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SUPERSEMAR: 5 Pertanyaan Untuk Jenderal Jusuf

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SUPERSEMAR: 5 Pertanyaan Untuk Jenderal Jusuf SUPERSEMAR: 5 Pertanyaan untuk Jenderal Jusuf detikFinance | detikFood | detikHot | detiki-Net | detikLaw | detikNews | detikSports | detikWanita | detikMall detikAcara | detikDomain | detikForum |detikKartu | detikKuis | detikLelang | detikMap | detikSurvey Otomotif | Sepak Bola | Yellow Pages | Foto |Kolom | Suara Pembaca | Members | E-mail | Ticket Box | Indeks MQ Aa Gym | Adil | Amien Rais | e-Samuel | Gede Prama | Karl May |Kho Ping Hoo | Perspektif Wimar | Rhenald Kasali Selasa, 06/03/2001 Kolom SUPERSEMAR: 5 Pertanyaan untuk Jenderal Jusuf Penulis: Penulis: Asvi Warman Adam * detikcom - Sampai hari ini naskah asli Supersemar (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret) 1966 belum ditemukan. Sementara itu pelaku yang terlibat dalam peristiwa tersebut semakin sedikit. Soeharto sudah sakit-sakitan dan ingatannya makin berkurang. Harapan satu-satunya barangkali pada Jenderal (pur) Jusuf yang sampai sekarang belum mau berbicara dengan terbuka mengenai persoalan ini. Ada beberapa pertanyaan yang perlu dijawab oleh mantan Pangab itu. Pertama, bagaimana sesungguhnya proses penyusunan dan penyerahan surat tersebut yang terkesan tidak wajar. Sudah diketahui umum bahwa surat tersebut dibuat bukanlah atas inisiatif dan kemauan Soekarno sendiri. Tahun 1998, anggota Tjakrabirawa Letnan Dua (purn) Soekardjo Wilardjito mengaku bahwa Jenderal Panggabean menodongkan pistolnya kepada Presiden Soekarno, sementara Jenderal Jusuf menyodorkan map surat untuk ditandatangani. Kesaksian Soekardjo di atas didukung pula oleh Kaswadi (77 tahun) dan Serka (purn) Rian Ismail yang kini bermukim di Klaten, Jawa Tengah. Mereka melihat bahwa tamu yang datang ke Istana Bogor berjumlah empat orang, bukan tiga orang seperti yang diketahui selama ini. Bahkan Kaswadi mengakui bahwa "Pada waktu itu, 11 Maret 1966, saya melihat Panggabean ada di Istana Bogor. Saat itu sekitar pukul 01.00 WIB dinihari. Panggabean datang mengendarai mobil jip dan berpakaian dinas militer. Ia kemudian berjalan masuk menuju Istana Bogor", tutur Kaswadi kepada LBH Jogyakarta. Kesaksian tersebut perlu dipertegas, kejadiannya tanggal 11 Maret atau 12 Maret 1966 (karena sudah masuk 01.00 pagi). (Wilardjito sendiri kemudian sempat diperiksa polisi bahkan dihadapkan ke pengadilan negeri Yogyakarta. Namun belum jelas bagaimana keputusan hakim sampai sekarang). Jabatan Mayjen M Panggabean pada waktu itu, seperti diungkapkan dalam tulisan Moerdiono "Di antara Para Sahabat: Pak Harto 70 tahun", adalah ketua Tim Umum yang dibentuk oleh Soeharto. Letnan Satu Infantri Moerdiono menjadi sekretaris Tim Politik yang diketuai oleh Mayjen Basuki Rakhmat dan Mayjen Ashari menjadi ketua Tim Ekonomi. Jumat pagi 4 September 1998, Jenderal M. Jusuf mengatakan bahwa yang menemui Soekarno tanggal 11 Maret 1996 hanya 3 jenderal, dan mereka di sana hanya sampai pukul 20.30 Tidak ditanyakan wartawan, berapa lama ketiga jenderal itu di Istana Bogor dan apa saja yang dibicarakan mereka dengan Presiden Soekarno? Kalau betul mereka baru pulang pukul 20.30 malam, itu memperlihatkan bahwa pembicaraan dengan Soekarno berjalan alot. Di dalam buku 70 tahun Soeharto itu, dimuat pula penuturan Sudharmono, ia menerima telpon dari Mayjen Sutjipto, Ketua G-5 KOTI, 11 Maret 1966 sekitar pukul 10 malam. Sutjipto meminta agar konsep tentang pembubaran PKI disiapkan dan harus selesai malam itu juga. Permintaan itu atas perintah Pangkopkamtib yang dijabat oleh Soeharto. Sudharmono sempat berdebat dengan Moerdiono mengenai dasar hukum teks tersebut. Beberapa jam kemudian, 12 Maret 1966 pukul 01.00 datanglah Sekretaris MBAD Brigjen Budiono membawa dokumen yang kemudian dikenal sebagai Supersemar. Menurut Sudharmono surat perintah tersebut "diperbanyak (difotokopi) di kantor kami". Kurang jelas apakah pada waktu itu sudah ada mesin fotokopi di Jakarta. Pertanyaan pertama di atas mengenai proses hanya tentu bisa dijawab oleh Jenderal Jusuf, salah satu saksi kunci yang hidup sampai sekarang. Soeharto sendiri sudah berkurang ingatannya. Pertanyaan kedua tentang siapa pengetik Supersemar? Beberapa waktu lalu muncul lagi pengakuan Letkol (pur) TNI-AD Ali Ebram, staf Asisten I Intelijen Resimen Cakrabirawa bahwa dia yang mengetik surat tersebut. Surat tersebut diketik dalam waktu satu jam dengan didiktekan oleh Bung Karno. Ia mengetik dengan gemetar dan mengatakan bahwa konsep itu berasal dari Soekarno sendiri. Yang diingatnya sekarang bahwa "dalam surat itu disebut ajaran, koordinasi, terus laporan dan menyangkut empat poin: soal keluarga, melindungi keluarga yang tidak ada. Yang keempat itu http://www.detik.com/kolom/200103/200136-100132.shtml (1 of 2)5/2/2006 1:21:45 PM SUPERSEMAR: 5 Pertanyaan untuk Jenderal Jusuf memberi laporan". Sebagai orang yang tidak biasa mengetik, ia mengerjakannya dengan gemetar dan berkata kepada Soekarno "Pak, saya mohon ampun kesesa (Pak, saya mohon tidak tergesa-gesa). Sebelum ditandatangan diketik kotanya yaitu Bogor. Betulkah Ali Ebram yang mengetik surat tersebut? Pasti Jenderal Jusuf tahu persis. Pertanyaan ketiga, benarkah apa yang disampaikan oleh pakar AS Ben Anderson bahwa mungkin saja surat perintah yang asli itu dihilangkan karena diketik dengan kop Markas Besar Angkatan Darat. Jadi jika dipertahankan tentu sangat lucu, surat kepresidengan ditulis dengan kertas berkop MBAD. Jadi surat itu "dihilangkan" bukan karena isi tetapi karena kop suratnya. Ben mengutip pengakuan seorang tentara yang mengaku waktu itu bertugas di Istana Bogor. Tidak dijelaskan nama dan pangkat tentara tersebut. Jika benar hal ini maka proses keluarnya surat perintah itu sebetulnya sudah direncanakan dengan matang di Jakarta, paling tidak oleh ketiga Jenderal tersebut. Jawaban pertanyaan di atas jelas dapat dijawab oleh Jenderal Jusuf karena ialah yang membawa surat tersebut ke Jakarta dan menyerahkannya kepada Jenderal Soeharto. Pertanyaan keempat, di mana naskah asli Supersemar berada? Konon, menurut KH Yusuf Hasyim, dari Tebuireng Jombang, yang menyimpan naskah asli Supersemar itu adalah Mas Agung (almarhum). Bila ini benar, kenapa surat tersebut sampai jatuh ke tangan tokoh yang dekat dengan Bung Karno? Yusuf Hasyim diberi salinan dua naskah Supersemar, yang satu berjumlah dua halaman, sedangkan yang satu lagi hanya satu halaman. Naskah asli itu konon kabarnya disimpan di sebuah bank di luar negeri, diperkirakan di Singapura. Jenderal Jusuf diduga mengetahui keberadaan surat tersebut. Paling sedikit ia dapat mengungkapkan setelah dibaca oleh Soeharto, surat itu diserahkan kepada siapa. Tentu saja, Sudharmono dan Moerdiono dapat dimintai keterangan. Pertanyaan kelima, apa yang dibicarakan oleh Jenderal Jusuf, Basuki Rachmad dan Amir Machmud di rumah Soeharto. Seperti sudah diketahui bahwa Presiden Soekarno meninggalkan sidang kabinet dan berangkat dengan helikopter ke Bogor, setelah mengetahui berkeliaran pasukan tidak dikenal di sekitar istana tanggal 11 Maret 1966. Jusuf, Basuki Rachmad dan Amir Machmud segera pergi ke rumah Soeharto di jalan Agus Salim. Bagaimana skenario yang dibicarakan mereka saat itu. Jawaban pertanyaan ini sangat penting dan krusial bagi penulisan sejarah Indonesia, khususnya sejarah terbentuknya Orde Baru. Mengenai Supersemar meskipun banyak kisah yang kontroversial di situ tetapi secara umum dapat disimpulkan bahwa surat tersebut bukanlah dibuat Presiden Soekarno dengan sukarela. Meskipun tidak ada todongan senjata, dapat dipahami bahwa penulisannya dilakukan dengan tekanan. Pada Supersemar, mungkin saja ia bisa berdalih tidak memaksa Soekarno, tetapi kenyataan ketiga Jenderal pembantunya telah membuat Soekarno terpaksa untuk membuat Surat Perintah tersebut. Apalagi pada pagi 11 Maret 1966 berkeliaran pasukan yang tidak memakai tanda pengenal di sekitar Istana, sehingga Soekarno memutuskan meninggalkan Istana dan pergi ke Bogor. Perlu diingatkan kembali bahwa Undang-Undang no 7 tahun 1971 tentang Ketentuan-Ketentuan Pokok Kearsipan, fasal 11 berbunyi: Barangsiapa dengan sengaja dan dengan melawan hukum memiliki arsip sebagaimana dimaksud dalam fasal 1 huruf a Undang-Undang ini dapat dipidana dengan pidana penjara selama-lamanya 10 (sepuluh) tahun. Orang yang terbukti menyimpan naskah asli Supersemar dan tidak menyerahkannya kepada negara ia bisa dijatuhi hukuman maksimal 10 tahun penjara. Hal ini juga berlaku bagi siapa, termasuk seorang Jenderal sekalipun. Wahai Jenderal Jusuf berbicaralah. Sebelum terlambat. @ * Penulis adalah doktor sejarah LIPI | Beranda | Redaksi | Kotak Pos | Info Iklan | Disclaimer |Powered by Agrakom | http://www.detik.com/kolom/200103/200136-100132.shtml (2 of 2)5/2/2006 1:21:45 PM.
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