Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY research organization providing POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY objective analysis and effective SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY solutions that address the challenges SUBSTANCE ABUSE facing the public and private sectors TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY around the world. TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Homeland Security View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk, Melanie Sisson Prepared for the Department of Homeland Security This research was sponsored by the United States Department of Homeland Security and was conducted under the auspices of the Homeland Security Program within RAND Infrastucture, Safety, and Environment. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Libicki, Martin C. Exploring terrorist targeting preferences / Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk, Melanie Sisson. p. cm. “MG-483.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3913-X (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—United States—Prevention. I. Chalk, Peter. II. Sisson, Melanie. III. Title. HV6432.L53 2007 363.325—dc22 2006011784 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Stephen Bloodsworth © Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface Each year, federal, state, and local governments spend billions of dol- lars protecting the United States against acts of terrorism, with human, military, and capital resources allocated in ways that reflect each poten- tial target’s value and vulnerability. Yet those buildings, institutions, and icons that the United States perceives as being of utmost value may not be those that its potential attackers perceives that way. That one potential attack may hurt the United States more than another does not mean that terrorists believe that the first would advance their goals any more than would the second. The goal of this investigation is to assess on what basis al Qaeda would select targets within the United States. Four hypotheses have been considered. The coercion hypothesis posits that acts of terrorism would be designed to cause pain and thereby influence U.S. foreign policy. The damage hypothesis posits that they are designed to hurt the U.S. economy and thereby reduce the means available to support U.S. foreign policy. The rally hypothesis posits that such acts are meant to rally support in the Muslim world. The franchise hypothesis assumes that al Qaeda has limits on its ability to direct terrorist acts and, instead, supports such acts carried out by like-minded terrorists. This study tested these hypotheses by examining major terrorist events (associated with al Qaeda) over the last dozen years, looking at al Qaeda writings, and soliciting the informed judgment of experts. This study was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of Comparative Studies. iii iv Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences The information presented here should be of interest to homeland security policymakers and members of the intelligence community who focus on terrorism. This monograph is one of two under the study “Understanding Terrorist Motives, Targets, and Responses,” with Martin Libicki as principal investigator. The RAND Homeland Security Program This research was conducted under the auspices of the Homeland Security Program within RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environ- ment (ISE). The mission of RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Envi- ronment is to improve the development, operation, use, and protec- tion of society’s essential physical assets and natural resources and to enhance the related social assets of safety and security of individuals in transit and in their workplaces and communities. Homeland Secu- rity Program research supports the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies charged with preventing and mitigating the effects of terrorist activity within U.S. borders. Projects address critical infra- structure protection, emergency management, terrorism risk man- agement, border control, first responders and preparedness, domestic threat assessments, domestic intelligence, and workforce and training. Questions or comments about this monograph should be sent to the project leader, Martin Libicki ([email protected]). Infor- mation about the Homeland Security Program is available online (http://www.rand.org/ise/security/). Inquiries about homeland security research projects should be sent to the following address: Michael Wermuth, Director Homeland Security Program, ISE RAND Corporation 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington, VA 22202-5050 703-413-1100, x 5414 [email protected] Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments .............................................................. xix Glossary .......................................................................... xxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO What Drives al Qaeda’s Choice of Targets? .................................. 5 The al Qaeda Targeting Process: Four Hypotheses ............................ 8 The Coercion Hypothesis ....................................................... 9 The Damage Hypothesis .......................................................11 The Rally Hypothesis...........................................................12 The Franchise Hypothesis......................................................14 Some Observations on Rationality..............................................18 Alternatives to Rational Action..................................................19 Organization.......................................................................21 CHAPTER THREE Hypothesis Testing: Quantitative and Qualitative Measures .......... 24 Measuring Intent................................................................. 24 v vi Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences Quantitative Measures .........................................................25 Qualitative Measures ...........................................................25 Modeling Intent .................................................................. 26 Coercion ........................................................................ 26 Damage ..........................................................................29 Rally ............................................................................. 30 Franchise .........................................................................31 Testing Hypotheses Against Past Attacks ......................................32 World Trade Center (WTC), New York, 1993............................. 34 Khobar Towers, Riyadh, 1996 ................................................35 East Africa Embassy Bombings, Nairobi and Dar Es Salam, 1998...... 36 USS Cole, Yemen, 2000 ........................................................37 WTC, New York, and Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia, 2001 ..............37 Bali, 2002 ........................................................................39 Djerba, 2002 ................................................................... 40 MV Limburg, Yemen, 2002................................................... 40 Mombasa, 2002 .................................................................41
Recommended publications
  • Combating Islamic Extremist Terrorism 1
    CGT 1/22/07 11:30 AM Page 1 Combating Islamic Extremist Terrorism 1 OVERALL GRADE D+ Al-Qaeda headquarters C+ Al-Qaeda affiliated groups C– Al-Qaeda seeded groups D+ Al-Qaeda inspired groups D Sympathizers D– 1 CGT 1/22/07 11:30 AM Page 2 2 COMBATING ISLAMIC EXTREMIST TERRORISM ive years after the September 11 attacks, is the United States win- ning or losing the global “war on terror”? Depending on the prism through which one views the conflict or the metrics used Fto gauge success, the answers to the question are starkly different. The fact that the American homeland has not suffered another attack since 9/11 certainly amounts to a major achievement. U.S. military and security forces have dealt al-Qaeda a severe blow, cap- turing or killing roughly three-quarters of its pre-9/11 leadership and denying the terrorist group uncontested sanctuary in Afghanistan. The United States and its allies have also thwarted numerous terror- ist plots around the world—most recently a plan by British Muslims to simultaneously blow up as many as ten jetliners bound for major American cities. Now adjust the prism. To date, al-Qaeda’s top leaders have sur- vived the superpower’s most punishing blows, adding to the near- mythical status they enjoy among Islamic extremists. The terrorism they inspire has continued apace in a deadly cadence of attacks, from Bali and Istanbul to Madrid, London, and Mumbai. Even discount- ing the violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the tempo of terrorist attacks—the coin of the realm in the jihadi enterprise—is actually greater today than before 9/11.
    [Show full text]
  • Weathering Morocco's Syria Returnees | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2148 Weathering Morocco's Syria Returnees by Vish Sakthivel Sep 25, 2013 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Vish Sakthivel Vish Sakthivel was a 2013-14 Next Generation Fellow at The Washington Institute. Brief Analysis The Moroccan government should be encouraged to adopt policies that preempt citizens from joining the Syrian jihad and deradicalize eventual returnees. ast week, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a video titled "Morocco: The Kingdom of Corruption L and Tyranny." In addition to pushing young Moroccans to join the jihad, the video inveighs against King Muhammad VI -- one of several public communiques in what appears to be an escalating campaign against the ruler. The timing of the video could not be more unsettling. A week before its release, against the backdrop of an increasingly insecure Sahel region, the government arrested several jihadist operatives in the northern cities of Fes, Meknes, and Taounate and the southern coastal town of Tiznit. Meanwhile, Moroccan fighters are traveling to Syria in greater numbers and forming their own jihadist groups, raising concerns about what they might do once they return home. VIDEO AND RESPONSE T he video released by al-Andalus, AQIM's media network, begins by outlining the king's alleged profiteering and corruption, citing WikiLeaks and the nonfiction book Le Roi Predateur by Catherine Graciet and Eric Laurent. It then moves to the king's close friends Mounir Majidi and Fouad Ali el-Himma, accusing them of perpetuating monopolies and patronage networks that impoverish the country while allowing the king to become one of world's richest monarchs.
    [Show full text]
  • MOROCCO: Human Rights at a Crossroads
    Human Rights Watch October 2004 Vol. 16, No. 6(E) MOROCCO: Human Rights at a Crossroads I. SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ 1 II. RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................................................... 4 To the Government of Morocco ........................................................................................... 4 To the Equity and Reconciliation Commission ................................................................... 6 To the United Nations............................................................................................................. 7 To the U.S. Government.........................................................................................................8 To the European Union and its member states................................................................... 8 To the Arab League.................................................................................................................. 9 III. INTRODUCTION: ADDRESSING PAST ABUSES................................................... 9 The Equity and Reconciliation Commission......................................................................14 Limits of the New Commission ...........................................................................................16 2003 Report of the Advisory Council for Human Rights ................................................23 IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER THE
    [Show full text]
  • Disguised Terrorism Versus Political and Economic Failures- Which Diagnosis Do We Need to Recognize? 205 Countries in Two Decades of Analysis
    International Journal of Economics and Finance; Vol. 13, No. 2; 2021 ISSN 1916-971X E-ISSN 1916-9728 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education Disguised Terrorism Versus Political and Economic Failures- Which Diagnosis Do We Need to Recognize? 205 Countries in Two Decades of Analysis Amr Saleh1 & Nader Alber2 1 Associate Professor of Economics Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt 2 Professor of Finance, Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt Corresponding Author: Nader Alber, Associate Professor of Economics Ain Shams University, Cairo, Egypt. E-mail: [email protected] Received: November 30, 2020 Accepted: December 26, 2020 Online Published: January 20, 2021 doi:10.5539/ijef.v13n2p35 URL: https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v13n2p35 Abstract Identifying the causes of terrorism has been a goal of researchers for decades. The evidences and implications of terrorism are both extremely ambiguous, but also poignant. Dealing with terrorism has become the centerpiece of political debates for years. Despite of that, it has always been followed by the similar and identical uncompromising and intransigent security measures in different parts of the world, even if the reasons behind the acts combine many and different types of human sides, including political, social, security, psychological, cultural, and religious dimensions. There are lots of tremendous feelings, not only for the victims but also for the assailants that believe in their unprejudiced acts and are continuously able to justify their significance of the use of violence. That is why the paper started by introducing the subject to the reader, including the terms related to the phenomena, but also introducing the idea that there is an economic cost associated with this phenomenon.
    [Show full text]
  • Extremism and Terrorism
    Morocco: Extremism and Terrorism On November 14, 2020, the Polisario Front, a pro-independence group in the Western Sahara, declared war on Morocco, ending a ceasefire that has been in place for over three decades. The declaration of war came one day after Morocco launched a military operation in the U.N.-patrolled buffer zone as the Polisario Front allegedly blocked access to Mauritania, Morocco’s neighboring country, preventing the transfer of goods and people between the two countries. About a month later on December 10, 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Morocco agreed to establish full diplomatic relations, including formalizing economic ties, with Israel. The move is a part of a deal that includes U.S. recognition of the disputed territory of Western Sahara as part of Morocco. Morocco joins Bahrain, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates in normalizing diplomatic ties with Jerusalem. (Sources: Axios, New York Times, New York Times) On October 6, 2020, Moroccan authorities arrested four men allegedly linked to ISIS in Tangiers. According to the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ), the four suspects planned to “destabilize security in the kingdom,” by carrying out attacks similar to ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Similar raids were carried out by Moroccan authorities on September 11 in Rabat and July 7 in Nador, northeastern Morocco. The suspects in each raid were allegedly linked to ISIS and sought to carry out terror attacks against prominent figures and sensitive sites in the Kingdom. (Sources: Associated Press, Defense Post, Defense Post) On December 17, 2018, Moroccan authorities discovered the decapitated bodies of two female Scandinavian tourists at a campsite near Mount Toubkal.
    [Show full text]
  • Ifjf'k”V(Appendix)
    ifjf’k”V(Appendix) TERRORIST KILLED BY UNITED STATE OF AMERICA Killed in 2004: Nek Mohammed A senior Taliban commander in South Waziristan who had links to Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar. Date killed: June 18, 2004 Killed in 2005: Abu Hamza Rabia Al Qaeda's operational commander. He was involved with two assassination plots against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Date killed: December 1, 2005 Haitham al Yemeni A senior al Qaeda's explosives expert who also is thought to have been close to Osama bin Laden and Abu Faraj al Libi. Date killed: May 15, 2005 Killed in 2006: LiaquatHussain Second-in-command of the Bajaur TNSM. Date killed: October 30, 2006 Imam Asad Camp commander for the Black Guard, al Qaeda's elite bodyguard for Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. Asad was a Chechen with close links to ShamilBasayev. Date killed: March 1, 2006 Killed in 2007: No senior al Qaeda or Taliban leaders or operatives were reported killed during the strikes in 2007. 187 Killed in 2008: Abu Zubair al Masri Served as an explosives expert for al Qaeda as well as a leader. Date killed: November 21, 2008 Abdullah Azzam al Saudi Served as liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest. Azzam facilitated al Qaeda's external operations network. He also served as a recruiter and trainer for al Qaeda. Date killed: November 19, 2008 Abu Jihad al Masri The leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group and the chief of al Qaeda's intelligence branch, and directed al Qaeda's intelligence shura.
    [Show full text]
  • Domestic Terrorism in Africa
    DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN AFRICA: DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN AFRICA: DEFINING, ADDRESSING AND UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN SECURITY DEFINING, ADDRESSING AND UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN SECURITY Terrorism Studies & Research Program ISS Head Offi ce Block D, Brooklyn Court, VealVeale Street New Muckleneuk,, PrPretoria Tel: (27-12) 346 9500 Fax:Fa (27-12) 346 9570 E-mail: iss@[email protected] ISS AdAddis Ababa Offi ce FirsFirst Floor, Ki-Ab Building, Alexander Pushkin Street, Pushkin Square, Addis Ababa Tell:(: (251-1111)3) 37272-1154/5/6 Fax:(: (251-1111)3) 372 5954 E-mail: addisababa@is@ safrica.orgg ISS Cape Town Offi ce 67 Roeland Square, Drury Lane Gardens Cape Town 8001 South Africa TTel:(: (27-27 21) 46171 7211 Fax: (27-2121)4) 461 7213 E-mail: [email protected] ISS Nairobi Offi ce 5h5th Flloooor, LanddmarkPk Pllaza Argwings Kodhekek RRoad, Nairobi, Kenya Tel: (254 -20) 300 5726/8 FaxFax: (254-20) 271 2902 E-mail: [email protected] ISS Pretoria Offi ce Block C, Brooklyn Court, Veale Street New Muckleneuk, Pretoria Tel: (27-12) 346 9500 Fax: (27-12) 460 0998 Edited by Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha E-mail: [email protected] Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha www.issafrica.org 5 and 6 November 2007 This publication was made possible through funding provided by the ISBN 978-1-920114-80-0 Norwegian Government. In addition, general Institute funding is provided by the Governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. 9 781920 114800 Terrorism Studies & Research Program As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy, collaborative security and gender mainstreaming.
    [Show full text]
  • Morocco Page 1 of 14
    Morocco Page 1 of 14 Facing the Threat Posed by Iranian Regime | Daily Press Briefing | Other News... Morocco Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005 Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor March 8, 2006 Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and a population of approximately 30 million. Ultimate authority rests with King Mohammed VI, who presides over the Council of Ministers, appoints or approves members of the government, and may, at his discretion, terminate the tenure of any minister, dissolve the parliament, call for new elections, and rule by decree. In the bicameral legislature, the lower house may dissolve the government through a vote of no confidence. The 2002 parliamentary elections for the lower house were widely regarded as free, fair, and transparent. The 2003 elections for local government councils were recognized as well- administered. In the latter elections, the government limited the participation of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD), one of the 27 political parties in the country. The civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces. There was progress in the implementation of the Moudawana (Family Status Code); the work of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER); and the suppression of sex tourism during the year; nevertheless, the human rights record remained poor in many areas. Human rights organizations and the Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro), an organization seeking independence for the western Sahara, accused the government of excessive force in Laayoune and Dakhla (Western Sahara) against demonstrators in May and in the fall and criticized the subsequent trials and harsh sentences given demonstrators.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessing Asymmetry in International Politics: Us-South Africa Relations: 1994-2008
    ASSESSING ASYMMETRY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: US-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS: 1994-2008 by SCOTT THOMAS FIRSING submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY in the subject INTERNATIONAL POLITICS at the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA SUPERVISOR: DR T HOEANE CO-SUPERVISOR: MS J K VAN WYK NOVEMBER 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures and Tables…………………………………………………………………………..9 List of Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………......10 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THIS THESIS 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..13 2. Literature review……………………………………………………………………………......14 3. Purpose and objectives……………………………………………………………………….....16 4. Approaches and methodology…………………………………………………………………..16 5. Scope and limitations of the thesis……………………………………………………………...18 6. Contribution of study…………………………………………………………………………....20 7. Research questions and structure of study….……………………………………………...........21 CHAPTER TWO: OVERVIEW OF ASYMMETRY THEORY 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………...26 2. Asymmetry theory.........................................................................................................................26 3. Strong versus the weak…………………………………………………………………………..29 4. Inattention and overattention…………………………………………………………………….31 5. Deference, autonomy and misperception……………………………………………………......33 6. Managing the asymmetric relationship…………………………………………………………37 6.1 Routinization…………………………………………………………………………………...37 6.2 Diplomatic ritual……………………………………………………………………………….38 6.3 Neutralization………………………………………………………………………………......39
    [Show full text]
  • The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign Against Al Qaeda Central
    The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central. A Case Study Javier Jordán University of Granada (Spain) Preprint version: Javier Jordán, “The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study”, Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 37, No 1 (2014), pp. 4- 29. Abstract This article examines the effects which the drone strike campaign in Pakistan is having on Al Qaeda Central. To that end, it constructs a theoretical model to explain how the campaign is affecting Al Qaeda’s capacity to carry out terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Although the results of one single empirical case cannot be generalised, they nonetheless constitute a preliminary element for the construction of a broader theoretical framework concerning the use of armed drones as part of a counter-terrorism strategy. Key Words: Al Qaeda, Terrorism, Intelligence, Drones, United States, Pakistan. Introduction Although it has tried to repeat its highly lethal attacks, Al Qaeda Central has been unable to strike successfully in the United States since 9/11 or in Western Europe since 7 July 2005 (London bombings). Logically, as with all complex social phenomena, the operational decline of the terrorist organisation is the result of multiple factors. This article focuses on just one: the campaign of drone strikes against Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan, particularly North Waziristan. A fruitful academic debate is taking place at present regarding the effectiveness of High Value Targeting (HVT) campaigns in the fight against terrorist organisations. Based on empirical studies involving relatively large samples, several authors question the effectiveness of such campaigns and even warn that they may be counterproductive.1 Others, however, also use empirical research to show that HVT reduces the effectiveness of terrorist organisations.
    [Show full text]
  • Sentinel Species: the Criminalization of Animal Rights Activists As Terrorists, and What It Means for the Civil Liberties in Trump's America
    Denver Law Review Volume 95 Issue 4 Symposium: Animal Rights Article 5 November 2020 Sentinel Species: The Criminalization of Animal Rights Activists as Terrorists, and What It Means for the Civil Liberties in Trump's America Will Potter Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr Recommended Citation Will Potter, Sentinel Species: The Criminalization of Animal Rights Activists as Terrorists, and What It Means for the Civil Liberties in Trump's America, 95 Denv. L. Rev. 877 (2018). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. SENTINEL SPECIES: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS AS "TERRORISTS," AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TRUMP'S AMERICA WILL POTTERt ABSTRACT The animal rights movement has pioneered new, diverse forms of so- cial activism that have rapidly redefined how we view animals. But those remarkable successes have been met with an increasingly aggressive back- lash, including new terrorism laws, widespread surveillance, experimental prisons, and legislation explicitly criminalizing journalists and whistle- blowers. This Article will explain how, if left unchecked, these attacks on animal advocacy will become a blueprint for the wider criminalization of dissent. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION................................................ 878 I. MEET THE WORLD'S NEWEST TERRORIST .......... ............ 879 II. NUMBER ONE DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT ... .............. 882 III. MOBILIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT ...................... ....... 883 IV. ANIMAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM............. ............... 887 V. FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM: "AG-GAG" LAWS .....
    [Show full text]
  • Digest of Terrorist Cases
    back to navigation page Vienna International Centre, PO Box 500, 1400 Vienna, Austria Tel.: (+43-1) 26060-0, Fax: (+43-1) 26060-5866, www.unodc.org Digest of Terrorist Cases United Nations publication Printed in Austria *0986635*V.09-86635—March 2010—500 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna Digest of Terrorist Cases UNITED NATIONS New York, 2010 This publication is dedicated to victims of terrorist acts worldwide © United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, January 2010. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. This publication has not been formally edited. Publishing production: UNOV/DM/CMS/EPLS/Electronic Publishing Unit. “Terrorists may exploit vulnerabilities and grievances to breed extremism at the local level, but they can quickly connect with others at the international level. Similarly, the struggle against terrorism requires us to share experiences and best practices at the global level.” “The UN system has a vital contribution to make in all the relevant areas— from promoting the rule of law and effective criminal justice systems to ensuring countries have the means to counter the financing of terrorism; from strengthening capacity to prevent nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological materials from falling into the
    [Show full text]