitzvah as a behavioral habit. Allow me to explain.

My answer was inspired by the Rambam's approach to character development, as presented in Hilchos Deos (Mishneh Torah: Sefer ha'Mada).

1:7 - How does a person habituate himself to these character traits until they are firmly established in him? He should do the actions which correspond to these “middle character traits” again, and again, and again, and repeat them constantly until these actions become easy for him without there being any burden in them, and they become firmly established in his soul.

For example, if a person wants to develop the trait of generosity, he should force himself to repeatedly do acts of generosity (e.g. giving tzedakah to the poor, volunteering at a soup kitchen, donating clothing to those in need) until these actions become second-nature to the point where he can do them naturally, without experiencing any emotional conflict or resistance.

Does the Rambam hold that this is the highest level of ethical development? Not at all. Someone who gives tzedakah lishmah is certainly superior to one who gives tzedakah she'lo lishmah, even though acts of generosity come "easily" for both of them. But from a strictly behavioral

32 standpoint, both of them will be able to do acts of generosity in a manner which is "easy" for them, "without any burden."

This point is even clearer when we consider ethical development in children. Let's use the example of the virtue of gratitude. Imagine two children: one who was raised to say, "Thank you" as soon as she learns to speak, and another who wasn't. At such a young age, it is doubtful whether these children are even capable of understanding what gratitude is. And yet, when these children mature to the point where they can understand what it means to be grateful, which one will have an easier time doing actions which express gratitude? Clearly the child who has already acquired the behavioral habit of demonstrating gratitude by saying, "Thank you." The other child will have to face an uphill battle to become a grateful person even if she intellectually recognizes the value in acquiring that particular virtue.

It is on this basis that I would like to answer the question on our Gemara. The reason why even the women of Machoza's low level she'lo lishmah abstention from work can still be characterized as leading to lishmah is because it contributes to their potential for a lishmah observance. Even though their motives and intentions have nothing to do with the mitzvah, they are nevertheless practicing behavior which is in line with the mitzvah, thereby paving the way for a lishmah observance of the mitzvah by making that observance easier to keep.

Consider another thought experiment: an "indolent but rewarded" woman of Machoza who doesn't work during the week and doesn't work on Erev Shabbos, and a "diligent but suffers a loss" woman of Manhattan who works during the week and works on Erev Shabbos. Imagine that both women decide to become more religious and wish to take on the meritorious practice of not working on Erev Shabbos. Which woman will have an easier time doing so? Clearly the woman of Machoza! Her habit of not working on Erev Shabbos will be a boon for her, even though this habit was initially established out of laziness, and had nothing to do with Torah and mitzvos!

If I am correct, then we need to tweak our understanding of "mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah." This statement does not mean that doing a mitzvah she'lo lishmah will naturally develop a person towards doing that mitzvah lishmah.

Rather, it can also mean that doing a mitzvah she'lo lishmah will facilitate the move to lishmah in any way - whether by contributing to a person's development in an active way, or by removing an impediment to their lishmah development.

Thus, the immigrant who is forced to put on tefillin without any knowledge of what he's doing, the lulav-shaking chakra realigner, the person who is allergic to gluten - all three types of cases fit into the category of mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah, insofar as they pave the way for lishmah by removing the behavioral impediments to a lishmah observance of the mitzvah. I like to imagine that the Ran had this in mind when he waved his hand, shook his head, and answered his own question by saying, "Don't worry: there are many types of she'lo lishmah."

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Conclusion

I'm sure there is more to explore on this topic, but I think that this idea stands on its own. The take- away lesson is this: don't underestimate the impact of behavioral conditioning in the pursuit of ethical and intellectual perfection. It would be very easy to look down on the women of Machoza - or on the immigrant being wrapped in tefillin [5] without knowledge, or on the lulav- waving chakra charger, or the gluten-free chametz avoider - but according to our Gemara, even these low-level she'lo lishmah types of mitzvah observance lead to lishmah, and should be encouraged and looked upon favorably.

Similarly, one should never dismiss or discourage anyone from keeping halacha even if their motives have nothing to do with halacha. Lastly, one should not view this type of she'lo lishmah observance as beneath our own standards, and use this reasoning to rationalize not keeping a particular halacha. No matter how far removed from the Torah's ideals we are, we should always involve ourselves in Torah and mitzvos even she'lo lishmah, because mitoch she'lo lishmah, ba lishmah.

When we bear these points in mind, having mercy on the human condition and recognizing how every step forward is significant, no matter how small, we are aligning our own perspective with that of Hashem, "[Whose] mercy is great unto the heavens."

Notes

[1] Sanhedrin 105b, Pesachim 50b, Nazir 23b, Sotah 22b and 47a, Horiyos 10b, Erachin 16b - and probably more [2] An analysis of what it means to learn “lekanter” and why this is an exception to the rule is beyond the scope of this blog post. I have an explanation, but including it would distract us from the topic at hand.[3] Ordinarily I am reticent to broadly apply the term "mitzvah" to all behavior that is sanctioned or encouraged by halacha, and instead prefer to treat it as a technical term referring to a specific commandment from the Torah or the Rabbis. I've decided to make an exception in this case, since the Gemara itself uses the term "mitzvah" to describe what is actually just a meritorious custom, rather than an actual Biblical or Rabbinic commandment. [4] Let me be the first to reveal the official "Machoza Mimosa" recipe: In a champagne flute, combine 1/3 cup chilled sparkling wine, 1/3 cup chilled orange juice, 1 tablespoon of honey and 1 tablespoon of absinthe, as a kiyum in: "For the lips of a strange woman drop honey, and her mouth is smoother than oil - but her end is bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword" (Mishlei 5:3-4). Yeah, I know that our Gemara doesn't condemn the women of Machoza, and not even Shlomo ha'Melech would consider them to fall into the category of "the strange woman" of Mishlei, but I still think that their "end is bitter as wormwood." [5] "force-phylacteried" would be the appropriate verb

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