march 2012 . Vol 5 . Issue 3

Contents The Evidence of Al-Qa`ida’s

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Evidence of Al-Qa`ida’s Role Role in the 2004 Madrid Attack in the 2004 Madrid Attack By Fernando Reinares By Fernando Reinares

Reports 6 A Pre-Trial Profile of Anders Behring Breivik By Jacob Aasland Ravndal 10 The Rabbani Assassination: Taliban Strategy to Weaken National Unity? By Michael Gabbay 14 Assessing Al-Qa`ida’s Presence in the New Libya By Andrew Lebovich and Aaron Y. Zelin 18 U.S. Gang Alignment with Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations By Mark Schmidt, U.S. National Gang Intelligence Center 20 The Emergence of the Difa-e-Pakistan Islamist Coalition By Arif Rafiq 22 Attacking Drug Cartels Through Undercover Money Laundering Operations By Robert Mazur A policeman walks alongside a train that was bombed in Madrid on March 11, 2004. - Photo by Christophe Simon/AFP/Getty Images n march 11, 2004, a series (LIFG) and included members of the 25 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity of coordinated bombings Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts ripped through Madrid’s (GICM), as well as two former members

commuter train system, of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and Okilling 191 people. Although the attacks 2 Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Although the have been described as the product of network also included common criminals an independent cell of self-radicalized who radicalized into jihadists, this cell individuals only inspired by al-Qa`ida, component was only a late addition. the extensive criminal proceedings About the CTC Sentinel on the Madrid bombings refute this Eight years after the Madrid terrorist The Combating Terrorism Center is an hypothesis.1 The network responsible attacks, new intelligence collected independent educational and research for the Madrid attacks evolved from the since the main judicial sentence in institution based in the Department of Social remnants of an al-Qa`ida cell formed in 2007 suggests that al-Qa`ida’s senior Sciences at the United States Military Academy, Spain a decade earlier. It was initiated leadership not only approved the West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses following instructions from an operative operation, but likely helped facilitate the Center’s global network of scholars and of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and supervise it. The key connection practitioners to understand and confront between al-Qa`ida’s central leadership contemporary threats posed by terrorism and and the Madrid bombing network was other forms of political violence. 1 In fact, the judicial sentence on the trial case refers to Amer Azizi, a Moroccan who lived in the militants convicted for the attacks as “members of terrorist cells and groups of jihadist type” and belonging The views expressed in this report are those of to a “terrorist group or groups of jihadist character.” The 2 Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qa`ida in June the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, sentence never alluded to an “independent” cell or similar 2001. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group disappeared the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. notion. See Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección after its offshoot, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Segunda, “Sentencia 65/2007,” pp. 172, 279. Combat, broke away in 1998.

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Madrid for a decade until November the bombing preparations. This detail for example, Abu Dahdah was close to 2001. Azizi was a prominent member and other crucial pieces of information Tarek Maaroufi, leader of the Tunisian of the “Abu Dahdah cell,” an al-Qai`da were acquired by at least three Western Combatant Group, who was living in cell established in Spain during the intelligence services between 2008 and Belgium. Abu Dahdah also traveled mid-1990s.3 By the time of the Madrid 2010 and shared with this author.6 to London regularly to bring money attacks, however, Azizi had become the to the jihadist ideologue Abu Qatada. adjunct to al-Qa`ida’s head of external This article first recounts how Azizi operations, the Egyptian Hamza became a key member of the Abu Dahdah Rabia.4 cell, where he forged connections “The initial groundwork with the men who would later execute for the Madrid attacks This article argues that Azizi initiated the Madrid attacks. It then provides plans to conduct a major act of jihadist a chronological narrative of how the began with a meeting in terrorism in Spain during the second half decision to attack Spain was made, as Karachi in December 2001 of 2001. At the time, he was already a well as Azizi’s role in the formation of committed al-Qa`ida activist, but not yet the bombing network. between Amer Azizi and a ranking member in the organization. Abdelatif Mourafik.” By 2002-2003, however, Azizi was From the Abu Dahdah Cell to Al-Qa`ida serving as the key intermediary between Central al-Qa`ida’s central leadership and the Amer Azizi was born in the Moroccan primary members of the Madrid bombing town of Hedami in 1968 and migrated to In the aftermath of 9/11, international network, including its local ringleader, Spain in the early 1990s.7 Once settled in security and intelligence investigations Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet (known Madrid, he married a native Spaniard, revealed that Abu Dahdah had a as “The Tunisian”)—with whom Azizi Raquel Burgos, who converted to direct link to the Hamburg cell led by had ties dating back to the late 1990s.5 Islam. Azizi began to attend Tablighi Muhammad `Atta and whose members By all accounts, Azizi traveled from Jama`at gatherings in the capital, were responsible for the attacks on Pakistan to Spain at the end of 2003, and by 1995 he had been radicalized the World Trade Center and Pentagon likely to convey the approval of al- and recruited into al-Qa`ida’s Abu in 2001.10 Moreover, Abu Dahdah had Qa`ida’s senior leadership for the Dahdah cell. Around this time, Abu previous knowledge of `Atta’s plans Madrid attack, as well as to finalize Dahdah dispatched Azizi to a jihadist to strike on U.S. soil and was informed military facility in Zenica, Bosnia. By about ongoing preparations.11 3 The cell was founded in or before 1994 by Mustafa Set- 2000, Azizi had also received military marian Nasar (also known as Abu Mus`ab al-Suri) and training in the Afghanistan camps, 10 `Atta himself traveled to Spain twice in 2001. During Anwar Adnan Mohamed Saleh. The Syrian-born Abu which were managed by al-Qa`ida and its his second trip, between July 8-19, 2001, `Atta met with 8 Dahdah (whose real name is Imad Eddin Barakat Yar- North African affiliates. Azizi’s training al-Qa`ida operative Ramzi bin al-Shibh—the so-called kas) became the cell leader in 1995 once Saleh moved to experience made him a respected “20th hijacker”—and one or two unidentified individu- Peshawar to help in al-Qa`ida’s reception of recruited member of the Abu Dahdah cell, within als involved in the 9/11 attacks. The meeting took place 9 Arabs and their transfer to Afghanistan, and al-Suri to which he became a leading recruiter. in two municipalities in the Catalonian coastal province London to assist Abu Qatada in editing the GIA’s maga- of Tarragona. Based on detailed analysis of the physical zine, al-Ansar. The Abu Dahdah cell had important movement and phone exchanges in the area among Abu 4 Following the arrest of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in jihadist connections in several countries Dahdah cell members, Spanish security services are con- Rawalpindi in March 2003, Abu Faraj al-Libi took over- worldwide, from the Middle East to vinced that Abu Dahdah cell members, including Azizi, all charge of al-Qa`ida’s operations and Hamza Rabia Southeast Asia. In Western Europe, facilitated the meeting between al-Shibh and `Atta—al- became commander for external operations, including though it cannot be established with certainty whether operations in the United States and Western Europe. On 6 Personal interviews, senior intelligence officers of two any of the Abu Dahdah cell members actually attended Azizi’s position as adjunct to Rabia and the intelligence Western governments, one of them European, in Decem- the gathering. For details, see Audiencia Nacional, Sala sources for this information, see Fernando Reinares, “11- ber 2011 and, for further documented confirmation, in de lo Penal, Sección Tercera, “Sentencia 36/2005,” pp. M: la conexión Al Qaeda,” El País, December 17, 2009; February 2012. 203-211; “Informe ampliatorio de las investigaciones Fernando Reinares, “The Madrid Bombings and Global 7 Amer Azizi was also known as Othman al-Andalusi, realizadas en torno a las visitas a España de Mohamed Jihadism,” Survival 52:2 (2010), pp. 91-95. Also see the Jaffar al-Maghrebi and, occasionally, Othman al-Faruq Atta y Ramzi Binalshibh (sic),” Dirección General de la following article on a jihadist website identifying Amer and Ilyas. Policía, Comisaría General de Información, Unidad Cen- Azizi’s position: www.alqimmah.net/showthread. 8 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción tral de Información Exterior, October 16, 2002; “Sumario php?t=9752, accessed June 11, 2010. no. 5, “Sumario 35/2001,” vol. 57, pp. 18, 322-418, 369; 35/2001,” vol. 6, pp. 1,823-1,869, vol. 53, pp. 16, 614-616, 5 Fakhet and six others blew themselves up in a flat in Audiencia of September 19, 2003. Also, Audiencia Na- 625, in particular the report “Informe sobre Mohamed the city of Leganés in Madrid’s metropolitan area sur- cional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción no. 5, “Declaración Belfatmi, sus relaciones con Amer Azizi y la célula de rounded by Spain’s National Police on April 3, 2004. judicial. Abdula Jayata Kattan @Abu Ibrahim,” Febru- Abu Dahdah,” Dirección General de la Policía, Comisaría The Spanish police detected the hiding place by inves- ary 4-5, 2004, p. 19. General de Información, April 16, 2004. Also, “Informe tigating a prepaid cell phone card used by a previously 9 Late in 2001, British soldiers found in al-Qa`ida’s sobre estado de las Diligencias Previas 367/01 y solicitud investigated member of the Abu Dahdah cell. See testi- camps in Afghanistan the files of several Moroccans, res- de comisión rogatoria internacional,” Dirección General mony in the Spanish parliament of the officer in charge idents of Spain, who arrived to these facilities in which de la Guardia Civil, Jefatura del Servicio de Información, in Cortes Generales, “Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de they stated that it was Othman al-Andalusi [Amer Azizi] September 16, 2002. los Diputados, Comisiones de Investigación, Sobre el 11 who sent them there for training. See “Sumario 35/2001,” 11 Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección Tercera, de marzo de 2004,” Session of October 25, 2004, p. 4. pp. 35, 668-735, 679. “Sentencia 36/2005,” pp. 203-211.

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Evidence on the connection between operative of Moroccan origin, based these “usurped lands.”17 Yet his attack the Hamburg and Abu Dahdah cells led in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area and plans were frustrated because, as the Spanish security services to dismantle considered one of the main al-Qa`ida document explained, “most members of it. Operation Dátil was launched in chiefs in that zone who “formerly acted the jihadist cell” were arrested due to November 2001, and most of the Abu as intermediary between Abu Faraj al- the “blessed attacks of New York and Dahdah cell’s core members were Libi and Western Europe, where he Washington.” This statement obviously detained. Several other members were resided.”14 referred to the dismantling of the Abu not arrested, however, due to a lack Dahdah cell two months after 9/11. of incriminatory evidence according Many of the details on Azizi’s activities to the legal standards in effect at the also appeared in a biography published The Decision to Attack Spain time. These men included Serhane ben by Tauhid Press as part of a series on The initial groundwork for the Madrid Abdelmajid Fakhet, Said Berraj and “Martyrs of Maghreb al-Aqsa in the Land attacks began with a meeting in Karachi Jamal Zougam—two years and three of the Hindu Kush,” and disseminated in December 2001 between Amer Azizi month later, they would become the on jihadist websites in 2009.15 The and Abdelatif Mourafik.18 Mourafik fundamental local operatives behind biography referred to Azizi by name and was an operative in the LIFG.19 The two the 2004 Madrid attacks. Amer Azizi, individuals met initially in Afghanistan closely connected to all three of the “In 2002, precisely at the at some point in or before 2000, when men, was in Iran when Operation Dátil Azizi received military training at the was launched, coordinating the route instigation of Mourafik Shahid Abu Yahya Camp, a facility to Afghanistan for jihadists recruited himself, Mustafa operated by the LIFG.20 In addition to in Spain. He evaded arrest and made LIFG members, recruits for the GICM his way to Pakistan by November- Maymouni, a Moroccan, were indoctrinated and trained there December 2001.12 Once in Pakistan, initiated the formation as well; later investigations into the Azizi moved up the ranks in al-Qa`ida’s Madrid bombing cell revealed that its central leadership and would become a of the local operational members included those affiliated with key facilitator for the Madrid attacks. cell that would eventually the GICM.21

Intermediary Between Al-Qa`ida and execute the Madrid Toward the end of the 1990s, both the Western Europe attacks.” LIFG and GICM agreed to coordinate Once joining al-Qa`ida central, Azizi activities.22 After 9/11, this agreement operated alongside Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, became relevant for the Madrid attacks, a senior al-Qa`ida member who directed as senior members of the LIFG and incursions into Afghanistan.13 Azizi was described his “military activity” and GICM were involved in not only the also linked to Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid (also role as “administration responsible” in known as Said al-Masri), a historical al-Qa`ida before “the amir” trusted him 17 This refers to the jihadist idea that non-Muslims cur- leader of al-Qa`ida and the former head for other important duties, first in “the rently inhabiting Spain are occupying al-Andalus, the of its financial committee, as well as to information team” and subsequently historical denomination for the Moorish dominion that al-Qa`ida operative Khalid Habib. Azizi’s “to lead one of the military sections.” extended over most of the Iberian Peninsula between the trajectory in al-Qa`ida since 2002 suggests Azizi, as the document asserted, finally eighth and fifteenth centuries. he was an important and highly valued “assumed the function of adjunct to the 18 Personal interviews, senior intelligence officers from senior member, with the experience commander for external action [Hamza two Western governments, including one European and knowledge to direct terrorist Rabia]” and was involved, among other country, held in December 2011 and, for further docu- operations in the West in general and tasks, in instructing “the lions that came mented confirmation, in February 2012. At the meetings, Western Europe in particular. A 2005 from far away with the end of preparing Azizi and Mourafik also probably planned attacks in European Union intelligence report on them to transform the tranquility of the Morocco. Some of those involved in planning the Madrid 16 al-Qa`ida’s leadership, for example, crusaders into a hell.” attacks were later arrested for the suicide bombings in mentioned an unidentified al-Qa`ida Morocco. Mourafik is also known as Malek el-Andalusi The biography noted that Azizi’s and Malek al-Maghrebi. 12 Spain’s National Police, however, found that he trav- intention to target Spain predated 19 “Informe general sobre conclusiones de la investi- eled back to Madrid, became aware of the circumstances the 9/11 attacks on the United States. gación de los atentados terroristas del 11 de marzo de and that authorities were searching for him, obtained According to the story presented in 2004,” Dirección General de la Policía, Comisaría Gen- money and arranged other unknown affairs before evad- the biography, in 2001 he returned eral de Información, Unidad Central de Información ing police detection and making his way to Pakistan. See to Spain from Afghanistan with the Exterior, July 3, 2006, pp. 67, 70-74; Audiencia Na- Dirección General de la Policía, Comisaría General de idea of executing an act of jihad on cional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción no. 6, “Sumario Información, Unidad Central de Información Exterior, 20/2004,” vol. 234, pp. 91, 130-191, 134. “Diligencias no. 18,” May 25, 2003. 14 Personal interview, intelligence liaison officer based 20 The camp was about 19 miles from Kabul. 13 Personal interview, senior antiterrorism officer in in Brussels, then working in the framework of the Euro- 21 The GICM became affiliated with, and supported by, the Spanish National Police, November 2009; personal pean Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, Octo- al-Qa`ida beginning in 2001. For details, see Peter L. interviews, senior intelligence officers from two Western ber 2007. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (New York: Free governments, including one European country, held in 15 See, for instance, www.alqimmah.net/showthread. Press, 2006), p. 279. December 2011 and, for further documented confirma- php?t=9752, accessed June 11, 2010. 22 Evan F. Kohlmann, “Dossier: Libyan Islamic Fighting tion, in February 2012. 16 Ibid. Group,” NEFA Foundation, 2007, pp. 13-15.

3 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 strategic-operational decision to attack had been a friend of Azizi since at least ties to Azizi, became the sole chief local targets in Spain, but also in the actual 1999 when the two attended the same organizer. The continuity between the configuration of the network behind the Tablighi congregations in Madrid.27 Azizi remains of the Abu Dahdah cell and Madrid blasts.23 recruited him into the Abu Dahdah cell the Madrid bombing network is so around 2001, and Maymouni became his evident that Fakhet himself might have The meeting in Karachi in December closest collaborator.28 Indeed, Mourafik exchanged with Abu Dahdah on the 2001 led to a more formal gathering in likely found Maymouni through Azizi. plot, since he even visited the latter in Istanbul in February 2002. In Istanbul, prison only five days before the March delegates from the LIFG and GICM, as Azizi and the Madrid Bombing Network 11 attacks.31 well as from the Tunisian Combatant In 2002, Maymouni rented the Morata Group, agreed that jihad should not be de Tajuña rural house in Chinchón that Fakhet was radicalized and recruited limited to conflict zones, but should served as the base of operations for the by Azizi into the Abu Dahdah cell in also be conducted in countries where bombers.29 He rented the house from the late 1990s.32 They met each other their members originated or lived.24 the wife of Mohamed Needl Acaid, who frequently until the summer of 2001 This argument was subsequently was at the time incarcerated in Spain and communicated by e-mail through disseminated in Madrid by August for belonging to the Abu Dahdah cell. 2002 in the early meetings of what In May 2003, however, Maymouni would become the basis for the Madrid was imprisoned in Morocco, where he “Fakhet was radicalized bombing network.25 In 2002, precisely had traveled temporarily, after being and recruited by Azizi into at the instigation of Mourafik himself, implicated in the Casablanca attacks, Mustafa Maymouni, a Moroccan, the same charge that moved Turkish the Abu Dahdah cell in the initiated the formation of the local police to almost simultaneously arrest late 1990s.” operational cell that would eventually Mourafik and extradite him to Moroccan execute the Madrid attacks.26 Maymouni authorities. Due to Maymouni’s arrest, another Moroccan, Driss Chebli, and 23 Moreover, Fakhet, as ringleader of the local cell, had Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet (“The 2002 and in 2003, although left no cell phone exchanges with Abu Abdullah al-Sadeq (the Tunisian”) came to jointly lead the electronic traffic since they saved the alias of Abdelhakim Belhadj), then amir of the LIFG, a Madrid local cell. Yet a few months e-mails in the draft box of an e-mail few months prior to the Madrid attacks when Fakhet was later, Chebli was arrested in Spain account to which they both had login 33 in Madrid and al-Sadeq was in Hong Kong. The content and accused of belonging to the Abu access. It was likely Azizi who—to 30 of these phone calls is not known. On these exchanges Dahdah cell. Fakhet, who had close complete the local operational cell— there is a Spanish police report dated June 7, 2005, elab- suggested engaging Jamal Zougam, orated with the help of friendly services—presumably for which the latter was assisted by Jamal Zougam. The a Moroccan who the Spanish National British—included in vol. 233 of “Sumario 20/2004,” pp. Kenitra cell was dismantled after the 2003 Casablanca Police had already investigated in 90, 730-790, 734. Furthermore, on the evening of March attacks. The secret police intelligence report providing the Abu Dahdah cell case and also in 24, 2010, the day after al-Sadeq was released from jail in these details is included in “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 191, connection with the Casablanca attacks 34 Libya, this author had the opportunity to meet him for a pp. 74, 588-574, 615. in 2003. Azizi had been in contact with brief interview at the home of his siblings in Tripoli. The 27 “Informe general sobre conclusiones de la investi- Zougam before escaping to Pakistan in 35 author was in the company of professor Rohan Gunarat- gación de los atentados terroristas del 11 de marzo de 2001. na, head of the International Centre for Political Violence 2004,” Dirección General de la Policía, Comisaría Gen- and Terrorism Research at Singapore’s Nanyang Tech- eral de Información, Unidad Central de Información Ex- tenant” of the cell leader. See Audiencia Nacional, Juz- nological University. In the course of the exchange, the terior, p. 73. From at least 2000, Fakhet also frequented gado Central de Instrucción no. 5, “Sumario 35/2001,” former amir of the LIFG acknowledged having had what these congregations. Audiencia of September 19, 2003, pp. 15, 17-18. he termed “social relations” with Fakhet. Separately, on 28 When Azizi escaped, Maymouni was ordered by 31 Personal interview, senior Spanish police officer April 3, 2004, minutes before Fakhet and six other mem- Mourafik to go to Morocco, where Azizi’s wife, Raquel charged in the past with the criminal investigation of the bers of the Madrid bombing cell blew themselves up in Burgos, a Spanish convert, had moved shortly after the Abu Dahdah cell, November 2008. Leganés, Fakhet made a cell phone call to a prominent disappearance of her husband, and helped her to rejoin 32 “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 163, pp. 61, 740. LIFG member who answered the telephone in London. him, first in Turkey and then in Pakistan. See “Suma- 33 The testimony of a protected witness, a person who In a personal communication on March 22, 2010, also in rio 20/2004,” vol. 191, pp. 74, 600-674. During its au- lived with Fakhet during 2002 and 2003, was funda- Tripoli, and reiterated during a meeting in Madrid in No- tumn 2009 offensive in South Waziristan Agency, the mental in knowing about these exchanges, as it is docu- vember the same year, Noman Benotman, a former LIFG Pakistani Army found and exhibited to the international mented in “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 114, pp. 39, 154 and high ranking member, confirmed this to the author. Ac- press a passport belonging to Raquel Burgos, recovered vol. 163, pp. 61, 923-961, 924. The actual content of these cording to Benotman, he was in London with the man from the debris of a house, next to the passport of Said e-mails is not known. who received the call at the time it was made. Bahaji, a German citizen and associate of the lead 9/11 34 “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 17, pp. 4, 411. 24 An intelligence note of December 17, 2004 about this hijacker Muhammed `Atta. See Katherine Tiedemann, 35 For instance, following a formal request from the meeting and the strategic decision adopted is incorporat- “Passports Linked to 9/11 Found in Northwest Pakistan French authorities, namely from judge Jean-Louis Bru- ed in the criminal proceedings for the Madrid bombings. Military Operations,” The AfPak Channel, October 30, guiére, concerning Zougam—who was already suspected See “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 97, pp. 31-32, 316, 848. 2009. of jihadist terrorism activities by 2000—the Spanish Na- 25 Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Central de Instrucción 29 “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 21, pp. 5, 583. tional Police searched his home in Madrid and found, in no. 6, Audiencia of July 5, 2006, pp. 64-65. 30 Details are included in the court indictment of Amer addition to al-Qa`ida propaganda, written contact details 26 At the same time, Mourafik instructed Maymouni to Azizi, where he was charged with terrorist offenses relat- for Azizi. See “Sumario 35/2001,” pp. 28, 477-428, 588; create another operational cell in Kenitra, Morocco, a task ed to his membership in the Abu Dahdah cell as a “lieu- “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 163, pp. 61, 679, 785.

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Azizi’s connections to the bombing and the last one to be chronologically networks or cells prone to direction network did not end there. Said Berraj, incorporated brought to the Madrid and support, even supervision, from who remains a fugitive for his role in bombing network half a dozen former al-Qa`ida’s external operations the Madrid attacks, had close ties to ordinary criminals. These men joined command through intermediaries with Azizi as well. On October 10, 2000, the network because they followed their first hand knowledge of the concrete both Azizi and Berraj were temporarily leader, Moroccan Jamal Ahmidan (also operational scenario and ties to local arrested in Turkey on their way to known as “The Chinese”), who in 1996 operatives. Networks and cells that Afghanistan.36 Azizi was then found in already had jihadist views—his radical eventually incorporated individuals possession of five false Pakistani visas. leanings intensified during a period ascribed to al-Qa`ida’s affiliated of imprisonment in Morocco between entities had a significant presence in In the end, the Madrid bombing 2000 and 2003.39 This last cluster Western Europe. They were able to network included four separate, of individuals was introduced for perpetrate sophisticated, coordinated though partially overlapping clusters operational and financial purposes.40 and highly lethal attacks in the region of individuals who all coalesced explicitly following al-Qa`ida’s general together between September 2002 and The al-Qa`ida operative who had ties to strategy.41 November 2003.37 Fakhet and Zougam most key members in the network was became nodes for their respective Amer Azizi. Usama bin Ladin first mentioned the Madrid train bombings a month after Conclusion the attacks in an audio recording “Far from being the Both the decision to attack Spain and broadcast by al-Jazira and al-Arabiya product of an independent the mobilization of a terrorist network on April 15, 2004.42 On the recording, to accomplish this objective were top Bin Ladin said, “There is a lesson cell, the Madrid down processes. The groundwork regarding what happens in occupied attacks were a complex started on or before December 2001 in Palestine and what happened on Pakistan and extended until February September 11 and March 11. These manifestation of al- 2002, involving al-Qa`ida’s North are your goods returned to you.” Qa`ida’s capabilities in African associate organizations whose On November 16, 2005, Ayman al- delegates gathered in Turkey that Zawahiri alluded to the March 2004 Western Europe after month. The track record of Amer Azizi attacks in a video praising the suicide 9/11.” inside al-Qa`ida central since that same bombings of July 7, 2005 in London year suggests he favored the subsequent approval and facilitation of the plot by al- 41 The local operational cell in Madrid followed direc- Qa`ida’s senior leadership. By October tives concerning al-Qa`ida’s strategy. On the evening of clusters, both of which evolved from the 2002, Azizi had likely instructed March 11, 2004, a communiqué signed by the Abu Hafs remnants of the Abu Dahdah cell. A third Mourafik to place Maymouni—who was al-Masri Brigades/al-Qa`ida, sent by e-mail to the Lon- cluster was related to the GICM, and its one of Azizi’s closest collaborators—in don-based al-Quds al-Arabi Arabic-language newspaper, node was Youssef Belhadj, a Moroccan charge of the bombing network. The first claimed responsibility for the train bombings. This based in Brussels who traveled back process included interaction between initial communiqué was most probably sent from Iran, and forth to Madrid since 2002, leaving key local organizers and Azizi before although it could have technically originated in Yemen, the city for the last time eight days and after he was appointed adjunct to Egypt or Libya. A second communiqué from the same before the train bombings; he knew the al-Qa`ida’s head of external operations, origin was posted on the Global Islamic Media Center date chosen for the attacks since at least Hamza Rabia. website on March 18, seven days after the train bomb- 38 October 19, 2003. The fourth cluster ings. It announced that “our leadership has decided to Far from being the product of an halt all operations in the soil of al-Andalus” until “we 36 “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 17, pp. 4, 414 and vol. 163, independent cell, the Madrid attacks are sure of the direction the new government will take,” pp. 61, 684. were a complex manifestation of al- referring to the Socialist Party victory over the Partido 37 Fernando Reinares, “The Madrid Bombings and Glob- Qa`ida’s capabilities in Western Europe Popular in the Spanish general elections held on March al Jihadism,” Survival 52:2 (2010). after 9/11. The coordinated explosions 14, 2004, three days after the attacks. The communiqué 38 “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 106, pp. 35, 601-635, 614; on the commuter trains on March 11, was downloaded early the following morning on a com- “Sumario 20/2004,” vol. 115, pp. 39, 970-939, 973; “Su- 2004 evidenced the existence of jihadist puter used by key members of the local cell. This explains mario 20/2004,” vol. 163, pp. 61, 608-661, 627; “Sumario the message handwritten by “The Tunisian” and faxed 20/2004,” vol. 180, pp. 69, 863. Another individual who Azizi. Also see ibid. to the press on the morning of April 3, the same day the knew well in advance about the date chosen for the at- 39 “Sentencia 65/2007,” p. 201. Leganés safehouse was detected by the police in the eve- tacks is Rabei Osman es Sayed Ahmed (also known as 40 See “Sumario 20/2004,” separate piece no. 11. Sepa- ning, announcing “the annulment of our previous truce.” Mohamed al-Masri). The Italian police discovered this rately, at least three other members of the Madrid bomb- The truce, however, had been declared not by the local fact when he was under security surveillance in Milan ing network were also in contact with a cell of Pakistani cell but by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades/al-Qa`ida. months after the train blasts. See report from DIGOS, men detained in Barcelona in September 2004 and after- The local cell simply accepted premises transmitted in Milano, Sezione Antiterrorismo, to “Procedimento pe- wards convicted for sending funds to al-Qa`ida’s senior advance from above and from abroad. See Reinares, “The nale 17596/04,” 2004, pp. 48, 55-57. Sayed Ahmed, a for- members in Pakistan. See Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism.” mer EIJ member who lived in Madrid during 2002 and Central de Instrucción no. 2, “Auto” of April 11, 2005, p. 42 On October 18, 2003, nearly five months before the 2003, was linked to Fakhet and MICG clusters within 6; Audiencia Nacional, Sala de lo Penal, Sección Primera, Madrid train bombings, Bin Ladin released a message, the Madrid bombing network, and an acquaintance of “Sentencia 39/2007,” pp. 4-5. broadcast by al-Jazira, threatening Spain.

5 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 as “the blessed raid which, like its of Breivik’s ideology. In summation, illustrious predecessors in New York, A Pre-Trial Profile of the findings suggest that Breivik had Washington and Madrid, took the battle Anders Behring Breivik a less privileged childhood than was to the enemy’s own soil.” initially thought, that he committed By Jacob Aasland Ravndal tactical mistakes during his attack While in U.S. custody at Guantanamo preparations, and that questions remain Bay after his arrest in May 2005, Abu on july 22, 2011, anti-Islam terrorist about the extent to which he radicalized Faraj al-Libi, the overall manager of Anders Behring Breivik detonated a completely on his own. al-Qa`ida’s operations at the time 2,100-pound bomb in the Norwegian of the Madrid attacks, declared that Government Quarter in the heart of Oslo, Anders Behring Breivik Hamza Rabia, then the chief external killing eight people, before shooting and There has been much debate and operations planner, “wanted strongly killing 69 people at Utøya, a small island speculation about Breivik’s mental to attack passenger trains in the US or 25 miles from Oslo. A further 158 people health. At stake is not only the issue UK following the March 2004 bombing were wounded in the attacks.1 The trial of due legal process, but also the of commuter trains in Madrid.”43 against Breivik begins in Oslo District question of whether Breivik represents On July 7, 2005, one year and four Court on April 16, 2012. It will provide a broader ideological movement. After months later, suicide bombers struck insight to many questions that remain 13 conversations with Breivik in jail, the London Underground system. unanswered. Before the start of the trial, the first court-appointed forensic The role of the alleged al-Qa`ida however, it is useful to recapture what psychiatrists concluded that Breivik mastermind behind this plot, Abu is known about Breivik as a person, his suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. Ubaydah al-Masri, could be compared tactics and networks. The diagnosis sparked intense public to that of Azizi in the Madrid attacks. debate in Norway because it implies This article summarizes information that Breivik is criminally insane, and In December 2005, when a U.S. drone from Norwegian sources2 to inform an therefore not legally responsible for the killed Amer Azizi and Hamza Rabia in international public. It does not provide killings according to Norwegian law.3 a North Waziristan home,44 they were a comprehensive overview of the case, The evaluation was soon leaked to the both preparing operatives for a similar but instead covers aspects that have press and has been widely criticized strike planned on the continental United been overlooked or misinterpreted by by both psychiatrists and non- States.45 international media. The article also psychiatrists for failing to contextualize leaves out the much larger subject Breivik’s statements and worldview.4 Dr. Fernando Reinares is Professor and The controversy was such that the Chair in Political Science at Universidad 1 During the attacks, 98 people were wounded at the court made the unprecedented decision Rey Juan Carlos (King Juan Carlos Government Quarter, while 60 people were wounded at of commissioning a second evaluation University), as well as Senior Analyst on Utøya. See “16 fremdeles alvorlig skadet etter terroran- by another team of psychiatrists, which International Terrorism and Co-Director of grepet,” VG Nett, August 1, 2011. will conclude its work in early April the Program on Global Security Challenges 2 In addition to Norwegian media, this article draws on 2012. Rather than addressing the issue at Real Instituto Elcano (Elcano Royal a 243-page forensic psychiatry report prepared by two of Breivik’s mental state, however, this Institute), both in Madrid. After the 2004 experts nominated by the court. The report provides article will summarize key aspects of Madrid train bombings, he served a term details from 13 interviews with Breivik carried out by his biography. as Senior Adviser on Antiterrorist Policy the psychiatrists in jail. During the interviews, Breivik to Spain’s Minister of Interior, and was described the different phases of his life, from childhood The first years of Breivik’s life were awarded with the Cross of Military Merit to the last hours and minutes before the attacks. In addi- marked by instability and an absent in 2010. Research for the book of which tion, the evaluation contains interviews with family and father figure. Breivik’s parents this article is a partial summary advanced friends, as well as detailed summaries from police inter- separated when he was a year-and- much during 2011, while Dr. Reinares was rogations, including the first one that took place on Utøya a-half-old. His father would mostly a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow minutes after Breivik was arrested. The report is avail- live abroad, working as a Norwegian Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. able in Norwegian at www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/ diplomat. His mother found raising oslobomben/psykiatrisk_vurdering/. The report has not Breivik and his older sister alone to be 43 The Joint Task Force Guantanamo assessment on been officially released, but was leaked to the press by challenging, and she therefore applied Abu Faraj al-Libi, dated September 10, 2008, is avail- unknown sources. Citing from a leaked document is not for a weekend home for her son when he able at http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/ unproblematic, but the author has chosen to do so here was two-years-old. In the application, detainees/10017-abu-faraj-al-libi, specifically p. 11. for several reasons. First, the report carries no classifica- Breivik was described as a demanding 44 In November 2009, the author received this infor- tion label. Second, the document is already in the public child who exhausted his mother both mation from Western intelligence sources who were sphere and has been widely cited in the press. Third, the present in Pakistan at the time, and the author received leaked version of the report has already been redacted 3 Some experts have suggested that “paranoid psy- written confirmation of the accuracy of this information to conceal the most sensitive personal information. The chosis” is a more likely diagnosis, which would define from the Spanish police’s antiterrorism services in De- author has taken the additional precaution of citing the Breivik as criminally insane anyway. For details, see cember 2009. document only on points that concern Breivik himself. “Psykiatriprofessor: Breivik må ha vært psykotisk,” fvn. 45 Personal oral communications with senior intelli- Finally, Norwegian authorities have not taken legal mea- no, January 6, 2012. gence officers of two Western states, one of them Europe- sures against those who leaked the report, nor have they 4 “Truer psykiatriens omdømme?” VG Nett, February an, held in December 2011 and, for further documented explicitly warned others against citing it in academic 22, 2012; Tore Bjørgo, “Med monopol på vrangforestill- confirmation, in February 2012. publications. inger,” Aftenposten, December 7, 2011.

6 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 physically and psychologically.5 The some time. Breivik cared for her when rent, did his laundry, and cooked for application was approved, and Breivik she returned home, and he even had his him.21 spent several weekends with another military service postponed to look after family.6 her.14 The same year, Breivik chose to be In 2007, Breivik told his mother he was baptized and confirmed in the Norwegian going to write a book.22 She describes Two years later, in 1983, Breivik spent a State Church,15 an incident which has led his behavior from this time forward as month in a national center for children some foreign commentators to suggest odd, as he became increasingly obsessed and youth psychiatry together with his he is a Christian fundamentalist. This with the book project. It culminated in mother and half-sister.7 At this point, is a misunderstanding. The majority of 2010. He would get angry whenever she Breivik’s father filed for custody. The Norwegian youth are confirmed at this disturbed him, and she felt like being case was presented to the court, which age, which does not necessarily mean “locked in” with her son.23 He would decided that his mother should have full that they are particularly religious.16 custody, pending further examination. Meanwhile, his father withdrew his At 16, Breivik began high school, but “Breivik originally wanted case.8 The year after, Norwegian child disliked it and changed schools after to build three bombs, but welfare filed a letter of concern leading the first year. He spent one more year in to further investigations of the family a second high school, before dropping realized he was running conditions. The authorities considered out for good.17 He moved out from his short of time and finances, moving Breivik into foster care, but this mother’s home in 2001, and lived in a was eventually deemed unnecessary, shared flat for a year. Between 2002 and decided to make only and the case was closed.9 and 2006, he lived by himself in a one.” rented apartment. During this period, Breivik’s teenage years were also Breivik started and managed several somewhat troubled. At age 14, he small companies.18 was charged twice with graffiti and also accuse her of being a Marxist and vandalism. Later the same year, he was In 2006, Breivik’s mother suggested a feminist.24 From 2010, he forbade her detained by police at Oslo central station he should move back home because to sneeze and would complain about the having just arrived from Denmark with she figured he could save money as food. He told her he was not as attractive 43 graffiti aerosol spray cans in his his various companies did not turn anymore, and that he was considering bag.10 His mother was unaware of his out to be successful.19 Breivik agreed plastic and dental surgery.25 Denmark trip, a fact which prompted to it, and claims it was at this time the talks between the Breivik family and thought of martyrdom struck him. He In the autumn of 2010, Breivik told child welfare in which his mother therefore decided to “take a year off to his mother that the book project was expressed concerns about her son play videogames” as a “martyr gift” to completed. He would talk more and more pursuing a criminal career.11 According himself.20 He largely withdrew from about politics, and make comments that to Breivik’s mother, his father became social life while his mother paid the she considered “crazy.”26 She describes furious when he heard about the graffiti her son as very “intense,” and in the incidents, and “closed the door” on his 14 According to Breivik’s mother, he applied for post- final year they lived together he more or 12 son. Breivik also explained that the ponement of military services several times, until he was less locked himself inside his room. He graffiti incident led to a break of regular finally dismissed. “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om expressed fear of being contaminated contact between him and his father, Breivik,” p. 77. by her because she talked to too many with whom he lost all contact at the age 15 For more details, see Anders Behring Breivik, “2083: people, and he would not eat in the 13 of 22. A European Declaration of Independence,” available at kitchen, only in his own room. He would http://2083europe.wordpress.com, p. 1,405. walk around in the apartment holding Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate 16 Confirmation is a Christian tradition symbolizing the a hand in front of his face, and would 27 to describe Breivik as a delinquent. He transition from childhood to adulthood. Although an in- sometimes wear a gauze mask. has also been described as a caring son. creasing share of youth today choose a non-religious or For example, when he turned 15, his humanist confirmation, more than 50% of Norwegian That autumn, Breivik purchased what mother fell ill and was hospitalized for youth still choose to be confirmed in church, not neces- his mother understood to be a bullet- sarily meaning that they are particularly religious. This proof suitcase and a shotgun, which he 5 “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om Breivik,” VG Nett, was likely the case for Breivik. kept in his room. In early 2011, she also undated. 17 Breivik never pursued any further formal education, noticed he had bought a large pistol. He 6 Kjetil s. Ostli and Tor Arne Andreassen, “Gransker although he claims to have undertaken between 15,000– would also dress up in his self-made bekymringsmeldinger om Anders Behring Breiviks 16,000 hours of self-study. “survival outfit” in the apartment. He barndom,” Aftenposten, November 26, 2011. 18 One of the companies produced fake diplomas. He 7 “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om Breivik,” p. 46. also sold outdoor advertising space and IT-support 21 Ibid., p. 218. 8 Ibid., p. 51. services. His various companies were all closed down 22 Ibid., p. 78. 9 Ibid., p. 53. after some time, and the last one filed for bankruptcy in 23 Ibid., p. 79. 10 Ibid., p. 54. 2006/2007. For details, see “Les de psykiatriske rap- 24 Ibid. 11 Ibid., p. 55. portene om Breivik,” p. 218. 25 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 75. 19 Ibid., p. 78. 26 Ibid., p. 80. 13 Ibid., pp. 91-92. 20 Ibid., p. 123. 27 Ibid., pp. 80 and 133.

7 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 told her about the coming of a civil war As for the weapons Breivik used on Finally, not everything went according and received large packages by airmail. July 22, his initial plan was to buy to Breivik’s plan on the day of the She also noticed he was storing strange them on the black market in countries attacks. His original idea was to be equipment in the basement, including he considered as “European criminal in Oslo and start the distribution of large rucksacks filled with stones and network hubs.”34 This somewhat naive the compendium at 3:00 AM the night four large containers with lids. When idea led Breivik into one of his tactical before, and to detonate the vehicle she asked what it was all for, he would misfortunes as he drove all the way to around 10:00 AM.40 The bomb, become angry. During the spring of the Czech Republic to actively approach 2011, Breivik’s mother once saw her people he believed to be criminals. In son coming out of his room with a red his book, which is also known as his “The most critical uniform jacket with emblems sewed “compendium,”35 he described the trip question for Norwegian onto it.28 On May 7, Breivik moved all as a complete failure as everyone he his equipment to a farm he rented at approached thought he was crazy.36 investigators has been Åsta in Hedmark County, where he He therefore lost his motivation and whether Breivik had any would build the bomb. returned empty-handed.37 accomplices. To date, there Breivik’s Tactics Surprisingly, acquiring weapons legally are no indications of him The car bomb Breivik detonated at the in Norway proved much easier than Government Quarter weighed about buying them on the black market abroad. receiving any help with 2,100 pounds (950 kilograms) and its Breivik simply used his hunting license the operational planning main components were fertilizer and and pistol club membership to buy a diesel. Breivik used online recipes to Ruger Mini 14 (semi-automatic rifle) or execution of the July 22 build it, and purchased the ingredients and a 9mm Glock 17 (semi-automatic attacks.” from retailers in Norway and abroad. pistol). He ordered six tons of fertilizer from the Norwegian cooperative Felleskjøpet on There are other incidents suggesting May 4, 2011.29 The aluminum powder—a Breivik may not have been as cool- however, was not detonated until core ingredient in fertilizer bombs—was headed as is commonly portrayed. For 3:25 PM.41 The precise reasons for the bought online from a Polish company.30 instance, he was kicked out of a bar delay are not clear. Breivik himself Breivik originally wanted to build three in Oslo one year before the attacks, claims to have been delayed back at bombs, but realized he was running having annoyed a Norwegian celebrity the farm and not having made it to short of time and finances, and decided by talking extensively about crusades, Oslo until 11:00 PM, after which he to make only one.31 After July 22, police Islam, and Templar Knights. While went to sleep because he was tired.42 found great quantities of leftover being escorted out of the bar, he It has later become known, however, bombmaking materials at Breivik’s reportedly shouted at the celebrity: “A that Breivik, on the night before the farm. year from now, I will be three times as attacks, visited the same bar in Oslo famous as you!”38 from which he had been kicked out of Most of Breivik’s special equipment was a year before.43 purchased on eBay, including a tactical Moreover, in March 2011, Breivik rifle foregrip from a Hong Kong-based apparently called the central In any case, Breivik did not wake until trader, a zoom spotting scope from a switchboard of Norwegian ministries, 8:00 AM the next morning, and started Chinese supplier, and a LaserLyte pistol threatening to kill members of The the day installing a new computer bayonet from a U.S.-based retailer.32 He Workers’ Youth League (AUF) at Utøya. modem and configuring Microsoft also bought 15 vinyl air bags that may This incident was logged, but never Outlook on his personal computer, have been used to stabilize the car bomb forwarded to the Police Secret Service presumably in preparation for the during transport.33 as it was considered an empty threat. e-mail distribution.44 This took more Breivik later acknowledged making the time than expected, which caused him call, but said he does not remember its to panic slightly.45 He decided to go on contents.39 an additional reconnaissance trip to the Government Quarter before returning

28 Ibid., p. 24. 34 For more details, see Breivik, p. 920. 29 Torgeir P. Krokfjord and Line Brustad, “Breivik kjøpte 35 Note that since July 22, the media has referred to tenposten, January 27, 2012. During interrogation, Breivik seks tonn kunstgjødsel i mai,” Dagbladet, July 23, 2011. Breivik’s compendium as his “manifesto.” Breivik, how- has acknowledged making the call. 30 Breivik bought 330 pounds of aluminum powder for ever, either refers to the document as his “book” or his 40 “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om Breivik,” p. 143. 2,000 euros. For more details, see Rune Christophersen, “compendium,” both in the compendium as well as dur- 41 “Politiet justerer tidspunktet for terrorbomben,” tv2. Oyvind Lefdal Eidsvik and Tron Strand, “Gransket fir- ing conversations with psychiatrists. He never used the no, September 23, 2011. maet Breivik bestilte fra,” bt.no, November 24, 2011. word “manifesto.” 42 “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om Breivik,” p. 143. 31 “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om Breivik,” p. 141. 36 Breivik, pp. 1422-1423. 43 Torgeir P. Krokfjord et al., “Breivik festet på kjendis- 32 Mark Hughes and Gordon Rayner, “Norway Killer 37 “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om Breivik,” p. 137. bar natta før massemordet,” Dagbladet, August 19, 2011. Anders Behring Breivik had Extensive Links to English 38 Torgeir P. Krokfjord et al., “Om ett år er jeg tre ganger 44 “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om Breivik,” pp. 143- Defence League,” Telegraph, July 25, 2011. mer kjent enn deg,” Dagbladet, August 23, 2011. 144. 33 Ibid. 39 “Breivik erkjenner telefon til regjeringskvartalet,” Af- 45 Ibid., p. 144.

8 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 to his mother’s home to upload the In his compendium, Breivik claims he (1090-1130) who earned the eponym movie trailer on YouTube. He claims visited a Serb “war hero” in Liberia in “Jorsalfare” after his combined crusade that he wrote the last message in the 2002, before attending the ordination and pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1108- compendium at 2:45 PM.46 When he meeting of his alleged Knights Templar 1111. It has also been alleged that Breivik finally decided to initiate his plan, organization in London later that year. attended EDL-demonstrations in many people had already left work at Norwegian police have confirmed that Newcastle and West London in 2010.58 the Government Quarter. In his own Breivik spent approximately a week This has yet to be confirmed, although mind, he failed his first mission because in Liberia in April 2002.51 Exactly a senior leader in the EDL has said he was delayed and not enough people whom he met remains unknown, but Breivik met with EDL leaders in March were killed. During an interview, he speculation has centered on Milorad that year during a visit to London to claims that he could have surrendered “Legija” Ulemek,52 a former commander listen to Geert Wilders speak.59 Breivik immediately if more people would have of The Red Berets.53 also joined the Norwegian Defence been killed in the first attack.47 League (NDL) in 2010, but former NDL It has also been confirmed that Breivik leader Lena Andreassen now says she Breivik’s Networks visited Belarus in 2005. While early personally threw him out because The most critical question for Norwegian commentators suggested he may have his views were “too extreme” (she investigators has been whether Breivik gone for paramilitary training,54 a more has not said when she threw Breivik had any accomplices. To date, there trivial reason has now been confirmed: out or to which of his statements she are no indications of him receiving Breivik went to see a woman he had met reacted).60 any help with the operational planning on a matchmaking website. The woman or execution of the July 22 attacks. in question has since told the police that There have also been rumors that Moreover, investigators say they have she dated Breivik for awhile, but left him Breivik met with representatives yet to find evidence that the Knights because he was such a chauvinist.55 from the now banned Russian neo- Templar organization described in the Nazi group Slavic Union, including compendium is anything but a product On May 17, 2009, the Norwegian the infamous Vjateslav Datsik.61 The of Breivik’s imagination. In the years Constitution Day, Breivik registered rumors have been confirmed by the leading up to the attack, however, the company “Breivik Geofarm,” which former leader of the Slavic Union, Breivik did communicate with people and later became his cover for buying Dmitrij Demusjkin, but not by other groups sharing his anti-Islamist ideas. fertilizer.56 Two Swedish citizens are sources.62 Breivik has also been linked He has also been linked to convicted currently under investigation for having to an organization called Order 777, terrorists with similarly murky political listed the company as their employer on a self-proclaimed “paraintelligence views. While these links do not amount Facebook. Both individuals had links service” and “Christian brotherhood” to organized collaboration, it may be on their Facebook sites to known war structured in “special operation units” too early to draw conclusions about the criminals and fascists from the Second to fight the threat of Islamic terrorism.63 extent to which other activists played a World War, in addition to the Serb The group has three key members: 1) the role in his radicalization process. paramilitary leader Arkan.57 former neo-Nazi and convicted terrorist Nick Greger from Germany; 2) the One reason is that Breivik traveled During 2009, Breivik also contacted former loyalist paramilitary fighter and extensively. From Breivik’s room, members of the English Defence convicted terrorist Johnny “Mad Dog” police retrieved two passports, one of League (EDL) on Facebook. He used the Adair from Northern Ireland; and 3) which documented travels to Turkey nickname Sigurd Jorsalfare, alluding to Paul Ray from England, known as one (1998), Liberia (April 2002), Ivory the Norwegian king Sigurd Magnusson of the initial founders of the EDL.64 Coast (April 2002), Malta (April 2004), Estonia (April 2004), Croatia (August 51 “Politiet har fått bekreftet Behring Breiviks Liberia- 58 Ryan Parry, “Norway Massacre: Anders Behring 2004), China (July 2005) and Lithuania tur,” Aftenposten, December 23, 2011. Breivik Plotted Killing Spree for Nine Years,” Mirror, 48 (travel date unknown). Norwegian 52 Runar Henriksen Jørstad et al., “Etterforsker Breivik- July 25, 2011. police have also confirmed large money spor til serbisk kommandør,” nrk.no, February 4, 2012. 59 Hughes and Rayner. transactions from Breivik to unknown 53 This was a special unit of the Serbian secret police, 60 “Hevder Breivik var for ekstrem,” bt.no, July 26, 49 persons abroad. He also laundered formed during the former Yugoslavia conflict. In 2007, 2011. money in Latvia through a company Ulemek was sentenced to 40 years in prison for the 2003 61 Torbjørn Brandeggen, “Breivik skal ha møtt Datsik,” 50 called Brentwood Solutions. assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in Bel- tv2.no, August 3, 2011. grade. For more details, see Igor Jovanovic, “More Red 62 Vladimir Pimonov, “Breivik i kontakt med russiske 46 Ibid. In the compendium, the last entry in the “Knights Beret arrests in Serbia,” Southeast European Times, Sep- nazister,” Ekstra Bladet, August 3, 2011. Templar Log” was dated July 22 at 12:51, p. 1,472. tember 26, 2011. 63 According to its homepage, Order 777 operates 47 “Les de psykiatriske rapportene om Breivik,” p. 140. 54 “Hevder Breivik fikk militær trening i Hviterussland,” on three levels: (i) operations to expose Islamic terror- 48 Sindre Granly Meldalen et al., “Passet avslørte Aftenposten, July 29, 2011. ists, their networks and activities; (ii) spiritual warfare to Breiviks verdensturne,” Dagbladet, February 3, 2012. 55 Torgeir P. Krokfjord et al., “Dette var Breiviks hånd- fight Islam itself; and (iii) assistance in founding citizen 49 One of the transactions amounted to $40,000. For plukkede konekandidater,” Dagbladet, January 19, 2012. militias with purpose of self-protection of communities more details, see Sindre Granly Meldalen et al., “Grillet 56 For a previous listing of this company, see www.gu- which are directly terrorized by jihadists. For more de- Breivik om mystiske dollar,” Dagbladet, March 2, 2012. lindex.no/o/Breivik_Geofarm/994089269. tails, see www.globalresistance.webs.com/aboutus.htm, 50 “Breivik skal ha hvitvasket penger i Latvia,” VG Nett, 57 Bent Skjærstad, “Mystiske svensker kobles til accessed March 2, 2012. March 3, 2012. Breivik,” tv2.no, July 29, 2011. 64 For details, see the following video: www.youtube.

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There are striking similarities between police, and there are no indications that The Rabbani Order 777 and Breivik in terms of he knew about Breivik’s terrorist plans. Assassination: Taliban their use of Templar iconography and He met Breivik on the Norwegian forum counterjihad rhetoric. Moreover, the Document.no and they later exchanged Strategy to Weaken Serb commander Milorad “Legija” a few e-mails.73 National Unity? Ulemek features in several of the videos posted by Order 777 on YouTube.65 Paul Conclusion By Michael Gabbay Ray, however, has explicitly distanced The number of loose ends in the Breivik himself from Breivik. He was initially case makes it all the more important to the announced drawdown of U.S. accused by the media for being the remain critical of claims concerning and NATO forces from Afghanistan person Breivik refers to as his mentor his connections, intellect and persona. and the accompanying transition of and a founding member of his Knights For now, more information is required the counterinsurgency mission to Templar: Richard the Lionhearted.66 before qualified conclusions can be the Afghan National Security Forces Paul Ray uses the nickname Lionheart offered on whether July 22 was a case (ANSF) is a major milestone in the which is also the name of his blog.67 of an ideology that created a madman, conflict, affecting the strategic calculus Moreover, Ray leads an anti-Islam or a madman that used an ideology of all its participants. Recent Taliban group called The Ancient Order of the to cultivate his own hatred and actions suggest that they have entered Templar Knights.68 Ray argues that he confusion. a new phase in their strategic decision- has been framed and that Breivik has making. Their intent to open a political merely copied his ideas. Ray admits that Jacob Aasland Ravndal is a research fellow office in Qatar and to hold discussions Breivik tried to become his Facebook and Ph.D. candidate at the Norwegian with the United States may signal that friend, but claims he denied the request Defence Research Establishment (FFI). the Taliban are interested in a negotiated because he “didn’t like the look of He studies far-right extremism with an resolution to the conflict. Recent high him.”69 Instead, Paul Ray has indicated emphasis on counterjihad ideology and profile attacks, however, appear to point that Alan Ayling (also known as Alan movements. Mr. Ravndal holds a master’s in the opposite direction: in particular, Lake) may be the person Breivik refers degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from the September 2011 assassination of to as his English mentor.70 Ayling is the the University of Oslo. Afghan High Peace Council chairman, alleged financier and strategist behind Burnahuddin Rabbani, and the the EDL, and another of its founding coordinated bombings of Afghan Shi`a members.71 processions on Ashura in December 2011, a striking introduction of Iraq-style Finally, Breivik has been linked to a mass sectarian attacks into Afghanistan. network of counterjihadist writers These conflicting signals raise important active on websites such as Gates of questions. Are the Taliban sincere Vienna and the Brussels Journal.72 about entering into peace negotiations? This network comes across as more Are spoilers trying to scuttle Taliban intellectual and less militant than peace efforts by conducting high profile the above-mentioned groups. A attacks such as the Rabbani and Ashura key person in this regard is Peder incidents? If the Taliban are not sincere Nøstvold Jensen (also known as about negotiations, then what is their Fjordman). Breivik copied 39 of strategy? Fjordman’s essays in his compendium, and refers to him as his main source of This article first considers the Rabbani intellectual inspiration. Fjordman has assassination and finds it unlikely that been investigated thoroughly by the it was conducted by “spoilers” distinct from the Taliban central leadership. com/watch?v=jelXXAvGoOg. The killing of the head of Afghan 65 For details, see the video “Order 777: A Introduction reconciliation efforts with insurgents [sic],” at www.youtube.com/watch?v=GY9Dzoqk-ww. 73 Breivik informed Fjordman about his book project and is on its face a Taliban rejection 66 Breivik, p. 1,416. wanted to meet him, a proposal Fjordman claims to have of negotiations with the Afghan 67 For details, see www.lionheartuk.blogspot.com. rejected. Breivik also offered Fjordman 5,000 Facebook government, the only party with whom 68 Jamie Armstrong, “I’m Not Anders Breivik’s British contacts to boost the distribution of a book Fjordman a meaningful peace settlement can be Mentor,” Vice.com, accessed March 19, 2012. was working on, but this offer was also rejected. It ap- made. Analysis of his position within the 69 Duncan Gardham and James Orr, “Oslo Attacks: EDL pears Breivik was familiar with Fjordman’s real identity network of government elites, however, Member Paul Ray Admits he May Have Been Anders at the time, and the blogger asked him to reveal as little suggests that the Taliban’s overriding Breivik’s Inspiration,” Telegraph, July 29, 2011. as possible about him as he was still not ready to become motive in targeting Rabbani was not to 70 For details, see www.lionheartuk.blogspot.com. a public figure. During police interrogations, Fjordman punctuate a rejection of peace talks, but 71 For more details, see Tash Shifrin, “EDL Strate- has admitted to meeting with Alan Lake/Ayling in 2007 rather to exacerbate ethnic cleavages gist ‘Alan Lake’ Suspended from Manager Job in City,” or 2008, and says he strongly disliked him because he within the Afghan government, thereby Searchlight Magazine, February 3, 2012. was so controlling. For more details, see Hans Henrik weakening its cohesion and isolating 72 For details, see www.gatesofvienna.blogspot.com and Torgersen et al., “Slik var kontakten mellom ‘Fjordman’ President Hamid Karzai. Chipping away www.brusselsjournal.com. og Breivik,” VG Nett, December 23, 2011.

10 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 at Afghan national unity is a companion alternatively, was authorized by the concerns the existence of a spoiler political strategy in service of the central leadership itself is crucial.1 faction itself. Despite having announced military objective of weakening the their willingness to engage the United ANSF who, given the U.S. drawdown, An examination of Taliban media States via the Qatar office, the Taliban will form the primary obstacle to statements before and after the event have repeatedly emphasized their lack Taliban control of either the Pashtun points toward the central leadership of interest in talking with the Afghan belt in the south and east or the country as being responsible. First, less than government since that announcement, as a whole. two weeks before his killing, the although a peace settlement cannot be Taliban issued a dedicated statement reached without doing so.6 A spoiler Although at odds with their critical of Rabbani, portraying him can only really be considered as such nationalist rhetoric that projects a as an opportunistic liar motivated by if it is working against the dominant message of unity among all Afghans, U.S. cash.2 This fits a previous pattern faction’s wish to pursue negotiations. a strong strategic case can be made where attacks against senior Northern Yet assuming that the Taliban media for the Taliban’s stoking of ethnic Alliance figures Marshal Fahim and office reflects the interests of the central tensions. They would do so for Abdul Rasul Sayyaf were also presaged leadership (and one has little choice but instrumental, not ideological, reasons, shortly beforehand by dedicated Taliban to assume that), there is no reason to as a means of undermining the support statements critical of them.3 Second, believe that the dominant faction within of non-Pashtuns for the government Reuters reported an initial claim of the Taliban leadership has an interest in and pushing them to provide for their the attack by the most prominent reaching an agreement with the Afghan own security rather than relying on the Taliban official spokesman, Zabihullah government.7 ANSF. The Ashura bombings, although Mujahid, who said it was planned by the condemned by the Taliban, and a recent Taliban’s central leadership. Although Although the weight of evidence attack in Taloqan that inflicted heavy the Taliban subsequently denied having implicates the Taliban central casualties on non-Pashtun civilians made the claim in the first place, Reuters leadership in Rabbani’s assassination, it would be consistent with this strategy. rebutted the Taliban’s disavowal of is puzzling as to why they would choose The article concludes by outlining making the claim, citing repeated to do so at the same time they were potential policy responses to counter contact with Mujahid concerning it.4 exploring talks with the United States. such a Taliban strategy including the Furthermore, the Taliban official media During their rule over Afghanistan, the forging of a new consensus among has never actually denied responsibility Taliban were not adept at the art and Afghan government powerbrokers and for the attack itself, which one would practice of diplomacy, but surely they the reorienting of the narrative put expect the Taliban to do if they had anticipated that Rabbani’s killing would forth in U.S. media statements aimed at not in fact executed it.5 The final point significantly diminish their credibility Afghans. as a negotiating partner with the United 1 Al-Qa`ida has been suggested as a possible spoiler who States, even if their ultimate purpose is The Rabbani Assassination may have killed Rabbani. See Alex Strick van Linschoten to enhance their military position rather Burnahuddin Rabbani was a former and Felix Kuehn, “Lessons Learnt,” Arts & Humanities than reach a peace settlement. Perhaps president of Afghanistan and the Research Council, January 2012. then there was an overriding factor in longtime leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, one 2 “Liar Has No Memory,” Voice of Jihad, September 8, favor of the attack that outweighed the of the major mujahidin factions in the 2011. cost to their credibility in negotiations. anti-Soviet insurgency and currently 3 The Fahim attack (claimed by the Taliban) occurred As to what that may have been, it is the main Tajik political party. On in July 2009, preceded by this statement: “The Alliance revealing to consider another element September 20, 2011, in his capacity as of the Antagonist Brothers, the Return of the Bulldozer of the public reaction to Rabbani’s death chairman of the High Peace Council, Assassin, Muhammad Fahim, to the Afghan Scene,” al- beyond the general despondency over he was meeting with a person whom Samud, May 27, 2009. The Sayyaf attack (unclaimed) oc- he believed to be a high-level Taliban curred in November 2009, preceded by this statement: appears to come from a learned, articulate individual emissary. Instead, the “emissary” “Sayyaf: You Studied Inside Me…But,” al-Samud, Octo- and refers to “rented” religious scholars who condemn killed Rabbani and himself with a bomb ber 1, 2009. Taliban statements whose title and focus are suicide attacks as un-Islamic—a frequent theme of Rab- placed under his turban. Although the dedicated to a particular Afghan government elite (other bani’s in the months before his death—and then pro- Taliban have consistently targeted than Karzai) are rare. A search of Taliban official online ceeds to defend suicide attacks by citing examples from leaders who belonged to their former media (Voice of Jihad and al-Samud) concerning the nine early Islamic history. It is of course speculative but it is enemy, the Northern Alliance, this non-Karzai elites in Figure 1 yielded only the three state- possible that this was Rabbani’s assassin, identified in attack was exceptional given both ments dedicated to Rabbani, Fahim, and Sayyaf that press reports as Mullah Esmatullah. See “The Message Rabbani’s stature—he is the most high were followed by assassination attempts. of a Suicide Bomber!” Voice of Jihad, December 15, 2011, profile Afghan government figure to 4 “Taliban Says Won Rabbani Trust in Order to Kill translation courtesy of the Naval Postgraduate School. have been killed by insurgents—and Him,” Reuters, September 21, 2011; Michael Georgy, 6 Nick Paton Walsh and Masoud Popalzai, “Taliban his role as chief peace envoy. Due to “Analysis: Mixed Taliban Messages on Killing May Show Will Not Talk Peace with Karzai Government, Spokes- its unavoidable interpretation as an Divide,” Reuters, September 21, 2011. man Says,” CNN, February 14, 2012. assault on peace talks, the question as 5 Curiously, in December 2011, the Taliban released an 7 A Taliban commander reportedly said that only a to whether the attack was organized by unusual written martyrdom statement in which neither “small group” within the Taliban is in favor of talks with a spoiler seeking to subvert tentative the author nor the target of the attack were specified. This the Afghan government. See “The Taliban Will Not Hold but sincere peace overtures endorsed is contrary to typical Taliban practice in which suicide Talks with the Government of Hamid Karzai,” Afghan by the Taliban central leadership or, bombers and their targets are identified. The statement Islamic Press, January 30, 2012.

11 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 the prospects of peacefully resolving the were claimed by the Taliban. The raw insurgency: the outrage of ethnic Tajiks High sectarian character of the Ashura Karzai that their most senior and respected 1.5 attacks marks a qualitative departure leader had been killed.8 It is possible for the current Afghan conflict and that the intent of this attack was to elicit was claimed by the Pakistani anti- just this reaction. Fahim Shi`a group, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.14 This 1 Khalili group, however, had never before Network of Afghan Government Elites Sayyaf claimed an attack in Afghanistan, Mohaqiq Sherzai An understanding of Rabbani’s special 0.5 and it seems highly unlikely that position within the elites who are aligned Rabbani they could have executed coordinated with the Afghan government yields State Centralization Dostum Ismail Khan bombings in geographically disparate insight as to why the Taliban may have 0 locations without the cooperation of a thought he was worth targeting despite Low significant Afghan insurgent faction. the inevitable blow to the perception of Nur Regarding the Taloqan attack, it is no −0.5 their sincerity regarding negotiations. −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 surprise that the Taliban would target Hawkish Dovish Figure 1 shows a “factional map” of 10 Insurgent Policy Baig, a former Northern Alliance elites within the Afghan government.9 Figure 1.11 commander.15 Yet to do so at a funeral, With the exception of Karzai, they heedless of civilian casualties, was are all regional powerbrokers who This illustrates his key position as sure to provoke outrage among non- have independent power bases among someone who could help Karzai in Pashtuns.16 The Rabbani and Taloqan Afghanistan’s ethnic groups and getting non-Pashtun hawks to support attacks can be reasonably attributed regions. The diagram shows their his policy of reaching out to the Taliban to the Taliban and indicate, at best, relative power (circle area), significant and a hoped-for peace agreement. that the Taliban have a tin ear with cooperative relationships between them Indeed, it has been suggested that respect to the ethnic repercussions (links), and their stances on two key Karzai chose Rabbani as chairman of the of their actions. The possibility must issues: 1) policy toward insurgents (i.e., High Peace Council for this exact reason. also be considered, however, that how amenable they are to negotiations If that is the case, then the opposite effect these incidents along with the Ashura and accommodating insurgent political should also be true: the loss of Rabbani serves to deepen Karzai’s isolation from power); and 2) state centralization (i.e., Campaign Against Political Rivals,” The Long War Jour- Tajik elites, and that may have been the their support for a strong central state, nal, December 25, 2011. Taliban’s goal. like the current presidential system, or a 14 While the Taliban leadership council issued a state- more decentralized one, such as a federal ment condemning the Ashura attacks, they mostly used Rationale for Taliban Incitement of Ethnic system). The diagram was generated on it as an opportunity to polemicize against U.S. efforts to Tensions the basis of a survey that elicited the create rifts in Afghanistan, directly attributing the at- Two other attacks on non-Pashtuns judgments of six analysts of Afghan tacks to a U.S. plot. In this light, their instruction to Tali- in December 2011 have also seriously politics, completed prior to Rabbani’s ban fighters to be on guard against such incidents rings 10 inflamed ethnic tensions: 1) the death. One striking feature of Figure hollow. A truly sincere and forceful condemnation would Ashura bombings in Kabul, Mazar- 1 is Karzai’s relative isolation in the have blamed fellow insurgents, as eventually Sunni na- i-Sharif, and Kandahar targeting issue space: only the two other Pashtun tionalist insurgents in Iraq came around to criticizing the ethnic Hazaras, killing more than 60 (red) co-ethnics are more dovish than targeting practices of al-Qa`ida in Iraq. See “Report on people and wounding over 200;12 and he is regarding the insurgency, and he the Gathering of the Leadership Council of Islamic Emir- 2) a suicide bombing in the northern is alone in favoring a highly centralized ate and its Statement Regarding the Recent Bombings on town of Taloqan, striking a funeral state. Rabbani is seen to be in the middle Ashura,” Voice of Jihad, December 11, 2011. ceremony, killing at least 20 civilians of the issue space and, importantly, is 15 Baig’s name had been listed in a Taliban statement ac- (wounding dozens more) and an ethnic the least hawkish of the Tajiks (green) cusing certain figures of being war criminals in October Uzbek member of parliament, Abdul and the other non-Pashtuns as well. 2011. This bears a similarity with the pattern of criticiz- Mutalib Baig.13 Neither of these attacks ing government-allied leaders shortly before attacking 8 As an example, the governor of Balkh Province, Atta them as noted above. See “From Torture in Government Mohammad Nur (tipped as a potential successor to Rab- 11 The individuals in this figure were chosen to represent Prisons to Mass Graves in Takhar,” Voice of Jihad, Octo- bani as Jamaat-i-Islami party leader) called for “revenge” key government-allied leaders for the four largest ethnic ber 26, 2011, translation courtesy of the Naval Postgradu- against “bloodthirsty predators.” See Michael Georgy, groups in Afghanistan: Pashtuns (red) - Hamid Karzai, ate School. “Analysis: Mixed Taliban Messages on Killing May Show Gul Agha Sherzai, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf; Tajiks (green) - 16 It should be noted that suicide bombings against fu- Divide,” Reuters, September 21, 2011. Rabbani, Marshal Fahim, Ismail Khan, Atta Mohammad nerals have occurred previously in the Pashtun belt and 9 For a previous use of factional maps, see Michael Gab- Nur; Hazaras (blue) - Karim Khalili, Mohammad Mohaq- that many Pashtun civilians have been killed by insur- bay, “Mapping the Factional Structure of the Sunni In- iq; Uzbeks (purple) - Abdul Rashid Dostum. gents. Although it can be fairly said that the Taliban are surgency in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 1:4 (2008). 12 Sharifullah Sahak and Rod Nordland, “Karzai Says an equal opportunity deployer of violence, similar tactics 10 The survey was administered in the spring of 2011. He Will Talk to Pakistan Over Attacks,” New York Times, may be used for different ends: the violence against Pa- The analysts consisted of scholars from academia and December 7, 2011. shtuns is aimed at coercing their support; the violence think tanks and independent consultants. A companion 13 Ernesto Londono and Javed Hamdard, “Afghan directed at non-Pashtuns, as will be argued here, may be survey assessing key insurgent leaders such as Mullah Lawmaker who Fought Taliban is Among 20 Killed in aimed at inciting ethnic tensions so that non-Pashtuns Omar, Mullah Baradar, the Haqqanis, and Gulbuddin Funeral Bombing,” Washington Post, December 25, 2011; mobilize against the Taliban but apart from, and thereby Hekmatyar was also administered. Matt Dupee, “Takhar Attack: Taliban Continue Their weakening, the Afghan government.

12 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 attacks are in fact concordant notes in United States to supply and support. hawkish line versus the Taliban as a deliberate Taliban campaign to incite Accordingly, for seizing central power, would be expected from Figure 1.20 A ethnic tensions. Given that they portray the key Taliban objective is also to prominent Tajik figure and Karzai’s themselves as Afghan nationalists, the weaken the ANSF; both in its own right former chief of intelligence, Amrollah Taliban would not do so on ideological as a military foe and as a critical enabler Saleh, recently spoke of Karzai losing grounds but a strong case can be made of a U.S. residual force that would be allies and becoming isolated; he on strategic grounds. decisive in defeating the Taliban in even mentioned the possibility of the the conventional force-on-force battles political opposition overthrowing the In presenting this case, it is assumed necessary for their conquest of the north government—hyperbolically to be sure, that the Taliban, as the Rabbani and west.18 but a clear signal of the readiness of assassination attests, are seeking a non-Pashtuns to take matters into their military solution to achieve their goals. Politically, the Taliban can further own hands.21 Their ultimate goal may be a limited their objective of weakening the one of controlling only the Pashtun ANSF by eroding the sense of national Policy Implications belt in the south and east, or a maximal unity among those aligned with the In response to the Taliban’s goal of one of seizing central state power in government. On an elite level, this weakening support for the ANSF by Afghanistan.17 For either one, however, entails weakening and isolating Hamid creating dissension in the Afghan consideration of the hierarchy of their Karzai. President Karzai is both a government, it is critical that the United potential military foes—U.S. forces, symbol of Afghan national unity and States implement a political strategy the ANSF, and non-Pashtun ethnic an active agent thereof given his role that reinforces its own military objective militias—shows that the ANSF is the as a bridge between Pashtun and non- of handing over combat responsibilities linchpin. Pashtun elites (as apparent via the to the ANSF. An essential component network links in Figure 1). Raising ethnic of this political strategy would be For the goal of Pashtun belt control, tensions will make it more difficult for forging a new elite consensus among it is clear that the counterinsurgency him to bridge that divide. If he sides Afghan powerbrokers, a consensus that fight will be mainly conducted by firmly with the non-Pashtuns, then is desperately needed. This could be the ANSF given the announced U.S. he will lose support among Pashtuns achieved by revising the constitution transition plans. Weakening the ANSF as will the ANSF, in which Tajiks are to a more decentralized system, as would naturally be a primary objective already overrepresented in the officer has been argued is historically better of a Taliban campaign to consolidate corps and southern Pashtuns are highly suited for Afghanistan.22 Karzai’s power there. If the Taliban goal is underrepresented.19 If he sides firmly political opposition has not pushed to reconquer Afghanistan, the fight with the Pashtuns, then non-Pashtuns for regional autonomy, mostly arguing would be more symmetric in nature will increasingly pull support from the more modestly for a parliamentary- than asymmetric, as it is improbable ANSF and seek to rearm their militias. based system and for the direct election that the Taliban could foment a of provincial governors. Although broad-based insurgency among non- The Taliban strategy to isolate Karzai Karzai has stated that he will oppose Pashtuns in the north and west, who is proving effective. Although Karzai a revision of Afghanistan’s political are extremely wary of a Taliban return moved to a hawkish stance in line system, there is no broad-based support to power. A relatively small U.S. with non-Pashtuns immediately for his position as Figure 1 implies; he residual force and the associated air after Rabbani’s assassination, he has would likely back down (as he has on a power would be sufficient insurance since drifted back to his usual dovish number of important issues), especially against a Taliban overrun of the north position, more in line with the desire if the United States were to add its and west. Whereas the U.S. military of Pashtuns to reach an accommodation weight in favor of such a change.23 can work with the ANSF, it would be with the Taliban. Dissatisfaction with Establishing a new consensus among much more difficult for the United Karzai among non-Pashtuns is presently Afghan leaders would re-energize States to maintain a residual force if it intense. A number of opposition the Afghan government, increasing had to deal with a diversity of loosely multi-ethnic political coalitions are its support among non-Pashtuns and controlled ethnic paramilitaries with coalescing around a platform based little or no allegiance to the formal on decentralizing government and a 20 For instance, the newly formed National Front coali- Afghan government and prone to tion is led by the Tajik Ahmad Zia Masood, the Hazara engaging in violence against Pashtun 18 It has been argued that the Taliban leadership recog- Mohammad Mohaqiq, and the Uzbek Abdul Rashid civilians. Even if the United States nizes that it could not prevail in a civil war even against Dostum. See “Mohaqiq Skeptical of Taliban Peace,” Daily were to effectively remove all of its ethnic militias. See Anatol Lieven, “Afghanistan: The Outlook Afghanistan, January 31, 2012. troops from Afghanistan, the ANSF Best Way to Peace,” New York Review of Books, February 21 Interview with Amrollah Saleh, Tolo News, February would still present a more formidable 9, 2012. However, this is far from clear and, in contrast, 18, 2012. opponent than would fragmented ethnic on the companion insurgent survey, five of six analysts 22 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Politi- militias and one much easier for the assessed that Mullah Omar believed that the Taliban cal History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, would prevail over non-Pashtun ethnic groups in the 2010). 17 In the companion survey regarding the insurgents event of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. 23 A revision to the constitution could also afford Karzai noted above, the majority of analysts assessed that seiz- 19 “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan an opportunity to continue to serve as Afghan leader (al- ing central power is the goal of Taliban leader Mullah National Army,” International Crisis Group, May 12, beit one with reduced powers) after his term expires in Omar. 2010. 2014, which might attract his support.

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Pashtuns alike. It would also allow for a taps into the proud narrative of Afghan stronger, more unified approach toward rebellion and victory against foreign Assessing Al-Qa`ida’s the insurgency with respect to both invasion, a frame that the United States Presence in the New Libya military and reconciliation efforts. has always struggled to counter. Yet the U.S. drawdown is bringing to the By Andrew Lebovich and Aaron Y. Zelin Another key component of the political fore a less proud narrative, one which strategy would be to commit in the near all Afghans grimly recognize from their a year after Libyans rose up against future to a long-term residual U.S. force, recent past: civil war. It is possible Colonel Mu`ammar Qadhafi, Western small but of sufficient size to prevent the to establish the facts on the ground governments and observers continue Taliban from overrunning the northern that would give the U.S. and Afghan to watch the security situation in that and western regions of the country governments the upper hand in the battle country with trepidation, concerned including Kabul, thereby making it of narratives: on the one side, a much with instability in the wake of Qadhafi’s clear that the Taliban could not prevail lighter U.S. presence buttressing a less ouster but also watchful for a possible in a civil war. It is this specter of ethnic centralized but more unified government spread of al-Qa`ida in the sparsely civil war that is becoming the dominant composed of all Afghan ethnic populated, oil-rich country. conflict logic in the strategic calculus of groups; on the other, an expansionist Afghan political actors, and the United insurgency overwhelmingly dominated This article provides an overview States needs to adapt its media strategy by one ethnic group (the primarily of the history of Libyans in jihadist accordingly as another element of its Pashtun composition of the Taliban organizations (including al-Qa`ida), an response. A narrative frame should be is understood and should not be assessment of al-Qa`ida and affiliated emphasized in which the Taliban are emphasized). By reorienting the conflict media activities following the Libyan portrayed as seeking to exploit ethnic narrative along an axis of looming civil uprising, an analysis of available divisions and plunge the country into war, Pashtuns potentially sympathetic evidence of a potential al-Qa`ida civil war in a drive for central power, to the insurgency may instead come to presence in Libya, and an evaluation of whereas the United States serves as view the Taliban as leading them toward the possible role the group could occupy a bulwark against the disintegration a future of bloody and fruitless ethnic in a new Libya. of Afghanistan that such Taliban conflict, and a Pashtun belt effectively ambitions could very well precipitate. A cut off from the rest of Afghanistan. The LIFG and Al-Qa`ida corollary to this narrative shift would be Although there are very important Soon after fighting erupted in Libya, for the United States to drop its present differences between the two cases, analysts pointed to the longstanding theme stressing the fragmentation of Sunnis in Iraq faced a similar choice in interest of al-Qa`ida in Libya and the the Taliban and Mullah Omar’s loss 2006-2007 and Iraqi nationalist Sunnis key role played by Libyans (especially of control over his fighters.24 While rejected the future of an al-Qa`ida- former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group appropriate as part of a media strategy led “Sunnistan.” Afghan nationalist combatants, such as Abu Layth al- highlighting military success against Pashtuns, including those in the ranks Libi and Abu Yahya al-Libi) in the insurgents, it could inadvertently of the Taliban, may likewise choose organization. Others referenced the serve to facilitate a surreptitious to reject the future of a disconnected, Sinjar Records that were recovered in Taliban campaign designed to inflame bottled-up, and restive “Pashtunistan”; 2007 that showed Libyans comprising ethnic tensions through violence by a prospect that Pakistan may also find the second-to-highest1 concentration helping their central leadership skirt unpalatable and which may eventually of foreign fighters to enter Iraq to fight responsibility for such acts.25 lead the Taliban to sit at the negotiating U.S. and other coalition forces.2 table in earnest. Currently, it is the Taliban who, in a Although the Libyan Islamic Fighting riff on their standard resistance frame Dr. Michael Gabbay is a research scientist Group (LIFG) traveled in similar depicting themselves as nationalists at the University of Washington. His ideological circles as al-Qa`ida, it did fighting against foreign occupiers, are research focuses on the dynamics of not appear to condone the group’s painting the reverse narrative in which insurgent and political networks. broader strategy of targeting the West. it is the United States that is deliberately The LIFG’s central leadership never sowing discord among Afghan ethnic publicly supported Usama bin Ladin’s groups. The Taliban resistance frame vision of global jihad. Although the

24 J.P. Morgan, “Battle for the Airways: Some People 1 Although Libyans formed the largest contingent of Say the Taliban is Winning the IO campaign War,” COIN fighters per capita, Saudis still formed the largest over- Common Sense, ISAF, May 2011. all group of foreign fighters. Additionally, the Sinjar Re- 25 For instance, the practice in U.S. military statements cords do not represent the total number of foreign fight- issued in response to insurgent attacks against civilians ers in Iraq, but rather a selection of approximately 600 of challenging Mullah Omar to condemn such attacks foreign fighters. implicitly admits the possibility that he is not in fact re- 2 Noman Benotman and James Brandon, “Briefing -Pa sponsible. For example, see “NATO and ISAF Leader- per: The Jihadist Threat in Libya,” Quilliam Foundation, ship Join President Karzai to Condemn Suicide Attacks March 24, 2011; Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “The Across Afghanistan,” ISAF Press Release, December 6, Enemies of our Enemy: Al-Qaeda and the Libyan Reb- 2011. els,” Foreign Policy, March 30, 2011.

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LIFG was in Sudan and Afghanistan at Yet when Abu Yahya, along with Abu AQ/AQIM Messaging and Online Jihadist the same time as al-Qa`ida, the LIFG was Layth al-Libi, “officially” joined al- Support for the Revolution training to topple the Qadhafi regime. Qa`ida in 2006, the senior leadership Prior to the anti-Qadhafi uprising, al- During the 1990s, the limited attempts of the LIFG refused to endorse what Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) the LIFG made to reach out to regional al-Qa`ida’s Ayman al-Zawahiri called a had not released any statements focusing extremist groups such as the Algerian merger between the groups, indicating specifically on Libya.10 Four statements Armed Islamic Group (GIA) ended in that Abu Layth, Abu Yahya, and others issued following the outbreak of violence disaster; LIFG members were arrested joined in an individual capacity.8 warned Libyans not to trust NATO, in Algeria after attempts to link up with appealed to Libyans to become involved militants, and a group of the LIFG’s Turning to Iraq, many have pointed to in jihadist activities, and called for the most hardened and experienced fighters the high number of Libyans involved creation of an Islamic state and the disappeared after a trip to the country, in that recent conflict as proof of establishment of Shari`a. Yet the group leading many to believe that the GIA LIFG involvement with al-Qa`ida. The was vague on how to enact such change, killed them.3 LIFG condemned the United States and AQIM has not put forth specific for its occupation of Iraq and agreed objectives or an agenda for Libya. As Noman Benotman, a former member with the stance that the fight against of the LIFG’s shura council, stated in a the United States was a “defensive AQIM has also made it a point to 2005 interview: “The LIFG has always jihad.”9 The Sinjar documents showed emphasize, praise, and congratulate been wholly focused on Libya. Our that a disproportionately high number Libyans for overthrowing Mu`ammar ultimate objective was the creation of an of Libyans passed through or were Qadhafi. The organization’s statements Islamic state in Libya.”4 Furthermore, involved with al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) repeatedly referred to Libyans as the the LIFG never congratulated al-Qa`ida networks. There is little hard evidence, “descendants” and “grandsons” of the on attacks they conducted such as the however, about how many Iraq veterans anti-colonial leader `Umar al-Mukhtar, 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings, the USS survived their fight to return to Libya, attempting to link the organization to Cole bombings, or even the 9/11 attacks. nor how many were actually members Libyan nationalist narratives.11 Yet the Rather, the LIFG only commented of the LIFG to begin with. group did not produce any Libyans on the U.S. retaliation in Sudan and to deliver these messages, unlike al- Afghanistan for the 1998 U.S. Embassy It is thus possible that not all Libyans Qa`ida central, whose messages on bombings.5 Moreover, LIFG leaders who went to Iraq—or those who would Libya featured Abu Yahya al-Libi as reportedly broke with Bin Ladin in a eventually return—were infected by al- well as Attiyatullah al-Libi, revealed 2000 meeting in Kandahar, cautioning Qa`ida’s particular brand of radicalism, for the first time in March 2011 to have the latter against staging a large-scale although some may still have picked been from the Libyan city of Misrata.12 attack against the United States.6 up military skills that would be used against their home governments upon In March 2011, both Attiyatullah Just after the 9/11 attacks, Shaykh Hasan their return from Iraq. and Abu Yahya issued statements Qa‘id (Abu Yunis al-Sahrawi), better “congratulating” Libyans on shaking off known today as Abu Yahya al-Libi, Unfortunately, a lack of available Qadhafi’s rule, focusing on the primacy penned a fatwa against the United States.7 information limits investigation beyond Al-Libi, still a member of the LIFG at anecdotal analysis of the impact of the 10 Aaron Y. Zelin, “Is al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghrib the time, argued that it was legitimate to war in Iraq on foreign fighters who Gaining Influence in Libya?” al-Wasat, November 1, attack the United States in Afghanistan. eventually returned home, including 2011. those who would take part in the Libyan 11 For AQIM’s messages related to the Libyan upris- 3 Camille Tawil, Brothers in Arms: The Story of al-Qa’ida revolution. ing, see “Support and Backing for the [Libyan] Revolu- and the Arab Jihadists (London: Saqi Books, 2010), p. 135. tion of our Family, the Free, Descendants of ‘Umar al- 4 Mahan Abedin, “From Mujahid to Activist: An Inter- Mukhtar,” al-Andalus Media, February 24, 2011; Abu view with a Libyan Veteran of the Afghan Jihad,” Spot- Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud (Abdelmalek Droukdel), “Sup- light on Terror 3:2 (2005). Since giving this interview, port for the Free, Descendants of ‘Umar al-Mukhtar,” Benotman has been a frequent media presence on the al-Andalus Media, March 18, 2011; Abu Mus`ab `Abd LIFG and jihadist issues, and helped negotiate a deal that al-Wadud (Abdelmalek Droukdel), “Congratulations on allowed imprisoned LIFG leaders to go free in return for the Victory of the Descendants of ‘Umar al-Mukhtar,” renouncing al-Qa`ida’s global jihadist agenda. al-Andalus Media, October 2, 2011; Shaykh al-Hasan 5 “Statement #14: Regarding the American Aggression Rashid al-Bulaydi, “Open Letter to the Muslims in Lib- against Sudan and Afghanistan,” Libyan Islamic Fight- 8 It should be noted that the senior leadership of LIFG ya,” al-Andalus Media, October 27, 2011; Shaykh Abu ing Group, August 25, 1998. was imprisoned in Libya at the time, and it was not until Uyyan ‘Asim, “Khutbah ‘Id al ‘Adha For The Year 1432 6 Camille Tawil, “The Changing Face of the Jihadist the following year that the leadership began a dialogue H,” al-Andalus Media, November 18, 2011. Movement in Libya,” Terrorism Monitor 7:1 (2009); Peter with the Libyan regime, a dialogue that would ultimately 12 Christopher Anzalone, “Al-Qaeda Loses its ‘Renais- Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: The Ji- lead to the group’s “revisions.” For a discussion of this sance Man,’” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2011. For the hadist Revolt Against Bin Laden,” New Republic, June 11, process, see Camille Tawil, “What Next for the Libyan statements, see Abu Yahya al-Libi: “To Our People in 2008. Islamic Fighting Group after Rebuff from the Libyan Re- Libya,” al-Sahab, March 12, 2011; ‘Atiyyatullah Abu ‘Abd 7 Shaykh Hasan Qa‘id (Abu Yunis al-Sahrawi), “Fatwa gime?” Terrorism Monitor 7:24 (2009). ar-Rahman, “Tribute To Our People in Libya,” al-Sahab, About the American Crusader Attacks on Afghanistan,” 9 “Statement #21: Regarding the Occupation of Iraq,” March 18, 2011; Abu Yahya al-Libi: “What is Intended September 23, 2001. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, April 11, 2003. For Libya?” al-Sahab, December 5, 2011.

15 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 of instituting Shari`a as the sole source eastern city of Darnah’s Abdel-Hakim Finally, just before the new year, two of legislation in the new Libya, and al-Hasadi and Sufyan bin Qumu, both reports came out that reinforced fears warning against the potential that the former Guantanamo Bay detainees. Al- that al-Qa`ida had begun to move United States or Libyans with links to Hasadi personally recruited fighters to back to Libya in force. In the Guardian, Qadhafi’s regime could usurp the rebels’ go to Iraq and was accused briefly in Jason Burke reported that at least two victory. Attiyatullah, however, called February 2012 of having established an senior al-Qa`ida figures as well as a for reconciliation if possible with those “Islamic emirate” in the city of Darnah, group of “North Africans” had made who “made mistakes and wrong choices which produced nearly half the recorded their way from Afghanistan to Libya, in the previous era.” Libyan fighters who traveled to Iraq.16 although some were arrested along the Both Hasadi and Bin Qumu are said to In December 2011, however, Abu have trained anti-Qadhafi fighters in Yahya’s message was more forthcoming Darnah, although Bin Qumu’s role in “Ultimately, while there on specific suggestions to Libyans, the town’s militias, especially the Abu are more than ‘flickers’ of including recommendations for: the Salim Martyrs Brigade, is in dispute.17 “formation of a board…to oversee al-Qa`ida in Libya, there the realization of the revolution’s This concern grew as another former is not enough information demands”; a call for rebels not to give Guantanamo detainee and LIFG leader, up their weapons; an invitation for Abdelhakim Belhadj, emerged at the head to determine if the group Islamic scholars to form an independent of Tripoli’s Military Council, a powerful has the means, or even the committee that would have a direct role militia that played a key role in seizing in formulating Libya’s constitution; and Qadhafi’s compound in August 2011.18 desire, to set up a durable the severing of any ties the rebels had presence in the country.” with Western governments. Indeed, this In November, AQIM commander statement is one of the more substantive Mokhtar Belmokhtar confirmed that the points made by an al-Qa`ida central group had benefited from the Libyan senior leader regarding the Arab uprising, using the ensuing chaos as way.21 CNN’s Nic Robertson and Paul Spring. Despite passing mention from a chance to acquire weapons.19 In the Cruickshank reported days afterward other leaders such as al-Zawahiri, it same interview, however, Belmokhtar that al-Qa`ida leader Ayman al- seems that al-Qa`ida central left Libyan explicitly denied that AQIM had played Zawahiri sent a senior Libyan al-Qa`ida messaging to the group’s Libyans, a direct role in the fighting against member who once lived in Britain, although it is not known who within al- Qadhafi, although he did call on Libyan “AA,” to Libya, and that between May Qa`ida actually formulated the group’s rebels to refuse attempts to have them and December 2011 he had recruited messaging on Libya. give up their arms.20 around 200 fighters in eastern Libya.22

Whispers of Jihad 16 “Al-Qaeda Sets Up ‘Islamic Emirate’ in Eastern Lib- Hints of an al-Qa`ida presence or The first indications that jihadists ya,” Agence France-Presse, February 23, 2011. sympathy in Libya have also made it to might be benefiting from the unrest 17 Charles Levinson, “Ex-Mujahedeen Help Lead Libyan the internet. Posters on popular jihadist in Libya came not long after violence Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2011; Rod Nordland forums such as Shamukh al-Islam have broke out, as regional leaders and and Scott Shane, “Libyan, Once a Detainee, is Now a U.S. provided what could be anecdotal press reports suggested that AQIM Ally of Sorts,” New York Times, April 24, 2011. evidence of sympathy for al-Qa`ida had gained weapons from abandoned 18 Omar Ashour, “Ex-Jihadists in the New Libya,” For- in Libya. These forums have featured Libyan stocks, including surface-to- eign Policy, August 29, 2011; Omar Ashour, “Fears Over some videos and pictures purportedly 13 air missiles. Others suggested that Islamists Within Libyan Rebel Ranks,” BBC, August 31, showing Libyan jihadists. There have the group had forged connections with 2011; Nic Robertson, “Former Jihadist at the Heart of been multiple rallies in Tripoli that Libya’s rebels, and that AQIM or al- Libya’s Revolution,” CNN, September 5, 2011. showcased a caravan of cars as well as Qa`ida central might seek to implant 19 Aboul Maaly, “Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou individuals holding flags resembling 14 23 itself in Libya. Al-Abass, alias ‘Belouar,’” al-Akhbar, November 9, 2011. those used by AQI. A similar flag was 20 For detailed analysis of this interview, see Andrew raised over a Benghazi courthouse in Meanwhile, many questioned whether Lebovich, “AQIM’s Mokhtar Belmokhtar Speaks Out,” October 2011, and other photos have the once-imprisoned LIFG leaders who al-Wasat, November 21, 2011. AQIM has not provided emerged on forums and in media sources renounced al-Qa`ida in 2009 would evidence of acquiring weapons, although a number of hold to their past positions now that Western government and other figures have confirmed France International, June 15, 2011; Bradley Klapper and they were free and some commanding AQIM’s acquisition of missiles and other advanced weap- Kimberly Dozier, “U.S.: Libyan Chemical, Nuclear Mate- 15 anti-Qadhafi fighters. Of particular onry. See Olivia Lang, “Fears Over Libya’s Missing Mis- rial Secure,” Associated Press, August 26, 2011. concern were leaders such as the siles,” BBC, September 8, 2011. Also see for instance Ben 21 Jason Burke, “Al-Qaida Leadership Almost Wiped Wedeman and Ingrid Formanek, “Missiles Looted from out in Pakistan, British Officials Believe,” Guardian, De- 13 Lauranne Prozenvano, “Liaisons dangereuses entre Tripoli Arms Warehouse,” CNN, September 7, 2011; Ré- cember 25, 2011. Aqmi et les insurgés libyens,” Jeune Afrique, March 30, gis Soubrouillard, “Trafic d’armes: La Libye, un arsenal à 22 Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Source: Al 2011. ciel ouvert,” Marianne, October 14, 2011; Isabelle Laserre, Qaeda Leader Sends Veteran Jihadists to Establish Pres- 14 Benotman and Brandon. “Des armes de Kadhafi récupérées par Aqmi au Sahel,” ence in Libya,” CNN, December 30, 2011. 15 Alison Pargeter, “Are Islamist Extremists Fighting Le Figaro, July 1, 2011; Ursula Soares, “Accrochage au 23 Aaron Y. Zelin, “On Flags, Islamic History, and al- Among Libya’s Rebels?” CTC Sentinel 4:4 (2011). nord d’Arlit, au Niger: la piste d’Aqmi se précise,” Radio Qa’ida,” al-Wasat, November 6, 2011.

16 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 showing the flags in various cities and Moreover, while the possibility of al- Regardless of whether jihadist violence towns.24 Qa`ida recruiting locally in places such takes root in Libya, unrest appears to as Darnah is a real and troubling risk, be spreading far beyond the country’s Forum members also posted a picture this information is linked (at least in the borders. Regular clashes have also taken of an alleged jihadist compound in open source) to a single source, and has place between Algerian and Tunisian Benghazi, which featured a message not been publicly confirmed elsewhere. security forces and arms smugglers, as spray painted on an outside wall in It is also not known how potential al- well as extremists; Algerian security Arabic that said “written by Qa`idat al- Qa`ida recruits are being trained in forces say that they arrested 214 Jihad in the Islamic Maghrib.” Late last Libya, and even if they will attempt to traffickers in the south and east of the year, on November 27, forum members operate in Libya. The country suffers country in 2011,36 including 87 Libyans posted pictures and a description of from multiple rivalries among heavily they said were linked to terrorist groups an event in Tripoli that announced armed militias30 and internal sectarian (although this information is only the creation of a new Libyan jihadist and ethnic divides31 that could make sourced to the Algerian government).37 media outlet, Himam (Endeavor) Media life difficult for a fledgling jihadist Also according to Algerian forces, 13 Foundation. movement. fighters, including a Libyan, were killed in a confrontation in Tebessa in Jihadists and the Revolution Additionally, the fighters within Libya early January.38 In Tunisia, authorities While the role of former LIFG members may receive little help from regional in February closed the major border and fighters with experience in sympathizers. While Benotman and crossing with Libya in an attempt Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in James Brandon, citing intelligence to stem weapons flows,39 and a little combating Qadhafi is without doubt,25 sources, say as many as 40 Libyans over a week later Tunisian authorities little is known about what these joined AQIM in recent years,32 other said they disrupted a “terrorist veteran fighters actually think; after specialists put the number considerably organization” that included members all, the LIFG’s own complicated history lower.33 trained in Libya.40 with al-Qa`ida26 shows the diversity of jihadist thought in the country. As This is not to downplay the possibility In December, Le Figaro reported that one expert who spent significant time of jihadist expansion in Libya. Both al- a key commander for Abdelhakim reporting from Libya, Barak Barfi, told Qa`ida and the LIFG have histories of Belhadj, Abdel-Mehdi al-Harati, one of the authors, “The jihadist camp clandestine organization in troubled was leading a detachment of Libyan was split [after NATO’s intervention in areas,34 and the limited public evidence fighters supporting Syrian rebels March 2011]. Once NATO entered the of an al-Qa`ida presence in Libya does along the border with Turkey.41 This conflict, some jihadists withdrew from not necessarily indicate that it is not may rekindle bad memories of the kind the battlefield, declaring they would there. Furthermore, even if elements of “jihadist international” that formed refuse to fight with infidels…Other sharing al-Qa`ida’s radical views and spread throughout Europe and jihadists continued to fight, under the are few in Libya today, this may well the Middle East after the Soviet jihad in auspices of brigades from Darnah and change. Belhadj complained to scholar Afghanistan, although it is interesting the February 17 units.”27 Omar Ashour in 2010 that many young that Belhadj, the cause of so much Libyan militants do not respect the anxiety during the Libyan revolution, Barfi added that, in his view, the LIFG former LIFG leadership, and could appears to be sending his fighters and leadership’s 2009 renunciation of al- break from the group, leaving them a key commander elsewhere instead of Qa`ida’s violent agenda was “genuine, prey to more extreme elements within concentrating on securing his gains in and not merely a ploy to win release the jihadist community.35 Libya. from prison” and that he and others saw little evidence of foreign fighters Conclusion entering Libya to fight on the side of 30 Clashes occur regularly in Tripoli and elsewhere. For Since the uprising against Qadhafi began 28 the rebels. In September 2011, an a thorough discussion of the problems posed by rival mi- in February 2011, Libya has become a anonymous American official said that litias and large-scale opposition movements, see Alastair source of attention for jihadists and officials believed some foreign fighters Macdonald and Oliver Holmes, “Libya – Divided it grave concern among regional and had entered the country, but that the Stands,” Reuters, December 16, 2011; Patrick Haimza- numbers were “in the dozens” and not deh, “Libya Still Under Arms,” Le Monde Diplomatique, 36 Chawki Amari, “Sahel: le traffic d’armes se porte bien, 29 more widespread, as in Iraq. December 2011; “Holding Libya Together: Security Chal- merci,” Slate Afrique, January 20, 2012. lenges After Qaddafi,” International Crisis Group,- De 37 Walid Ramzi, “Algeria Thwarts Arms Smuggling At- 24 Ibid. Also see William McCants, “Black Flag,” Foreign cember 14, 2011. tempt,” Magharebia, January 16, 2012. Policy, November 7, 2011. 31 Steve Sotloff, “In Libya, a Fundamentalist War 38 “Des hommes armés connectés à AQMI captures à il- 25 Personal interview, Camille Tawil, December 7, 2011. Against Moderate Islam Takes Shape,” Time Magazine, lizi et à l’Est,” Le Courrier d’Algérie, January 9, 2011. 26 Omar Ashour, “Post-Jihadism: Libya and the Global January 18, 2012. 39 “La Tunisie s’inquiète d’un traffic d’armes libyennes Transformations of Armed Islamist Movements,” Ter- 32 Benotman and Brandon. sur son territoire,” Radio France International, February rorism and Political Violence 23:3 (2011). 33 Personal interview, former European counterterror- 5, 2012. 27 Personal interview, Barak Barfi, December 20, 2011. ism analyst, February 2011. 40 Tarek Amara, “Tunisia Says it Cracks Islamist ‘Ter- 28 Ibid. 34 Ashour, “Post-Jihadism.” rorist’ Unit,” Reuters, February 13, 2012. 29 Chris Lawrence, “Libya the New Terrorist Haven?” 35 Omar Ashour, “Ex-Jihadists in the New Libya,” For- 41 Edith Bouvier, “Des Libyens épaulent les insurgés CNN, September 14, 2011. eign Policy, August 29, 2011. syriens,” Le Figaro, December 23, 2012.

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Western leaders. There are clear signs U.S. Gang Alignment with operations more on production, letting of jihadist efforts to infiltrate Libya, transportation be the concern of other and even signs of some possible success Mexican Drug Trafficking trafficking groups. for al-Qa`ida in establishing a limited Organizations presence in Libya. Security officials As a result, the Mexican cartels, some of must be vigilant for signs of support for By Mark Schmidt, U.S. National Gang Intelligence which had been in business dating back al-Qa`ida among Libyan militias and Center to the Prohibition Era in the United further expansion of the group’s reach, States, took on more responsibility in especially evidence of training and modern gang members, while continuing trafficking—not just moving cocaine indoctrination of Libyans by al-Qa`ida- their stereotypical fights for territorial for the Colombians, but rather actually linked figures. control or boasting gang allegiance buying the cocaine, then selling it directly through colors, tattoos, and symbols, into U.S. markets and reaping the It appears that AQIM in particular has also adapt to their environment for profits. As drug proceeds significantly chosen to profit from the Libyan unrest survivability. One aspect of this increased for Mexican cartels, so did the by seizing weapons, but have remained adaptation is making money through desire to expand operations to increase ensconced in safe havens in northern criminal ventures; more specifically, profits, and expansion usually meant Mali and Algeria. The same cannot be their ability to create alliances with encroachment into rival cartel territory. definitively said for other al-Qa`ida- other criminal enterprises for the The result has been an estimated 47,000 linked figures, who are accustomed to purpose of financial gain that benefits dead in Mexico from 2006 to 2011,1 as operating clandestinely when setting the gang and its members. Accordingly, the cartels continue to fight the Mexican up funding and operational networks American gang alliances with Mexican authorities and each other for control and may be doing the same in Libya. Drug Trafficking Organizations of the lucrative drug smuggling routes Given al-Qa`ida’s expressed interest (MDTOs) is a logical step for gangs in into the United States. in the country and the key role Libyan establishing and maintaining control militants have historically played in the over the street level sales of illegal Cooperation with U.S. Gangs organization, this concern cannot be drugs in many U.S. cities. Today, while illegal drugs are smuggled easily dismissed. into the United States in every This article provides background on the conceivable way, the preponderance of For the moment, though, armed history of modern drug trafficking in cocaine is shipped from the southwest jihadists—especially those sharing the United States, how MDTOs leverage border.2 U.S. gangs operating along al-Qa`ida’s extreme ideology—do not U.S. gangs for narcotics distribution and the southwest border appear to have appear to be in a position to contest the enforcement purposes, and identifies been the first gangs to enhance their fragile Libyan state. Ultimately, while the linkages between MDTOs and U.S. relationship with MDTOs; however, there are more than the “flickers” of al- gangs in Chart 1. there has always been some level of a Qa`ida in Libya first suggested by NATO relationship between the southwest commander Admiral James Stavridis Background on Modern Drug Trafficking border criminal enterprises. Cross- in March 2011,42 there is not enough During the 1980s, Miami was the border familial ties and knowledge information to determine if the group epicenter of drug trafficking. Colombian of criminal activities occurring in has the means, or even the desire, to set traffickers sold narcotics and laundered one’s territory are aspects that aided up a durable presence in the country— money in real estate and expensive cars, southwest border gangs in establishing especially when Western governments opening U.S. bank accounts to wire working relationships with MDTOs. and special forces are keeping a keen money back to Colombia. During this eye on Libya, and opposing armed time, Colombians were the primary Modern U.S. gang expansion into militias remain ready to protect their traffickers of cocaine into the United trafficking operations was slow and own power and influence. States, mostly through Florida, and sold integral. Prior to 2006, the gangs along their supplies to U.S.-based criminal the southwest border would buy their Andrew Lebovich is an Associate Senior organizations in wholesale, and also to drugs from the traffickers for street-level Analyst at the Navanti Group, and a U.S.-based Colombian sellers. By the sales. Then, gangs aided traffickers by former Policy Analyst with the New end of the 1980s and through the 1990s providing protection for drug shipments America Foundation. Aaron Y. Zelin is a and 2000s, however, new laws and into the United States. Gangs also took researcher in the Department of Politics greater federal enforcement operations on a more logistical support role for the at Brandeis University and maintains the targeted the traffickers; this caused traffickers once the shipment entered website Jihadology.net. They co-edit the trafficking routes to expand in an effort the United States. Gangs would not blog Al-Wasat. The views expressed in this to thwart law enforcement intervention. only protect drug warehouses, but also article are those of the authors and may This was accomplished by the increased began protecting shipments across the not reflect the views of their employers or participation of additional trafficking border, bulk money shipments back into clients. organizations, such as the Dominicans, Jamaicans, and even Mexican 1 Randal Archibold, “Mexico’s Drug War Bloodies Ar- traffickers, who joined the Colombians. eas Thought Safe,” New York Times, January 18, 2012. 42 Adam Entous, Keith Johnson, and Charles Levinson, The Colombians, while still involved 2 “National Drug Threat Assessment 2010,” National “Amid Libya Rebels, ‘Flickers’ of al Qaeda,” Wall Street in trafficking drugs into the United Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice, Journal, March 30, 2011. States, slowly began to refocus their February 2010.

18 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3

CHART 1: MDTOs Alliances and Rivals

Cartel Aligned With Rivals The Sinaloa Cartel Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos Los Zetas (aka Guzman-Loera Organization or New Mexico Syndicate Cardenas-Guillen Cartel (Gulf) Pacific Cartel) Los Carnales Tijuana Cartel Latin Kings Beltran-Leyva Cartel Mexican Mafia (California) Juarez Cartel Sureños MS-13 Arizona Mexican Mafia (Old & New) Wet Back Power Sinaloa Cowboys West Texas Tangos Los Negros Valencia Cartel (Considered a branch of the Sinaloa Cartel) Sonora Cartel (Considered a branch of the Sinaloa Cartel) Colima Cartel (Considered a branch of the Sinaloa Cartel) Border Brothers (California) Border Brothers (Arizona) La Familia Michoacana Cartel Sinaloa Cartel Los Zetas (Formerly part of Los Zetas under Cardenas-Guillen Cartel (Gulf) Cardenas-Guillen Cartel (Gulf Cartel) the authority of the Gulf Cartel) Surenos The Beltran-Leyva Cartel MS-13 Vincente Carrillo-Fuentes Cartel West Texas Tangos (Juarez Cartel) Los Zetas Vincente Carrillo-Fuentes Cartel Arellano-Felix Cartel (Tijuana) (Juarez) Cartel de la Sierra (Sierra Cartel) Beltran-Leyva Cartel Sinaloa Cartel Barrio Azteca La Familia Michoacana Cartel Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos Cardenas-Guillen Cartel (Gulf) Mexikanemi Texas Syndicate MS-13 Cardenas-Guillen Cartel (Gulf Cartel) Sinaloa Cartel Los Zetas La Familia Michoacana Cartel La Familia Michoacana Cartel Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos The Sinaloa Cartel Partido Revolutionary Mexicano Raza Unida Texas Chicano Brotherhood Vincente Carrillo-Fuentes Cartel Los Zetas The Sinaloa Cartel (Juarez Cartel) Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos La Familia Michoacana Cartel Barrio Azteca New Mexico Syndicate Los Carnales The Beltran-Leyva Cartel Los Zetas La Familia Michoacana Cartel (expected to soon be taken over by the Sierra Cartel) Arellano-Felix Cartel (Tijuana Cartel) Mexican Mafia (California) Los Zetas Sureños The Sinaloa Cartel Arizona Mexican Mafia (Old & New) Border Brothers (California)

* Source: 2011 National Gang Threat Assessment – Emerging Trends

19 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3

Mexico, as well as cars and weapons. organizations. As criminal enterprises, The Emergence of the Eventually, gangs would also help loyalty, discipline, and territoriality are MDTOs conduct enforcement operations cornerstone philosophies on how gangs Difa-e-Pakistan Islamist aimed at traffickers in the United States and MDTOs manage their respective Coalition who owed money, as well as other organizations. This is because criminal rival MDTOs attempting to encroach enterprises must function in a covert By Arif Rafiq into claimed territory. Currently, capacity if they wish to survive law many national-level U.S. gangs have enforcement intervention and rival in october 2011, more than 40 Islamist established relationships with MDTOs criminal takeover. Without loyalty to and right-wing parties and groups in to bypass the so-called “middle man”3 the organization, whether a gang or Pakistan joined together to establish and purchase larger quantities of drugs, a DTO, rivals and law enforcement the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC), or and disperse them to their markets could easily infiltrate and dismantle the Defense of Pakistan Council. Led by directly. A February 2010 National the organization from the inside. Jama`at-ud-Da`wa (JuD), the front group Drug Intelligence Center Assessment Discipline is paramount to keep for Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT), the DPC’s of drug trafficking by gangs estimated members inline so that their actions stated focus is to prevent Pakistan from that gangs’ wholesale purchase of do not disrupt the organization or its strengthening ties with both the United drugs, that were subsequently divided operations. Controlling and expanding States and India. Specifically, it opposes and shipped to the gang’s controlled one’s territory is also important to the the reopening of NATO’s Pakistan- territory, cut the price of cocaine by a survivability of the organization as it based supply route to Afghanistan, U.S. third—essentially increasing the gang’s protects the economic area of operation drone attacks in Pakistan, and granting drug trafficking profit more than 30%. from competitors. most favored nation trading status This also allows gangs to undercut to India. The DPC has held sizeable competitive dealers and monopolize and Outlook rallies in Pakistan’s major urban expand their market share of street- Aside from possible personality conflicts centers, creating speculation that the level drug sales.4 that could arise, there is no apparent group is supported by Pakistan’s Inter- reason for either group to end their Services Intelligence (ISI) in a bid to The working relationship between mutually beneficial relationship. With sideline mainstream political parties in gangs and MDTOs became more U.S. gangs able to increase their profit Pakistan by bolstering the political role transparent over the past five years as by taking over wholesale distribution of Islamists.1 news of horrific violence poured out that in many instances were operated of Mexico. One shocking example was by domestic drug trafficking networks, Fears of the DPC’s influence, however, the U.S. Consulate murders in Ciudad and MDTOs gaining increased reliance are overblown at this time. Pakistan’s Juarez, where Barrio Azteca members, on their U.S.-based partners, criminal Islamist and right-wing parties are a U.S. prison gang working directly enterprises on both sides of the border divided, and the DPC’s members only with the Vincente Carrillo-Fuentes benefit from their shared cooperation. have marginal electoral influence. Cartel (Juarez Cartel), murdered a U.S. As such, the symbiotic relationship Economic concerns and patronage Consulate employee and her husband of gangs and MDTOs stands to only politics, which the DPC’s constituents on March 13, 2010.5 strengthen over the foreseeable future, are poorly positioned to exploit, will giving U.S. gangs greater access to be the primary drivers in Pakistan’s MDTOs were in search of U.S.-based wealth through their increased control next general elections that will occur partners who would not cooperate with of wholesale and street-level sale of between late 2012 and early 2013. law enforcement. Accordingly, the illegal drugs in the United States. loyalty and discipline attributes of gangs Nonetheless, the emergence of the made them ideal partners. Theoretically, Mark Schmidt, a former U.S. Army DPC and the increasingly public role the loyalty and discipline of U.S. gangs Counterintelligence Agent, received his played by JuD suggests a failure in would hinder cooperation with law Bachelors of Arts in Government and Politics, Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. enforcement, and thus better protect the focusing on Comparative and International Since the 1980s, Pakistan’s military drug trafficking operation. The success Studies from George Mason University in apparatus has become dependent on of their working relationship is, in part, Fairfax, Virginia. Mr. Schmidt has been an Islamists and jihadists to weaken because gangs and Drug Trafficking Intelligence Analyst with the Federal Bureau secular political parties, expand the Organizations (DTOs) are like-minded of Investigation for 11 years, and has worked country’s reach in Afghanistan and counterterrorism, counterintelligence, contain a strengthening India. With the 3 In this context, the “middle man,” or “men,” refers to Eurasian organized crime, Middle Eastern anti-state shift by a sizeable percentage drug trafficking criminal enterprises that solely operated criminal enterprises and criminal street gang of the country’s jihadists in the wake inside the United States, but purchased large quanti- investigations. He has been with the National of 9/11, Pakistan’s military lacks a ties of drugs from MDTOs, which they resold to gangs Gang Intelligence Center since January coherent strategy to contain its domestic and other street-level drug salesmen across the United 2009. jihadists. Rather than developing a States. comprehensive counterradicalization 4 “National Drug Threat Assessment 2010.” program, Pakistan’s military instead 5 Daniel Borunda and Adriana M. Chavez, “Federal Case Linked to Consulate Deaths Yields Racketeering Pleas,” 1 Imtiaz Ahmad, “ISI Behind New Political Party, Difa-e- El Paso Times, September 23, 2011. Pak,” Hindustan Times, February 21, 2012.

20 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 attacks jihadists in some parts of the with the spy agency’s operational a lot of importance for us and we are country, while encouraging jihadists history, but it would also help advance willing to fight for them.”6 in other parts of the state. It pursues a the Pakistan military’s current strategy of “divide and rule,” but this objectives. The fact that the DPC’s chief Ethnic and Factional Divisions Weaken has only strengthened the phenomenon coordinator is Hamid Gul, who formed Islamist Unity Efforts of jihadism over time. The emergence the IJI alliance in 1988 while serving as The growing public presence of radical of the DPC is a symbol of the long- ISI director-general, has helped to fuel groups such as the ASWJ and LeT term challenge of violent Islamism in this perception. On the other hand, Gul through the DPC is a worrisome trend Pakistan. could simply be reusing a strategy from that portends the radicalization of an old playbook, with little involvement Pakistani civil society. While the DPC The DPC Emerges Amid Strategic Uncertainty of the ISI. could develop into a coherent pressure for Pakistan’s Military group—using its street presence to Military-backed, broad-based Islamist The Pakistan military’s strategic lobby political and military officials—it and right-wing coalitions are not new environment is presently shaped by lacks the ingredients for formal success to Pakistan. In 1988, the ISI helped five major factors: upcoming general in Pakistani politics. group the center-right Pakistan Muslim elections that could alter the civil- League with Jamaat-i-Islami and other military balance; troubled relations None of the DPC’s constituent Islamist parties in the form of the with the United States, which is organizations have representation in Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), or Islamic both a patron and competitor; the the federal parliament or provincial Democratic Alliance.2 The IJI, created commencement of the endgame in assemblies. Although the rising to counter the military’s rival Pakistan Afghanistan; a possible resumption Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf party (PTI), a Peoples Party (PPP), won a majority of of Indo-Pak peace talks; and an DPC member, is likely to perform well seats in the 1990 general elections and uncertain future for jihad in South in the next general elections, it has kept formed a short-lasting government.3 Asia with anti-state jihadists in a safe distance from the organization. Pakistan weakened and a possible U.S. PTI is likely using the DPC to bolster its More than a decade later, Pakistani departure from Afghanistan. nationalist and Islamist credentials, but Islamists—leveraging anti-American it maintains its own independent agenda sentiment after coalition forces invaded The DPC provides Pakistan’s military and does not want to be seen by foreign Afghanistan and unseated the Taliban— with the opportunity to put pressure observers as being sympathetic or tied formed the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal both on the United States and the to militant and terrorist organizations. (MMA) party. Like the IJI, the MMA is civilian government. Pakistan’s alleged to have ISI support.4 The MMA military can leverage the specter of a While the DPC serves as the latest voted in favor of the controversial rising radical opposition to the U.S.- umbrella organization for Pakistan’s Seventeenth Amendment, which Pakistan partnership and suggest that Islamists, it is weakened by the lack diluted parliamentary sovereignty concessions made to Washington will of participation by the Fazlur Rehman and empowered the office of the be attached with a significant price. faction of the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam- president held by military ruler Pervez Furthermore, the DPC can serve as a Fazlur (JUI-F) party, which is the Musharraf, much to the consternation means to slow the civilian government’s Islamist party with the greatest number of the country’s democratic opposition. attempts to advance rapprochement of parliamentary seats. Maulana Fazlur The MMA swept the polls in the border with India, which the military opposes. Rehman, the leader of the JUI-F, has regions with Afghanistan, forming the Finally, by amplifying the public been highly critical of Pakistan’s government in what was then known presence for pro-state jihadists, the DPC military-intelligence establishment as the North-West Frontier Province can also be a way for Pakistan’s military in recent months.7 He is positioning and leading the governing coalition in to channel jihadist activity away from himself for an electoral alliance with Baluchistan Province. the Pakistani state and toward India one of Pakistan’s two major parties, the and the United States. center-right Pakistan Muslim League- Today, with the formation of the DPC, Nawaz or the center-left Pakistan similar allegations of ISI involvement A test for how close the DPC is to the Peoples Party. Given his political weight have been made.5 While there is no military will come when Pakistan and current opposition to the military, publicly-available evidence to prove the decides to reopen the NATO supply Fazl is unlikely to play “second fiddle” allegation, ISI support for an Islamist route to Afghanistan. Will the DPC back to the military’s ally, the JuD. He could alliance would not only be consistent away from the issue or will it elevate its be amenable, however, to an Islamist criticism of the civilian government and electoral alliance led by his party. 2 “Hameed Gul Admits he Formed IJI,” The News Inter- include the military? While members of national, August 30, 2009. the DPC have issued limited criticism 3 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military of the military, many of its members (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna- have offered strong praise for the 6 Taha Siddiqui, “Difa-e-Pakistan Part 2/2: Who is Aid- tional Peace, 2006). institution. Indeed, Maulana Ahmed ing the Jihadis’ Resurgence?” Express Tribune, February 4 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, Ludhainvi, head of the anti-Shi`a 12, 2012. D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004). Ahl-e Sunnat wal-Jammat (ASWJ), 7 Saba Imtiaz, “‘We Will Make Pakistan an Islamic Wel- 5 Mujahid Husain, “The Mullah Media Alliance,” View- said that “the army is the largest fare State’: JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman,” Express point, March 2, 2012. institution of this country, so it holds Tribune, January 27, 2012.

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The DPC’s growth will also be stifled The government of Pakistan Attacking Drug Cartels by internal rivalries and divisiveness has no coherent nationwide Through Undercover inherent to Pakistan’s political culture counterradicalization strategy. While and religious communities. An ASWJ Pakistan’s military has initiated Money Laundering supporter criticized fellow DPC a comprehensive deradicalization Operations members Gul and Ijaz-ul-Haq at the campaign in the Swat area, elsewhere Islamabad rally in February 2012.8 A in the country it has allowed jihadist By Robert Mazur prominent politician from neighboring groups to flourish.11 Pakistan’s military Rawalpindi, Shaykh Rashid Ahmed, did remains committed to utilizing jihadist federal undercover money laundering not attend the Islamabad gathering. groups as force multipliers and operations are a vital tool in law non-conventional weapons against enforcement’s efforts to build legal cases Furthermore, the DPC has had difficulty neighboring states. It lacks the ability against the hierarchy of drug cartels gaining traction in Pakistan’s smaller and will to dismantle the jihadist and associated criminal networks. In provinces. It has held rallies in the infrastructure in the country as a whole the last few months, however, critics capital as well as large cities in Punjab and simply focuses on pitting jihadists have suggested that federal undercover and Sindh. Yet Baluch nationalist against one another or redirecting their money laundering operations blur the parties have refused to participate in the focus away from Islamabad and toward line between effective law enforcement group’s Quetta rally planned for April Kabul and New Delhi. The risks of and “facilitating crime,” ignore the 2012 and civil society activists have continued jihadist support by the state sovereignty of other governments, opposed the DPC’s Peshawar rally.9 are clear. The thousands of Pakistani and have not produced results that civilians and security personnel killed impact cartel leadership. Detractors The Dangers in Pakistan’s Strategy by insurgents and terrorists since of this tool argue for more stringent Pakistan’s post-2009 counterinsurgency 9/11 demonstrate that today’s “good” congressional review of these operations have successfully pushed jihadists can become tomorrow’s “bad” operations, with suggestions that they Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) out jihadists. are counterproductive. from the settled areas near the country’s population centers and back into the Arif Rafiq is president of Vizier This article, however, argues that tribal areas. The TTP is a weakened Consulting, LLC, which provides undercover money laundering operations organization mired by internal divisions strategic guidance on Middle East and are one of the most effective and critical and plummeting public support.10 While South Asian political and security weapons to identify and prosecute those the TTP is a far less potent insurgent issues. involved in the command and control of threat, it remains a significant terrorist global narco-terrorist organizations. threat, particularly in the Federally Much of the analysis in this article is Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber based on the author’s 27-year career as Pakhtunkhwa Province. a federal agent, including five years of long-term undercover work operating Moreover, Pakistan remains home to as a money launderer for drug cartels. what is perhaps the world’s greatest concentration of jihadist organizations. The Threat from Drug Cartels to the United Groups such as the LeT that do not pose States a direct threat to the Pakistani state Drug cartels threaten U.S. national today could become its adversaries in the security. They move hundreds of future. A major lesson of the post-9/11 tons of illegal drugs into American era for Pakistan is that allied jihadist communities, resulting in increased groups can become foes with the right domestic crime as well as thousands amount of strain on the relationship. of drug-related murders. Drug money Additionally, despite the loyalty of corrupts law enforcement, as well as senior members of jihadist groups, low military, political, judicial, legislative to mid-level commanders can defect and and even media personnel in various rebel against their former handlers. countries. It provides funding for terrorist organizations such as Hizb Allah, the Taliban, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that prioritize the murder of Americans. 8 Kalbe Ali, “One-Upmanship Mars Latest Defence of Several prosecutions brought during Pakistan Rally,” Dawn, February 21, 2012. the past few years as a result of the 9 “Major Baloch, Pakhtun Political Parties to Boycott dedicated work performed by the DEA’s Difa-e-Pakistan Organized Meeting,” ANI, February 27, Special Operations Division, including 2012; Iftikhar Firdous, “Peshawar Civil Society Demands 11 Fazal Khaliq, “Strategic Discussions: Radicalisation the November 2011 indictment of Ban on Difa-e Pakistan,” Express Tribune, March 6, 2012. - Causes, Remedies Discussed,” Express Tribune, July 5, Ayman Joumaa and members of his 10 “Internal Rifts Within TTP Over Peace Talks with 2011; “Jaish-e-Muhammad Builds Huge Base in Baha- Colombian/Lebanese drug money Pakistan,” Agence France-Presse, March 9, 2012. walpur,” Daily Times, September 14, 2009. laundering operation, substantiate this

22 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 fact.1 Likewise, the prosecutions of The Importance of Undercover Money include: Bank Atlantic (2006) – fined Khan Mohammed,2 Haji Juma Khan,3 Laundering Operations $20 million;9 American Express Bank and many others confirm the strong One of the few law enforcement tools International (2007) – forfeited $55 narco-terrorist connection.4 that genuinely worries cartel leaders million;10 Union Bank of California is undercover money laundering (2007) – fined $21.6 million;11 Wachovia While U.S. resources have been operations. Cartel leadership recognizes Bank (2010) - fined $160 million;12 concentrated on waging wars in the that targeting their money supply is one Lloyds (2009) - fined $350 million;13 UBS Middle East and South Asia, the danger of the only ways that law enforcement (2009) - fined $780 million;14 Deutsche from drug cartel activity in Latin can build solid proof of their role in Bank (2010) - fined $553 million;15 Credit America has only gained momentum. command and control, and that this Suisse (2009) - fined $536 million;16 ABM These organizations are operated by technique could potentially undermine Amro Holding NV (2010) - fined $500 sophisticated individuals. They hide the entire organization. Yet they have million;17 and Barclays Bank (2010) - fined behind surrogates or frontmen while they no choice but to expose themselves to $298 million.18 attempt to corrupt the infrastructure of this risk because unlaundered “dirty” the countries from which they operate. money provides them with far less This author acted as the primary Some of the world’s most sophisticated power and security than tainted funds undercover agent in several long- international bankers and businessmen that appear legitimate. term undercover money laundering cater to them and make tens of billions operations during the late 1980s and of dollars guarding their fortunes. The reality is that a segment of the the early 1990s. During one, two-year international banking and business undercover operation, this author and The illegal drug trade globally generates community solicits business his team laundered $34 million. This more than $400 billion per year.5 relationships with people who possess amounted to 1/100th of one percent Reports estimate that in North America “flight capital,” which constitutes money- of the $800 billion in drug proceeds cocaine sales alone generate roughly seeking-secrecy from governments. This generated during those two years and $35 billion. Factor in other drugs, and author learned this fact first hand during proves that successful undercover at least $65 billion is being made from months of debriefings of convicted money laundering operations do not the sale of illegal drugs in the United international bankers.8 This money- require the laundering of significant States each year. At the same time, less seeking-secrecy comes in different amounts of the cartel’s fortunes. than $1 billion in drug proceeds are forms. Beyond drug proceeds, at a seized in the United States per year.6 minimum it includes funds from: illegal Yet through this $34 million, this Law enforcement never even sees 99% arms dealing; the unlawful movement of undercover money laundering operation of cartels’ annual revenue. No matter funds to sanctioned nations; tax evasion; recorded more than 1,000 conversations where in the world big drug deals take the evasion of customs duties; white collar with cartel leaders and launderers, place, most often they involve U.S. crime; and the pilfering of national assets which would not have been possible if dollars. Therefore, as was the case with by individuals with political influence. the network had not been infiltrated European drug proceeds traced through through an undercover money laundering the money laundering organization of Law enforcement benefits greatly from operation. As a result of the operation, Lebanese-based Ayman Joumaa,7 the having an undercover methodology the U.S. Department of Justice: trail of the greatest portion of illicit drug to access the corrupt segment of the sales around the globe runs through the international banking and business - prosecuted more than 100 drug U.S. banking system. community involved in laundering funds traffickers and money launderers, for those in control of “flight capital” including people who reported directly because sophisticated launderers serve a to Pablo Escobar; large number of criminal organizations. Prosecuting these individuals has value 9 “BankAtlantic,” press release, U.S. Department of Jus- because they can identify those involved tice, April 26, 2006. in the command and control of large 10 U.S.A. v. American Express Bank International, South- 1 U.S.A. v. Ayman Joumaa, Eastern District of Virginia, scale drug trafficking and other illegal ern District of Florida, 2007. 2011. enterprises, they have key records, and 11 U.S.A. v. Union Bank of California, Southern District of 2 “Kahn Mohammed,” press release, U.S. Department of they can identify the current location of California, 2007. Justice, December 22, 2008. massive illegal fortunes. 12 U.S.A. v. Wachovia Bank, Southern District of Florida, 3 “Haji Juma Khan,” news release, U.S. Drug Enforce- 2010. ment Administration, October 14, 2008. To justify this type of approach 13 U.S.A. v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, District of Columbia, 4 U.S.A. v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, Southern District of to undercover money laundering 2009. New York, 2011. operations, one need only look at the 14 U.S.A. v. UBS AG, Southern District of Florida, 2009. 5 “Estimated Illicit Financial Flows Resulting From list of international banks that have 15 “Deutsche Bank AG,” press release, U.S. Department Trafficking & Other Transnational Organized Crimes,” admitted criminal guilt in connection of Justice, December 21, 2010. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, October 2011. with their servicing of “flight capital” 16 U.S.A. v. Credit Suisse AG, District of Columbia, 2009. 6 This information is available on the U.S. Department during the past five years. They 17 U.S.A. v. ABN Amro Bank N.A., District of Columbia, of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Fund website. 2010. 7 “Ayman Joumaa,” press release, U.S. Department of 8 Robert Mazur, “Institutional Will – The Organized 18 U.S.A. v. Barclays Bank PLC, District of Columbia, Justice, December 13, 2011. Crime Remedy,” Journal of Money Laundering 15:2 (2012). 2010.

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- seized about 3,200 pounds of cocaine; fortunes—thus dismantling their whole The undercover companies and - seized more than $100 million in cash enterprise. The 1,000 consensual businesses routinely used in undercover and assets; recordings made by undercover agents operations are generally thrown - collected over $500 million in fines; with money launderers, traffickers together in an effort to catch up to a case - forced the world’s 7th largest privately and bank officers in the operation specific opportunity and most often held bank then, the Bank of Credit and that targeted the Bank of Credit and deal with a single drug organization or Commerce International, to plead guilty Commerce International enabled the corrupt institution, rather than slowly and forfeit their licenses to operate in prosecutors to convict every defendant building a sound front that can be used 72 countries (essentially dismantling that went to trial, which led to their to attack several criminal organizations the bank); cooperation and the dismantling of the simultaneously. Establishing an - convicted and imprisoned many senior bank. effective undercover money laundering bank executives involved in laundering operation is no different than devoting hundreds of millions in drug proceeds; With the help of a half dozen informants resources to develop any other type - executed search warrants around and concerned citizens, it took nearly of weapon used in the defense of the the world that resulted in the seizure two years to establish a sophisticated country; it should and could easily be of truckloads of records documenting front as a corrupt businessman involved used in more than one battle. hundreds of millions in laundered drug in verifiably operating businesses, proceeds, including the records that including an investment company, In almost every case, U.S. authorities proved Panamanian General Manuel mortgage brokerage business, air rely on “cooperative financial Noriega had, as drug dealers claimed, charter service, jewelry chain, and institutions” to establish undercover taken more than $50 million in cash stock brokerage firm with a seat on the accounts, a fact that looms as a payments in return for the free passage of NY Stock Exchange. Once established, detriment to the security of the untold amounts of drugs and money.19 this author used his undercover operation for several reasons beyond the identity to build relationships with potential inadvertent leak. It is naïve Without the tool of an undercover suspected corrupt businessmen and to think that senior management in an money laundering operation, these bankers around the world. Without international bank will not be made successes would not have been that detailed planning, the operation aware of the opening of undercover possible. Unlike other traditional would have never succeeded. In accounts.20 If an undercover operation law enforcement efforts that often rely today’s era of databases and high-tech is soundly established, provided that on the testimony of paid informants, background capabilities, this type the sovereignty of other countries is surveillance or wiretaps, undercover of undercover front complexity is a respected, it is far more secure to open money laundering operations readily minimum requirement to realistically accounts covertly, rather than with the enable law enforcement to collect gain access to those truly in control of knowledge and involvement of bank certain types of highly reliable evidence, the underworld’s financial maze. personnel at any institution. including the documents that provide the money trail that leads to those How to Improve Undercover Money In general, long-term undercover involved in command and control of Laundering Operations operations, especially those involving criminal organizations. In addition, To identify and seize the 99% of drug money laundering operations, should they routinely involve recorded proceeds that currently evades law be used sparingly. Undercover agents conversations made by a sworn law enforcement, the sophistication of selected for these assignments should enforcement officer, rather than highly law enforcement’s undercover money be vetted through an undercover school paid informants, acting in an undercover laundering operations should be process that involves experienced capacity. Those recordings offer improved. Most often, law enforcement trainers and psychological testing/ airtight evidence against professional puts an undercover money laundering monitoring. These operations should be money launderers who are otherwise operation together in reaction to a monitored and managed to ensure that painted by defense counsel to juries as set of case specific facts gathered by they truly infiltrate cartel leadership victims of untrustworthy informants informants or other sources. Because and their money laundering partners and an overreaching government undercover identities and business in the international bank and business prosecution unjustly accusing “pillars fronts are rarely created in advance community. What matters most is that, of the community.” The prosecution and of their need, authorities tend to on a continuing basis, each operation imprisonment of professional money use informants to fill significant continues to identify new violators launderers leads to their cooperation, roles in undercover money laundering and evidence of new crimes. The old their testimony relative to the owners operations, which later makes it standard of justifying these operations of the money they laundered, and access necessary to have informants carry a to additional unknown records that heavy burden testifying about critical 20 All of BCCI’s convicted senior management were will support otherwise unachievable facts. That flaw offers an appetizing previously employed by many other international banks prosecutions of the highest level scenario in the perspective of a defense and maintained a close relationship with their colleagues members of criminal organizations, as attorney. The jury is typically reminded in other institutions. If the other accounts used in the well as the seizure of their organization’s repeatedly that the entire credibility operation had been opened with the knowledge of the of the government’s case lies on the account initiators that the accounts were undercover ac- 19 Robert Mazur, The Infiltrator (New York: Little, Brown shoulders of a deal the government counts, the security of the undercover operation would & Company, 2009. made with a “snitch.” have been needlessly jeopardized.

24 march 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 3 by seizing funds equal to the amount February 3, 2012 (SOMALIA): Kenya’s laundered is archaic and ill advised. Recent Highlights in military bombed a convoy of al-Shabab Each operation should strive to launder Terrorist Activity fighters in Dalayat village in southern the least amount of money to get the Somalia, killing an estimated 100 maximum evidence, but seizures during February 1, 2012 (PAKISTAN): militants. – Reuters, February 4 the undercover operation should only Pakistan said it killed an al-Qa`ida- be done when a certainty exists that linked Azerbaijani national in Kurram February 5, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A doing so will not cast doubt about the Agency of the Federally Administered suicide bomber detonated an explosives- credibility of the undercover agent. Tribal Areas. As reported by Dawn, “The laden vehicle at a police parking lot in militant, identified as Aslanov Zaur, Kandahar city, killing at least seven The DEA should lead a multiagency was among the six foreign militants people. “Kandahar had been relatively initiative to selectively launch one who were killed during clashes with quiet for months, but there have been highly efficient and well planned money security forces in the Jogi area of a series of suicide bombings since Jan. laundering undercover operation every Central Kurram Agency…The passport 11, when there was a foiled attack on the year so that an ongoing resource of highly (passport number 3503893), issued police headquarters,” explained the New skilled undercover operatives infiltrate from the Azerbaijani capital Bakku in York Times. “An official for the Afghan the hierarchy of the underworld February 2009, shows Zaur belonged intelligence department in Kandahar on a global basis. To be effective, to the city of Sumaqyit, located at a said that informers and captured multinational resources through ally distance of 31 kilometers from the insurgents have told investigators partnerships need to support these capital and was born on September 25, recently that the city is in insurgents’ operations, and each operation should 1981…The travel documents also reveal cross hairs. Taliban commanders have run for an average of two to three that he had entered the city of Astar, been ferrying would-be suicide bombers years. Operational care should be taken the capital of Gilan province of Iran on to the city and organizing attacks, the to ensure that litigation brought as a March 26, 2009 (evident from the entry intelligence official said.” – New York result of one such operation does not stamp), and since than [sic] had gone Times, February 5 legally necessitate the exposure of any underground. He is suspected to have other undercover money laundering entered Afghanistan and then Pakistan February 5, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A operation. In 10 years, cartel leadership through unfrequented routes.” – Dawn, military convoy was hit by a roadside and others who possess underground February 4 bomb in Kurram Agency of the Federally fortunes would suffer a lethal blow and Administered Tribal Areas, killing one the international banking community February 2, 2012 (IRAQ): Militants Pakistani soldier. – RFE/RL, February 5 would finally learn that the stench of bombed an Asiacell equipment building tainted funds carries too great a risk for near Mosul, Ninawa Province, disrupting February 6, 2012 (UNITED STATES): business. mobile phone service in some areas. Chicago cab driver Raja Lahrasib Khan According to Reuters, “The attackers, pleaded guilty to providing material By enhancing the sophistication some of whom wore military uniforms, support to a terrorist group. According of undercover money laundering held guns to the heads of security guards to Bloomberg, “A naturalized U.S. operations, the authorities who take on late on Thursday and planted four large citizen, Khan, 58, was arrested in March the cartels and their money managers explosives in the building, which houses 2010 after his son was apprehended will be afforded a much clearer aim at routing and switching equipment.” at a London airport carrying $700 of the Achilles’ heel of the underworld. – Reuters, February 3 $1,000 in marked $100 bills that a U.S. undercover agent had given the cab Robert Mazur is a retired DEA agent February 2, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Taliban driver for delivery to Ilyas Kashmiri. certified in both the United States and militants ambushed a police patrol Kashmiri was allegedly an ally of the Canada as an expert in international in Lakki Marwat District of Khyber al-Qaeda terror network and a fighter money laundering. He provides consulting, Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing three in the movement to expel Indian forces training and expert witness services in the officers. – Dawn, February 2 from Kashmir, the disputed territory anti-money laundering compliance field between Pakistan and India and where to both law enforcement and the private February 2, 2012 (PHILIPPINES): Khan was born. He was reportedly sector. He is the author of The Infiltrator: Philippine’s military killed 15 al- killed in a U.S. missile strike last year. My Secret Life Inside The Dirty Banks Qa`ida-linked militants in an airstrike Khan today admitted meeting Kashmiri Behind Pablo Escobar’s Medellin on a rebel camp on Sulu Island in the twice in Pakistan.” – Bloomberg, February 6 Cartel. southern Philippines. At least two of the dead were allegedly from Jemaah February 6, 2012 (UNITED STATES): Islamiya. Authorities believe that Somali-American Ahmed Hussein among the dead was Malaysian bomb Mahamud, 27, of Westerville, Ohio, expert Zulkipli bin Hir (also known pleaded guilty to one count of as Marwan), although they have yet to conspiracy to provide material support find his body. Later reports suggested to a foreign terrorist organization. that Bin Hir escaped the attack, but was Mahamud admitted raising money to badly wounded. – Reuters, February 2; AP, send Minnesota men to Somalia to join February 3; New York Times, March 13 al-Shabab. As stated in the Associated

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Press, “Mahamud admitted that from terrorist group as well as the sermons sites.” It was not immediately clear who 2008 through February 2011, Mahamud of Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al- was responsible for the attack. – AP, and others conspired to provide money `Awlaqi. – AP, February 9 February 10 and people to al-Shabab, knowing the group was a designated foreign terrorist February 9, 2012 (TURKEY): A potential February 11, 2012 (SYRIA): Gunmen organization. Specifically, Mahamud female suicide bomber died in Istanbul assassinated a Syrian general, Issa al- said that in the summer of 2008, he after explosives she was carrying Kholi, outside his home in Damascus. and others told members of Minnesota’s detonated. She appeared to be the only – Bloomberg, February 12 Somali-American community that they casualty. Authorities suspect that she were raising money for a local mosque belonged to the Kurdistan Workers’ February 12, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida or for orphans in Somalia. Instead, Party (PKK). – AFP, February 10 leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released a Mahamud said, the $1,500 went new video message expressing support toward airline tickets for men who February 9, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. for the uprising in Syria. Al-Zawahiri would eventually go to Somalia.” – AP, drone strike killed Badur Mansoor, a top urged Muslims in Lebanon, Jordan, February 7 Pakistani Taliban commander who was Turkey and Iraq to join the uprising also reportedly serving as an al-Qa`ida against President Bashar al-Assad’s February 6, 2012 (YEMEN): Three operative. The attack occurred in North “pernicious, cancerous regime.” – Voice suspected al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Waziristan Agency of the Federally of America, February 12 Peninsula militants escaped from a Administered Tribal Areas. – Los Angeles prison in southern Abyan Province. Times, February 9 February 13, 2012 (UNITED KINGDOM): – Yemen Post, February 7 Abu Qatada, who at one time was February 10, 2012 (UNITED STATES): allegedly al-Qa`ida’s senior operative in February 7, 2012 (NIGERIA): A Federal prosecutors in the United Europe, was released on bail from a high suicide bomber reportedly detonated States released new details about security British prison. The European an explosives-laden vehicle outside a the Christmas Day terrorist plot in Court of Human Rights told the United military barracks near the northern 2009, alleging that Yemeni-American Kingdom to release Qatada because city of Kaduna. A spokesman for Boko cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi directed and he had not been charged with a crime. Haram claimed responsibility. The approved it. “Awlaki’s last instructions The British government, however, spokesman also claimed credit for an to him [Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab] cannot deport Abu Qatada to his native attempted attack on an air force base. were to wait until the airplane was over Jordan because the court believes that – Global Post, February 8; BBC, February 8 the United States and then to take the the Jordanian government will torture plane down,” the court papers said. Al- him for information. He will be kept in February 8, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. `Awlaqi was killed by a U.S. drone in virtual house arrest. – NBC News, February drone strike killed 10 Pakistani Taliban Yemen in 2011. – Reuters, February 10 13; New York Daily News, February 13 militants in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal February 10, 2012 (UNITED STATES): A February 13, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Areas. – Los Angeles Times, February 9 federal judge sentenced Mohammed Wali The Taliban announced that Mullah Zazi to four and a half years in prison on Obaidullah Akhund, one of their top February 8, 2012 (SOMALIA): A suicide charges that he obstructed a terrorism officials, died in a Pakistani prison bomber detonated an explosives- investigation and intentionally misled almost two years ago. According to the laden vehicle near the popular Hotel authorities. Mohammed Wali Zazi is the Los Angeles Times, Mullah Akhund, who Muna in Mogadishu, killing at least 15 father of Najibullah Zazi, the convicted died in March 2010, “had been a senior people. Officials blamed al-Shabab for would-be suicide bomber who plotted lieutenant of Mullah Mohammed Omar, the attack. – RTTNews, February 8; Voice of to detonate explosives in New York City the movement’s supreme commander, America, February 8 subways. – CNN, February 10 and served as the Taliban defense minister during their reign over February 9, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida February 10, 2012 (SYRIA): Suicide Afghanistan in the 1990s. He was also leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released a bombers in two explosives-laden one of Osama bin Laden’s main allies new statement saying that the Somali- vehicles targeted security compounds within the Taliban during the time based group al-Shabab has officially in Aleppo, killing 28 people. According when the two organizations were closely joined al-Qa`ida. – Voice of America, to the Associated Press, “The morning linked.” – Los Angeles Times, February 13 February 9 blasts in Aleppo, Syria’s most populous city, ripped apart the facades of the February 13, 2012 (SOMALIA): Al- February 9, 2012 (UNITED KINGDOM): local headquarters of the Military Shabab insurgents held rallies across A British judge sentenced nine men, Intelligence Directorate and a barracks Somalia to celebrate their acceptance all British Muslims, to prison for their of the Security Preservation forces. into al-Qa`ida. Al-Qa`ida chief Ayman involvement in al-Qa`ida-inspired plots At the Directorate, windows were al-Zawahiri announced the merger of to bomb the London Stock Exchange, as shattered and a large crater was torn the two groups on February 9. – AFP, well as to establish a terrorist training into the pavement outside the entrance… February 13 camp. The prosecution said that Security officials said suicide bombers although the men were not members in explosives-packed vehicles tried to of al-Qa`ida, they were inspired by the smash through the entrances of both

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February 14, 2012 (THAILAND): An February 16, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Two engage in direct talks with the Afghan Iranian man blew off both his legs in a U.S. drone strikes targeted militants government,” Karzai said in a statement. failed bombing in Bangkok. According in North Waziristan Agency of the – AFP, February 21 to ABC News, “an Iranian named Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Saeid Moradi was in a rented house in Approximately 13 militants were killed. February 23, 2012 (IRAQ): A wave of downtown Bangkok when a cache of – Dawn, February 16 attacks targeting mostly Shi`a Muslims explosives detonated, apparently by killed at least 55 people. The attacks hit accident, taking off a section of the roof. February 16, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A six different provinces. The al-Qa`ida- Thai police say that Moradi, wounded suicide bomber targeted a police vehicle linked Islamic State of Iraq claimed by the explosion, tried to flag down a in Peshawar, injuring five policemen. responsibility. – Voice of America, February cab on the street.” After the cab driver – The Nation, February 16 23; New York Post, February 23; AP, February 24 refused to take Moradi, he “allegedly threw a grenade at the taxi, injuring February 17, 2012 (UNITED STATES): February 23, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A car the driver, and started running. When The Federal Bureau of Investigation bomb tore through a bus station in he tried to hurl a second grenade at arrested Amine El Khalifi, a Moroccan, Peshawar, killing 13 people. – Dawn, police, the bomb bounced off a tree. It after he attempted to bomb the U.S. February 24 exploded near Moradi and took off his Capitol in Washington, D.C. The man, legs.” Authorities are investigating why however, never posed a danger as he February 23, 2012 (NIGERIA): Nigeria’s the Iranian man had explosives in his was carefully monitored by authorities military chief claimed that the Islamist house. – ABC News, February 14 as part of an undercover sting operation. sect Boko Haram has ties to al-Qa`ida He was arrested in a parking lot near in the Islamic Maghreb. His statement February 14, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide the Capitol wearing what he thought marked the first time a top security bomber detonated his explosives in was an explosives vest, as well as a official in Nigeria linked the group to front of a Yemeni election committee MAC-10 gun that authorities rendered al-Qa`ida. – AFP, February 23 office in Aden. The bomber was the only inoperative. El Khalifi had been living casualty. – Reuters, February 14 in Alexandria, Virginia, and was February 24, 2012 (IRAQ): Al-Qa`ida in unemployed, according to officials. Iraq released a statement warning that February 15, 2012 (UNITED STATES): – Chicago Tribune, February 17; New York Times, a coming war between Sunni and Shi`a A U.S. judge sentenced Umar Farouk February 17 Muslims in Iraq was inevitable. – AP, Abdulmutallab, who tried to down a February 24 U.S. aircraft on Christmas Day 2009, February 17, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A to multiple life sentences. According to suicide bomber killed at least 26 February 24, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Agence France-Presse, “Abdulmutallab people outside a mosque in a Shi`a Taliban suicide bombers attacked a showed no emotion as Judge Nancy neighborhood in Kurram Agency of the police station in Peshawar, killing four Edmunds handed down the maximum Federally Administered Tribal Areas. officers. – AP, February 24 sentences for the eight counts to which – Reuters, February 17 he pleaded guilty in October [2011], February 25, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): which amount to four consecutive life February 17, 2012 (SOMALIA): A car A gunman shot to death two U.S. sentences and an additional 50 years bomb tore through a police compound military advisers inside a heavily behind bars.” – AFP, February 15 in Mogadishu, destroying part of the guarded ministry building in Kabul. facility’s perimeter wall. Two people According to one press report, “The February 16, 2012 (SYRIA): U.S. were wounded. – AFP, February 18 Taliban claimed responsibility for the Director of National Intelligence James Interior Ministry attack, saying it was Clapper said that the recent terrorist February 19, 2012 (IRAQ): A suicide retaliation for the Quran burnings, bombings in Damascus and Aleppo bomber in a vehicle detonated explosives after the U.S. officers—a lieutenant “had all the earmarks of an Al-Qaeda- outside a police academy in Baghdad, colonel and a major—were found dead like attack…And so we believe Al- killing 15 people. Most of the victims on the floor of an office that only people Qaeda in Iraq is extending its reach into were reportedly students applying to who know a numerical combination can Syria.” He added, “Another disturbing join the police force. – AFP, February 19 enter, Afghan and Western officials phenomenon that we’ve seen recently, said.” – Seattle Times, February 25 apparently, is the presence of extremists February 20, 2012 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida who have infiltrated the [Syrian] in the Arabian Peninsula announced February 25, 2012 (PAKISTAN): opposition groups. The opposition that a senior member of the group, Tariq Pakistani authorities began to demolish groups in many cases may not be aware al-Dahab, died in a bloody family feud. the house in Abbottabad that served as that they’re there.” – AFP, February 16 – AP, February 20 the home for al-Qa`ida chief Usama bin Ladin until he was killed there by U.S. February 16, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A February 21, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): forces. – ABC News, February 27 suicide bomber attacked Pakistani Afghan President Hamid Karzai invited volunteers part of a pro-government the Taliban for direct talks with his February 25, 2012 (YEMEN): Hours after militia in Upper Dir District of Khyber government. “In order to realise the the newly-elected Yemeni president Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing one objectives of the peace process, I was sworn in, a suicide bomber drove a person. – Dawn, February 16 invite the leadership of the Taliban to vehicle into the gates of a presidential

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palace in the port city of Mukalla, CTC Sentinel Staff killing at least 26 people. Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula claimed Editor-in-Chief responsibility. – Reuters, February 25; CNN, Erich Marquardt February 29 Senior Editor, CTC February 26, 2012 (UNITED STATES): Editorial Board U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. warned against arming rebels in Syria. Department Head “We really don’t know who it is that Department of Social Sciences (West Point) would be armed,” she told reporters. “Are we supporting Al-Qaeda in COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Syria? Hamas is now supporting the Deputy Department Head opposition. Are we supporting Hamas Department of Social Sciences (West Point) in Syria?” Clinton contrasted the situation in Syria with Libya, saying, LTC Liam Collins “This is not Libya, where you had a base Executive Director, CTC of operations in Benghazi, where you had people who were representing the entire opposition.” – AFP, February 26

February 26, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Eight U.S. soldiers were wounded during a violent protest outside a U.S. forward operating base in Kunduz Province. The Contact soldiers were injured after a protestor Combating Terrorism Center reportedly threw a grenade into the U.S. Military Academy compound. – NBC News, February 26 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 February 26, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suicide Phone: (845) 667-6383 bomber in a vehicle detonated explosives Email: [email protected] outside a church in the central city Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ of Jos, killing at least three people. Boko Haram claimed responsibility. * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 According to the BBC, “The bombing sparked a riot by Christian youths, with reports that at least two Muslims were killed in the violence.” – Australian Broadcasting Corporation, February 27; BBC, February 26 support The Combating Terrorism Center would February 27, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): like to express its gratitude to its financial A suicide bomber in a vehicle killed at supporters, for without their support and least nine people at Jalalabad airport in shared vision of the Center products like the eastern Afghanistan. The airport also CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you serves as a forward operating base. The are interested in learning more about how Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility. to support the Combating Terrorism Center, – BBC, February 27; Guardian, February 27 please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association February 28, 2012 (PAKISTAN): of Graduates at 845-446-1561. Gunmen disguised in military fatigues forced 18 Shi`a Muslim men off buses in Kohistan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. The men were then executed. – AFP, February 27

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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