Atlantic Council SOUTH CENTER

ISSUE BRIEF ’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, but for How Long?

APRIL 2018 SCHEHEREZADE FARAMARZI

ome fifteen million of Iran’s eighty million people are Sunni , the country’s largest religious minority. Politically and economically disadvantaged, these Sunnis receive relatively lit- tle attention compared with other minorities and are concen- Strated in border areas from Baluchistan in the southeast, to Kurdistan in the northwest, to the Persian Gulf in the south.

The flare up of tensions between regional rivals and Iran over Lebanon, Syria, , and would seem to encourage interest in the state of Iranian Sunnis, if only because the Saudis present them- selves as defenders of the world’s Sunnis, and Iran the self-appointed champion of the Shia cause.

So how do Iran’s Sunnis fare in a state where Shia theology governs al- most every aspect of life? How have they been affected by this regional rivalry? Are they stuck between jihadist and other extreme regional Sunni movements on the one hand, and the Shia regime’s aggres- sive policies on the other? Is there a danger that these policies could push some disgruntled Iranian Sunnis toward militancy and terrorism? A tour of Turkmen Sahra in the northeast of Iran near the , and in Hormozgan on the Persian Gulf in 2015 and 2016 revealed some of the answers. More recent interviews were conducted by phone and in person in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and with European-based experts.

“Being a Sunni in Iran means pain, fear, anxiety, restrictions,”1 said a young The Atlantic Council’s South woman in a southern Hormozgan village. “We’re afraid to say we’re Sunnis,” Asia Center is a solution- added the woman, who was wrapped in a brightly colored floral chador oriented program focused on and, like others who were interviewed, asked that she not be named. the practical promotion of peace and cooperation in the South Asia region and its periphery. A group of high school girls in the same hamlet burst into giggles when The Center is committed to asked what they thought of the or Daesh. All said they were producing innovative ideas and actions that “wage peace” in South Asia. 1 Author interview, March 2015. ISSUE Sunni BRIEF RegionsIran’s in Iran Sunnis Resist Extremism, but for How Long? ISSUE BRIEF Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, but for How Long?

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EAST Some breakdown of areas where AZERBAIJAN NORTH GOLESTAN KHORASAN Sunnis are found: GILAN WEST AZERBAIJAN • Almost all of ZANJAN MAZANDARAN which is majority Shia and borders a part of Iraq that is as making it illegal to insult the Prophet Mohammed’s (though Minab is mostly Shia and Bandar KURDISTAN ALBORZ Abbas has a significant Shia settler RAZAVI almost entirely Shia. wife . Parliament, he recently noted, did not leg- KHORASAN population) and parts of . SEMNAN islate this directive into law. “We’re afraid the same will HAMEDAN • Almost all parts of the Baluchistan area of Victims of Systematic happen regarding the Leader’s historical and clear di- Sistan-Baluchistan Province (though not in rective,” he said. “Iran and the will benefit MARKAZI the Sistan part of the province); LORESTAN ESFAHAN Because most Sunnis also belong to ethnic minority from it if the government, judiciary, armed forces, par- • Kurdistan Province; ILAM groups, it is often unclear whether discrimination is liament, and all state organs take it seriously and act on (though the capital of Kermashah Province, SOUTH based on ethnicity or —or both. Most Sunnis it. It will also have a positive effect on Iran’s relationship Kermanshah city, is majority Shia while KHUZESTAN KHORASAN CHAHARMAHAL live in remote, impoverished areas, making it difficult with Muslim states and Muslim people.”8 the rest of Kermanshah province is mostly AND BAKHTIARI Sunni); parts of Western Azerbaijan is majority to tell whether poor government services are due more Sunni Kurds such as Mahahbad, Piranshahr, KOHGILUYEH AND BOYER-AHMAD to geography than to . One main point of contention is that Sunnis are not al- Sardasht, Oshnaviyeh, and Bukan counties. FARS lowed to build in major cities, including the • Turkmen live mainly in Northern and Northeastern However, discrimination against Sunnis is deeply insti- capital Tehran, where an estimated one million Sunnis Iran—their region is called Turkmen Sahra that includes substantial parts of . tutionalized in the ’s laws, rules, and reside. The government claimed in 2015 that Tehran had regulations. Article 107 of the Constitution allows only nine Sunni mosques, but prominent Sunnis say these • There are Sunnis in and Torbat-e Jam in Khorassan 6 Province, as well as Aimaq Sunnis. Shias to become Supreme Leader or members are merely prayer rooms. “The country suffers from SISTAN AND of the powerful Assembly of Experts that chooses the and ,” said Molavi Abdulhamid, • There are Sunnis in Talesh country in . BALUCHISTAN HORMOZGAN leader. Article 115, paragraph 5, stipulates that the pres- adding that the Sunnis’ other top demand is to be as- • Tehran has one million Sunnis. ident of the Republic shall be a Shia. The Constitution signed senior government and provincial positions. also denies ethnic minorities the use of their languages in schools, universities, and the media. It does, how- President Hassan Rouhani’s special assistant for religious ever, recognize Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence and ethnic affairs, Younesi, admitted in9 published as sources of law and religious education. interviews four years ago that discrimination against surprised to learn that Daesh is a Sunni group. “Is it really ty-seven-minute video message5 by Daesh in March 2017 Sunnis—especially for cabinet ministries and provincial Sunni?”2 one asked with astonishment. “If they’re Sunni, denounced Iran’s Sunni leaders, specifically prominent Sunni demands to eliminate Article 115 and implement governorships—was a result of the of hard-line they must be good, no?” wondered a young woman at cleric Molavi Abdulhamid Ismaeelzahi, and ac- Article 12—which grants them certain rights, such as full Shia clerics and promised improvements. In Rouhani’s another gathering. “Daesh uses the Sunni name to com- cused them of being stooges of the Iranian government. freedom of worship—have been consistently ignored. first administration, a Sunni served as deputy oil minis- mit , girls,” interjected her sister. “It doesn’t In an unprecedented move, however, Supreme Leader ter. Another is now Iran’s ambassador to Vietnam, albeit 3 7 distinguish between children and adults.” Iran’s Religious Makeup Ayatollah in September 2017 called for the only Sunni in the diplomatic corps. There are currently an end to discrimination against Sunnis and other mi- twenty-one Sunni representatives in Iran’s parliament, Persian Gulf-based, Saudi-funded Persian-language TV According to official figures, ninety-nine percent of nority groups. “All elements of the Islamic Republic up from nineteen in the previous session. In Sistan- broadcasts and a proliferation of Persian-language Sunni Iranians are Muslim, with the remainder being , are duty bound, in accordance with religious teach- Baluchistan, two ethnic women were appointed local religious websites are confusing many Iranian Sunnis , and Zoroastrians. Some 300,000 Bahais, the ings and the Constitution, to refrain from allowing any governors, and one was appointed deputy provincial about their faith and are seeking to turn them against largest non-Muslim minority, are not recognized as a discrimination and inequality among Iranians from any governor. Yet, no Sunni has held a ministerial portfolio. Iran’s Shia majority. Sheikh Abdulkarim Mohammadi, a religious group in the Iranian Constitution and are not ethnicity, race or faith,” Khamenei said in reply to a let- prominent Sunni scholar, said Sunnis are being pulled included in the official census. The figures also do not ter from Molavi Abdulhamid, the Friday prayer leader Discrimination against Sunnis was laid bare in 2000 from opposing sides—the Iranian state with its discrimi- give a breakdown of Sunnis and Shias. Iranian officials in the Baluchistan capital of Zahedan. when hard-liners lobbied to block the candidacy of natory policies and the hardline anti-Shia propagandists claim Sunnis make up seven to nine percent of the Kurdish Sunni MP Jalal Jalalizadeh to parliament’s in Arab states. “Iran’s Sunnis have lost their footing,” he population, but Sunni leaders and observers put the Abdulhamid has characterized Khamenei’s response as presiding board. Influential Ayatollah Vahid Khorasani said in an interview in the Hormozgan village of Herang.4 total between 12 and 25 percent. “historic and decisive,” but cautions that previous di- threatened to issue a fatwa delegitimizing the assem- rectives regarding Sunnis have not been enforced, such bly “if a Sunni was installed above Shias.”10 He vowed Last year’s Daesh attacks in Tehran compounded fears Nearly one million ethnic Persian Sunnis live in the south- to “walk in the streets wrapped in a shroud,” among Iranian Sunnis that the regime would use the threat ern provinces of Hormozgan and Fars and in north- Jalalizadeh said in a recent interview. of Salafism to intensify their suppression. Traditional ern Khorasan. The majority of Sunnis are ethnic Kurds, 6 are the followers of , whom they con- Sunni leaders have sought to alleviate these concerns by Baluch, and Turkmen, whose ethnic brethren extend be- sider to be the only rightful successors of the Prophet Muham- mad, beginning with Ali ibn Abu Talib (600-661 AD) and ending urging their followers not to join extremist groups. A thir- yond Iran’s borders. There are also a very small number of with ibn al-Hasan (born 869 AD), who, according to 8 Written questions were submitted to Molavi Abdulhamid who Arab Sunnis in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, Twelver , disappeared but will reemerge and bring peace responded in writing in September 2017. and justice to the world. 9 Ali Alfoneh, “Marginalizing Religious Minorities Risks Fueling 2 Author interview, March 2015. 7 “Leader Reiterates Prohibition of Ethnic, in Radicalism in Iran,” Middle East Institute, December 11, 2017, 3 Author interviews, March 2015. Iran,” Tasnim News, September 6, 2017, https://www.tasnimnews. http://www.mei.edu/content/io/marginalizing-religious-minori- 4 Author interview with Sheikh Abdulkarim Mohammadi, March 5 Arash Azizi, “What Does ISIS Say When It Speaks Persian?” Iran- com/en/news/2017/09/06/1512301/leader-reiterates-prohibi- ties-risks-fueling-radicalism-iran. 2015. wire, July 24, 2017, https://iranwire.com/en/features/4725. tion-of-ethnic-racial-discrimination-in-iran. 10 Author interview with Jalal Jalalizadeh, August 2017.

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Shia hard-liners are paranoid that if Sunnis occupy deci- Shi’ism the official religion to stem the threat of the ing states would exploit their ethnic identity. His son, to propagate its faith in Iran. Iran’s Shia regime also sion-making positions, they would be privy to state se- Ottomans (the self-declared defenders of Sunni ) , intensified the cultural as- started early on to proselytize in Sunni-populated areas crets and jeopardize Iran’s security, explained Jalalizadeh. to the west and the Mongols to the east. Converting similation policy, banning ethnic languages in schools of the country. Under the supervision of Shia clerics, They allege that Sunni allegiance is to Sunni Arab states, to Shi’ism was “a smart survival ,” said and local government offices and making it a crimi- the Islamic Propagation Organization built Shia schools not to Iran. The best way to eliminate this threat is to Nasrawi, an expert in Islamic affairs.15 nal offence to publish or even possess publications in and controlled school curriculums, said Akbarein, who marginalize and keep them out of public life. “When you those languages. That said, under the last Pahlavi rule, taught religious studies in both Sunni and Shia sectors create extreme economic hardship it’s much easier to The Safavid period is often described as the beginning religious minorities enjoyed greater freedom than un- of Sistan-Baluchistan from 1993 to 2000. convert them to the Shia faith,” Jalalizadeh said. of modern Persian history. Much of Persia was unified der the current regime. under a single political entity, transforming an essen- The various Sunni Islamist groups in Iran employ differ- A seemingly deliberate process to marginalize Sunnis tially tribal nomadic order and making Persian the Under the Shah, said Jalalizadeh, discrimination against ent strategies toward and Tehran. The Muslim is through gozinesh—a discriminatory and ideolog- main language—even replacing as the language Sunnis was subtle. “It’s true that the Sunni-populated Brotherhood and the and Ashari schools, ically based regulation that filters applicants’ eligibi- of theological discourse. areas were deprived, but at least they could manage which emphasize and tolerance, tend to lity to work in the state sector or to attend university.11 their own affairs,” he said. “For instance, a Sunni could steer away from regional tensions. Jihadist groups that Even when they are selected, they face another hurdle: The brutal conversion of the Sunni population lasted head the state-run radio and television broadcast in view both the Iranian and Saudi governments as her- herast, a branch of the Intelligence Ministry tasked with about 120 years, forcing droves of intellectuals, poets, their region or could be the general manager of a min- etics are more affected by regional developments and ensuring that applicants are loyal to the regime. scientists, and prominent Sunni [scholars] to istry department in their local areas.” identify with fellow jihadists. flee the country. Many with lesser means escaped to Not surprisingly, unemployment is high in Sunni-majority remote areas of the country, such as Hormozgan. “Because the state was secular, there was much less Saudi efforts to allocate funds to Iranian Sunnis, in the areas. According to the mayor of the port city of constraint on Sunnis,” said Sheikh Abdulkarim in Herang. form of scholarships to study in Saudi-sponsored univer- in Baluchistan, ninety percent of high school teachers and Soon after establishing a Shia state, the Safavids im- “They didn’t interfere in our religious affairs.” He was sities in the Persian Gulf, have not borne . An Iranian seventy percent of elementary teachers in Sunni Baluch- ported some 1,200 clerics from Lebanon’s Jabal Amel able to pursue his studies at a seminary in the south- Salafi Kurd, who studied in Kuwait on a Saudi scholarship, populated areas are Shia. The Sistan-Baluchistan and region to disseminate the Shia creed and vilify the ern port city of , which boasted thirteen later joined the -affiliated Call and Kurdistan regions ranked the lowest in a 2009 human de- Sunni faith—the effects of which remain instilled in seminaries before the . Reform Organization—which has good relations with the velopment index.12 Sunnis stand a better chance of get- Iranian Shia culture. The clerics popularized the Shia Iranian government—instead of working for the Saudis, ting low-ranking jobs that the government considers safe, festival of Ashura, which marks the death of the Imam The Shah promoted two schools of Sunni religious according to an observer who asked not to be identified. such as banking and agriculture, said Habibolah Sarbazi, Hossein, the son of Imam Ali, in a 680 AD battle with thought as a bulwark against Soviet influence in Iran. director of the Italy-based Baluch Activists Campaign.13 the Ummayad Caliph Yezid; to this date, Ashura epito- The Islamic regime has used the same — Iran’s northwestern Kurdish region was home to the five mizes Sunni of Shias. Deobandi in Baluchistan and in the south, and Muslim assailants in last June’s attacks in Tehran, the first time Iran’s Religious History Brotherhood in Kurdish areas—to stem the spread of that jihadists struck the heart of the Islamic Republic. In attempts to “Persianize” and assimilate various eth- Saudi Wahhabi-Salafi . Tehran blamed Saudi Arabia. But several Kurdish activ- Persia (the name for Iran until 1935) was predominantly nic, religious, and subnational identities, successive ists and experts discounted a Saudi role. “Most of the Sunni from the advent of Islam in the seventh century governments and foreign powers redrew frontiers and Saudi Influence Over Iranian Sunnis Is Salafi jihadis in Iranian Kurdistan have been influenced until the sixteenth century. During this period, the scattered communities around the country. The first Debatable by Iraqi Kurds,” said Mokhtar Zarei, a former Kurdish country produced some of the world’s top scientific significant redrawing of borders occurred under the political prisoner in Sanadaj in Iranian Kurdistan.18 and political thinkers and the most important books in the late 19th century, when Britain The extent of the Saudi ideological influence in Iran is on religion, including The Six Books of ,14 which carved up the Baluch homeland and divided it among open to debate. At the outset of the 1979 revolution, Kaveh Ghoreishi, an Iranian Kurdish journalist based in have gained universal acceptance as part of the official Iran, , and . the Saudis lacked a coherent policy toward Iranian Germany, said the attacks were “directly linked to the canon of . Sunnis; any financial help may have been provided weakening of Daesh in Iraq and Syria,” where Iran-backed In 1928, Reza Pahlavi began a full-scale redrawing of only to certain individual clerics. The Saudi aim was militias have been fighting the Islamic State group.19 At the turn of the sixteenth century, the Safavid dy- internal ethnic and religious boundaries.16 The secular not necessarily to spread , according to nasty (1501-1722) conquered much of what is now Iran leader was not as concerned about the religious affil- Mohammad Javad Akbarein, an Iranian scholar and The attacks reflected Iran’s ambiguous and at times and parts of and Georgia and made Twelver iation of Sunnis as much as he feared that neighbor- former Shia cleric. “What’s important for them is pre- contradictory relationship with Salafists. While tough serving the Sunni faith and maintaining a strong bal- on extremist groups threatening its sovereignty or ance with Shias,” he said.17 its military presence in Syria or Iraq, the Iranian gov- 11 Gozinesh involves an ideological test requiring candidates to demonstrate allegiance to and the Islamic Republic, 15 Author interview with Salah Nasrawi, November 2017. ernment has often turned a blind eye to such groups, including the concept of Velayat-e Faqih, or governance by a 16 Through a series of administrative divisions—in 1928, 1938, and Unlike the Islamic Republic, which subsidizes numerous most notably to let them fight US forces in Iraq and supreme Shia jurist. 1955—various Baluch-inhabited areas joined adjacent provinces, such as Kerman and Saheli (present-day Hormozgan). According Arabic language channels to reach Arab Shia, Saudi Afghanistan, but also to undercut the secular nation- 12 The national mean for the human development index was 0.717 Arabia has only recently begun to use TV networks in 2001 and grew to 0.747 in 2009. to Baluch expert Hadi Gamshadzehi, many Baluch were forcibly resettled in and Khorasan. Up to 150,000 Baluch were 13 Author interview with Habibolah Sarbazi, August 2017. forced to migrate to Arab countries and to Zanzibar and Tanza- 14 The books were by: Sahih Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Abu Dawood, nia in (Author interview with Hadi Gamshadzehi, August 18 Author interview with Mokhtar Zarei, June 2017. Imām at-al-Tirmidhi, al-Nasa’i, and Ibn Majah. 2017). 17 Author interview with Mohammad Javad Akbarein, August 2017. 19 Author interview with Kaveh Ghoreishi, June 2017.

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alist Iranian Kurds. There is no evidence, however, that though Sunni, not Shia, Kurds have been in the oppo- Nour’s Dubai director, Abdulsalam Mollaei, said as a rule end of the Qajar dynasty (1785-1925). It is older than Iran has actually financed, armed, or trained jihadist sition against the state, said Hawzhin Baghali, a - the UAE does not give permits to non-Arabic religious the Deobandi school that was born in ’s Ganges groups. based researcher of Iranian Islamist movements.22 networks “for fear of antagonizing Iran.”26 But of course, River Valley in the 1860s and was developed in Iran in authorities there know exactly what kind of work they the latter third of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, Iran has accused Saudi Arabia—as well as the Having failed to forge tangible ties with Islamists in Iran, do. “You will never find proof because the way they op- and Pakistan—of providing direct aid to Saudi Arabia has reportedly turned to backing secular op- erate is to avoid detection,” said the Kuwaiti official. “In the south, we do not like to call ourselves Deobandi,” Baluch insurgents, a charge Baluch observers dismiss. position groups, including the Kurdish Democratic Party said Sheikh Mohammad Ali Amini, the head of the Dar of Iran (KDPI), and to a lesser extent, the Komola Party. Oddly, Saudi Arabia, which promotes itself as the guard- al-Ulum religious educational in Bandar Since 2003, there has been an upsurge in antire- This alleged move has coincided with the renewal since ian of the world’s Sunnis, has not shown much interest in Lengeh. “We are only different in name, but similar in gime violence in Baluchistan, mainly by the Jundollah 2016 of a series of KDPI military operations, code-named the plight of Iranian Sunnis. “It’s because they are afraid our views.” He describes Asharism as somewhere “be- group, whose tactics include and behead- Rasan [uprising again], against Iranian security targets to provoke Tehran,” said the Kuwaiti official,27 adding tween and Salafism.”30 ing Iranian soldiers and Islamic Guards that ended a two-decade ceasefire. that anti-Persian may be a major factor. Another Corps (IRGC) members. Despite the capture and ex- factor could be Saudi fears of provoking Iran into stirring Asharis “pay attention to the inner self,” he said, and ecution of leader Abdul Malek Rigi in 2010, the small Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander, has ac- up the Shia population in eastern Saudi Arabia, which unlike proponents of Ahl al-Hadith, Ashari theology “cash-strapped” group continues to pose a security cused the Saudi consulate in Irbil in Iraqi Kurdistan of also complains about being victims of discrimination. stipulates that inferences from the and the had- threat with deadly attacks on government targets, being behind the attacks;23 however, Saudi Arabia and ith are based on rationality. The Ahl al-Hadith, on the noted Sarbazi. the KDPI have denied the charges. An observer quot- Other Persian Gulf states have shown similar apathy other hand, “are religiously dogmatic” and “on some ing KDPI sources said the Saudis offered money to toward Iranian Sunnis. Bahrain’s Sunni government im- issues are extreme and tend to exaggerate,” he said. “Anyone—especially in Baluchistan—who takes up arms some KDPI members “presumably to carry out attacks ported and Bedouin Syrians to increase its The Ahl al-Hadith theological school, which has been against the Islamic Republic is automatically slapped against targets inside Iran.”24 The KDPI has denied it Sunni population in relation to the Shia majority that championed in recent years by Salafi and jihadist with the jihadi tag, a tactic that garners wider public was involved but said that such payments could have it sees as a threat to its survival. A few years ago, the movements, suffices with appearances and does not support for the government,” Akbarein said. “There’s happened on an individual basis. UAE deported several Iranian Sunnis who had been interpret; it considers the Quran and authentic hadith so much talk of Baluch that it’s difficult to living in the Emirates for decades after relations with to be the only authority in matters of law and creed.31 disseminate who is a jihadi and who is engaged simply “The regional rivalries between Iran, Turkey and Saudi Tehran soured. This may explain why many Persian in an anti-government guerrilla activity for its rights.” Arabia have created an opportunity through which Sunnis who live in Arab countries along the Persian Since the 1970s, Ashari, Deobandi, and Muslim Brother- Iranian Kurdistan can become part of the bigger re- Gulf often hide their Iranian heritage. hood institutions have been encouraged, financed, and Baluch radicalism dates back to the Soviet occupa- gional picture,” said Mamand Roja, a Kurdish researcher controlled by the Iranian government. The Shah used 25 tion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Baluch fighters who and analyst. Iranian Sunnis Follow the Shafei School them as a bulwark against Soviet influence, and the had been recruited for returned to Iran after the Islamic Republic has used them as a counterbalance to war ended and formed Islamist groups, including the The most visible Saudi intervention in Iran has been The majority of Iranian Sunnis belong to the Shafei Saudi Wahhabi currents in Iran, Dudoignon said. Mohammad Rasoul Organization, which later through Persian-language TV channels. Even here, school—one of four schools of Islamic law in the became Jundollah and then morphed into Jaish al- there is no evidence that the broadcasts have radical- Sunni faith. Like the school—to which Baluch, As in Baluchistan, Hormozgan’s Sunni leaders have Adl, said Amdolmoqset Kamal, a Baluch academic in ized Sunnis or encouraged them to take up arms against Turkmen, Aimaqs,28 and in Khorasan province “always stood up” to radical movements in Iran, said Turkey.20 These groups, which are not affiliated with the Iranian state. adhere—the Shafei school relies predominantly on the Sheikh Amini, who describes Sunni ’ relation- al-Qaeda or the Afghan , have failed to build a Quran and the hadith. ship with Tehran32 as good. “We can freely voice crit- significant power base in Iran because of the influence The TV channel operators claim they receive funds from icism of government policies and communicate our of clerics such as Molavi Abdulhamid, experts say. wealthy Persian Gulf businessmen, including Saudis, but Shafei scholars in Hormozgan—except those educated demands. We’re in contact with the country’s highest not from any government. However, a retired Kuwaiti of- in Saudi Arabia29—follow the Ashari theology and marjai [senior clerics], the Leadership and the presi- “After the anti-Soviet jihad, the main priority of the ficial, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said he had have been under the strong influence of the Deobandi dent.” Government interference in Sunni institutions in Iranian state was to counterbalance Saudi influence in no doubt that Saudi intelligence was behind the channels. schools in Baluchistan since the 1980s. Ashari thought, the south is minimal “because we are attentive to what the Sunni populated regions,” said French academic Nour, the Persian-language channel that operates from which arrived in Iran during the Seljuk period in the we do,” further adding, “We seek unity and the preser- Stéphane Dudoignon, a Baluch expert.21 Dubai, is registered as an Amman-based company to cir- tenth century, had no institutional presence until the vation of Iran’s territorial integrity.” cumvent detection of a Saudi government role, he said. Because Sunnis are not homogenous, it is difficult to gauge the degree to which they are affected by the 30 Author interview with Sheikh Ali Amini, August 2017. 31 The Taliban belong to the Deobandi school. rising Iran-Saudi rivalry. In Kurdistan, for example, 22 Author interview with Hawzhin Baghali, February 2018. 26 Author interview with Abdulsalam Mollaei, August 2017. 32 However, relations have been far from good in past decades. In 23 Mohammed A. Salih, “Why Iranian Kurdish Party Is Stepping 27 Author interview with former Kuwaiti official, February 2018. the sectarian factor has always been secondary, even July 1994, Haji Mohammad Ziaie, a prominent Baluch Sunni figure Up Fight Against Tehran,” Al-Monitor, July 1, 2016, https://www. 28 The majority of the nomadic or seminomadic Aimaq tribes are in who had been critical of the government’s pol- geopolintelligence.com/why-iranian-kurdish-party-is-stepping- Sunnis. icies toward the Sunni minority, particularly in Baluchistan, was up-fight-against-tehran/. 29 Those who studied in Saudi Arabia were influenced by the Ahl assassinated under suspicious circumstances (his decapitated 20 Author interview with Amdolmoqset Kamal, August 2017. 24 Author interview with observer, February 2018. al-Hadith theological school championed in recent times by Sala- body was found in a valley, an arm and a leg were missing, and 21 Author interview with Stéphane Dudoignon, September 2017. 25 Ibid. fi and jihadist movements. his abdomen had been split open).

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Around 1896, when famine hit Iran, newly wed Abdullah Sheikh Abdulkarim partly blames the Iranian regime’s and Aisha boarded a dhow in Bandar Lengeh, along foreign policy and anti-Sunni propaganda for the rising with twenty-five mules, and sailed to the Arab side of popularity of these fanatical influences. “Sunnis feel the Persian Gulf. In Dubai, Abdullah worked as a ser- their identity is being eroded to the point that they feel vant for wealthy Iranian merchants. The couple went they have no choice but to embrace this hardline cul- on to have a son and two daughters. The son, Gholoum ture,” he said, adding that before the revolution, Shias Hussein, grew up to become a smuggler, mainly trans- and Sunnis coexisted and intermarried. Shias voted for porting sugar to Iran. His son, Abdul Ghaffar Hussain, Sunni candidates to parliament, but today, Sunnis are became a deputy mayor in 1959. Twenty years later, he routinely disqualified by Council that vets established the Emirate’s first factory for paint, plastic, candidates. and pipes. Today, he is a major industrialist in Dubai. Sunnis have stopped listening to him because his voice “We never felt we were discriminated against. To this is being drowned out by extremists, he said. “It’s get- day, they have treated us well,” said the eighty-five-year- ting worse by the day. Our voice no longer has the old Hussain, speaking fluent Persian in his crammed of- same impact because the opposite side comes for- fice. “My father always said we should never forget our ward with a stronger message. Their rationale is that Residents of a Hormozgan hamlet prepare for the Nowruz celebration of chaharshanbeh soori, an ancient pre-Islamic rite of jumping over fire. Only a handful of villagers turned up for the celebration, which hardline Islamists consider haram, or . Today, except for my eldest daughter, passive religion doesn’t work anymore. Today, I feel a religiously forbidden. March 2015. Photo by Scheherezade Faramarzi. none of my children and grandchildren speak Persian.” stranger in my community, even among my seminary students. I can barely hold onto my pulpit. My followers His ancestors fled Khorasan when the Safavids launched will multiply if I preach violence. No one wants to hear The Islamic Republic has capitalized on the influ- While the Ashari clerical networks provided the Iranian their Shia conversion campaign, heading south and - about tolerance, compromise and kindness. I am pay- ence and prestige of the Sunni religious schools in state with links to Arab nations across the Persian Gulf, tling briefly in various towns on the way. They had ar- ing a hefty price to stay moderate.” Hormozgan and has used them in diplomacy toward the Deobandi networks in Baluchistan have afforded rived in Larestan in what is now Hormozgan when Shah the Arab world, Dudoignon said. The main Sunni re- ties to religious authorities in Central Asia, the southern Ismail, the first and most brutal of Safavid rulers, died So far, however, no extremist movement has risen against ligious schools—namely the Dar al-Ulum in Bandar states of the former , and, to a lesser ex- and was succeeded by the more lenient Shah Tahmasb. Shias in Hormozgan. Lengeh and seminaries in Bandar Abbas—have, since tent, the Caucasus. In Baluchistan, Iran used Deobandi the late nineteenth century, educated a succession of leaders to rally support for the Afghan mujahadeen The last major migration of Iranian Sunnis across the Improvement, but Concerns for Future imams who have been active throughout the Persian against the Soviets. In recent years, such networks have Persian Gulf occurred shortly before and after the 1979 Gulf. Mollaei claims that there are about five thousand played a major role in Iran’s diplomacy with several post- revolution. Those who remained rebuilt their houses elementary, intermediary, and senior students study- “” governments, Dudoignon said. Khamenei with money they received from relatives. The most gen- Despite the hurdles, there have been some general im- ing at twenty-two Sunni seminaries in Iran. dispatched a Muslim Brotherhood leader as his envoy erous help, however, has gone to building mosques. provements for Iranian Sunnis. Official anti-Sunni rheto- to Tunisia following the election victory of Ennahda, a One tiny Hormozgan hamlet of no more than 1,000 res- ric has subsided, and Khamenei has called for lifting the The authority of Ashari theologian Sheikh Abdulrahman party inspired by ’s Muslim Brotherhood. idents boasts five mosques, but no high school, library, discrimination. Alam Saleh, a -based al-Khalidi al-Makhzumi, founder of the Sultan al-Ulama or hospital. academic, went as far as to say that this is “the closest 34 in Bandar Lengeh in the early twentieth century, How Persian Sunnis Survived we have reached so far to a Golden Age for Sunnis.” extended across the Persian Gulf, especially to Qatar and Many in the Arab states of the Gulf are also spread- Bahrain. In 1962, Iranian-born Sheikh Abdullah , There are few, if any, documents that shed light on ing among relatives in Hormozgan the strict religious The relative improvement began after Sunnis rallied the first director of the Administration of Religious how a large number of Persians remained devoted to teachings of extremist clerics who have been popping behind Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential Affairs in the Ministry of Education of Qatar, co-founded the Sunni faith during the that be- up in recent decades. elections. Since then, Sunnis have voted for reform- the World Muslim League to counter Egyptian President gan more than five hundred years ago. Did they flee to ist candidates—Rouhani won six million Sunni votes in Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab nationalism. He also helped distant areas to escape conversion, or was the central Fanaticism and ignorance about religion have become 2013—making them kingmakers in elections. transform Qatar into a center of Sunni learning indepen- government unable to reach them because they lived epidemic in some Hormozgan towns and villages, to the dent from Riyadh. In the 1980s, he was instrumental in in remote parts of the country? extent that Quranic texts and credible hadith are liber- “Twenty years ago,” said Saleh, “nobody asked ‘who mobilizing international support for the Afghan jihad. His ally distorted. Unlike decades ago, men and women do are Sunnis going to vote for.’ They asked, ‘who will the activities raised Qatar’s international stature and helped “Generally, both the above happened,” said Sheikh not mingle or share the same dinner table. Many mun- Kurds or the Baluch vote for?’ For the first time, the stem possible homegrown Islamist movements there.33 Abdulkarim. “We assume they mostly fled to remote and dane practices are deemed haram [religiously forbid- Sunni vote has entered the political discourse,” which uninhabitable areas, such as here, because they were den], such as plucking eyebrows or shaking hands with “indicates that Sunnis are being recognized as a lever not within the reach of the Safavid army. Historically, the opposite sex. Celebrating the ancient pre-Islamic and a political force.” 33 Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “Iran, an Unexpected Sunni Hub Between security was assured in places where life was difficult.” Nowruz festivities—including chaharshanbeh soori, an South Asia and the Gulf” in Pan-Islamic Connections: Transnational Networks Between South Asia and the Gulf, eds. Christophe Jaffre- ancient rite of jumping over a fire—are also considered lot, Laurence Louer (: Hurst & Company, 2017). haram because they are not mentioned in the Quran. 34 Author interview with Alam Saleh, September 2017.

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL ATLANTIC COUNCIL 9 ISSUE BRIEF Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, but for How Long? Atlantic Council Board of Directors

INTERIM CHAIRMAN R. Nicholas Burns *Maria Pica Karp Rajiv Shah As Iran’s political landscape has evolved, reformist move- The changes in the Sunnis’ situation, said Saleh, are ments have emerged among Sunnis who have joined also linked to the general situation in the Middle East *James L. Jones, Jr. Richard R. Burt Andre Kelleners Stephen Shapiro Wendy Sherman the country’s larger, mainstream religiously-oriented because regional issues are now more about religion CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, Michael Calvey Sean Kevelighan reformist camp. In so doing, they have shifted their de- than ethnicity. INTERNATIONAL James E. Cartwright *Zalmay M. Khalilzad Kris Singh mands from ethnic rights to general religious rights that ADVISORY BOARD John E. Chapoton Robert M. Kimmitt James G. Stavridis are more appealing to the wider Iranian public. They are On the home front, it is not clear if Iran’s strategy of Brent Scowcroft Ahmed Charai Henry A. Kissinger Richard J.A. Steele Melanie Chen Franklin D. Kramer Paula Stern communicating these demands through the country’s working with Sunni religious networks will continue to CHAIRMAN, dominant reformist channels and asking, for instance, prevent the spread of Salafism. While the policy may INTERNATIONAL Michael Chertoff Laura Lane Robert J. Stevens “why do Shia Kurds have a better chance to advance have succeeded until now, the advent of ADVISORY BOARD George Chopivsky Richard L. Lawson Robert L. Stout, Jr. than Sunni Kurds?” said a Kurdish analyst requesting could make it more difficult unless Iran makes “decisive David McCormick Wesley K. Clark *Jan M. Lodal *Ellen O. Tauscher anonymity. 35 The same goes with Baluch and Turkmen concessions” to the Sunni population, Dudoignon said. David W. Craig *Jane Holl Lute Nathan D. Tibbits PRESIDENT AND CEO reformists. Still, secular nationalist aspirations remain “We are not anymore in the political framework of the *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. William J. Lynn Frances M. Townsend *Frederick Kempe strong among the larger Kurdish population. post-Cold War years.” Nelson W. Cunningham Wendy W. Makins Clyde C. Tuggle EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS Ivo H. Daalder Zaza Mamulaishvili Melanne Verveer At the same time, Sunnis are developing strong new The explosion of Persian-language Sunni religious web- *Adrienne Arsht *Ankit N. Desai Mian M. Mansha Charles F. Wald leaders. “Now, there is one by the name of Molavi sites has created a new generation of Salafi-inspired *Stephen J. Hadley *Paula J. Dobriansky Gerardo Mato Michael F. Walsh Abdulhamid who has taken up that role,” said Saleh. religious and political activists who are questioning the au- VICE CHAIRS Christopher J. Dodd William E. Mayer Maciej Witucki “This in itself is a positive outcome because in Iran thority of the Ashari, Deobandi, and Muslim Brotherhood *Robert J. Abernethy Conrado Dornier T. Allan McArtor Neal S. Wolin there are no political parties to bring about change.” leadership. The Baluch , the French scholar Thomas J. Egan, Jr. Timothy McBride Guang Yang said, are already “losing ground to grassroots radical *Richard W. Edelman *Stuart E. Eizenstat John M. McHugh Mary C. Yates “Molavi Abdulhamid, a far-sighted leader, who un- movements inspired by cross-border and transnational *C. Boyden Gray Thomas R. Eldridge Eric D.K. Melby Dov S. Zakheim derstands that the problems we face today are tem- Salafi trends.” *George Lund Julie Finley Franklin C. Miller porary, doesn’t support militant groups,” said Molavi *Virginia A. Mulberger HONORARY DIRECTORS *Alan H. Fleischmann Judith A. Miller Salahaddin Shahnavazi,36 a teacher at the Makki school Iran’s military intervention in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen *W. DeVier Pierson David C. Acheson in Zahedan and a PhD student in theology in Istanbul. has also antagonized its Sunni population. Analysts *John J. Studzinski Ronald M. Freeman *Alexander V. Mirtchev Madeleine K. Albright Courtney Geduldig Susan Molinari Molavi Abdulhamid “ that only gradual strug- and Sunni leaders fear this policy could play into the TREASURER James A. Baker, III *Robert S. Gelbard Michael J. Morell gle can eliminate the problems and there is no need for hands of extremists. “When we tell our followers that *Brian C. McK. Henderson Harold Brown radical action,” concurred Sarbazi. our government’s foreign policy is not directed against Gianni Di Giovanni Richard Morningstar Frank C. Carlucci, III Iranian Sunnis, they ask ‘then why is it behaving that SECRETARY Thomas H. Glocer Edward J. Newberry Ashton B. Carter In 1999, Khatami instituted local elections, giving local way toward Sunnis abroad?’” said Sheikh Abdulkarim. *Walter B. Slocombe Murathan Gunal Thomas R. Nides Robert M. Gates 37 actors a bigger role in governing their own areas —in DIRECTORS *Sherri W. Goodman Franco Nuschese Michael G. Mullen another boost to Sunni political participation. Stéphane Abrial Amir A. Handjani Joseph S. Nye Leon E. Panetta Odeh Aburdene John D. Harris, II Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg William J. Perry Paradoxically, the participation of local forces—includ- began her career in Scheherezade Faramarzi *Peter Ackerman Frank Haun Ahmet M. Oren Colin L. Powell ing followers of mainly Deobandi, Ashari, and Muslim Iran in 1978 as a reporter on the English-language Tehran Timothy D. Adams Michael V. Hayden Sally A. Painter Condoleezza Rice Brotherhood schools—in municipal councils has con- Journal. When the independent press was excluded from Bertrand-Marc Allen Annette Heuser *Ana I. Palacio George P. Shultz tributed to the secularization of political discourse, Iran after the revolution, she reported from Beirut for The *Michael Andersson Amos Hochstein Carlos Pascual Horst Teltschik said Dudoignon. This does not mean that the larger Associated Press, covering the Iran-Iraq war, the Lebanese David D. Aufhauser Ed Holland Alan Pellegrini John W. Warner Sunni society has become secular, but that those reli- and Israeli invasion, and the arms-for-hostages ex- *Karl V. Hopkins David H. Petraeus gious movements have come to reiterate the demands change that came to be known as Iran-Contra. She went on Matthew C. Bernstein William H. Webster Robert D. Hormats Thomas R. Pickering of secular nationalists who were all but eliminated after to report for the AP from across the Middle East as well as *Rafic A. Bizri Miroslav Hornak Daniel B. Poneman *Executive Committee Members Pakistan, Afghanistan, , and Europe. Dennis C. Blair the revolution. Thomas L. Blair Mary L. Howell Arnold L. Punaro List as of March 1, 2018 Philip M. Breedlove Wolfgang F. Ischinger Robert Rangel Reuben E. Brigety II Deborah Lee James Thomas J. Ridge Myron Brilliant Reuben Jeffery, III Charles O. Rossotti 35 Author interview with Kurdish analyst, February 2018. Joia M. Johnson Robert O. Rowland 36 Author interview with Salahaddin Shahnavazi, August 2017. *Esther Brimmer Stephen R. Kappes Harry Sachinis 37 Governor-generals are still appointed by Tehran. Reza Bundy

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