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Ifjf'k”V(Appendix) ifjf’k”V(Appendix) TERRORIST KILLED BY UNITED STATE OF AMERICA Killed in 2004: Nek Mohammed A senior Taliban commander in South Waziristan who had links to Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Date killed: June 18, 2004 Killed in 2005: Abu Hamza Rabia Al Qaeda's operational commander. He was involved with two assassination plots against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Date killed: December 1, 2005 Haitham al Yemeni A senior al Qaeda's explosives expert who also is thought to have been close to Osama bin Laden and Abu Faraj al Libi. Date killed: May 15, 2005 Killed in 2006: LiaquatHussain Second-in-command of the Bajaur TNSM. Date killed: October 30, 2006 Imam Asad Camp commander for the Black Guard, al Qaeda's elite bodyguard for Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. Asad was a Chechen with close links to ShamilBasayev. Date killed: March 1, 2006 Killed in 2007: No senior al Qaeda or Taliban leaders or operatives were reported killed during the strikes in 2007. 187 Killed in 2008: Abu Zubair al Masri Served as an explosives expert for al Qaeda as well as a leader. Date killed: November 21, 2008 Abdullah Azzam al Saudi Served as liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest. Azzam facilitated al Qaeda's external operations network. He also served as a recruiter and trainer for al Qaeda. Date killed: November 19, 2008 Abu Jihad al Masri The leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the chief of al Qaeda's intelligence branch, and directed al Qaeda's intelligence shura. He directed al Qaeda's external operations in Egypt. Date killed: October 31, 2008 Khalid Habib The commander of the Lashkar al Zil or the Shadow Army, al Qaeda's paramilitary forces in Pakistan's northwest and Afghanistan. Date killed: October 16, 2008 Abu al Hasan al Rimi A senior al Qaeda operative. Date killed: October 2008 - exact date unknown Abu Ubaidah al Tunisi An al Qaeda military commander who fought against the Russians in Afghanistan. Date killed: September 17, 2008 Abu Musa An al Qaeda operative from Saudi Arabia. Date killed: September 8, 2008 Abu Qasim An al Qaeda operative from Egypt. Date killed: September 8, 2008 Abu Hamza An explosives expert from Saudi Arabia who served as al Qaeda's commander in Peshawar. Date killed: September 8, 2008 Abu Haris A senior al Qaeda military commander from Syria who led more than 250 Arab and Afghan fighters under the guise of the Jaish al Mahdi in Helmand province. He became al Qaeda's operations chief in the tribal areas in 2008. 188 Date killed: September 8, 2008 Abu Wafa al Saudi An al Qaeda commander and logistician. Date killed: September 4, 2008 Abdul Rehman A local Taliban commander in the Wana region in South Waziristan. Date killed: August 13, 2008 Abu Khabab al Masri The chief of al Qaeda's weapons of mass destruction program and a master bomb maker. Date killed: July 28, 2008 Abu Mohammad Ibrahim bin Abi al Faraj al Masri A religious leader, close to Abu Khabab al Masri. Date killed: July 28, 2008 Abdul Wahhab al Masri A senior aide to Abu Khabab al Masri. Date killed: July 28, 2008 Abu Islam al Masri Aide to Abu Khabab al Masri. Date killed: July 28, 2008 Abu SulaymanJazairi The chief of al Qaeda's external network. Jazairi was a senior trainer, an explosives expert, and an operational commander tasked with planning attacks on the West. Date killed: May 14, 2008 Dr. Arshad Waheed (aka Sheikh Moaz) A mid-level al Qaeda leader. Date killed: March 16, 2008 Abu Laith al Libi Senior military commander in Afghanistan and the leader of the reformed Brigade 055 in al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army. Date killed: January 29, 2008 Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts.php#ixzz3NJctrBrM 189 Sixty years of US aid to Pakistan Year Economic Economic Assistance Military Coalition Assistance, (through USAID) Assistance, Support Total Total Funds 1948 0.77 0.00 0.00 1949 0.00 0.00 0.00 1950 0.00 0.00 0.00 1951 2.89 0.00 0.00 1952 74.25 73.55 0.00 1953 748.29 286.23 0.00 1954 156.95 152.24 0.00 1955 733.15 477.18 266.00 1956 1,065.67 700.89 1,086.50 1957 1,079.65 619.90 437.59 1958 968.22 589.59 533.13 1959 1,367.93 985.25 366.81 1960 1,689.84 1,181.35 230.39 1961 989.53 780.04 260.47 1962 2,334.65 1,446.28 549.02 1963 2,066.77 1,063.68 292.31 1964 2,222.66 1,334.16 187.55 1965 1,928.90 1,041.58 77.38 1966 816.28 691.28 8.40 1967 1,213.36 719.38 26.33 1968 1,501.68 672.50 25.98 1969 541.76 504.31 0.50 1970 968.32 570.93 0.87 190 1971 474.25 31.21 0.73 1972 692.87 261.87 0.42 1973 715.35 387.63 1.24 1974 381.97 219.13 0.95 1975 614.34 326.02 0.92 1976 644.10 336.78 1.28 1977 319.16 209.40 0.92 1978 214.92 55.49 1.52 1979 128.81 23.31 1.20 1980 137.53 0.00 0.00 1981 164.16 0.00 0.00 1982 400.60 200.07 1.20 1983 534.18 383.29 499.77 1984 568.05 415.84 555.90 1985 607.26 447.53 583.53 1986 623.56 460.91 545.82 1987 599.07 469.53 534.54 1988 769.14 635.00 430.69 1989 559.72 421.27 367.06 1990 548.07 422.37 283.44 1991 149.59 141.78 0.00 1992 27.14 0.57 7.20 1993 74.19 7.98 0.00 1994 68.43 0.00 0.00 1995 23.13 10.10 0.00 1996 22.79 0.00 0.00 1997 57.17 0.00 0.00 1998 36.32 0.00 0.00 1999 102.14 6.72 0.22 191 2000 45.72 0.00 0.00 2001 228.02 0.54 0.00 2002 937.34 744.74 1,739.70 1,386.06 2003 377.93 284.81 1,760.23 1,450.98 2004 406.12 316.56 891.39 794.11 2005 490.42 374.04 1,397.06 1,050.15 2006 689.43 488.46 1,246.10 916.13 2007 688.62 498.91 1,079.72 755.74 2008 614.48 392.05 1,378.32 1,014.90 2009 1,353.65 1,076.25 1,114.26 685.00 2010 1,867.13 1,529.53 2,524.61 1,220.50 Source: “Sixty years of US aid to Pakistan: Get the data”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/11/us-aid-to- pakistan 192 Pakistan Profile: A chronology of key events: Musharraf coup 1999 October - General Pervez Musharraf seizes power in coup. 2000 April - Nawaz Sharif sentenced to life imprisonment on hijacking and terrorism charges over his actions to prevent the 1999 coup. 2000 December - Nawaz Sharif goes into exile in Saudi Arabia after being pardoned by military authorities. 2001 June - Gen Pervez Musharraf names himself president while remaining head of the army. 2001 September - Musharraf swings in behind the US in its fight against terrorism and supports attacks on Afghanistan. US lifts some sanctions imposed after Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998. 2001 December - India, Pakistan prompt fears of full-scale war by massing troops along common border amid growing tensions over Kashmir following suicide attack on Indian parliament. 2002 January - President Musharraf bans two militant groups - Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e- Mohammad - and takes steps to curb religious extremism. 2002 April - President Musharraf wins another five years in office in a referendum criticised as unconstitutional and flawed. 2002 May - Pakistan test fires three medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, amid rumours of impending conflict with India. 2002 August - President Musharraf grants himself sweeping new powers, including the right to dismiss an elected parliament. Thaw with India 2003 November - Pakistan declares a Kashmir ceasefire; India follows suit. 2003 December - Pakistan and India agree to resume direct air links and to allow overflights of each other's planes from beginning of 2004, after a two-year ban. 193 2004 February - Leading nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan admits to having leaked nuclear weapons secrets, reportedly to Libya, North Korea and Iran. 2004 June - Pakistan mounts first military offensive against suspected Al-Qaeda militants and their supporters in tribal areas near Afghan border. US begins using drone strikes to target Al-Qaeda leaders in the area. 2004 April - Parliament approves creation of military-led National Security Council, institutionalising role of armed forces in civilian affairs. 2004 May - Pakistan readmitted to Commonwealth. 2005 April - Bus services, the first in 60 years, operate between Muzaffarabad in Pakistani-administered Kashmir and Srinagar in Indian-controlled Kashmir. 2005 August - Pakistan tests its first nuclear-capable cruise missile. Kashmir quake 2005 October - Earthquake kills tens of thousands of people in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. 2006 September - Government signs peace accord to end fighting with pro-Al-Qaeda militants in Waziristan tribal areas near Afghan border. 2007 February - Sixty-eight passengers are killed by bomb blasts and a blaze on a train travelling between the Indian capital New Delhi and the Pakistani city of Lahore.
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