FRENCH and AMERICAN CULTURAL OCCUPATION POLICIES and GERMAN EXPECTATIONS, 1945-1949 a Dissertation
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NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE: FRENCH AND AMERICAN CULTURAL OCCUPATION POLICIES AND GERMAN EXPECTATIONS, 1945-1949 A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History By Corey J. Campion, M.A. Washington, DC September 29, 2010 Copyright 2010 by Corey J. Campion All Rights Reserved ii NEGOTIATING DIFFERENCE: FRENCH AND AMERICAN CULTURAL OCCUPATION POLICIES AND GERMAN EXPECTATIONS, 1945-1949 Corey J. Campion, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Roger Chickering, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The dissertation explores the local implementation of French and American cultural occupation policies in Germany from 1945-1949. It focuses on events in French-occupied Freiburg and American-occupied Stuttgart and relies on materials gathered in local and state German archives as well as the French and American national archives. The dissertation argues that postwar German culture developed not through the unilateral implementation of Allied policies, but rather through negotiations between Allied and German visions. In Freiburg and Stuttgart negotiations over the purpose and character of postwar cultural activities reflected a broader debate over what 1945 meant for the future of German society. To varying degrees, French and American officials viewed the Reich’s collapse as an invitation to rebuild Germany along the lines of their own “superior” political and cultural traditions. By contrast, German officials looked to rebuild along native lines and, in the wake of what they described as unwelcome Nazi political and cultural “experiments,” greeted Allied reeducation efforts with a combination of frustration and suspicion. Thus, while the Allies shared with their Germans general democratic, capitalist, and Christian values, they struggled to win support for their specific reforms. Combined with conflicts between civilian and military officials and continued personnel reductions, the lingering physical and psychological trauma of war frustrated reeducation efforts and rendered the transfer of Allied culture more difficult than occupation planners had anticipated. Although historical, geographic, and cultural ties between Baden and France helped the French to achieve a greater cultural presence in Freiburg, the situation most owed to the willingness of French officials to iii impose their agenda on local Germans. In Stuttgart, American concerns over the antidemocratic nature of occupation and an historical American aversion to imperialism stiffened the challenge that broader discrepancies between German and American cultural expectations posed to occupation officials. Thus, after four years of occupation, the most important Allied contribution to the denazification and democratization of both cities came not through the promotion of Allied customs, but rather the victory of Allied armies over the Reich and the cessation of Nazi rule. iv Acknowledgements As a graduate student I have read hundreds of acknowledgement pages. Only upon completion of my own project, however, do I appreciate their importance. While the conclusions of this study are my responsibility, I could not have reached them without the generous support of many. I would like to thank Georgetown University, the Center for German and European Studies, and the Department of History for their contributions to my academic and professional training. The German Academic Exchange Service also provided a generous scholarship, without which my research in Europe would have been impossible. During my time abroad, the staffs of the municipal and state archives in Freiburg and Stuttgart offered both rapport and succor. Special thanks are due to Dr. Ecker in Freiburg and Dr. Müller in Stuttgart. They taught me both about their cities and the practice of research and demonstrated an enthusiasm for the project, which, on occasion, surpassed my own. In France, I was fortunate enough to work in the Archives de l’occupation française en Allemagne et en Autriche before they relocated from Paris to Colmar. I benefited not only from the staff’s archival assistance but also its eagerness to discuss all matters French, German, and American over coffee. In the United States, my thanks go to the staffs of the National Archives in College Park, MD and the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. Both saved me time and headaches by helping me to locate documents and resources that I was convinced were only available in Europe. I am also indebted to my mentors, who guided me not only through the conception and research of this project, but also its birth. Dr. Roger Chickering taught me about research, Germany, and the value of a narrative. He also introduced me to the city (Freiburg) that in addition to the focus of my work has remained a kind of second home for my wife and me. Dr. Richard Kuisel taught me about France, America, and the historian’s craft. Finally, Dr. Aviel v Roshwald was generous enough to serve on my committee and contribute his insights about improving the project. Throughout this exciting, and at times arduous, process I have relied on the support of friends and family members. In Freiburg, Hans-Georg Merz has provided generous research support. More importantly, he and his wife have provided their hospitality and friendship. In Washington, I have benefited from intellectual and personal exchanges with countless colleagues. My thanks also extend to Thomas Cunningham, who has provided constant friendship and in his own striving to be “copacetic,” inspires others to do the same. To my grandmother, who was born in Blieskastel and lived through the American occupation, I owe my interest in the German language and German history. I regret that she did not live to tell me if I got the story right. To my parents, I am grateful for all that they did to make my journey from Kansas City to Freiburg and Stuttgart possible. To my wife, Sarah, I owe more than words can express. She has taught me about love, faith, horses, and life. While my name appears on the title page, this dissertation is as much hers as it is mine. Therefore, I dedicate it, and the years of absenteeism that it required, to her. Finally, I thank God for the strength and wisdom to see this endeavor to its end. vi To my wife, Sarah vii Table of Contents Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter 1: German Paths to 1945 – Freiburg and Stuttgart Before the Allies’ Arrival ..………. 13 Chapter 2: Allied Paths to 1945 – Wartime Experiences and Postwar Expectations ………….. 70 Chapter 3: Moviegoers and Occupiers – German and Allied Expectations for the Screen …... 124 Chapter 4: On Stage – German and Allied Visions for the Theater ………………………….. 159 Chapter 5: Read All About It! – Germans, Allies, and the Postwar Press ……………………. 197 Chapter 6: Back to School – Debating the Future of Germany’s Youth ……………………... 238 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………. 284 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………….. 290 viii List of Tables and Maps Table 1: Reichstag Election Results for Main Political Parties ………………………………... 69 Map 1: German States and Occupation Zones ………………………………………………... 123 ix “Am 21. April 45 war es dann soweit. Es legte sich eine unheimliche Stille über unseren Stadtteil. Die Franzosen kamen. In Erinnerung meiner Flucht nach Freiburg kam ich durch viele zerstörte Städte, wie Berlin, Dresden, Stuttgart und Heilbronn. Auf den zerstörten Häusern konnte man mit grossen Buchstaben [von den Nazis] geschriebene Texte lesen: ‘Unsere Mauern können brechen, aber unsere Herzen nicht!’ Ich las diesen Text einige Male und dachte […] was für eine Lüge.” – Resi Spyra, resident of Freiburg, recollection of the war’s end, 21 April 1945. “…the ravaged faces of the three men who signed before us the acknowledgement of the total defeat of the Reich has given us a picture of the German people’s ruin. But these ruins will rise again one day and, to prevent the development of a new tragedy that would stain the world with blood, there will always be a need for France.” – General de Lattre de Tassigny, French First Army, victory speech to Allied officials following the German capitulation, 8 May 1945. “The American people have a huge stake in peace. Twice within the century […] we have given of our lives and our resources to prevent the domination of Europe by force. We recognize that a threat to freedom anywhere is a threat to our own freedom. […] Solving the German problem will be a major constructive step toward peace. It is a complex task. A new political and economic life [has] to be reconstructed from the chaos of defeat.” – General Lucius D. Clay, Military Governor U.S. Zone, retrospective discussion of the occupation in his memoir, Decision in Germany. x Introduction In March 2003 American-led Coalition forces invaded Iraq and toppled the government of Saddam Hussein. In the wake of the invasion, the victors sought both to demilitarize and democratize the defeated country. For historians of post-1945 Germany, the occupiers’ mission was familiar. The same appeared to be true for American officials and commentators, who insisted on the similarities between the postwar occupation of Germany and the Coalition’s presence in Iraq. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice thus compared the Iraqi anti-occupation insurgency to the Nazi “Werewolves,” who confronted Allied forces in the wake of the Reich’s collapse. In the meantime, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld justified the Coalition’s mission by arguing that any decision to leave a defeated Iraq in the hands of Saddam’s ruling Baath party would have been tantamount to leaving a devastated Germany under Nazi control.1 Comparisons of the occupations also influenced American policies. Calls for the “de- Baathification” of Iraqi society drew on the example of denazification, while plans for Iraq’s democratization drew on postwar strategies for German reeducation. More than policy guidelines, however, American officials perceived in the occupation of Germany a model for the successful export of American democracy. (West) Germany had become democratic, they argued, because of the Allied, and especially American, commitment to democratize and reeducate German society.