DOCSLIB.ORG

America's Imperfect War: the Ethics, Law, and Strategy of Drone Warfare

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
America's Imperfect War: the Ethics, Law, and Strategy of Drone Warfare University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 8-2017 America’s Imperfect War: The Ethics, Law, and Strategy of Drone Warfare Treston Lashawn Wheat University of Tennessee, Knoxville, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the American Politics Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Political Theory Commons Recommended Citation Wheat, Treston Lashawn, "America’s Imperfect War: The Ethics, Law, and Strategy of Drone Warfare. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2017. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/4668 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Treston Lashawn Wheat entitled "America’s Imperfect War: The Ethics, Law, and Strategy of Drone Warfare." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science. Michael Fitzgerald, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: John Scheb, David Houston, David Reidy Accepted for the Council: Dixie L. Thompson Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) America’s Imperfect War: The Ethics, Law, and Strategy of Drone Warfare A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Treston Lashawn Wheat August 2017 Copyright © 2017 by Treston L. Wheat All rights reserved. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Thank you to my Committee members Dr. John Scheb, Dr. David Houston, Dr. David Reidy, and Dr. Michael Fitzgerald for participating in this intellectual journey. Thank you to Dr. Fitzgerald for serving as my Committee Chair. I would also like to acknowledge the support of my family, and I dedicate this study to my best friend, Jon, who taught me about the personal costs of war. iii ABSTRACT This study explores the ethics, law, and strategy of targeted killings by drones in the War on Terror. It starts with an exploration of just war theory, its historical development and criteria, to create a foundational framework by which to analyze the ethics of drones as a tactic. Then it defines terrorism and insurgency, establishing how sub-state actors operate, and the strategies states will use to neutralize them as threats. This shows that the War on Terror is actually an armed conflict because terrorism and insurgency are forms of warfare under the law and in warfare theory. After looking at terrorism a broad concept, a history of the War on Terror, its operational context, and the specific nature of al-Qaeda and its affiliates are explained to give context to the ethical debate. Because of the actions of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the U.S. is at war with these organizations and is allowed to use kinetic action against them. The study then approaches the history, law, geopolitics, and ethics of drone warfare to show targeted killings and strategic strikes are legitimate forms of kinetic action and are legal, ethical, and useful tactics to neutralize enemy combatants and terrorist organizations. Finally, using the cases of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia this study demonstrates that targeted killings by drones are proportional, discriminatory, and militarily necessary. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One Introduction p. 1 Chapter Two Just War Theory: Historical Development and Modern Interpretations p. 10 Chapter Three Understanding Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello with Historical Examples p. 36 Chapter Four Sub-State Violence: Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare p. 63 Chapter Five Operational Context: Al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the War on Terror p. 97 Chapter Six Operational Context: Iraq, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda’s Affiliates p. 131 Chapter Seven Drones: History and Law p. 158 Chapter Eight Ethics of Drones and Targeted Killings p. 186 Chapter Nine Strategy and Geopolitics of Drones p. 210 Chapter Ten Drones: Proportionality, Discrimination, and Military Necessity p. 237 Chapter Eleven Conclusion p. 257 Bibliography p. 267 Vita p. 289 v CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION After the ending of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the international order predicated itself on the centrality of the nation-state for sovereignty and legitimacy. Institutions, law makers, and sovereigns based their normative principles both ethically and legally on the fact states are the primary political actors in international relations. This raises problems when states have tensions with non-state actors and have to engage with them. Although there are several theoretical paradigms on which policy makers have justified their actions, the general consensus among them concerning ethics is adherence to the traditions of just war. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, DC the U.S. has systematically targeted violent sub-state actors, which raises questions concerning ethics and warfare. The U.S. experience with the problems of warfare dates back to the Founding. The Founders did not appreciate calculated realism and preferred to justify conflict and its conduct on idealist grounds. They found the country on “ideals,” not realism and balance of power. Then when the Framers wrote the Constitution, they made it difficult for the President to go to war. Congress had significant power over the military, particularly the ability to raise armies and maintain a navy, but for some time in the 19th century America’s military power would be meager at best. Presidents like Thomas Jefferson tried to expand naval power to deal with specific threats, but usually the Congress focused on defensive positions like forts. America had a sense of its own national exceptionalism and almost an overdose of idealism, seeing war as typical of the Old World. The country was protected by the Great Power conflicts by the European balance of power and a two ocean buffer. But over the two and half centuries of America’s existence, it would learn about and adapt to “small wars.” Small wars, also called limited or asymmetric wars, 1 are different than total wars. They are wars fought less than whole heartedly, wars where America intervenes in the internal affairs of others, wars without significant popular support, and “wars among the people.” That is the type of war that President Bush would find himself engaging in after 9/11 and developing modern tools for the conflict. America invaded Afghanistan to stop al-Qaeda, but the War on Terror would not remain within the borders of that country. Al-Qaeda spread through its affiliates into Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. One weapon the United States has used widely is drones. Drones have become a regular tool used for warfare and paramilitary operations, and they are here to stay. As such, meaningful debate must take place on the ethics of their use if America wants to stay true to its democratic and Western values along with an adherence to the rule of law, domestic and international. If drones are ethical, legal, and useful for targeting and neutralizing terrorists, then they become one of the best tools in the protracted war against al- Qaeda and its affiliates. The U.S. government has argued that their drone policies are morally justified within the just war tradition (Brennan, 2012; Holder, 2012; Obama, 2013). However, there is significant debate within academia as to whether or not this is true. Many academics have approached the topic by merely raising the issues of drones and explaining how just war ethics might apply (Bataoel, 2011; Enemark, 2013; Cook, 2015; Welsh, 2015). Moral questions raised include the applicability of new technologies and their ability to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. On the other hand, Strawser (2010) contends there is a moral obligation to use drones because they help protect the “just warfighter” when the use of force is justified. Yet several academics take serious issue with drones, believing their use in targeted killings as unethical. Adams and Barrie (2013) argues that drones are problematic because of 2 their bureaucratization, meaning decisions become mechanical and a threat to the democratic process. Boyle (2015) delineates how the Obama administration’s discrete choices and enunciation of a right to presumptive self-defense challenges the normal legal and ethical paradigms that would apply to drones. Brunstetter and Braun (2011) argue that the lack of transparency makes drones difficult to judge while the distance from the conflict may make killing easier. Enemark (2011) also raises the need for greater transparency while Rae (2014) worries that permanent conflict could arise because of the ease of killing the enemy. Braun and Brustetter (2013) also contend that the CIA’s drone program is problematic because almost a quarter of attacks have collateral damage, which means a new moral language of jus ad vim (just use of force short of war) might be necessary. Kreps and Kaag (2012) follow this argument by stating that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is incredibly challenging. On the other hand, Carvin (2015) thinks that proportionality is misapplied to the drone, especially because scholars cannot get an accurate count of civilian casualties. Scholars offer competing ethical perspectives and a variety of problems associated with drones, but just war ethics provides a way to systematically evaluate these issues and problems. This study assesses drone warfare and targeted killings as a tactic within asymmetric warfare and counter-terrorism according to the criteria of jus in bello.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ifjf'k”V(Appendix)
    ifjf’k”V(Appendix) TERRORIST KILLED BY UNITED STATE OF AMERICA Killed in 2004: Nek Mohammed A senior Taliban commander in South Waziristan who had links to Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Date killed: June 18, 2004 Killed in 2005: Abu Hamza Rabia Al Qaeda's operational commander. He was involved with two assassination plots against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Date killed: December 1, 2005 Haitham al Yemeni A senior al Qaeda's explosives expert who also is thought to have been close to Osama bin Laden and Abu Faraj al Libi. Date killed: May 15, 2005 Killed in 2006: LiaquatHussain Second-in-command of the Bajaur TNSM. Date killed: October 30, 2006 Imam Asad Camp commander for the Black Guard, al Qaeda's elite bodyguard for Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. Asad was a Chechen with close links to ShamilBasayev. Date killed: March 1, 2006 Killed in 2007: No senior al Qaeda or Taliban leaders or operatives were reported killed during the strikes in 2007. 187 Killed in 2008: Abu Zubair al Masri Served as an explosives expert for al Qaeda as well as a leader. Date killed: November 21, 2008 Abdullah Azzam al Saudi Served as liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest. Azzam facilitated al Qaeda's external operations network. He also served as a recruiter and trainer for al Qaeda. Date killed: November 19, 2008 Abu Jihad al Masri The leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the chief of al Qaeda's intelligence branch, and directed al Qaeda's intelligence shura.
    [Show full text]
  • The Al-Qaeda Revival in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects
    Essay _ 94 The Al-Qaeda Revival in NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability Pakistan: Challenges and 2020, Vol. III (1) Pages 94-101 Prospects njips.nust.edu.pk Farhan Zahid1 Pakistan remains a country of vital importance for Al-Qaeda. It is primarily because of Al-Qaeda’s advent, rise and shelter and not to mention the support the terrorist organization found at the landscape of Pakistan during the last two decades. The emergence of in Pakistan can be traced back to the Afghan War (1979-89), with a brief sabbatical in Sudan the Islamist terrorist group rose to gain prominence after shifting back to Afghanistan. It then became a global ‘Islamist’ terrorist entity while based in neighboring Afghanistan and found safe havens in the erstwhile tribal areas of Pakistan in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Prior to its formation in 1988 in Peshawar (Pakistan), it had worked as Maktab al-Khidmat (Services Bureau) during the Afghan War.2 It had its roots in Pakistan, which had become a transit point of extremists en route to Afghanistan during the War. All high profile Al-Qaeda leaders, later becoming high-value targets, and members of its central Shura had lived in Pakistan at one point in their lives. That is the very reason the Al-Qaeda in Pakistan is termed as Al-Qaeda Core or Central among law enforcement practitioners and intelligence communities. Without going into details of Al-Qaeda’s past in Pakistan the aim of this article is to focus on its current state of affairs and what future lies ahead of it in Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign Against Al Qaeda Central
    The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central. A Case Study Javier Jordán University of Granada (Spain) Preprint version: Javier Jordán, “The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study”, Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 37, No 1 (2014), pp. 4- 29. Abstract This article examines the effects which the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is having on Al Qaeda Central. To that end, it constructs a theoretical model to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda’s capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Although the results of one single empirical case cannot be generalised, they nonetheless constitute a preliminary element for the construction of a broader theoretical framework concerning the use of armed drones as part of a counter-terrorism strategy. Key Words: Al Qaeda, Terrorism, Intelligence, Drones, United States, Pakistan. Introduction Although it has tried to repeat its highly lethal attacks, Al Qaeda Central has been unable to strike successfully in the United States since 9/11 or in Western Europe since 7 July 2005 (London bombings). Logically, as with all complex social phenomena, the operational decline of the terrorist organisation is the result of multiple factors. This article focuses on just one: the campaign of drone strikes against Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan, particularly North Waziristan. A fruitful academic debate is taking place at present regarding the effectiveness of High Value Targeting (HVT) campaigns in the fight against terrorist organisations. Based on empirical studies involving relatively large samples, several authors question the effectiveness of such campaigns and even warn that they may be counterproductive.1 Others, however, also use empirical research to show that HVT reduces the effectiveness of terrorist organisations.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistani Kashmiri Militants Now Fighting NATO Forces Amir Mir Friday 18 September 2009
    Pakistani Kashmiri militants now fighting NATO forces Amir Mir Friday 18 September 2009 LAHORE: The reported death of the ameer of the Azad Kashmir chapter of the Harkatul Jehadul Islami (HUJI) Commander Ilyas Kashmiri in a US drone attack has confirmed that the trouble-stricken Waziristan region has become the new battlefield for the Kashmiri militant groups which are increasingly joining forces with the pro-Taliban elements to fight out the NATO troops from Afghanistan. International media reports have confirmed while citing US intelligence sources the death of the HUJI leader Ilyas Kashmiri along with Nazimuddin Zalalov alias Yahyo, a top al-Qaeda leader belonging to the Islamic Jehad of Uzbekistan. Both died in two separate drone attacks conducted on September 7 and September 14, 2009 respectively by the Afghanistan- based American drones in the Machikhel and Khushali Toori Khel villages of the Mir Ali sub division of North Waziristan. Ilyas Kashmiri died after the predator targeted a car carrying five suspected militants in Khushali Toori Khel village. Ilyas Kashmiri was considered to be one of the most dangerous al-Qaeda-linked Pakistani commanders. No. 4 on the Pakistani Ministry of Interior’s Most Wanted list, Kashmiri was a veteran of the Kashmir jehad who had spent several years in an Indian jail after being arrested from Jammu & Kashmir. While the Pakistan chapter of HUJI is led by Qari Saifullah Akhtar, its Azad Kashmir chapter, which is autonomous, was headed by Ilyas Kashmiri. He was arrested by the Pakistani authorities after the December 2003 twin suicide attacks on General Musharraf’s presidential cavalcade in Rawalpindi, but released in February 2004 due to lack of evidence.
    [Show full text]
  • Al Qaeda’S Command- And-Control Structure
    Testimony of Steven Emerson Before the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence April 9, 2008 Steven Emerson Executive Director Investigative Project on Terrorism www.investigativeproject.org email:[email protected] Introduction: The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was successful in obliterating much of al Qaeda’s command- and-control structure. Due to a robust and successful counter-terrorist policy made up of good intelligence gathered by the FBI, asset forfeitures and designations by the Department of the Treasury, and other good work by the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies within the intelligence community, the U,S. has fortunately not been hit with another attack since 9-11. Moreover, in the six and a half years since the those horrible, al Qaeda’s direct orchestration of acts of terrorism on the operational level has been somewhat constrained. This is not to say that al Qaeda has not been involved in terrorist attacks and plots since 2001 (training and guidance provided by al Qaeda in the 2005 London transit bombings and foiled 2006 Heathrow plot prove otherwise), but the group’s leaders have relied largely on the power of self- anointed franchises and recognized the power of spreading its message and ideology via the Internet. Extremist Muslims throughout the world have responded to this message and have sought to execute a number of attacks. While most have been stopped, some have been successful, killing hundreds and injuring thousands more, resulting in propaganda coups for al Qaeda and its leadership. Parallel to franchising the al Qaeda ideology, the group has successfully regenerated its operational capabilities in the sanctuary of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics
    IDSS COMMENTARIES (1/2006) IDSS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of IDSS. ___________________________________________________________________________ Afghanistan and the Globalisation of Terrorist Tactics Hekmat Karzai* 4 January 2006 FOUR years have passed since the United States’ Operation Enduring Freedom toppled the Taliban regime. While much work remains, several surveys indicate that the overall conditions of the Afghan people appear to have improved, and may actually exceed the conditions of the pre-war period two decades ago. A recent poll conducted by US television network ABC indicates that Afghans generally believe their country is moving in the right direction, demonstrated by the return of more than three million refugees. The country currently enjoys an elected government and an enlightened constitution. Educational opportunities have expanded and schooling is now provided for all children regardless of gender. Yet, the future success for Afghanistan is far from assured. Security remains a concern in the daily lives of the average Afghan as the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Hizb-e-Islami continue to regroup and undertake terrorist attacks throughout the South and the Southeast of Afghanistan. They are learning and emulating tactics of other groups, especially, the ones practised in Iraq. Last year, 85 American soldiers and over 1,500 individuals, including NGO workers, religious leaders, international officers and government officials were killed by means common to Iraq. Many experts say that because of the US military might during Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban and the foreign fighters were forced to establish sanctuaries in foreign cities and among tribal protectors living in areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY institution that helps improve policy and POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY decisionmaking through research and SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY analysis. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND Support RAND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Security Research Division View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION Project supported by a RAND Investment in People and Ideas This monograph results from the RAND Corporation’s Investment in People and Ideas program.
    [Show full text]
  • Al-Qaeda Is Seen As Restoring Leadership
    Qaeda Is Seen as Restoring Leadership - New York Times Page 1 of 4 April 2, 2007 Qaeda Is Seen as Restoring Leadership By MARK MAZZETTI WASHINGTON, April 1 — As Al Qaeda rebuilds in Pakistan’s tribal areas, a new generation of leaders has emerged under Osama bin Laden to cement control over the network’s operations, according to American intelligence and counterterrorism officials. The new leaders rose from within the organization after the death or capture of the operatives that built Al Qaeda before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, leading to surprise and dismay within United States intelligence agencies about the group’s ability to rebound from an American-led offensive. It has been known that American officials were focusing on a band of Al Qaeda training camps in Pakistan’s remote mountains, but a clearer picture is emerging about those who are running the camps and thought to be involved in plotting attacks. American, European and Pakistani authorities have for months been piecing together a picture of the new leadership, based in part on evidence-gathering during terrorism investigations in the past two years. Particularly important have been interrogations of suspects and material evidence connected to a plot British and American investigators said they averted last summer to destroy multiple commercial airliners after takeoff from London. Intelligence officials also have learned new information about Al Qaeda’s structure through intercepted communications between operatives in Pakistan’s tribal areas, although officials said the group has a complex network of human couriers to evade electronic eavesdropping. The investigation into the airline plot has led officials to conclude that an Egyptian paramilitary commander called Abu Ubaidah al-Masri was the Qaeda operative in Pakistan orchestrating the attack, officials said.
    [Show full text]
  • Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States
    S. HRG. 111–254 CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 10, 2009 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 54–639 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JACK REED, Rhode Island SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN THUNE, South Dakota E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MEL MARTINEZ, Florida EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JIM WEBB, Virginia RICHARD BURR, North Carolina CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana MARK UDALL, Colorado SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina MARK BEGICH, Alaska ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director (II) VerDate Nov 24 2008 10:28 Jan 29, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\54639.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB C O N T E N T S CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES MARCH 10, 2009 Page Blair, Hon.
    [Show full text]
  • Gateway to Terror Anjem Choudary and the Al-Muhajiroun Network
    Gateway to Terror Anjem Choudary and the al-Muhajiroun network www.hopenothate.org.uk Anjem Choudary and the al-Muhajiroun network Gateway to Terror Anjem Choudary and the al-Muhajiroun network By Nick Lowles and Joe Mulhall ABOUT THE AUTHORS Joe Mulhall is currently an AHRC PhD candidate based at Royal Holloway, University of London, researching British fascism, anti-fascism, antisemitism and racism. He is a former campaign organiser at HOPE not hate and the former UK Section Head of the Extremis Project. Contact: [email protected]. Nick Lowles is Chief Executive of HOPE not hate and has led several successful community campaigns against extremism, including that which helped defeat the BNP in Barking & Dagenham. He has written six books on fascism, anti-racism and football hooliganism. In 2012 he co-authored: The ‘Counter-Jihad’ movement: the global trend feeding anti-Muslim hatred. He has also worked for BBC Panorama, World in Action and MacIntyre Undercover. Contact: [email protected]. www.hopenothate.org.uk HOPE not hate Educational Ltd, PO Box 67476, London NW3 9RF Contents Contents 5 Introduction The al-Muhajiroun network 6 Executive summary 30 The organisational map The British operation The international network 7 History of al-Muhajiroun 32 The al-Muhajiroun network 10 Profile of Anjem Choudary 34 The Global Sharia movement 11 Key figures in the al-Muhajiroun network 36 The Sharia4 group guide 12 Ideology 38 Partner organisations: Milliat Ibrahim 14 The al-Muhajiroun network today 39 Partner organisations: The US plotters
    [Show full text]
  • CPC Outreach Journal #660
    USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama Issue No. 660, 21 October 2008 Articles & Other Documents: Military Report Says Terms 'Jihad,' 'Islamist' Needed China To Help Build 2 Pakistan Nuclear Plants Al-Qaeda Web Forums Abruptly Taken Offline Top-Secret Report Details Pakistan's Deep Turmoil Al-Qaida Denies Web Attack, But Its Sites Struggle US Reaffirms Cooperation To Pak In War Against Terror Al -Qaeda Terror Suspects Set For Saudi Trial North Korea Sticks To Pact, U.S. Says U.S. Strike Is Said To Kill Qaeda Figure In Pakistan Important News Expected From North Korea Terrorists 'Use Child Porn' To Exchange Information North Korea: Penpix Of Possible Successors To Kim Tamil Tigers Launch Gas Attack Jong Il The Worst of the Worst? Super Cyber Command Iran: US Experts Ponder Framework For Engagement An Argument for 'Bottom-Up' Policy on National Between Washington And Tehran Preparedness Iran Arrests Pigeons 'Spying' On Nuclear Site Clearing The Path Toward A Nuclear Renaissance The Limits Of Nuclear Power Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense.
    [Show full text]
  • HOYT-THESIS-2014.Pdf (718.6Kb)
    A GAME OF DRONES: COMPARING THE U.S. AERIAL ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN IN YEMEN AND PAKISTAN A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies Angelo State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF SECURITY STUDIES by MELANIE RAEANN HOYT December 2014 Major: Security Studies A GAME OF DRONES: COMPARING THE U.S. AERIAL ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN IN YEMEN AND PAKISTAN by MELANIE RAEANN HOYT APPROVED: Dr. Anthony Celso Dr. Robert Ehlers Dr. Bruce Bechtol Dr. Christine Lamberson APPROVED: Dr. Susan E. Keith Dean of the College of Graduate Studies ABSTRACT To combat the terrorist threat the United States faces in Yemen and Pakistan, Remotely Piloted Vehicles have been employed to deter, deflect, and defend. These RPV’s operate thousands of miles from the closest military base in states that are not officially engaged in war. In these sovereign lands, cultures that have existed for thousands of years are torn between corrupt governments, terrorist insurgency cells, and sudden death from above. Reports on whether the aerial assassination campaign has impacted terrorist activity have been interpreted very differently among analysts. This thesis will explore how RPV’s have affected foreign policy, terrorism, and the security threats these places pose to the United States. Answers to these questions directly affect the future of international law, and how war will be waged in future combat. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS ...............................................................................................
    [Show full text]