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THE AND POLITICAL ISLAM: • A POLITICAL ENCOUNTER 1966-1977

SafruI Muluk

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty ofArts and Science In Partial FuJfi1Jment of the Requirement • for the Degree of Master ofArts

Institute ofIslamic Studies McGill University Montreal

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Canadl .' '" AB8TRACT • . Author Safrol Muluk Title of Thesis : The Indonesian Armyand Political Islam: A Political Encounter 1966-1977

Department Institute ofIslamic Studies, McGill University

Master ofArts

The main objective of this study is ta analyze the politica1 struggle

between the Indonesian army and Islamic political parties in the New

Order era between 1966-1977. The historica1 background of the

involvement of the army in palitics and the attempt of poUtical Islam ta

• establish an Islamic state is a central issue that characterized the

reIationship between these two groups. When the came to

power in 1966, it bas exercised strict control over politically organized

Islam. With the army emerged as the most significant political force,

there was no choice for poIitica1 Islam except to reformulate its politica1

agenda in order to suit national development program undertaken by the

military backed govemment. The future of political Islam and the

involvement of the army in the social and politica1 arena in

field has since then been central to the development of politica1 system in

that country.

ü RÉSUMÉ

Auteur : Safrul Muluk

Titre : L'armée indonésienne et l'Islam politique: Une rencontre politique 1966-1977

Département : Institut des Études Islamiques, Université McGill

Diplôme : Maitrise ès Arts

L'objectif premier de cetteétudeestd'analyser la lutte politique entre l'année indonésienne

et les partis politiques islamiques à l'époque de l'Ordre Nouveau (1966-1977). Le contexte

historique de l'implication de l'armée dans les affaires politiques ainsi que la tentative de l'Islam

politique pour établir un état islamique est l'enjeu principal qui a caractérisé les relations entre ces

deux groupes. Lorsque l'Ordre Nouveau est parvenu au pouvoir en 1966, celui-ci a exercé un

• controle strict sur l'Islam organisé politiquement. Alors que l'armée devenait la force politique la

plus importante, l'Islam politique n'avait pas d'autre choix que de refonnuler ses objectifs afin de

de se canfonnerau programme de dével~ppement national entrepris parle gouvernement. L'avenir

de l'Islam politique ainsi que l'implication, de l'armée dans l'arène. socio- politique en Indonésie furent détenninant dans le développement du système politique de ce pays.

iü ,,-.., • ACKNOWLEDGEMENT First of an, 1 would like to express my gratitude ta Prof. A. Uner

Turgay, my academic advisor and supervisor, for bis supervision and

valuable advice throughout my study. 1 would aIso like ta thank Ms.

Salwa Ferahian of Library of the Institute of Islamic Stuclies for her

assistance in my research. My gratitude aIso goes ta the Library staff

who assisted me in locating research materials. 1 aIso owe thanks to

Marc Munro and Steve Miller who helped me to edit my work and ta

overcome my clifficulties in English grammar.

1 would like to express my gratitude ta the Canadian Intemational

Development Agency (eIDA) for providing me with fmancial assistance ta • studyat McGill University. 1 wauld aIso like to tliank Ms. Wendy Allen, the Director of the MCGill-lndonesia IAIN Development Project, and her

staff bath in and Montreal.

Finally, 1 am indebted ta my lovely wife, Kausari, who has always

given me encouragement to complete this thesis. To my parents, Haji

Abu Safir and Bunda, 1 owe an enarmaus debt ofgratitude.

Montreal, May 2000.

S.M • iv )e SPELLIlIG AlID TRAlfSLITERATIOK In transliteration of the Arabie names and terms in this thesis, 1

have used the transliteration scheme employed at the Institute ofIslamie

Studies, McGill University. Indonesian terms in this thesis are written

according to the latest Indonesian spelling (1972); for Indonesian names

the spelling is retained which the persons themselves used or use. The

only differences between the oid and the new system of spelling are that

ch, dj, oe, and tj ~mekh, j, u, and c.

The main differences in transliteration !rom Arabic and Indonesian are:

Arabie English Indonesian Arabie EngUsh Indonesian

cS th ts ~ dl

• ~ 11 h P ", th , C kh ch/th P ~ dh ) dh dz ~ ~\ sh sy -' w u/w Cf' , sh

Foreign words and phrases are italicized.

v .", LIST OF ABBRBVIATIORS

• Abangan = nominal Muslim ABRI = Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic ofIndonesia)

DPR = Dewan Perwa1dlan Rakyat (People's Representative Council, Parliament)

Dwüungsi = dual function

GBHN = Garis - Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outlines of State Policies)

Golkar =Golongan Kazya (Functional Group)

HMI = Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Association ofMuslim University Student)

KAMI = Kesatuan Aksi MahasiswaIndonesia (Action Front of Indonesian University Students)

Korpri -= Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Corps ofGovernment • Workers ofthe Republik of Indonesia) Masyumi = Majelis Syuro MusUmin Indonesia (Consultative CouncU ofIndonesian Muslim)

MPR =Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Council)

Nasakom. = Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis ( Nationalists, Religious Groups, and Communists)

NU =Nahd1atul Ulama ( Renaissance ofthe Ulama)

Pannusi = Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party)

POl = Partai DemoIaa:si Indonesia (Indonesian Democratie Party)

Permesta = Perjuangan SemestaAlam (Inclusive Struggle)

vi ~ Pern =Pergerakan Tarbiyah IsIamiyah (Islamic Educational MovementJ • PlI =Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student) PKI =Pattai Komunis rndonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) PNI =Partai Nasional Indonesia"(Indonesian National Party) PRRI =Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Govemment ofthe Republic of Indonesia)

Santri = devout Muslim.

•

vii o • TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ...... •...... •...... •..•...... il

Resume ...... iii

AckIlowledgrn.ents ...... iv

Spelling and Transliteration '...... v

List ofAbbrevi.ations .•...... vi. ... Table ofContents ...... ~ ...... •...••..•.•...... •...•..•...... ••....•...... •..•...... ~

Intraduction ...... 1

CIlAPTER ORE: THE MILITARY ABD POLITICAL ISLAM OP TO 1965: THE BARLY BIICOURTER

A. Revolutionary Period (1945-1949) ~ 10 • B. The, Army's Doctrinal Thinking 18 C. Parliamentary Democracy Period (1950-1959)...... 26

D. The Guided Democracy Period (1959-1965) 32

CIlAPTER TWO: THE MlLITARY ABD POLITICAL ISLAM UBDER THE NEW ORDBR REGIME (1966-1977)

A. The "Rise" ofthe Army . 40

B. The New Order's Policies on Islam. . 52 a. Political Issue 55 b. Religious Affairs . 63

c. The Debates on the Concept ofDual Function of the Army ....•....•....•.•...... •... 65

vili CRAPTER TBREE: THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM AlfD THE DUAL FUlfCTIOlf 01' IlmOlfESlAR ARMY lIf THE BE\\' ORDBR REGIME

A. The Future of Politicallslam 73 B. Modernization Issue 76 D. The Future of the Dual Function ofthe Army 82

CONCLUSION •.•.•...•••....••.•.•.••.....••.•...•...•...... •....•...... • 88

•

Dt IIfTRODUCTIOB

• In the independence movement, the military exerted great influence on the evolution of Indonesia's post-colonial political structure. Because

the army pIayed a very active part in the struggle for independence, it is

strongly identified with the natïon-state that emerged as a result and

whose development it continued to influence, particularly in the political

realm. Contributions and sacrifices for the achievement of independence

created a sense of entitlement. Consequently, military leaders felt that

they had as much right to shape and decide the political direction of the

country, as did the civilian leaders. Therefore, the historical factors that

influenced the formation of the army, as weIl as the degree of the

• institutional development of the political infrastructure, became key

factors in determining the leveI of military political involvement.

Consequently, any analysis of the involvement of the army in the political

arena in Indonesia must begin by stressing its revolutionary origin.!

This is not a situation unique ta Indonesia. Writing on military

intervention in politics, Amos Perlmutter points out:

Military regimes are found in societies undergoing change and Iacking legitimate political order and support. They tend ta thrive in unstable, politically underdeveloped, structurally non-cohesive, and in most cases, non-functioning or poorly functioning governments. Military regimes are established to replace weak regimes, weak

1 Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics 1955-1959: ~ Emergenœ of • Guided Democracy (New Delhi, Calcutta: KP Bagchi and Company, 1982), 21. 2

executives and government, and especially to defend the state from • a communist or extremist revolutionary takeover.2 In a similar vein, Morris Janowitz explains that the reason the

militmy bas a wider involvement in domestic economic, social, and

political change derives from the weakness of civi1ian political

institutions.3 The fallure of civilian authorities ta govem effectively can

lead ta a militmy inteIVention in many countries where self-rule is

comparatively new. Conversely, Harold Crouch argues that ca strong,

effective, civilian government which successfully maintains its legitimacy

seems virtually immune to the possibility of a military COUp·.4 Looking at

the problem from another perspective, Taufik Abdullah maintains that,

cthe possibility for a poIitica1 inteIVention does not only exist in the • militmy itself, but it is also determined by extemal socio-political conditions. Political banlauptcy and demoralization in a democratic

system... accompanied by an economic crisis can push the militaIy to

take action".5The historical context of the militmy creates the values and

2 Amos Perlmutter, -rhe Comparative Analysis of MilitaIy Regimes: Formations, Aspirations and Achïevements,· World Politics 33, no. 1 (October 1980): 97-98~

3 Morris Janowîtz, Military Institutions and Coercion inDeveloping Nations (Chicago: The Unversity ofChicago Press, 1977), 80-81.

4 Harold Crouch, *The Military and Politics in Southeast ABia,· in Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch, eds., Müi:tary-Ciuilicm Relations in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), 294.

5 Taufik Abdullah, cCivil-Military Relation in the Third World: An • IntroductoryTaxonomy,· Prismt:I, no. 20 (March 1981): 4. 3

orientations of military officers. In turn, this will establish a distinct • tradition and set of values which they tend to maintain. When the militaIy expands its politica1 activity and becomes a political bloc, the

civilian leadership remains in power only because of the military's

passive assent or active assistance.6

In the case of Indonesia, this tendency is very strong. The reason

for this is because it was not created as an instrument of the state, but

was itself involved in the creation of the state. It was self-created and

thus owes nothing to the post-colonial political order nor to any of the

political parties.7

Since its establishment in October 1945, the Indonesian armed

forces have been directly involved in every attempt to liberate the country • from foreign domination, especially that ofthe Dutch, and in maintaining the nation's continued independence. According to Morris Janowitz, the

Indonesian army can he categorized as an Canny of nationalliberation-.8

This is to say that the creation of the army and the birth of the nation

are inextricably linked.

The experiences of army leaders during the tirst Bve years of

independence were significant in giving birth ta a strong ethos, as weil as

6 Moms Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion, 83.

7 Salim Said, -rhe Political Role of the Indonesian MilitaIy: Past, Present, and Future,• SoutheastAsian Journal ofSocûJl Science 15, no. 1 (1987): 16.

8 Morris Janowitz, T1te Military inthe Political Development ofNew Nations • (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 10. 4

a range of arguments about what role the armed forces shouId play in • society. -The army's self creation, the politica1 behavior of General Sudinnan, the context of weak civilian institution in which Sudirman's

leadership was exercised, and the pattern of direct military government

during the guerilla war" aIl helped ta create the army's selfimage.9

David Jenkins asserts that the notion that the army emerged from

the people, that it fought for independence alongside the populace even

when the civilian politica1 leaders had surrendered, and that it had

participated extensively in nominally civilian matters during that time,

was to give birth to the idea that the armed forces were justified in

playing an extensive role in non-military affaîrs. lO As a result, this self-

perception led to an interventionist political culture where the military • saw itself as having the right ta intervene and involve itself in politics as and when it saw fit. Il According to Janowitz, it is appropriate to describe

Indonesia as a civil-military coalition, beca.use of the crucial role of the

armed forces. Here the military serves as an active political bloc in its

support of civilian parties and other bureaucratie power groups. The

9 Salim Said, Genesis of Power: General Sudinnan and the Indonesian Military Politics, 1945 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 129-130.

10 David Jenkins, Su.ht:uto and His GeneraIs: Indorresian Military Politics 1975e1983 (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1983), 1.

U Büveer Smgh, 7he Dual Fu.nction of the Indorresian Armed Forces • (Singapore: Singapore Institute ofInternational Affairs, 1995), 41. s

civilian group is therefore in power thanks ta the assistance of the • military.12 The army's emergence as an important factor in Indonesian politics

was conceptualized in the notion of lIlDual Function-. This term was tirst

introduced by General , then the Army Chief of

Staff (KSAD, Kepala Staff Angkatan Darat), at the graduation ceremony

at the military academy at Magelang on Il November 1958. The term

dual function is used ta explain the dual raie of the armed forces in

Indonesia. By dual function, we Mean that the armed forces act bath as

a lIlmilitary force- and as a lIlsocial-politica1 force.- General Abdul Haris

Nasution developed this as ajustification for the involvement ofthe army

in the ideological, political, social, economic, and religious fields. The • notion derived from the heroic revolutionary self-image which had grown out of the army's role in suppressing a series of rebellions that plagued

national unity. In general theoretical terms, Harry J. Benda provides an

explanation that fits the Indonesian situation:

Having played a significant role in the liberation of their countries and having gained access to military power, they have also created a political following bath among their subordinates and quite oCten, among the public at large. The militaIy, in short have become a competing elite which has increasingly come to challenge the civüian intelligentsia's monopoly of political power in formerly colonial non-western countries.13

12 MoITis Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercio~ 83

13 Harry J. Benda, -Non-Western Intelligentsia as Political Elites· in John H. Kautsky, ed., Political Ortmge in Undsr Developed Coun1ries (New York), 235­ • 257. 6

• By taking up bath a political and a military role, the Indonesian army transformed itself into the most important politica1 force in

Indonesia - so important that it has dominated Indonesian society and

politics for the last three decades; particularly after the New Order

regime came to power in 1966. The socio-poütical role of the army,

however, was not accepted by aIl national elements. The political parties,

for instance, and especially Islamic groups, have been vety critical of this

dual function. It is clear that a military institution is not a democratic

one. Consequently, the implementation of this concept would put

democratic life at risk. Moreover, Indonesia has adopted a democratic

model, under which civilian-political elites exercise control over the • military through a formai set of rules, which specify the functions of the military and the conditions under which the military may exercise its

power.14 The opposition of political Islam towards the concept of dual

function clearly shows the rivahy between the army and political Islam.

The dis.!lute over whether or not the army's dual function was

justified aIso involved a small segment within the military itself.

Ironically, this faction was 100 by General Nasution, who initially

proposed the very idea ofcthe middIe way of the army", that later became

known as Dual Function. The initial purpose of the concept was not to • 14 Morris Janowitz, Militcuy Institutions and Coercion, 79. 7

take over the government, but merely to give the army greater moral • influence over a broad range of social, political, and economic issues. Divisions over the issue aIso extended into the army-dominated 15

party, an orgsnization which was used as a political vehicle by the New

Order government ta implement its politica1 agenda.

Shortly before the New Order regime came to power in 1966,

relations between the army and politica1 Islam were close. In fact, Islamic

groups were involved in the establishment of Sekber Golkar (Sekretariat

bersama Golongan Karya, or Joint Secretariat Functional Groups)16 and

in the successful attempt to remove from office in 1966. Golkar

was established to counter balance the increasing power of the PIQ

(Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist Party) which • reached its pinnac1e during the Guided Democracy period in the mid- 1960s.

IS Even though Goikar was established strictly as a response to the PK! (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or Indonesian Communist Party), it later became a strong political vehicle of the army-backed govemment to maintain its political interests in the New Order periode

16 The establishment of Sekber Golkar (Sekretaris bersama Golongan Karya, or the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) was supported by ninety­ seven organjzations, fifty-three of them were army-sponsored organizations along with the four Indonesian armed. forces organizations, ten intellectual organizations (sueb as Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia, Ikatan SaIjana Indonesia) as well as Islamic student organizations such as Gerakan Tentara Pelajar (Youth Army Movement), Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth), Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Association of Muslim University Students), and Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students). The • name Sekber Golkar was later change to Golkar. 8

Despite these early genial relations between Islamic groups, • military leaders and the government in their attempts which allow them to counter the increasing power of the PKI, the New arder regime, which

was formed mostly by army officers,17 bas followed on strict and adopted

a comparatively severe policy towards political Islam. The long struggle

waged by the army against severa! local rebellions, which aimed at

establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia, poisoned the New Order's

attitude towards political Islam. Politically active Islam was perceived as

a threat to the national ideology, . At the same time, under the

New arder regime, the Muslim parties' political agenda shifted from

resisting Communism to protesting against the military-controlled

government. Nevertheless there was a clear distinction in the approach of • the New arder government and the army towards political Islam and religious Islam. White the former was carefully prevented from developing

a political power-base that might challenge the established order,

religious Islam was given every accommodation by the regime.

In this thesis, 1 will focus on the politica1 struggle between

politically active Islamic groups and the army. The discussion will

analyze the socio-political role of the army and how it has affected

political Islam. The discussion will begin with the historlOO background

of the early involvement of the army in politics and its subsequent

17 It is worth noting that Javanese soldiers formed most of the army. • These Javanese oflicers mostly came from abangan orientation whose 9

impact upon its doctrinal thinking. The early relationship between the • army and political Islam will he an important aspect ofthis analysis. The next component of this discussion will consider the period

from the rise of the New Order government in 1966 until1977 when the

second general election under the New Order regime was held in

Indonesia. The end point of our discussion will be 1977. This period is

significant in that it marks an era of particular antagonism between

politica1 Islam and the army. From 1977 onward, there has been a

considerable change in the way political Islam has approached socio-

religious affairs in Indonesia, resulting in a reciprocal reIationship

between the two.

In our analysis of the 1966 to 1977 period, we will examine the • ideological vision of the military, and how this contribute to political Islam's dramatic loss of influence in the govemment. Here, the major

setbacks for political Islam will also be discussed. Finally the discussion

will conclude with an analysis of the future of political Islam and the

doctrine ofdual function in New Order Indonesia.

adherence to Islam is often weak and influenced by non-Islamic beliefs and • practices. They had little sympathy, ifany, for Islam, especially political Islam. 10

CHAPTEROlŒ

THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AND POLITICAL ISLAM UP TO • 1965: THE EARLY ENCOUNTER

A. RevolutfolUU7 Period (1945-1949)

The emergence of politica1 Islam in Indonesia can he traced back

to the tum of the centUIy. Even though the initial purposes of the

existing organizations at the time were not explicitly political, it was

apparent that there were many politica1 interests supporting their

establishment. The Muhammadiyah, for example, founded in Yogyakarta

on 18 November 1912 by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan,l was inspired by the

• modemist ideas of Muhammad Abduh. The primary concerns of the

Muhammadiyah were originally restricted ta matters of religion,

education, and social welfare, but over time the movement took on a

politica1 agenda. Alfian, one of Indonesia's leading politica1 scientists,

argues that despite its insistence that it was strictly a non-political

organization, there can be no doubt that the Muhammadiyah, due to its

socio-religious agenda, was indeed very involved in politica1 affairs of

Indonesia.2

1 Deliar Noer, The Modemist Muslirn Movement in Indo~ 1900-1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973), 73.

2 For extensive analyses oC the political role oC this organization during Dutch colonialism see Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The Political Behauior of a • Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Il

By the time Indonesian independence was proclaimed in 1945, • there were severa! socially active Islamic organizations. They were the Syarikat Islam3 (Islamic Union) founded in Surakarta in 1912, the

Muhammadiyah, Persis 4 (Persatuan Islam, or Islamic Association)

established in in 1923, the NU (Nah.dlatul Ulama, or

Renaissance of the Ulama), set up in Surabaya in 1926, Perti5

(Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, or Islamic Educational Movement)

founded in Bukittinggi in 1930, and the Ma$yumi6 (Majelis Syura

Muslimin Indonesia, or Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) set

up in Yogyakarta in 1945.

Macla Universi~ Press, 1989). There are many studies that have been written on the Muhammadiyah. See for instance, James Peacock, Purifying the Faith: The Muhammo.diyah Movement in Indonesia (Califomia: The Benjamin/ClImmings Publishing Company, 1978); Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan 7Tee: A Study of the Muhœnmadiyah in a • Central Javanese Town (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983).

3 The origin of this organization can be traced back to the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Commercial Union), which was initially established by H. Samanbudi in 1911 to unite the Muslim. traders against rising competition from Chinese traders and the economica1ly constrictive practices of the Indonesian Nobility. See Dwight Y. King, Interest Groups and Politiœl Linkage in Indonesia 1800-1965 (Michigan: Northem. TIlinois University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 35.

4 A comprehensive study of the Persatuan Islam was made by Howard M. Federspiel in his Persatuan Islam: Islamic RefoTm in Twen1ieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca: Comell Modem Indonesia Project, 1970); a1so in Deliar Noer, The Modemist, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Universit;y Press, 1973), 84-92.

5 The history of the establishment ofthe Perti and its carly development can be read in Deliar Noer, 'I1rs Modemist Muslim Movement inIndonesi4 19()().. 1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Universitr Press, 1973), 72-75.

6 An extensive study on the Masyumi was undertaken by De1iar Noer. See bis -Yasyumi: Its Organization, Ideolog,Y, and Political Role in Indonesia,· • (M. A. Thesis, Comell University, 1960). 12

The period from 1945 ta 1949 was marked by bath political strife • among political parties over the formation ofa national ideology and the anti-colonial struggle against Outch efforts to restore their hegemony.

The strife ultimately led to political paralysis. A series of coalition

governments had failed ta hold power long enough to impiement any

programs or establish any form of moral authority.7 The political parties

at that time can be categorized into two major competing groups,

Muslim nationalists and secular nationalists, who were in constant

struggle for ascendancy. Faisal Ismail asserts thus,

'Secular Nationalists' is a group of Indonesian political leaders ­ Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Hindus or others - who firmly rejected religion as the basis of the state, even though they were not personally seeularists, nor lacking in religious sentiments, tendencies, and affiliations. "Muslim NatianaIists· on the other hand is a group of Muslim leaders who deeply committed ta their • faith, believed that Islam should be used as the basis of the state. They believed that religion and state couldn't he separated sinee there is no separation of worldly matters and otherworldly affairs in the teaching ofIslam.8 In a similar vein, Boland aIso points out that it was not unusual

for individually pious Muslims ta ally themselves with the ·secular"

nationalist organizations. These were people who regarded Islam in the

7 Harold Crouch, 7hs Anny and PolitWs in Indonesia (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1978),30.

8 Faisal Ismail, -Yslam, PoIitics and ldeology in Indonesia: A Study of the Process of Muslim Acceptance of the Pancasila- (ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University, 1995), 4-5. The secularist intellectuals also comprised socialists, Christians and militaly elite coming from the abangan cultural background. ln • the Javanese cultural context, ClüI'ord Geertz in bis book, The Religion ofJava, 13

first place as religion, sa that for them religious conviction was a • persona! issue. It was, therefore, complete1y inappropriate as a governing principle for dawla (government and politicS).9

Shortly before the declaration of Indonesian independence on 17

August 1945, the Muslim nationalists and secular nationalists wrestled

over how to shape a unifying national ideology. What kind of national

ideology was to he employed to maintain national unity in an

independent Indonesia? Should it he Islamic or secular? Could there be

any choice or compromise acceptable to bath?

With the approach of independence in 1945, the issQ,e of national

vision became increasingly imperative. During discussions in the

sessions of the PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, or The • Committee ta Prepare for Indanesian Independence), the place of Islam became the subject of an intensely rancorous debate. Political Islam,

having contributed enormously to Indonesian independence, claimed

that Islam should be the basis of the state. In addition, Islamic leaders

continuously stressed that Indonesia was a Muslim country with about

90 % ofthe population considering itself Muslim.10

divided Muslims into santris (devout Muslims) and abangans (less devout or nominal Muslims).

9 B. J. Boland, 7he Struggle ofIslam in Modern Indonesia,· (Leiden: The Hague-Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 8.

10 Anthony Reid, in bis study of the Indonesian national revolution, bas noted that Muslim. representatives had ca1ways argued the need for a Muslim state in which religious Iaw would be enforceable. See Anthony J. S. Reid, • Indonesian National Revolution: 1945-1950 (Melbourne: Longman. 1974), 20. 14

The ideological conflict between the two groups over the issue of • national identity remained tense and would not he resolved until Sukarno de1ivered bis seminal speech of 1 June 1945, in which he

offered bis idea of Pancasila.ll Shortly after Sukarno's speech, a

Committee of Nine was established in order to reach a political

compromise on the question of the proper basis of the state. The

members of this committee were Sukarno, , Ahmad

Subarjo, A. A. Maramis and Muhammad Yamin, who represented the

secular nationalists on the one hand, and Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, H.

Agus Salim, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso and Abdul Wahid Hasjim who

represented the Muslim nationalists on the other. 12

ACter a long debate, the Muslim nationalists finally succeeded in • putting their ideological stamp upon the preamble to the Constitution. This document, which was signed on 22 June 1945, came to he known

as the Jakarta Charter. The formulation of Pancasila in the Jakarta

11 Pancasila (Lima Sîla, or Five Principle) is a national ideology proposed by Sukarno conta;n;"g five principles; 1) Nationalism. 2) Intemationalism, 3) Democracy, 4) Social Welfare, and 5) Belief in God. For more information on Sukarno's ideas on Pancasjla and the response of Muslim Nationalist on bis speech, see Faisal Ismail, -Islam, Politics and Ideology in Indonesia: A Study of the Process ofMuslim Acceptance ofthe Pancasila- (Ph. o. Dissertation, McGül University, 1995), 32-40.

12 Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta were the first President and Vice­ . A-A. Maramis wu Christian representative in the Committee. H Agus Salim and Abikusno Tjolaosujoso were very prominent ulama, as well as Abdul Wahid Hasjim who founded the Nahdlatul Ulama organ;zation in 1926. Faisal Ismail, -rs1am., Politics and Ideology in Indonesia-, • p.so IS

Charter was: (1) belief in Gad with the obligation to practice the Shari'a • for its adherents, (2) just and civüized humanitarianism, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom of

unanimity arising out of de1iberation amongst representatives, and (5)

social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia. 13 One particuIarly

important passage for the Muslim nationalists was the first principle

which contained the clause: • with the obligation to practice the Shari.'a

for its adherents (dengan kewajiban ~njalankan syariat Islam bagi

pemeluknya). These are the seven words (in the original Indonesian

version) which gave rise to a constitutional controversy that has

continued to this day.

The above expression, however, saon attracted harsh objections • from the secuIar nationalist faction. They maintained that religion shouId not he the basis of the state. They went on to argue that the

basis of the state was a sufticient safeguard for aIl the religions existing

in Indonesia. The situation reached a crisis point, when on the eve of

independence, the Catholics and Protestants living in the eastem parts

of Indonesia threatened to renounce the republic if the Islamic clause

remained. Ta prevent the countty from falling apart, Muhammad Hatta,

later the first vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia, invited a

representative from the Muslim nationalists to discuss their concerns. In

these discussions, a compromise was finally reached stating that there • 13 Muhammad Y8IDÎn, ed., Naskah Persiapan Unt.ümg-Undang Dasar 16

should he astate that was neither secular nor Islamic. Allan Samson • expIains that Muslim leaders on the PreparatoIY Committee agreed ta the exclusion to avoid dissension, and remained confident that this would be rectified once the strength and Moderation of Islam were demonstrated. They reaIized that the Constitution was intended ta he temporary and believed that Islam would have an intluential voice in the formulation ofa new Constitution. 14

Even though an ideological compromise was reached with the

acceptance of Pancasila as national ideology, the debate continued in

the Constituent Assembly until1959. 15

One important fact that should be notOO is that from 1945 to

1955, there was continuous tension within the Islamic parties

• themselves. As the competing concems were being worked out between

faiths, political divisions began ta appear within the Islamic

movements. 16 The first split occurred in the largest Islamic party in the

country at that time, the Masyumi. In July 1947, a number of its

members, feeling themselves excluded from decision-making process, re-

established the old PSU (Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian

Islamic Union Party).

1945, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Ya~Prapanca, 1959), 154.

14 Allan A. Samson, -Islam and Politics in Indonesia· (Ph.D. Dissertation, Universit;y ofCalifomia, Berlœ1ey, 1972), 267.

IS For further information on the Muslim response ta the debates in ConstituentAssembly on the acceptance ofPanœS11a, see Faisal Ismail, ~slam, • Politics and Ideology in Indonesia., 69-108• 17

In April 1952, the Nahd1atul Wama (NU) aIso withdrew from the • Masyumi, and transformed itselffrom a socio-religious organization into a formai political party. The NU withdrawal was largely due to the

disappointment felt by the NU's conservative CWama at being kept on the

margins of the politica1 struggle. Religious authority had little influence

within the organization. Every problem was considered only from

political point ofview, without appeal to religious guidance.17

As far as relations between the army and political Islam were

concemed, this is best illustrated by a confrontation between the leaders

of the army on the one hand, and the leaders of the Masyumi on the

other, over the issue of the Darul [slam.1S (Negara Islam, Islamic state)

rebellion, which began in 1948 in Surakarta. The leaders of the army • were anxious to know the position of the Masyumi on the rebellion. They asked Mohammad Natsir, the Prime Minister at that time and a leading

16 B. J. Boland, The Struggle ofIslam, 47.

17 H. Aboebakar, ed., Sedjarah Hidup K. H A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar (Djakarta: Panitia Buku Peringatan Almarhum K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), 478.

18 is the post-1945 movem.ent which tried to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia. As a consequent of the Renvü1e agreement between the Republican govemm.ent and the Dutch in 1948, Indonesian troops had to be withdrawn from West , where the resistance against the Dutch was organized, to Central Java. Many irregular units, however, in particular those ofthe two major Muslim guerilla organizations Hizbullah and Sabilillah refused to comply. Free from the active control of the Republican army, and mainly on the initiative of KartosuwiljoJ these units evolved their own militaIy organization and administration, which later became the core of the Islamic State of Indonesia. For a detailed discussion on Darul Islam. rebellion, see C. Van Dijle, Rebellion under the Banner ofIslam (The Hague: Martinus NijhofJ, • 1981), 69-71. 18

member of the Masyumi, to condemn the rebellion. Responding ta the • military's request, the Masyumi's leaders responded cryptically that the Most the party could sayon the matter of the Islamic State was that the

rebellion had chosen its own way. The army's leadership interpreted this

statement as an indication that Masyumi advocated the idea of a

CNegara Islam" as a means of achieving its own goals. The role of Islam,

therefore, would remain a divisive political issue.

B. Tbe .AnDy'. DoctriDal Thlnldag

The Indonesian army was officially established on 5 October 1945.

Its establishment was intended to defend the independence that had

• been proclaimed on 17 August 1945. This army was to he known as the

Army of the People's Security (TKR, or Tentara Keamanan Rakyat). The

officers of the new military forces were drawn from different

backgrounds. Some had undergone professional military training as

officers in the Dutch colonial army (KNIL, or Koninklijke Nederlandsche

Indische Leger). The majority, however, came (rom the Japanese-

sponsored PETA (Pembe1a Tanah Air, or the Defenders ofthe Fatherland)

background, and had received only adequate military training.

Consequently, they had a far less sophisticated level of militaIY training

than that obtained by the ex-KNIL groUp.19 Beside these two groups,

19 Because ofthese different backgrounds, later on, the two groups had • different visions on how the army should play its role in socio-political arena. 19

there were aIso officers who joined the army from the laskar units • during the revolution. These units were established spontaneously to fight the Dutch, but were later transformed into regular troops. These

officers usually did not have formai military training at all.

The social background of the officers aIso varied. A few of them

came from the aristocracy while a majority of the officers had peasant

backgrounds, having originally been lower-level officials, farmers, and

c1erks. The majority of army officers, however, were Javanese. This was

reasonable because the revolution took place mostly in Java. The fact

that the overwhelming majority of officers were Javanese had an

important consequence for the political orientation of the Indonesian

army. The Javanese are divided between those known as abangan, • whose adherence to Islam is often tenuous and influenced by non- Islamic beliefs and practices, and those referred to as santri, who fully

identify themselves with Islam.2o Beca.use the majority of Javanese

officers came !rom an abangan orientation, the ethos of the army as a

whole was greatly influenced by the abangan perspective, which had

little sympathy for the goals ofpolitical Islam.~l

Some ex-KNIL ofticer wanted to transform the army into an apolitical professional army, whüe the ex-PETA officers were against this idea.

20 See Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

21 Harold Crouch, Cfudonesia- in Military-Ciuilian Relations in South-East Asia, eds. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch. (Singapore: Oxford • Universi~ Press, 1985),52. 20

Ouring the revolutionary period, due to the lack of discipline and • ideological unity, the army had Iittle power to voice its political agenda. Moreover, Indonesia adopted a parliamentaIy democracy system based

on the Western model in which the militaIy is normally subordinate to

civilian control.

Despite its initial lack of effective political influence during the

revolutionary period (from 1945 ta 1949), the army, even at this early

stage, began to fonn an idea of itself as a political agent. Indeed the

anny's doctrinal thinking was shaped during this periode Deeply

involved in the struggle for independence, the militaIy leaders became

convinced that politics and militaIy afTairs were inseparably

intertwined.22 Harold Crouch states that the Indonesian army's • involvement in politics began at the time of its formation during the revolution against Outch rule and has continued ever since.23

Soon after gaining its independence, Indonesia faced overwhelming

social and economic problems. These had ta he addressed immediately.

Yet the constant rivahy among political parties was one of the primary

reasons why social and economic problems were not being properly

handled. Ouring the tirst· tive years alter Indonesian independence,

social unrest and political struggle were a part of everyday lüe. Politics

22 Harold Crouch, The Annyand Po1itics, 24. • 23 Harold Crouch, CUldonesia-, 50. 21

had been paralyzed by the polarization of the nationalist movement into • two hostile camps: Muslim nationalists and secular nationalists. These groups were involved in constant struggle over the formation of the

national ideology.

In such a situation it was to be expected that government leaders

from different rival parties would be preoccupied with political

maneuvering designed to ensure their own short-term political agenda

rather than the long-term problems of creating an effective

administration or promoting economic development. As a result,

national integration and political stability were in constant danger. The

nation teetered on the brink of a severe economic crisis. President

Sukarno and bis politicians ultimately failed in their efforts ta improve • the situation of the countly. The apparent ineifectiveness of civilian rule gave the military the excuse it would need ta interfere in matters

normally falling within the government's domaine

In the eyes of military officers, the army has saved the state from

catastrophe on severa! occasions in the past. Thus for them, they

constitute the "guardian of the state and the people of Indonesia.· This

claim is not only based upon their role in the struggle for national's

liberation, but aIso on their success against separatist forces, for threats

to security came not only from the Dutch. On 18 September 1948, for

example, the PlO (Partai Komunis Indonesia, or The Communist party) • rebelled against the government and declared a Soviet Republic in 22

Madiun in East Java. The revoit was quickly put down, but the legacy of • animosity between the army and the Communists would poison the heart ofIndonesian politics for years ta come.

In addition to armed uprising, such as the Darul Islam rebellion in

1948, there were other developments that made the army suspicious of

the Muslim community. An ideological debate between the Muslim

nationalist who wanted to estabIish an Islamic state and the secular

nationalist who wanted ta Coster Pancasila as the national vision had

taken precedence over far more pressing practical issues. The energy

consumed by theologica1 matters created a deep cynicism towards

politica1 Islam within the army. Yet the military had little sympathy

either for secular civilian politicians; these latter had proved themselves • weak and incompetent in their eyes. On 19 December 1948, the civilian government led by President Sukarno capitulated to the Dutch and had

to relocate to Yogyakarta.24 The army, led by General Sudirman,

however, refused to comply with the surrender and continued to wage a

guerilla war. The gueril1a experience during the revolution strengthened

the politica1 orientation of military officers. When the Dutch captured

24 The political leaders and militaIy oflicers were opposing each other over the issue of the tactics ta be adopted in the pursuit of the fight for independence. Politician leaders insisted that cooperation with the allies was more effective rather than waging a guerilla war against them. Harold Crouch contends that by its very nature the struggle for independence was political as weIl as military. This is because the resistance took the fonn ofguerilla warfare in which there was no clear boundmy between militaIy and civilian life, and the active fighters were heavily dependent on the support of local population• • For more information see Harold Crouch, The Annyand Politics, 24-26. 23

the politica1 leadership of the republic in December 1948, the effective • leadership ofthe revolution fell into military hands and it was the army that provided the civil administration in the nationalist-held areas until

a cease-fire was reached in the middIe of 1949.25

The army's decisiveness, when set against the ineptitude of the

civilian government left a deep impression on the Indonesian political

consciousness. An interesting remark by Peter Polomka describes the

unique nature of the Indonesian National Army:

There is no simple way ta describe the Indonesian National Army (TNI) as a politica1 force. Its ofticers come from varying ethnie, religious, social and educational backgrounds ... A very few had received Dutch mllitary training before the independence struggle. ... Still others were trained in the post independence periode But MOSt c1aims they enlist as patriots rather than career military men, and their politica1 claims are centered on their long • involvement in safeguarding the Republic.26 The army's role in internaI security, especially during the first five

years after independence, pulled it deeper into politics. U1f Sundhaussen

points out that neither the military nor civilian leaders at the time seem

to have been aware ofthe fact that using the military in internai security

operations necessarily involved them in maJdng political choices.

Inevitably the army would see the world in terms of political friends and

2S Harold Crouch, '1ndonesia-, 53.

26 Peter Polomka, IndonesiD. sinœ Sukarno (Austra1ia: Penguin Books • Australia Ltd., 1971), 79. 24

politica1 enemies as weIl.'J7 The lack of attention given by civilian • politician to the welfare of the military during the few years after independence was a further source of discontent. David Jenkins asserts

that Indonesia's pre-war nationalist leaders, Sukarno in particular, had

little concem for the political forms which Indonesia might adopt after

independence and paid almost no attention to military and defense

problems.'J8

Regarding this issue, Van Der Mehden writes:

Where the army has been in the vanguard of the struggle for independence, as in some parts of Asia, it may enter the political arena because of a belle! that the ideals of the independence movement have been betrayed by self-seeking and corrupt civilian politicians whose factional quarrels have led ta confusion and tunnoil.29

• Adding to the problem, Salim Said argues, was the sudden change of the govemmental system in November 1945 !rom an American style

presidential system to a European parliamentary system.30 This, he

claims, contributed immediately to the graduaI weakening of civilian

71 UIf Sundhaussen, 1he Road to power: lndonesian Müitary Politics 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982), 57.

28 David Jenkins, -rhe Evolution ofIndonesia Army Doctrinal Tbinking: The Concept ofDwifungsi,· SoutheastAsian Jou.rrrol ofSocial Science Il, no. 2 (1987): 15-16.

29 Fred Van Der Mehden, The Politics ofDeveloping Nations (New Jersey: Englewood Clift"s, 1969), 93.

30 Salim Said, -nte Political Role of the Indonesian Military: Past, Present, and Future·, Southeast Asian Jou.rrrol ofSocial Science, vol. 15, no. 1 • (1987), 19. 25

institutions. Mter this change the state ground ta a halt as it tried ta • accommodate the new system. Furthermore the new parliamentaIy system allowed the creation of many political parties which in tum

created even more problems for a newly barn caunay that still lacked a

strong sense ofitself.

As far as the army was concemed, the ineffectiveness of civilian

politicians was the root cause of the general political turmoil and many

rebellions. Yet since the rebellions place army personnel at risk, they

helped pave the way for direct militaIy involvement in the political

decision maIdng process.

C. Parliameatazy Democney Period (1950-1959)

• There were at least two important events which took place during the period of liberal democracy which influenced the development of

Indonesian politics, the 1955 general election and the introduction of

martiallaw in 1957. In 1955, Indonesia held its tirst general election.

The results of this election brought no decisive victory' to any of the 29

political parties.31 As a result, a political compromise was necessary

31 The PNI gained 22.3 per cent of total votes, while Masyumi got 20.9 per cent. NU received 18.4 per cent and the PKI gained 16.4 per cent of total . votes. See Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca:" Comell • University, 1957), 58-59. 26

both in Parliament and in the Constituent Assembly.32 The result was • that governments necessarily took the form of coalitions between rival parties which represented difIerent and contlicting political agenda.

During the period ofliberal democracy, and up ta about 1957, the

army's political roIe was fairly small. This was largely because the army

accepted the principle based on the western liberal democratic tradition

in which the military was subordinate to civilian supremacy. More than

that, during this period the army did not have a shared ideolagy, clear

program, or well-defined politica1 goals. It was on the political defensive

at this time.33 The army, according ta Feith and Casties, repeatedly

claimed to the parliamentary govemment that it was the ultimate

guardian of the independence for which its members had given their • lives and wouId do so again ifneed he.34 This was a very clear statement

32 This Assembly wu elected in 1955 in order to draft and approve the definitive Constitution for the Republic of Indonesia. After several years, the Assembly had reached agreement on a number of issues. One question, however, had developed into a major issue that could not arrive at any compromise. This was the question of the basis of the state. The Islamic parties, which advocated Islam as the basis of the state, had to face the nationalist bloc, which advocated Pancasila as the basis of the state. For almost two and a ha1f years, many meeting were held to solve this problem, without coming any nearer to a solution. To break the deadlock, President Sukamo decided to issue a presidential decree on 5 July 1959, which declared the retum to the 1945 Constitution in which Pancasi1a was the basis of the state. This was also the beginning of Guided Democracy. For a detailed discussion of the events leading to the implementation of Guided Democracy, see B. J. Boland, 7he StruggleofIslam, 90-100.

33 Daniel S. Lev, -rIte Political Role of the Army in Indonesia-" Pacifie Affairs, vol. 36, no. 4 (1963): 349-350.

34 Herbert Feith and Lance Castle, eds., Indonesian Political Thinking • 1945-1965(Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press, 1970), 412. 27

of political resolve considering that the liberal political system was • proving itself to be unable to cope with the increasing political tensions in the countIy. Government leaders failed not only in the creation of

effective administration, but aIso in promoting economic development.

This lack of institutionaI and material advancement extended into the

militaIy as weIl.

Some military officers, for example, especially the better-trained

ex-KNIL ofticers (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger, or the Dutch

colonial army) sought to tum the revolutionary guerilla forces into a

disciplined and apolitica1 professional army along the western model,

i.e., under the control of the civilian government. This proposai,

however, was rejected by ather officers, particuIarly ex-PETA afficers • (Pembela Tanah Air, or Defenders of the Fatherland),3S who saw ütt!e reason for military men ta renounce a political roIe, especially when

their own interests were involved.36 As the conflict within the

parliamentary arena grew sharper, the pressure for army intervention

3S PETA was the Japanese-sponsored army initially trained to support Japanese troops against the Allies. The level of skill of these officers was less sophisticated than that obtained by the ex..KNIL group.

36 Harold Crouch, -Indonesia-, 54. • 28

became overwhelming.37 Some military officers were personally offended • by the behavior ofparliament.38 The conflict became even more compücated after the rival parties

in the parliament sought military support and military factions sought

support from the politica1 parties. Tensions reached their climax on 17

October 1952 when the army's senior officers demanded that President

Sukarno dismiss parliament. The army promised the President their full

SUpport.39 The proposal itself was a c1ear sign that the army would

expand the scope ofits activities in arder ta reduce the possibility of any

further assaults by poIiticians on what the army regarded as its internai

affairs.

Another important event which took place during the period of • liberal democracy was the introduction of martial law in 1957. The introduction of martial law itself was intended ta extinguish severa!

locally based resistance movements such as those in Sulawesi, Ambon

and Aceh, as weIl as the Darul Islam revoIt in . By the mid-

1950s, disaffection with the civilian government had become more wide-

37 Herbert Feith and Lance Castle, 009., Indonesian Political Th.inking, 412.

38 Politica1 interference, inadequate supplies, and bad material conditions within the army had angered them. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democmcy inIndDMSia (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1962), 263; Daniel S. Lev, -TIte Political Role ofthe Army in Indonesia-, Pacifie Affairs, vol. 36, no. 4 (Wmter 1963-64), 350.

39 For further information on a number ofthe background events leading ta this occasion, see Herbert Feith, TIte Decline of Constitutional Dernocracy, • 246-260. 29

spread, particularly in the outer islands. Complaining of political • domination and economic exploitation byJava, and fearing the growth of communist influence in Jakarta, regional militaIy commanders

organized a series of local coups in Sumatra and Sulawesi which won

popular support in these predominantly Istamic regions. As for political

Islam, this wouId he the beginning of a long struggle for political

recognition.4O

With the introduction of martiallaw, the military leadership had

now assumed political power over the country. Harold Crouch contends

that during the following years, the concept of the army as an apolitical

tool of the state quickly gave way ta the aIder idea that the army was the

guardian of the national interest with the responsibility to intervene in • political affairs whenever the weaknesses of civilian government made it necessary.41 As far as the army was concemed, the parliamentary

system did not work and therefore should he abandoned and replaced

by a new system in which they could he more involved in the political

decisions of the country.42 During the last two years of liberal democracy

40 See Harold Crouch, cIndonesia-, 55.

41 Harold Crouch, The Anny and Politicsl 30.

42 Some of the important factors which can be considered to be central to the fsilure ofparliamentary democracy were the lack ofa unüied leadership in the political parties, the numerous parties contending for power, the growing hostility between secular and religious political parties, and the Jack of understanding between the Cabinets and the extra-parliamentary forces like • the President and the army. 30

(1957-1959), the military leadership began to claim a degree of power • that had formerly been the prerogative of nonrniUtary sectors. With the introduction of martial law over the whole of Indonesia in March 1957,

the army was able to assume wide powers in virtually every field. As

Harold Crouch explains:

Martial law gave wide powers to the central army leadership and the regional commanders who were able to participate directIy in government decision-making. Further, their responsibility ta maintain security enabled them to take strong action against their politica1 opponents.43

During martial law, the army command structure, which now

paralleled civilian govemment organizations throughout the countIy,

was to an intents and purposes the actual govemment.44 Even though

• the purpose of martial law was ta extinguish all resistance movements,

it no daubt helped advance the desire of militaIy officers to assume

nonmilitary roles such as cabinet members, ambassadors, provincial

govemors, senior civil servants, university rectors, and executives in

government firms.

Convinced that its participation in the govemment was necessaty,

the oId internai fissures began ta close.45 Newly unified and with a

43 Harold Crouch, -Indonesia-, 56.

44 Howard M. Federspiel, -rhe Military and Islam in Sukarno's Indonesia-, PacificAffairs, voL 46, no. 3 (Fall1973), 407.

45 The contlict within the army was triggered by the views of the better­ trained ex-KNIL oflicers ta tum the revolutionary gueri11a forces into a • disciplined and apolitical professional army, which emphasize on 31

common sense of purpose, the army took advantage of the weakness of • the parliamentary system to press for a new government structure in which the army's place would be central. Together with President

Sukarno the army 100 the way for the reintroduction of the republican

1945 Constitution. This would provide the institutional framework for

Guided Democracy.46

D. GuIde. Democracy Period (1959-196&)

The Guided Democracy system, which was introduced in 1959 to

replace the parIiamentaIy constitution, was based on the 1945

Constitution. The implementation of Guided Democracy was a direct

• result of the fallure ofthe Constituent Assembly ta draft and approve the

definitive Constitution for the Republic of Indonesia. In introducing the

new system, the president had the support ofthe army leadership which

provided him with organizational backing that he needed. Under the

Guided Democracy system, the army played an increasingly direct raIe

in government and administration. The political power of the military

was formally based on martial law which had been introduced to deal

with the regional revoIt in the Mid 1950s.47

professionalism. The ex-PETA officers, whose technica1 military proficiency was secondary to that ofthe ex-KNIL group, opPOsed the idea.

46 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics, 33-34. • 47 Harold Crouch, -Indonesia-, 56. 32

During the period of Guided Democracy, military officers • unambiguously entered the political elite. Military leaders extended and defended their involvement in non-military sectors. Writing of the

increasing role of the military in non-military sectors, Harold Crouch

states:

Army officers formed the largest groups in Sukarno's Supreme Command which in practice replaced the cabinet as the key day­ to-day decision-making body. In the cabinet about one-third of the minister were drawn from the armed forces and many senior officiaIs in government departments had military backgrounds.48 Not only did military oflicers get involved in politics, they aIso

joined the economic elite. The involvement of the military in business

increased remarkably under martial law once local commanders found

themselves able to use their influence in the administration to ensure

that licenses, credit, contracts and other facilities were made available to

• enterprises with which the military was associated.49

Yet because martiallaw was temporaIy and under great scrutiny

from all politica1 camps, it was at this time that General Abdul Haris

Nasution, the Army Chief of Staff (KSAO, Kepala Staff Angkatan Darat),

proposed a policy which he referred to as -the middle way." This policy

advocated the -dual function" of the Indonesian army and was an

attempt ta address civilian concerns while at the same time justifying

the presence of the army in non-militaty sectors. The initial idea of dual

48 Ibid. • 49 Ibid, 57. 33

function was proposed in bis speech of Il November 1958 to the • graduation class at the military academy at Mage1ang. Speaking without notes he said that the position ofthe TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or

Indonesian National Army) was not like that of an army in a Western

countIy, where the military was solely an -instrument of the

govemment.· Neither was it like those in various Latin America

countries where they monopolized political power. Rather, he asserted,

the TNI was one of the forces of the people's struggle which was at the

same levei and which fought shoulder to shoulder with other national

political forces. 50

According ta Nasution, the Indonesian army could not and would

not copy the Latin American model where the army acted as a direct • political force; nor would the army emulate the Western European model where armies are lifeless tools ofthe govemment.51

The intent of Dual Function was intentionally vague. The army

would neither be politically active nar simply a spectator. Thus the

concept ofDual Function served as a justification for the military to play

an equal role in making political decisions and in making its voice heard

without assuming direct control. Daniel S. Lev argues that Nasution's

concem at this time was to ensure that the military cantinued to

50 Cited from David Jenkins, -nte Evolution ofIndonesia Army Doctrinal Thinking: The Concept of ,· Southeast Asian JOU1"1ItÙ ofSocial Science Il, no. 2 (1987): 20. Beœuse tbis speech was made without a text, the only • record ofit is in contemponuy newspaper reports. 34

exercise an influence in decision maldng, if only to keep the political • parties, and in particular the increasingly powerful PKI, at bay.52 Under Guided Democracy, politics revolved around the army and

the President as the two pillars of the system. The PlO, however,

continued to challenge the army for ultimate succession.53 In the 1955

General Election for example, the PK! received a total of 16.4 percent of

the votes (39 seat out of 260 seats in the House of Representatives), the

fourth largest after the PNI with 57 seats, the Masyumî with 57 seats,

and NU with 45 seats.S4 According ta Baladas Ghoshal, the PKI's

considerable success in the election was aise due ta its growing

alignment with the nationalist forces. 5s The intensification of this

ideological conflict became the main feature in politics after the 1955 • election. The PKI, motivated by political interests, found it necessary to support the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian National

Party) in defending the Pancasila state.

The army, however, was not alone in its animosity towards the PKI.

Isa Anshary of the Masyumi argued that the Communists never openly

51 UlfSundhaussen, The Raad ta Power, 126.

52 Daniel S. Lev, *The Politica1 Role of the Army in Indonesia,· Pacifie Affairs36 (Winter 1963-1964), 349-364

53 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics, 34.

54 For the result of the parliamentaIy elections see A Van Marle, -rhe First Indonesian Parliamentary Elections·, Indonesia 9 (1956): 258.

55 Baladas GhoshaI, Indonesian Politics 1955-1959: The Emergence of • Gu.i.ds1 Democracy (New Delhi, Calcutta.: KP Bagchi 8& Company, 1982), 47. 35

expressed the nature of their ideology, but were waiting for a chance to • take political power; ooly then would they reveal their real agenda, by destroying Pancasila principles in order ta impose their Marxist ideology

on the nation. If this were to happen, Anshary wamed, all those who

advocated the Pancasila would quickly realize that their unity was

groundless.56 To counter the PlO, Indonesia needed to retum ta its

natura! position of authority. Mohammad NatsirS7, the president of the

Masyumi, despite a qua1ified acknowledgement of some good ideas

contained in the Pancasila, argued that the explanations and arguments

put forward by its supporters were not sufticient to convince bim and

bis Muslim colleagues in the Constituent Assembly to accept it as the

basis ofthe state:

• Of course, nobody denies that there are good ideas in the Pancasila. Yet the arguments given by its supporters demonstrate that they themselves cannot explain what are its true contents, its proper sequence, its source, its nucleus, and the inter-dependence

56 Ten:tang Dosar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam. Konstituante. vol. 2 (Bandung: Konstituante Republik Indonesia. 1958), 237.

57 Bom in 1908 at Alahan Panjang (West Sumatra). Natsir be10nged ta a modemist Muslim family and was very active in the Persis in Bandung. He was a leader ofthe PIT (Indonesian Islamic Party) (1938), president orthe Masyumi (1952-1959) and the first Prime Minister of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (1950). He selVed as minister of information in three cabinets ofthe Old Order govemment. In the 19709 he was appointed vice-president orthe Mu'tamar al­ 'Alam al-Islami (Islamic World Congress) and one of the members of the executive board of the Rabitah al-'Alam al-IsJamï (Islamic World League). From 1970s untll bis death in 1992 was president of the DDD (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, or Indonesian Islamic Propagation Couneil). See O. Q. Raeder and Mahidin Mahmud, Who's Who in Indonesia (Singapore: Gunung • Agung, 1980), 192. 36

of its components. Because these are not clear, the difficu1ties then gradually arise. Since the foundation ofour state needs to be clear and distinct so as- not ta confuse the nation, it is difticult for • our group ta aceept something which is vague.58

In the Constituent Assembly, the attempt by Muslim groups ta

have -the seven words· of the Jakarta Charter aftirming Islam as the

basis of the state reinstated proved unsuccessful. It was overruled by

the combined opposition of President Sukarno, the PNI, the PKI, the

Christian parties, and ultimately, the army.59 The ideological battle

between the representatives of the Islamic political parties and those of

the non-Islamic politica1 parties in the Constituent Assembly resulted in

a deadIock. Bath sides defended their own uncompromising vision for

Indonesia. In an attempt to break this deadlock and to prevent national • unity from disintegrating, President Sukarno, with the support of the army under the leadership of General Nasution, issued a presidential

decree on 5 July 1959 which proclaimed a retum ta the 1945

Constitution.60 This decree also meant that the Pancasila would he

entrenched as the sole ideological basis of the state. Sukarno then

dissolved the Constituent Assembly, implemented what he called

58 Mohammed Natsir, Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara (Bandung: Pimpinan Fraksi Masyumi dalam Konstituante, 1957), 5.

59 David Jenkins, Suhmto andHis generals, 10.

60 Muhammad Yamin, ed., Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar • 1945, vol. 3 (Jakarta: Prapanca, 1960), 662-663. 37

CGuided Democracy"61 and later established the Provisional People's • Consultative Council. Guided Oemocracy was a major setback for political Islam.

Masyumi was ofticially ordered to disband on 17 August 1960 by

President Sukarno. The reason for this was due to its attitude towards

the 1958 rebellion of the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik

Indonesia, or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)

which had taken place in Sumatra.6~ Because the Masyumi had

consistently opposed Sukarno's concept of Guided Democracy, and

shown some ambivalence towards the revoIt, it was Iabeled the party of

separation and rebellion.63 Indeed, the regime had valid reasons for

suspicion. Even though Masyumi did not officially support the rebellion, • three of its leaders had in lact joined the PRRI revoIt. In response, Sukarno arrested most of the Masyumi leadership. The revoIt itself,

however, had not been entirely a Muslim affair and not aIl Muslim

groups had sided with it. Many of the mast prominent PRRI military

61 For further discussions of Su.kamo's Guided Democracy, see for exampIe, Baladas GhoshaI, Indonesian Politics 1955-1959 : The Emergence of Guided Democracy (New Delhi, Calcutta: KP Bagchi 8& Company, 1982); Daniel S. Lev, The Transtition ta Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957­ 1959(lthaca : Come11 University-Modem Indonesia Project, 1965).

62 For further discussions on the background of the revoIt, see Baladas Ghoshal, lndonesianPolitics 1955-1959, chapter IV, -rranstition to Guided Democra.cy - The Aftermath of Konsepsi and the 1958 Rebellion,· 116-156.

63 Daniel S. Lev, 7hs Raad to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: Comell • University Press, 1966), 185. 38

leaders were Christians, including Warouw, Simbolon, Kawilarang and • Sumual. Nevertheless, the perception was that it was an Islamic revoIt and Masyumi as the major political party was now excluded from

politics.

Sukarno's Guided Democracy aIso served ta strengthen the

position of the PKI. The growing power of the PKI was considered by the

military to be a direct threat ta its own position. The worst nightmare of

the army seemed to he unfolding when the PK! launched a bloody coup

d'état on September 30, 1965. Six generals and one lieutenant were

assassinated in quick succession. The military under the command of

General , Chief of the Army Strategie Reserve Command

(Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat, Kostrad) immediately counter­ • attacked, quelling the coup and reasserting the army's position. Following the failed coup of the PKI, Sukarno's politica1 power declined

drastica1Iy. The collapse of the PK! and the downfall of Sukarno were

crucial to the emergence of the New Order govemment. The army was

now the organization best positioned to shape Indonesia's politica1 and

socio-economic institutions.

• CHAPTERTWO • THE nmoRESIAR MlLITARY AIm POLITICAL ISLAM UImBR THE lŒ\V ORDER REGIME (1966-1977)

A. The "Rise" ofthe MWtuy

The critical role ofthe military in the defeat of the PKI revoit of 1965

facilitated the rise of the army ta a pre-eminent political position within

the New Order regime. 1 Owing ta the extreme >violence of this power

struggle 2, politica1 discourse in Indonesia has been forever marked by it.

Politica1 power became centra1ized in the hands of the Indonesian

military forces who throughout this period Iargely monopolized the • politica1 decision-making process.

1 The term New Order' is used to refer to Suharto-Ied government which came to power in 1966. The New Order regime aims at creating a system in which politica1, economic, and culturallife is inspired by Pancasila , based on belief in God. Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy. and Social Justice. See Nawaz B. Mody, Indonesia under SUhœto (New York: Apt Books Inc., 1987), 178.

2 Ernst Utrecht in bis Ten YeaTS 1 Military TenorinIndonesia says Cduring the chaos, whiCh followed the coup, the surviving part ofthe military leadership took the opportuni~ to butcher their arch-enemies, the Communists. About 500,000 innocent communists, peasants, workers, schoolteachers, youth and women were mercilessly killed by the Army's crack troops, RPKAD, and fanatic Moslem youths incited by landowners, businessmen and anti-Communist müitary like General Nasution and Sukendro. About 250.000 other ~ocent persons were arrested. Still the militaly are detaining without trial about 100.000 politica1 prisoners in various prisons and concentration camps.- Emst Utrecht, -Military Elite,- in Malcolm. Caldwell, ed., Ten Years' Militœy Terror in • Indonesia, (Nottingham: The Russell Press Ltd., 1975).43-44. 40

Following its successful response ta the PIa coup on 30 September • 1965, the army moved in, and after a bloody one-sided battle, itself deposed Sukarno. By March 1966, a conseIVative military-backed regime

under the leadership ofa relatively unknown general called Suharto had

firmly established itself.3 Sukarno's political power saon declined

drastically mainly because of bis Callure to meet three popular demands:

1) to dissolve the PK!; 2) ta purge the cabinet of allleftist elements; and

3) to reduce prices in order ta improve economic conditions.4 These three

demands were lmown as Tritura (tiga tuntutan hati rwrani rakyat, or

three demands of the people's conscience).

Due ta bis decHning support and the ever increasing level of

political turmoil, Sukarno issued the ~tter of Il March,-5 in which he

• 3 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics under Suhœto (New York: Routledge. 1993), p. 1; General Suharto was barn on June 8, 1921 at Kemusu. Argomulyo, Jogjakarta and began bis career in military seIVÎce. He graduated from Militaty Cadres School KNIL (Koninly7c Nederlandsch-Indische Leger = Royal NetherlandJs East Indies Anny) in 1940. On May 1, 1963, Suharto was appointed ta be commander ofJakarta-based Army Strategie Reserve Command (Kostrad). Following the communist abortive coup, Suharto was chosen by Sukarno to receive the March Il order, popularly lmown as Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, and achieved a remarkable suceess in restoring arder and securiW. This success led him to be promoted as four stars general of Indonesian army on July 1, 1966. He was then appointed acting President on Feb 22, 1967 and become President on March 27, 1968. For more detailed information on Suharto's career, see O.G Raeder and Mahidin Mahmud, WhoJs Who inIndonesia (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1980), 1-4.

4 Bee Tim Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Bohan Penataran Pedoman Penglulyatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila, Undong-Uruùmg Dasar 1945 dan Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara (Jakarta: Sekretariat Tim Pembinaan Penatar dan Bahan Penataran Pegawaï Republik Indonesia, 1978),91.

S In Indonesian history, the trtetter of Il March 1966- is known as • (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, or the Decree of Il March 1966). 41

ordered Suharto to take aIl measures considered necessary to guarantee • security, calm, and stability of the govemment and the revolution, and to ensure the persona! safety and authority of the President, as well as to

cany out aIl the teachings orthe Great Leader ofthe Revolution.6

Suharto, personally invested with vast powers, wasted no time in

crushing the army's chiefpolitical enemy, the Communists. On 12 March

1966, he ordered the dissolution of the PK! and its affiliated

organizations throughout the country. Within a short span of time, the

political atmosphere in the capital underwent a dramatic reversai.

Following this success, a year later on 12 March 1967, Suharto was

officially named Acting President, and selVed thereafter as the second

president of the Republic ofIndonesia until May 1998.7 • Ouring the first year of bis presidency, Suharto was still in search of a political vision. As a military man, it was naturaI that he would look

ta the military for support and direction. Thus he instituted the doctrine

of the dual function of the army which greatly expanded the army's

influence into non-military spheres. There was, however, no clear

statement as to what kind of government the doctrine was intended ta establish, and according ta Leo Suzyadinata:

6 Suripto, Surat Perintah Il MOTet (Surabaya: Grip, 1969), 74. For a detailed discussion leading to this event, see Harold Crouch, The Anny and Politîcs in lndonesia (Ithaca and London: Comell University Press, 1978), 179­ 189. • 42

Within the military itself, there were at least two groups, the militants who wanted to eradicate al1 politica1 parties 8 and the moderates who wanted to maintain a political system in which • parties would be preserved.... The latter group realized the influence of political parties among population and wanted ta gain some kind of legitimacy through working within the existing political system, at least to majntain its format if not its substance.9

It was c1ear to the military leaders that the past experiments with

the liberal political system and Guided Democracy had bath failed ta

establish strong govemment and economic growth. A total restructuring

of the political system was, therefore, proposed on the grounds that the

former ideologically based muIti.-party system had been responsible for

much of Indonesia's political instability in the past. 10 General Nasution,

in a speech delivered on 16 July 1962 stated that:

• We have witnessed this system of liberal democracy being applied in the administration of our state, (and) we have felt the consequences and seen the results thereof. Liberal democracy in Indonesia has led to political contlicts, ·political delinquencies·,

7 B.J. Boland, The Struggle ofIslam in Modem Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoft: 1982), 142.

8 Civilian politicians were regarded as being selfish and opportunistic people who looked for the satisfaction of their own interests at the expense of the nation. Consequently, the army oflicers were critical of the political parties. They tended to see political parties as the source of aIl chaos and misery in the put As a militaIy man, Suharto shared the same view.

9 Leo SuIyadinata, Müitary AscendtJncy and Political Culture: A Study of 1ndonesia's OOLlCAR (Central for International Studies: Ohio University, 1989), 20-21.

10 Mubammad K8ma] Hassan, Muslim. lntel1.ectual. Re890rtSeS to New OrtIer Modemization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka • Kementrian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982), 3• 43

rebellions and the destruction of the national culture and maraIs resulting in efforts of poütical parties establishing themselves as ·pressure groups· and the like, sa that as a nation we had almost • lost the ideological basis giving a nation the characteristics and identity ofits own. Il

Up to the commencement of the New Order regime, there was no

major political party which represented the interests of the military.12

Consequently, it was difficult for Suharto ta use the existing political

parties ta accommodate the armyès agenda. 13 He, therefore, looked for

an organization that wauld best serve as bis politica1 vehic1e. Harold

Crouch argues that Suharto had originally wanted ta establish a pro­

military faction of anti-Communist and antï-Sukarno intellectuals within

a well-established party, but had abandoned the idea by mid-1968

• deciding instead ta foster the expansion of Sekber Golkar. 14 Golkar

(Golongan Karya, or Functional Group) was established on 20 October

1964 ta compete with the communist and leftwing forces during the

Guided Democracy era. In arder to marshal support !rom antï-PKI forces,

11 A.H. NasutioD, Indonesian National Anny and the Indonesian Revolution, speech on the occasion of receiving the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa. of Socio-Politica1 Sciences !rom Andalas State University in Padang on 16 July 1962.

12 Leo Suryadinata, Müitary AscendD.ncy, 20.

13 Morris Janowitz notes that if the militmy was to succeed in providing national leadership and promoting mass support for its policies, it had ta develop a political apparatus outside the military establishment, but under its direct domination. Bee Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay irL Comperative Analysis (Chicago: University of • Chicago Press, 1964), 29• 44

the army, under General Nasution, together with students and • intellectuals, got together and discussed strategies to counter the growing strength of the PlO. Of the ninety-seven institutions and

organizations which took part in the meeting, fifty-three were army-

sponsored organizations along with the four Indonesian armed forces

organizations. 15

Suharto, therefore, chose Golkar as a medium through which he

could gain political support from both the military and civilian

politicians. As far as the armys interests were concemed, the new

political format engineered by Suharto gave a great opportunity for even

greater involvement in the national political rea1m. Following its success

in taking tirm control over the country, the New Order sought ta • establish the legitimacy ofits authority as the protector of: (a) an arder of the state and nation which is based on the implementation of the Panca.sila and the 1945 constitution in a pure and consistent manner. (b) an arder that wishes ta realize the ideals of independence, that is, a just and prosperous Indonesian society based on the Pancasila. (c) an arder that wishes to establish the system of state and society based on the constitution, democracy and law. (d) an arder of constitution and an arder of development. 16

14 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1978), 245-252.

15 See Leo Suryadjnata, Military Ascendtmcy, 10-12. • 16 Tim Pembinaan Penatar, BahanPenataran, 167. 45

The highest priority of the New Order was ta secure politica1 • stability and foster a dynamic continuation of national development. In its attempt to maintain social order and economic growth, however, the

new govemment adopted strict security measures. The army was the

main player. Under the New Order regime, the army would become so

deeply involved in the regulation of civil society that it couId be argued

Indonesia had become a military state. This, however, had not been the

intent behind the original idea of -the middIe waY' proposed by General

Nasution in 1958. According ta bis conception of the army's roIe,

Nasution clearly wamed that the political involvement of the Indonesian

military should not be aimed at taking over the state. If the armed forces

were to perform a political role at aIl, then this should only be in the MPR • (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or PeopIe's Consultative Counci1), and not in the day-to-day politics of the country.17 The placement of military

officers in civilian positions was therefore a deviation from the initial

intent of«the midd1e waY'. On this issue, Nasution asserts that:

During the New Order, the concept and the implementation of the dual function of the army bas deviated substantially as opposed ta the initial goal. ABRI, which is supposed to be -the people's force-, has become -the government force-. Indications to this direction can be seen by what is called -mobilization- and -participation-.18

17 See Bilveer Sïngh, 'l11e Dual Function of1he Indonesian Armed Forces: OriginsJ Actualization and Imp1i.cotions for Stability and Development (Singapore Institute ofInternational Aftàirs, 1995), 125 • 18 A.H. Nasution. -Ydentitas ABRI" Muhibah No. 9, Tahun XVI (1982), 20. 46

According to Howard M. Federspiel, the political system developed • by the New Order regime had five principal characteristics. These can be summarized as follows: (1) the military controlled government was

oriented such that state security and domestic peace received top

priority; (2) the political system rested on the patrimonialism of the

military leadership; thus state employees, peasants and various other

societal groups were organized ta provide a political base for government

policies; (3) national economic development was the responsibility of a

group of highly respected technocrats; this group won the support of

major international financial institutions sucb as the World Bank, the

International MonetaIy Fund, and the Asian Development Bank for

development plans, which had the approval bath of the international • agencies and the military officers who controlled the government; (4) the government stressed agricultural production, which 100 to a food surplus

and fostered a generally prosperous farm population, thereby providing

stability ta the rural areas despite heavy population pressures; and (S}

the national philosophy-called the Five Principles (Pancasila)- was

maintained as the sole basis ofall public activity.19

As far as the methods used by the New Order regime to achieve its

politica1 aims, Dr. Mochtar Pabottinggi has identified four: (1) giving the

army a special role and position not only as a security force but aIso as a

19 Howard. M. Federspiel. ~uslim. Intellectual- Asian SunJey, vol. 31, no. • 3 (March 1991), 232-233• 47

socio-political force; (2) treating Golkar as a favorite child, to the extent • that Golkar was chosen as the govemment's political vehic1e; (3) launching a systematic policy of depoliticizing ail socio-political forces;

and (4) filling the state's representative body in two ways, byappointing

its representatives from above and by selecting them through general

elections.2o Strongly supported by state resources and dominated by

militaJy officers, the New Order regime was determined ta win the second

general election in 1971 in order ta legitimate its mIe. Prior to this

eIection, army involvement in the political arena was limited to officers

campaigning for Golkar during the elections and identifying themselves

with the agenda of the organization. This made the distinction between

the two organizations very unclear. Allan A. Samson explains that:

• The New Order's tirst parliamentary election in 1971 was designed ta serve two purposes: to formulize a politica1 system, dominated at an levels by the bureaucracy, with President Suhano and the armed forces holding the reins of power but sharing some of its exercise and benefits with civilian officia1dom; and to legitimate that system as Indonesian expression of the principle of popular sovereignty in the eyes bath ofits own citizemy and of the world.21

After the eIection, however, the army officers identified themselves

more as members of the armed forces than as members of Oolkar.

20 See Kompas, Febru81Y 9, 1994.

21 Allan A. Samson, -Indonesia 1973: A Climate of Concem- in Asian • SUrvey, vol. 14, no. 2 (February 1974), 258. 48

Commenting on the characterîstics of bath Golkar and the army, Crouch • states: Despite the electoral success, the Golkar was essentiaIly a creation of the military authorities and had little sense of separate identity. Lacking bath a party organization of its own and roots in society, the Golkar was a temporary federation of heterogeneous organizations mobilized by the army with the intention of weakening the parties. Conceived as an electoral machine designed to undermine the strength ofopponents rather than create a new Cocus of loyalty and identification, the Golkar showed no signs ofdeveloping into a means ofchanneling civilian aspirations upwani.~2

It was obvious that the military leadership had to ~tain two

identities at the same time. At times they were officers in the service of

the nation, at others they were the ruling party. In any case, Golkar

• proved itself to he an effective political vehicle for Suharto. During the

campaign period, seme miIitary officers, for example, were reported to

have threatened people that they would get into ·trouble- if they did not

vote for Golkar. Once elected, the military officers filled Most of the

important positions in bath the state apparatus and parliament. The

large number of miIitary ofticers serving in civiIian positions such as

govemorships, district officerships and village headships, created an

uproar among politica1 parties, especially among the Islamic groups.

Concerning the composition of the military officers in the DPR

(Dewan PerwakiJan Rakyat, or People's Representative Councfi) and in

• 22 Harold Crouch, 71le Anny andPolitics, p. 271. 49

the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People's Consultative • Council) at this time, Leo Suryadinata notes that: The grip on Indonesian politics by the military-dominated government can he seen in the composition of the DPR and the MPR. The national DPR consisted of 460 members, 360 of which were elected, whfie 100 were appointed (25 civilians and 75 military) by the government (president). The structure clearly favored the government. More conspicuous was the composition ofthe MPR which had 920 members, 460 ofwhich came Û'Om the DPR, one third were appointed from the military by the president, and the rest were local representatives. Because of this political structure, many argued that the development and the military were bound to control the state legislative and executive branch.23

The army's seats significantly strengthened Golkar's position in the

parliament, since it was no secret that the army and Golkar spoke with

• one voice. Commenting on the political dominance of the military,

Michael R. J. Vatikiotis points out that:

By the late 1970s, half the cabinet and two thirds of the regional govemorship were military appointees. In the bureaucracy, 78 per cent of directors general and 84 per cent of ministerial secretaries were ABRI appointees. Even in the diplomatic service, aImost half the country's ambassadors were !rom the miIitary in 1977. In the early 1980s, a former US diplomat estimated that active and retired militaIy men-occupied half the positions in the 'higher central bureaucracy'. More importantly, the military dominated the affairs of every cabinet department. Some of the appointments, especially the diplomatie service were granted to retiring officers. The majority was on the active list and valued the wider publicity and greater opportunities for numeration (sic) offered by their postS.24

23 Leo Suryadinata, Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in • Indonesia (Singapore: Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies, 1982), 7. 50

General Ali Murtopo, a former spokesman for the New Order, aIso • implicitly acknowledged that the army and Golkar were one and the same. He wrote:

Some circles are of the opinion that the triumph of Golkar was achieved due to the following factors: the avaiIability offunds, the support of the officers, particularly from ABRI, the formation of Korpn'25 within various ministries, institutions and firms, and aIso various forms of intimidation. AlI of this contributed ta the triumph of the Golkar.~6

As far as the process of forming government policies was

concemed, bath Golkar and the army would usually work hand in hand.

As was feared by political parties, the government's justification of the

army's dual function resulted in political abuses by the military. Together

• with Golkar, the army had successfully dominated political power and

used it to achieve its interests and implement the government's political

agenda.

24 Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, IndDnesian Politics under Suharto (New York: Routledge, 1994), 70-71.

2S Korpri is an acronym of Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik lndonesia (Corps of Govemment Workers of the Republic of Indonesia). As a corps of govemment workers, the members of Korpri were instructed ta vote for government party, Oolkar. • 26 Ali Murtopo, 8trategiPolitikNasionm (Jakarta: CSIS, 1974), 82-83. SI

• B. The Rew Order'. Pollele. OD I8lam

The rise of the New Oroer and the extensive involvement of the

army in the Indonesian political scene enjoyed a great deal of support

from Muslim students and intellectuals.27 The students and young

intellectuals, who were tired of the incompetence and bickering of the

political parties and had accused them of being seltish, had started to

look for an alternative. Up to this point, it appears that bath the New

Order intellectuals and the military shared the same view. They clid not

like the existing political parties, for these had caused so ManY problems

in the past that, as a result, the economic development of the countIy • was sadly neglected.28 27 The establishment of Sekber Golkar (Sekretaris bersama Golongan Karya, or the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) for example was supported by ninety-seven organizations, fifty-three of them were army­ sponsored organizations slong with the four Indonesian armed forces organizations, ten intel1ectual organjzations (such as Ikatan Sarjana Ekonomi Indonesia, Dœtan Sarjana Indonesia) as well as ten student organizations (such as Oerakan Tentara PeIajar, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Pengurus Besar Pelajar Islam Indonesia). Ct wu intended to counter­ balance the influence of the Communist Party (PKI) which emerged as an important political force after the 1955 general election. PIQ intluence reached its zenith during the Guided Democracy periode The Muslim forces aIso took part in the establishment of Sekber Golkar to counter the PKI. For Indonesian Muslims, the downfall of the PU put a we1comed end to the anti-reIigious Communist9. Hence they hoped for a brighter future for Islam in the years to come. Knowing that the Muslims were a potential ally force against the PKI. the army raised the banner ofIslam as the unifying force. Even though Golkar was established strictly as a response ta the PKI, it later becam.e a strong political vehicle of the army-backed government ta maintain its political interests in the New Order periode • 28 Leo Suryadinata, Military Ascendtmcy, 32 52

The support for Golkar by Muslim students and intellectuals was • inspired by an eagemess ta have a better political atmosphere. The oppression experienced by the Masyumi during the Guided Democracy,

for instance, was not expected to oceur during the New Order regime. 29

Bath the students and Muslim intellectuals saw the cooperation with the

army to be the best available solution. There was new hope that political

Islam would take part in determining the national political direction.

Some intellectuals thought that the military-civilian partnership could be

cultivated for the better development and modemization of the country.

On this issue, Muhammad Sadli, a leading Indonesia economist, believed

that the army should confine itself to its military and political roIes,

leaving public administration in the hands of civilians.30 In short, it was • expeeted that there would be a division of power between the military and civilians, with respect to the political and administrative roles of the

state.

Prior to and at the beginning of the New Order period, Muslim

leaders had shown a strong tendency to get involved in politica1 action. In

faet, they identified the Islamic struggle with Islamie political action.

29 On 17 August 1960, the 15th anniversary ofIndonesien independence, the Islamic politica1 party Masyumi was banned by decree of President Sukarno. It was announced ofticia1ly that the decision wu taken for «the we1fare of state and nation- because of Masyumi 'complici~ in the PRRl and Permesta revolts of 1958-1959. See Allan A. Samson, CJslam in Indonesian Politics· Asian Survey, vol. 8. no. 12 (December 1968), 1001. • 53

Non-Islamic groups aIso supported the rehabilitation of Masyumi. This • was due to severa! reasons ranging !rom Ira concem for democratic rights, a desire to avoid the politica1 instability that continued pariahdom

would invoke, to criticism of the illegality of the dissolution of

Masyumi.-31

In the first few months of the New Order regime, political Islam

gained considerable strength. On 16 December 1965, the Coordinating

Body ofMuslim Activities (Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin, BKAM) was

formed, uniting 16 Islamic organizations. The intention was to work

towards a rehabilitation of Masyumi.32 Many Islamic organizations

openly began to advocate for the retum of the Masyumi. In June 1966

the largest Islamic socio-religious organization, the Mubammadiyah, • came out in open support of Masyumi's rehabilitation, and the next few months saw numerous Islamic and intellectual organizations give their

support as weil. By December 1966, it was anticipated that Masyumi's

rehabilitation would occur very shortly. 33 At the time everything seemed

to be going weIl for political Islam. What had not been anticipated by the

30 For more information see Muhammad Sadli, Meneropong Suatu Aspek Dari Perimbangan Kekuatan Politik Baru: Hubungan Meliter-Sipü (Djakarta: Lelmas, 1966).

31 Allan A Samson, -Islam cmd Politics in Indonssid' (Berkeley: Ph.D. dissertation, University ofCalifornia, 1972), 44.

32 B. J. Boland, The Struggle a/Islam, 151.

33 Allan A. Samson, -Islam in Indonesian PolitiCS-, Asian Survey, vol. 8, • no. 12 (December 1968), 1005. 54

Islamic parties, however, was the resistance of the army. Having • experienced unpleasant relations with political Islam, the New Order regime, which was essentially an army backed-govemment, made it c1ear

that it would prevent politica1ly organized Islam from emerging as

powerful poütica1 parties. A stricter and more severe treatment can he

seen in ManY of the policies developed by the New Order regime for

Islamic parties.34

a. PoUticall__•

Despite the initially congenial relations between Islamic groups,

the army's leaders and the govemment, the New Order leadership issued

a statement on 21 December 1966, stating that the rehabilitation of • Masyumi was impossible. This came as a complete shock ta Muslim politicalleaders. The reason for the banning of the Masyumi was because

the regime considered its purely Islamic platform. ta be a deviation from

Pancasîla.35 The official statement stressed that the anny «would take

firm steps against anyone, whichever side whatever group which will

deviate from Pancasila and the 1945 constitution as which bas a1ready

34 Although politica11y active Islam bas been curtailed by the New Order regime, religious Islam bas experienced a fair treatment!rom govemment Many religious facilities were built an over the countIy. Funds were made available to support religious activities during Islamic festivities.

3S See M. Sirajuddin Syamsuddin, ~eligion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Mllhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order,· (Ph.D. Dissertation, • University of California, 1991), 51. ss

been done by the Communist Party revoIt in , Gestapu, Darui • Islam ... and Masjumi-Socialist Party ofIndonesia.-36 The fact that Masyumi leaders had been involved in the PRRI

(Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or Revolutionary

Government of the Republic of Indonesia) uprising of 1958 was a further

argument for continuing the proscription.37 However, Many people

believed that the official explanation given by the army was not the

actuel reason. A more plausible explanation was that the army was very

suspicious of IsIamic-based notions related to the state. It was feared

that speculation about religious ideology would trigger contlict among

Indonesian leaders,38 sinee the relationship between the State and Islam

had been an acute problem ever sinee the first day of independence. The • place of Islam in the nation state of Indonesia was then and remains todaya dilemma.

Affan Gaffar points out that the first assault on the Muslim

community by the New Order military-supported govemment was the

prohibition of Masyumi's revival.39 The secularist intellectuals (military

36 Quoted or translated by Allan A. Samson, CZslam in Indonesian Politics·, Asian Survey, vol. 8, no. 12 (December 1968), 1005, !rom a source which he does not mention.

37 B. J. Boland, 'lhe Struggle o/Islam, 151.

38 Allan A. Samson, CZslam Indonesia Sejak arde baru- in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, Yasrnin Hussain, eds., Islam di Asian Tenggara: • PerlœmbanganKontempo~· (Jakarta: LP3E8, 1990),71. S6

elite, socialist and Christian) Cfelt that a politica1ly powerful Islam would • he an obstruction to modemization. Many were disdainful of the quality and capabilities oftraditional (Muslim) leaders.-4O

Since the government had on 7 Apri11967, completely rejected the

possibility of the rehabilitation of Masyumi, the BKAM decided to

establish the Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, or Indonesien Muslim

Party), which was actually no more than a thinly veiled continuation of

Masyumi under another name. The new party, however, was intended to

he a precursor for the eventual rehabilitation of the Masyumi

organization. On 20 June 1967, a letter was sent to Acting President

Suharto informing him of the creation of an Islamic group ewhose

politica1 aspirations were not yet grouped in an existing political partY'41 • and the government decided to accept the formation of this new Islamic party. Yet certain army ofticers, continued to object to the active

participation of important ex-Masyumi leaders in this new party. Thus

even though he had agreed ta the basic proposal, Suharto did not want

to have any difticulties with these officers.42 Consequently, the party

39 Affan Gaffar, -Politik Akomodasi: Islam dan Negara di Indonesia.- in M. Imam Aziz Cs, eds., Agama, Demokrasi dan Keadilan (Jakarta: Penerbit Pl' Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1993), 102-103.

40 Allan A. Samson, -Is1am. and Politics in Indonesia·, 298.

41 Allan A. Samson, -rs1am. in Indonesian Politics·, Asian Survey, voL 8, no. 12 (December 1968), 1007. • 4:2 B. J. Boland, The Struggle of1s1.am, 152. 57

leadership had to be acceptable not only ta their own organizations and • supporters, but aIso ta the militaIy as weIl. By 1968 the Muslim leadership became fullyaware of the fact that

they were not going ta he accepted as partners in running the affairs of

Indonesia, and that a politically powerful Islam was ta have no place in

the new political system of cPancasUa Democracy.-43 The struggle after

the 1965 coup by the PKI seemed ta have focused on hostilities between

the army and the Islamic groups. Realizjng that their interests would be

best served by a secular regime, some Catholics openly supported the

army.44 Commenting on this issue during a discussion with the Jakarta

Chapter of HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, or Muslim Students'

Association) in 1970, the Head of the Indonesian Councü of (Protestant) • Churches, former Lieutenant General T.B. Simatupang, said that Islamic parties had ta cstrive to remove the suspicion of outsiders and convince

them that the Muslim group is not a group that will alter the Pancasila

and the Constitution of 1945.-45 Deliar Noer describes the situation thus:

The widening gap between the Muslims and the govemment, and increasingly mutually suspicious attitudes, can perhaps be related ta Pancasila, the principles on which the state is founded. While almast everybody in Indonesia now agrees with Pancasila, the Muslims feel that the govemment wants ta ·secularize- the five

43 Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectuoi Responses, 44.

44 Leo Swyadinata, Military Ascendancy, 27• • 4S Sïnar Harapan, 25 April, 1970. S8

principles; on the other hand, the government feels that the • Muslims want ta -rslamize- them.46 The rise in the influence of secularist-oriented intellectuals and

Christians in the govemment, military and Golkar gave tise ta a fear that

Indonesia's socio-politica1 future would be completely dominated by an

alliance ofnon-Islamic interest groups.

For the New Order regime and the anny, political Islam was a

threat to Pancasila. This distrust on the part of the military for political

Islam motivated it to suppress any reemergence of an Islamic politica1

base powerful enough ta oppose its predominance. Ruth McVey has

noted that the long years of warfare against Muslim rebellion encouraged

many Javanese officers of an abangan persuasion to strengthen their • objection ta Islamic activism.47 Aware that political parties, especially the Islamic parties, could

still pose a threat to its dominance, the government through the MinistIy

of Home Affairs headed by General issued in 1969

Ministerial Instruction No. 12, stipulating that civil selVants could not

join any political party. In addition, he issued Govemmental Regulation

No. 6 (PP No. 6/1970) which stated that civil servants could only have

46 DeUar Noer, ·Contemporary Political Dimension of Islam,· in Islam in Sou.theastAsia, ed. M.S. Hooker (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), 198.

47 Ruth McVey, -rhe Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the • Indonesian Army (part 1),· IndDnesia, vol. Il (Aprü 1971), 138• S9

cmono-Ioyalty.-48 This policy was designed to prevent the possibility of • losing supporters within the public service to political parties. It was not surprising, therefore, that Golkar won a landslide victory in the 1971

general election.

Mer winning the election, Golkar and the militaIy worked hand in

hand to implement a policy ofpolitical restructuring that was designed to

regroup all politica1 parties into larger, more controllable organizations.

By January 1973, the government had succeeded in regrouping the

existing nine political parties into two, namely the ppp (Partai Persatuan

Pembangunan, or United Development Party) and the POl (Partai

Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratie Party).49 Although the

govemment maintained that the politica1 restructuring was intended to • make them more effective and less divisive,so it was obvious that the goal was to place them under the govemment's control. As one aspect of this

policy, the New Order government launched a campaign of

cdepoliticizing" Islam. This campaign olten resorted to cauthoritarian-

48 Leo Suryadinata, Mi1itary Ascendancy, 38.

49 The Nahdlatul 'Ulama, the Parmusi, the PSU, and the Perti were fused into the Partai Persa.tuan Pembangunan (PPP), whüe the PNI, IPKI, Parkindo, Partai Murba, and Fartai Katolik were fused into the Partai Demo1aasi Indonesia (PD!).

50 The govemment's justification of this policy wu that it eJjminated the political antagonism and instability which had occured during the Old arder period due to the multi-party system. See Fachry Ali and Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, ~erosotnya A1iran dalam Partai Persatuan Pembanguilan,· in • Analisa Kekuatan Politik diIndonesia (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988), 228• 60

measures in its efforts to achieve its political goals.51 Liddle says that the • chiefintent of the bill [W]as to further restrict the parties' ability ta compete with Golkar. The parties bill attempted to prevent civil servants from joining a party (but not Golkar), to limit the parties' choice of ideological foundation to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (thereby making bath parties indistinguishable from Golkar, a special handicap to the Islamic PPP), and to prohibit party organjzation be10w the level of district (an area of roughly half-a­ million people in populous parts of Java and Sumatra, further divided administratively into subdistricts and villages). The general election bill was designed to maintain the leverage of the 1971 election, when the government was able ta exercise broad discretionary powers conceming campaign rallies, the placing of polling booths in government offices, the political activities of military officers, the screening ofcandidates and so on.52

The restructuring was also aimed at assuring political stability.

• The government, henceforth, had the power ta interfere in the internai

affairs of the parties since the government now financed their operational

activities. Laode Ida notes:

Therefore, Many experts believe that the process of amalgamating Islamic parties with the ppp was the Golkar's stràtegy to perpetuate internaI contlict, which would discourage their gaining any politica1 sympathy with the masses. Thus at the same time their sympathy would go to the Golkar whose leadership (at that time) was mature and its internai conditions stable.53 .

51 FaisallsmaîJ. -rslam. Politics and Ideology in Indonesia, 135.

~ William R. Lidd1e. -rhe 1977 Election and New Order Legitimacy,· SoutheastAsianAffaiT, vol. 17, no. 3 (1978), 127.

5.1 Laode Ida, Anatomi Konflik: NU, Elit Islam dan Negara (Jakarta: • Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996),42• 61

When conflicts emerged among the factions within the politica1 • parties, it was very likely that the govemment would get involved. Faisal lsmai! notes that -from the Jate 1960s until the early 1980s, the

government quite often interfered in the internaI affairs of political

parties when they were in turmoil by promoting and supporting ooly the

pro-government factions.-54 The restructuring of politica1 policies was

guided by the New Order regime to avoid an accusation of abusing the

principles of democracy, but at the same time strict contraIs were

imposed over them so that they would never be strong enough to

challenge the government.

Resistance ta this bill was naturally mounted by bath Islamic and

nationalist parties because it completely favored Golkar. Nevertheless, • after severa! adjustments, the bill was passed by the parliament. The implementation of this bill was the responsibility of the 1978 cabinet,

which was composed of the twenty-four cabinet ministers chosen by

Suharto. Ten of these were military men and the ather fourteen civilian

technocrats, yet all were from Golkar. The other two politica1 parties had

no seats in the cabinet whatsoever.

b. ReJillou Affala .

Muslims were also concemed with a number of social issues. Their

attention was focused upon the government's new marriage bill • 54 Faisal Ismail, -rslam, Politics and Ideology in Indonesia-, 133 62

introduced in the DPR on 16 August 1973. The government contended • that maniage law should be standardized on a national basis, regardless ofthe religious traditions ofthe people. As soon as the bill was brought ta

public notice, a month before it was ta be tabled, voices of discontent

from various groups in the Muslim community began ta be heard.55 The

introduction of a new marriage bill in which several articles were not in

accordance with the shari'a -Was interpreted as another sign of the

determination of the Christian and secular groups ta realize a truly

secular Pancasila state.-56

This proposaI resulted in vigorous debates within parliament.

ABRI, Golkar and sorne segments of the Democracy faction (POl) totally

supported the bill. Tbe IsIamic faction, on the other band, rejected it. • There was no room for compromise since it was absolutely contrary to their interpretation of Islamic doctrine. The most controversial aspect of

the bill was Article 2 which stipulated that cmarriage is considered

legitimate if it bas been performed in front of a marriage officer,

registered in the marriage registration office by the ofticer, and performed

in accordance with this law. "57 Thus by implication it appeared that the

bill did not consider a Muslim marriage legitimate if it was not registered

55 Muhammad Kamal Hassan, ·Contemponuy Muslim Religio-Political Thought in Indonesia: The Response ta "New Order Modernization- (Ph. o. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975), 225.

56 Ibid, 227 • 63

in the official marriage registration office. In effect, the social role of

Islamie institutions was no longer being reeognized. Many Islamic groups

outside of parliament, especia1ly the «Ulama, eondemned the bill. Feeling

betrayed, the Islamic groups believed that it was part of an anti-Islamic

plot sinee the bill was prepared without any consultation with the 'ulama

and without the input ofthe Ministry ofReligious Affairs.se

Muslim youth groups were outraged and held widespread protests.

In order to prevent these protests from degenerating into violence, the

militaJy decided to compromise with the Islamic groups, making

fundamental changes which made it acceptable to Muslims. The

compromise is reflected in Article 2 of the bill which was changed as

follows: (1) a marriage is legitimate, ü it has been performed to the laws • of the respective religions and beliefs of the parties concemed; (2) every marriage shall be registered according to the regulations of the legislation

in force"S9

57 Direktorat Jenderal Hukum dan Perundang-undangan Departemen Kehakiman, Sekitar Pembentula:m Undang-Undang Perkawinan &sena Peraturan PelaksanD.annya (Jakarta, n.d.). Il.

58 See Tempo, September 8, 1973, 6.

59 Direktorat Jenderal Hukum, SekitaT PembentuJaJn Undang-Undang • Perka~253• 64

c. The Debate 011 the CoDeept ofthe Dual l'uDctloD 01the • AnDy. In August 1966 at its seminar in Bandung, the armed forces

decided that the dual function of the Indonesian militaly shouId become

a permanent feature of Indonesian political life. This decision was very

important because, from that moment aD, the army was instrumental in

the formulation ofnational policy. Official recognition ofthe army's active

participation in politics was contained in the Provisional MPR Decree No.

XXIVjMPRS/1966, which stated that the armed forces is a taol of the

revolution and the state, which in executing this task must make use of

bath physica1/technical armaments and social/political armaments.60 Therefore, as a social force, the Indonesian army saw itself as the social • stabilizer in the national struggle for independence and prosperity. Harold Crouch asserts that the emergence of the army ta a position of

unchallengable political preeminence was welcomed enthusiastically only

by a small section of the civilian politicaI leaders and accepted as

unavoidable reality by most ofthe reste-61

Regarding the concept of the dual function of the army, there were

two general perspectives existing among civilian politicians and the

military officers. The political parties and those who were not Golkar

60 Bùveer Singh, '1'hB Dual Fun:tiDn of the IndDnesian Ann.ed Forces (Singapore: Singapore Institute ofInternational Affairs, 1995), 2. • 61 Harold Crouch, 'l1Is Anny andPolitics, 245• 65

members, especially Islamic groups, c1early rejected the idea. They were • concemed that the implementation ofdual function would put an end to democracy in Indonesia. This was because they relt that the military

institution was not a democratic organization.

Because Indonesia had adopted democratic system as its political

ideology, it was argued, civilian politicalleaders should exercise control

over the military through a formaI set of rules. These rules specify the

functions of the military and the conditions under which the military

MaY implement its power. In particular, these rules exclude the military

from involvement in domestic partisan politics. Thus, military officers are

professionals in the employ of the state.62

As far as political Islam was concemed, the fact that an • overwhelming majority of army officers had an abangan orientation was another senous factor. There was no doubt that these officers would

stand in the way when it came ta political matters in which a politica11y

active Islam was involved, as had been the case in 1967 when the

government refused to rehabllitate the Masyumi party. If these officers

dominated parliament and government, it would be vexy difficult for

political Islam to implement its political agenda.

Civilian intellectuals within Golkar, however, did not have the

same opinion on how the dual function should be exercised. They were

62 MoITis Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion inDeveloping • Nations (Chicago: The Unversit;y ofChicago Press, 1977), 79. 66

divided into two groupS: one group saw the social and politica1 roles of

the militaIy as a temporary phenomenon, white the other seemed to

• 63 accept the presence ofthe military for the long term.

A. Rahman Tolleng, a former Bandung KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi

Mahasiswa Indonesia, or Action Front of Indonesian University Students)

leader, was amang those who represented the tirst group. According ta

him, the military presence in non-militaIy sectors would decrease over

time and eventually disappear.64 The invoivement of military officers in

government positions was needed to secure the stability needed for

national development. Long-term politica1 stabilization would require the

setting up of a new politica1 framework within which civilian groups

could be accommodated.65 Tolleng's statement on how the army's dual • function should be carried out was however criticized vigorously by the militaIy members of Golkar and he was asked to withdraw his statement.

The militaIy had given notice that it wished to remain a socio-politica1

force for an indefinite period oftime. 66

Sumiskum, a Gadjah Mada University graduate, represented the

opposite camp, which supported the long-term presence of the army in

63 Leo SUIyadinata, MüitaTy Asceruümcy and Political Cu1tuTe: A Study of lndonesia's GOLKAR (Central for International Studies: Ohio University, 1989), 35.

64 Bee Tempo, 7 May 1971.8.

55 Harold Crouch, 'l11e Army andPolitics, 245 66 Ken Ward, The 1971 Elections in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University Centre ofSoutheast Asian Studies, 1974), • 31. 67

government. According ta Sumiskum the active presence of the military • on the Indonesian political scene was vital. A future improvement in the behavior of civilians and significant advancements in the rate of

deve10pment would he the ooly justification for limiting the role of the

militaIy in the future. On the 25th Anniversary of ABRI's (Angkatan

Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or Indonesian Armed Forces) founding,

just prior to the 1971 election, President Suharto stated in an address:

[The) dual function of ABRI is one of the aspects of the implementation of democracy based on Pancasila and the system ofour state administration. It is this system that the Indonesian nation has built up and which we have accepted together. Let there be no group in society impose its will so as to alter this system of dual function either overtly or covertly. This would be very negative and may even result in an ABRI decision to act undemocratically.67

• Suharto's address was a declaration that the government was now in the bands of the militaIy. Yet opinions within the anny itself could be

seen as falling into two perspectives. There were those who argued that

the army's dual function did not necessarily Mean holding important

positions in the govemment; rather, it was much more important to step

back from the politica1 stage and direct national development from

behind the scenes. The army was not supposed ta take over the

67 '!he Military in Indonesia. Department of Information, Republic of • Indonesïa, Issue No. 61/71, 1971, 1. 68

government; its main goal was ta guard the country and interfere only • when the country was in danger.68 Others, however, argued that military officers must he directly

involved. This was important in order ta safeguard social, economic and

political stability. This group maintained that throughout Indonesian

history ooly the army had proven itself capable of securing and

maintaining political stability. Thus successful economic development

required the disciplined leadership of the militaIy. Stability would

encourage investment from both foreign and domestic sources. It should

be recalled that this was nat the original Nasution formulation. For him,

the army was to be primarily a defense force and only secondarily a

social-political force. According to Salim Said, this -reformulation • provided a stronger ideological underpinning for a government which was seeking to justify a vastly increased role in the non-militaxy sector"69

Even Nasution himself had become one ofthe harshest critics of the dual

function of the armed forces. Salim Said aIso points out that «it is an

irony in Indonesian history that Nasution, who conceptualized the

political ideology of the military, and led them into the politica1 arena in

68 See Harold Crouch, ~asalah Dwi Fungsi- in Syamsuddin Haris and Riza Sihbudî (eds.), Menelaah Kembali Fonnat Politik Orde Baru (Jakarta: Yayasan Insan PoJitika. and PPW-LIPI, 1995), 101.. 104.

69 David Jenkins, -rhe Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Tbinking: The Concept of Dwifungsi,- Southeast Asian Jaurrud ofSocial science Il, no. 2 • (1983),26. 69

the 1950s, at the end, became a bitter critic of the implementation of bis • brainchild." 70 Nasution correctly predicted the need for the involvement of the

army in the country's political atfairs, but he misjudged its motives. After

Suharto became president, the development of the country was the

domain of the militaIy. The army essentially was the New Order. More

and more, military officers held govemmental positions once occupied by

civilian politicians. Nono Anwar Makarim's comments on Alfian's paper

suggest that after the abortive coup of 1965, every aspect of Indonesian

social life changed, as civilians were systematically displaced by men in

UDÜorms.71 Through its dual function, the army in Indonesia had

transformed itself into the largest socio-political organization in the • country. Vatikiotis bas stated that the Indonesian armed forces constitute an institution that is far more than a standing force with a

command structure; it is the soul of the nation and the largest politica1

organization in the country.72 Bllveer Singh notes that:

In many ways, Nasution's doubt and uneasiness with the way the dual function of the armed forces was being interpreted and implemented began when the New Order consolidating its power and began ta rationalize the militaIy's dominance in the country,

70 Salim Said, -rhe Political Role ofthe Indonesian Militaxy: Past, Present and Future-, SoutheastAsianJoumal o/social SCiences 15, no. 1 (1987),29.

71 For Makarim's comments, see Hasil-Hasil Seminar PemiliJum Umwn danMasalah-Masalahjang DitimbulIamnja (Djakarta: 1970), 45-47.

72 Michael, R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suhtuto (New York: • Routledge, 1994), 60. 70

especiaJly during the Second Army seminar. Thus in 1966, Nasution warned bis fel10w ofticers at the SESKOAD (Sekolah Staffdan Komando Angkatan Darat, or Army Staff and Command • Col1ege) that there was a need for the ·purification of the meaning and the implementation- ofthe dual function concept. 73

The immediate question posed by the socio-political role of the

armed forces in that period turned upon the fate ofdemocracy and social

justice. The direct role played by the Indonesian army in the social,

economic and politica1 system without a doubt raised very serious

questions. A military institution is not a democratic institution. Indeed

the military men who beeame chiefs of villages, district heads, or

govemors often used force or military methods in dealing with the people

under their authority. Many of these men were incompetent in

• administrative and economic matters since the only training they had

was in military matters.74 Thus the legitimacy of military rule was a1ways

tenuous. Sinee the concept of dual function had no constitutional basis

and was against the principles of democracy, dual function was seen as

heing essentia1ly illegitimate, regardIess of the arguments or rationale

used to justify it.7S

73 Büveer Singh, The Dual Fu.ndion of The IndoTll!Sian Atmed Forces: Origins, Actualization and Implications for Stability and Development (Singapore Institute ofInternational Affairs, 1995), 125.

74 See AIfian, -Suharto and the Question of Politica1 Stabili~, Pacifie Cornmunity, voL 2. no. 3 (Apri11971), 544. • 75 Bilveer Singh, The Dual Ftmction, 131• 71

Oey Hong Lee, a strong critic of the New Order regime, argues that • the main feature of the regime was that it Iacked legitimacy despite the militaIy's attempts ta invent or force a form of legitirnization. He goes on

to say that the 1971 election was obviously conducted in an

undemocratic manner, enabling the regime to secure control of the MPR

and DPR and make them captive assemblies.16 For this very reason, a

small number of students and intellectuals known as Golongan Putih

decided to boycott the 1971 elections. They believed that the army's political intervention would put an end ta democratic life. •

76 Oey Hong Lee, ~e Emasculation of Political Parties- in Malcolm Caldwell, ed., Ten Years Mi1:itary Terrors in Indonesia (England: Spokesman • Books, 1975), 59-74. CHAPTER THREE

• THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM: AND THE DUAL FUNCTIOll OF THE IIfDOlfESIAR ARMY IN THE nWORDERERA

A. The l'uture 0' Politicall8lam

When the New Order regime took power in 1966, politica1 Islam

and Islamic organizations believed that the alliance they had established

with the army would finally end the army's suspicion regarding Islam.

Many Muslim leaders felt that Islam would gain a legitimate place in

political importance under the New Order. This was especially the case

with respect to former Masyumi leaders who had been politically • persecuted during the Guided Democracy periode Their hope, however,

tumed out to be in vain. The efforts of Muslim leaders to rehabllitate the

Masyumi party failed when the military announced that it wouId not

tolerate the reestablishment of the Masyumi party. The reason given was

because some of its leaders had undertaken to fight against the army in

the PRRI 1 rebellion in West Sumatra in 1958 and that their beliefs

deviated from Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

1 PRRI stands for Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Those who had particlpated in the central govemment campaign against PRRI were extremely bitter about the Masyumi's disloyalty in sympathizing with, or at least not • condemning, a revoit, which c1aimed the lives of 2.500 soldiers. See Harold 73

The government, however, granted the proposaI to establish a new • Islamic party to channel the politica1 aspirations of the Islamic community. As a result, Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Party) was

established on 20 Februmy 1968.~ Despite the establishment of this

Islamic party, the New Order government had sent a clear message that

politically active Islam would not be accepted as partners in power. Islam

would remain peripheral ta the new political system of Pancasila

Democracy. Even though Islamic leaders had aftirmed their support for

Pancasila and thus the ambition to establish an Islamic state had been

officially abandoned, political Islam was still perceived as a threat.

-Islamic phobm-3 still drove govemment policy during the New

Order era. After the 1971 eleetion, for example, one ofthe steps taken by • the New Order govemment to further restrict politically-organized Islam was the implementation ofa new policy ofpolitica1 restructuring, a policy

which resulted in the formation of the ppp and the POl in January 1973.

Even though the govemment argued that the policy was intended to

Crouch, -mdonesia- in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., 7he Politics of /stamic Reassertion. (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 200.

2 The process of the establishment of this party was nat Cree from limitations. The new party was approved on condition that former senior Masyumi leaders not occupyleadership position. Obviously~ the govemment did not want the new party to be the rebirth of the Masyumi under a different name. See B.J. Boland, The Sttuggle ofIs1œn in Modem Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoft 1982), p. 151-153.

3 'Ibis term. was used ta descnbe govemment attitudes towards Islamic parties. Based on previous experience with poJitica1 Islam which tried to implement Islamic state in Indonesia, the government believed that politically • organized Islam was still a threat to Pancasilaideology. 74

eliminate the politica1 antagonism and instability that had occurred • during the Oid Order period due to the-multi party system, it was clear that the real reason was to prevent the political parties from challenging

the govemment. Nawaz B. Mody maintains that Suharto's policies were

aimed at controlling political parties, ensuring their docility and

preventing them from emerging as a threat to militaIy rule.4

Faisal Ismail argues that to maintain democratic life, the

govemment let political parties exist, but imposed strict controls upon

them so that they would never attain enough strength to oppose the

govemment.5 In line with this policy, the New Order govemment

launched its campaign of -depoliticizing' Islam which olten employed

-authoritarian- acts in its efforts ta achieve its political goals. According • to Man Gaffer, a Ieading Indonesia's politica1 scientist, -authoritarian" became one of the main characteristics of the New arder government.6 In

its attempt to further reduce Islamic influence in politics, the New Order

government, Nawaz argues, adopted a policy which was based largely

upon that of the Dutch Islamologist Snouck Hurgronje. This involved

.. Nawaz B. Mody, lndonesi.an under Suharto, (New York: Apt Books Ine., 1987), p. 150.

5 Faisallsmaïl, -Islam, Polities and Ideology in Indonesia: A Study of the Process of Muslim Acceptanee of the Pancasila- (Ph. O. Dissertation, McGill Universi~, 1995), p. 133.

6 Man Gaftàr, -rslam dan Politik dalam Orde Beru (Islam and Politics • during the New Order)" Ulumul Quran, vol.4, no. 2 (1993), pp. 19..20. 75

düTerent religious activities, but proscribing attempts to develop a • powerful political base.7 While promoting religious, social and educational activities,8 the

attitude of the govemment towards political Islam has been strict and

suspicious. This attitude was best explained by Suharto in bis address ta

the People's Congress in 1972 when he stated -religion will aIso retum ta

its real function, providing a thorough teaching for life ...• rather than

seeking political power for its own narrow goals.9

B. Mociel'Df-.tloD laue.

The first task of the New Order regime was to create political

stability and to rehabilitate the collapsed economy. The establishment of • politica1 stability aIso entailed laying the foundations for a new political system. The Indonesian experience with liberal democracy and Guided

Democracy had been unsatisfactory and frustrating for the people,

especially the army. The New Order government was, therefore, looking

for a new political system that would be in harmony with the countly's

7 Nawaz B. Mody. IndDnesian under SuhDrto, 153.

8 During the New Order, the number of Istamic boarding schools and mosques bas increased remarkably. Islam was taken more seriously in Indonesia. Govemment officiaIs have been expected to lead the prayers during the Islamic festive season. People have become more aware of Islamic rituals and identit;y. See Leo SUlyadinata, Müitary Ascendancy and Political Culture (Ohio: Central for International studies, Ohio University, 1989), 129.

9 Ken Ward, The Foundation of the Portai Muslimin lndonesia (Ithaca: • Comell University Modem Indonesia Project Interim Report, 1970), 45-47. 76

political traditions and at the same time would justify the army's • involvement in politics. The resu1t was Pancasila Democracy. The New Order regime emphasized politica1 stability as an

indispensable prerequisite of the development process. Establishing a

framework of poütical order was therefore a key to modemization and

development. Several western scholars have aIso pointed out the relation

between stability and economic progress.10

To improve the economic situation, Suharto depended on a group

of technocrats which included people such as Soemitro

Djojohadikoesoemo (Minister of Trade in the tirst Deve10pment Cabinet

from 1968-1973), Emil Salim (Member of economic advisoxy team to the

President from 1968-1971), M. Sadli (Minister of Manpower from 1971 to • 1973), Ali Wardhana (Minister of Finance in the tirst Development Cabinet from 1968 to 1973), and others. Most of these men had received

their degrees in economics and political science from major western

educational institution such as Berkeley, Harvard, MIT and Comell. With

good political connections in the West ta help them draw up and

implement the economic policies of the New Order government, these

men, dubbed the --, played a major role in the Indonesian

strategy of development. Effectively supported by the army and a group

10 See for example Guy Parker, 'Toward. a New Order in Indonesia-' • ForeignAffairs, vol. 45, no. 3 {April 1967), pp. 506-507. 77

of well-trained technocrats, the New Order succeeded in improving the • economic and social conditions ofthe countly. To promote and improve the national economy, the New Order

regime came up with the term flmodernization" as its main theme. When

this term was introduced as the main proposition of national

development, some Islamic groups and organizations, especially those

with oider members, showed contempt for the govemment's proposai.

For them, modernization was simply an effort ta secularize Islamic

values, indeed, ta westernize existing religious and social values of all

kinds. According ta Howard M. Federspiel, Indonesian Muslim

intellectuals have wamed about the negative affects that could occur if

modernimtion takes place without carefully maintaining the strength of • normative values in Indonesian society.Il Due to its inability to relinquish their formalistic and legalistic

approach in politics, once again, politically-organized Islam was seen as

an obstacle to national development. The position of political Islam

appeared to be worsening. The clifficulties Muslims faced in synthesizing

their philosophical foundations with the existing socio-cultural and

politica1 realities were mainly the reason for the animosity between Islam

and the state in Indonesia. The army itself and its civilian supporters

tended ta see the question of modemization in terms of reforming the

politica1 structure of the Old Order sa as ta remove obstacles that might • 78

obstruct the implementation of the government's modernization • program.12 Early in the 1970's, against the backdrop of army power politics

and the politica1 frustrations of the Muslim community, there emerged a

controversial group of younger Muslims who tried ta interpret Islam in

the context of socio-political change. 13 These young Muslim intellectuals

began to promote new ways of thinking and interpretations of how Islam

should approach socio-political issues. They felt that the political

circumstances of the New Order called for a change in the behavioral and

emotional cosmos of the Muslim community, whereas the idealistic

approach of integration would only help to perpetuate intellectual

impotence and stagnancy within the ummah (people}.14 They sought to • develop a new format for political Islam which required: (1) reexamination of the theologica1 or philosophica1 underpinnings of

political Islam; (2) redetinition of the politica1 objectives of Islam; and (3)

reassessment of the ways by which those political ideals could be

11 Howard M. Federspiel, Indonesia in Transition: Muslim Intellectuals and National Development (New York: Nova Science Publisher Ine. J 1998), 123

12 Harold Crouch, ~taryPolitics under Indonesia's New Qrder-, Pacifie Affairs, vo145, no. 2 (Summer 1972),210.

13 Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim InteUectual Responses ta IrNew 0rtJerl' Modem:i.zation in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementrian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982), p. 78. • 14 Ibid.. 92. 79

effectively rea1ized. 15 These young intellectuals attempted ta refarmulate • in general terms the fundamental Islamic postulates regarding Gad, man and the physical world, and the manner of their relationship in the Iight

of new political realities. 16 This new movement was known as ~enewa1

Movemenf' or Gerakan Pembaharuan. 17

The ideas of pembaharuan were given formaI recognition on 2

January 1970 when Nurcholis Madjid, 18 the best known leader of the so-

called cRenewal Movement", read a paper entitled -rhe Necessity of

Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of Integration of the Ummali'

on the occasion of a social evening organized jointly by four of the most

important Muslim youth and student organizations- HMI, GPI (Gerakan • Pemuda Islam, or MusHm Youth Movement), PlI (Pelajar Islam Indonesia,

15 Bachtiar Effendy, -Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Politica1 Ideas and Practices in Indonesïa-, (ph. D. dissertation, The Ohio S'tate University, 1994), p. 142-143.

16 Muhammad Kama! Hassan, Muslim InteUectual Responses, p. 89.

17 The emergence of the -Renewal Movemene' within a section of the young Muslim intellectuals began in the 1970's. Being a part of the -1966 Generation- (Angkatan '66) and having played an important role in bringing the Old Order to an end, many of the younger generation of Muslim shared the ruling elite's vision of a new and pragmatic Indonesia. This movement was the most radical development in Islamic religio-politica1 thought in New Order Indonesia. In its development, this movement was identified mainly with HM! (Himpunan Mshasiswa Islam, or Association of Muslim Universitr Students), the largest student organi?ation in Indonesia. The reason for this was because most ofits proponents were the members ofthis organization. See Muhammad Kama! Hassan, Muslim InteUectual Responses, 90. • 18 Then the Genera! Chaïrman ofHMI• 80

or Muslim Students of Indonesia), and Persami (Persatuan Sarjana • Muslimin Indonesia, or Association ofIndonesian Muslim Graduates).19 According to Madjid, in order to relieve the ummah from the

malaise which had arrested its overal1 advancement and to change the

unattractive image of Islam that it had been projecting, the ummah

should free itself from traditional values and pursue instead to future-

oriented values.20 Despite some basic elements of the Islamic faith that

are unchanging (tirst and foremost belief in Gad), Islam, he argues,

provides no detinite prescription concerning activities in this world. For

him, the values of Islam have adynamie character. Thus, the process of

continuous development will a1ways take place in order to suit the actual

situation.21 Therefore, the need to fabricate a development-supportive • ideological perspective that would permit religion, as weIl as political1y- organized Islam, to get involved in the process of modemization was a

necessity.22 He believed that only through the separation of Islam from

political parties and the concept of an Istamic state wouId Islam be able

19 Ibid. 91

20 Ibid. 189.

21 S.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam. in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 223.

22 For a full account on Nurehalis Madjid's renewal ideas, see • Muhammad Kam.al Hassen , Muslim Intellectual Responses, pp. 187-233. 81

ta develop in Indonesia.23 Otherwise, Islam as a social force would • remain unimportant and politically marginal. Because of bis dramatic views on how Islam should approach socio-politica1 problems and bis

rejection of the idea of Islamic state, Madjid tended to aggravate the

relationship between older Muslim leaders and proponents of renewal

movement. On the other hand, the govemment, in its effort to provide

more social content in the national development plan, attempted to

convince religious communities to support the govemment's policies and

get involved in the fulfillment of national goals.

c. The l'1Iture ofthe Duall'uactloD ofthe AnD,

When we discuss the New Order regime, we are essentially talking • about the army. The Indonesian army was the undisputed dominant faction within the New Order. Led by Suharto, the New Order govemment

immediately appointed military officers to Most of the strategie positions

in the government. Parallel military institutions were establishecl next to

those run by civilians. In order to control the civilian positions that

remained, the New Order regime used GoIkar as a thinly disguised

23 For a more comprehensive discussion on bis views. see Nurchalis Madjid, Islam, KemDdeman dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Penerbit Mizan, • 1987). 82

political vehicle. This govemment-backed party ha.s been viewed by many • as simply an extension ofthe army into the socio-politica1 sphere.24 The military officers, having been in a weak position when they

were not inc1uded in national politics, felt the necessity ta justify their

new power. The concept of 'the middle way of the army' which was

introduced by General Nasution provided them with political

justification. Saon, the uneven politica1 role played by the army became a

threat to democratic life in the country. The army's deep involvement in

politics has led ManY, inc1uding former Vice-President Hatta, to reach

the conclusion that the New Order government was in fact a military

regime.25

President Suharto, in bis address on the occasion of the 25th • anniversary of the Indonesian army in 1971, stressed that he would continue ta promote the dual function of the army, and justified bis

policy in the name of Pancasila Democracy. The Most interesting thing

about Pancasila Democracy was that its principles were exceedingly

vague and could be interpreted vezy broadly. This suited the political

purpose of army leaders who wanted to develop a broad ideological

consensus behind their military roie.

24 Rusli Karim, Perjalantm Portai Politik di IndDMSia: Sebuah Potret Pasang Surut, (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1983), p. 164.

25 Mohammad Hatta, Menu.ju Negara Hukum (Jakarta: Yayasan Indayu, • 1980), p. 16 83

The critics of the dual function of the army continued to stress the • likelihood that this doctrine would put democratic process in danger, especially if the army kept on exereising its political dominance. Even a

small segment ofretired military generals, known collectively as the Petisi

Kelompok 50 (Petition of Group Fifty) admitted that the New Order

govemment's policies on dual function had to he evaluated and

reformulated if democratic lüe in the country was to be upheld. In this

regard, General Ali Murtopo said that:

The statements of the ABRI (armed forces) leader clarified that dual function will stay. And this is allowed by the Constitution. The concept of ABRI with regard to the State Ideology has been institutionalized, and ABRI will not want to be the tools ofastate which has a different ideology. Therefore, the constitutional rights of ABRI involving itself in the political struggle will not be • abandoned by ABRI. 26 In a similar tone, former Commander-in Chiefof the army, General

Try Sutrisno stated that

For the army to enhance and strengthen their raIe and function as a socio-politica1 power, it is necessary to spread and deepen the perception of the army's dual function among society. Juridically, the army's dual function is unquestionable: it is a natura! thing, a necessity in the nation's existence. However, it is equally natural, in a democratic country, that there would be people who are skeptical about the implementation of the dual function system, not its existence itself. Those people, with a1l sincerity, should ask themselves a few questions: Could the success of development we have experienced sa far have been achieved without the correct implementation of the anny's dual function? The trend would surely be düTerent ü the practice of

26 Ali Murtopo, Strategi. Politik NasiDnal, (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi, • CSIS, 1974). pp. 82-82. 84

dual function was not present. Instability and conflicts would probably color the nation's politicallife. Our past experience is c1ear evidence that such a situation can arise. Therefore, we • must see to it that the execution of the dual function he performed in such a way that it will guarantee solutions to every problem in conformity with the principles of Pancasila democracy.~7

At the same time, the military leadership reaUzed that the social

and politica1 environment of the country had begun ta change, and to

that extent, it had to adjust its socio-politica1 concepts. With remarkable

improvements in the social, economic and politica1 arenas, along with

better educational institutions, young Indonesians have become more

aware of their rights and role as citizens and want to see greater

democratimtion in the country. The main issue is the relevancy of the

• army's dual function. Is the army wi1ling to make any changes to its

doctrine to keep up with the demands ofdemocratization? Concerning this particular issue, Brigadier-General Nugroho Notosusanto, in an apologetic tone, has suggested that

ü the army's socio-political function is dropped, and the army only acts as the tooi of the government, then if politica1 turbulence occurs in which social forces oppose each other because of their interests contradicting each other, is there any other potential power that can play the role of moderator and stabilizer? 28

71 SuaTa Kary~ 30 May 1989.

28 Nugroho Notosusanto, ed., Pejuang dan Prajurit (Jakarta: Sïnar • Harapan, 1984), p. 349. 85

General Ali Murtopo, elaborating on the need for the army's • continuing involvement in politics, has written: We can logica1ly conclude that it is very possible that the dominant position of the army will decrease and even disappear, if the situation becomes normal, and ü the civilian political groups free themselves from the elements of subversion, and if they can prove that they are better than now.29

The statements from the military leadership and the President

clearly suggested that the military would not abandon the power in its

hands. What is interesting about the position of the Indonesian army

was that in its attempts ta hold on to its power, it did not have the

problem of Iegitimacy. Surprisingly, Most politically-conscious

Indonesian also did not question the legitimacy of the military in politics. • They were concemed about the interpretation and implementation of the doctrine, not the doctrine itself. Thus, there was little debate about

whether or not the army should play a nonmilitary raIe.

From the above discussion, we can conc1ude that military

dominance was a long-term characteristic of Indonesian politics during

the period1966-1977. With the armyemerging as an important partner

of the New Order regime, if not to say as the government itself, the

military's legitimacy in the political arena stayed intact. The civilian

29 Ali Murtopo, Strategi Politik Nasional (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi, • CSIS, 1974), p. 124. 86

politicians could do litt1e about the situation while political power • circu1ated chiefly among the military officers themselves.

•

• • CONCLUSION Relations between Islam and the state in Indonesia have gone

through ManY difficult times. In fact, right before Indonesian

independence was proc1aimed in 1945, an intense debate over national

ideology had begun. Islamic political leaders felt that Islam, having

played a vital role in the achievement of independence and constituting

the religion of the majority of the population, should be the proper basis

of the state. This idea was, however, rejected by secular oriented groups,

the combined forces of nationalist groups and the army. This situation

had colored every step of politica1 development from 1966 to 1977 and

• created an antagonistic relationship between Islam and the state in

Indonesia.1

When the New Order regime came to power in 1966, Islamic

political leaders began ta regard Islam as the mast important civilian

force in the society. This was because the communists and Sukarno, its

major antagonists, had been eliminated. They hoped that the overthrow

of Sukarno and the communists would once again make Islam a central

1 The intense relation finally reached its climax when the Darul Islam rebellion aiming at establishing an Islamic state broke in 1948. This was just the beginning of a long war between Islam. and the state with the army in the middle. In 1953, the Darul Islam rebellion broke out in Aceh. Even though the reasons behind those rebellions were not entirely the same, they an demanded. • that Islam must be applied as the nation's ideology. 88

politica1 and moral force in Indonesia.2 This optimism, however, tumed • out to be in vain. Even though Muslims had worked alongside the military ta crush the communists in 1965, and helped ta overtum

Sukarno's presidency in 1966, politically organized Islam was perceived

as a threat ta Pancasila. A long and painful past experienced by the army

in the early years of independence against politica1 Islam had c1early left

a distrustful attitude within the military. The crux of political struggle

after the emergence of the New Order in 1966 seemed ta be the hostility

existing between the armyand the Islamic groups.

Under Suharto's leadership, the army emerged as the most

powerful political force in Indonesia. With the feature of dual function as

its justification for involvement in social and political affairs, the army • dominated virtually every aspect ofIife. The govemment with the support from military afficers had been working to prevent any efforts to

reestablish political1y powerful Islam.3 Because of strict and severe

limitations imposed by the government, Muslims, despite having a

majority in numbers, had become palitica1ly weak. This was apparent in

the 1971 election when four Islamic parties (The PSII, the NU, the Perti,

and the Parmusi) only managed to obtain less than 30 percent of the

2 Nawaz B. Mody, IndDnesian under SUhœto, (New York: Apt Books Inc., 1987), p. 150.

3 The proposai to rehabilitate the Masyumi party, for example, was rejected by the army. To channel the aspirations ofthe Muslim community. the govemment, however, granted the formation of a new Islamic party. namely • Parmusi. 89

total votes. In addition to these limitations imposed on political Islam, • the Iack of a unified vision among Islamic groups and political parties was aIso responsible for their weakness. Moreover, its inability to keep

abreast with rapid social change had left the Muslim community

politically and socially inferior. On the ather hand, the military-backed

gavernment, using Golkar as its political vehicle, received over 62 percent

of total votes, with the nationalist parties getting less that 7 percent of

the total.

Ta further strengthen its power, the militaly-backed government

introduced a number of measures to secure its politica1 position. One of

the actions taken was the amalgamation of the existing nine political

parties inta two, namely ppp (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United • Development Party) and POl (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratie Party). With this politica1 restructuring, the government was

able ta further weaken existing political parties.4 There is no doubt that

in Indonesia, under the New Order regime, political Islam. found it

difficult ta impiement its agenda, especially as it chose Dot to reformulate

its approach ta politics. In arder ta he a partner to the New Order,

politica1 Islam had to be able ta offer intellectually impressive and viable

.. Because these parties had diff'erent interests and were made up of different groups, the fusion only created internaI tension and factions. See Leo Swyadinata, "Political Contestation in Indonesia,· in Political Contestation; Case Studies from Asia, eds. Nonna Mahmood and zakaria Haji Ahmad (Singapore: • Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 1990), 20. 90

theories with regard to development and modernization.s This would • Mean articulating and elaborating Islamic socio-political ideals in modem terms. The failure ta do so was definitely a further setback for

political Islam. It is still unclear whether Islam will once again he able to

emerge as a powerful political force in Indonesia.

As for the army, the New Order regime provided it with a

justification to expand its politica1 power. Although civilian frustration

was acute, there seemed to he no prospect of removing the militaly from

control of the govemment.6 The armyappeared to he set to remain the

most powerful political force for some time ta come.

Post Script

• Over the past two years (1998-2000), the political situation in Indonesia has changed dramatically. Since the resignation of President

Suharto on 21 May 1998,7 political power in the country has aIso altered.

The army's dominance over politics was under intense scrutiny. The

5 Mubammad Kama! Hassan, Muslim Inte11ectual Responses to New arder Modernization in lndonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementrian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1982), p. 186.

6 Harold Crouch. The Army and Politics in lndonesia (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1978), p.351.

7 For a full account on the occasions and chronologica1 events leading to bis resignation, see Edward Aspina1l, Herb Feith, and Geny van IOinken, eds., The Last Days of PresidJmt Suharto (Australia: Monash University, Monash Asian Institute, 1999); Vidhyandika Moeljarto and Arya Budhiastra Gaduh, '1ndonesia in Transition: Govemment Responses ta the Reform. Demands in the • 8tate of Uncertainty·J 'Ihe Indonesian Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 3 (third quarter, 91

demands from the students and the people in general for a redefinition of • the raIe ofthe army in social and political affairs has been sa strong that the army has had ta consider its position in literally every field. As a

major pillar ofthe New Order regime, the army was aIso held to a certain

level of responsibility and it could do little to defend its position. Military

officers have been asked to confine themselves to their natura! position,

as the security apparatus of the countIy.

The most significant change which has been taking place since

Suharto's resignation is the process of shifting politica1 power from the

military ofticers to civilian politicians. The dual function of the army,

which has been subject ofdebate since its introduction in the 1960s, has

been DOW redefined ta accommodate the demands for political reforms • and to bring about democratic political system. As far as the advocates of political Islam were concemed, since

Suharto stepped down and appointed vice-president B.J. Habibie as his

successor, their position has become increasingly important. Islam has

once again emerged as an important political force in Indonesia. The

redefinition of the army's politica1 orientation has provided other political

forces with great opportunities to get involved in politics.

• 1998), 183-205. 92

With the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as the President8 , it is • conceivabIe that Islam will begin to play an important roIe in politics, and most certainly a more prominent roIe in the social and economic affairs

of Indonesia. As for the army, this MaY he the begiDDing of the

emergence of an apolitical and professional army.

•

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