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Cemiss 2009 – R34 Centro Militare di Studi Strategici Ricerca CeMiSS 2009 – R34 Le nuove direttrici jihadiste nel mediterraneo. il pericolo di al Qā’ida in Maghreb Direttore della ricerca: Dott.ssa Maria LOSACCO INDICE Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 4 Capitolo Primo ..................................................................................................................... 9 LA DIMENSIONE STORICO-GEOGRAFICA .................................................................................... 9 1.1. La rete di Al Qā‘ida ................................................................................................... 9 1.2. Il terrorismo in Algeria ............................................................................................. 13 1.2.1. La nascita del terrorismo in Algeria .................................................................. 13 1.2.2. Il Gruppo Islamico Armato (GIA) ...................................................................... 14 1.2.3. Dal Gruppo Islamico Algerino al Gruppo Salafita per la Predicazione ed il Combattimento ........................................................................................................... 22 1.2.4. I contatti tra il Gruppo Salafita per la Predicazione ed il Combattimento e Al Qā‘ida: dal GSPC ad Al Qā‘ida nel Maghreb Islamico ........................................... 24 1.3. Il terrorismo in Libia ................................................................................................ 29 1.3.1. La nascita del terrorismo in Libia ...................................................................... 29 1.3.2. Il Libyan Islamic Fighting Group ....................................................................... 30 1.3.3. I contatto tra il Libyan Islamic Fighting Group e Al Qā‘ida ................................ 33 1.4. Il terrorismo in Marocco .......................................................................................... 38 1.4.1. La nascita del terrorismo in Marocco ................................................................ 38 1.5. Il terrorismo in Tunisia............................................................................................. 47 1.5.1. La nascita del terrorismo in Tunisia ................................................................. 47 1.5.2. I contatti tra la Tunisia e Al Qā‘ida in Maghreb ................................................. 50 CAPITOLO SECONDO ............................................................................................................ 53 LA DIMENSIONE OPERATIVA ................................................................................................... 53 2.1. Le comunità musulmane in Europa: integrazione e problematiche sociali .............. 53 2.2. Le cellule terroristiche in Europa ............................................................................. 57 2.2.1. Il terrorismo in Francia ...................................................................................... 60 2.2.2. Il terrorismo in Italia .......................................................................................... 63 2.2.3. Il terrorismo nel Regno Unito ............................................................................ 65 2.2.4. Il terrorismo in Spagna ..................................................................................... 69 CAPITOLO TERZO ................................................................................................................. 75 LA DIMENSIONE FINANZIARIO - TECNOLOGICA .......................................................................... 75 1. I metodi di finanziamento ........................................................................................... 75 2. L’uso della tecnologia ................................................................................................ 79 CONCLUSIONI ...................................................................................................................... 81 APPENDICE ......................................................................................................................... 85 1. La dottrina Salafita: radici storiche ed evoluzione ...................................................... 85 2. 7 luglio 2005: gli attentati alla metropolitana di Londra .............................................. 90 3. E allora Muori ............................................................................................................. 95 BIBLIOGRAFIA ...................................................................................................................... 97 3 Executive Summary Con il presente studio si intendono analizzare i motivi per i quali movimenti jihadisti di origine nord africana rappresentano una minaccia alla sicurezza dei Paesi europei, la loro origine, l’organizzazione operativa e le fonti di finanziamento a cui attingono. La radicalizzazione dei Paesi nord africani è avvenuta per gradi. Negli anni ’80 la maggior parte dei gruppi fondamentalisti, come ad esempio la Fratellanza Musulmana, erano orientati soprattutto ad una miglioramento della condizione di vita nei loro Paesi; la stessa supremazia economica e tecnologica dell’Occidente era percepita come il frutto di una colpa dei musulmani, i quali si erano allontanati dalla strada indicata dal profeta Maometto. In quest’ottica il primo obiettivo da raggiungere era una nuova islamizzazione della società, una sorta di ritorno alle origini e alla retta via che potesse rifondare dalle fondamenta l’Islam. In sintesi si manifesta il bisogno imprescindibile che a guidare i Governi sia la legge islamica, che gli Stati perdano la loro laicità, che sopraggiunga la Shari’a. In questo senso la lotta, il jihad, è innanzitutto contro i governi ormai contaminati dalla loro apertura all’Occidente e per questo apostrofati come “non – musulmani”. L’evento che cambia la percezione della lotta islamica, lo spartiacque tra i due momenti di opposizione prima interna e poi rivolta all’estero, è l’invasione dell’Afghanistan da parte dell’Unione Sovietica; il concetto di jihad a questo punto abbraccia anche la lotta contro gli infedeli, e da quel momento in poi rimarrà tale. Ogni buon musulmano è quindi chiamato a compiere il jihad, ossia anche a difendere l’Islam in ogni territorio un tempo facente parte dei domini arabi e che era 4 governato dalla legge islamica: Afghanistan, Palestina, Cecenia, ma anche la Spagna rientrano in questo concetto. La resistenza in Afghanistan negli anni ’80, ha cementato l’ideologia jihadista come nessun altro evento prima, ha infervorato gli animi di migliaia di musulmani che sono accorsi in Afghanistan in difesa dell’Islam, ha favorito la nascita di migliaia di mujaheddin, perfettamente addestrati e abituati al combattimento, che, una volta ritornati nei loro paesi di origine, hanno cominciato a diffondere le idee rivoluzionare perpetrando la lotta fino ad allora intrapresa. È questa la genesi storico-sociale dei movimenti terroristici islamici nei Paesi nord africani. Tale fenomeno comincerà ad interessare l’Europa soprattutto a far data dagli anni ’90, cioè da quando le politiche particolarmente oppressive dei governi nord africani provocheranno la fuga di molti combattenti nei paesi europei, Francia in primis. Se le attività illecite in cui molti di loro sono coinvolti, vengono in un primo momento bollate come azioni criminali da parte di immigrati che faticano a trovare un posto nella società, ben presto ci si rende conto che l’Europa costituisce una pedina fondamentale sullo scacchiere della lotta terroristica. Comincia una dura lotta tra i governi occidentali che, sentendosi minacciati, cominciano a dare la caccia in maniera serrata agli esponenti dell’estremismo islamico e le organizzazioni terroristiche che affinano le loro tecniche e sviluppano le loro organizzazioni: da una parte vengono smantellate numerose cellule impegnate nel fornire supporto logistico, documenti falsi, fondi, e nuove reclute, dall’altra si radicano i gangli delle organizzazione in maniera sempre più profonda sul suolo occidentale. Il quadro si presenta in continua evoluzione. Gli attentati dell’11 settembre dimostrano tutta la vulnerabilità degli Stati Uniti che in virtù degli ideali di libertà che essi rappresentano si espongono drammaticamente ad una penetrazione agevole da parte di nuclei terroristici. A quel punto il pericolo che tale situazione possa replicarsi in Europa diventa sempre più reale. La controffensiva occidentale risulta però risoluta e incisiva, Al ā‘idaQ perde terreno in seguito alle operazioni militari avviate in Afghanistan nel 2002. Il porto sicuro dal quale organizzare la sua attività terroristica, nel quale addestrare i martiri, 5 non esiste più e diventa impellente spostare il proprio campo operativo cercando e trovando collaborazione con i movimenti islamici dei paesi nord africani. Il Maghreb rappresenta la scelta più logica, la soluzione ideale, in virtù dei legami trai i leader storici di Al Qā‘ida con i cosiddetti “arabi afghani”, i veterani che avevano combattuto in Afghanistan negli anni ’80, della possibilità di reclutare giovani maghrebini ansiosi di ripetere le gesta dei mujaheddin di vent’anni prima, dei contatti che i nord africani hanno con i loro connazionali nella vicina Europa. Nell’ampio quadro della guerra terroristica e del contrasto al terrorismo,il Mediterraneo ha assunto quindi un ruolo preminente di assoluta centralità. Tale progetto, da tempo profetizzato,
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