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Perils Accompanying the Moment of Promise

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Perils Accompanying the Moment of Promise Perils Accompanying the Moment of Promise Security Challenges in North Africa following the Arab Spring H]jadk MIKAEL ERIKSSON A [[gehYfqaf_l`]Ege]flg^Hjgeak]EacY]d=jackkgf FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden’s largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fi elds such as security policy studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises, protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors. FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency Phone: +46 8 555 030 00 www.foi.se FOI-R--3273—SE User Report Defence Analysis Defence Analysis Fax: +46 8 555 031 00 ISSN 1650-1942 July 2011 SE-164 90 Stockholm Mikael Eriksson Perils Accompanying the Moment of Promise Security Challenges in North Africa following the Arab Spring Cover Picture: Jasmine Flower symbolising the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia in 2011. Picture used with permission of Istockphoto.com FOI-R--3273—SE Titel Med risker följer möjligheter: säkerhetspolitiska utmaningar i ljuset av den arabiska våren Title Perils Accompanying the Moment of Promise: Security Challenges in North Africa following the Arab Spring Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--3273—SE Rapporttyp /Report Type Användarrapport/User report Månad/Month Juli/July Utgivningsår/Year 2011 Antal sidor/Pages 94 p ISSN ISSN 1650-1942 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet/Ministry of Defence Projektnr/Project no A12018 Godkänd av/Approved by Maria Bergstrand FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys Division of Defence Analysis 164 90 Stockholm SE-164 90 Stockholm Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk. All form av kopiering, översättning eller bearbetning utan medgivande är förbjuden FOI-R--3273—SE Sammanfattning Studien analyserar den säkerhetspolitiska utvecklingen i Nordafrika med fokus på Algeriet, Egypten, Libyen, Marocko och Tunisien och tar sin början med den arabiska våren med start i slutet av 2010. Syftet är att generera en bättre förståelse for hur de arabiska revolterna kommit att påverka den säkerhetspolitiska miljön i området. Genom att undersöka och försöka ge en förklaring till särskilt viktiga skeenden, så syftar studien till att särskilja och identifiera mönster och trender i den säkerhetspolitiska situationen i regionen. Fokus ligger på s.k. ”hård säkerhet”, men omfattar dock ej den nuvarande militära insatsen i Libyen. Även s.k. ”mjuka” säkerhetsvariabler ligger till grund för analysen. Således finns sociala och kulturella aspekter med i studien för att bättre förklara de säkerhetspolitiska utmaningarna regionen står inför. Analysnivån ligger på både regional och landsspecifik nivå. Forskningsfrågorna som studien vill besvara är huruvida revolterna i Nordafrika har bidragit till att göra regionen mer eller mindre stabil, förstått i termer av säkerhet, samt vilka implikationerna av revolterna kan komma att bli för regionen. Studien bygger på primär- och sekundärkällor samt intervjuer med experter och forskare specialiserade på området, samt avslutas med förslag till vidare forskning. Ett Memo med policyrekommendationer som bygger på denna analys finns även tillgängligt utöver denna rapport (’Perils accompanying the moment of promise: policy summary and recommendations’). Nyckelord: Algeriet, Arabisk vår, Egypten, Jasminrevolutionen, Libyen, Maghreb, Mellanöstern, Marocko, Nordafrika, Revolt, Revolution, Säkerhet, Tunisien 3 FOI-R--3273—SE Summary This study examines the political and security developments taking place in North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. It is confined to the events of the Arab Spring starting in late 2010. The aim is to generate a deeper understanding of the Arab revolts and how they are likely to shape the security environment in the region. By investigating key political events and their main causes, the study seeks to distinguish patterns in the events to date in terms of security, as well as some future trends from a security perspective. While the immediate focus is on broad security and defence matters, albeit excluding the current military intervention in Libya, a number of the aspects touched on also link to ‘softer’ security factors. In addition, the study seeks to explain the country-specific contexts in order to increase understanding of the events taking place. The main research questions tackled are whether the current uprising in North Africa has made the region more or less stable (in terms of security), and the implications the popular uprisings will have for the future security and stability of the region. The study builds on primary and secondary sources and interviews carried out with experts and scholars based in the area, as well as interviews with scholars and specialists on North Africa. The study concludes with suggestions for further research. A standalone memo based on this study provides further policy recommendations (Perils accompanying the moment of promise: policy summary and recommendations’). Keywords: Algeria, Arab spring, Egypt, Jasmine revolution, Libya, Maghreb, Middle East, Morocco, North Africa, Revolt, Revolution, Security, Tunisia 4 FOI-R--3273—SE Acknowledgements This report is a product of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) and conducted for the Ministry of Defence. It has benefited intellectually from insights provided by a number of scholars and practitioners. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge the external reviewer, Professor Leif Stenberg (Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University), for having identified a number of shortcomings in an early draft and for his advice on improving a number of aspects of this study. Gratitude is also owed to colleagues at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, who with great interest challenged a number of assumptions put forward in this study. Valuable feedback was also provided by a number of colleagues at the Africa project: my thanks to Justin MacDermott, Johan Norberg and Linn Asplund, and also to Markus Derblom at the Swedish Defence Research Agency. Finally, the author also wishes to express thanks to Andrew Mash as well as Sanna Aronsson for editorial improvements. Any errors in the report remain those of the author. 5 FOI-R--3273—SE Table of Content 1 Introduction 9 1.1 Scope and delimitation.................................................................... 15 1.2 Research question .......................................................................... 15 1.3 Method ............................................................................................ 15 1.3.1 A note on terminology................................................................. 16 1.4 An outline of the report.................................................................... 17 2 What happened? 19 2.1 Key features of the revolts .............................................................. 19 2.2 The Arab revolt, non-violence and change: country developments.................................................................................. 23 2.2.1 The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia............................................. 23 2.2.2 The Arab Spring in Egypt............................................................ 25 2.2.3 Popular Unrest in Algeria............................................................ 27 2.2.4 The February 20 Movement in Morocco..................................... 28 2.2.5 The Libertarian Turn in Libya...................................................... 29 2.2.6 Conclusion .................................................................................. 30 3 Background conditions 32 3.1 Historical conditions in the region ................................................... 32 3.2 Contemporary regional conditions .................................................. 37 3.2.1 Political problems........................................................................ 37 3.2.2 Economic problems .................................................................... 39 3.2.3 Poverty aspects .......................................................................... 40 3.2.4 Armed conflicts in the region ...................................................... 41 3.3 Conclusions..................................................................................... 46 4 Military and security realities prior to and following the revolt 48 4.1 Country data.................................................................................... 48 4.1.1 Tunisia......................................................................................... 50 4.1.2 Egypt........................................................................................... 50 4.1.3 Algeria......................................................................................... 51 6 FOI-R--3273—SE 4.1.4 Morocco.......................................................................................52 4.1.5 Libya............................................................................................53 4.1.6 Regional military
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