A Persistent Threat: the Evolution of Al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A Persistent Threat: the Evolution of Al Qa'ida and Other Salafi Jihadists CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for re- search quality and objectivity. A Persistent Threat The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists Seth G. Jones C O R P O R A T I O N NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE A Persistent Threat The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists Seth G. Jones Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-8572-6 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND—make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute.html R® is a registered trademark Cover image: Oleg Zabielin/Fotolia © Copyright 2014 RAND Corporation This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see the RAND permissions page (www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html). RAND OFFICES SANTA MONICA, CA • WASHINGTON, DC PITTSBURGH, PA • NEW ORLEANS, LA • JACKSON, MS • BOSTON, MA CAMBRIDGE, UK • BRUSSELS, BE www.rand.org Preface This research examines the evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi- jihadist groups, as well as implications for U.S. policy. It was con- ducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. This work may be of interest to government officials involved in counterterrorism; academics and scholars engaged in research on ter- rorism and counterterrorism; graduate and undergraduate students of international politics; and those in the general public interested in al Qa’ida and contemporary terrorist threats. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/ isdp.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ...............................................................xv CHaptER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Key Definitions ..................................................................... 2 Research Design .................................................................... 4 Outline of the Report .............................................................. 5 CHaptER TWO A Decentralized Movement ..................................................... 7 A Diffuse Structure ................................................................ 9 Differing Ideological Views and Objectives ....................................12 Far Enemy Versus Near Enemy ...............................................14 Geographic Scope ...............................................................15 Attacking Shi’a ..................................................................17 Other Differences ...............................................................18 Causes of Decentralization ...................................................... 20 A Growing Vulnerability ...................................................... 23 CHaptER THREE Growing Capabilities ...........................................................25 Number and Size of Groups .................................................... 26 v vi A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists Capabilities and Levels of Violence ............................................ 34 Core al Qa’ida and Affiliates ................................................. 34 Other Salafi Jihadists .......................................................... 38 Varied Threat to the U.S. Homeland .......................................... 40 Why the Expansion of Salafi-Jihadist Groups? ............................... 43 CHaptER FOUR Strategic Options ................................................................49 Strategy 1: Engagement ..........................................................53 Strategy 2: Forward Partnering ..................................................55 Strategy 3: Offshore Balancing ..................................................58 A Strategic Framework ...........................................................59 APPENDIX List of Salafi-Jihadist Groups ..................................................63 About the Author ................................................................67 Endnotes ...........................................................................69 Index ...............................................................................85 Figures and Tables Figures 2.1. Core al Qa’ida and Its Affiliates ....................................11 2.2. Notional Map of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Envisioned Caliphate ..............................................................16 3.1. Number of Salafi-Jihadist Groups by Year, 1988–2013 ........ 27 3.2. Number of Salafi-Jihadists by Year, 1988–2013 ................. 27 3.3. Areas of Salafi-Jihadist Activity in Libya, 2014 ..................31 3.4. Location of Selected Salafi-Jihadist Groups in the Middle East, 2014 .............................................................32 3.5. Areas of Jabhat al-Nusrah Activity in Syria, Early 2014 ........33 3.6. Number of Attacks by al Qa’ida and Affiliates, 2007–2013 ............................................................35 3.7. Far Enemy Versus Near Enemy Attacks by al Qa’ida and Affiliates, 2007–2013 .......................................... 36 4.1. Countries of Concern for the United States ..................... 50 Tables 3.1. Examples of Salafi-Jihadist Groups That Threaten the United States .........................................................41 4.1. A Summary of Strategic Options ..................................52 A.1. List of Salafi-Jihadist Groups .......................................63 vii Summary This report examines the status and evolution of al Qa’ida and other Salafi-jihadist groups, a subject of intense debate in the West. Some argue that al Qa’ida—especially core al Qa’ida—has been severely weakened, and there is no longer a major threat to the United States from Salafi-jihadist and other terrorist groups.1 Former CIA officer Marc Sageman concluded that “al Qaeda is no longer seen as an exis- tential threat to the West” and “the hysteria over a global conspiracy against the West has faded.”2 According to University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer, “Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic
Recommended publications
  • The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays
    Program on National Security at the FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE Al-Qaeda al-Shabaab AQIM AQAP Central The Foreign Fighters Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: Selected Essays Edited by Michael P. Noonan Managing Director, Program on National Security April 2011 Copyright Foreign Policy Research Institute (www.fpri.org). If you would like to be added to our mailing list, send an email to [email protected], including your name, address, and any affiliation. For further information or to inquire about membership in FPRI, please contact Alan Luxenberg, [email protected] or (215) 732-3774 x105. FPRI 1528 Walnut Street, Suite 610 • Philadelphia, PA 19102-3684 Tel. 215-732-3774 • Fax 215-732-4401 About FPRI Founded in 1955, the Foreign Policy Research Institute is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests. We add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics. About FPRI’s Program on National Security The end of the Cold War ushered in neither a period of peace nor prolonged rest for the United States military and other elements of the national security community. The 1990s saw the U.S. engaged in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and numerous other locations. The first decade of the 21st century likewise has witnessed the reemergence of a state of war with the attacks on 9/11 and military responses (in both combat and non-combat roles) globally. While the United States remains engaged against foes such as al-Qa`ida and its affiliated movements, other threats, challengers, and opportunities remain on the horizon.
    [Show full text]
  • Rights Watch
    British Irish RIGHTS WATCH SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE CONCERNING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS SEPTEMBER 2007 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 British Irish RIGHTS WATCH is an independent non-governmental organisation that monitors the human rights dimension of the conflict and the peace process in Northern Ireland. Our services are available free of charge to anyone whose human rights have been affected by the conflict, regardless of religious, political or community affiliations, and we take no position on the eventual constitutional outcome of the peace process. 1.2 This submission to the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations concerns the United Kingdom’s observance of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). All our comments stem directly from our work and experience. In the interests of brevity, we have kept details to a minimum, but if any member of the Committee would like further information about anything in this submission, we would be happy to supply it. Throughout the submission we respectfully suggest questions that the Committee may wish to pose to the United Kingdom (UK) during its examination of the UK’s sixth periodic report. 2. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2.1 In its 2001 examination of the United Kingdom’s observance of the provisions of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee recommended that the United Kingdom incorporate all the provisions of the ICCPR into domestic law1. However, the UK has yet to comply with this recommendation. Suggested question: · What plans does the UK have for incorporating all provisions of the ICCPR into domestic law and what is the timetable? 2.2 The Human Rights Committee’s last examination of the UK’s observance of the provisions of the ICCPR further recommended that the UK should consider, as a priority, accession to the first Optional Protocol2.
    [Show full text]
  • Arabization and Linguistic Domination: Berber and Arabic in the North of Africa Mohand Tilmatine
    Arabization and linguistic domination: Berber and Arabic in the North of Africa Mohand Tilmatine To cite this version: Mohand Tilmatine. Arabization and linguistic domination: Berber and Arabic in the North of Africa. Language Empires in Comparative Perspective, DE GRUYTER, pp.1-16, 2015, Koloniale und Postkoloniale Linguistik / Colonial and Postcolonial Linguistics, 978-3-11-040836-2. hal-02182976 HAL Id: hal-02182976 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02182976 Submitted on 14 Jul 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Arabization and linguistic domination: Berber and Arabic in the North of Africa Mohand Tilmatine To cite this version: Mohand Tilmatine. Arabization and linguistic domination: Berber and Arabic in the North of Africa. Language Empires in Comparative Perspective, DE GRUYTER, pp.1-16, 2015, Koloniale und Postkoloniale Linguistik / Colonial and Postcolonial Linguistics 978-3-11-040836-2. hal-02182976 HAL Id: hal-02182976 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02182976 Submitted on 14 Jul 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not.
    [Show full text]
  • ISLAMISM and ANTISEMITISM. PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE on THEIR RELATIONSHIP from CROSS-NATIONAL OPINION DATA Arno Tausch
    ISLAMISM AND ANTISEMITISM. PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE ON THEIR RELATIONSHIP FROM CROSS-NATIONAL OPINION DATA Arno Tausch What do we really know about mass support for Islamism? And what is its connection to antisemitism? Our analysis of these questions is based on pro- max factor analytical studies based on openly available cross-national survey data. First, we analyze the determinants of what led representative global World Values Survey (WVS) global Muslim interview partners to reject to have a Jewish neighbor, which is the only available WVS item to measure antisemi- tism. We also identify the extent of relationships between antisemitism, the economic and social situation, religion data, and opinions on terrorism among global Muslim publics based on the global Pew Research Centre surveys. Fi- nally, we re-evaluate Arab Barometer survey data on ‘moderate Islamism’ and its relationship to antisemitism. All our new quantitative evidence supports the hypothesis developed in this essay from the literature that Islamism is deeply connected to antisemitism. Our data also indicate that Muslim dissatisfaction and dissent with society, often mentioned as the drivers of Islamism, are in fact connected to Muslim secularism and a distance from Islamism. Channeling this dissent in secular left- and right-wing protest parties would be an im- portant future task in the stabilization of Arab and Muslim democracies. Keywords: antisemitism, Islamism, promax factor, World Values Survey. Background The comparative analysis of international opinion surveys has become an important field of studies in international social science (Davidov et al. 2011). Without question, the assessment of public opinion among larger publics is a vital element in any fight against terrorism, and not just against Islamist terrorism (Ayalon 2002).
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisian Islamism Beyond Democratization
    Tunisian Islamism beyond Democratization Fabio Merone Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Political and Social Sciences Promotor: Prof. dr. Sami Zemni 1 Acknowledgments This dissertation is the outcome of several years of work and research. Such an achievement is not possible without the help and support of many people. First and foremost, I wish to present my special thanks to Pr. Francesco Cavatorta. He met me in Tunisia and stimulated this research project. He was a special assistant and colleague throughout the long path to the achievement of this work. I would like to show my gratitude in the second place to a special person who enjoyed to be called Abou al-Mouwahed. He was my privileged guide to the world of the Salafist sahwa (revival) and of its young constituency. Thirdly, I would like to pay my regards to my supervisor, pr. Sami Zemni, that proposed to join the friendly and intellectually creative MENARG group and always made me feel an important member of it. I would like to thank also all those whose assistance proved to be a milestone in the accomplishment of my end goal, in particular to all Tunisians that shared with me the excitement and anxiety of that period of amazing historical transformation. Last, but not least, I would like to show my warm thank to my sweet daughter that grew up together with this research, and my wife, both paying sometimes the prize of a hard and tiring period of life. This research project was funded in several periods.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Sunnis Resist Extremism, but for How Long?
    Atlantic Council SOUTH ASIA CENTER ISSUE BRIEF Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, but for How Long? APRIL 2018 SCHEHEREZADE FARAMARZI ome fifteen million of Iran’s eighty million people are Sunni Muslims, the country’s largest religious minority. Politically and economically disadvantaged, these Sunnis receive relatively lit- tle attention compared with other minorities and are concen- Strated in border areas from Baluchistan in the southeast, to Kurdistan in the northwest, to the Persian Gulf in the south. The flare up of tensions between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran over Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen would seem to encourage interest in the state of Iranian Sunnis, if only because the Saudis present them- selves as defenders of the world’s Sunnis, and Iran the self-appointed champion of the Shia cause. So how do Iran’s Sunnis fare in a state where Shia theology governs al- most every aspect of life? How have they been affected by this regional rivalry? Are they stuck between jihadist and other extreme regional Sunni movements on the one hand, and the Shia regime’s aggres- sive policies on the other? Is there a danger that these policies could push some disgruntled Iranian Sunnis toward militancy and terrorism? A tour of Turkmen Sahra in the northeast of Iran near the Caspian Sea, and in Hormozgan on the Persian Gulf in 2015 and 2016 revealed some of the answers. More recent interviews were conducted by phone and in person in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and with European-based experts. “Being a Sunni in Iran means pain, fear, anxiety, restrictions,”1 said a young The Atlantic Council’s South woman in a southern Hormozgan village.
    [Show full text]
  • John J. Mearsheimer: an Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power
    John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power Peter Toft Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Østerfarimagsgade 5, DK 1019 Copenhagen K, Denmark. E-mail: [email protected] With a number of controversial publications behind him and not least his book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John J. Mearsheimer has firmly established himself as one of the leading contributors to the realist tradition in the study of international relations since Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics. Mearsheimer’s main innovation is his theory of ‘offensive realism’ that seeks to re-formulate Kenneth Waltz’s structural realist theory to explain from a struc- tural point of departure the sheer amount of international aggression, which may be hard to reconcile with Waltz’s more defensive realism. In this article, I focus on whether Mearsheimer succeeds in this endeavour. I argue that, despite certain weaknesses, Mearsheimer’s theoretical and empirical work represents an important addition to Waltz’s theory. Mearsheimer’s workis remarkablyclear and consistent and provides compelling answers to why, tragically, aggressive state strategies are a rational answer to life in the international system. Furthermore, Mearsheimer makes important additions to structural alliance theory and offers new important insights into the role of power and geography in world politics. Journal of International Relations and Development (2005) 8, 381–408. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065 Keywords: great power politics; international security; John J. Mearsheimer; offensive realism; realism; security studies Introduction Dangerous security competition will inevitably re-emerge in post-Cold War Europe and Asia.1 International institutions cannot produce peace.
    [Show full text]
  • POLS 3960: U.S. Strategy in Asia, Spring 2016 Syllabus (PDF)
    POLS 3960 U.S. Strategy in Asia Spring 2016, MWF 12:00-12:50 Classroom: Brouster Hall 040 Professor Nori Katagiri Email: [email protected] Office: McGannon 127 Phone: 977-3044 Office hours: MW 1400-1500 or by appointment Course Description and Objectives: This course is designed to explore various parts of East Asia and American strategy to deal with issues we face in the region. The countries we examine primarily include those in Northeast Asia, China, and Southeast Asia. We will discuss the nature of relationship the United States maintains with countries in East Asia and our strategic options mostly in the post-Cold War era. In so doing, we will explore what political ends the country has in Asia and what strategy there is to pursue them. In this course, we seek to explore the past, present, and future of East Asian politics, economy, and security gain familiarity with the theoretical literature on US interests in East Asia analyze the nature of US relationship with East Asia understand the role of power, resources, and ideas in the formation and application of national and regional interests investigate a set of strategic options for the United States, and hone critical thinking on political events taking place in East Asia The course is divided into four sections: (1) the past and present (2) American strategy, (3) Northeast Asia and China, and (4) Southeast and South Asia. First, we examine the background of our interests in the region. Second, we explore our strategic choices in East Asia. Third, we discuss strategic options we have in China and Northeast Asia.
    [Show full text]
  • Testimony of Thomas Joscelyn Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense Of
    Testimony of Thomas Joscelyn Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Editor, The Long War Journal Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade United States Congress “Global al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges” July 18, 2013 1 Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the threat posed by al Qaeda. We have been asked to “examine the nature of global al Qaeda today.” In particular, you asked us to answer the following questions: “What is [al Qaeda’s] makeup? Is there a useful delineation between al Qaeda’s core and its affiliates? If so, what is the relationship? Most importantly, what is the threat of al Qaeda to the United States today?” I provide my answers to each of these questions in the following sections. But first, I will summarize my conclusions: • More than a decade after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks there is no commonly accepted definition of al Qaeda. There is, in fact, widespread disagreement over what exactly al Qaeda is. • In my view, al Qaeda is best defined as a global international terrorist network, with a general command in Afghanistan and Pakistan and affiliates in several countries. Together, they form a robust network that, despite setbacks, contests for territory abroad and still poses a threat to U.S. interests both overseas and at home. • It does not make sense to draw a firm line between al Qaeda’s “core,” which is imprecisely defined, and the affiliates.
    [Show full text]
  • Jihadism in Africa Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances
    SWP Research Paper Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber (Eds.) Jihadism in Africa Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances RP 5 June 2015 Berlin All rights reserved. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2015 SWP Research Papers are peer reviewed by senior researchers and the execu- tive board of the Institute. They express exclusively the personal views of the authors. SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 10719 Berlin Germany Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] ISSN 1863-1053 Translation by Meredith Dale (Updated English version of SWP-Studie 7/2015) Table of Contents 5 Problems and Recommendations 7 Jihadism in Africa: An Introduction Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 13 Al-Shabaab: Youth without God Annette Weber 31 Libya: A Jihadist Growth Market Wolfram Lacher 51 Going “Glocal”: Jihadism in Algeria and Tunisia Isabelle Werenfels 69 Spreading Local Roots: AQIM and Its Offshoots in the Sahara Wolfram Lacher and Guido Steinberg 85 Boko Haram: Threat to Nigeria and Its Northern Neighbours Moritz Hütte, Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 99 Conclusions and Recommendations Guido Steinberg and Annette Weber 103 Appendix 103 Abbreviations 104 The Authors Problems and Recommendations Jihadism in Africa: Local Causes, Regional Expansion, International Alliances The transnational terrorism of the twenty-first century feeds on local and regional conflicts, without which most terrorist groups would never have appeared in the first place. That is the case in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Syria and Iraq, as well as in North and West Africa and the Horn of Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Volume X, Issue 2 April 2016 PERSPECTIVES on TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 2
    ISSN 2334-3745 Volume X, Issue 2 April 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 2 Table of Contents Welcome from the Editor 1 I. Articles ‘Gonna Get Myself Connected’: The Role of Facilitation in Foreign Fighter Mobilizations 2 by Timothy Holman II. Special Correspondence to Perspectives on Terrorism Why Has The Islamic State Changed its Strategy and Mounted the Paris-Brussels Attacks? 24 by David C. Rapoport III. Research Notes Analysing the Processes of Lone-Actor Terrorism: Research Findings 33 by Clare Ellis, Raffaello Pantucci, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Edwin Bakker, Melanie Smith, Benoît Gomis and Simon Palombi Analysing Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists: Research Findings and Recommendations 42 by Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker Evaluating CVE: Understanding the Recent Changes to the United Kingdom’s Implementation of Prevent 50 by Caitlin Mastroe In Conversation with Mubin Shaikh: From Salafi Jihadist to Undercover Agent inside the “Toronto 18” Terrorist Group 61 Interview by Stefano Bonino IV. Resources Bibliography: Terrorism Research Literature (Part 2) 73 Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes V. Book Reviews Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 30 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects 103 Reviewed by Joshua Sinai ISSN 2334-3745 i April 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 2 VI. Notes from the Editor Op-Ed: Competing Perspectives on Countering ISIS 118 by Hashim Al-Ribaki Conference Announcement and Call for Proposals 120 About Perspectives on Terrorism 122 ISSN 2334-3745 ii April 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 2 Welcome from the Editor Dear Reader, We are pleased to announce the release of Volume X, Issue 2 (April 2016) of Perspectives on Terrorism at www.terrorismanalysts.com.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership And
    The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership, and Cyber Profiles Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security July 2017 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence Led by the University of Maryland 8400 Baltimore Ave., Suite 250 • College Park, MD 20742 • 301.405.6600 www.start.umd.edu National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism A Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence About This Report The authors of this report are Gina Ligon, Michael Logan, Margeret Hall, Douglas C. Derrick, Julia Fuller, and Sam Church at the University of Nebraska, Omaha. Questions about this report should be directed to Dr. Gina Ligon at [email protected]. This report is part of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) project, “The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership, and Cyber Profiles” led by Principal Investigator Gina Ligon. This research was supported by the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate’s Office of University Programs through Award Number #2012-ST-061-CS0001, Center for the Study of Terrorism and Behavior (CSTAB 1.12) made to START to investigate the role of social, behavioral, cultural, and economic factors on radicalization and violent extremism. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S.
    [Show full text]