Das Reich der Seele Walther Rathenau’s Cultural Pessimism and Prussian Nationalism ~ Dieuwe Jan Beersma

16 juli 2020 Master Geschiedenis – Duitslandstudies, 11053259 First supervisor: dhr. dr. A.K. (Ansgar) Mohnkern Second supervisor: dhr. dr. H.J. (Hanco) Jürgens

Abstract Every year the Rathenau Stiftung awards the Walther Rathenau-Preis to international politicians to spread Rathenau’s ideas of ‘democratic values, international understanding and tolerance’. This incorrect perception of Rathenau as a democrat and a liberal is likely to have originated from the historiography. Many historians have described Rathenau as ‘contradictory’, claiming that there was a clear and problematic distinction between Rathenau’s intellectual theories and ideas and his political and business career. Upon closer inspection, however, this interpretation of Rathenau’s persona seems to be fundamentally incorrect. This thesis reassesses Walther Rathenau’s legacy profoundly by defending the central argument: Walther Rathenau’s life and motivations can first and foremost be explained by his cultural pessimism and Prussian nationalism. The first part of the thesis discusses Rathenau’s intellectual ideas through an in-depth analysis of his intellectual work and the historiography on his work. Motivated by racial theory, Rathenau dreamed of a technocratic utopian German empire led by a carefully selected Prussian elite. He did not believe in the ‘power of a common Europe’, but in the power of a common German Europe. The second part of the thesis explicates how Rathenau’s career is not contradictory to, but actually very consistent with, his cultural pessimism and Prussian nationalism. Firstly, Rathenau saw the First World War as a chance to transform the economy and to make his Volksstaat a reality. Secondly, he was a neoconservative intellectual who dreamt of a homogenous society. He distrusted the representative democracy of the Weimar Republic. Thirdly, after the war, Rathenau waged an ‘economic war’. Together with Chancellor Joseph Wirth, Rathenau constantly obstructed peace negotiations to make his independent German empire a reality. The last part of the thesis discusses the interpretation of Rathenau made by the Austrian writer Robert Musil in his magnum opus Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften, a work which has been underdiscussed in the scholarship on Rathenau. This thesis argues that Musil’s literary caricature, Dr. Paul Arnheim, is a very insightful interpretation of Rathenau’s neoconservatism.

Bio Dieuwe Jan Beersma received a bachelor’s degree in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. Due to his passion for history and literature he decided to write his master’s thesis at the History department. His thesis on Walther Rathenau combines his knowledge of international relations and politics with his passion for German history and literature. The incorporation of Robert Musil gives his thesis an interdisciplinary character and it deepens our understanding of Walther Rathenau’s legacy.

II

Nun folgt sofort ein Widerspruch: Damit das Spiegelbild klar und rein erscheine, muß die projizierende Flamme gleichmäßig leuchten: nur homogene Gemeinschaften haben Ideale.

Walther Rathenau, Zur Kritik der Zeit, p.99

III Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 – Rathenau’s Intellectual Career 6 1.1. Der Geist – The rise of the educated middle class 6 1.2. Die Zukunft - The rise of neoconservatism 9 1.3. Höre Israel - Rathenau’s antisemitism 13 1.4. Mitteleuropa – Rathenau’s German Colonial Empire 15 1.5. Entgermanisierung - Rathenau’s cultural pessimism and racial theory 17 1.6. Von Kommenden Dingen - Rathenau’s technocratic Utopia 20

Chapter 2 Part One - Rathenau’s Career During the First World War 27

Chapter 2 Part Two - Rathenau’s Post-War Career 35 2.2.1. The Broader Context 36 2.2.2. Rathenau and Wirth’s Wirtschaftskrieg 40 2.2.3. The Genoa Conference and the Rapallo Treaty 48 2.2.4. Harry Graf Kessler and the myth of ‘preventive diplomacy’ 53 2.2.5. Rathenau’s assassination 55

Chapter 3 - Musil’s Arnheim: An early interpretation of Walther Rathenau in ‘Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften’ 59 3.1. Robert Musil and Rathenau 59 3.2. Arnheim - Musil’s literary portrait 61

Conclusion 67

Bibliography 71

IV Introduction Walther Rathenau was born in 1867 into a wealthy Jewish family in the rising industrial city of Berlin. Hans Fürstenberg (1890-1982), the man who would come to write an insightful memoir on Rathenau’s life, grew up in the same neighbourhood. In one of Fürstenberg’s childhood memories, he would later describe, his mother came to kiss him goodnight while Walther stood in the doorframe of his bedroom.1 The men met again during their student days and later in life through work and travels. They both served in the army and both of them were, what was called, Bildungsbürger: men with a broad education and a passion for the arts and literature.2 Their family businesses worked together intensively over the years. Hans’ father, Carl Fürstenberg (1850-1933), was one of the prominent Jewish bankers who financed projects of Walthers’ father, Emil Rathenau (1838-1915).

In all of Fürstenberg’s memories, Walther Rathenau acted as a ‘proud man, full of self- knowledge’.3 Fürstenberg knew, however, that behind this ‘veneer of strength lied a persisting feeling of inferiority’.4 When he looked back on Rathenau’s life in 1962, Fürstenberg was surprised that many regarded him as a ‘patron saint of the Weimar Republic’.5 Fürstenberg outlived Rathenau by many years and wrote a memoire on his childhood friend in 1962 named Erinnerung an Walther Rathenau. According to Fürstenberg, the mythical- and saint- like image of Rathenau was caused by how he had been presented in the historiography. Fürstenberg stated that the biography written by Harry Graf Kessler (1868-1937) had been especially influential.6

Kessler’s biography Walther Rathenau: Sein Leben und Sein Werk (1928) has become the standard in Rathenau-scholarship. Its central thesis is that Rathenau had a contradictory character:

1 Hans Fürstenberg,‘Erinnerung an Walther Rathenau, Ein Kommentar’ In: Kessler, Harry Graf, Walther Rathenau, Sein Leben und Sein Werk (Wiesbaden 1962) 390. 2 Ibidem, 396-398. 3 Ibidem, 390. 4 Ibidem, 390. ‘Sofern er Minderwertigkeits-Komplexe besaß – und daran ist kaum zu zweifeln -, wußte er sie gut zu verbergen.’ 5 Ibidem, 386. ‘Schutzheilige’ 6 Ibidem, 387.

1 […] [der] Doppelbestimmung Walther Rathenaus, zu jenem nie in ihm ausgeglichenen Konflikt zwischen dem Hang zu weltfremder seelischer Verinnerlichung und der geheimnisvoll unwiderstehlichen Nötigung zu eng auf einen Zweck eingestelltem kaufmännischem und technischem Schaffen, zu jener Doppelheit, die ihn schließlich tragisch innerlich zerriß und äußerlich zu einem Gegenstand des Anstoßes und des Hasses für Millionen machte […].7

Kessler argued that there was a clear and problematic distinction between Rathenau’s intellectual theories and ideas and his political and business career.8 He stated that for Rathenau the differences between his intellectual and practical career were so strong, so contradictory, that this led to ‘internal divisiveness’. Many more biographies on Rathenau have been written in the meantime, which all differ in content and character. Kessler’s concept of contradiction, however, has stuck. In 1967, for instance, the Dutch historian H.W. von der Dunk emphasized the contradictory nature and ambivalence of Rathenau’s character.9 Peter Berglar emphasized Rathenau’s multiplicity (vielschichtige Gestalt) in 1970.10 In 1997 Dieter Heimböckel called Rathenau a ‘Widersprüchlicher Universalist’.11 This approach persevered and returned in the biographies of Wolfgang Michalka in 2008 and Lothar Gall in 2009.12 The ‘contradiction’-argument seems to have become a myth in itself, which has been haunting research on Rathenau for decades. Perspectives in the historiography might be changing slowly, however. In 2009, Dieter Heimböckel, who had once claimed differently, stated that a new approach to the study of Rathenau might be needed.13

Kessler also presented Rathenau as an ‘Erfüllungspolitiker’, working towards solidarity with both the Russians in the East and the Allied Powers in the West.14 Kessler presented Rathenau as a politician who brought peace to the continent.15

7 Harry Graf Kessler, Walther Rathenau, Sein Leben und Sein Werk (Wiesbaden 1962) 25.

9 Hermann Von der Dunk, ‘Walther Rathenau 1867-1922, Leven tussen aanpassing en kritiek’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 80 (1967) 331. 10 ‘Peter Berglar, bekannt durch zahlreiche literarische, zeitkritische, philosophische und historische Arbeiten, bringt die vielschichtige Gestalt Walther Rathenaus (1867-1922) zur lebendigen Anschauung.’, Quote from the back cover of Peter Berglar, Walther Rathenau: Ein Leben zwischen Philosophie und Politik (Vienna 1987). 11 Dieter Heimböckel, ‘Widersprüchlicher Universalist : der Industrielle, Politiker und Schriftsteller Walther Rathenau.’ Schweizer Monatshefte : Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur (1997) 77.11. 12 Lothar Gall, Walther Rathenau, Portrait einer Epoche (Munich 2009) 258; Michalka, Wolfgang. ‘Vordenker der Moderne’ In: Michalka, Wolfgang e.a. ed., Walther Rathenau (Berlin 2008) 28: ‘Rathenau’s Vielseitigkeit und Widersprüchlichkeit.’ 13 Dieter Heimböckel, ‘Kunst contra Mechanisierung’, In: Delabar, Walther e.a. ed., Walther Rathenau: Der Phänotyp der Moderne. Literatur- und kulturwissenschaftliche Studien zu Walther Rathenau (Bielefeld 2009) 12. 14 Kessler, Rathenau, 297, 300. 15 Ibidem, 352.

2 But we now know that Kessler tried to hide some of Rathenau’s intentions and most important decisions. After Rathenau’s assassination, the Rathenau family and some of his friends had given Kessler open access to source material. To strengthen societal remembrance, the government actively participated with Kessler’s biography by opening all archives to him.16 The German Foreign Office, however, actively censured several sources used by Kessler and Kessler agreed to change his text in accordance with instructions from the Foreign Office’s legal advisors.17 In light of these findings, Kessler’s biography appears to be revisionist and unreliable.

But Kessler’s interpretation of Rathenau as a peaceful international politician and a defender of German democracy permeates until this day. Yearly, one of the most important prizes in German politics is handed out by the Rathenau-Stiftung: the Rathenau-Preis. This prize is handed out to politicians and statesmen who have made an exceptional contribution to international tolerance and cooperation. The Stiftung states that they want to spread Rathenau’s ideas of ‘democratic values, international understanding and tolerance.’18 Chancellor Angela Merkel, when handing out the prize to Hans-Dietrich Genscher in 2008, said that Rathenau was responsible for ‘die Gestaltung der Beziehungen zu unseren Nachbarn durch Einbindung Deutschlands in Europa.’19 When awarding the Rathenau-Preis to Hilary Clinton in 2011, the former German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle stated: ‘Rathenau was a true champion of individual liberty. He saw clever minds as a driving force of our prosperity. He stressed the rights of all people. He worked for a world order where everyone meets as partners.’20 The Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte accepted the price in 2014, stating about Rathenau: ‘In the 1920’s he was already pleading for European cooperation. I share his belief in the power of a common Europe, of our shared European values and ideas.’21

16 Kessler, Rathenau, 386. 17 Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy: New Sources and New Interpretations’, In: Berghahn, Volker R. e.a. ed., Germany in the Age of Total War (Totowa, New Jersey 1981) 139. 18 Rathenau-Stiftung.de 2020. 19 Angela Merkel, ‘Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zur Verleihung des Walther-Rathenau-Preises an Hans- Dietrich Genscher am 21. Oktober 2008 in Berlin, Bulletin der Bundesregierung’ (2008) 113-3: 2. 20 Guido Westerwelle, ‘Laudatio von Außenminister Westerwelle auf Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton anlässlich der Verleihung des Walther Rathenau Preises in Berlin (Englisch)’ 21 Mark Rutte: 'Walther Rathenau was een Duits politicus in de vroege jaren 20 van de vorige eeuw. Toen al sprak hij over Europese samenwerking. Ik deel zijn geloof in de kracht van Europa, van onze waarden en onze ideeën.' Source: EU- monitor.nl

3 This thesis shows that Rathenau held quite different views than the ones portrayed by Rutte, Merkel, Westerwelle and the Rathenau Stiftung. Through a close inspection of Rathenau’s intellectual ideas and his practical career, it shows that Rathenau’s life cannot and should not be summarized as contradictory, as Kessler and many after him have done. This approach in the historiography has contributed to the fact that Rathenau is now wrongly perceived as a democrat and a liberal. This thesis thus reassesses Walther Rathenau’s legacy fundamentally by defending the central argument:

Walther Rathenau’s life and motivations can first and foremost be explained by his cultural pessimism and Prussian nationalism.

The first chapter primarily focusses on Rathenau’s intellectual career. It argues that Rathenau’s theories were neoconservative in character from the beginning of his life until its tragic end. In doing this, it argues that the current historiographic tradition which presents Rathenau as contradictory is fundamentally flawed. The analysis shows that Rathenau was very consistent in his cultural pessimism and Prussian nationalism.

The second chapter motivates that Rathenau put his neoconservative theories into practice. This means that Rathenau acted in accordance with his cultural pessimism and Prussian nationalism, both as an industrialist and as a politician. It also shows that the public remembrance of Rathenau as a prime example of international cooperation and tolerance is not in accordance with the historical facts. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first part discusses Rathenau’s career during the First World War, the second part discusses Rathenau’s career after the war.

4 The third chapter shows how the thesis-argument (Walther Rathenau’s life and motivations can first and foremost be explained by his cultural pessimism and Prussian nationalism) can be recognized in the work of the Austrian writer Robert Musil (1880-1940). He understood that Rathenau was symptomatic for his time period. Musil’s magnum opus, Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften (MoE), first published in 1930, works like a prism. It reveals a forgotten world, one that was in transition from the ninetieth to the twentieth century. Musil made a literary interpretation of Rathenau, a caricature in the form of Dr. Paul Arnheim. Musil knew Rathenau’s work in detail and he had also closely observed his political career. In his satire, Musil does not distinguish between his intellectual and practical career, he does not regard them as ‘contradictory’. In the historiography on Rathenau, the works of Musil have been referenced and used as a historical source, yet mainly the same parts of his work are used over and over again.22 The same is true the other way around. Many scholars of literature did not seem to have the time or will to study Rathenau’s history in detail.23 The third and final chapter takes the first step in analyzing Musil’s representation in more depth. By combining the analysis of literature and history this research has a unique interdisciplinary character.

22 Mainly the chapter on Arnheim as a Großschriftsteller is used in the historiography, and Musil’s critique on Rathenau in the <> and not much else. See Ernst Schulin, Rathenau, 37; Brenner, Rathenau, 119; Shulamit Volkov, Walther Rathenau, Weimar’s Fallen Statesman (Yale 2012) 114; Lothar Gall, Walther Rathenau, 170-173. 23 A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil by Payne, Bartram and Tihanov consists of excellent essays, but does not offer much historical context when it comes to the character of Arnheim/Rathenau. This thesis shows there is much more to add.

5 Chapter 1 – Rathenau’s Intellectual Career This first chapter discusses Rathenau’s intellectual ideas, by doing an in-depth analysis of his intellectual work and the historiography on his work. It motivates that Rathenau was actually a cultural pessimist and a Prussian Nationalist. Rathenau was not a defender of parliamentary representative democracy. He dreamed of a technocratic utopian German empire, led by a carefully selected Prussian elite. He did not believe in the ‘power of a common Europe’, but in the power of a common German Europe. The chapter starts with a broader introduction of the societal context to create a better understanding of Rathenau’s theories. After this, his theories are discussed in greater detail, especially his works Zur Kritik der Zeit (1912) and Von Kommenden Dingen (1917).

1.1. Der Geist – The rise of the educated middle class During the nineteenth century, Prussia was known for its ‘Prussian particularism’. The political system benefitted the conservative-agrarian establishment by its voting system, the ‘three-class-franchise’. At the end of the century this ‘Old Prussia’ slowly came to an end. The agrarian establishment slowly started to lose its privileged position. Conservative intellectuals started to develop a Prussian ‘universalist’ tradition. They were inspired by the philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) who taught in the 1820’s that the reformed Prussian state was to embody ‘the reconciliation of the particular and the universal.’24 In the new Prussian School the state was seen as an ‘impersonal, transhistorical instrument of change.’25 The German unification of 1871 was based on the ideas of the Prussian School. Under Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), a whole network of social legislation was built, starting from the 1880s, including medical, labour, age and invalidity insurance. According to Bismarck the Kaiserreich was to be a ‘social monarchy’.26 The Prussian School combined Prussian patriotism and nationalism with a strong focus on the state and national ‘social’ policies.

24 Christopher Clark, The Iron Kingdom, The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600-1947 (London 2007) 614-618. 25 Ibidem. 26 Ibidem.

6 After the German unification in 1871, the industrialization and technological changes in Prussia went into overdrive, resulting in a Second Industrial Revolution. Especially Berlin changed drastically and turned into a sprawling, modern city. During the unification Berlin counted 865,000 inhabitants. By 1905 the city had grown to around 2 million residents.27 In the new metropolitan areas a novel and more independent middle class started to form. At first these more ‘independent’ citizens had consisted mostly of tradespeople and technologically trained professionals. But slowly the civil servant also joined their ranks. Civil servants used to see themselves as direct representatives of the state. Yet with the vastly developing pluralization and differentiation of public organizations and institutions, their role became more independent and specialized. They were, for example, responsible for railways, the mail service, public housing and teaching. These civil servants had a lot of respect for and contact with those working in the freie berufe: the doctors, the journalists, the publishers and writers. All these social groups formed the new educated middle class. This neuen Bürgertum grew into a substantial class of around three million people.28 It was a class which prided itself on its newly received independence. It despised the agricultural aristocracy of ‘Old Prussia’. Some of those who reached independence had amounted huge substances of wealth and took pride in showing it.29

Being a member of the new middle class was not about having much wealth, however. Modesty was the prime virtue of this new class, in every aspect of life. In their clothing, their leisure, their spending, their comforts and especially in their spirit (Geist). They presented themselves as having the higher moral ground, not being interested in property, income and privileged positions.30 Those who mastered this Geisteshaltung had Bildung. Amongst the Bildungsbürgertum, the educated middle class, it was deemed fashionable to show that one had a personal, well cultured taste when it came to ‘the Higher Arts’, literature, music, theater, but also architecture. The amount of opera houses, theaters and art galleries in Berlin exploded. It was in fashion to build a house which reflected their well-developed taste.31 The Bildungsbürgertum also benefitted from shorter working hours, therefore they had plenty of time to spend their weekends or evenings consuming the latest cultural offerings.32

27 Shulamit Volkov, Walther Rathenau, Weimar’s Fallen Statesman (Yale 2012) 2. 28 Lothar Gall, Walther Rathenau, Portrait einer Epoche (Munich 2009) 16-17. 29 Ibidem, 16-17. 30 Ibidem, 21. 31 Ibidem, 14. 32 Ibidem, 25.

7 Best of all, it seemed people could become a member of this educated middle class by their own effort. The novelist Thomas Mann (1875-1955) was used as a prime example of the Gebildete Mensch, he had not finished university but had reached his prominence and fame on his own.33 Harry Graf Kessler became the biographer of this new generation. He knew every person of importance in Wilhelmine Germany. The ideal of the Bildungsbürger became the central identification marker for the new middle class. Slowly but steadily this new middle class became convinced that the way towards a better society was not offered by a specific ideology or political economic system, but by the Spirit, the Geist of the individual. A Gebildeter Mensch had the capacity to communicate with his inner self and therefore was capable of Selbstbestimmung. This was Bildungidealismus. A better world was imagined where every citizen could find his inner self. This new form of idealism created a new societal distinction, between Gebildeten and Ungebildeten.34

This change in social mobility meant a chance for Jews to finally integrate into society. With the unification of 1871, Jews were recognized as being equal citizens. But for a long time this legal equality did not change the practical reality of social exclusion of Jews.35 Their chances of rising in the ranks in Prussia had always been very slim and the Prussian bureaucracy remained as good as closed to Jewish applicants. But in the new metropolitan economy, Jews could contribute to society in the free professions.36 By the 1880’s, with the construction of the new railroads and the rise of electricity, the industrialization went into overdrive. The coal and iron of Silesia and the Ruhr could now be delved and transported in much more effective ways. Gustav Krupp (1870-1950) built his huge iron and steel manufacturing conglomerate; Werner Siemens (1816-1892) built his empire on the technology of the telegraph. But companies such as Krupp and Siemens had to finance their huge industrial efforts. Many Jews were active in commerce and finance and were responsible for investing in these huge projects. The role of Jews in the modernization of Germany, however, is often grossly overestimated. Only just over 1 percent of the population was Jewish.37

33 Gall, Rathenau, 20. 34 Ibidem, 27. 35 Volkov, Rathenau, 4-5. 36 Ibidem, 4-5. 37 Ibidem, 4-5

8 Walther Rathenau was part of this 1 percent, as he was born into a Jewish family. His father Emil Rathenau (1838-1915) had inherited money from his grandfather and he had the opportunity to study engineering in Hanover and Zurich. When Emil returned to Berlin he married Mathilde Nachmann (1845-1926), a daughter of a very wealthy Jewish banking family from Frankfurt.38 But Emil was not yet the industrial magnate he came to be. Several of his business ventures failed, and many of his projects were severely damaged by the stock exchange crash of 1873. The economic crisis was so dire that Emil’s father-in-law took his own life. At the Paris World Exhibition of 1881 Emil finally found his fortune. He met with Thomas Edison (1847-1931) and immediately recognized the huge potential of the electric light bulb and seized the opportunity. He bought the very first patent on European soil and started to build his empire on the production of the light bulb and many other electrical goods. In his life, Emil was regarded as a very strong and successful man. Kessler later wrote that he had ‘features of Napoleon in him.’39 Without a doubt, Emil Rathenau, but also magnates such as Siemens and Krupp, laid the foundation of modern capitalism and mass production and consumption in Germany. The Rathenau family profited immensely from the opportunities and social mobility of the modern economy.

1.2. Die Zukunft - The rise of neoconservatism The new social mobility and the cultural differentiation of city life came at a price. Metropolitan life, in all its manifestations, with its impressions and its noise, could have an alienating effect on the citizen. Many of the new citizens had been uprooted. They had lost their job in the older disappearing industries and were searching for a new place in the city. What many found instead, was insecurity, poverty and a lack of social bonding and connection. Those employed suffered from the lack of protection, bad housing and bad health care. They could lose their jobs at any moment due to the pressures of capitalist competitiveness. The rise of mass media strengthened the anonymizing effect of modern life, seemingly splintering society in all kinds of subgroups.40

38 Volkov, Rathenau, 7-8. 39 Harry Graf Kessler, Walther Rathenau. Sein Leben und Sein Werk (Wiesbaden 1962) 13. 40 Helmut Lethen, ‘Chicago und Moskau: Berlins moderne Kultur der 20er Jahre zwischen Inflation und Weltwirtschaftskrise’, In: Boberg, Jochen e.a. ed, Die Metropole: Industriekultur in Berlin im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich 1987) 206.

9 City life, therefore, was increasingly regarded in a more and more negative light. The conservative journalist Adolf Stein wrote: ‘Warum gingen denn die Menschen so ruhig weiter, als wenn überhaupt nichts geschehen wäre…? Die Straßenbahnen fuhren wie immer’.41 The city was not seen as hopeful and dynamic, but cold and indifferent. The end of the 19th century was a time of insecurity. For many, this was reflected by the political system. To them, the Kaiser with his impulsiveness, mood swings and randomly improvised public speeches, was the perfect embodiment of the chaos and lack of direction of the Wilhelminian society.42

Many intellectuals sought to solve these tensions and negative effects of modernity. They wanted to convert technology and modernity into an ‘organic part of German Kultur’. Historian Jeffrey Herf has called this movement ‘reactionary modernism’: ‘the “reconciliation between the antimodernist, romantic and irrationalist ideas’ and “modern technology”.’43 The German Kulturnation could in this way be technologically advanced while remaining true to its Geist. The reactionary modernist movement came to be known as the ‘Konservative Revolution’, a name invented by Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1874-1929), Walther Rathenau’s close friend.44 Reactionary modernism was a project of the political right. Neoconservatives like Ernst Jünger, Ludwig Klages and Oswald Spengler are the most well- known intellectuals. In its core, reactionary modernism was an anti-Western and cultural pessimist-ideology. Cultural pessimists believed that Germany had to be protected against the materialist ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world and the ‘backwards’ Eastern cultures of the Russians.45 Reactionary modernists believed in the ‘triumph of the spirit and the will over reason’, believing in a world of ‘hidden powerful forces’, a Divine Law, ein Göttliches Gesetz.46 Reactionary modernists wanted to reverse the process of materialist ‘degeneration’ by uniting the nations ‘body and soul’.47

41 Lethen, ‘Chicago und Moskau’, 208. 42 Joachim Radkau, Das Zeitalter der Nervosität, Deutschland zwischen Bismarck und Hitler (Munich 1998) 27. 43 Thomas Rohkrämer, ‘Antimodernism, Reactionary Modernism and National Socialism. Technocratic Tendencies in Germany 1890-1945’, Contemporary European History 8 (1999) 29. 44 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge 1986) 21. 45 Ibidem, 12-14. 46 Ibidem, 12-14. 47 Ibidem, 18.

10 Many Prussian conservatives were logically attracted to neoconservatism because it glorified the Prussian German Kultur. For the industrialist the positive attitude towards technology was practically free advertisement. The military and civil service liked the prominence and glorification of the state.48 But many of the new educated bourgeoisie were attracted to new conservatism as well. The emphasis on the German Geist fitted the Bildungsbürger quite well. They were already well acquainted with the ‘romantic anti-capitalism’ of the neoconservatives. Herf states: ‘the social basis of the conservative revolution was the middle class.’49 Herf mostly discusses reactionary modernist thinkers who were active after World War I.50 But long before the First World War, before Oswald Spengler and Ernst Junger, another person had received much attention with such ideas: Walther Rathenau.

Walther Rathenau had suffered under the struggles of his father’s career: ‘In Not bin ich nicht aufgewachsen, aber in Sorgen.’51 Rathenau was aware of his father’s many talents, but he increasingly despised the ‘one-sidedness’ of Emil’s talents. ‘Growth’ and ‘the end-goal’ had obsessed his father: ‘Sein Vater war nicht Herr, sondern Knecht der von ihm selbst aufgerichteten riesigen Maschine.’52 In his father, Rathenau came to see the embodiment of the faults of modern capitalism. In the modern world everything had become a commodity or a ‘means’ (ein Zweck). Objects, nature, God, nothing could escape the grasp of the economic markets. The modern capitalists and modern citizens were obsessed with gathering these commodities or means, they had become Zweckmenschen. In the eyes of Rathenau, his father was a perfect representation of a Zweckmensch, a slave of his never-ending goal of gathering. To distance himself from his father, Rathenau started to form neoconservative ideas.53

This began when he was studying maths, physics and chemistry in Berlin and Straßburg. He also took courses in philosophy. He was close to his mother, and through her he came to love German romanticism and idealism. He especially loved the poems of Schiller.54 He was also greatly inspired by Fichte’s Deutschtum Metaphysik.55

48 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 11. 49 Ibidem, 22. 50 Ibidem, 13. 51 Kessler, Rathenau, 15. 52 Ibidem, 23. 53 Ibidem, 23. 54 Ernst Schulin, Walther Rathenau, Repräsentant, Kritiker und Opfer seiner Zeit (Zurich – Frankfurt 1979) 47. 55 Wolfgang Michalka, ‘Kriegsrohstoffbewirtschaftung, Walther Rathenau und die “kommende Wirtschaft”’, In: Michalka, Wolfgang ed., Der Erste Weltkrieg, Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse (Munich 1994) 497.

11 Rathenau strongly believed in a special German vitality, in a special German Seele.56 In 1906, Rathenau travelled to Greece, where he had a special ‘mystical experience.’ Being immersed in Ancient Greek culture he came up with his so-called Reich der Seele.57 In 1908, he published Physiologie des Kunstempfindens in which he stated: ‘Ästhetischer Genuß entsteht, wenn eine verborgene Gesetzmäßigkeit empfunden wird.’58 Inspired by Schiller, Rathenau concluded that the Greeks, like the Germans, had a special relation with nature, that their art evoked a ‘religious experience’ that revealed the hidden laws of God and nature.59 Just like Wagner, Rathenau saw ‘German art’ as a crucial way to raise political and cultural consciousness.60 Rathenau despised modern art and became attracted to the Prussian neoromanticism of Hermann Bahr, because it sought to overturn the determinism, objectivism and rationalization of modernity.61 For Rathenau, neoromanticism was the perfect philosophical system to distance himself from the materialistic world of his father and the negative aspects of modernity and city life.

He soon found a likeminded thinker in Maximilian Harden (1861-1927). Harden was born into a Jewish family of Polish descent. He was actually born as Felix Ernst Witkowski, but as a he was a stark admirer of Bismarck and the German empire he decided to change his name. More importantly, he converted to Protestantism. Like the baptized Heinrich Heine, Harden saw this as an entry ticket into the modern Prussian German society. Harden was a radical and very controversial neoconservative and neoromantic thinker.62 Under his influence Rathenau’s neoromanticism developed into neoconservatism.

Harden founded the weekly Die Zukunft, which mainly consisted of vicious neoconservative critiques on the Kaiserreich. Harden and Rathenau were very critical towards Wilhelm II’s reign. Both Harden and Rathenau thought that Bismarck was a prime example of a ‘Great Man’, in line with political giants such as Friedrich II and Napoleon.63 They thought that after Bismarck the Reich had been in decline.

56 Schulin, Rathenau, 47. 57 Ibidem, 47. 58 Antje Johanning, ‘Die Kunst hat vom Baum der Erkenntnis nicht genossen, Anmerkungen zum Kunstverständnis Walther Rathenau’s’, In: Delabar, Walther ea. ed., Walther Rathenau: Der Phänotyp der Moderne. Literatur- und kulturwissenschaftliche Studien zu Walther Rathenau (Bielefeld 2009) 38. 59 Ibidem, 43. 60 Joep Leerssen, ‘Notes towards a Definition of Romantic Nationalism’, Romantik 2 (2013) 9-35. 61 Dieter Heimböckel, ‘Walther Rathenau und die Literatur seiner Zeit’ In: Wilderotter, Hans ed., Walther Rathenau 1867- 1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 69. 62 Volkov, Rathenau, 42-44. 63 Ibidem, 44.

12 Due to the rapid industrialization and vastly changing industrial society the supremacy of the German Reich was under threat. According to Harden and Rathenau, the old agricultural aristocracy still had too much influence on the political system. This prevented the political system from reaching the ‘dynamic’ nature of parliamentary system like that of the British Empire. But the parliamentarism of the British Empire was deemed too ‘materialistic’. Harden and Rathenau wanted to maintain the Bismarck’s ‘social monarchy’ while infusing it with the ideals of the educated middle class.64 Rathenau and Harden believed that if the educated middle class could participate in the political system, new ‘great men’ would arise that would lead the Reich back to the glory of Bismarck’s reign.65

1.3. Höre Israel - Rathenau’s antisemitism It did not take long until Rathenau published his very first article in Harden’s Die Zukunft. Rathenau had become very familiar with Harden’s neoconservative Nietzschean Kampfethik. He started to infuse it with racial theory whilst studying Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain intensely. He also practiced physiognomy, the pseudoscience of comparing the biological qualities of different races.66 There was only one problem holding him back. Rathenau’s new love for neoconservative theory did not mix well with his own Jewish ancestry. While German idealism was national, Judaism was ‘international’. How could a Jew be loyal to the state? This resulted in Rathenau’s problematic relationship with his own cultural background, his so-called ‘Jewish self-hatred’.67

His friend Alfred Kerr (1867-1948) said that Rathenau, at the time, was obsessively preoccupied with two things: ‘die soziale Zukunft Deutschlands und das Seitenproblem des Judentums.’68 It would become the central topic of his first published essay in Die Zukunft: Höre Israel (1897). Because he knew his opinions would be very controversial, he published it under a pseudonym: W. Hartenau. In a draft version, Rathenau confessed that he flirted with antisemitism: ‘Bedarf es einer Rechtfertigung, wenn ich zum Antisemitismus neige?’69

64 Volkov, Rathenau, 42-44. 65 Schulin, Rathenau, 40. 66 Ibidem, 43. For a visual example of one of Rathenau’s many physiognomic studies see: Braun, H.F. ‘Antisemitismus und Assimilation’, 321. 67 See Ritchie Robertson, The ‘Jewish Question’ in German Literature 1749-1939, (Oxford 1999) 296. Especially the chapter ‘Assimilation’ gives an excellent, very detailed account of the problems of Jewish assimilation and Jewish self-hatred. 68 Clemens Picht, ‘Walther Rathenau zwischen Antisemitismus und jüdischer Prophetie’, In: Wilderotter, Hans ed., Walther Rathenau 1867-1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 121. 69 Picht, ‘zwischen Antisemitismus und jüdischer Prophetie’, 117.

13 Rathenau’s first argument stated that the integration of the Jewish people in Germany had utterly failed.

Inmitten deutschen Lebens ein fremdartigen Menschenstamm [...] Auf märkischen Sand eine asiatische Horde [...] so leben sie in einem halb freiwilligen, unsichtbaren Ghetto, kein lebendes Glied des Volkes, sondern ein fremder Organismus in seinem Leibe.70

Rathenau stated that the Jews had not become part of the German Volk, but had remained separate, backwards ‘Asiatic’ people. Many scholars state that Rathenau’s argument was mainly aimed at the Jews who had fled from the East, the so-called Ost-Juden. These Jews who had fled from prosecution from the East had a bad reputation amongst the ‘cultivated and assimilated Jews’. They were seen as a societal problem, as the embodiment of backwardness with their strange Yiddish language. The writer Alfred Döblin (1878-1957) believed that the Eastern Jews were ‘medieval’.71 Like Rathenau, Döblin was a ‘cultivated Jew’ who tried to separate himself from this ‘world of primitivism’.

In Höre Israel, Rathenau did attack the Ost-Juden, denouncing their ‘unathletic, sloppy shape’. However, it seems that Rathenau was very critical towards the ‘cultured’ Jews as well. Rathenau specifically targeted the community from which he came, the very rich ‘assimilated’ Tiergartenjuden, the Jewish elite.72 He called them ‘imitierte Germanen.’73 Rathenau’s solution was a radical transformation of the Jewish community. Rathenau seemed to attack the then recently established Centralverein der deutschen Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens. According to Rathenau, this society had not promoted integration into German society. They only tried to defend Jews, instead of urging them to reform. According to Rathenau, this was not enough. They had to be ‘Jews nurtured on German soil.’74 They had to assimilate fully in the German Kultur and by doing this become fully part of the German Volk. This should not be done with a baptism, by converting to Christianity, like Maximilian Harden did. This would be ‘unsuitable’. Baptism only leads to ‘secret Judaization’ and to even more materialism, driving the more conservatively oriented Jews into the arms of ‘destructive parties’, meaning the ‘materialist’ socialists and liberals.75

70 Picht, ‘zwischen Antisemitismus und jüdischer Prophetie’, 117; Ritchie Robertson, The ‘Jewish Question’ in German Literature 1749-1939 (Oxford 1999) 250. 71 Anton Kaes, Shell Shock Cinema: Weimar Culture and the Wounds of War (Princeton 2009) 110. 72 Picht, ‘zwischen Antisemitismus und jüdischer Prophetie’, 117. 73 Ibidem, 117. 74 Ibidem, 117-118. 75 Ibidem, 117-118.

14 Rathenau’s approach to Judaism was very common in neoconservative circles. In the theories of most prominent reactionary modernists, anti-semitism wasn’t fundamental.76 Racial theory was not the foundation on which distinctions were made, but culture. That does not mean, however, that anti-semitism was not part of the Konservative Wende. The culture of materialism was more often than not associated with Jewishness or the Jewish Geist. 77

1.4. Mitteleuropa – Rathenau’s German Colonial Empire In 1899 Rathenau joined AEG’s senior management.78 This meant, together with his publications in Die Zukunft, that Rathenau received more and more attention. He was eventually invited to meet the Chancellor, Bernhard von Bülow (1849-1929). When he met Von Bülow at a dinner in 1906, Rathenau joked about his Jewish heritage: ‘Eure Durchlaucht, bevor ich der Gunst eines Empfanges gewürdigt werde, eine Erklärung, die zugleich ein Geständnis ist. [...] Durchlaucht, ich bin Jude.’79 Von Bülow was so impressed by Rathenau that he invited him to two official tours to the German territories in East Africa and Southwest Africa. Rathenau gladly accepted and temporarily resigned from AEG.80 This started Rathenau’s career in colonialism at the center of German authority.81

Rathenau’s attraction to colonialism had everything to do with his neoconservative ideas. Rathenau thought that Germany was threatened both culturally and economically, which fits within his cultural pessimism. Rathenau had written much about Germany’s poor geographical location, stating that although the Reich was large, it had relatively few natural resources. Germany was vulnerable because it depended on imports from ‘materialist’ foreign cultures, it was ‘commercially encircled’.82 Rathenau’s solution was to expand the influence on the European mainland to counter the rise of Anglo-Saxon materialism. Rathenau invented the concept of Zollverein.

76 Herf, Reactionary Modernism, 35. 77 Ibidem, 35. 78 Galin Tihanov, ‘Robert Musil in the Garden of Conservatism’, In: Payne, Philip. e.a. ed., A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil (Rochester, New York 2007) 126. 79 Quote from German version of Volkov, Schulamit, Walther Rathenau: Ein Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland 1867-1922 (Munich 2012). Page number sadly unknown, source was only accessible through Google books due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19). 80 Volkov, Rathenau, 67. 81 Wolfgang Brenner, Walther Rathenau, Deutscher und Jude (Munich 2006) 175. 82 Wolfgang Michalka, ‘Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft als Friedens- und Kriegsziel’, In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Walther Rathenau 1867-1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 179.

15 This Zollverein was not a forefather of the European Schengen system or the European Union, as some anachronistically interpret Rathenau’s idea today.83 In truth, it was a system for a united ‘Middle-Europe (Mitteleuropa) under German leadership.’84 Rathenau did not believe in the ‘power of a common Europe’, but in the power of a common German Europe. Only then, stated Rathenau, could Germany put pressure on England to have ‘a seat at the table on the division of the world’.85 Rathenau envied British colonialism. With a functioning Zollverein, the next step to a German colonial empire could be taken. Rathenau wanted this colonial empire to expand to ‘Middle-Africa and Smaller Asia’.86 To Rathenau, expansion was essential: ‘Wir brauchen Land dieser Erde.’87 Then the problem of lack of resources and dependence on foreign countries would finally be solved.

Rathenau thought that ‘active’ foreign policy would make the colonial empire a reality. He fully backed the German Flottenverein, a huge military effort instigated by Bülow and Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859-1941), and further developed by Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg (1859- 1941). Around 1912, under the leadership of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930), the Flottenverein really gained momentum. Rathenau finally believed that Germany had gained power on the world stage to challenge the Anglo-Saxon materialist empire: ‘[...] mit jedem Schiff, das Deutschland baut, lockert sich ein Stein des britischen Kolonialgebäudes!’88

Rathenau also had his eyes on Morocco. In 1905 Kaiser Wilhelm II decided to occupy Tangiers. This utterly failed, and Germany had to recognize the French occupation of Morocco. But the German industry did not give up yet, they wanted to exploit Morocco by diplomatic means. Rathenau became a spokesman for this Marokko-Minensyndikat. He had been hired by the wealthy German industrial brothers Mannesmann.89 The syndicate was funded by the Alldeutsche Verband (ADV), an extreme right-wing nationalist organization which propagated German colonial expansion by use of force.90

83 An example: ‘The man who envisioned a customs union of central European countries and lectured about the dangers of sovereign debt was clearly a man of the future. Volkov's book gives us a glimpse into what twentieth-century Germany could have been had he been allowed to realize his full potential.’ Quote from: Sabine von Mering, ‘Walther Rathenau. Weimar's Fallen Statesman’, German Politics and Society (New York 2013): 116. A good friend of mine made the smart suggestion that Rathenau’s Zollverein could better be compared with the Confederation of Napoleon, who had envisioned a supreme leading role for France in a new economic union. 84 Michalka‚‘Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft’, 179. 85 Ibidem, 179. 86 Hans Wilderotter, ‘Walther Rathenau im Umkreis der ‘Weltpolitik’, in: Wilderotter, Hans ed., Walther Rathenau 1867- 1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 346. 87 Ibidem, 346. 88 Walther Rathenau, Über Englands Gegenwärtige Lage, In: Von Kritik der Zeit (Berlin 1925) 165. 89 Wilderotter, ‘Rathenau Umkreis Weltpolitik’, 355. 90 Ibidem, 355.

16 The ADV was founded and funded by the later National Socialist media magnate Alfred Hugenberg (1865-1951) and the board of the Friedrich Krupp AG.91 Through his connection with the Mannesmann brothers and their acquaintances like Stinnes, Thyssen and others, Rathenau was well involved in the agenda of the ADV at the time. The ADV started a huge propaganda offensive: West-Marokko Deutsch! The influence of the ADV and the Minensyndikat led the German Foreign Office to send the German ship ‘The Panther’ to Agadir, starting the second Moroccan Crisis. This almost started a World War and further decreased the trustworthiness of the Wilhelm II’s Empire.92 This thesis shows that Rathenau continued to work, throughout his life, with the industrialists he met at the Minensyndikat.93

Rathenau’s positive attitude towards colonialism somewhat changed when he visited South- Africa. He learned of the Herrero genocide and called it the ‘die größte Atrozität, die jemals durch Deutsche Waffenpolitik hervorgerufen wurde.’94 But still he preferred the continuation of colonialism, dreaming of a German Mittelafrika. He continued to develop plans for a bridge between Congo and Cameroon.95 Rathenau was convinced of the need of colonialism for the survival of the German Empire.

1.5. Entgermanisierung - Rathenau’s cultural pessimism and racial theory Rathenau did everything he could to prove his loyalty to the Prussian culture. He bought a beautiful country house in Freienwalde which had formerly been in the hands of the Prussian crown, and built a villa in Berlin in the Koenigsallee in Berlin/Grunewald.96 He saw his Berlin villa as an example of ‘classical beauty’ against the modern ‘kunsthistorischem Fassadenbabel’ in the rest of Berlin.97 To him, his neoclassical mansions represented his Prussian ‘Spartanentum.’98 In Freienwalde and Berlin/Grunewald Rathenau regularly held dinners where he received the Berlin cultural elite, including the Viennese Jewish writer Joseph Roth, Austrian writer Franz Blei and Hugo von Hofmannsthal.99

91 Wilderotter, ‘Rathenau Umkreis Weltpolitik’, 355. 92 Ibidem, 356-357. 93 Ibidem, 356-357. 94 Brenner, Rathenau, 209. 95 Wilderotter, ‘Rathenau Umkreis Weltpolitik’, 350. 96 Karl Corino, ‘The Contribution of Biographical Research to the Understanding of Characters and Themes of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften’. In: Payne, Philip. e.a. ed., A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil (Rochester, New York 2007) 291. 97 Johanning,‘Die Kunst’, 37. 98 Wolfgang Michalka, ‘Vordenker der Moderne’ In: Michalka, Wolfgang e.a. ed., Walther Rathenau (Berlin 2008) 65. 99 Volkov, Rathenau, 90-93.

17 In conversation Rathenau liked to talk the most and mostly about himself. Harry Kessler stated that Rathenau ‘would speak like a preacher or a rabbi, never less than quarter of an hour, a speech instead of an answer, little content, mostly dogma.’100 Many of the writers he received at his dinners published at the Fisher Verlag, the publishing house that had agreed to publish Rathenau’s own works. Zur Kritik der Zeit (1912) and Zur Mechanik des Geistes (1913), with the undertitle ‘Reich der Seele’ were published by Fisher. In these books Rathenau continued his idealization of the Prussian culture, while infusing it with his racial theories. During his entire life, Rathenau called Mechanik des Geistes ‘his most important work’.101 Rathenau’s racial thinking is well illustrated by the following passage:

Daß Doppelphänomen der Mechanisierung und Entgermanisierung erklärt restlos alle Erscheinungen der Zeit: die Mechanisierung als Folge und Selbsthilfe der Volksverdichtung und als Ursache des Dranges Zur Wissenschaft, Technik, Organisation und Produktion; die Entgermanisierung als Folge Der Umschichtung und als Ursache des Mangels an Richtkraft, Tiefe, Idealismus und absoluter Überzeugung.102

This passage shows that Rathenau foresaw a racial change within the German Prussian State, a ‘Rassenwechsel.’103 In Zur Mechanik des Geistes he distinguished between a lesser race (Unterschicht) and a ‘courageous superior race’ (muthafte Oberschicht).104 But slowly the superior race was being threatened with the coming of Anglo-Saxon unbridled liberalism and the materialist socialism. The materialist lesser race would win the Rassenkampf and would take over the power of the ‘brave’ superior races.105 The German Gemeinschaft would be ‘mechanized’.106 Germany would be rationalized and ‘disenchanted’. The German culture, identity and especially the German soul would disappear, replaced by a ‘grey and decaying racial mixture’.107 This process of Entseelung and Entgermanisierung had already begun.108

100 Volkov, Rathenau, 94. The German version of Volkov’s book could not be used due to the inaccessibility of the archive. 101 David Felix, Rathenau and the Weimar Republic (Baltimore, Maryland 1971) 49. 102 Walther Rathenau, Zur Mechanik des Geistes (Berlin 1925) 50. 103 Michalka, ‘Vordenker der Moderne’, 36. 104 Ibidem, 36. 105 Walther Rathenau, Zur Kritik Der Zeit (Berlin 1925) 40. ‘Rassenkämpfe, Rassenkrieges’ 106 Michalka, ‘Rathenau Vordenker der Moderne’, 36. 107 James Joll, ‘Walther Rathenau – Intellectual or Industrialist?’ In: Berghahn, Volker R. e.a. ed., Germany in the Age of Total War (Totowa, New Jersey 1981) 53. 108 Joll ‘Rathenau’, 36-37; Schulin, Rathenau, 57; Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 249-250.

18 Rathenau continued his attack on the Prussian Kaiserreich. Rathenau argued in Staat und Judentum (1911) that the ‘Jewish Problem’ still existed. But now it was no longer caused by the Jews themselves, but by the old Prussian agrarian nobility. Like the educated middle class, it was very difficult for the Jews to enter the public service. He called this: ‘[...] die verfassungswidrige Unduldsamkeit des Staates.’109 The closedness of the Prussian state led to a poor selection process, ultimately hurting the longevity of the Prussian state itself. If reform would not occur, Germany would end up like the United States. Rathenau often used the United States as the perfect negative example of the destructiveness of mechanization:

Den Vereinigten Staaten, die hinsichtlich ihrer Einschlagsverhältnisse dem europäischen Durschnitt entsprechen, fehlt die Vorschule germanischer Oberherrschaft und Leitung, sie konnten daher zwar die mechanistische Zivilisation auf den höchsten Gipfel treiben; kulturbildenden Kräften sind ihnen nicht entstanden [...].110

This passage shows that Rathenau thought that Germans had a special disposition, reflected in their culture, that could protect the Gemeinschaft from dangerous foreign influences. Germany had to be culturally united to avert the process of mechanization that plagued the United States. The culture of the United States lacked ‘German leadership’ and became so racially degenerated that its citizens were only interested in reading stupid ‘mechanized’ detective novels.111 As he mentions in Zur Kritik der Zeit: ‘Das Volk bedurfte noch lange germanischer Geistesleitung und bedarf noch heute germanischen Einschlages.’112

To Rathenau, the strong will of the Germans was reflected by their biological qualities, proven by physiognomy: ‘Zweifellos ist dieses blonde und blauäugige Idealtypus der überlebenden germanischen Naturen entlehnt.’113 To Rathenau, the blond and blue-eyed Prussian was the definitive proof of the existence of the ‘reineren Germanentum.’114 The Prussian embodied the ideals of courage.

109 Helmuth F. Braun, ‘Antisemitismus und Assimilation’, In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 320. 110 Rathenau, Zur Kritik Der Zeit, 93-94. 111 Ibidem, 102-103. ‘Amerikanische Menschen des Erfolges beginnen den Massen zu imponieren, [...]; zum Lesebuch des Volkes ist nach Ritter- und Indianergeschichte der Detektivroman geworden.’ 112 Ibidem, 93. 113 Ibidem, 101. 114 Ibidem, 101.

19 All the other races lacked these qualities: ‘Hinterlist, Betrug, Diebstahl, ja selbst Lüge, die im außergermanische kreise als zulässige Diplomatie gilt.’115 The lesser biological heritage of foreigners led them to steal, lie and deceit. Rathenau’s racial theory remained. Germans had fundamental biological and ‘cultural qualities’ (Kulturqualitäten) in their blood that could protect the society from mechanization. That also meant that, in Rathenau’s perfect society, Jews had no choice but to adapt to these ‘cultural qualities’.

1.6. Von Kommenden Dingen - Rathenau’s technocratic Utopia Historian Wolfgang Michalka stated that Rathenau could best be classified as a ‘Vordenker der Moderne.’116 This had everything to with his neoconservatism. Rathenau’s perfect society was a utopian society. Rathenau focused on building and protecting the future Germany. His theories focused on how mechanization could be averted. In 1912, he had published England und Wir, in which he stated that a Schicksal kriege was imminent between Germany and the ‘materialist’ Anglo-Saxon world. According to Rathenau, England and its allies were doing everything to destroy Germany’s continental hegemony as created by Bismarck.117 Rathenau had clearly seen the First World War coming. At first, Rathenau seemed depressed and appalled by the outbreak of the War. But then he saw opportunities:

[...] dieses unermessliche Wirtschaftsgebiet dehnte sich vor dem geistigen Auge, und uns war die Aufgabe gestellt, diese Welt, diese webende und strebende Welt zusammenzufassen, sie dem Kriege dienstbar zu machen, ihr einen einheitlichen Willen aufzuzwingen und ihre titanische Kräfte zur Abwehr zu wecken.118

This passage shows that Rathenau immediately foresaw that the war effort could unite the German society in previously unimaginable ‘titanic’ ways. Germany would have ‘one will’. The War was a ‘singing open chord for an immortal song of sacrifice, loyalty and heroism.’119

115 Rathenau, Zur Kritik Der Zeit, 102. 116 Michalka, ‘Vordenker der Moderne’, 28. 117 Walther Rathenau, England und Wir, Eine Philippika, In: Von Kritik der Zeit (Berlin 1925) 211. 118 Schulin, Rathenau, 65. 119 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19), Quote from: Joll, ‘Rathenau – Intellectual or Industrialist?’, 55.

20 Rathenau used the First World War to make his utopian vision of a ‘soulful’ German economy come to fruition. He saw the War not as a traditional, but as an economic war, a Wirtschaftskrieg.120 To Rathenau, the War was a clash between economic and ideological systems. He was convinced that Britain would be fighting for economic supremacy at all costs.121 To him, the First World War was a ‘Weltrevolution’ against mechanization.122 Rathenau saw the First World War as an opportunity to cure the ‘inner societal division’ of Germany. With one united country, Germany could be protected against the ‘westlichen, bürgerlichen idealen Werte des 19 Jahrhunderts.’123 The liberal West would not set foot on German ground, and the East would be pacified by the German Imperium. It becomes clear that Rathenau was motivated by his cultural pessimist ideas, trying to protect the decline of Germany and German Kultur at all costs.

During this incredible war effort, Rathenau developed his new philosophical theories. Die Neue Wirtschaft (1918) and Von Kommenden Dingen (1917) were all focused on the total transformation of society. The First World War was to be a definitive turning point, a start of the new German utopian Gemeinschaft. He stated: ‘Wir sind Ein Volk, aber wir sind es noch nicht genug.’124 Rathenau was convinced that unity was essential for the survival of Germany: ‘Nur homogene Gesellschaften haben Idealen.’125 His new society would be an ‘organism’ in which all societal class differences would disappear as much as possible. Because every action in society would be ‘organically linked’ to another, there would be no more conflict of interests within German society.126 This unity was essential for the survival of Germany. Rathenau thought that victory would not be achieved by politics, but by the united biological power of the German people: ‘sie liegen nicht in der Politik, sondern in den Kräften des deutschen Volkes begründet.’127

120 Michalka, ‘Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft’, 182. 121 Ibidem, 182. 122 Wolfgang Kruse, ‘Walther Rathenau und die Organisierung des Kapitalismus’, In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Walther Rathenau 1867-1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 156. 123 Ibidem, 156. 124 Ibidem, 159. 125 Rathenau, Zur Kritik der Zeit, 99. 126 Kruse, ‘Rathenau Organisierung Kapitalismus’, 157. 127 Rathenau, England und Wir, 213.

21 In Zur Kritik der Zeit Rathenau had already stated that the German Geist was the most important factor for developing a united Germany. In his works he wrote during the War Rathenau expanded on the irrational world of the Geist. Rathenau started to develop a new political religion.128 Organized dogmatic religions such as Judaism and Christianity only worked against the German unity, they embodied Mitleid (compassion) and Knechtschaft (slavedom).129 In Rathenau’s Nietzschean philosophy, compassion stands for weakness and that is dangerous for the ‘reineren Germanentum.’130

Rathenau’s alternative religion was a political religion. In Von Kommenden Dingen Rathenau spoke of an ‘organischer Theokratie.’131 His Volksstaat would be organized in accordance with the ‘divine law’, with ‘Göttliches Gesetz.’132 If this homogenous society would be able to live according to Gods divine law, the solutions for German survival would come by itself: ‘[...] die metaphysische Aufgabe soll uns ihr physisches Abbild enthüllen.’133

Not by religion, but by strength, the Germans had developed their ‘noble blood’: ‘[...] auch der Urahn des Ariers war ein düsteres Geschöpf, weit tiefer stehend als Mongole und Neger.’134 These ‘primitive’ races had developed into courageous Germans because they were strengthened by the power of their Soul, their Seelenkraft. They came to this power by having ‘a spark of God in them’.135 The Germans had been successful in rediscovering their German Soul because they believed. ‘Dieser Glauben aber hat eine stärkere Evidenz als die des intellektualen Beweises.’136 The Germans were not to be spoiled by the intellectualism of the materialist cultures or dogmatic religion. The German people only had to go back to their original state of being: ‘wir kehren heim.’137

128 For an interesting article on Rathenau’s influence on the ‘political religions’ of the 20th century read: Thomas Rohkrämer, ‘Politische Religion, Civic Religion oder ein neuer Glaube, Walther Rathenau’s Vision einer anderen Moderne’, In: Delabar, Walther ea. ed., Walther Rathenau: Der Phänotyp der Moderne. Literatur- und kulturwissenschaftliche Studien zu Walther Rathenau (Bielefeld 2009) 195-214. 129 Rathenau, Zur Kritik der Zeit, 104, 101; Von Kommenden Dingen, 68. 130 Rathenau, Zur Kritik der Zeit, 101. 131 Rathenau, Von Kommende Dingen, 53. 132 Kruse, ‘Rathenau Organisierung Kapitalismus’, 159. 133 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 56. 134 Ibidem, 57. 135 Ibidem, 59. ‘das Volk aber ist seine Mutter’ 136 Ibidem, 60. 137 Ibidem, 225.

22 Germany would be born again: ‘So erscheint uns die Forderung der Wiedergeburt [...].’138 This rebirth of Germany was embodied by the Volksgemeinschaft, where everything that had formerly divided the German society had disappeared. The Germans should not believe in religion, but in the political religion of the Volksgemeinschaft. This was essential, or else society would again fall apart into division and classes: ‘[...] wo Volksgemeinschaft ermangelt, erzwingt es die Klassenscheidung.’139

Rathenau’s authoritarian Volksgemeinschaft ensured that these racial qualities of the Prussian Soul were to be protected against mechanization.140 Anschluss with Austria would lead to a perfect protection of the new united German state from the outside.141 When Germany finally had its empire and access to its own natural recourses, it could be fully autarkical.142 Then the German citizen could finally live in ‘Menschliche Freiheit’.143 The German state would be a Volksstaat, in which the ‘sittlichen und tätigen Gemeinschaftswillen’ was represented.144 The Gemeinschaft would be so perfect and harmonious that even the Rule of Law would be unnecessary:

Nicht Einrichtungen, nicht Verfassungsparagraphem und Gesetze schaffen den Volksstaat, sondern Geist und Wille.145 [...]‘Aristokratie und Demokratie, Parlamentarismus und Absolutismus. [...] Die Institutionen zivilisierter Staaten, mögen sie verschiedene Namen und äußere Formen tragen, sind in der Zusammensetzung ihrer verwickelten Gleichgewichte ähnlicher als man vermutet, weit verschiedener ist der Geist, der sie erfüllt.146

This passage shows that according to Rathenau, every political system and ideology was futile because they lacked the German Geist. Rathenau invented a new word for his political religion: ‘der Organokratie.’147 The Geist, in the form of the Organokratie, would make every other form of statehood unnecessary.

138 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 85; Kessler, Rathenau, 116. 139 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 50. 140 Hans Wilderotter, ‘Rohstoffversorgung und Kriegszieldiskussion’ In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 363. 141 Michael Dorrmann, ‘Von Kommenden Dingen, Revolution und Republik’, In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 393. ‘Deutschland, mit Deutsch Österreich vereinigt’ 142 Michalka, Vordenker der Moderne, 44; Kent, Bruce, The Spoils of War, The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932 (Oxford 1989) 46. 143 Schulin, Rathenau, 81. 144 Ibidem, 81. 145 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 261-262. 146 Ibidem, 313. 147 Ibidem, 317.

23 Rathenau’s Organokratie needed a supreme monarchical leader. He called for a kräftige Monarchie, with a powerful ‘fatherfigure’ at the helm.148 The relation between the Volksstaat and the monarch should be one like between father and Son: ‘[…] gesunde Natur, Erfahrung und Überblick wird den Vater zum Führer auch des erwachsenen Hauswesens machen.’149 Rathenau’s supreme monarch would represent the total fusion between the monarchy and the Volksgemeinschaft.

But this total fusion would be very difficult to achieve within a traditional capitalist economy. Rathenau had to apply his irrational ideas to the economy as well. In 1919, he re-emphasized his message in Die Autonome Wirtschaft. Autonom did not mean independent, like in a liberal representative democracy, but an economy totally controlled by the state: ‘Wirtschaft [...] nicht mehr Sache der Einzelnen, sondern der Gesamtheit.’150 Only then there would be ‘harmonious cooperation’. Property would be heavily regulated. There would be no room for the ‘negerhafte’ primitivism of luxury goods.151 Luxury was deemed harmful to society.152 This was a daring standpoint for a man who owned two luxurious decorated palaces himself.

Private enterprise would be totally abolished. This would be the final step in the German Gemeinschaft, there would be no more division between the laborers and employers.153 In a harmonious society, with the harmonious production processes, labour would also be spiritualized. There would be no more competition in the new ‘Werksgemeinschaft.’154 The labor movements would have to be totally incorporated into the Volksstaat. The loyalty of the proletariat, with whom Rathenau was very much concerned, would show the perfection of Rathenau’s system: ‘Wenn uns aber gelingt [...] eine neue Wirtschaft aufzubauen, so ist uns die Mitwirkung der unteren Schichten gesichert.’155 He stated that his society would ‘destroy the foundations of socialism’.156 Class division would be no more, the Volksstaat would be complete.

148 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 266. 149 Ibidem, 266-267. 150 Wilderotter, ‘Rathenau im Umkreis Weltpolitik’, 363. 151 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 199. ‘negerhafte Urgeluste’ 152 Kruse, ‘Rathenau Organisierung Kapitalismus’, 159. 153 Schulin, Rathenau, 103-104. 154 Dorrmann, ‘Von Kommenden Dingen’, 392. 155 Wilderotter, ‘Rohstoffversorgung’, 365. 156 Ibidem, 365.

24 In the context of all these findings, it seems strange that many historians have argued that Rathenau was very much against nationalism.157 This probably has to with a misreading of the source material. It is true that Rathenau mentions his disregard for nationalism many times in Von Kommenden Dingen, yet, when one reads the text carefully, it becomes clear that Rathenau equalizes nationalism with mechanization.158 Rathenau thought that the European hemisphere had been obsessed with nationalism because of the Rassenwechsel. The ‘lesser races’ had taken over the political climate of Europe: ‘Die Niedergeborene hat nur eine Heimat [...].’159 Ironically, Rathenau’s solution to nationalism was…nationalism. His Reich der Seele, his Organokratie - which was to be the embodiment of the German Geist - would bring balance to the European hemisphere and enlighten the ‘lesser races’.160

Rathenau’s latest works made him a well-known and influential neoconservative figure. Von Kommenden Dingen became a huge success and according to historian Ernst Schulin, it was read by almost the whole German nation:

Die Sozialdemokraten und Gewerkschaftler nahmen Stellung, die Vertreter der Kirchen, der Frauenbewegung, der Arbeitgeberverbände, die Freimaurer und Bodenreformer. Es wurde nicht nur in der Heimat gelesen, die Soldaten nahmen es im Tornister mit, in den Gefangenenlagern berichteten Neuankömmlinge von 1917/18 ihren Kameraden davon, Pfarrer in der Schweiz und in Schweden konnte man auf der Kanzel davon sprechen hören.161

Zur Kritik der Zeit en Mechanik des Geistes had become popular throughout Europe as well. Rathenau received fan mail until the end of his life.162 Many scholars have concluded that Rathenau’s work did not have much influence. A critic wrote short after Rathenau’s death: ‘These books, in spite of wide circulation in a period avid for metaphysics, have not exercised the slightest influence.’163 Historian David Felix stated: ‘While the better minds and the cultural establishment smiled over him or ignored him, Rathenau won a wide audience among people who yearned to think and had half the capacity for it.’164

157 Maybe also due to Kessler, see: Kessler, Rathenau 112. ‘Rathenaus schroffe Ablehnung des Nationalismus.’ 158 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 257. ‘Nationalismus und Imperialismus sind Zeittendenzen [...] sie haben als inneres Moment den gegenwärtigen Krieg vorbereitet [...].’ 159 Ibidem, 252. 160 Ibidem, 248-249. 161 Schulin, Rathenau, 75-77. 162 Ibidem, 102 163 Joll, ‘Rathenau’, 60. 164 Felix, Rathenau, 50.

25 But this is not true. His works seems to have inspired his fellow neoconservatives. Both Zur Kritik der Zeit as Von Kommenden Dingen had a great influence on Oswald Spengler (1880- 1936). When Spengler published Der Untergang des Abendlandes, Rathenau was the first important public persona he wrote to. Spengler thanked him for his considerable influence and eagerly requested a review from him.165 Many more neoconservatives were influenced by Rathenau, such as the reactionary modernist Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), as well as the political philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). Schmitt had also read Robert Musil’s Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften exclusively to read the parts about Arnheim, a character based on Rathenau.166 The neoconservative economist Ferdinand Fried (1898-1967) wrote that Rathenau’s work was the basis of his own economic theories on a centrally led state economy.167

Precisely this idea of a centrally coordinated German economy, the Organokratie, was what Rathenau wanted to realize the most. The following chapter shows how Rathenau tried to put his ideas into practice.

165 Tihanov, ‘Robert Musil in the Garden of Conservatism’, 129. 166 Rohkrämer, ‘Antimodernism’, 37; Tihanov, ‘Robert Musil in the Garden of Conservatism’, 122. 167 Rohkrämer, ‘Antimodernism’, 37.

26 Chapter 2 - Rathenau’s Practical Career This second chapter discusses Rathenau’s practical career as an industrialist and a politician. It shows that Rathenau’s practical career was consistent with his intellectual career. To make this analysis more accessible, the chapter consists of two parts. The first part discusses Rathenau’s career during the First World War. It argues that Rathenau did everything to militarize the German society to stimulate the war effort. He saw the War as a chance to transform the economy and to make his Volksstaat a reality. Rathenau wanted Germany to expand towards the East, trying to form his Ostimperium to further ensure German independence. The second part of this chapter argues that Rathenau remained a neoconservative after the War, dreaming of a homogenous society. In fact, Rathenau started to wage an economic war to ensure Germany’s total independence and to realize his Volksstaat.

Chapter 2 Part One - Rathenau’s Career During the First World War On the 13th of August, 1914, Rathenau wrote a letter to the Minister of War, Erich von Falkenhayn (1861-1922). In the letter, he proposed the formation of a Kriegsrohstoffabteilung (KRA): a great effort by leading industrialists and the state to collectively organize the war economy. With this organization, all necessary materials could be gathered to prolong and eventually win the War. Rathenau called the economy the ‘Kriegsgott unserer Tage’ and he would do everything in his power to make good use of it.168 Rathenau was dreaming of a German world power. Waiting was not an option, Germany still had a problem with natural resources. Rathenau saw the KRA as an opportunity to take the necessary materials from captured territories such as Belgium.169 Rathenau made sure to form a special requisition department within the KRA.170 Rathenau knew that, by doing this, he was acting against international law, specifically the Haager Landskriegsordnung, which only allowed the taking of resources from occupied territory for the nourishment of the army.171

168 Kruse. ‘Walther Rathenau und die Organisierung des Kapitalismus’, 151. 169 Ibidem, 153. ‘[...] in der eroberten Gebietsteilen Requisitionen nach dem uns unentbehrliche Rohmaterialen durchzuführen.’ 170 Ibidem, 153-154. 171 Ibidem, 153.

27 During the First World War, Rathenau climbed high up the ladder within the power structure of the A.E.G.: he became the president of the company. Rathenau used his business experience when thinking of efficient ways of structuring the KRA. He decided to form Aktien Gesellschaften (AG). These Aktien Gesellschaften were huge syndicates, each consisting of one specific part of the war economy. The A.E.G. formed one as well, the Kriegs-Metall A.G..172 This Kriegs-Metall A.G. was one big industrial monopoly, consisting of six huge electrical- and metal companies. These syndicates had all the power to set prices, but also to organize the division of resources amongst producers. The Kriegs-Metall A.G. was, for example, under almost no public scrutiny. The central controlling institution, the KRA, consisted of industrial leaders themselves. Because of this the syndicates had nothing to fear.173

The syndicate structure of the KRA resulted in a very extreme influence of big industry in the matters of the state. For the A.E.G. this meant business. It is no coincidence that after the formation of the KRA, the A.E.G. made record profits for almost two and a half years.174 The A.E.G. became the second biggest weapon-manufacturer during the First World War, producing grenades, airplanes, protection materials and guns. Eventually, A.E.G. equipped the U-boats and warships with the latest technological gadgets.175 Rathenau also founded and profited from the Kriegs-Chemikalien AG, formed for the production and gathering of chemicals and gasses. Rathenau’s prime goal was to organize the production of Salpeter, a lucrative business. It was mainly used for gunpowder and explosives, but also for the poisonous gasses on the Western front.176 Rathenau’s confusion of interests within the KRA was noticed. The later Reichsfinanzminister Rudolf Wissell (1869-1962) stated about Rathenau: ‘die deutsche Wirtschaft, in eine riesenhafte, alles aufsagende Aktiengesellschaft, ja, gewissermaßen zu einer großen A.E.G umfunktionieren zu wollen.’177 In the Reichstag in 1914 the later Vice-Chancellor Matthias Erzberger (1875-1921) called Rathenau’s involvement in the KRA ‘prinzipiell für verkehrt, daß jemand staatliche Funktionen ausübe und gleichzeitig in der Industrie tätig sei’, the social-democrat Philipp Scheidemann (1865- 1939) fully agreed.178

172 Kruse, ‘Walther Rathenau und die Organisierung des Kapitalismus’, 154. 173 Kruse, 154; Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry and Labour in Germany (Princeton 1966) 46. 174 Kruse, ‘Walther Rathenau und die Organisierung des Kapitalismus’, 164. 175 Ibidem, 164. 176 Wilderotter, ‘Rohstoffversorgung’, 372; Feldman, Army, Industry and Labour in Germany, 54 -55. 177 Kessler, Rathenau, 275; Kruse, ‘Rathenau Organisierung Kapitalismus’, 165. 178 Kruse, ‘Rathenau Organisierung Kapitalismus’, 163.

28 Rathenau left the KRA early. There has been much discussion in the historiography on the reasons why. It seems very likely, however, that Rathenau stepped down due to these self- enrichment claims.179 This is even more likely because Rathenau never fully retired. His replacement, Major Joseph Koeth (1870-1936), was specifically chosen by Rathenau because he could further develop the interest of big industrial companies.180 Not surprisingly, Rathenau remained in close contact with Koeth. Rathenau, for example, succeeded in blocking an ‘enquiry commission’, sent by the federal government for looking into the relation between the KRA and A.E.G..181

Rathenau had all the reason to prolong his influence. Rathenau saw much opportunity in expanding business towards Belgium. He had advised the Military Governor in Belgium, Moritz von Bissing (1844-1917), to ‘invest’ in the Belgian economy using A.E.G. equipment and resources. Not coincidentally, the A.E.G. had a daughter company in Belgium, which smoothed the process of ‘requisition’, or the plundering of Belgian resources.182 Like all other German industry during the First World War, the A.E.G. also had a severe labor shortage. This may have been the reason why Rathenau requested the deportation of 700.000 Belgians for forced labor to General Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937).183 Rathenau’s other solution for the labor shortage was advising the German government to exploit its own citizens, with the use of the Hilfsdienstgesetz. 184 This law was to be an official obligation for participating in the war effort. Rathenau wrote to the Prussian Minister of War Heinrich Schëuch (1864-1946) and the Vice-Chancellor Matthias Erzberger. He advised them to make sure that two to four million Germans were permanently ready for military means.185 General Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934) agreed approvingly: ‘Wer nicht arbeitet, soll auch nicht essen.’186

179 Kruse, ‘Rathenau Organisierung Kapitalismus’, 154. 180 Ibidem, 155. 181 Ibidem, 164. 182 Ibidem, 164. 183 Brenner, Rathenau, 351. 184 Kruse, ‘Rathenau Organisierung Kapitalismus’, 160. 185 Ibidem, 162. 186 Ibidem, 162.

29 Although Rathenau had benefitted himself, Rathenau’s KRA and his solutions for the labor shortage had everything to do with his plans for restructuring the society and economy into a Volksstaat.187 He thought that his Kriegsgesellschaften and the Hilfsdienstgesetz could serve as models for ending the antagonism and class divisions within Germany.188 The Kriegsgesellschaften could serve as a model for centrally planning the economy and when the War was over, the two to four million Germans who had worked for the Hilfsdienstgesetz could build publics goods to serve ‘die künftigen Wirtschaft.’189

But with the Hilfsdienstgesetz Rathenau willingly brought the war effort to the front door. The front became a Heimatfront. The War became a ‘Total War’, reaching out to all members of society. The entire economy and political system were transformed to primarily serve the interest of the state, not that of the individual.190 This is why the National Socialist Albert Speer (1905-1981) admired Rathenau’s wartime policies. To him Rathenau was ‘einen der geistigen Väter der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaftsorganisation.’191 Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) also spoke very approvingly of Rathenau’s collectivization efforts and ‘Wer nicht arbeitet, soll auch nicht essen’ became one of his favorite and most used slogans.192

Rathenau continued to search for economic benefits during the War. Rathenau started to believe that binding Germany to the massive force of Russia could have huge economic benefits. He called Russia: ‘unser künftiger Absatzgebiet.’193 But before these economic relations could be realized, Rathenau was convinced that Russia first had to be occupied by the German army.194

187 Kessler, Rathenau, 196. 188 Kruse, ‘Rathenau Organisierung Kapitalismus’, 158. 189 Ibidem, 162. 190 Ibidem, 151. 191 Kruse, 162; Michalka, ‘Kriegsrohstoffbewirtschaftung’, 500. 192 Michalka, ‘Kriegsrohstoffbewirtschaftung’, 500; Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (London 1996) 529. ‘Lenin had promised that the fundamental rule of the Soviet order would be “He who does not work, neither shall he eat”.’ 193 Michalka, ‘Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft’, 184. 194 Ibidem, 184. ‘Um das künftige Verhältnis zum Rusland vorzubereiten [...] einen großeren Teil des wirklichen Rusland längere Zeit bezetst [zu] halten.’

30 Rathenau did not foresaw much challenge:

Russia has national passions but no national honor. She has loved all her past conquerors as the Russian peasant woman loves a beating. We must march to St. Petersburg and Moscow and occupy a larger part of Russia for a prolonged period of time. The discipline and restraint of the German soldier, the justice and incorruptibility of the German administration, will become legendary in a short while… The protection of our eastern frontier gives us the military supremacy on the continent.195

This statement shows that Rathenau thought that the German soldier and the German empire were much stronger and nobler than the Russians: he thought they were peasants. Many Germans thought this way of their eastern neighbors. In both German and Russian racial theory there had been much speak of a showdown between ‘Germandom’ and ‘Slavdom’.196 Russia had a population of 180 million people. The relatively young state of Germany only had 67 million. The population difference alone made many Germans fear the East.197

With the capture of Russia, Germany would have military supremacy on the continent. The Ostimperium would give opportunity for colonial expansion, but also opportunity for winning the War.198 In the summer of 1915 the German army made huge gains on the Eastern front.199 Rathenau saw an opportunity and wrote a letter to Chancellor Bethman Hollweg and General Ludendorff on the 30th of august: ‘Rußland braucht eine Finanzmacht(…) Wir können Rußland finanzieren (…) Rußland ist unser künftiges Absatzgebiet.’200 He then travelled with the chairman of A.E.G., Felix Deutsch (1884-1964), to the military headquarters of Oberost in Kowno (currently in Lithuania), where the prime subject of discussion was the tactic towards Russia. In this conversation Rathenau stated to military strategist Max Hoffman that the result of approaching Russia should be ‘destroying the unity of the Entente’.201

195 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19). Translated citation is from: Kollman, Eric C., ‘Walther Rathenau and German Foreign Policy: Thoughts and Actions’, The Journal of Modern History 24(2) (1952) 131. 196 Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy, The Russian Revolution 1891-1924 (London 1996) 248. 197 Ibidem, 248. 198 Michalka, ‘Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft’, 184. 199 Boris Grekow, ‘Walther Rathenau und Rußland zwischen 1914 und 1922’, In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 204. 200 Ibidem, 204. 201 Ibidem, 204.

31 Rathenau’s intentions of approaching Russia were not only tactical, he had his own economic interests in revitalizing the connections. The A.E.G. had a special Russian department, the Russische A.E.G (R.A.E.G.). Between 1902 and 1914 this daughter company was Hoflieferant for the Tsar. The R.A.E.G. had provided electricity for all governmental buildings, and had built up a huge part of the Russian infrastructure.202 The relationship with their daughter company was so strong that their commerce went on after Russia and Germany had officially declared war, using an alternative route over Sweden. With the prolongation of the War, however, this trade route dried up. These natural recourses, and especially oil, were much too important for the German economy.203

But then the Balkan Front broke down, and the Supreme Command and General Ludendorff foresaw an operational crisis.204 The plans for expansion towards Russia failed in light of the revolution in 1917. There was now much fear that the revolution would spread towards Germany. Not only was Germany now threatened by the military might of the Entente, internally Germany became politically volatile as well. The situation became even worse when the United States stepped in on April the 6, 1917, pleading to fight against the ‘German autocrats’. The Supreme Command flirted with an armistice to stem the revolutionary tide, whilst keeping the unity of Kaiserreich and the army intact.205

Germany was now threatened from all sides. The parliament of Bethman Hollweg came under immense pressure. The Reichstag started to discuss a potential armistice without annexations. Also, the old fashioned democratic dreiwahl system would finally be reformed, to counter the pressure of the revolutionaries.206 For the Kaiser, however, this was too much to handle. As soon as Ludendorff threatened him that he would step down, Wilhelm decided to discharge Hollweg from his position as chancellor. The parliament was no more, a power vacuum had originated.207 Before Ludendorff had threatened with his resignation, Rathenau had advised him to make use of the political instability.

202 Grekow, ‘Walther Rathenau und Rußland’, 204. 203 Ibidem, 204. 204 Michael Geyer ‘Insurrectionary Warfare: The German Debate about a Levée en Masse in October 1918’, The Journal of Modern History 73(3) (2001) 466. 205 Geyer, ‘Insurrectionary Warfare’, 473. 206 Wilderotter, ‘Rohstoffversorgung’, 368. 207 Ibidem, 368.

32 Rathenau still wanted to implement his autocratic form of parliamentarism, for the selection of strong leaders, Führungspersönlichkeiten.208 He stated: ‘Wirklich Agenten des Volkes, genauer der Partei, sind die Führer, und ihre Zahl ist um so großer, ihre Begabung um so stärker, je verantwortlichere Aufgaben ihnen der Staatsorganismus zuweist.’209 In Ludendorff, Rathenau saw the man who could realize his dream, a man with ‘an Diktatur streifenden Gewalt und somit auch Verantwortung.’210 Rathenau advised Ludendorff to seize power and to use this dictatorial power to implement this elitist form of parliamentarism. This would avert democratic parliamentarism in the future: ‘damit sie nicht später unter Erschütterungen vor sich gehen’.211 Rathenau wanted to prevent the Volksstaat from becoming a parliamentary democracy, a Massenregierung. Rathenau feared an armistice. Rathenau wanted to fight for the renewal of the German society. He wanted to make peace on German terms, to keep the influence of the ‘materialist’ Entente at a minimum.212

He decided to make full use of the society he himself had militarized. Rathenau had much faith in the power of the German Spirit, in the sacrifices made by the German people. He praised their ‘Spartanengeist.’213 On the brink of the armistice he published an article in der Vossische Zeitung, called Ein Dunkler Tag, calling for an insurrection of the German people: ‘Die nationale Verteidigung, die Erhebung des Volkes muß eingeleitet werden. [Es] darf kein Tag verloren gehen.’214 According to Rathenau, diplomacy would not keep the Entente at bay. General Ludendorff, who had pleaded for the armistice had to be replaced: ‘Wer die Nerven verloren hat, muß ersetzt werden.’215 The Kriegsgesellschaft had to be directed at a new goal: peace according to the rules of Germany. The people had to fight ‘for the behalf of the collective will of the survival of the nation’, for the Volkskraft.216 General Heinrich Schëuch was immediately inspired by Rathenau’s call for mobilization. He mobilized 200.000 recruits and promised half a million extra men in the next half year. Schëuch took the Endkampf very seriously by making steps to mobilize and arm women and minors.217

208 Wilderotter, ‘Rohstoffversorgung’, 369 209 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 323. 210 Wilderotter, ‘Rohstoffversorgung’, 368. 211 Ibidem, 368. 212 Ibidem, 368 -369. 213 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 181. 214 Geyer, ‘Insurrectionary Warfare’, 459. 215 Ibidem, 483. 216 Ibidem, 484. 217 Ibidem, 490-491.

33 But Rathenau’s call for insurrection was in vain. The Supreme Command remained against it. Ludendorff stated that it ‘would destroy more than one can tolerate.’218 Rathenau had come a long way in making his Volksstaat a reality, but now his influence on the Kriegsgesellschaft officially came to an end.

During the First World War, Rathenau was empowered by his cultural pessimism and Prussian nationalism. He had done everything to protect the interest of the German state and the German culture. He saw the First World War as a clash of ideological and economic systems, he cooperated in restructuring the German society in an authoritarian military dictatorship. To Rathenau, this was justified because it would prevent Germany from being influenced by the materialist cultures of both the East and West. After the War, Rathenau would continue to act on his central convictions, albeit by diplomatic, more non-violent means.

218 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19), Quote from: Geyer, ‘Insurrectionary Warfare’, 485.

34 Chapter 2 Part Two – Rathenau’s Post-War Career Rathenau’s post-war career is much more complex to describe, but is essential to the analysis. Rathenau’s practical career remained consistent with his intellectual career. Rathenau remained a cultural pessimist and a Prussian nationalist throughout his career after the war until his death.

The first paragraph offers a broader introduction to the post-war international diplomacy. Rathenau’s post-war career can only be understood in the context of the Paris Peace talks, the Versailles Treaty and the further negotiations that resulted from it. The second paragraph discusses Rathenau’s distrust in the representative democracy of the Weimar Republic. Rathenau much preferred his ideal German Volksstaat, and started to wage an economic war to make it a reality. Together with Chancellor Joseph Wirth, Rathenau constantly obstructed peace negotiations. Rathenau wanted to have an independent German empire at all costs. He wanted to have peace on German terms and to prevent any form of foreign influence. The third paragraph discusses how Rathenau used the Genoa Conference to obstruct the Versailles Treaty. Rathenau continued to press for Germany’s expansion towards the East, planning to approach, exploit and pacify the new Russian Bolshevik regime. The Treaty of Rapallo shows how far Rathenau was willing to go to ensure Germany’s total independence. The fourth paragraph explains how the link between Rathenau’s practical and intellectual career has been overlooked for such a long time. The chapter explains the distortive influence of Harry Graf Kessler’s biography on the historiography. The fifth paragraph discusses the tragic end of Rathenau’s life, his assassination. This paragraph offers some important nuances to the historiography and highlights some important similarities between Rathenau and those who assassinated him. Again, it seems that Kessler is responsible for initially distorting our understanding of this tragic event.

35 2.2.1. The Broader Context The War was over. The resulting peace turned out pretty advantageous for England. Germany had lost its colonies and its fleet to the British. With the channel being safe and under the protection of the United States, the United Kingdom did not have much to fear.219 France ended up in a very different situation. They had suffered the most. It had lost a quarter of all men between eighteen and thirty. Proportionally, France had the most casualties of all combatant countries, losing an amount of 1.3 million people from a population of 40 million. France’s industrial capital was completely demolished. Six thousand square miles of agricultural and industrial land had been shelled and destroyed, with France losing access to important natural resources such as coal, iron ore and steel. Whole areas such as Verdun had turned into dead zones, not even birds could survive there.220 France was not confident that their ‘victory’ had ensured security. Unlike the UK, Germany still remained the big neighbor on the Eastern border, trumping France not only in size but in population as well. The German industrial potential was still huge, because much less of their industrial capital had been destroyed and their infrastructure was pretty much intact.221 Unlike France, Germany still had substantial gold reserves and was not officially bankrupt.222

It seemed clear that the Allied victory had not been decisive enough to really crush the German power. When the German troops arrived back in Berlin, they were saluted by Reichspresident Friedrich Ebert (1871-1925) at the Brandenburger Tor with the words: ‘I salute you, who return unvanquished from the field of battle.’223 It seems that there was not a real sense of loss in Germany’s capital.

Before the War, France had relied on her oldest ally Russia to counter this German power. But Russia had been weakened by the chaotic Russian Revolution. By now, Russia had become a major concern to the Allied countries. During and after the Paris peace talks, it was unclear what was actually going on in Russia.224 Some politicians, such as Winston Churchill, warned for the dangers of the Red Terror and the spread of the revolution.

219 Margaret Macmillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (London 2003) 31-32. 220 Ibidem, 28. 221 Ibidem, 28. 222 Ibidem, 60. 223 Adam Fergusson, When Money Dies: The Nightmare of Deficit Spending, Devaluation, and Hyperinflation in Weimar Germany, (London 2010) 28. 224 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 66.

36 Others, like British prime minister David Lloyd George (1863-1945) and the American President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), thought that eventually the Soviets would settle down and establish a Social Democracy.225 In any case, France could not count on the still ambiguous loyalty of the Bolshevik party.226

Prime Minister David Lloyd George had been hailed as a great savior by the British people. He had replaced the washed-out Herbert Asquith with much success, and led the UK towards victory.227 Lloyd George’s war-time career reflects that of Rathenau. As the Minister of Munitions, Lloyd George had centralized the war effort and had efficiently organized the war industry.228 But he was ill-prepared for the aftermath. Jubilant crowds had carried him through the streets. Now there were high expectations, the miseries of the War would finally pay off into a better future. Strengthened by Wilson’s promises of peace, the British people expected more welfare and social harmony.229 This did not happen. The global economy went into a major slump, and unemployment was disastrously high. The much-hailed Lloyd George became nervous, because he knew he failed the expectations of the British people. He became less and less interested in the curtailing of German power. He wanted to reestablish Germany as an economic power. In this way British exports could be restarted to contribute to solving the unemployment problems.230

The economic situation on the European continent was disastrous. Huge numbers were faced with famine.231 Wilson warned: ‘So long as hunger continued to gnaw, the foundations of government would continue to crumble.’232 The United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand had surpluses in food. But the European countries did not have the money to buy it. France wanted to use the German reparations to reconstruct the industry and infrastructure, they refused to use it for the imports of food.233 Their only option was to turn to the United States for a loan. But the public opinion in the US was very much against it. Also, the United States was not yet the economic superpower it eventually came to be.

225 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 80. 226 Ibidem, 28. 227 Ibidem, 38. 228 Michalka, ‘Kriegsrohstoffbewirtschaftung’, 500. 229 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 38. 230 Sally Marks, ‘Reparations in 1922’, In: Fink, Carole e.a. ed., Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge 1991) 70. 231 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 60. 232 Ibidem, 60. 233 Ibidem, 60.

37 The only thing the United States could do was to pressure the European government to balance their budgets and attract investors and loans by the resulting lowered risk on government default.234

Meanwhile, the Germans further strengthened their bargaining position by making smart use of President Wilson’s fourteen points. During the War, Woodrow Wilson had promised a peaceful resolution. He had published his fourteen points: fourteen base principles that would set the course for a world of nations living in harmony. All over the world Wilson’s promises were celebrated, in the Arab Revolt, by Polish nationalists, in Korea. When Wilson arrived in Paris huge crowds awaited him shouting: ‘Vive l’Amerique! Vive Wilson!’235 Wilson appreciated the attention he received. But meanwhile he acknowledged in private that the post-war problems were very complicated to solve. His Media Chief George Creel (1876- 1953) was responsible for the huge success of Wilson’s fourteen points. But on board of the presidential ship, the George Washington, Wilson acknowledged to Creel: ‘I am wondering whether you have not unconsciously spun a net for me from which there is no escape.’236 With the armistice, Germany had preferred a Wilsonian mercy, pleading for an armistice based on his fourteen points. In a series of public letters, Wilson endorsed this form of an armistice.237 This caused a lot of irritation within the European powers. The fourteen points were notoriously vague and open. The French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929) ranted about Wilson: ‘God himself was content with ten commandments. Wilson modestly inflicted fourteen points on us… the fourteen commandments of most empty theory!’238

This ‘emptiness’ in the armistice would give Germany too much room to influence the negotiations. The United States acknowledged they unwisely left the door open too much and revised some of the fourteen points in the armistice with Germany. But the harm had already been done. The Germans could now state that they had agreed with the fourteen points and that any revisions made in the Paris peace talks were illegitimate.239

234 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 60-61. 235 Ibidem, 14. 236 Ibidem, 15. 237 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 19; Dorrmann, ‘Von Kommenden Dingen, Revolution und Republik’, 404. 238 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 33. 239 Ibidem, 19-20.

38 The Germans would indeed use this argument to great effect. During the Paris peace talks a huge and dissatisfied crowd gathered in Berlin, carrying the sign ‘Nur die 14 Punkte.’240 The Germans were excluded from the Paris peace talks. But to show good will, the German Foreign Office prided itself with the new democratic Weimar Republic, proclaimed by the social-democrat Phillipp Scheidemann.241 The Germans slowly realized that this would not be sufficient to France. When the German ambassador Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau (1869- 1928) heard that France would claim control over the Saar region, and would plead for a free city of Danzig, he exclaimed: ‘Under no circumstances would I sign this treaty.’ Then he started threatening with Russian Bolshevism: ‘If the Entente insisted on these conditions, in my opinion Bolshevism would be unavoidable in Germany.’242 As soon as the German diplomats realized that the peace terms would be much harsher, they started to threaten. They presented Germany as the only protection against the Bolshevist threat in Russia. This would be a valuable instrument for Germany for undermining the peace treaty.243 Rathenau would come to use this tactic to great effect.

Germany had to sign the peace treaty. Germany did not have the strength to pick up arms again. For Vice-Chancellor Matthias Erzberger it was clear that refusing to sign would bring a disastrous chaos to Germany. This would strengthen the German revolutionaries, and Germany would risk further annexations by both France and Poland.244 France made the signing of the Versailles treaty as public and as humiliating as it could be. They chose the Mirror Room, where Germany had proclaimed its Empire in 1871. By signing, Germany lost thirteen percent of its territory and thirteen percent of its population. Germany had to disarm. They could not join the League of Nations. They had to pay restoration payments of 132 billion gold marks. They lost the Saar Basin, Poland and parts of Prussia and Silesia.245 German diplomats were disgusted and disappointed in the promises of Wilson. One diplomat exclaimed: ‘This shameful treaty had broken me, for I had believed in Wilson until today.’246 The banker Max Warburg called it: ‘the worst act of world piracy ever perpetrated under the flag of hypocrisy.’247 The German nationalists blamed Erzberger and those who had signed for betraying the country. The ‘stab in the back legend’ was born.

240 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 289. 241 Ibidem, 462. 242 Ibidem, 462. 243 Ibidem, 462. 244 Ibidem, 472. 245 Ibidem, 463. 246 Ibidem, 465. 247 Ibidem, 465.

39 Was the treaty really that bad? For the public it really seemed to be the case. On closer inspection, Germany did have a lot of leverage. As described before, Germany’s industry and infrastructure had survived the War relatively well. Germany still had its gold reserves. Britain was interested in doing business. Russia had a completely new government which was open for negotiations. In reality, the payments of 132 billion gold marks was much lower. With a complex scheme of bonds and clauses arranged mostly by Britain, Germany had to pay only half of it. Historians have discovered that Germany only paid around 22 billion marks in the period between 1918 and 1932.248 Whilst the German government said that they were paying too much, this was not the case. It turns out that Chancellor Joseph Wirth and his fellow minister Walther Rathenau made an important contribution in obstructing and revising the Versailles Treaty.

2.2.2. Rathenau and Wirth’s Wirtschaftskrieg Rathenau had remained an industrialist during the War. But with the KRA he developed an interest in governance and a reputation as someone with knowledge of public affairs. His published books, and especially die Neue Wirtschaft, were greatly discussed in the Reichstag.249 But he did have somewhat of a bad reputation. He narrowly avoided a war crime indictment by the Allied. He was hated by the Left due to his militaristic adventures in the War and by the Right due to his ‘German socialism’. He was not allowed to participate in the Paris peace talks due to his controversial call for mass mobilization and his responsibility for the deportations of Belgians.250 When a telegram was read out in the Reichstag, nominating him for Reichspresident, the parliamentarians busted out in laughter.251 Rathenau was furious and uttered his contempt for parliament:

The parliament of any other civilized state would have shown sufficient respect for a man of recognized intellectual standing to have passed over in silence this act of bad taste. But the first Parliament of the German Republic, assembled in the darkest and most solemn hour and destined to set the seal on Germany’s ignominy, greeted it with shouts and laughter.252

248 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 480. 249 Felix, Rathenau, 58. 250 Dorrmann, ‘Von Kommenden Dingen’, 404. 251 Felix, Rathenau, 57. 252 Original German quote could not be found, Translation from: Joll, ‘Rathenau’, 49.

40 This quote shows that Rathenau did not have much sympathy for this ‘liberale Demokratie westlichen Typs.’253 He thought the experiment with parliamentary democracy would not last long. He thought parliaments would divide the Volksgemeinschaft in different fractions and that this would lead to bureaucratic and inefficient ‘commissions’.254 This form of government would be ‘labile’ and would result in a ‘Negerrepublik.’255 Instead, the parliament should reflect the ‘will for unity’ (Wille zur Einheit). The power of the state had to come from the Gemeinschaft: ‘Sein Erbteil ist ihm gegeben in der Kraft seines Bodens, seiner Lage und seines Volkes.’256 Rathenau saw some potential in political parties, but it seems he did not take them very seriously. He called German politicians of his time ‘Bierbankphilistern und Mitlaufern.’257 He thought their characters were ‘unrecognizable’, he ‘could not distinguish Scheidemann from Naumann from Kühlmann’.258

So Rathenau remained a proponent for an independent elitist group of leaders, outside of the party system, which would direct the transformation to a ‘soulful’ German autarkical economy.259 He dreamed of a special messianic role for the German people and its strong leaders. The making of the Reich der Seele was ‘eine Aufgabe des Geistes [...] so selbstverleugnend, daß sie nur von uns Deutschen gelöst werden kann.’260 Rathenau idealized the unity of the German society in 1914, and wanted to use this as an example for the future. ‘Der Krieg hat in seinem Beginn gezeigt, daß ein höheres Leben möglich ist.’261 He was a member of the Deutschen Gesellschaft 1914. This club, consisting of four hundred members, idealized the ‘unity’ of 1914. ‘Der Geist von 1914 wollen wir erhalten!’ their chairman Wilhelm Solf had exclaimed under much applause.262 Rathenau would do everything in his power to protect this German spirit of unity in the coming years.

253 Dorrmann, ‘Von Kommenden Dingen’, 390. 254 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 337-339. 255 Ibidem, 241. 256 Ibidem, 335. 257 Ibidem, 340. 258 Dorrmann, ‘Von Kommenden Dingen’, 390. 259 Ibidem, 390. 260 Ibidem, 390. 261 Rathenau, Von Kommenden Dingen, 341. 262 Bernd Sösemann, ‘Jenseits von Partei und Parlament, Walther Rathenaus >>aufbauende Ideenpolitik<< in der Deutschen Gesellschaft 1914, In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Walther Rathenau 1867-1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 171; Michalka, ‘Kriegsrohstoffbewirtschaftung’, 496.

41 Because of the pressure of socialist revolutions from the Left and the pressure of the extreme and militaristic Right in the form of the Kapp-Putsch, the German voter craved for something more moderate. The centrist Constantin Fehrenbach (1852-1926) was voted into office. Under his chancellorship, Germany sought to counter the pressure of the socialists and the Right. Suddenly Rathenau seemed a rather attractive person for public service. He had been pleading for socialization and collectivization for years, albeit in a more watered down and bourgeois German version.263

Rathenau’s theories had become relevant again. Soon, Rathenau was invited to take a seat in Fehrenbach’s Second Socialization Commission and had another opportunity to put his theories into practice.264 Immediately Rathenau made ideas for the collectivization of the coal industry, called the Rathenau Proposal. This proposal failed however, because his great competitor Hugo Stinnes (1870-1924) and his National Economic Council did everything in their power to block it. Stinnes did not agree with Rathenau’s supposed socialism. This was not to be the last time Stinnes and Rathenau crossed swords. Stinnes and Rathenau both represented some of the most powerful industrial companies. Stinnes represented the steel sector and hoped for a renewed German military and political domination. Rathenau represented the electro-technical industry and believed in the more diplomatic but not less offensive force of ‘economic penetration’.265

Harry Graf Kessler’s early biography presented Rathenau and Stinnes as arch-enemies.266 In reality, their relationship was much more nuanced. Rathenau and Stinnes spoke often, they even had a long and intimate talk the day before Rathenau was assassinated. They were both nationalists and they had much mutual respect and admiration for each other. It seems likely that they coordinated a sort of ‘good cop, bad cop’ tactic when it came to politics and negotiations.267

263 Felix, Rathenau, 58. 264 Kessler, Rathenau, 291. 265 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 124. 266 See Kessler, Rathenau, 298; 295-296; 293. In these pages, Kessler represents Stinnes as someone who is mainly interested in sabotaging and slandering Rathenau. 267 Dorrmann, ‘Von Kommenden Dingen’, 411-412. An example of the ‘good cop, bad cop’ tactic: Hugo Stinnes often joined Rathenau in international conferences. During the Spa Conference, Stinnes had rabidly denounced the Allied ultimatum which asked two million tons of coal a month from Germany. Millerand was actually quite impressed with Stinnes desperation and was open to some revision of the coal ultimatum. Rathenau and Wirth could then step in to apply a ‘softer’ approach to the negotiation, see: Felix, Rathenau: 64-66.

42 Rathenau met the Minister of Finance, Joseph Wirth (1879-1956), at the Socialization Committee. Wirth was immediately impressed by Rathenau’s vitality and knowledge. Unimpressed by the quibbling Fehrenbach cabinet, he started to call on Rathenau for advice. It was the beginning of a special friendship of political and personal nature.268 The friendship with Wirth launched Rathenau’s career in international diplomacy. Wirth took Rathenau to the Spa Conference of 1918, where Germany and France negotiated restoration payments. At the conference, Rathenau did not have any influence on decision making, but he did learn about the details of the restoration policies.269 The Spa Conference ended without any results, however. The Fehrenbach cabinet had to resign. Germany needed a new government as soon as possible and Wirth was the most logical candidate for the chancellorship, he had the most experience with the restoration politics.270 And indeed it was Wirth who became the new chancellor.

When Wirth became chancellor, Rathenau was suddenly very close to the center of power. Now he had even more opportunities for putting his ideas into practice. Rathenau still wanted Germany to be strong and independent. Like during the First World War, Rathenau thought that expanding towards Russia was the best option. He and Felix Deutsch wrote a letter to the new Chancellor Wirth to set up a ‘study commission’ for ‘restoring the economic relations with Soviet-Russia’.271 Rathenau stated: ‘an organization must be created in Russia which may purchase and export all available wealth […] Everything which Russia can no longer afford comes out.’272 Chancellor Wirth agreed and wanted ‘the unrestricted right to export.’273 With Wirth’s approval, Rathenau took further steps, setting up a second Ostsyndikat. Under his initiative a group of twenty-six German industrialist formed an ‘international consortium’ for the reconstruction of Russia, with the cooperation of English, American and French investors.274 Almost all of Germany’s powerful industrialists took part: Felix Deutsch, representatives of Krupp and Siemens and also Hugo Stinnes. These men knew each other well, many had worked together during the Moroccan Crisis under the wing of the ADV and many were members of the Deutschen Gesellschaft 1914.275

268 Kessler, Rathenau, 292. 269 Felix, Rathenau, 60. 270 Ibidem, 64-66. 271 Grekow, ‘Walther Rathenau und Rußland’, 207. 272 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19). The translation is quoted from: Robert Himmer, ‘Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo’, Central European History 9(2) (1976) 171. 273 Himmer, ‘Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo’, 171. 274 Ibidem, 155; 173. 275 Sösemann, ‘Jenseits von Partei und Parlement’, 172; Wilderotter,‘Rathenau im Umkreis der ‘Weltpolitik’, 354.

43 Together they awaited the collapse of the unstable Bolshevik regime. Inevitably, the country would open up with enormous profitable investment possibilities as a result.276 The künftiges Absatzgebiet was theirs for the taking. Rathenau had tried to pacify Russia while appeasing the Entente with enormous profits and the repayment of the restorations. With this ‘three cornered struggle’, Rathenau and his consortium tried to discourage an Allied-Soviet rapprochement. Russia could be colonized in an economic way while the Entente powers turned a blind eye.277 The end goal was clear: the downfall of the Soviet system. Rathenau stated: ‘Let private trading corporation go [into Russia] individually. When we have sufficient number of contracts, the Soviet system will fall.’278 The downfall of the Soviet system would mean a stronger and more independent Germany, a Germany that could defend itself from Western ‘materialist’ culture.

Like Brockdorf-Rantzau had done before him, Rathenau made smart use of the fear of the Marxist revolutions in the Western hemisphere. Whilst approaching the Western powers, he scared them at the same time. He threatened with the inevitability of an independent Germany as a protectorate against the Bolshevik threat. Waging an economic war against Germany would eventually result in waging a war against themselves: ‘If vindictiveness prevails, then one of the formerly strongest props in the European structure will be destroyed, then the boundary of Asia will move to the Rhine […] then a horde of desperados will be encamped before the doors of Western civilization; a non-European spirit of economy will threaten the secure nations, not with arms, but with infection.’279 This passage shows that Rathenau still used language in line with his cultural pessimist and racial theories, talking about Russian ‘hordes’ and treating their presence as an ‘infection’, as a threat to ‘Western civilization’ and the ‘European spirit’.

Rathenau’s experience in the Reparation Committee, and his success with the Ostsyndikat made him an excellent candidate for the Ministry of Reconstruction. With reluctance, Rathenau excepted the prime responsibility for the restoration politics, he became the Minister of Reconstruction in the Wirth cabinet.280

276 Robert Himmer, ‘Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo’, 155. 277 Ibidem, 181. 278 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19). Quote from: Himmer, ‘Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo’, 169. 279 Quote from: Eric C. Kollman, ‘Walther Rathenau and German Foreign Policy: Thoughts and Actions’, The Journal of Modern History 24(2) (1952) 136. 280 Peter Krüger, ‘Rathenau als Außenpolitiker’, In: Wilderotter, Hans ed., Walther Rathenau 1867-1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 191.

44 As the Minister of Reconstruction, Rathenau immediately started negotiations with the French. The government of Aristide Briand (1862-1932) tried to keep the door open. Rathenau met the Foreign Minister Louis Loucher (1872-1931), who had acknowledged that there was a limit to what the Germans could pay.281 Although Germany had survived the War with much of their industrial capital and gold reserves intact, the restoration payments were indeed quite severe. Germany’s restoration payments amounted to 10% of their whole economy. They had a deficit of six billion marks.282 To start up the economy and to attract investors, the German government had to balance the budget. But according to economists like John Maynard Keynes, this was impossible to do with the current reparations program.283 The Wiesbaden agreement made by Loucheur and Rathenau tried to open up the reparations impasse, but did not change much.284

The Briand government and Loucheur were put under pressure by the French Reparation Commission led by Raymond Poincaré (1860-1934). Poincaré did not trust Rathenau and Wirth’s intentions. He stated: ‘Behind her camouflage of misery, Germany is basically occupied in reestablishing herself.’285 Only a week later, Poincaré saw his fears turn into reality. In public Rathenau acted as if France was accepting German exports of goods instead of hard currency. This was not what France had promised, they still needed hard currency the most. Rathenau lied, but by doing this he tried to put pressure on the Briand government.286 Making use of the French confusion, Rathenau wrote to the British Ambassador Lord D’Abernon (1857-1941). Rathenau urged the British to start importing German goods and to sell them to Russia. Then Britain could return the currency to Germany. Rathenau used the Wiesbaden agreement as a way of dividing the Allied powers.287 He called this strategy an ‘offensive of fulfilment’.288

281 Felix, Rathenau, 75. 282 Ibidem, 26-29. 283 Macmillan, Paris 1919, 182. 284 Felix, Rathenau, 75. 285 Ibidem, 71. 286 Ibidem, 85. 287 Ibidem, 87. 288 Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War, The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations 1918-1932 (Oxford 1989) 151.

45 While the Wirth government was avoiding payments to France, it was printing money rapidly which resulted in an exponentially rising inflation.289 At the same time Rathenau publicly denied that this printing of money caused inflation. He blamed the inflation on the distorted trade balance caused by reparations.290 But this was not an honest representation of their policies. The Rathenau-Wirth Government lived far beyond its means, printing money to fund labor schemes that led to an over-employment instead of underemployment, the subsidies of heavy industry, the rising imports and manufacturing of luxury problems and their total incapability to collect the needed taxes.291 Rathenau and Wirth blamed their incapability to make the necessary reform on the Allied powers. The contemporary economist Adam Fergusson has called their policies ‘four years of financial cowardice, wrong-headedness and mismanagement.’292

Meanwhile, Rathenau had become very influential. In Wirth’s cabinet meetings, Rathenau was the one who spoke the most, much to the annoyance of foreign minister Friedrich Rosen (1856-1935).293 Rosen thought that Rathenau was ‘not to be taken seriously.’294 The public opinion in Germany put Wirth and Rathenau under much pressure. To pay for the restoration payments the government either had to raise taxes or confiscate property. These were the economic measures Rathenau had often discussed in his books. When put to practice however, Rathenau was very much against it. He stated: ‘The present economic situation does not permit experiments.’295 The Minister of Finance Robert Schmidt (1864-1943) thought otherwise. He presented an ambitious plan to raise the necessary hard currency needed for the restoration payments. He pleaded for a compulsory mortgage on twenty percent of the value of Germany property, to sell them as mortgages notes on the foreign markets.296 This would provide the German government the much-needed cash for the reparations. This was called the Schmidt plan.297 But the plan was dead on arrival. Wirth instructed a committee led by Rathenau to ‘destroy’ the plan, because it would create ‘class conflict’.298

289 Felix, Rathenau, 77. 290 Fergusson, When Money Dies, 76. 291 Ibidem, 76. 292 Ibidem, 248. 293 Peter Krüger, ‘Rathenau als Außenpolitiker’, In: Wilderotter, Hans ed., Walther Rathenau 1867-1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 192; Felix, Rathenau, 65-66. 294 Felix, Rathenau, 65. 295 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19), Quote from: Felix, Rathenau, 92. 296 Felix, Rathenau, 92-03. 297 Ibidem, 92-03. 298 Ibidem, 92-03.

46 It is clear that Rathenau and Wirth preferred experimenting with the French rather than experimenting with their own citizens. As such, the German government kept running huge deficits, with a rising inflation. It turns out that Rathenau was much less progressive and cooperative than the public image he himself had cultivated. The risk of a government default was now too high to receive any loan, resulting in unpayable interest rates. Rathenau and Wirth were in a financially impossible situation whilst the Reparation Commission was already pushing for the next payment.299 Because they had given up on raising any hard currency, Wirth and Rathenau had to use more and more demagoguery to make sure the public opinion was on their side. Wirth and Rathenau started to put maximum pressure on the Allied powers in the Reichstag. Wirth exclaimed: ‘As if we were only fulfillment people! […] The government kept its mouth shut but acted patriotically!’300 Rathenau stated: ‘Patriotism glowed in the heart of this Jew!’301

Joseph Wirth put German patriotism further to the test in defending Upper Silesia. The Reparations Committee insisted that the German government would leave this region to the Allied powers. Wirth refused, and, in secret, with the approval of President Ebert, he approached the Freikorps of Captain Hermann Ehrhardt (1881-1971), better known as Organisation Consul.302 This illegal military squad had been responsible for the Kapp Putsch. This did not stop Wirth from approaching General Hans von Seeckt (1866-1936), who had close relations with Ehrhardt. Seeckt and Ehrhardt were responsible for organizing the military effort of the Freikorps in Upper Silesia and military operations in Poland.303 The Wirth government pretended to demilitarize, while militarizing their lost territories in secret. It is unclear if Rathenau was involved, but taken into account that Rathenau was very close to Wirth it appears to be likely. Rathenau also knew Hans von Seeckt from the Reichswehr quite well.304 Wirth’s policies came at a great cost. By activating and legitimizing the Freikorps, they unleashed a militaristic extreme-right organization that kept undermining the young German republic. Especially for Rathenau the backlash would be fatal. Members of the same Organisation Consul would assassinate him in 1922.

299 Felix, Rathenau, 94-96. 300 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19), Quotes from Felix, Rathenau, 101. 301 Felix, Rathenau, 101. 302 T. Hunt Tooley, National identity and Weimar Germany: Upper Silesia and the eastern border, 1918-1922 (Lincoln, London 1997) 230. 303 Ibidem, 230. 304 Volkov, Rathenau, 149.

47 Even worse, using the Freikorps had been unnecessary and ineffective. Inevitably, Germany lost Upper Silesia and Prussia to Poland, under pressure of the League of Nations.305 The League of Nations was an Allied led institution, in favor of Poland and France. Germany’s effort to maintain Silesia had been totally futile, and the use of the Freikorps did not do much to strengthen sympathy from the Allied powers. Germany now lost much more of their reserves, specifically eighteen percent of their coal reserves, twenty-eight percent of iron ore, seventy percent of zinc.306 The Wirth government pretended to be surprised and scandalized. Rathenau was furious and wanted the government to resign immediately, otherwise it would lose moral credit.307 The Wirth government did resign, with patriotic fervor. But Wirth was not done, four days later he reinstated the government. By now Wirth and Rathenau embodied the German fulfillment policies. Especially Rathenau had become ‘indispensable’. Significantly, in the new cabinet, the critical Friedrich Rosen was dropped, because he would not cooperate with Rathenau and Wirth’s policies.308 Not surprisingly, Rathenau became the new foreign minister. When Germany lost Silesia, Wirth and Rathenau wanted to reduce further restoration payments at all cost. The Wirtschaftskrieg had reached a new stage. Wirth and Rathenau wanted to make the best use of the upcoming Genoa Conference.

2.2.3. The Genoa Conference and the Rapallo Treaty The French knew that Germany could pay off some of the restoration payments, but they had their strong doubts on Germany’s willingness to do so.309 Germany was not the only country that had to pay off debts. The United Kingdom, under the leadership of Lloyd George, had borrowed astronomical amounts of money from the United States, and France had followed suit.310 So now the Allied countries had to ask the new American President Warren G. Harding (1865-1923) and his Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) for debt cancellations. This was out of the question for the Americans. Harding and Hoover wanted the Allied countries to decrease expenditure, especially when it came to the huge investments in armaments which these countries still made. They also advised the Allied countries to further decrease the reparation sums that Germany had to pay.311

305 Felix, Rathenau, 103. 306 Ibidem, 103. 307 Ibidem, 103. 308 Ibidem, 136. 309 Marks, ‘Reparations in 1922’, 69. 310 Ibidem, 69. 311 Stephen A. Schuker, ‘American Policy Toward Debts and Reconstruction at Genoa, 1922’, In: Fink, Carole e.a. ed., Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge 1991) 95.

48 Doing otherwise would have disastrous consequences, as Hoover stated: ‘the mass of armaments must come down in steps or they will come down in a second world crash.’312 For France however, decreasing reparations was out of the question. France had a stale- and old-fashioned economy that was much smaller in scale than that of Germany. The Briand government had failed to reorganize the industry and a strong anti-German public opinion made it nearly impossible to raise the necessary taxes. The French decided to wait it out and depend on the restoration payments of Germany.313 Disarmament was out of the question as well. The new Poincaré government knew of Wirth’s Freikorps adventures in Upper Silesia.314

The Allied were further weakened by the loss of their properties in Russia. Rathenau’s A.E.G. was not the only organization that had benefitted from trade with Tsarist Russia. After the 1917 Revolutions, the Bolshevik government had not recognized the property rights of all Western companies. Many former Russian properties were now Polish. The main point of interest to everyone involved was oil: ‘The oil problem was the very essence for understanding Western-Russian relations.’315 All countries concerned were afraid that the Bolsheviks would ‘nationalize’ the oil fields, meaning that they would lose all property rights. This race for Russia’s natural resources complicated matters further.

France had lost the oil fields in Georgia.316 The French government, now under the leadership of Poincaré, picked up rumors of Soviet contacts with German industrialists and bankers. France feared this potential German-Soviet rapprochement, because it would make Germany’s already strong economic position even stronger.317 France’s allies however, were much less concerned with Germany. The Dutch government was not interested in an anti- German alliance. They had made an agreement with the Russians by themselves, under the leadership of Henri Deterding of Dutch Royal Shell.318 Meanwhile the Russians kept making separate treaties, such as done with the Dutch. In this way, Lenin could divide the capitalist countries and thereby strengthen the socialist cause.319

312 Schuker, ‘American Policy Toward Debts and Reconstruction at Genoa’, 95. 313 Marks, ‘Reparations in 1922’, 70. 314 Felix, Rathenau, 71. 315 A.A. Fursenko, ‘The Oil Problem’, In: Fink, Carole e.a. ed., Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge 1991) 150. 316 Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Anne ‘French Plans for the Reconstruction of Russia: A History and Evaluation’, In: Fink, Carole e.a. ed., Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge 1991) 140. 317 Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, ‘French Plans for the Reconstruction of Russia’, 134. 318 Fursenko, ‘The Oil Problem’, 151. 319 Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, ‘French Plans for the Reconstruction of Russia’, 140.

49 By the time Lloyd George announced the Genoa Conference the Poincaré government had lost all hope that it would be beneficial to French interests. Clearly, the initiative of Lloyd George was revisionist. He wanted to open up the Versailles Treaty and start up trade with Russia and Germany to solve Britain’s unemployment problems.320 The French absolutely refused this, and this triggered a radical French-led opposition against any revisions of the Versailles Treaty in Genoa. France’s only option was taking an offensive position, threatening with the Ruhr-occupation if Germany would not meet the demands. Lloyd George had visited Poincaré, pressuring him to loosen up. This did not work. ‘Poincaré is a fool!’ Lloyd George supposedly shouted in frustration.321 By now it was clear that the Genoa Conference was doomed to fail.322

To counter a possible German-Russian rapprochement the Allied governments reacted with the London Memorandum, giving the Soviets the opportunity to join the Versailles reparations program.323 This took away the negotiation strength Rathenau’s consortium had.324 But Rathenau was not to be stopped. He kept dreaming of recapturing the Reich’s prime position on the world market.325 As Rathenau said: ‘we shall do better to advance our interests aggressively and tenaciously […] Germany must build up its strength at home and then wait to strike at the right moment.’326 Wirth and Rathenau had become ‘spokesmen of open defiance.’327

To steer Russia away from the Entente, Rathenau decided to approach the Russians in secret, accompanied by Felix Deutsch, Otto Wiedfeldt (member of the board of Krupp) and Hugo Stinnes. They met with Karl Radek (1885-1939), secretary of the Comintern and head of German affairs of the Bolshevik government.328 Under the supervision of Rathenau the head of the eastern department of Germany, Ago von Maltzan (1877-1927), started to draft a treaty with Radek, which was to become the Treaty of Rapallo.329

320 Carole Fink, ‘Beyond Revisionism: The Genoa Conference of 1922’. In: Fink, Carole e.a. ed., Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge 1991) 18. 321 Andrew Williams, ‘The Genoa Conference of 1922: Lloyd George and the Politics of Recognition’, In: Fink, Carole e.a. ed., Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge 1991) 39. 322 Fink, ‘Beyond Revisionism’, 27. 323 Kessler, Rathenau, 334. 324 Krüger, ‘Rathenau als Außenpolitiker’, 196. 325 Manfred Berg, ‘Germany and the United States: The Concept of World Economic Interdependence’, In: Fink, Carole e.a. ed., Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge 1991) 78. 326 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19). Translation quoted from: Felix, Rathenau, 145. 327 Felix, Rathenau, 133. 328 Ibidem, 137. 329 Ibidem, 136-137.

50 It is a very common myth that not Rathenau, but Von Maltzan had initiated the talks with the Russians. But it was actually Rathenau who took the very first initiative for Rapallo.330 While doing this he knew that the possible treaty would be political dynamite. But the end goal was clear, die ‘Sprengung der Entente.’331 The French-British alliance would be severely weakened. Rapallo was meant to be a Überraschungscoup, staggering the Entente, meaning a return of German power.332 The German industrialists would have the first initiative in accessing the oil fields and would achieve their goal of being the first to start up trade with Russia. Rathenau’s A.E.G. would profit immensely and could pick up trade with the R.A.E.G.. Wirth and Rathenau also approached Russia due to their interest in the newly created Polish corridor. Germany had lots of interests in the area, especially in coal and grain in former areas of Prussia.333 Both Wirth and Rathenau had a strong anti-Polish sentiment, and for them a German-Russian rapprochement was a possibility for a redivision of Poland.334

At the start of the Genoa Conference, the Italian Foreign Minister Francesco Giannini tipped the German delegation that a Russian-English agreement was close at hand.335 Giannini’s rapport was notoriously vague. But for the German Foreign Office the moment to strike had come. In the middle of the night, Walther Rathenau signed the Rapallo Treaty with the Russians, in what jokingly came to be called the ‘pyjama party’.336

Several prominent historians state that Rathenau was put under pressure by Von Maltzan and Wirth.337 It is true that Rathenau panicked, and briefly had the idea to contact Lloyd George.338 Rathenau had hesitated, and Wirth had threatened to sign it himself.339 But it is very likely that Wirth and Von Maltzan were just incredibly annoyed by Rathenau’s behavior. Suddenly, at the very last moment, he showed anxiety and doubt. Until this very moment Rathenau must have been ready to sign. He had worked on this Treaty since 1919. After all, he had met with Karl Radek and he had instructed Von Maltzan to approach the Russians.

330 Grekow, ‘Walther Rathenau und Rußland’ 204; Pogge von Strandmann ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 135. 331 Grekow, ‘Walther Rathenau und Rußland’ 200. 332 Ibidem, 200. 333 Kent, The Spoils of War, 212; 290. 334 Krüger, ‘Rathenau als Außenpolitiker’, 196. 335 Felix, Rathenau, 141. 336 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 143. 337 Schulin, Rathenau, 128; Gall, Rathenau, 239; Krüger, ‘Rathenau als Außenpolitiker’, 198. 338 Schulin, Rathenau, 128. 339 Peter Krüger, ‘A Rainy Day, April 16, 1922: The Rapallo Treaty and the Cloudy Perspective for German Foreign Policy’, In: Fink, Carole e.a. ed., Genoa, Rapallo and European Reconstruction in 1922 (Cambridge 1991) 56.

51 Further proof for Rathenau’s responsibility is that several advisers had advised him against signing the Treaty. Bauer and Hermes of the German Reparations Commission and the diplomat Carl von Schubter had stated that ‘it would wreck relations with Britain and France.’340 Also, the night before, Rathenau had read a letter from the diplomat Gerhard von Mutius, informing that Rapallo would lead to an occupation of the Ruhr.341

The most convincing argument for Rathenau’s responsibility is that he knew that the Allied where still open for negotiations. Von Maltzan had received last-minute information that the talks between England and Russia had stopped. Many historians argue that Rathenau had not been aware of this information.342 But that seems very unlikely as well. It was publicly known that the negotiations between Russia and England had failed. The day before the signing, the press had already reported that ‘the Russian delegation required a few days more in which to examine the Allied proposals.’343 Even Rathenau himself had stated that ‘resumption of negotiations between Russia and the Entente could be expected.’344 This proves that Rathenau knew the talks had not been conclusive, and that he knew that the Anglo-Russian negotiations at the villa of Lord D’Abernon had failed. The German Foreign Office knew that the Allied powers were still open for negotiation. Rathenau had even been invited by Lloyd George to negotiate.345

Knowing all this information, Rathenau continued to sign the Treaty. The Foreign Office justified his decision to the outside world with the Giannini report. The Treaty was framed as a ‘preventive’ move.346 But to the Allied powers is was clear what Rathenau, Von Maltzan and Wirth had done. The British diplomat Lord Curzon concluded: ‘It was rightly regarded by them as a gesture of defiance, as a gratuitous insult directed by Germany against the Powers, with whom she should have been in collaboration.’347

340 Felix, Rathenau, 152-152; Peter Krüger ‘A Rainy Day, April 16, 1922’, 60. 341 Krüger, ‘A Rainy Day, April 16, 1922’, 58. 342 Ibidem, 55. 343 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 136. 344 Ibidem, 137. 345 Volkov, Rathenau, 204. 346 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 143. 347 Ibidem, 142.

52 It seems that the Treaty of Rapallo was indeed an act of defiance. Rathenau and Wirth had never believed in an international consortium with the Allied. Rathenau had stated: ‘a recognition of the Soviet government by France and Britain would not be especially comfortable to us.’348 Rathenau and Wirth were primarily interested in protecting the German industry and the German interests, with the aim of regaining Germany’s former influence in world politics.349 So Rathenau signed. And if he did feel any grief, he did not show it. When Rathenau and Lloyd George met each other the next day, Rathenau acted towards the British Prime Minister as if he didn’t understand ‘what the fuss was all about’.350

Rathenau stated: ‘We have concluded our peace, not with a system, but with a people, and we have concluded it with the men who at this moment represent this people.’351 This shows that he was still hoping for the destabilization of Russia, implying that the Bolshevist reign would only be temporary. The Bolshevist politician Leonid Krasin felt Rathenau’s disregard: ‘The ruling circles of Germany continue to regard Russia…as an object for capitalist exploitation, as a colony, as a country of muzhiks.’352 The Treaty of Rapallo was not a shining example of ‘international tolerance’ but a result of the deeply problematic and unstable ‘three cornered struggle’. The Treaty showed that expansion to the east, the protection of the German Kultur and the destruction of the Bolshevist regime remained the prime goals for Rathenau and the most powerful German industrialists after the First World War, leading up to the second.

2.2.4. Harry Graf Kessler and the myth of ‘preventive diplomacy’ How could it be that the Treaty of Rapallo is so misremembered? How did the Germans ‘fabricate[d] a rumor which many historians have taken to be a fact’?353 The answer is, again: because of the work of Kessler. It was Kessler who presented Rapallo as a peace treaty, as representative of Germany’s good intentions:

348 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19). The translation is quoted from: Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 130. 349 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 137. 350 Andrew Williams, ‘The Genoa Conference of 1922’, 42. 351 Translation from: Himmer, ‘Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo’, 182. 352 Himmer, ‘Rathenau, Russia, and Rapallo’, 183. 353 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 143.

53 Ihre Ergebnisse für Deutschland waren seine Wiedereinreihung als Großmacht in das europäische Konzert, ein großer Gewinn an Vertrauen für die neue deutsche Außenpolitik, die in Rathenau und Wirth verkörpert war, und der Rapallo Vertrag, der nach einem kurzen Sturm sich als Grundlage neuer vertraulicher Beziehungen auch zu England bewährt hatte.354

With these words Kessler has built the foundation of the ‘preventive diplomacy’ myth. Kessler was influenced by the Foreign Office. Not many sources were and are available on the Rapallo Treaty. Kessler received the written account by Maltzan. He could not use all of it, however. His first version of Rapallo’s historiography was checked by legal advisers of the Foreign Office, Mr. Gaus and Dircksen.355 It is very probable they made sure that the Treaty was presented in line with the ‘prevented diplomacy’ narrative. It is not a coincidence that Kessler ‘overlooked’ an important citation from Maltzan’s notes, which had shown that Rathenau had initiated the Treaty.356

There was no ‘new trust’ in German foreign policy, however, quite the opposite. The Americans were furious and blamed Rathenau for Rapallo. To them, Rathenau was a man ‘with exaggerated ego and exalted conceit.’357 The Treaty had embarrassed David Lloyd George. He recognized the Germans had exploited the Giannini report and was surprised ‘that a great country like Germany should act on a report like that.’358 Rapallo had ‘served the immediate interests of nobody but the Bolsheviks.’359 The Treaty also meant the nail in the coffin for the Genoa Conference. It deepened the French-German test of strength. The French felt obliged to react firmly, resulting in the disastrous Ruhr occupation.360 With the Ruhr occupation Rathenau and Wirth’s already disastrous inflationary monetary policy spiraled out of control. One thing has become very clear, Rapallo destroyed all hope for a common reconstruction of Western Europe.361

354 Kessler, Rathenau, 351. 355 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 139. 356 Peter Grupp, ‘Harry Graf Kessler als Biograph Rathenau’s’ In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 115. 357 Schuker, ‘American Policy Toward Debts and Reconstruction at Genoa’, 117. 358 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 134. 359 Kent, The Spoils of War, 178. 360 Schuker, ‘American Policy Toward Debts and Reconstruction at Genoa, 1922’, 121. 361 Krüger, ‘A Rainy Day, April 16, 1922’, 62.

54 The entire truth on the Treaty of Rapallo may be impossible to reveal, it will remain a difficult subject. It is hard for historians to reach a consensus on the motivations and actions of the parties concerned. Many of the sources have been lost.362 Von Maltzan’s account of Rapallo is not very reliable, but it’s one of the few accounts we have: another reason why especially the role of the Bolsheviks in the Rapallo Treaty is still shrouded in mystery. Much of the Soviet archives are still inaccessible.363 But based on the facts we do have, it seems very likely that Rathenau carries prime responsibility for this disastrous treaty.

The ‘preventive diplomacy’ myth lives on until this day. It can, for example, be found in Ernst Schulin’s biography (1973), Lothar Gall’s biography (2009), in the essay-collection of the Deutsches Historisches Museum (1993) and in many more sources.364 Kessler’s narrative still has a distortive influence on the historiography of today. Historians still shift all responsibility towards Wirth and Von Maltzan. But the facts regarding Rathenau are clear. Rathenau was not the victim, but the architect of The Treaty of Rapallo. He acted on the basis of ‘active diplomacy’, centered on returning Germany to world power. This is perfectly logical. Rathenau acted in line with his career during the First World War. Rathenau dreamed of a German Gemeinschaft. Above all he wanted to achieve his Volksstaat by keeping out any Western or Eastern influence.

2.2.5. Rathenau’s assassination Rathenau was murdered on the July 24,1922 by two young members of the Organisation Consul. The assassination is relevant for the central argument of this thesis. It seems that Walther Rathenau shared many of the neoconservative ideas of his own assassins. The fact that Rathenau was murdered despite these ideological similarities proves the power of the antisemitic movement in Germany, and how it had very quickly radicalized after the First World War.

362 Eva Ingeborg Fleischhauer, ‘Rathenau in Rapallo’, 367. 363 Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rapallo-Strategy in Preventive Diplomacy’, 139. 364 Some examples: Gall, Rathenau, 418 states: ‘Rathenau sich zunächst strikt gegen einen Sondervertrag mit Rußland aussprach, zu dem ihn der im Oktober 1921 zum Leiter der Ostabteilung des Auswärtigen Amts ernannte Ago von Maltzan und auch Wirth drängten.’; Dorrmann, ‘Von Kommenden Dingen’, 418 and Schulin, Rathenau, 128 make similar statements.

55 Most German Jews had supported the War. The Jewish Centralverein had stated: ‘daß jeder deutsche Jude zu den Opfern an Gut und Blut bereit ist, die die Pflicht erheischt.’365 But the extreme right-wing antisemitic Reichshammerbund refused to accept this Jewish loyalty, starting to blame the Jewish Rathenau and his KRA for the problems of food supply and poverty in the German war economy. The anti-Jewish propaganda became worse and worse, resulting in a ‘Jew-counting’ (Judenzählung).366 The Jewish Centralverein participated in this statistical survey, meant to observe how many Jews served and had served in the German army. The Centralverein thought this would offer proof that the anti-Semitic propaganda of ‘disloyal’ Jewish troops was not true. But the survey had the opposite effect, further strengthening the false dichotomy between Jews and Germans.367

When the peace treaty was signed, the antisemitic movement blamed it on the Jews, they called it a Judenfrieden.368 In 1919 this led to the foundation of the Deutschvölkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund. This organization became a huge success, reaching 200.000 members at the time of Rathenau’s assassination. It worked together with the nationalist Alldeutsche Verband, the organization which Rathenau had represented during the Moroccan Crisis. These organizations were in turn supported by the paramilitaries, the antirepublican Freikorps Organization Consul.369 This was the same Organisation Consul that had worked together with the Wirth cabinet in Upper Silesia. These relatively large groups of antisemitic organizations blamed many of Germany’s miseries on Walther Rathenau, solely on the fact that he was a Jew and therefore not a German but a traitor.

Alfred Roth of the Alldeutsche Verband stated: ‘Dr. Rathenau kann schon deshalb nicht die Belange des deutschen Volkes vertreten, weil er ja kein Deutscher, sondern ein Jude ist.’370 The paramilitaries sang songs in the streets: ‘Knallt ab den Walther Rathenau die gottverdammte Judensau.’371 These antisemitic groups were so ideologically radicalized that they weren’t interested in the fact that Rathenau shared many of their neoconservative ideas.

365 Braun, ‘Antisemitismus und Assimilation’, 336. 366 Ibidem, 337. 367 Ibidem, 337. 368 Ibidem, 337. 369 Ibidem, 337. 370 Ibidem, 338. 371 Brenner, Rathenau, 454.

56 It is very interesting that along with these extreme antisemitic organizations, the speech of the nationalist Karl Helfferich (1872-1924) is prominently mentioned in the historiography. Helfferich is often presented as the instigator of the assassination, as being the ‘spokesman of the Republik feindliche extreme right-wing’.372 It is true that Helfferich’s speech, which took place just before the assassination, had been very critical towards Rathenau. But his speech cannot be qualified as extreme right-wing or antisemitic. Helfferich had criticized Wirth and Rathenau’s fulfillments policies, ‘the frightful devaluation of the German currency’ and the ‘handing over of great chunks of our own recourses to foreigners’.373 These were political arguments, however hypocritical they were. Helfferich himself had been co-responsible for Germany’s disastrous economic policies. As the Finance Minister during the First World War he had borrowed massive amounts of money. During his speech, a communist had called him the ‘Bankruptcy Minister’.374 Helfferich went too far when he threatened to put Rathenau and Wirth before the Supreme Court, implying they were traitors. But Helfferich never attacked Rathenau personally, neither did he speak of his Jewish ancestry. Helfferich’s critique was mainly directed at the Wirth cabinet. Also, nobody in the Reichstag thought that Helfferich’s speech was anything special, there is no proof that anyone in the Reichstag thought that Helfferich had gone too far.375

Why then is Karl Helfferich’s speech so prominently discussed and remembered in the historiography? The answer is again: because of the work of Harry Graf Kessler. When he heard of the assassination, Kessler concluded: ‘Helfferich is the murderer, the real one, the responsible one.’376 Many members of the German parliament blamed the assassination on Karl Helfferich and his nationalist party. Chancellor Wirth exclaimed in the Reichstag: ‘Da steht der Feind, der sein Gift in die Wunden eines Volkes träufelt – Da steht der Feind – und darüber ist kein Zweifel: dieser Feind steht rechts!’377 Helfferich had a reputation of inflicting violence on political opponents. He indirectly contributed to the murder of Matthias Erzberger, due to the Erzberger-Helfferich Prozess, which had severely damaged Erzberger’s reputation.378

372 Martin Sabrow, ‘Die Folgen des Attentats auf Walther Rathenau’, In: Wilderotter, Hans e.a. ed., Walther Rathenau 1867- 1922 Die Extreme berühren sich (Berlin 1993) 425. 373 Felix, Rathenau, 170. 374 Ibidem, 170. 375 Ibidem, 171. 376 The original German source could not be found due to inaccessibility of the archives (due to Covid-19). The translation is quoted from: Felix, Rathenau, 174. 377 Schulin, Rathenau, 136 378 Sabrow, ‘Die Folgen des Attentats auf Walther Rathenau’, 425.

57 But should Helfferich have been held accountable for the actions of Organisation Consul? Is it not strange that Wirth had put all responsibility on the nationalists, whilst he himself had worked together with Organisation Consul in Upper Silesia?

The whole matter is complicated and definitely not as clear-cut as Kessler has represented it. It seems likely however that Rathenau’s neoconservatism turned against him. Rathenau himself had strong connections with the German right throughout his entire life. Rathenau had started his career at the Minensyndikat, which was an organization that worked together with the Alldeutsche Verband. Rathenau had built his career on the glorification of Prussia, of the German Soul, the German race. Rathenau himself had made an important and influential contribution to the false dichotomy between Jews and Germans. He even sought to revise the Weimar Republic into a more autocratic political structure. It is no surprise that one of Rathenau’s assassins, the 24-year-old Erwin Kern, was actually inspired by Rathenau’s racial theory. Kern had read his works on the Mut- und Furchtmenschen.379 He had actually respected Rathenau’s ideas. Kern had not only killed Rathenau because he was a Jew, but because he was ‘less despicable’ than the other Weimar politicians, but therefore ‘all the more dangerous’.380

379 Schulin, Rathenau, 137. 380 Ibid.

58 Chapter 3 – Musil’s Arnheim: An early literary interpretation of Walther Rathenau in 'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften' The previous chapters have shown how influential Kessler’s biography has been in the historiography on Rathenau. Kessler’s work, written around 1922, continues to influence the way we remember Rathenau today. Around the same time Kessler wrote his well-known work, another, very different, interpretation of Rathenau was being formed. This chapter discusses the Austrian writer Robert Musil’s (1880-1940) literary interpretation of Rathenau’s life. In his magnum opus Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften (1930-1943), Musil created a caricature of Rathenau which embodies him so well that there is no discussion whether it is indeed Rathenau on whom the character is based.381 The name of the caricature is dr. Paul Arnheim, a Prussian with a finely ‘clipped moustache and a pointed beard.’382 Although Arnheim is a literary interpretation of Rathenau, and therefore strictly not the same, it helps us to understand the power of Rathenau’s central neoconservative convictions, as Paul Arnheim acts in total accordance with these ideas. Musil’s contribution is relevant to us today. His literary interpretation resembles the historical facts, as the following analysis will show. Most importantly, in creating his caricature, Musil emphasized that the intellectual and practical career of Rathenau could not be regarded as ‘contradictory’, as it is depicted in the current historiography.

3.1. Robert Musil and Rathenau Robert Musil was born on the 6th of November, 1880, in the Austrian city of Klagenfurt, into a family consisting mainly of academics and technics. Like the Rathenau’s, Musil’s family benefitted from the Second Industrial Revolution and made smart use of the many new possibilities. At first, Musil seemed to choose a vocation similar to that of many of his family members. After having served in the army for a short period, he studied mechanical engineering with great success. He wrote his doctoral thesis on the famous mathematician of the Vienna Circle: the scholar Ernst Mach, who, as we will see, was an important influence on his work. Like Rathenau, Musil had all the opportunities for a glorious career in industry or the civil service. Against all odds, he chose to fully dedicate his life to writing.383

381 Karl Corino, ‘The Contribution of Biographical Research to the Understanding of Characters and Themes of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften’. In: Payne, P. Bartram, G. en Tihanov, G. (red.) A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil, (Rochester, New York) 290. 382 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 620. 383 Robertson, Ritchie (2014). ‘Introduction’. In: Robertson, Ritchie e.a. ed. (red.), Musil, Robert The Confusions of Young Törless, (Oxford 2014) viii.

59 Musil’s body of work revolves around the ‘inner world’ and the ‘outer world’.384 He was incredibly interested in how the outside world influenced the individual. In Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften, Musil focusses on the influence of modernity and metropolitan life on the individual. His fascination with ‘the outside world’ was caused by his expertise on the before mentioned Ernst Mach. Mach’s Gestalt theory states that experiences do not have a random influence on individuals, but that individuals interpret these by shaping them into a certain abstract form.385

In Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften Musil continued with his reflections on the inner and the outside world. The genre of the book is hard to pin down. The passages on Rathenau are satirical of character. The book is told from the perspective of Ulrich, Musil’s alter ego. Ulrich decides to take a ‘holiday from life’. He observes the modern Western civilization, life as it is, without any definitive interpretation. Meanwhile the leaders of the declining Austrian- Hungarian organize a Parallelaktion, a great project for one great collective effort for revitalizing the empire. Several people are invited to participate and contribute to the organization. One of them is a Prussian, the character based on Walther Rathenau: Paul Arnheim.

Musil was very attracted to the city of Berlin. Starting from the 1920’s he visited the city very regularly, eventually making it his permanent residence from 1931 until 1933. His experiences in Berlin came to be the basis for Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften.386 Musil met Walther Rathenau in Berlin, shortly before the First World War. Through a testimony of the writer Elias Canetti (1905-1994) we know that, at their first encounter, Rathenau had put his arm around Musil’s shoulder. Musil was a very sensitive man and did not appreciate this gesture in the slightest. According to Canetti, this was the basis of Musil’s dislike of Rathenau.387 Musil even described the event in Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften, magnifying his uncomfortable experience: ‘That arm on his shoulder made Ulrich unsure of himself. To stand there in this quasi embrace was ridiculous and unpleasant, a miserable feeling, in fact.’388

384 Silvia Bonacchi en Philip Payne, ‘Musil’s Die Vollendung der Liebe: Experience Analyzed and Reconstituted’, In: Payne, Philip. e.a. ed., A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil (Rochester, New York 2007) 193. 385 Robertson, ‘Introduction’, xvii. 386 Lethen, ‘Chicago und Moskau’, 211-212. 387 Philip Payne, ‘Introduction: The Symbiosis of Robert Musil’s Life and Works, In: Payne, Philip. e.a. ed., A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil (Rochester, New York 2007) 38; Corino, Karl, ‘The Contribution of Biographical Research’, 290. 388 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 702. ‘

60 Of course, Musil’s skepticism towards Rathenau was more well-grounded than that. Musil thought of himself as being a ‘free spirit’, as a ‘man of possibilities’ (Möglichkeiten). Musil was not interested in defining concepts, truths, convictions and ideologies, he wanted to understand the feelings and perceptions behind them.389 To Musil, Rathenau was the exact opposite: a distinctly ideological person who was mainly interested in constantly explaining and defining the world around us.390 Rathenau made wild statements in his books, shaping the world into the abstract form of a political religion, and he tried to apply his theories in his business and political career. Musil had read Zur Mechanik des Geistes and thought it was a work that ‘lacked academic rigor and credibility’.391 He called Rathenau’s intellectual work ‘Pseudosystematik.’392

The fact that Rathenau and Musil differed so much was exactly what sparked Musil’s interest. Musil wanted to understand the thought processes of the people around him.393 He made literary interpretations of many people who were close to him: some of his close friends, his mother and father, also of those who had interested or intrigued him. Rathenau definitely intrigued Musil, he filled a whole notebook on his work.394 The contents of this notebook became the foundation of the caricature Paul Arnheim.

3.2. Arnheim - Musil’s literary portrait Musil’s literary portrait of Rathenau in Der Mann Ohne Eigenschaften is very substantial. A large portion of the first chapter of the book consists of passages featuring Arnheim. For the sake of brevity, the analysis will focus on three of Musil’s main characterizations of Arnheim in the text. The first is the portrayal Arnheim’s neoconservatism, the second is Arnheim’s lack of academic rigor and the third emphasizes Arnheim’s conflicts of interests, being a politician and an industrialist at the same time. For the sake of readability, the citations of Musil are taken from the excellent translation by Sophie Wilkins.

389 Payne, ‘Introduction’, 8; 57. 390 Matthias Luserke-Jaqui en Philip Payne ‘Figuring Thought in Culture: ‘Utopia’ Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften from the Perspective of Kulturwissenschaft’, In: Payne, Philip. e.a. ed., A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil (Rochester, New York 2007) 319. 391 Ibidem, 39. 392 Philip Payne, ‘Robert Musil’s Diaries: Medium between Life & Literature’ in: Philip Payne e.a. ed., A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil (New York 2007) 107. 393 Payne, ‘Introduction’, 17. 394 Philip Payne, ‘Robert Musil’s Diaries’, 107.

61 Argument 1: Rathenau’s neoconservatism When Musil introduces Arnheim we see that the biographical similarities are striking: ‘His father was the mightiest mogul of “Iron Germany,” that is, Bismarck’s Germany […].’395 Like Rathenau, he was ‘based on the trend of the times and his international connections, to become a Reichsminister someday.’396 Arnheim is a man of power: ‘a German nabob, a rich Jew, and an eccentric who wrote poetry, dictated the price of coal, and was the Kaisers personal friend.’397 Arnheim’s career reflects that of Rathenau’s at Die Zukunft and his friend Maximilian Harden: ‘Journalists […] who through their admiration had first created Arnheim’s image as a great man […] did not realize how much he was their own creation […].’398

Like Rathenau, Arnheim is a neoconservative, obsessed with the ‘German Soul’ and its effect on the harmonization of society. He states that the Soul‘[…] transforms the confused impressions of civilized life into harmonious spiritual vibrations.’399 Arnheim pleads for ‘the union of soul and economics or of ideas and power.’400 Arnheim denounces the ‘materialism’ of reason: ‘Reason tyrannizes our lives.’401

Musil recognized that Rathenau’s neoconservatism and love for the irrational came from his Bildungsidealismus. He decided to satirize Rathenau’s bourgeois neoconservatism. Like Rathenau, Arnheim states that the educated middle class, the ‘soulful middle class’, should lead society.402 He calls for a society led by strong leaders, Führungspersönlichkeiten: ‘Only strong individual personalities, with experience in both reality and the realm of ideas, would be able to direct such a campaign!’403 Like Rathenau, Arnheim is clearly not very fond of representative democracy.

395 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 98. 396 Ibidem, 98. 397 Ibidem, 201. Rathenau knew the Kaiser quite well indeed, he even wrote a book on him, Der Kaiser (1919). Rathenau specifically did not want to be viewed as a ‘friend’ of the monarch. See: Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, ‘Rathenau, Wilhelm II, and the perception of Wilhelminismus’, in: Mombauer, Annika e.a. ed. The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany (Cambridge 2003) 261. 398 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 207. 399 Ibidem, 178. 400 Ibidem, 111. 401 Ibidem, 112. 402 Ibidem, 420. 403 Ibidem, 113.

62 Arnheim believes that specifically strong Germans are capable of leading the society, because it’s success ‘depended primarily upon people with strong personalities [...] strengthened by Prussian intellectual discipline.’404 Arnheim writes theories about how to achieve this, he writes books on the ‘new breed of men.’405 Precisely this elitist view of politics is the basis of Arnheim’s neoconservatism. Like Rathenau, Arnheim calls for a homogenous Gemeinschaft, instead of a divided Gesellschaft. He blames divisiveness on the culture of materialism and mechanization, caused by reason. ‘Arnheim observed that the more all-inclusive the organization, the further the various proposals would diverge from one another. This was a characteristic symptom of its present state of development, based, as it was, only on reason.’406 The state should instead ‘[…] force a whole people into awareness of the will, inspiration, and all that was basic, which lay far deeper than reason.’407

Musil calls Arnheim’s ideal of homogenization: ‘The Mystery of the Whole’. With Arnheim ‘[…] the whole always takes precedence over its parts.’408 His new society would have ‘[…] life without social differences, where action, soul, mind and body would all be one.’409Arnheim’s theories are anti-intellectual and anti-liberal. Arnheim states: ‘The intellect has achieved nothing but watering down the great past into liberalism.’410 Like Rathenau, Arnheim seeks to ‘hit socialism at the heart’. Arnheim could ‘also claim that he thought as a socialist.’411

Musil probably read Rathenau’s Physiologie des Kunstempfindens, and incorporated this in his satire. Arnheim states: ‘God is profoundly unmodern […] Art should first reflect the unity of existence and its inner order.’412 Arnheim calls modern art: ‘fragmentation everywhere’.413 Here Musil cleary references Rathenau’s cultural pessimist theories of ‘mechanization’, Arnheim states that modern art leads to ‘a new mechanized social and inner life’.414

404 Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 179. 405 Ibidem, 557-558. 406 Ibidem, 184. 407 Ibidem, 184. 408 Ibidem, 207. 409 Ibidem, 514. 410 Ibidem, 212. 411 Ibidem, 457. 412 Ibidem, 211. 413 Ibidem, 211. 414 Ibidem, 211.

63 Like Rathenau, Arnheim glorifies Prussian culture. He argues that the Prussian spirit must be the foundation of the world to come: ‘[…] the German sprit can still be saved from rationalism […].’415 Arnheim wants to achieve this by […]‘interweaving the new into the traditional […].’416 By doing this, he ‘[…] hoped to help bring the New Era to birth […].’417

In his satire, Musil emphasized that Rathenau had always remained a neoconservative. Like Rathenau, Arnheim propagates irrational and antimodernist ideas while glorifying Prussian culture. He infuses this with a utopian technological vision of a world to come, which would combine the new with the traditional. This satire shows that if the concept of reactionary modernism had existed back then, Musil had definitely qualified Rathenau as one.

Argument 2: Rathenau’s lack of intellectual rigor Musil did not believe that Rathenau had discovered a unique relationship with the soul. According to Musil, Rathenau’s power and wealth had made him overconfident in his utopian ideas.418 Rathenau’s texts were indeed notorious, they were classified as random and undisciplined in structure by many. Fürstenberg wrote in 1962 how Rathenau’s theories were never taken seriously by ‘Nichtfachleute’, they were classified as amateurish, as ‘nicht erwachsen.’419

In his satire, Musil decided to emphasize this critique on Rathenau’s work. Like Rathenau, Arnheim lacks academic qualities: ‘Arnheim’s books also had the same kind of self- assurance, the world was in order, as soon as Arnheim had given it his due consideration.’420 ‘[His] books and articles, by now quite an imposing number of them, were widely read, enjoyed large printings, and were translated into many languages’ […] but ‘His excursions into scientific areas for support of his general views did not, it is true, always satisfy the strictest criteria.’421

415 Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 621. 416 Ibidem, 421. 417 Ibidem, 422. 418 Luserke-Jaqui en Payne, ‘Figuring Thought in Culture: ‘Utopia’, 319. 419 Fürstenberg, ‘Erinnerung an Walther Rathenau’, 423. 420 Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 190. 421 Ibidem, 204.

64 Musil continues about the lack of Arnheim’s academical rigor: ‘[…]When a man who has known how to do so well for himself speaks, there must be something in it.’422 Arnheim’s work was so unscientific that it would be impossible to reason with it: ‘His moral concepts, normally [were] a comprehensive system for being always in the right [...].’423 Arnheim is not interested in the real truth but his own truth. His books are a ‘cultured omniscience’, ‘freely disposing of things in two directions at once.’424

Argument 3: Rathenau’s conflicts of interests and opportunism In his satire, Musil emphasized Rathenau’s opportunistic nature. Like Rathenau, Arnheim’s business interests had coincided with his political and intellectual career: ‘Arnheim’s reflections ended not without some profit for himself.’425 This was also the prime reason why Arnheim cooperated with whomever was in power. Arnheim calls this ‘the active life’, in which he states to ‘make use of the system [rather] than to neglect it.’426

Like Rathenau, Arnheim combines his business interests with his utopian visions. Arnheim was ‘convinced that the creators of wealth [...] were destined to take over at some point from the ruling powers.’427 Arnheim ‘came to see the regal man of business as the synthesis of change and permanence, power and civility, sensible risk-taking and strong-minded reliance [...].’428 Arnheim pleaded for a ‘[…] fusion of interests between the business and the soul.’429 But he does this in the interest of the German empire and German commerce, Arnheim is ‘making culture, politics and society serve business.’430 Like Rathenau, Arnheim wants state and business to become fully one.

422 Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 204. 423 Ibidem, 415. 424 Ibidem, 313; 304. 425 Ibidem, 441. 426 Ibidem, 297. 427 Ibidem, 421. 428 Ibidem, 421. 429 Ibidem, 422. 430 Ibidem, 591.

65 As this thesis shows, Rathenau had mixed politics with personal interests throughout his entire career. Musil’s satire was not being harsh or overly critical, it seems to be well grounded. Musil even recognized Rathenau’s goals for the exploitation of Russia. In the novel, Arnheim temporarily leaves the Parallelaktion due to a dispute concerning the ‘Galician Oil Fields.’431 These oil fields were located in the disputed areas after the Russian Revolution. It seems very likely that Musil knew that Rathenau wanted to have exclusive access to these oil fields for the German state and the R.A.E.G., and incorporated it in his satire.

Most importantly, Musil saw how Rathenau’s neoconservative convictions had deeply influenced his career and the choices he made in his life. Musil saw how Rathenau had wanted to make his Reich der Seele a reality, and how he had tried to mold society to his will. Musil decided to emphasize this in his literary caricature. Like Rathenau, Arnheim keeps rattling on about his ‘Mystery of the Whole’, about ‘the unity of existence’, about his ‘New Era’ and the rebirth of the ‘German spirit’, and like Rathenau he can’t help but benefit himself. Although Musil’s satire is an interpretation of Rathenau in literary form, this analysis shows how much it resembles the historical facts. Surprisingly, Musil’s satirize emphasizes precisely those historical facts which were overlooked by Kessler and the current historiography. Most importantly, Musil does not distinguish between his intellectual and practical career, he does not regard them as ‘contradictory’. This is why Musil’s literary portrait of Rathenau is an important contribution to the understanding of Rathenau’s neoconservatism.

431 Musil, The Man Without Qualities (Translation by Sophie Wilkins) (London 2017) 701.

66 Conclusion Those who are awarded the Rathenau-Preis receive a special medal with the following engraving:

‘Ich will Selbstbestimmung, selbstverdienstes Geschick und Freiheit.’432

Today this quote is anachronistically interpreted as Rathenau’s call for a liberal representative democracy. To do so is a great misinterpretation. ‘Selbstbestimmung, Selbstverdientes Geschicke und Freiheit’ was, for Rathenau, only possible in his ideal state: a united German Volksgemeinschaft. This Volksstaat was supposed to be led by strong Prussian leaders picked from the Bildungsbürgertum. These leaders had the essential capability to communicate with their soul. They could discover the rules of the Divine Being, of God’s law, which would give direction to the German society. At the helm of the state would be a monarchical father figure. The German citizen had to totally integrate into Prussian culture. Rathenau’s technocratic utopian visions are symptomatic of his time period, in which new ideologies were formed by prominent industrials and intellectuals who tried to unite the new with the traditional. But in this case, ‘new’ did not mean liberal or democratic.

Rathenau did not believe in the ‘power of a common Europe’, but in the power of a common German Europe. His Reich der Seele became his lifetime project. To motivate his central beliefs, Rathenau used racial theory. He believed that the Prussian ‘superior race’ was threatened by a materialist ‘lesser race’. He looked with scorn on the ‘backward’ Ost-Juden and the aristocratic Tiergartenjuden. The Jews had to try extra hard to fully ‘assimilate’ into society. Rathenau was also very sceptical towards ‘Western’ representative democracies. To him they were incapable of protecting a country from ‘materialist’ cultures. He thought that the German parliamentarians of the Weimar Republic were weak Bierbankpolitiker. He was not interested in international cooperation. His much-praised European Zollverein was actually a plan for a renewed German colonial empire.

432 Rathenau-Stiftung.de

67 During the First World War, Rathenau had done everything in his power to make his homogenous German society a practical reality. ‘Nur homogene Gesellschaften haben Idealen’ had remained his motto, while he mobilized the German society with his Kriegshilfsdienstgesetz and the German natural recourses with the Kriegsrohstoffabteilung. He thought it was perfectly justified to ‘requisite’ natural resources from foreign countries. By doing all this Rathenau had enriched himself. With the KRA, the A.E.G. had made huge profits. He also tried to decrease the labor shortages of the A.E.G with forced labor programs, such as the deportation of 700.000 Belgians. He wanted to expand Germany to the east, by establishing an Ostimperium. Rathenau was so concerned with the survival of the Reich der Seele that he was capable of calling for a total mobilization of society. He even thought that a dictatorship by Ludendorff was a good idea.

After the War, Rathenau did not shift towards a more conciliatory international policy. Instead he did all he could to obstruct the Treaty of Versailles. It is a myth that the Treaty of Versailles was wholly disastrous for Germany. Actually, Germany had survived the War relatively well, with a lot of industrial capital and even their gold reserves intact. But instead of cooperating with the Allied powers, Rathenau and Chancellor Wirth tried everything to avoid paying any hard currency. They printed huge amounts of money and frustrated the French by only paying them with useless goods. They sent illegal Freikorps to Upper Silesia. Meanwhile, Rathenau instructed the Foreign Office to approach the Russian Bolsheviks. The Treaty of Rapallo proves that Rathenau did not want to negotiate. He wanted Germany to be fully autonomous. Of course, he and his industrialist consortium were also interested in the Russian oil fields. He signed the Treaty while he knew the Allied were still open for negotiation. Rathenau is primarily responsible for the disastrous Treaty of Rapallo, which resulted in a massive hyperinflation, which was in turn caused by Wirth and Rathenau’s disastrous monetary policy in the first place. Perhaps the Ruhr occupation could have been avoided if Rathenau had listened to his advisors and had gone back to the negotiation table.

In 1962, Hans Fürstenberg, Rathenau’s childhood friend, already concluded that Rathenau had not been a ‘patron saint of the Weimar Republic’. He had seen that Kessler was not always quite right. Kessler’s biography has distorted the historiography of Rathenau until this day. We know that Kessler’s narrative has been censored by the German Foreign Office. The ‘myth of preventive diplomacy’ has somehow contributed to the popular idea that Rathenau was an Erfüllungspolitiker. He was not, at least not in the way Kessler has presented.

68 Rathenau represented a world of German Prussian idealism and nationalism, a world that has totally evaporated from existence. The whole concept of the Volksgemeinschaft turned out to be a disaster and led to one of the most criminal regimes in history. German idealism is practically dead, as the German philosopher Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) stated in 1966:

[Die Kultur] perhorresziert den Gestank, weil sie stinkt; weil ihr Palast, wie es an einer großartigen Stelle von Brecht heißt, gebaut ist aus Hundsscheiße. Jahre später als jene Stelle geschrieben ward, hat Auschwitz das Mißlingen der Kultur unwiderleglich bewiesen. [...] Alle Kultur nach Auschwitz, samt der dringlichen Kritik daran, ist Müll.433

Germany has come under the influence of the Pax Americana. The Western world now lives in the aftermath of Reagan’s age of the entrepreneur, in a society of mass consumerism and luxury. Instead of Rathenau’s ideal of a homogenous German-led world, we live in a world of extreme competition. Like in the 1920’s, people still look up to influential businessmen. But today’s most successful businessmen are entrepreneurs, those of Silicon Valley. They embody the theory of creative destruction of Joseph Alois Schumpeter, building their large international monopolies with the aim of competing all others out of business. The central banks, the European Union and the business world have for a very long time been influenced by the Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism of Margaret Thatcher, Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Clearly, Rathenau’s Reich der Seele has failed to materialize. American ‘soulless materialism’ has ruled the world and almost nothing resembles the future that Rathenau has foreseen.

Or so it seems. Because after the refugee crisis something has changed in the political climate of Germany. Suddenly, Germans began to think that their country was being threatened by foreign influences. Cultural pessimism returned. The social-democrat Thilo Sarrazin published ‘Deutschland schafft sich ab’. It became a massive best-seller. German idealism and patriotism suddenly returned in the public discussion, resulting in the historical success of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). ‘Wir sind das Volk!’ shouted their campaign ads. ‘Heimat ist ein kostbares Gut, das geschützt werden müß,’ is the slogan of AfD-leader Björn Höcke.

433 Klaus Hofmann, ‘Poetry after Auschwitz - Adorno’s dictum’, German Life and Letters (2005) 58:2, 184-185.

69 Björn Höcke remembered how his father had cried during the fall of the Berlin Wall: ‘Das is das Ende des deutschen Volkes.’434 In some German states this cultural pessimist message resonated, in Saxony the AfD received almost 27 percent of the votes in 2016.435 Anti-Western thinking is back. Some of the voters in Görlitz, where the AfD received 44% of the votes, stated that ‘they did not want to be occupied by the United States’.436 Among political scientists it is clear that ‘The Euro crisis ceased to be important for AfD support whereas xenophobic motives became more central.’437 The importance of national culture has returned in German politics.

Rathenau was murdered by an antisemitic paramilitary organisation primarily because of his Jewish background, despite the fact that he himself shared many of the neoconservative ideas of his assassins. The assassination of Rathenau has to be remembered because it reminds us of the dangers of political extremism. However, by doing this it is also important to remember Rathenau as he truly was, not as we want him to be. And that’s perfectly possible. Rathenau’s cultural pessimist theories have become very relevant again. With the rise of nationalist populism, many in our society already have discovered the relevance of cultural pessimism. Oswald Spengler has received much attention. In the Netherlands for example, Spengler’s works have been translated and published again. Maybe it is time to rediscover Rathenau in the same way, the man who influenced Spengler in the first place. This thesis is just the first step in rediscovering Rathenau as a cultural pessimist and a Prussian nationalist. Many questions are left unanswered. His involvement in Upper Silesia and Organisation Consul, the formation of the Treaty of Rapallo, Rathenau’s colonial career and collaboration with the Alldeutsche Verband, but also his entire intellectual work has to be studied in much more detail. Musil’s caricature helps us to understand Rathenau’s neoconservatism. In his interpretation he rightly emphasized that Rathenau’s cannot be regarded as ‘contradictory’. Musil despised Rathenau’s theories and how he had acted on them in his professional career. But he acknowledged that Rathenau was a man with strong ideals, a ‘Man With - very distinct – Qualities’.

434 Volker Weiß, Die Autoritäre Revolte (Stuttgart 2017) 186. 435 Philip Oltermann, ‘Revenge of the East’? How anger in the former GDR helped the AfD’, The Guardian (2017) September 28th. 436 Ibidem. 437 Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, ‘The ‘Alternative für Deutschland in the Electorate’: Between Single-Issue and Right-Wing Populist Party’, German Politics (2017) 26(1): 124.

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