Exploring Long-Term Effectiveness of Armed Drone Strikes in Overseas Contingency Operations
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LETHAL TARGETING ABROAD: EXPLORING LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMED DRONE STRIKES IN OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies By Luke A. Olney Washington, DC April 14, 2011 Copyright 2011 by Luke A. Olney All Rights Reserved ii LETHAL TARGETING ABROAD: EXPLORING LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMED DRONE STRIKES IN OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS Luke A. Olney, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Adam R. Grissom, Ph.D. ABSTRACT As the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan continues in its tenth year, it is important to evaluate not only the short-term effectiveness, but also the long-term implications of lethal targeting – specifically the use of armed drone strikes – against high-value individuals. This paper explores the following research question: are drone strikes an effective long-term strategy in overseas contingency operations? Specifically, it examines the hypothesis that U.S. drone strikes cause an increased number of militant attacks on local governments, which is likely to contribute to local instability in the long term. Two cases are analyzed to determine the impact of drone strikes on host governments. The first case examines Yemen from January 2001 through September 2010. Data is evaluated on the drone strike that killed Abu Ali al-Harithi on November 3, 2002, and the U.S. cruise missile strikes on targets in Yemen on December 17, 2009, to determine the relationship between U.S. strikes and militant attacks on the Government of Yemen. The second case evaluates sustained drone strikes in northwest Pakistan from January 2004 to September 2010 and the relationship between strikes and militant attacks on the Government of Pakistan. Each case provides a contextual narrative for the strike periods evaluated. This study concludes that drone strikes appear to have increased the number of militant attacks on local government-related targets after isolated drone strikes in both Yemen and Pakistan. However, in Pakistan where drone strikes have been sustained over time, militant iii attacks against the Government of Pakistan leveled off with approximately 30 attacks per month in 2010. Without further evaluation of more variables, including domestic military operations, recruitment levels, and other political factors, it is difficult to conclude that drone strikes are solely responsible for the increased militant attacks on host nations. However, the data is highly suggestive of the causal link between strikes and attacks. Decisionmakers should be aware of this possibility and make decisions that limit the counterproductivity of drone strikes. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER II. TERMINOLOGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE .............................................................. 5 CHAPTER III. CONTROVERSY OF DRONE STRIKES ........................................................................ 13 CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 21 Hypothesis ............................................................................................................................................... 21 Data and Variables ................................................................................................................................. 21 Limitations .............................................................................................................................................. 23 CHAPTER V. CASE STUDIES AND FINDINGS .................................................................................... 24 Yemen case .............................................................................................................................................. 24 Pakistan case .......................................................................................................................................... 31 CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 37 CHAPTER VII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................. 41 APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................................ 43 Appendix A: Attacks in Yemen .............................................................................................................. 43 Appendix B: Drone Strikes in Pakistan .................................................................................................. 48 Appendix C: Attacks in Pakistan ............................................................................................................ 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 119 v CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION As the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan continues in its tenth year, it is important to evaluate not only the short-term effectiveness, but also the long-term implications of lethal targeting – specifically the use of armed drone strikes – against high-value individuals (HVIs). The consequences of drone strikes not only affect the success of U.S. forces to eliminate enemy combatants, but also its ability to win the ―hearts and minds‖ of the local populace. U.S. drone strikes also impact the stability of host nations where such strikes are conducted. Lethal targeting should be reassessed to ensure its effectiveness in removing HVIs and that such a tactic is not counterproductive to U.S. efforts in already troubled regions, especially as President Obama seeks to de-escalate involvement in Afghanistan. Armed drone strikes have had mixed results, but it is likely that they will continue to be used as a means of lethal targeting to disrupt insurgent networks long into the future. The death of Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the main Taliban militant group in Pakistan, Tehrik-i- Taliban, demonstrates the attractiveness of drone strikes. Baitullah, along with his wife and several body guards, was killed by a U.S. drone strike on a compound in South Waziristan, Pakistan.1 In contrast, a subsequent drone strike on Baitullah‘s more aggressive successor, Hakimullah Mehsud, missed its intended target.2 Successful strikes have eliminated key enemy leadership while even unsuccessful ones no doubt limit the freedom of movement of enemy combatants. However, drone strikes have raised serious questions about how strikes affect enemy networks and their potential for civilian casualties. 1 ―Obama: ‗We took out‘ Pakistani Taliban chief.‖ Reuters, August 21, 2009, online edition, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-41873120090820 (accessed February 7, 2011). 2 Carlotta Gall, ―Video Shows U.S. Attack Did Not Kill Top Militant,‖ The New York Times, May 3, 2010, online edition, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/world/asia/03taliban.html# (accessed February 7, 2011). 1 Drone strikes are widely criticized for causing undue civilian casualties. A recent study estimates the actual civilian fatality rate since 2004 is 21 percent, and only six percent during 20103, but these numbers are highly disputed. Even if the correct HVI is eliminated, civilians are inevitably caught in the crosshairs of Hellfire missiles fired from Predators. Faulty intelligence has sometimes led to the wrong target being struck altogether. On February 21, 2010, 23 Afghan civilians were wrongly identified by a U.S.-operated drone as enemy combatants and killed in airstrikes. It also appears that U.S. commanders were less than forthcoming about reporting the civilian casualties until an investigation was launched.4 Such incidents often create resentment with the indigenous populations toward the U.S. and local governments.5 This and the enemy‘s demonstrated ability to replace its commanders create powerful arguments against the use of drone strikes. These types of second-order effects raise legitimate concerns about the contribution of lethal targeting to U.S. strategy. What follows is a case study on lethal targeting that intends to contribute to the knowledge and understanding of employing the tactic of armed drone strikes in the ―Global War on Terror,‖ now dubbed Overseas Contingency Operations, and an evaluation of military doctrine that guides the HVI targeting process. This paper explores the following research question: are drone strikes an effective long-term strategy in overseas contingency operations? Specifically, it examines the hypothesis that U.S. drone strikes cause an increased number of militant attacks on local governments, which is likely to contribute to local instability in the long term. 3 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ―The Year of the Drone,‖ New America Foundation, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (accessed March 14, 2011). 4 Robert H. Reid, ―Officers reprimanded in fatal drone strike,‖ Army Times, May 29, 2010, online edition, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/05/ap_afghanistan_airforce_drone_052910/ (accessed February 7, 2011). 5 George C. Wilson, ―The True Cost of Assassinations,‖ CongressDaily, September 13, 2010. 2 This paper begins with a review of terminology associated with drone strikes and the military doctrine