AL-QA'IDA AND THE WAR ON TERRORAFTER THE WAR IN IRAQ By Ely Karmon*

This article provides a detailed analysis of recent developments of the terrorist activities of al- Qa'ida in the Middle East.

This article is part of a paper originally written for a project and conference on "After the Iraq War: Strategic and Political Changes in Europe and the Middle East," co -sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.

It should be stressed that contrary to the alliance cannot be attained unless these impression given by the media and some movements possess an Islamic base in the analysts in the West concerning its so called heart of the Arab region." He notes that diffuse independent networking character, mobilizing and arming the nation will not al-Qa'ida began life and long continued its yield tangible results until a fundamentalist operations with the support of states:1 state is established in the region:

•1980s, phase one: Activity in Pakistan, The establishment of a Muslim state , and the United States. in the heart of the Islamic world is •1990-96, phase two: To work alongside not an easy or close target. the Islamist revolutionary regime in Sudan However, it is the hope of the to export revolution to , , Muslim nation to restore its fallen Saudi Arabia, and Eritrea. caliphate and regain its lost glory… •1996-2001, phase three: Operations from We must not despair of the repeated Afghanistan, as an ally of the Taliban strikes and calamities. We must government. never lay down our arms no matter how much losses or sacrifices we Even today, the organization is "state- endure. Let us start again after every centered" in the sense that its goal is to take strike, even if we had to begin from power in specific Islamic states and scratch. establish a new form of authoritarian government, a caliphate. The significance It is in this framework that we must see of a reliable base in Muslim territory is the concentration of al-Qa'ida 's operational reflected in al-Qa'ida's return to Arab land, efforts on the Iraqi front. At the end of and its attempts to destabilize at least one 2004, the US State Department assessed regime and achieve a new safe haven. that the role of key Islamist groups in Iraq Ayaman al-Zawahiri, bin Ladin's deputy, makes it "the central battleground in the explains the importance of the quest for a global war on terrorism. "3 "fundamentalist base":2 "Victory for the Islamic movements against the world

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Since the demise of the Taliban regime Islamists; or the Indonesian Jemaa and al-Qa'ida "solid base" in Afghanistan Islamiyya (in fact a group led from three phases can be distinguished in the Indonesia by Abu Bakr Bashir but with operational activity of the organization and Malaysian, Philippine, and Singaporean its affiliates and supporters in the Muslim branches striving to form a new regional world: (1) After the demise in Afghanistan, ).5 It seems that only the the strategy of destabilizing Muslim suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia in May countries by attacks against soft targets; (2) 2003 were directly related to al-Qa'ida after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, militants.6 Interestingly, with the concentration on the Iraqi arena against the exception of Saudi Arabia, the economies US army and the coalition forces with the of all these countries or communities hope of a victory on the 1980s Afghanistan (Djerba, Bali, Casablanca, Istanbul, model; (3) since the fall of 2004, an Mombassa) are heavily dependent on extension of the fighting to most of the tourism. Middle East, an increased effort in Europe, The campaign by al-Qa'ida terrorists and but the appearance of the first strategic associates against Arab and Muslim splits in its ranks. regimes may be explained by a shift in the ideological and strategic thinking of those Al-Qa'ida is Weakened after the Demise in Islamists who now occupy the vacuum left Afghanistan by bin Ladin and his deputy. The targeting The goal of the World Islamic Front of the tourist infrastructures calls to mind (WIF) for the Struggle Against Jews and the strategy of the Egyptian jihadist groups Crusaders proclaimed by bin Ladin on in the mid-1990s. One might speculate that February 22, 1998 was to form an this strategy results from the growing international alliance of Sunni Islamist influence of al-Zawahiri, bin Ladin's organizations, groups, and Muslim clerics deputy.7 Yet this is also the result of the sharing a common religious/political decline in al-Qa'ida's operational ideology and a global strategy of Holy capabilities following the quick demise in War (jihad). It was replaced in the spring Afghanistan, the unremitting campaign of of 2002 by a new name, or perhaps harassment against its leaders, and the framework Qa'idat al-Jihad (The Jihad capture or elimination of many of its central Base)--and WIF virtually disappeared. 4 commanders. 8 After the war in Afghanistan and until On February 11, 2003, just before the the Madrid bombings in March 2004, in US-led war in Iraq, bin Ladin distributed spite of bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, and other two audiocassettes. One addressed the Iraqi al-Qa'ida spokes persons' repeated threats people while the other (at 53 minutes his to hit devastatingly at the heart of the longest to date) was directed to Arab United States and the Western world, all governments and clerics. The main focus of successful terrorist attacks have targeted his speech was not the United States, but Muslim countries (and Muslim rather the Arab governments and the communities such as Mombassa, Kenya). Islamic clerics that supported them and Local or regional groups affiliated with al- gave them legitimacy. The conflict with Qa'ida were primarily responsible for these Arab governments was presented as 9 these operations. They include the Salafi eternal and insolvable. factions in Tunisia and ; Yemeni

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Focus on the Iraqi Arena most powerful weapon Muslims had, the Bin Ladin's February 2003 message to best method to continue the conflict with the Iraqi people sought to encourage the ir the "Crusader Enemy." It mentioned that it morale and guide them as to how they was with guerilla warfare the Americans should face and defeat the incoming were defeated in Vietnam and the Soviets American invasion of their country. In an were defeated in Afghanistan, "the method attempt to convince the Iraqis that the that expelled the direct Crusader United States was not invincible, bin Ladin colonialism from most of the Muslim lands, explained how he and his followers, with Algeria the most well known."13 numbering only about 300, had frustrated Despite American warnings Damascus the American action against them at Tora permitted the passage of thousands Bora in Afghanistan. He stressed the volunteers, many of them Syrians, wishing importance of the Iraqi people fighting to join the Iraqis in their war against the united against the Americans, irrespective Americans. It started with a few dozen of whether they were Arabs or non-Arabs volunteers, mostly from the Palestinian (Kurds), Sunnis, or Shi'a.10 Religious refugee camps in Lebanon. This went on scholars from the Islamic Research until a missile from an American plane hit Academy at Egypt's al-Azhar university one of the buses of volunteers in Iraq, also declared on March 10, 2003 that a US killing five passengers. 14 attack on Iraq would require Arabs and Thus, the scenario for the insurgency Muslims to wage a jihad in Iraq's defense and terrorist campaign in Iraq was built against "a new crusade that targets its land, already in the weeks and possibly the honor, creed, and homeland. "11 months before the war, involving an At the height of the war, Iraqi Vice "objective" coalition of ex-Ba'thists and President Taha Yassin Ramadan declared army and intelligence officers, Iraqi Sunni that Saddam Hussein's government was Islamists delivered from Saddam's yoke, ready to meet the overwhelming military Muslim volunteers from Arab and superiority of the United States by resorting European countries, and with the tacit to widespread suicide attacks against support of Syria and probably Iran. Americans and British troops "and all who Due to some major American strategic support them," both inside Iraq and errors and in spite of the swift and stunning elsewhere in the Arab world. At a news US military campaign in Iraq, this scenario conference on March 29, 2003 he claimed developed into "a continuum of violence that the Iraqi soldier who killed four and uncertainty”: the lack of a quick Iraqi Americans in a outside the political alternative to the Saddam regime holy city of Najaf was the first in a wave of (contrary to what happened in Iraqis and other Arab volunteers ready to Afghanistan), the disbanding of the regular become "martyrs." Arabs outside Iraq, he army and police forces, and the lack of a said, should help "turn every country in the clear planning for the immediate aftermath world into a battlefield. "12 of the war.15 In the words of a known Upon the fall of Baghdad, al-Nida, al- American military analyst, "the US chose a Qa'ida's website posted a series of articles strategy whose post-conflict goals were which stated that guerilla warfare was the unrealistic and impossible to achieve, and

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Ely Karmon only planned for the war it wanted to fight the problems in establishing a legitimate and not for the "peace " that was certain to government and national forces.18 follow."16 Although from the beginning of the war A short description of the Iraqi and its immediate aftermath many Islamist insurgency is necessary in order to groups were involved in the fighting against understand and evaluate its use by al-Qa'ida the US and coalition forces, the Jordanian- and other global jihadist groups in order to Palestinian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi expand the fight to the whole of the Middle was considered to be the most dangerous East and beyond: leader of the most dangerous group connected with al-Qa'ida.19 He was During the summer and fall of 2003, presented by the US and Western Iraqi insurgents emerged as intelligence age ncies as the former director effective forces with significant of a training camp in Afghanistan and a popular support in Arab Sunni close associate of Usama bin Ladin. He was areas, and developed a steadily believed to have escaped to Iraq during the more sophisticated mix of tactics. In US invasion. He was reportedly in Baghdad the process, a native and foreign from May-July 2002 to undergo medical Islamist extremist threat also treatment, while est ablishing a network of developed which deliberately tried approximately two dozen members who to divide Iraq's Sunni Arabs from its moved about freely throughout Baghdad for Arab Shi'ites, Kurds, and other Iraqi over eight months, primarily conducting minorities. By the fall of the 2004, transfers of money and materials. 20 He this had some elements of a low - coordinated terrorist activities in the Middle level civil war, and by June 2005, it East, Western Europe, and Russ ia from his threaten to escalate into a far more base in Iraq, and his connections stretched serious civil conflict.17 as far as Chechnya and the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. Al-Zarqawi was considered to be Iraqi insurgents, terrorists, and the leader of the terrorist group al-Tawhid, extremists exploited the media focus on which first gained public attention in dramatic incidents with high casualties and Germany when a number of its me mbers high publicity. They created "alliances of were arrested in that country in April convenience and informal networks with 2002. 21 Zarqawi was also presented as the other groups to attack the United States, leader of the Arab contingent within Ansar various elements of the Iraqi Interim al- linked to al-Qa'ida plots in Government and elected government, and during the millennium celebration, as well efforts at nation building." Then insurgents as to attempts to spread the biological agent increasingly focused on Iraqi government ricin in London and possibly other places in targets, as well as Iraqi military, police, and Europe. 22 security forces and tried to prevent Sunnis At some point, most likely after the from participating in the new government, occupation of Iraq in April 2003, he split and to cause growing tension and conflict from Ansar al-Islam and created his own between Sunnis and Shi'a, and Arabs and organization, which he called al-Tawheed Kurds. By May 2005, this began to provoke wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad). This Shi'a reprisals, in spite of ef forts to avoid organization first came to world attention this by Shi'a leaders, contributing further to when US citizen Nicholas Berg was

4 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol . 10 , No . 1 ( March 2006 ) Al-Qa'ida and the War on Terror beheaded in April 2004, allegedly by forces and primarily against the officials Zarqawi himself, and the event was and security forces of the new Iraqi videotaped and posted on Islamist websites. government has attracted more and more Al-Tawheed wal-Jihad lacked a solid base groups and volunteers to his ranks. of operation, and therefore the group Although for a long time he was considered decided to use Fallujah as "a safe haven and the representative of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, it a strong shield for the people of Islam--'the was only in December 2004 that his Republic of Al-Zarqawi. '"23 allegiance to bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida The radical Sunni Islamist insurgents, materialized. This was due to growing like those belonging to the Zarqawi group, strategic and tactical disagreements called also "neo-Salafis" or "Takfiries ", between the various leaders of the jihadist believe they are fighting a region-wide war movements. in Iraq to create a Sunni puritan state, a war that extends throughout the world and Expanding in the Middle East, Increased affects all Arab states and all of Islam. Effort in Europe, First Strategic Splits Foreign volunteers are one of the most The disagreements are a result of the dangerous aspects of the insurgency need to achieve at any cost a quick visible involved in the cruelest sectarian terrorist victory in the fight against the US-Western attacks against civilians--mostly suicide coalition and its Arab allies and relate to bombings, kidnappings, and beheadings. three main issues: (1) With the growing Some clerics and Islamic organizations strategic and political status of the Shi'a in recruit young Arabs and men from other Iraq and the potential threat they represent Islamic countries for Islamist extremist in the entire Gulf area, the Shi'a have been organizations and then infiltrate them into designated as the Sunni jihadist movement's Iraq through countries like Syria. There is main enemy. (2) The growing number of the danger that some will probably survive innocent Muslims killed in terrorist attacks and emerge as new cadres of expert due to the increasing violence in Iraq and terrorists building a new generation of Saudi Arabia, have produced negative trained radical young men and jihadists reactions among Arab public opinion and outside the country. 24 the need to delineate tactical "red lines." (3) Zarqawi's group is composed mostly of With the beginning of the terrorist jihadist non-Iraqi Arab volunteers who originate activity in Saudi Arabia in May 2003, there from countries bordering Iraq--Saudi has become a need to define the main Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Syria -- due to struggle front --Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or the ease with which jihadists from these possibly Egypt. The need to score a countries can infiltrate Iraq. According to strategic victory on the Iraqi and Middle some researchers, the multi-national nature Eastern fronts, to attract greater of the two groups could also explain the participation of new young levees in the alliance between Zarqawi and bin Ladin. 25 struggle, and solidarity from the Arab The successes of the Zarqawi group masses have also pushed the jihadist leaders during the two and a half years of terrorist to bandwagon the Palestinian intifada and and guerrilla activity and the continuation to increase their operational efforts in of their painful strikes against the coalition

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Ely Karmon

Europe in the hope of disrupting the US majority, Salafi web sites and forums have coalition. stepped up their attacks against the Shi'a, Iran, and Shi'a doctrines.28 The Sunni-Shi'a Divide It is interesting to note that it was bin Ladin From the September 2003 assassination who accepted the strategy of Zarqawi and of Ayatollah al-Hakim and to present, the Saudi jihadists, recognizing the Zarqawi has made the utmost effort to predominance of the leaders who continued provoke the Shi'a of Iraq to retaliate against the fight on the ground rather than that of the Sunnis and thus trigger a civil war. This the nominal leadership which was hiding strategy, reflecting the common Wahhabi somewhere in Pakistan. This process took a doctrine, became obvious after US whole year and resulted in the nomination authorities leaked a letter written by him in of Zarqawi as the "emir " of al-Qa'ida in January 2004. The Shi'a were described as Iraq. "the most evil of mankind…the lurking Bin Ladin did not respond to Zarqawi's snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, first letter sent to him in December 2003 the spying enemy, and the penetrating (the one leaked in January 2004 by the venom. " Their crime was "patent Americans). On October 17, 2004, "with polytheism, worshipping at graves, and the advent of the month of Ramadan and circumambulating shrines."26 the need for Muslims to unify ranks in the Zarqawi's position contradicted bin face of the enemy," Zarqawi announced Ladin and al-Qa'ida's views concerning the that "Tawhid and Jihad Group, its prince Shi'a. It should be noted that in his audio and soldiers, have pledged allegiance to the message of February 2003, bin Ladin shaykh of the Usama bin stressed the importance of the Sunnis and Ladin. "29 He changed the name of his Shi'a fighting united against the Americans. organization from al-Tawheed wal Jihad to He even cited Hizballah's 1983 suicide Tandhim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi bilad al- bombing of the US Marine barracks in Rafidain (The al-Qa'ida Jihad Organization Beirut as the first "American defeat" at the in the Land of the Two hands of Islamist radicals.27 Rivers). Interestingly, the announcement The victorious image in the Arab and mentioned that "[t]here have been contacts Muslim world achieved by the Shi'a between Shaykh Abu Musab al- Hizballah movement and its leader Hasan Zarqawi…with the brothers in Al-Qaida for Nasrallah after the Israeli unilateral 8 months," but "a catastrophic dispute withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May occurred." The contacts resumed, however, 2000 and, more recently, the exchange of and in the end, "the brothers from Al- prisoners (including many Palestinians) Qaida " understood "the strategy of the between Israel and Hizballah in January Tawheed wal-Jihad Movement in 2004, created much resentment and Mesopotamia…" and "their hearts" were criticism in Saudi jihadi-Salafi elements. "pleased by the methods [al-Zarqawi] Moreover, the presentation of Nasrallah as used. "30 the "New Salah al-Din" put the role of the Al-Qa'ida indeed reprinted and global vanguard of Islam played by Qa'idat acknowledged the statement, responding al-Jihad at risk for a takeover by the favorably to the new development in their Hizballah. Since the process of establishing online magazine Mu'askar al-Battar. 31 On a new government in Iraq, with a clear Shi'a December 27, 2004, bin Ladin designated

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"honored comrade Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi" to refrain from harming each other at this as the "commander [Amir] of al-Qaida time in which the Americans are targeting" organization in the land of the Tigris and them. 35 This is indeed a new kind of real- the Euphrates," and asked "the comrades in politik on the part of al-Qa'ida leadership. the organization" to obey him.32 In a video aired on al-Jazeera, in what appears to be a The Killing of Innocent Muslims response to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's The jihadist fighters in Iraq were call on his Shi'a followers to vote en masse enraged when in July 2004 Abu and decree that those who boycott the Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Zarqawi's former elections are "infidels," bin Ladin warned prison mentor, posted an article on his against the participation in elections: website criticizing "blowing up cars or "Anyone who participates in these setting roadside explosives, by firing elections… has committed apostasy against mortars in the streets and marketplaces, and Allah." He also endorsed the killing of other places where Muslims congregate. " security people "in Allah's name."33 Al-Maqdisi stated that the "hands of the However, this important issue has Jihad fighters must remain clean so that continued to trouble the relations between they will not be stained by the blood of the al-Qa'ida leadership and al-Zarqawi, as those who must not be harmed even if they evidenced in the letter sent to the latter by are rebellious and shameless," and warned Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2005. In this against attacks on Christian churches, as major document Zawahiri acknowledges this would strengthen the will of the "the extent of danger to Islam of the infidels against Muslims everywhere.36 A Twelve 'er school of Shiism… a religious year later, al-Maqdisi criticized "the school based on excess and falsehood," and extensive use of suicide operations " in "their current reality of connivance with the which many Muslims were being killed and Crusaders." He admits that the "collision expressed reservations about the extensive between any state based on the model of killing of Shi'a in Iraq. Moreover, he prophecy with the Shi'a is a matter that will opposed declaring the Shi'a as non- happen sooner or later. " The question he Muslims, which in effect permitted their and "mujahedeen circles" ask Zarqawi is blood. 37 "about the correctness of this conflict with In a 90-minute audio recording released the Shi'a at this time. Is it something that is in May 2005, Zarqawi relied on Muslim unavoidable? Or, is it something can be put jurists to justify and legitimize the off until the force of the mujahed collateral killing of Muslims in the act of movement in Iraq gets stronger? "34 killing infidels, as the evil of heresy is Moreover, Zawahiri reminds Zarqawi greater than the evil of collateral killing of that "more than one hundred prisoners-- Muslims.38 In the same recording, Zarqawi many of whom are from the leadership who announced the beheading of the chief of are wanted in their countries-- [are] in the intelligence of the Shi'a Badr, "the brigade custody of the Iranians." The attacks of perfidy, the brigade of apostasy and the against the Shi'a in Iraq could compel "the brigade of agents for Jews and Crusaders. " Iranians to take counter measures." Some Islamist Saudi writers, such as Abd Actually, al-Qa'ida "and the Iranians need al-Rahman ibn Salem al-Shammari, also

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Ely Karmon praised the beheading of captives. This then presence--both military and civilian--from became one of Zarqawi's preferred tactics Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf region. 42 in his attempts to threaten and expulse the According to Cordesman and Obaid, foreign presence in Iraq, and he was Saudi Arabia only began to experience proudly named the "Shaykh of the serious internal security problems when bin Slaughterers."39 Ladin and al-Qa'ida actively turned against In a July 2005 audiotape, Zarqawi the monarchy in the mid -1990s and began claimed that it was a duty to wage jihad to launch terrorist attacks in an effort to against the Shi'a, because they were destroy it.43 However, these attacks apostates (murtadoon) and had formed an remained sporadic until May 2003 when alliance with the Crusaders against the jihad cells affiliated with al-Qa'ida began an fighters. In July 2005, Zarqawi published a active terror campaign directed both at third statement in which he rejected al- foreigners--especially Americans --and the Maqdisi's accusations and attacked him, regime.44 saying that ulama who were not According to this analysis, an participating in the jihad in Iraq had no organization that called itself the al-Qa'ida right to criticize the actions of the fighters, Organization in the Arabian Peninsula set thereby even serving Crusader interests. 40 up an infrastructure that included safe A small number of Sunni shaykhs and houses, ammunitions depots, cells, and organizations urged Zarqawi to withdraw support networks. However, in Afghanistan his anti-Shi'a statements on the grounds that there were disagreements among the they ignite fitna (internal strife), thus leadership of al-Qa'ida regarding the timing serving the interests of the occupation. So and potential targets of attack in Saudi did the Association of Muslim Scholars in Arabia, and the then local leader Yousef al- Iraq, the Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Uyeri maintained that al-Qa'ida members Abd al-Aziz al-Shaykh, and the Syrian were not yet ready for it. This group was Islamist Shaykh Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa responsible for the May 2003 attacks which Halimah. Moreover, five "resistance indicated that al-Qa'ida in the Arabian organizations "--the Army of Muhammad, Peninsula had become a major threat. Since al-Qa'qa Brigades, the Islamic Army in the May 2003 attack, Saudi Arabia has Iraq, the Army of Jihad Fighters in Iraq, 45 remained a prime target for bin Ladin. and the Salah al-Din Brigades--stated that "the call to kill all Shi'ites is like a fire This analysis does not explain why al- consuming the Iraqi people, Sunnis and Qa'ida did not anything serious to attack its Shi'ites alike" and proclaimed that the major target and the loathed Saudi royal resistance targeted only Iraqis "connected regime until after its demise in Afghanistan. to the occupation. "41 It seems more realistic to evaluate that there was a kind of unwritten agreement between Define the Main Struggle Front: Iraq, the Saudi rulers and bin Ladin not to touch Saudi Arabia, Egypt? Saudi interests and soil. This could also Throughout bin Ladin's public explain why Saudi Arabia was one of the statements and declarations runs one only three countries (with Pakistan and the fundamental and predominant strategic UAE) that recognized the legitimacy of the goal: the expulsion of the American Taliban regime in Afghanistan, supported it

8 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol . 10 , No . 1 ( March 2006 ) Al-Qa'ida and the War on Terror financially, and maintained diplomatic facto timeout from terrorist operations relations with it until the last moment. conducted on Egyptian soil. 48 According to Dr. Sa'ad al-Faqih, a In an article written by the Saudi Abu wide ly acknowledged expert on al-Qa'ida, Abbas al-Aedhi, the Sinai attack is the jihadists have abandoned their previous presented as the first of several forthcoming tactics of targeting Westerners and the attacks in Egypt as part of a clear strategy security forces in Saudi Arabia and are now approved by the mujahideen in Saudi focusing all their attention on the royal Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt. The jihad in Iraq family. They "believe that the prevailing and Egypt are viewed as "the ropes to opinion in Saudi Arabia--and probably in strengthen the Jihad in Arabia "49 The next the wider Muslim world-- is that the royal steps should be the beginning of jihad in family is infidel and deserves harsh Yemen and Kuwait on the one hand, and treatment… [and they] have overcome their the unification of the North African jihadist fear of a secular takeover in the event of the groups in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, sudden downfall of the House of Saud. " Mauritania, and the Sudan, on the other According to al-Faqih, it seems that in the hand. The main theme of al-Qa'ida's late 1990s , bin Laden thought that if the strategy, however, is to place the jihad House of Saud were removed, the country groups in Saudi Arabia at the center, would fall into the ha nds of secular forces. coordinating the Islamist activity with the Al-Qa'ida has reached the conclusion that, two "branches" in Iraq and Egypt as part of as they learned from the Iraq theater, the this central goal. This strategy was devised sudden collapse of the regime would either among others by the late Yousef al-Uyeri, invite foreign interference or lead to chaos. killed in June 2003 by the Saudi police. An American invasion would therefore According to this analysis, al-Uyeri marks provide a massive recruitment opportunity the shift of the younger generation of the for them and a certain victory.46 It is of dominant scholars of global jihad to Saudi interest to note that according to al-Faqih, hands and should be viewed as the arc hitect the local Saudi leadership has made "quite a of global jihad in Iraq.50 few clumsy decisions " in the recent past Another jihadist analysis, seemingly and "at the operational level there is now a based upon the 1601 page book on jihad by very tenuous link between bin Laden and Abu Mus'ab al-Suri relates to the Sinai his advisers and the local al-Qaeda 47 attacks of October 2004, the consequent leadership in Saudi Arabia. " Cairo (April 2005) attacks, and the Sharm According to Reuven Paz, an Israeli al-Shaykh (July 2005) attacks. According expert on Islamist organizations, the attacks to al-Suri the most important jihadist target in Saudi Arabia marked an important in this phase must be attacks against change in the jihadist strategy and a return tourists. The attacks in Sinai were, from the distant Afghanistan to the Arab therefore, a highly successful example of land. This shift became even more evident this strategy, both against the Egyptian after the first jihadist attacks in Sinai, on government and in terrorizing the October 7, 2004, after seven years of a de Westerners.51 This also seems to be an attempt to identify new fronts in the Arab

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Ely Karmon world--apart from Iraq-- to conduct the The Brigades of Martyr Abdulaziz al- struggle. Paz believes there is a high Moqrin, a previously unknown group likelihood that we are facing two separate apparently named for a Saudi al-Qa'ida strategies and even two different competing leader killed in a 2004 shootout with parties of global jihad, with Zarqawi in the security forces, issued a website statement Iraqi arena and al-Suri stationed in other threatening to carry out further attacks in parts of the Arab world.52 Kuwait. Clear Saudi ties also have emerged Furthermore, it is important to note that in militant crackdowns in the Gulf island the Saudi involvement in the Islamist state of Bahrain. In 2004, at least six insurgency in Iraq is significant, as they Bahrainis were arrested on suspicion of represent some 61 percent of Islamists planning to bomb government buildings killed and some 70 percent of Arab suicide and foreign interests and collaborating with bombers. It seems that thus far, Saudis are foreign terrorist groups. In January 2005, not only the group most affected by the Omani authorities arrested at least 100 insurgency in Iraq, but also help feed it. Islamic extremists suspected of planning to One significant explanation for this could carry out attacks at a popular shopping and be the Wahhabi hostility towards the Shi'a, cultural festival. 57 who are perceived as infidels, and the notion of the need to support the Sunni Playing the Palestinian Card minority in Iraq.53 Until his demise in Afghanistan in the Apparently, the new strategy proposed winter of 2001/2 bin Ladin gave Palestine by the new ideologues of global jihad is low priority. For him , the heart of the implemented on the ground. In January matter was the US presence on the holy soil 2005, eight Kuwaiti soldiers, five of them of Saudi Arabia, which he saw as the officers, were arrested after a tip from bridgehead of a corruptive non-Muslim Saudi Arabia that an al-Qa'ida cell was culture. Throughout bin Ladin's public operating in Kuwait and planning attacks statements and declarations is one against US troops. The subsequent round- fundamental and predominant strategic up of suspects included the detention of an goal: the expulsion of the American imam said to be the cell's mastermind.54 On presence--both military and civilian--from March 19, 2005, a car bomb driven by an Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf region. Egyptian suicide bomber in Doha, the Bin Ladin and the WIF he created did not capital of Qatar, demolished a theater forget what they saw as crimes and wrongs packed with Westerners and damaged an done to the Muslim nation: "the blood English speaking school, leading to one spilled in Palestine and Iraq…. the fatality and up to 50 people injured. The massacre of Qana, in Lebanon… and the attack was the first in the country, which massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, hosts the US Central Command that Assam, the Philippines, Fatani, Ogadin, directed the 2003 invasion of Iraq,55 and Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnia, and in Bosnia - came two days after the suspected al-Qa'ida Herzegovina. " Yet it is worth noting that leader in Saudi Arabia urged militants in the Palestinian issue was given no special Qatar and other Gulf states to wage holy prominence. According to Abdel-Bari war against "crusaders " in the region. 56 Atwan, editor of the London-based al-Quds al-Arabi, bin Ladin "has been criticized in the Arab world for focusing on such places

10 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol . 10 , No . 1 ( March 2006 ) Al-Qa'ida and the War on Terror as Afghanistan and Bosnia -Herzegovina, missiles at an Israeli holiday jet (an and [he] is therefore starting to concentrate airline plane --a Boeing 757 carrying 261 more on the Palestinian issue."58 Following passengers) that had taken off from the the demise of Afghanistan, the hiding al- city's airport failed. Qa'ida leaders bin Ladin and Zawahiri The reason for this sudden interest in mentioned Palestine more and more as a top Jewish and Israeli targets was most likely priority and in parallel there was a sharp the result of al-Qa'ida and associates increase in attacks by jihadist groups groups' attempts to bandwagon what was against Jewish and Israeli targets. considered at that stage a very successful The first major attack after the war was violent al-Aqsa intifada by Hamas, the suicide bombing on April 11, 2002 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other outside a historic synagogue in Djerba, Palestinian groups. On the one hand, it Tunisia. The 16 dead included 11 Germans, permitted them to claim their support to the one French citizen, and three Tunisians. Palestinian people, but at the same time it Twenty-six German tourists were injured. created an anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the terrorist campaign which would attract Holy Sites claimed responsibility. more solidarity and support from the Arab On May 16, 2003, 15 suicide bombers and Muslim masses and possibly attract attacked five targets in Casablanca, more young recruits to their ranks. More Morocco, killing 43 persons and wounding recently in August 2005, four Israeli cruise 100. The targets were a Spanish restaurant, ships carrying a total of 3,500 tourists a Jewish community, a Jewish cemetery, a scheduled to dock in the Mediterranean hotel, and the Belgian Consulate. The Turkish resort of Alanya were rerouted to Moroccan Government blamed the Islamist the island of Cyprus by the Israeli al-Assirat al-Moustaquim (The Righteous authorities due to fear of a terrorist attack. Path), but foreign commentators suspected A Syrian citizen named Louai Sakra was an al-Qa'ida connection. arrested for plotting to slam speedboats On November 15, 2003, two suicide packed with explosives into the cruise ships truck bombs exploded outside the Neve filled with Israeli tourists. Shalom and Beth Israel synagogues in Istanbul, killing 25 persons and wounding Al-Qa'ida in Palestine? at least another 300. The initial claim of A new radical Muslim terrorist group res ponsibility came from a Turkish militant with close ties to al-Qaida in Afghanistan, group, the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Pakistan, and Iraq, has started operating in Front, but Turkish authorities suspected an the , according to PA security al-Qa'ida connection.59 officials. Jundallah, or "Allah's Brigades," On November 28, 2002, at least 15 consists mostly of former Hamas and people died in the first suicide attack by al- Islamic Jihad members. It launched its Qa'ida against an Israeli target: an Israeli- first attack on IDF soldiers near Rafah in owned hotel in Mombassa, Kenya. A large mid-May 2005. The group is especially part of the Paradise Hotel was reduced to active in the southern Gaza Strip. rubble and nine Kenyans and three Israelis Jundallah's emergence in the Gaza Strip were killed. A parallel attempt to fire two confirms suspicions that al-Qa'ida has

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Ely Karmon been trying to was trying to establish itself their enemies. The leaflet is the latest in the area before Israel's planned indication of al-Qa'ida 's effort to establish withdrawal. 60 itself in the Gaza Strip after the Israeli On August 2, 2005, a posting on the withdrawal from the area. On the eve of the forum al-Mustaqbal al-Islami (Islamic disengagement, a number of rockets were Future) included what it termed the "First fired at the former settlements of Neveh Declaration of al-Qa'ida from the Land of Dekalim and Ganei Tal. An announcement the Outpost, Occupied Palestine," claiming responsibility on behalf of al- specifically the "military wing" of a group Qa'ida members in the Gaza Strip was made calling itself "Alwiyat al-Jihad fi Ard al- by three masked gunmen who appeared in a Ribat" (The Jihad Brigades in the Land of videotape. Al-Qa'ida 's new on-line the Outpost). The declaration described a television channel branded PA chairman rocket operation undertaken on July 31, Mahmoud Abbas a "collaborator with the 2005 against the settlements of Neve Jews," accusing him of assisting Israel in its Dekalim and Ganne Tal: war on Hamas.63 Nine Katyusha rockets were fired from … In the context of the Islamic Lebanon into Israel on the night of Jihad by our mujahideen brothers of December 27, 2005. Four rockets hit the al-Qa'ida's World Organization town of Kiryat Shmona, another hit the against the Jew s and Crusaders. We Western Galilee town of Shlomi, and four declare that the Brigades are not a landed in open areas. IDF intelligence new or passing organization on the estimated that the Popular Front for the land of Palestine, but a [true] Liberation of Palestine--General Command, believer spirit that urges on the headed by Ahmed Jibril--was responsible mujahideen to make themselves into for the Katyusha fire, most likely in a single rank. coordination with Hizballah. As a result , on December 28, 2005, Israel Air Force fighter Some observers, however, believe that jets fired two missiles at a PFLP-GC the new group is merely a split from Fatah training base at Na'ameh, about seven or an operational pseudonym that will kilometers south of Beirut, slightly disappear after a few uses, as was the case wounding two fighters. 64 with the Tanzim Jundallah group.61 On December 29, 2005, al-Qa'ida's In September 2005, Mahmoud Waridat, Committee in Mesopotamia (Iraq), led by a West Bank Palestinian arrested in July the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed same year, was charged by IDF prosecutors responsibility for the rocket attack. with undergoing training at an al-Qa'ida According to its statement: camp in Afghanistan in the summer of 2001, though it was said the defendant later [After] careful planning and declined an offer to join bin Ladin's global intelligence gathering, a group of al- network.62 A leaflet distributed in Khan Tawheed lions and Al-Qaida Yunis in October 2005 by al-Qa'ida Jihad in operatives put their faith in Allah Palestine announced that the terrorist group and launched a new attack on the had begun working towards uniting the Jewish state… [with] ten Grad Muslims under one Islamic state, the only rockets from Muslim territory of way for Muslims to achieve victory over Lebanon toward selected targets in

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the northern part of the Jewish activities, Islamist extremists and vocal state…. This blessed attack was fringe communities that advocate terrorism carried out by the mujahideen in the exist and reportedly have provided cover name of Mujahid Shaykh Usama for terrorist cells. It must be stressed that Bin Laden, the commander of al- there was a serious Islamist terrorist threat Qa'ida... With the help of Allah, in Europe long before 9/11. On December what is yet to come will be far 24, 1994, four terrorist members of the worse."65 Algerian GIA hijacked Air flight 8969 at airport bound for . The Sources in the IDF said it was difficult terrorists assassinated an Algerian to determine the reliability of the policeman. In addition, during the intense announcement. standoff, authorities learned that the aircraft was laden with more than twenty sticks of It should be noted that there is an al- dynamite and that the GIA planned to fly Qa'ida affiliate in Lebanon, Usbat al-Ansar, the plane into the in Paris, comprised of radical Sunni Palestinians blowing it up. The plane was diverted to the from the Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp in International Airport and there southern Lebanon. On August 19, 2005 an French commandos managed to overcome al-Qa'ida affiliate calling itself the Abdalla h the terrorists. 67 Azzam Battalions fired three Katyusha In the 1990s, the NATO, EU, and US rockets from Aqaba, Jordan. One of the decision to support Bosnia's independence rockets landed near 's airport, the practically neutralized bin Ladin's plan to second narrowly missed an American ship use the Bosnian front--and later Kosovo in the Aqaba harbor , and another hit a and Albania --to penetrate Europe. Still, group of Jordanian soldiers. some ex-mujahideen remain in Bosnia and seem recently to be active. Although it is possible that Hizballah or In December 2000, the arrest of four one of its Palestinian allies were behind the suspected al-Qa'ida members by German December 27, 2005 bombing of northern police foiled a plot to attack the Strasbourg Israel, the claiming of responsibility by Cathedral. An Islamist preacher named Abu Zarqawi's al-Qa'ida Committee in Qatada was arrested for the attack but was Mesopotamia should be taken seriously. It released on a lack of evidence. Also, in is possible that the stage of al-Qa'ida and September 2001, US, European, and Iran refraining "from harming each other" Middle Eastern efforts foiled a plot to blow has already passed and the moment has up the US embassy in Paris. The same arrived when the Iranian regime, in month, a plot was uncovered to bomb a coordination with Assad's regime or NATO air base in Kleine Brogel, Belgium, Hizballah, have decided to give a free hand home to 100 US military staff. Germany to al-Qa'ida to do the ir "dirty work. "66 (the Hamburg cell) and (the wide infrastructure in Madrid and some Increased Effort in Europe provincial cities) were identified as key Although the vast majority of Muslims logistical and planning bases for the in Europe are not involved in radical September 11, 2001 attacks on the United

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States. Moreover, the Milan Islamic Center police operations in Germany, Italy, in Italy has served since the mid-1990s as a Ireland, and the UK have led to the arrest of base and support for several Egyptian, terror suspects and the dismantling of an Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan al-Qa'ida Islamic network centered in Italy that affiliated cells, which did not reach the recruited fighters for the insurgency in Iraq. stage of conducting terrorist attacks before This network, possibly involving Ansar al- their arrests. Islam in Italy and al-Tawhid in the UK and The March 11, 2004 attack on the trains Germany, also had a foothold in Norway, in the Atocha station in Madrid was the first France, Spain, and the . successful operation in Europe by an al- The preferred option and long-term goal Qa'ida affiliated group. It was followed by of al-Qa'ida is therefore not a concept the July 7 and 23, 2005 series of four different from "transnationalism." The suicide bombings in the London Muslim world is not, nor has it ever been, underground, the second one a failed defined wholly or mainly in terms of the operation. The March 2004 terrorist umma or transnational linkages and bombings in Madrid have been attributed to identities. To be sure, forms of solidarity an al-Qa'ida-inspired group of North over Muslim-related political conflicts and Africans. UK authorities suspect the four issues --such as Palestine, Kashmir, and now young British nationals who carried out the Iraq-- do exert a hold on many people and July 7, 2005 terrorist attacks on London had inspire some to radical activism.69 ties to al-Qa'ida as well. These attacks were presented as Zarqawi Taking the Lead? retaliation for the participation of Spanish According to a serialized book published and British troops in t he US-led coalition in in July 2005 by a Jordanian journalist, the Iraq. The Madrid attack executed just three future strategy of Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi is days before elections in that country indeed based on expanding the conflict with the brought down the Aznar government and United States and Israel and involving new imposed a socialist government that parties in it. Simultaneously, a broad-based decided to withdraw its troops from Iraq. Islamic jihadist movement will assume However, the arrest of some 130 Islamist responsibility for changing the activists preparing new major attacks in circumstances that have long prevailed in Spain after the March 2004 bombings and the region and for establishing an Islamic the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq caliphate state in seven stages with Iraq as prove that the war is only a good pretext.68 its base. 70 The goals of the Islamists are much larger Turkey, which is located north of Iraq, is and they are not willing to compromise. and viewed as the most important Islamic state the Islamists have no intentions of stopping because of its great economic and human after one victory, and most likely not stop resources and significant strategic location. before the liberation of Andalusia from Abu-Mus'ab and al-Qa'ida believe that Spanish "occupation." Turkey lacks self-determination and Since the war in Iraq, attacks and threats freedom because "the Jews of Dunma " have also targeted the "minor " US allies in control the army and the economy and are the framework of the international the real powerbrokers in the country. coalition: Poland and Norway, South Therefore, Turkey's return to the ranks of Korea, Italy, and Denmark. Moreover, the nation "will not happen unless a

14 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol . 10 , No . 1 ( March 2006 ) Al-Qa'ida and the War on Terror powerful strike is dealt to the Jewish in one country or region are influencing presence in that country. " Al-Qa'ida 's neighboring countries and conflicts. current strategy is to infiltrate Turkey Therefore, the war on terrorism will require slowly and postpone major operations there a long and intricate campaign. The danger until major gains are made in Iraq. of the Islamist networks can be neutralized Iran is the second country that al-Qa'ida in the long run only by preventing the seeks to involve in this conflict. Iran formation of a "liberated fundamentalist expects that the United States and Israel territory"--the concept of Ayman Zawahiri- will strike a number of nuclear, industrial, -in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Central and strategic Iranian facilities. Abu-Mus'ab Asia, Indonesia or elsewhere in the Muslim thinks that the US-Israeli confrontation with world. Iran is inevitable and could succeed in The existing danger is not that of a destroying Iran's infrastructure. united World Islamist Front and its victory, Accordingly, Iran is preparing to retaliate but rather of a politically and socially by using the powerful cards in its hands. destabilized Middle East and of an The area of the war will expand, pro-US increasingly paranoid and undemocratic Shi'a in Iraq and Afghanistan will suffer global society (especially if WMD embarrassment and might reconsider their terrorism succeeds). On the strategic - alliances, and this will provide al-Qa'ida military level, only political, intelligence, with a larger vital area from which to carry and operational cooperation between the out its activities.71 great international players--the United However, according to al-Faqih, "al- States, Europe, Russia, China, and India-- Qaeda secretly thinks it might have made a can overcome this dangerous perspective. mistake by appointing Zarqawi as its On the ideological and political level, the leading representative in Iraq," because he radical trends in the Muslim societies can is "too decisive as a commander" and is be defeated only by the moderate Muslims. driven by arrogance. According to some The words of a famous moderate rumors, "the jihadi circles are trying to Muslim leader of a moderate Muslim reach bin Laden in order to convince him to country, Abdurrahman Wahid, former remove Zarqawi as the local al-Qaeda president of Indonesia, speak for commander in Iraq. " The jihadist leaders in themselves: Iraq are not at all happy with Zarqawi's conduct and "begrudge his arrogance and An effective counterstrategy must recklessness." Basing himself on Zawahiri's be based upon a realistic assessment letter to Zarqawi, al-Faqih concludes that of our own strengths and Zawahiri rema ins al-Qa'ida's main weaknesses in the face of religious strategist. 72 extremism and terror. Disunity, of course, has proved fatal to countless Conclusion human societies faced with a similar It is clear from this succinct presentation existential threat. A lack of and from the events on the ground that the seriousness in confronting the current situation in the Middle East is both imminent danger is likewise often complex and volatile and that developments fatal. Those who seek to promote a

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peaceful and tolerant understanding of Islam must overcome the NOTES paralyzing effects of inertia, and 1 Fred Halliday, "A Transnational Umma: harness a number of actual or Reality or Myth?," October 7, 2005, at: potential strengths, which can play a http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalizatio key role in neutralizing n/umma_2904.jsp. fundamentalist ideology. These 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the strengths not only are assets in the Prophet's Banner, published as a serialized struggle with religious extremism, book by the London Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. but in their mirror form they point to English translation available at: the weakness at the heart of www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ayman_bk.html fundamentalist ideology… . 3 US Department of State, Office of the Muslims themselves can and must Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Countr y propagate an understanding of the Reports on Terrorism 2004, Department of "right" Islam, and thereby discredit State Publication 11248, April 2005, pp. extremist ideology. Yet to 61-62. accomplish this task requires the 4 Reuven Paz, "Qa'idat al-Jihad. A New understanding and support of like- Name on the Road to Palestine," ICT minded individuals, organizations website, May 7, 2002, at: and governments throughout the www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articl world. Our goal must be to eid=436. illuminate the hearts and minds of 5 April 11, 2002, a blast at Tunisian humanity, and offer a compelling synagogue kills 17 people. A fuel tanker is alternate vision of Islam, one that blown up outside a synagogue on the banishes the fanatical ideology of Tunisian island of Djerba killing 19 people, hatred to the darkness from which it including 14 German tourists. An al-Qa'ida emerged.73 spokesman later says the organization was behind the suicide attack. *Ely Karmon is Senior Research Scholar at October 12, 2002, bomb attacks on Bali The Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) nightclubs kill 202. Two bombs rip through and also Research Fellow at The Institute a busy nightclub area in the Balinese town for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at The of Kuta killing 202 people, most of them Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya, foreign tourists. The Indonesian authorities Israel. He lectures on terrorism and believe the attacks were carried out by the guerrilla in modern times at IDC, at the South East Asian militant network Jemaa IDF Military College, and at the National Islamiah which is said to have links to al- Security Seminar of the Galilee College. Qa'ida. Karmon is the author of Coalitions of November 28, 2002, Israeli targets come Terrorist Organizations. Revolutionaries, under attack in Kenya. Sixteen people Nationalists and Islamists (Leiden, Boston: including three suicide bombers are killed Brill Academic Publishers, 2005). in a blast at an Israeli owned hotel in Mombassa. A missile fired at an Israeli plane misses its target. A message on a

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website purporting to come from al-Qa'ida says the group carried out the attack. 7 Ayman al-Zawahiri audiocassette, May 12, 2003, dozens killed in Saudi October 9, 2002; September 2003: Parts of bombings. At least 34 people are killed in a the 105-minute tape broadcast by al-Jazeera series of bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia 's satellite television showed Bin Ladin with capital Riyadh. The targets were luxury al-Zawahiri, who urged supporters to bury compounds housing foreign nationals and a Americans in "the graveyard of Iraq." US Saudi office. Washington and Riyadh Although bin Ladin had not appeared on a say al-Qa'ida is the prime suspect. It is the videocassette for many months, remaining first in a string of attacks over successive silent, he allowed al-Zawahiri to speak. months in Saudi Arabia. 8 As of May 2005 the list included, among May 16, 2003, Morocco is rocked by others: Ramzi bin al-Shibi (the reputed suicide attacks. Bomb attacks in Casablanca recruiter for the 9/11 attacks); Mohammed kill 45 people including 12 attackers. Atef, Abu Zubaydah, and Khaled Shaykh Targets include a Spanish restaurant, a five Mohammad (all senior operational star hotel, a Jewish community center, and planners); Abd al-Rahim al-Nashirih (bin the Belgian consulate. Four men later Ladin's alleged point man on the Arabian sentenced to death for the attacks are said Peninsula and chief organizer for maritime by the Moroccan authorities to be members attacks such as the USS Cole suicide strike of the Salafia Jihadia widely believed to be in 2000); Riduan Isamuddin (also known as linked to al-Qa'ida. Hambali, al-Qa'ida's main link to Southeast December 15, 2003, suicide bombers hit Asian militant groups and the accused two Turkish synagogues. At least 23 people mastermind of the 2002 Bali attacks in are killed and more than 300 injured in two Indonesia); Ahmed Khalfan Ghilani (one of devastating suicide attacks on synagogues the FBI's 22 most wanted terrorists, in Istanbul. The government blames al- believed to be a key figure behind the 1998 Qa'ida for the attacks. U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya and December 20, 2003, two bomb attacks on Tanzania); Abu Faraj al-Libbi (thought to British interests in Turkey. Attacks on the be al-Qa'ida's third most senior leader in British Consulate and the HSBC bank 2005 and main coordinator for operations in offices in Istanbul leave 27 people dead and Pakistan); Haitham al-Yemeni (described as more than 450 wounded. There are separate a central figure in facilitating the claims of responsibility from two allegedly international dissemination of jihadist al-Qa'ida connected groups. communications and supplies). See BBC News, Timeline: Al-Qaeda, at: List taken from Peter Chalk, Bruce http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetool Hoffman, Robert Reville, Anna-Britt s/print/news.bbc.%20co.uk/1/hi/world/3618 Kasupski, Trends in Terrorism: Threats to 762.stm. the United States and the Future of the 6 "Saudis arrest suspects in Riyadh Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, RAND bombings," ICT website, May 28, 2003, at: Center for Terrorism Risk Management http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=9 Policy, 2005. 01.

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9 Two bin Ladin supporters developed this 17 Cordesman, Iraq's Evolving Insurgency, critical analysis of Muslim governments in pp. 11-12. their articles. They present the Arab League 18 Ibid. and the Muslim Conference as "two 19 For an in-depth analysis of his career see paralyzed associations." Moreover, Arab Nimrod Raphaeli, "The Sheikh of the Islamic movements are also criticized, and Slaughterers: Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi and the weak leadership of the Muslim the Al-Qa'ida Connection," MEMRI Inquiry Brotherhood, for instance, was compared and Analysis Series, No. 231, July 1, 2005. with the strong figures of Hassan al-Bana 20 King Abdallah of Jordan told the press and Sayyid Qutb. that in 2002, Jordan had asked Iraq to 10 B. Raman, "The Iraq War & Terrorism," extradite al-Zarqawi following the murder South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 647, of the U.S. diplomat Lawrence Foley, but March 30, 2003. the Saddam regime had ignored the request. 11 Iraq Report, Vol. 6, No. 10, March 14, Most agree that al-Zarqawi was definitely 2003. in Iraq at the end of 2002 and that he was 12 John F. Burns, "Iraqis Threatening New given shelter by the terrorist group Ansar Suicide Strikes against U.S. Forces," NYT, al-Islam (see below), which operated from March 30, 2003. northern Iraq. Ibid . 13 "Al-Qa'ida on the Fall of Baghdad," 21 Ulrich Schneckener, "Iraq and Terrorism: MEMRI Special Dispatch-- Jihad and How Are 'Rogue States' and Terrorists Terrorism Studies, No. 493, April 11, Connected?," Stiftung Wissenschaft und 2003. Politik Comments, March 2003. 14 Ze'ev Schiff and Nathan Guttman, 22 Kenneth Katzman, "Iraq: U.S. Regime "Thousands cross Syrian border to fight for Change Efforts, the Iraqi Opposition, and Iraq," Haaretz, April 1, 2003. See also Post-War Iraq," Congressional Research Jonathan Schanzer, "Foreign Irregulars in Service Report, March 17, 2003. Iraq: The Next Jihad?," Analysis of Near 23 Raphaeli, The Sheikh of the Slaughterers. East Policy from the Scholars and 24 See Anthony H. Cordesman, New Associates of The Washington Institute, Patterns in the Iraqi Insurgency: The War PolicyWatch No.747, April 10, 2003. for a Civil War in Iraq, Center for Strategic 15 On the lack of planning for the and International Studies, Working Draft, immediate aftermath of the war see Bob Revised: September 27, 2005. Woodward, Plan of Attack (London: Simon 25 Reuven Paz, "Arab Volunteers Killed in & Schuster, 2004), p. 413. Iraq: An Analysis," Project for the 16 See Anthony H. Cordesman, with the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) assistance of Patrick Baetjer, Iraq's Series of Global Jihad , Vol. 3, No. 1 Evolving Insurgency, Center for Strategic (March 2005). and International Studies, Working Draft: 26 See Raphaeli, The Sheikh of the Upda ted as of June 23, 2005. Cordesman Slaughterers. gives an in-depth analysis of the 27 See Reuven Paz, "Global Jihad and the characteristics of the Iraqi insurgency and Sense of Crisis: al-Qa'idah's Other Front," the strategic and tactical errors of the Bush PRISM Occasional Papers, Vol. 1, No. 4 Administration in dealing with it. (March 2003), at: www.e- prism.org/pages/4/index.htm.

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28 Reuven Paz, "Hizballah or Hizb al- The Office of the Director of National Shaytan? Recent Jihadi-Salafi Attacks Intelligence released the letter dated July 9, against the Shiite Group," PRISM 2005, obtained during counterterrorism Occasional Papers, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February operations in Iraq. 2004), at: http://www.e- 36 Raphaeli, Iraqi Elections (III). prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_2_ - 37 See Y.Yehoshua, "Dispute in Islamist _Hizbullah_or_Hizb_al-Shaytan.pdf. Circles over the Legitimacy of Attacking 29 See National Terror Alert, at: Muslims, Shi'a, and Non-combatant Non- http://www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/ Muslims in Jihad Operations in Iraq: Al- index.php?p=297. Maqdisi vs. His Disciple Al-Zarqawi," 30 "Communiqué from Al-Tawheed wal- MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series - No. Jihad Movement (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) 239, September 11, 2005. in Iraq," October 17, 2004, at 38 "The [collateral killing] is justified under http://www.globalterroralert.c om/zarqawi- the principle of dharura [overriding bayat.pdf. necessity], due to the fact that it is 31 "Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to al- impossible to avoid them and to distinguish Qaeda: From Mu'asker al-Battar, Issue 21," between them and those infidels against Translation by Jamestown Foundation whom war is being waged and who are the Researcher Jeffrey Pool, Terrorism intended targets. Admittedly, the killing of Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 24, December 16, a number of Muslims whom it is forbidden 2004. to kill is undoubtedly a grave evil; however, 32 Islamist sources in Britain criticized bin it is permissible to commit this evil – Ladin's designation of Zarqawi as leader of indeed, it is even required – in order to the group, because it was smaller than other ward off a greater evil, namely, the evil of terrorist organizations operating in Iraq, suspending Jihad ." See "Abu Mus'ab Al- such as Jaysh Ansar al-Sunna or al-Jaysh Zarqawi: Collateral Killing of Muslims is al-Islami. See Raphaeli, The Sheikh of the Legitimate," MEMRI, Special Dispatch , Slaughterers. No. 917, June 7, 2005. 33 Nimrod Raphaeli, "Iraqi Elections (III): 39 Raphaeli, The Sheikh of the The Islamist and Terrorist Threats," Slaughterers. MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis Series - No. 40 Yehoshua, "Dispute in Islamist Circles 202, January 18, 2005. over the Legitimacy of Attacking Muslims, 34 See Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights Under Shi'a, and Non-combatant Non-Muslims in the Prophet's Banner, published as a Jihad Operations in Iraq." serialized book by the London al-Sharq al- 41 "Sunni Sheikhs and Organizations Awsat, the English translation at: Criticize Al-Zarqawi's Declaration of War http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ayman_b Against the Shi'ites," MEMRI Special k.html. Dispatch Series, No.1000, October 7, 2005. 35 "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi," 42 According to the "Declaration of War ODNI News Release No. 2-05, October 11, against the Americans Occupying the Land 2005, at of the Two Holy Places"(its full title), "the http://www.dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf. latest and the greatest of [the] aggressions,

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incurred by the Muslims since the death of Ayeri's was the only regional al-Qa'ida the Prophet… is the occupation of the land operation to report directly to OBL). Al- of the two Holy Places--the foundation of Ayeri's lieutenants, in turn, reported directly the house of Islam, the place of the to him. They were responsible for setting revelation, the source of the message and up five autonom ous cells focusing the place of the noble Ka'ba, the Qiblah of exclusively on operations within Saudi all Muslims--by the armies of the American Arabia. Crusaders and their allies." The declaration 46 See Mahan Abedin, "New Security is presented as the first step in the "work" Realities and al-Qaeda's Changing Tactics: of "correcting what had happened to the An Interview with Saad al-Faqih," Spotlight Islamic world in general, and the Land of on Terror, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 3, the two Holy Places in particular…. No. 12 (December 15, 2005). Dr. Saad al- Today…. the sons of the two Holy Places, Faqih heads the Saudi opposition group, have started their Jihad in the cause of Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia Allah, to expel the occupying enemy out of (MIRA). the country of the two Holy places." See 47 Ibid. Ely Karmon, "Terrorism a la Bin Ladin is 48 Reuven Paz, "From Riyadh 1995 to Sinai not a Peace Process Problem," 2004: The Return of Al-Qaeda to the Arab PolicyWatch , No. 347, The Washington Homeland," PRISM Series of Global Jihad , Vol. Institute for Near East Policy, October 2, No. 3 (October 2004). 49 1998. The article, entitled "From Riyadh/East 43 Cordesman and Obaid claim that the to Sinai," was published on several Islamist Kingdom was the first target of al-Qa'ida Internet forums. when in November 1995, the US-operated 50 According to Paz, two of his Saudi National Guard Training Center in Riyadh associates, are trying to fill his place-- was attacked, leaving five Americans dead. Shaykh Ahmad al-Zahrani, alias Abu This subsequently led to the arrest and Jandal al-Azdi in Saudi Arabia , and Shaykh execution of four men, purportedly inspired Abu Omar Seyf in Chechnya, who is the by Usama bin Ladin. However, bin Ladin leading Islamic scholar of the Arab who denied involvement praised the attack battalion of volunteers there. Another (see Washington Post, August 23, 1998) individual to be noted is Shaykh Hamed al- and according to other analysts the Ali, a Saudi who lives in Kuwait. terrorists were inspired by the Jordanian 51 The analysis was published on jihadist ideologue al-Maqdasi. September 25, 2005 by a known al- 44 See Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Qa'ida supporter, nicknamed Abu Obaid, "A l-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Muhammad al-Hilali. It appears to be Asymmetric Threats and Islamist the first analysis of this kind to be Extremists," Center for Strategic and based on the 1601 page book on Jihad International Studies, Working Draft: by Abu Mus'ab al-Suri which was Revised January 26, 2005. published via the internet in January 45 Ibid. Again according to Cordesman and 2005. See Reuven Paz, "Al-Qaeda 's Obaid, at the beginning, al-Ayeri was the Search for new Fronts: Instructions for chief of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula Jihadi Activity in Egypt and Sinai," and reported directly to bin Ladin (al-

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PRISM Occasional Papers, Vol. 3, No. 58 Karmon, "Terrorism a la Bin Ladin is not 7 (October 2005). a Peace Process Problem." 52 According to Paz, al-Suri is probably the 59 See Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961- most talented combination of a scholar and 2003: A Brief Chronology, Office of the operative of global jihad. He was one of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. chief al-Qa'ida explosive trainers in Department of State, March 2004, at Afghanistan, but also gave many lectures http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.h about jihadist strategy, religion, and tm. indoctrination. Many of his lectures from 60 Khaled Abu Toameh, "Al-Qaida-linked Afghanistan are posted on his web site in terrorists in Gaza," The Jerusalem Post, the form of video and audiotapes, and much May. 20, 2005. of the material there appears in his 61 Stephen Ulph, "Al-Qaeda expanding into monumental book. His call for a "Global Palestine?" Terrorism Focus, Jamestown Islamist Resistance" could be part of global Foundation, Vol., 2, No. 15, August 5, jihad, but also a call for a new form of al- 2005. Qa'ida loyal to the doctrines of Abdallah 62 "IDF prosecutors charge West Bank Azzam, but not necessarily to the Saudi Palestinian with Al-Qaida link," Reuters, form of jihadist Tawhid. Interestingly, al- September 8, 2005. Suri has a European background. He is a 63 Khaled Abu Toameh, 'Al-Qaida raises its Spanish citizen as a result of marriage, and head in Gaza," Jerusalem Post, October 10, lived in the 1990s in Spain and London. He 2005. is well familiar with the European arena 64 See Amos Harel, 'Iraq al Qaeda claims and Muslim communities there, primarily Tuesday's missile attack on northern Israel,' that of Nor th Africans. Ibid . Haaretz, December 29, 2005. 53 Reuven Paz, "Arab Volunteers Killed in 65 See the Communique at Iraq: An Analysis," PRISM Series of Global http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/1205/ Jihad , Vol. 3, No. 1 ( March 2005). zarqawi1205-9.pdf. 54 12,000 US civilians live in Koweit, while 66 "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi. " 25,000 US troops are based in there, using 67 See " Flight 8969" at: it as a launch pad for operations in Iraq. See http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/ Robin Gedye, "Soldiers in 'anti-US plot' %20Flight%20AF%208969%20Alger- held by Kuwait," Daily Telegraph , January Paris%20hijacked. 15, 2005. 68 See "El número de presos por terrorismo 55 Sean Rayment and Peter Zimonjic, "One islámico en España ha crecido un 59% en el dead as blast demolishes Qatar theatre 2005," Barcelona La Vanguardia , packed with westerners," Daily Telegraph, December 25, 2005. March 20, 2005. 69 Halliday, "A Transnational U mma." 56 Reute rs, March 25, 2005. 70 Fuad Husayn, The Second Generation of 57 Paul Garwood, "Terror wave spreads Al-Qa'ida (Part 13), a serialized book on Al across Mideast, raising concerns over Zarqawi and Al-Qa'ida published by the regional links," Associated Press, February London al-Quds al-'Arabi, July 11, 2005. 1, 2005. See also Yassin Musharbash, "What al-

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Qaida Really Wants," Spiegel Online, August 12, 2005, at: http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/ 0,1518,369448,00.html. 71 Ibid. 72 See See Mahan Abedin, "New Security Realities and al-Qaeda's Changing Tactics: An Interview with Saad al-Faqih," 73 Abdurrahman Wahid, "Right Islam vs. Wrong Islam ," WSJ.com Opinion Journal, December 30, 2005, at: http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=1 10007743.

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