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THE JIHAD Different Areas of Research The Strategic Studies Group (GEES) is the oldest private and independent think- tank of Spain. Since 1987 has produced assessments and analysis and has advised different corporations, governments and media outlets inside as well beyond Spain. The reports, analysis, articles and events are prepared by specialists from THE JIHAD different areas of research. During the more than 30 years of existence, the Strategic Studies Group (GEES) has become an indispensable reference within the world of liberal-conservative ideas, specially in issues related to security and defense. The Strategic Studies AGAINST SPAIN Group (GEES) and its members are active members in several international initiatives and networks of think-tanks across the world, being considered globally as the most influential conservative center in Spain. ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND FUTURE VISIT THE STRATEGIC STUDIES GROUP: OF THE ISLAMIST THREAT http://www.gees.org ON SOCIAL NETWORKS: https://www.facebook.com/grupoGEES Strategic Studies Group https://twitter.com/grupogees © 2018 GEES – Strategic Studies Group ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE ISLAMIST THREAT THE JIHAD AGAINST SPAIN SPAIN AGAINST THE JIHAD The Jihad AGAINST SPAIN ORIGIN, EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE ISLAMIST THREAT Strategic Studies Group GEES TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE BY IGNACIO COSIDÓ ........................................................................ 5 PRESENTATION ..................................................................................................... 9 1. EUROPE’S FIGHT AGAINST ISLAMIST TERROR .......................................... 11 1. BACKGROUND....................................................................................................... 12 1.1. The islamic roots of the threat to Europe............................................................... 12 1.2. The political history of the threat to Europe.......................................................... 16 2. JIHAD COMES TO EUROPE................................................................................ 19 2.1. The establishment of europe’s jihadi networks ..................................................... 19 2.2. Islamist violence turns on Europe - The ‘Al-Qaeda Era’ 2000-2012 .......................................................................................................... 22 2.3. More Dangerous Than Ever - The Islamic State Era And The Threat Europe Faces Today ............................................................................. 27 3. EUROPE’S RESPONSE TO THE THREAT FROM RADICAL ISLAM............ 31 3.1. Europe’s challenge in conceiving the threat it faces.............................................. 31 3.2. Europe’s challenge in implementing effective counter-terrorism policies....................................................................................... 35 2. SPAIN: HISTORY, EVOLUTION, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF JIHADISM IN SPAIN................................................................................................................... 37 1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 38 2. ORIGINS OF JIHADISM IN SPAIN: FROM 1995 UNTIL MARCH 11........... 40 2.1. Algerian networks in spain...................................................................................... 40 2.2. Al-Qaeda central and Spain..................................................................................... 42 2.3. Terrorist Plots Against Spanish Interests ............................................................... 43 3. EVOLUTION OF JIHADISM FROM MARCH 2004 TO DECEMBER 2013... 45 3.1. Algerian networks after March 11 .......................................................................... 46 3.2. “Iraqi” networks on spanish soil ............................................................................ 47 3.3. Non-linked actors: independent cells and “Lone Wolves”................................... 49 4. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 50 3. THE THREAT OF THE ISLAMIC STATE FOR OUR COUNTRY................... 53 1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 53 2. A PANORAMIC VIEW OF WHY SPAIN IS AN OBJECTIVE FOR ISIS JIHADIS .................................................................................................................... 55 3. NETWORKS AND INDIVIDUALS LINKED TO SYRIAN CONFLICT.......... 57 3.1. Jihadi militancy via internet.................................................................................... 62 4. THE DIMENSION OF THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING.. 66 5. TERRORIST PLOTS AND ATTACKS AGAINST SPAIN.................................. 67 5.1. The importance of Spain as origin and destination for Jihadis .................................................................................................................. 70 5.2. Spain’s geographical situation.................................................................................. 72 6. CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................... 74 4. THE JIHADIST THREAT IN THE MAGREB AND THE SAHEL ................... 75 1. INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 75 2. THE JIHADIST THREAT IN EGYPT AND THE MAGHREB.......................... 75 2.1. Egypt .......................................................................................................................... 76 2.2. The Maghreb and Algeria ........................................................................................ 77 2.3. The Maghreb and Tunisia........................................................................................ 80 2.4 The Maghreb: Libya.................................................................................................. 83 2.5. Morocco..................................................................................................................... 85 3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SAHEL THREAT .................................................. 87 3.1. Mali and Mauritania................................................................................................. 88 3.2. Nigeria ....................................................................................................................... 91 3.3. Niger........................................................................................................................... 91 4. OBSTACLES TO DEFEAT THE SALAFI-JIHADIST THREAT ....................... 92 CONCLUSION: AND NOW WHAT? WE CAN AND WE MUST DEFEAT ISLAMISM .............................................................................................. 95 PREFACE BY IGNACIO COSIDÓ Europe has become one of the main strategic objectives of jihadist terrorism. The brutal attacks in Paris, London, Brussels, Berlin, or Barcelona, part of a long list of minor attacks, clearly show the interest of Islamists to hit Europe. The threat of jihadism in Europe responds to a double reason: The strategic interest of terrorists in our continent and the vulnerability to these attacks shown so far by the European Union. On the one hand, Europe is identified as a sum of democracies opposed by definition to totalitarianism on which the criminal dreams of building a universal caliphate rest. To the extent that several European countries are also involved in the fight against Islamist forces, from Syria to Afghanistan and the Sahel, Europe as a whole has become an enemy to beat. On the other hand, together with the security deficits that the European Union has demonstrated, the presence in Europe of a large Muslim com- munity in clear expansion in our territory in which radicalization networks have taken root in sev- eral countries, turn the Old Continent into a field conducive to battle. We are also facing a threat not only in the long term, but it also seems set to increase in the near fu- ture. The successive defeats of the self-styled Islamic State in both Syria and Iraq have paradoxically made Europe more valuable strategically and have freed resources to attack targets in our territory. In this sense, it is especially disturbing the specter of the possible return of foreign terrorists who left European territory to fight in that theater dan who can now try to return to Europe with combat experience and even greater fanaticism. Their capacity for action, but, above all, influence and re- cruitment among young Muslims living in Europe, must be closely monitored and pursued. Terrorism will therefore remain the main threat to security in Europe in the coming decades. The report that you have in your hands will undoubtedly contribute to a better understanding of the nature of this threat, its real dimension, and also some necessary reforms to tackle it more effec- tively. It is important to have a clear perception of the threat to know what we are really facing. We Euro- peans have avoided for a long time any term that links this terrorism with Islamism or jihadism. We preferred to talk about international terrorism or simply about a terrorist threat.This GEES re- port specifically stresses the ideological-political dimension of this terrorism because it is an essential factor for developing a strategy to combat it. Second, it highlights the complexity and multiple dimensions of this threat. For many years we fo- cused our objective on defeating
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