july 2012 . Vol 5 . Issue 7

Contents Between Islamization and

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Between Islamization and Secession: Secession: The Contest for The Contest for Northern Mali By Derek Henry Flood Northern Mali Reports By Derek Henry Flood 6 A Profile of AQAP’s Upper Echelon By Gregory D. Johnsen 9 Taliban Recruiting and Fundraising in Karachi By Zia Ur Rehman 12 A Biography of Rashid Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British Operative By Raffaello Pantucci 16 Mexican DTO Influence Extends Deep into United States By Sylvia Longmire 19 Information Wars: Assessing the Social Media Battlefield in Syria By Chris Zambelis

22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

An Islamist fighter from the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa in the city of Gao on July 16, 2012. - AFP/Getty Images n january 17, 2012, a rebellion 22, disgruntled Malian soldiers upset began in Mali when ethnic about their lack of support staged a coup Tuareg fighters attacked a d’état, overthrowing the democratically Malian army garrison in the elected government of President Amadou Oeastern town of Menaka near the border Toumani Touré. with Niger.1 In the conflict’s early weeks, the ethno-nationalist rebels of the By April 1, all Malian security forces had National Movement for the Liberation evacuated the three northern regions of of Azawad (MNLA)2 cooperated and Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. They relocated About the CTC Sentinel sometimes collaborated with Islamist to the garrisons of Sévaré, Ségou, and The Combating Terrorism Center is an fighters of Ansar Eddine for as long as as far south as Bamako.4 In response, independent educational and research the divergent movements had a common Ansar Eddine began to aggressively institution based in the Department of Social enemy in the Malian state.3 On March assert itself and allow jihadists from Sciences at the United States Military Academy, regional Islamist organizations to West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses establish themselves in cities under its the Center’s global network of scholars and 1 Adama Diarra and Tiemoko Diallo, “Tuareg Fighters At- rudimentary administration.5 Locals practitioners to understand and confront tack Town in Northern Mali,” Reuters, January 17, 2012. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and 2 Its official name, in French, is Mouvement National pour other forms of political violence. la Libération de l’Azawad. Haïdara sur la confusion autour du nom Ançardine: Nous 3 Ansar Eddine has been variously transliterated as Ansar n’avons aucun lien avec les djihadistes d’Iyad Aghaly,” Dine, Ançar Dine, Ansar al-Din, and Ansar ul-Din. Iyad L’Independant, April 5, 2012. The views expressed in this report are those of ag Ghaly’s new movement should not be confused or con- 4 Personal observations, Bamako, Sévaré and Ségou, Mali, the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, flated with the 30-year-old Islamic movement in southern May 26, June 3-4, 2012. the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. Mali called Ansar Dine led by Cherif Ousmane Madani 5 AQIM and its predecessor, the Salafist Group for Preach- Haidara. See “Mise au point de Chérif Ousmane Madani ing and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le

1 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 from Gao also reported seeing members Gao and Timbuktu Regions conducted The core of the present crisis in of Nigeria’s Boko Haram and other by the author during a two-week span northern Mali is formed from a Salafi-jihadis who they claimed spoke in Bamako, the Malian capital, and the decades-old separatist sentiment of the none of the regional languages and northerly front line town of Sévaré in Kel Tamasheq (the endonym used by attempted to use English as a lingua May and June 2012. Tuaregs and other Tamasheq-language franca in Gao.6 speakers) that stems from economic Background inequality, neglectful development As a result, the northern two-thirds In 1958, Tuareg elders penned a letter to of the north by southern elites and of Mali have become a safe haven for Paris petitioning French administrators perceptions of ethnic differences. Ansar Eddine, al-Qa`ida in the Islamic for an independent Tuareg state from While external factors in the conflict Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement what was then a constituent part of such as Libyan arms and the influx of for Unity and Jihad in West Africa Soudan Français (French Sudan). notorious Algerian jihadist actors have (MUJAO)7—three Salafi-jihadi groups. Mali’s colonial rulers wrestled with The temporary alliance between the the question of whether to include “The northern two-thirds MNLA and the Salafi-jihadi forces Saharan Tuareg and Arab populations has now turned into outright rivalry. into a separate political entity or bind of Mali have become a safe The MNLA has been pushed out of all them together with ethnic sub-Saharan haven for Ansar Eddine, of northern Mali’s cities and towns by Africans in the southern regions.10 The Ansar Eddine and MUJAO, retreating term Azawad traditionally referred to AQIM and MUJAO—three into the wilderness.8 On July 15, the the vast plain north of the Niger Bend Salafi-jihadi groups.” faltering MNLA announced that it between Timbuktu and the town of was formally withdrawing its demand Bourem northwest of Gao, but gradually for an independent state, with a expanded to mean the entirety of northern Mauritania-based rebel official stating: Mali by assorted rebel outfits fighting brought the conflict much international “Independence has been our line since there in the first half of the 1990s.11 attention, it is also important to note the start of the conflict but we are taking that highly localized economic and on board the view of the international The sparse deserts of northern Mali ecological factors helped the fighting community to resolve this crisis.”9 The suffered a series of rebellions by come to fruition. The once vital tourism MNLA has been forced to pragmatically ethnic-Tuareg12 fighters that began industry has entirely collapsed while reconstitute its demands in light of its not long after the country was granted the region is concomitantly suffering eviction by Ansar Eddine and MUJAO. independence from France in 1960. a food crisis exacerbated by drought Before the present uprising, Malian conditions.14 This article highlights several of the Tuaregs rebelled against the state in core issues at stake both for West 1962-1964, 1990-1996 and 2006-2009. In the 2012 rebellion, the MNLA Africa and the wider world in northern The root causes of these armed uprisings broadened the geography of Azawad Mali’s vast breakaway region. First, were economic, racial, linguistic, or even further by including a swath of it analyzes the long-held separatist some mix of the three depending on northwestern Mopti Region up until the roots of the present conflict. Second, the particular perspective of those town of Douentza. On April 5, Moussa it examines Ansar Eddine’s narrow asked.13 These insurgencies were put ag Assarid, a Paris-based spokesman of Islamist worldview in context of the down by ham-fisted counterinsurgency the MNLA, was quoted saying: “Since events unfolding in Timbuktu. Finally, operations and peace negotiations. The the day before yesterday when our units it looks into the near decade-long 2012 rebellion coupled with encroaching reached Douentza which we consider to U.S. military relationship with Mali. Salafist radicalism, however, has be the frontier of the Azawad.”15 The article draws on interviews with cleaved Mali’s state and society between Malians of varying ethnicities from north and south in a way the previous From the conflict’s outset, the MNLA’s three outbreaks did not come close to goal was the swift formal political Combat), have had a presence in difficult to reach zones doing. partition of Mali. Ansar Eddine, in its of northern Mali for a number of years. The stark differ- role as a Salafi-jihadi organization, has ence today is that AQIM is operating openly and with 10 “Mali’s Tuareg Rebels Declare Independence,” Asso- expressed no genuine interest in the impunity in the three regional capitals of Gao, Kidal, and ciated Press, April 6, 2012. politics of post-colonial state building. Timbuktu as never before. See Andre Le Sage, Africa’s 11 James McDougall and Judith Scheele, Saharan Fron- Rather, its desired near-term objective Irregular Security Threats: Challenges for U.S. Engagement tiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa (Bloomington, is the implementation of Shari`a (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Stud- IN: Indiana University Press, 2012), p. 145. (Islamic law) throughout Mali. ies, 2010), p. 4. 12 The Tuareg (singular endonym Imuhagh) are an eth- 6 Personal interviews, locals from Gao, Bamako, Mali, nic Berber (singular endonym Amazigh) group who are May 29, 2012. one of the indigenous peoples of North Africa. They are 7 In French, it is Le Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad an often marginalized nomadic pastoralist group who 14 Personal observations, Mopti Region, Mali, June 3-5, en Afrique de l’Ouest. feel sidelined by the Arab and black demographic majori- 2012; Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat, “The Tuareg: 8 “Islamists Push Tuareg Rebels from Last N. Mali Bas- ties in the countries they inhabit and view their culture as Between Armed Uprising and Drought,” African Argu- tion,” Agence France-Presse, July 12, 2012. being perpetually under threat. ments, February 28, 2012. 9 Mark John and Tiemoko Diallo, “Mali Rebels Say Have 13 Personal interviews, locals who fled Timbuktu, Sé- 15 Rukmini Callimachi, “Mali Rebels Declare Cease-Fire Dropped Separatist Goal,” Reuters, July 15, 2012. varé, Mali, June 4, 2012. After Seizing North,” Associated Press, April 5, 2012.

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weaponry, they also accessed weapons in his capacity as leader of the ADC.22 stockpiled from previous outbreaks In the meeting, Ghaly described violent of political violence and raided arms confrontations between his ADC fighters depots abandoned by retreating Malian and AQIM in October 2006. troops. A press report described the Malian army weapons acquired by For Ghaly to then suddenly emerge as AQIM in Gao as a “vast cache.”19 a die-hard Salafist raises a number of questions, such as precisely when and There is evidence that the third source where he was radicalized.23 Regardless of weapons—those that rebels either of the reason for his radicalization, the never surrendered in previous bouts of secessionism or gained in the years 22 “Spotlight on Leader of Islamist Group in Mali,” As- leading up to the 2012 war—also likely sociated Press, April 27, 2012. forms a significant amount of arms in 23 It has been suggested that Ghaly became much more the current conflict. Ensconced in the interested in stringent variants of Islam after South rugged Tigharghar Massif due south Asian missionaries from the global Deobandi-inspired of the Algerian border, Tuareg rebels movement Tablighi Jama`at became active in Ghaly’s A map of Mali. then led by Iyad ag Ghaly and the late home Kidal Region. Ghaly reportedly became a Tablighi militant leader Ibrahim ag Bahanga Jama`at devotee along with other members of his Ifoghas The two groups fumbled through nearly began as a movement called the Alliance clan at some point during the 1990s. For Ghaly to make two months of power sharing in Kidal, for Democracy and Change (ADC) on the doctrinal leap from the revolutionary yet non-violent Gao, and Timbuktu that culminated in May 23, 2006, when it mounted attacks Tablighi Jama`at to outright Salafi-jihadism would have the declaration of the “Islamic State of on army garrisons in Kidal and Menaka been a sizeable one. See Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, 16 Azawad” on May 26. Sounding as if in which they acquired a large trove of “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and 20 they were trying to coopt each other’s weapons. Pitfalls on the Saharan Front,” Journal of Contemporary agenda, they issued a joint statement African Studies 25:1 (2007): pp. 148-150. It also has been proclaiming: “We are all in favor of Although on July 15 the MNLA publicly speculated that he was radicalized during his stint as a the independence of Azawad…we all recanted its separatist stance in light of diplomat at the Malian consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Ara- accept Islam as the religion” with Ansar territorial losses to Islamist fighters, it bia, from 2008-2010 when he was ejected by Riyadh Eddine’s Sanda Ould Bouamama adding, will not diminish Tuareg separatism over for being in contact with Sunni extremists. Aside from 17 “Allah has triumphed.” This awkward the long-term. Indeed, the renouncement Ghaly himself, Saudi and other reformist Wahhabi pros- attempt at a fusion of such disparate of the MNLA’s secessionist goal issued elytizers from the Gulf have been active in mosque con- ideologies was a contradiction in terms, by Ibrahim ag Assaleh, a member of the struction and other forms of religious development in the unraveling just days later. MNLA’s negotiating team who traveled Malian Sahel for many years trying to appeal to Malians to Burkina Faso for mediation talks, was in general. Some sources cite Ghaly’s presence in Jed- In an interview in Kidal following the immediately contradicted by its Paris- dah as beginning in 2007. See “Spotlight on Leader of 21 fallout with the MNLA in Gao, Ansar based spokesman, Moussa ag Assarid. Islamist Group in Mali”; author’s personal observations, Eddine’s quixotic leader Iyad ag Ghaly Mali, June 3, 2012. Still other sources suggest that Ghaly framed his goal in strangely modest The Role of Ansar Eddine cloaking himself in the mantle of Salafism is merely an- terms: “We are not asking for much: Ansar Eddine, an armed Islamist other ruse for power by a long-time savvy political op- just the application of Shari`a law in movement of the Salafi-jihadi strain, portunist. Ghaly supposedly made a failed bid to be the the northern and southern regions is viewed as an outfit whose mercurial leader of the MNLA and to be chief of his Ifoghas Tuareg [of Mali]. We are Malians and we are decision-making processes seem to clan which considers itself the ruling elite of the area. Af- 18 against the division of Mali.” regularly contradict their previous ter being rebuffed in this scenario, he then founded An- public statements. Ansar Eddine was sar Eddine and set forth a Salafi-jihadi religio-political Although much has been made of the formed toward the end of 2011 by a agenda at odds with historic Tuareg irredentism. Just as Tuareg rebels’ return from Libya via veteran 1990s Tuareg rebel leader importantly, Ghaly’s Salafism goes against the current northern Niger following the collapse of named Iyad ag Ghaly. Ghaly had been of Mali’s widely adhered to Tijaniyya, Hamawiyya, and the Qadhafi regime, this circumstance a mainstream figure in Tuareg rebel Qadiriyya Sufi tariqas that cross both geographic and more helped to reinvigorate a stalemated politics for many years and liaised ethnic boundaries. For details, see Steve Metcalf, “Iyad conflict than was itself the raison d’être with the U.S. Embassy in Bamako on ag Ghaly - Mali’s Islamist Leader,” BBC Monitoring, July for the present war. Although Tuareg several occasions including a May 2007 17, 2012; Brian J. Peterson, “Mali ‘Islamisation’ Tackled: fighters returned from Libya with fresh meeting with the then U.S. ambassador The Other Ansar Dine, Popular Islam, And Religious stocks of small-arms, ammunition, Tolerance,” African Arguments, April 25, 2012. The final fighting vehicles, and anti-aircraft 19 “Al-Qaeda Branch Seizes Key Mali Arms Depot as idea proposed in regard to Iyad ag Ghaly’s radicalization Crisis Deepens,” Agence France-Presse, May 27, 2012. deals with his role as an interlocutor during hostage ne- 16 James Butty, “Mali Says Rebel Tomb Desecration a 20 Abdoulaye Tamboura, “Tuareg Crises in Niger and gotiations between President Amadou Toumani Touré’s War Crime,” Voice of America, July 2, 2012. Mali,” Institut français des relations internationals, Jan- central government and the GSPC (which later became 17 “Mali Rebel Groups Unite to Create New Islamist uary 2008, pp. 4-5. AQIM) where he was exposed to that group’s Salafist State,” Agence France-Presse, May 27, 2012. 21 Sébastien Badibanga, “Nous n’avons pas renoncé à ideology in the process. For details, see Boris Thiolay, 18 Adama Diarra, “Mali Islamist Leader Rejects Inde- notre revendication de l’indépendance de l’Azawad,” Af- “Mali: Iyad ag Ghali, le rebelle touareg devenu djihad- pendence,” Reuters, June 16, 2012. rik.com, July 15, 2012. iste,” L’Express, April 12, 2012.

3 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 man once described as “soft-spoken and Zeid, another of AQIM’s southern amirs, Kasse described their reasoning behind reserved” in leaked U.S. Embassy cables has been spotted in Timbuktu.30 Ahmed the demolitions: “We found a man lying from 2007 now calls for “holy war.”24 Ould Cherif, the head of the ethnic Arab at the foot of a mausoleum. He was National Front of Liberation of Azawad praying. That is why we broke the door Once all vestiges of Malian authority (FNLA) militia, was quoted as saying that and took it off of its hinges. We think evaporated, animosity between ethno- Abu Zeid personally ordered his men out he was stupid praying at the tomb of nationalist rebels and Salafi-jihadi of the city to avoid conflict with AQIM.31 a human being. No matter who it is, fighters seemed inevitable. At the outset you can only pray to God.”35 When the of the conflict, the MNLA stated that By June 28, Ansar Eddine boasted that International Criminal Court indicated one of its goals was to rid Azawad of they had evicted the MNLA in totality that damage in Timbuktu may represent AQIM figures while its then tacit allies from northern Mali’s three key urban a war crime, Ansar Eddine’s ever defiant in Ansar Eddine were simultaneously centers of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu.32 Oumar Ould Hamaha said: “The only closely aligned with the al-Qa`ida As Ansar Eddine tightened their tribunal we recognize is the divine court franchise.25 Following a half-hearted grip over Timbuktu, they accelerated of Sharia.”36 From this rigid stance, it attempt at uniting for the purposes of vandalism of its Sufi holy places appears less likely that a negotiated power sharing in late May, it would not classified by UNESCO as protected settlement will be initiated before an be long before the AQIM-allied Ansar World Heritage Sites. This destruction armed intervention in the north. Eddine—estimated to have only a few attracted arguably more attention than hundred fighters—emerged as the more the flight of several hundred thousand Mali and the International Response well endowed war fighting group.26 refugees and internally displaced The most vocal concerns about the persons (IDPs). crisis in northern Mali have arisen from A key point of tension between the a few of its geographically contiguous MNLA and Ansar Eddine has been the Ansar Eddine’s emboldened spokesman neighbors, Niger in particular. The visible presence of AQIM leaders and for Timbuktu, Sanda Ould Bouamama, United Nations and Western powers, fighters in the areas under Ansar Eddine justified the Salafist destruction of Sufi primarily France and the United States, rule. AQIM’s southern amir, Mokhtar sites on theological grounds. Bouamama have not acted forcefully while the Belmokhtar, was reportedly seen in stated: “What is UNESCO? We don’t crisis continues along a highly negative Gao.27 Belmokhtar purportedly issued a care about the words of any entity trend line. The UN Security Council’s statement on the events surrounding the because God is one without partners. 15 members voted unanimously on MNLA’s departure from the city.28 He All UNESCO’s calls are just polytheism. Resolution 2056 (2012), which will was reported killed by the MNLA in the We are Muslims and we don’t revere put economic sanctions on individual battle of Gao that occurred between the any shrines or idols.”33 The Salafists militant leaders under the rubric of the MNLA and combined Ansar Eddine and of Ansar Eddine seek to rid Mali of UN’s al-Qa`ida Sanctions Committee MUJAO forces on June 27. It was later what they deem to be shirk (polytheism). under Resolution 1267 (1999).37 reported that Belmokhtar was still alive, They consider themselves the righteous and was basing himself in Gao after upholders of tawhid (the oneness of God) Despite the less than enthusiastic the MNLA’s ouster.29 Abdelhamid Abu whose inherent duty is to eradicate shirk response from Malian state actors, in a bid to create a more virtuous Islamic Economic Community of West African 24 Serge Daniel, “Mali Rebel Iyad ag Ghaly: Inscrutable society based up the divine principle of States (ECOWAS) leaders have been Master of the Desert,” Agence France-Presse, April 5, tawhid. Revered graves and shrines and attempting to cobble together a force 2012. ceremonies like Mawlid al-Nabi (the comprised of 3,270 proposed troops 25 Moussa ag Assarid, “Ma lutte pour la liberté et la birthday of the Prophet Muhammed) are from Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal that digneté de mon people se poursuit,” Le Blog Officiel de considered in violation of the Salafists’ could aid Malian regular forces in 34 Moussa ag Assarid, July 14, 2012. This source is the blog strict interpretation of tawhid. retaking the lost northern regions. In of the MNLA’s Paris-based international spokesman. reaction, MUJAO threatened Senegal 38 26 In contrast to the MNLA, it is believed Ansar Eddine Viewing itself as a new local standard- with reprisal attacks. Senegal’s has access to financial largesse from the vast ransoms bearer in regional Sunni orthodoxy, newly elected President Macky Sall AQIM has received from several European governments the movement believes it is justified then suddenly withdrew from the in return for the release of their hostages held in the Saha- in leveling Timbuktu’s historic sites to proposed coalition, citing prior regional ra. AQIM and MUJAO currently hold nine Western hos- rubble. Ansar Eddine member Mohamed tages. Ansar Eddine may also be funding itself through 35 “Ansar Dine Fighters Destroy Timbuktu Shrines,” al- AQIM’s well established drug trafficking routes and the mistes du nord,” Agence France-Presse, July 20, 2012. Jazira, July 1, 2012. looting of banks in the territories it conquered in late 30 Echorouk News, April 26, 2012. 36 Ron Depasquale, “UN Council Threatens Mali Fight- March 2012. See “Mali: Rebels and their Cause,” IRIN, 31 “New Mali Militia Leaves Timbuktu to ‘Avoid Blood- ers with Sanctions,” Associated Press, July 5, 2012. April 23, 2012; Thomas Fessy, “Mali Unites Against the bath,’” Agence France-Presse, April 28, 2012. 37 UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) later became Resolution Ansar Dine Islamists in Timbuktu,” BBC, July 17, 2012. 32 Tiemoko Diallo and Adama Diarra, “Islamists Declare 1989 (2011) when the Taliban and al-Qa`ida were decou- 27 Michelle Faul, “Mali Attracts Islamist Fighters in Full Control of Mali’s North,” Reuters, June 28, 2012. pled from the original sanctions stemming from the 1999 Void after Coup,” Associated Press, April 6, 2012. 33 Jemal Oumar, “Locals, UNESCO Condemn Destruc- resolution. See “Security Council Calls for ‘Road Map’ for 28 “Bellawar [Belmokhtar] raconte sa version des affron- tion of Timbuktu Mosque,” Magharebia, July 4, 2012. Restoration of Constitutional Order,” United Nations, tements de Gao et appelle ‘au calme et à la concertation,’” 34 Terje Østebø, Localising Salafism: Religious Change July 5, 2012. Agence Nouakchott d’Information, July 1, 2012. Among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia (Leiden, Nether- 38 Bakari Gueye, “Senegal Faces al-Qaeda Threat,” 29 “Mali: Al-Qaida cordonnes les différents groupes Isla- lands: Brill, 2011), p. 159. Magharebia, June 26, 2012.

4 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 peacekeeping commitments that had October 2002, the Pan-Sahel Initiative movement but it is attempting to frame already stretched the Senegalese was launched by the U.S. Department of its struggle in purely Islamist terms military too thin.39 State and implemented by the Pentagon mostly irrespective of Sahelian state to train and equip the militaries of Mali, boundaries after it dislodged its partner One of the biggest questions with Mauritania, Niger and Chad. The goal turned peer competitor, the MNLA. regard to Mali’s northern rebels and of the initiative was to bolster border While AQIM may be on the defensive in now entrenched jihadists has been security along the Sahel’s porous the Kabylie and Algeria’s urban centers, the potential role or lack thereof of post-colonial frontiers and to boost it has grown in the Sahel economically Algeria. The government of President interoperability among the regional if not in numbers of recruits.48 Abdelaziz Bouteflika has insisted on militaries.44 The poorly funded, low- its noninterventionist stance as the priority program was not begun in The collapse of the Tunisian and Libyan crisis along its southern border has earnest until the following year when security states has resulted in the only escalated over the course of its it was officially commenced in Mali by expansion of AQIM’s maneuverability six-month duration. The immediate U.S. European Command (EUCOM).45 in the Sahel and Sahara.49 It has also reaction by Algiers to the outbreak of The Pan-Sahel Initiative concluded in allowed AQIM to link itself to outfits conflict was to immediately withdraw 2004 and was then absorbed into the such as Ansar Eddine, MUJAO,50 and military advisers it had working with much larger in scope Trans-Sahara possibly Boko Haram. Despite years Malian troops and to suspend all Counterterrorism Initiative,46 which of U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in military assistance.40 The Bouteflika included the four aforementioned Mali, the region faces its biggest security government stated it sought a solely countries as well as Algeria, Tunisia, challenge since the Algerian civil war political solution to the crisis. After Morocco, Nigeria and Senegal. of the 1990s. As the Algerian state has winning its hard-fought independence from France in 1962, Algeria became a For years after these programs began, 48 Paul Schemm, “Officials: Feared al-Qaida Offshoot bulwark of the non-aligned movement critics who specialize in the Sahel and Neutralized,” Associated Press, July 9, 2012. in Africa, viewing itself as a politically Maghreb regions were skeptical of the 49 Nizar Maqni, “Tunisia: A New Home for Jihadi- protective buffer state between the U.S. military’s entrance into France’s Salafis?” al-Akhbar, March 3, 2012; Christian Lowe and 41 global north and south. In this light, historic zone of influence. Yale political Lamine Chikhi, “Algeria Says Kidnapped Governor it is wary of a Libya-style military anthropologist Mike McGovern stated: Freed on Libyan Soil,” Reuters, January 17, 2012. intervention in any form along its “the overall estimation of this author 50 MUJAO emerged in 2011 of uncertain and oft debated borders imposed by France or other is that the threat of violent jihadi origins. It says its aim is to expand jihad in West Africa, 42 Western powers. Despite hosting the activity in the Mauritanian, Malian, although many of its attacks have been in Algeria and the Tamanrasset joint military command Nigerian and Chadian Sahel is very Maghreb beginning with a kidnapping of three European 47 designed to coordinate cross border small though not inexistent.” AQIM is aid workers in October 2011 from a Polisario Front refu- efforts on AQIM in southern Algeria, regularly reported to be an organization gee camp in Tindouf, Algeria. Its center of gravity is in Algiers has not so far demonstrated an in decline, particularly in Algeria Gao near the frontier with Burkina Faso which acts as appetite to intervene in what it views as where the movement was borne out of a human conduit for its recruitment from littoral states 43 internal Malian affairs. the Salafist Group for Preaching and along the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic coast. Gao is Combat (GSPC). also equidistant from the border with Niger, which pro- The Post-9/11 Role of the U.S. Military in Mali vides MUJAO with aspiring jihadists as well. MUJAO The U.S. military’s engagement in Mali was commonly believed to not has been described as an outgrowth of AQIM’s expan- Mali has been evolving for nearly a be overly susceptible to Salafi-jihadi sion in the Sahel or a dissident movement maintaining decade. After 9/11, the greater Sahel movements because of the prevalence important ideological differences; other sources suggest and Sahara regions were highlighted of Sufi tariqa (brotherhoods or orders). it is a competitor to AQIM. Residents who fled Gao stated as lightly or undergoverned spaces Mali’s past Tuareg rebellions erupted that the ethnic and national makeup of foreign jihadists that were vulnerable to transnational from long-held local grievances as in their city differed from those groups in Timbuktu due Salafi-jihadi terrorist organizations. In the MNLA still continues to portray to Gao’s proximity to the aforementioned borderlands. the battle lines of the present conflict. MUJAO is believed to be led by a Mauritanian, Hama- 39 Tamba Jean-Matthew, “Senegal Changes Mind on Ansar Eddine is also a local Malian da Ould Mohamed Kheirou, who is described as a key Sending Soldiers to Mali,” Africa Review, July 11, 2012. member of the group’s shura council. See Dimitri Kaboré, 40 “L’Algérie décide de geler son aide militaire au Mali,” 44 James J.F. Forest and Matthew V. Sousa, Oil and Ter- “Libération des otages du Mujao: escale à Ouagadougou,” El Khabar, January 28, 2012. rorism in the New Gulf: Framing U.S. Energy and Security Fasozine, July 19, 2012; “Algérie: un groupe islamiste 41 Robert Malley, The Call From Algeria: Third Worldism, Policies for the Gulf of Guinea (Lanham, MD: Lexington ouest-africain revendique l’attentat de Tamanrasset,” Revolution, and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley, CA: Univer- Books, 2006), p. 166. Agence France-Presse, March 3, 2012; personal inter- sity of California Press, 1996), pp. 144-145. 45 Alex Belida, “US Counterterrorism Training for W. views, internally displaced Gao residents, Bamako, Mali, 42 Abdelkader Abderrrahmane, “Deep Read: Malian Africa Gets Under Way,” Voice of America, November May 29, 2012; Dario Cristiani, “West Africa’s MOJWA Tinderbox - A Dangerous Puzzle,” Mail & Guardian, July 14, 2003. Militants – Competition for al-Qaeda in the Islamic 9, 2012. 46 The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative was Maghreb?” Terrorism Monitor 10:7 (2012); “Radical Isla- 43 In April 2010, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger later changed to Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Part- mist Group Threatens France,” Agence France-Presse, created the Le Comité d’état-major opérationnel conjoint nership in 2007. January 3, 2012; “Al-Akhbar News Agency interview (Committee of Joint Chiefs, CEMOC) to jointly combat 47 Mike McGovern, Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses with Hamada Mohamed Kheirou, a commander in the AQIM. See “Al-Qaeda Offshoot Claims Algeria Attack,” on Terrorism (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, al-Tawhid w’al-Jihad Movement,” Ansar al-Mujahidin Agence France-Presse, March 3, 2012. 2010), p. 81. Forum, May 1, 2012.

5 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 applied pressure, AQIM has become non-state actors roaming northern more adept at exploiting the Sahel’s weak Mali. While no single group can claim A Profile of AQAP’s Upper security infrastructure and its southern to control or even hold all of this vast Echelon amirs have become emboldened.51 The territory, locals say that the AQIM’s Sahel has transformed from a rear GSPC veterans are the commonality By Gregory D. Johnsen logistical base to the locus of jihadist between the different jihadist activity in North and West Africa. movements jockeying for influence the united states has relied heavily on across the region.53 They believe that airstrikes to disrupt al-Qa`ida in the Despite the suspension of the U.S. train AQIM is what connects Ansar Eddine, Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) activities and equip program in the wake of the MUJAO, Boko Haram, and other in Yemen. U.S. forces killed Muhammad March coup, AFRICOM still maintained unaffiliated jihadists who have managed al-Kazami in 2009, Jamal al-Anbari and Special Operations troops in the to cross into Mali and what pushes Nayif al-Qahtani in 2010, as well as country. Their presence was revealed them further against the comparatively Anwar al-`Awlaqi in 2011 and Fahd al- when three soldiers died after careening secular MNLA rebels. Add to this mix Qusa in 2012. As important as these men off Martyr’s Bridge into the River Niger Arabs arming themselves under the were, their deaths have done little to alongside three Moroccan women while banner of the FNLA and black Songhais diminish AQAP’s strength. At the same driving from Bamako’s Badalabougou and Peuls reconstituting the Ganda time, U.S. strikes over the past two- neighborhood toward the Centre Ville Koy/Ganda Iso movement, and the and-a-half years have killed a number in April.52 narrative of the struggle for the north of of civilians, which has likely helped Mali becomes that much more complex. AQAP’s recruiting within Yemen.1 Conclusion A well-planned military intervention The ECOWAS talks involving Ansar in any form would require taking these By early 2012, as Yemen’s military Eddine, the MNLA and Malian interim increasingly fissiparous ethnic, tribal, fractured and split amidst widespread authorities in Ouagadougou mediated and religious dynamics into account. popular protests, AQAP seized and held by Burkinabe President Blaise several towns in the southern Yemeni Compaoré have led to no tangible The Salafi-jihadi agenda has so far been governorates of Abyan and Shabwa. effect. ECOWAS has been unable to get limited to the regions of Mali under Following the installation of Abd Rabu Malian political or military leaders to control of the Islamists. They have Mansur Hadi as Yemen’s president in green light its proposed intervention focused on eliminating the presence February, the United States increased force. Former colonial power France of their MNLA rivals from population the number of strikes in the country, has not demonstrated a willingness to centers, consolidating territorial and in May and June a sustained military get formally involved in the conflict as control and implementing their offensive by Yemeni troops backed it has done in the past with several of interpretation of Shari`a. On June 29, by the United States forced AQAP to its former colonies when confronted by MUJAO issued a statement claiming it abandon overt control of the towns it coups and rebels. AFRICOM intimated was behind a suicide attack far north had captured.2 that it could aid Malian or ECOWAS of Mali on a gendarmerie building 54 troops with logistics or intelligence in Ouargla, Algeria. Ansar Eddine 1 There have been conflicting reports as to whether or not gathering, but has not indicated that and its allies AQIM and MUJAO have U.S. airstrikes and resulting civilian casualties have in- U.S. troops may play an advisory role continually tweaked their agenda to deed led to a spike in recruiting for AQAP. According to on the ground despite nearly a decade suit the circumstances of the day. For the U.S. and Yemeni governments, however, AQAP has of counterterrorism involvement in now, the fight to advance their Salafi- grown in strength from 200-300 fighters in late 2009 Mali. Mali’s interim president still has jihadi objectives is primarily contained to more than 1,000 in 2012. Material in both Arabic and not returned from medical exile in Paris in northern Mali’s angular borders, yet English suggests that this increase is being driven, at following the brutal May 21 beating he there is no firm indication this shaky least in part, by civilian deaths. See, for instance, reports withstood in the presidential Koulouba status quo will hold. in al-Maddad newsletter, published by Ansar al-Shari`a, Palace in Bamako. Prime Minister Cheick as well as Kelly McEvers, “Yemen Airstrikes Punish Modibo Diarra continues his diplomacy Derek Henry Flood is an independent Militants, and Civilians,” NPR All Things Considered, in regional capitals, but the Islamist analyst working in MENA, Central and July 6, 2012. hold in the north is consolidating in the South Asia. Mr. Flood has written for 2 Given the nature of U.S. strikes in Yemen and the fact interim. Asia Times Online, CNN, Christian Science that both the U.S. and Yemeni governments obfuscate Monitor and Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst the details of military actions in the country, it is difficult Songhai Malians from Timbuktu and Gao among others. Previously he served as to maintain an accurate account of when and where the interviewed by this author described editor of The Jamestown Foundation’s U.S. attacks. Reporting by the New York Times, the New AQIM as firmly in the top echelon of Militant Leadership Monitor. America Foundation and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism all agree that the United States has increased 51 Henry Wilkinson, West African Studies Global Security the number of strikes since Hadi took office in February Risks and West Africa: Development Challenges (Paris: Or- 2012. See, for instance, Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Se- ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 53 Personal interviews, locals from Timbuktu, Sévaré, cret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and 2012), p. 24. Mali, June 4, 2012. Will,” New York Times, May 29, 2012; Peter Bergen and 52 “Three U.S. Military Service Members Killed in Auto 54 “Le groupe terroriste Mujao revendique l’attentat con- Jennifer Rowland, “Obama Ramps up Covert War in Ye- Accident,” U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, April 20, tre la gendarmerie à Ouargla,” Tout Sur l’Algerie, June 30, men,” CNN, June 12, 2012; “Yemen Strikes Visualised,” 2012. 2012. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 2, 2012.

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Today, AQAP is at a crossroads. Does al-Wahayshi was extradited back to Saudi intelligence agents, who were it revert to what it was prior to 2011, Yemen. Apparently unaware of his cooperating with the U.S. government a terrorist organization operating in close connections to Bin Ladin, Yemeni at Guantanamo, put al-Shihri on a list the shadows? Or, does it try to reclaim intelligence held him in the general of the 37 most dangerous prisoners, and the territory it lost and once again prison population at a maximum- the United States labeled him a “negative position itself as a governing authority? security facility in Sana`a. leader.”9 Still, on November 9, 2007, Whatever the group decides, the four top the United States sent him and 13 others leaders profiled in this article—Nasir In February 2006, al-Wahayshi and back to Saudi Arabia.10 Once back in the al-Wahayshi, Said al-Shihri, Qasim al- 22 other prisoners tunneled out of the kingdom, al-Shihri was required to take Raymi and Ibrahim Asiri—will play key jail and into a neighboring mosque roles in shaping AQAP’s strategy going where the men said their morning forward. prayers before walking out the “Nasir al-Wahayshi, Said door to freedom. After the dramatic al-Shihri, Qasim al-Raymi Nasir al-Wahayshi, AQAP’s Leader prison break, al-Wahayshi set about Nasir al-Wahayshi is a tiny wisp of rebuilding al-Qa`ida’s network and Ibrahim Asiri are key a man with a jutting beard and soft- in Yemen. He recruited carefully, to the future of AQAP.” spoken manner. Known by the kunya Abu relying on the relationships he had Basir, he was born in 1976 in the region built during his years in prison. of Mukayras in what was then Abyan.3 Months later, in June 2007, Qasim al- Redistricting in 1998 put Mukayras Raymi announced al-Wahayshi as al- part in a rehabilitation program run by in al-Bayda and that same year al- Qa`ida in Yemen’s new commander.7 the Ministry of the Interior. Less than Wahayshi left Yemen for Afghanistan.4 Al-Wahayshi immediately set out to a year later, in September 2008, Saudi He had just graduated from one of correct some of al-Qa`ida’s mistakes officials decided he no longer posed Yemen’s private religious institutes, of the past. Using the lessons he had a threat and he was released.11 The which had been established in the 1970s learned from Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, 35-year-old al-Shihri was offered a wife and 1980s as a way to convince Yemeni al-Wahayshi designed a network that and a job, but he declined. tribesmen that a republican form of could withstand the loss of key cell government was compatible with Islam. leaders and, most importantly, he Within weeks of his release, al-Shihri Staffed by Egyptian exiles and Saudi realized that to win in Yemen al-Qa`ida organized and led several former teachers, many of these institutes needed popular support. To that end, Guantanamo Bay detainees over the eventually gravitated toward the more al-Wahayshi attempted to minimize border to Yemen to rejoin al-Qa`ida. In radical works of Islamic theology. Muslim civilian casualties and provide January 2009, al-Shihri and Muhammad a clear rationale for those al-Qa`ida al-`Awfi, another former Guantanamo Al-Wahayshi arrived in Afghanistan considered legitimate targets. Bay detainee, appeared alongside Nasir in the months after Usama bin Ladin’s al-Wahayshi and Qasim al-Raymi in 1998 fatwa, declaring war on the United In 2009, al-Wahayshi oversaw what a video announcing the formation of States and Israel, and he soon joined he ambitiously called a merger of AQAP. al-Qa`ida. Bin Laden made the young the Yemeni and Saudi branches of Yemeni his personal secretary, and for al-Qa`ida. The new organization, al- As the deputy commander and highest- the next four years the two were nearly Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, has ranking Saudi in AQAP, al-Shihri inseparable.5 Al-Wahayshi spent all of since attempted several attacks against played a key role in recruiting other his time with Bin Ladin, watching as the U.S. and Saudi targets. Most notably, Saudis and fundraising in the kingdom. older man built and ran an international it smuggled a bomb onto a U.S.-bound In late 2009, a cell phone video of al- organization. He sat in on councils and airliner on Christmas Day 2009. Shihri surfaced in which he made a plea helped with correspondence. for money from wealthy Saudi donors. Said al-Shihri, AQAP’s Deputy Leader In an effort to avoid detection the video After the 9/11 attacks and the confused On September 11, 2001, Said al-Shihri never left the phone on which it was aftermath of the Battle of Tora Bora in was at home in Saudi Arabia. A veteran recorded. Instead, an AQAP courier late 2001, al-Wahayshi was separated jihadist with experience in Afghanistan traveled throughout Saudi Arabia from the al-Qa`ida commander. Bin and Chechnya, he traveled to Bahrain on showing the video message to different Laden escaped into Pakistan, while al- September 23 before making his way to individuals.12 Wahayshi moved south toward Iran, Afghanistan.8 Al-Shihri was captured where he was eventually arrested and in December 2001 and later sent to held for nearly two years.6 In late 2003, Guantanamo Bay.

3 UN Security Council SC/9848, January 19, 2010. New York Times, July 6, 2010. 9 Ibid. 4 Ibrahim al-Maqhafi, Mu’ajim al-buldan wa-l-qaba’il al- 7 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Yemen Attack Reveals Struggles 10 Robert F. Worth, “Freed by the U.S., Saudi Becomes a yamaniya, volumes 1-2 (Sana`a: Dar al-Kalimah, 2002), Among al-Qaeda Ranks,” Terrorism Focus 4:22 (2007). Qaeda Chief,” New York Times, January 22, 2009. pp. 1269-1270. 8 “Said al-Shihri,” Administrative Review Board Sum- 11 Abdullah al-Oraifij, “Shihri’s Father Damns Him for 5 Jabir al-Fayfi, “Interview on Hamuna,” Saudi Televi- maries, Round 2, Guantanamo Bay, available at http:// Returning to al-Qaeda,” Saudi Gazette, January 26, 2009. sion, December 2010. projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/372-said- 12 “Al-Arabiya takashif rasala min al-qa`ida,” al-Arabi- 6 Robert F. Worth, “Is Yemen the Next Afghanistan?” ali-al-shihri/documents/3. ya.net, December 27, 2009.

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Al-Shihri has also been an important Al-Raymi has been reported killed When Asiri was released he started voice in planning AQAP’s external plots. several times, including in a U.S. another cell, only this time he was In 2009, al-Shihri modified al-Raymi’s airstrike in January 2010, but he has looking to fight the Saudis as well as original plan to assassinate Muhammad always survived.18 His younger brother, the Americans. Muhammad bin Nayif’s bin Nayif, convincing the Yemeni that Ali, is currently in Guantanamo Bay. men from the Ministry of the Interior the plot required a Saudi bomber.13 again broke up the cell. Asiri and his Ibrahim Asiri, AQAP’s Chief Bombmaker younger brother, Abdullah, escaped the Qasim al-Raymi, AQAP’s Military Commander Following the death of Anwar al-`Awlaqi crackdown and fled to Yemen, crossing Currently AQAP’s military commander, in September 2011, Ibrahim Asiri has the border in August 2006.23 Qasim al-Raymi has a commanding emerged in Western media reports presence and a subtle mind. During his as AQAP’s biggest threat.19 Much of In the nearly six years since Asiri’s time in a Yemeni prison, al-Raymi often this reporting, like that surrounding escape from Riyadh, he has emerged delivered the Friday sermon for his al-`Awlaqi, focuses on a single as one of AQAP’s top bombmakers. fellow prisoners, and it was al-Raymi individual—an “evil genius”20—as He made the bomb his brother, who first had the idea of using one of opposed to the more accurate if less Abdullah, used in AQAP’s attempted Saudi Arabia’s early successes in the spectacular truth of a group effort. assassination of Muhammad bin Nayif war on AQAP against the kingdom. In Al-Raymi thought of the idea to in August 2009, and he built the one the spring of 2009, al-Raymi told Said Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab smuggled al-Shihri about his idea to smuggle a “In the nearly six years on board a Northwest Airlines plane on suicide bomber into Saudi Arabia posing Christmas Day later that same year. It as a repentant terrorist.14 The plan, al- since Asiri’s escape from is unclear whether Asiri built the two Raymi explained, would turn Saudi Riyadh, he has emerged explosives used in the 2010 parcel bomb Arabia’s earlier victory in convincing plot or the latest underwear bomb that an AQAP commander to surrender into as one of AQAP’s top was intercepted by an undercover agent a defeat. Al-Raymi thought the bomber bombmakers.” in early 2012. What does seem clear is could get close enough to Muhammad bin that Asiri, who apparently acquired Nayif, Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism his bombmaking skills after arriving head, to assassinate the prince. The in Yemen, is also training others in eventual attack, in August 2009, barely assassinate Bin Nayif—the plot from an effort to not only increase AQAP’s missed killing Bin Nayif. which AQAP’s attempts against the capabilities, but potentially to replace United States have stemmed—but it him should he be killed. Born in 1978, al-Raymi spent some time was al-Shihri who, along with others, in the 1990s at al-Qa`ida’s training refined the plot and Asiri who provided In late 2010, following the parcel bomb camps in Afghanistan.15 He was among the technical expertise.21 plot, an AQAP author mocked Western the 23 prisoners who escaped in February analysts who were focused exclusively 2006 and it was al-Raymi, more than Asiri did not plan to join al-Qa`ida, on Asiri, asking: “Isn’t it funny how anyone else, who helped al-Wahayshi at least initially. In 2003, when the America thinks AQAP has only one rebuild al-Qa`ida’s fractured network United States invaded Iraq, Asiri major bombmaker?”24 in Yemen.16 More recently, al-Raymi has was a chemistry student at King Saud played a key role in AQAP’s takeover University in Riyadh. Within months Conclusion of towns in Abyan and Shabwa, and he had abandoned his studies and Nasir al-Wahayshi, Said al-Shihri, evidence from the martyr biographies joined a group that was looking to fight Qasim al-Raymi and Ibrahim Asiri the organization often publishes on the against U.S. forces in Iraq. Saudi troops are key to the future of AQAP. Yet to internet suggests that he often directs uncovered the cell and seized Asiri, truly dismantle and disrupt AQAP, the movements of fighters.17 imprisoning him for several months. Yemen and the United States must both Asiri’s time in prison radicalized him. eliminate the group’s leadership and “Up until that point I didn’t know that erode the popular support that has led to

13 Turki al-Sahayl, “Tafasil jadid min muhawala ighti- the Saudi government was in the service an influx of new recruits in recent years. 22 yal Muhammad bin nayif,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 12, of the crusaders,” he later said. 2011. Gregory D. Johnsen is the author of The 14 Ibid. 18 Sudarsan Raghavan, “Yemeni Airstrike Kills Six Sus- Last Refuge, Yemen, al-Qaeda and 15 United Nations 1267 Committee, July 3, 2012. pected al-Qaeda Militants,” Washington Post, January 16, America’s War in Arabia, due out this 16 Al-Raymi delivered al-Qa`ida’s first audio message 2010. fall from W.W. Norton. A former Fulbright following its resurrection in 2007. He was also the in- 19 Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson and Tim Lister, “Al- Fellow in Yemen, he is currently a Ph.D. dividual who announced that al-Wahayshi had been Qaeda’s Biggest Threat,” CNN, February 16, 2012. candidate in Near Eastern Studies at named the amir of the new group with al-Raymi as his 20 Representative Peter King, as quoted in Sudarsan Princeton University and the author of the deputy commander. Following the “merger” that formed Raghavan and Peter Finn, “Al Qaeda Bombmaker Rep- Yemen blog, Waq al-Waq. AQAP in January 2009, al-Raymi was named a “military resents CIA’s Worst Fears,” Washington Post, May 8, commander,” while al-Shihri, a Saudi, became AQAP’s 2012. 23 Ibid. deputy commander. 21 Al-Sahayl. 24 “Questions We Should be Asking,” Inspire 3 (2010): 17 See, for instance, “Shuhada al-jazira #10, Mawhid al- 22 Salim al-Najdi, “Sira al-datiya abu al-khayr, ‘abdullah p. 6. The author thanks Aaron Zelin for help in locating Maribi,” al-Malahim Media, March 2012. hasan tali ‘asiri,” Sada al-Malahim 11, November 2009. this source.

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With its affluent residents, Karachi Recruitment Taliban Recruiting and is fertile ground not only for criminal Karachi’s role in recruitment for Fundraising in Karachi groups and armed wings of political and al-Qa`ida and Taliban groups is religious parties, but also for Taliban underreported. While the recruiting By Zia Ur Rehman militants as well as al-Qa`ida. During pool in the tribal areas is largely the last decade, there has been an influx uneducated, Karachi offers a very karachi is pakistan’s commercial hub of Pashtun and Sindhi people to the city different dynamic. Karachi is recognized as well as its largest city. Taking due to displacement caused by ongoing for its academic institutions as well as advantage of Karachi’s ongoing ethnic Pakistani military operations in the religious seminaries. and sectarian violence, militants from country’s tribal areas, as well as by several Taliban factions and al-Qa`ida recent flooding in Sindh Province.5 One professor in the Applied Physics have moved to the city to escape U.S. department at Karachi University told a drone strikes and Pakistani military Karachi is considered an attractive reporter in May 2011 that the material operations in Pakistan’s northwest hideout for al-Qa`ida and Taliban learned in certain courses could be used tribal regions.1 groups because the sheer size of the by students for militant purposes.11 city, combined with its assortment of “Last semester, I was planning to start Karachi’s role as a shelter for al-Qa`ida ethnic and linguistic groups, makes it and Taliban militants is well known. easy to live and operate unseen.6 Al- “One professor in This article, however, provides clarity Qa`ida and Taliban groups can also on how al-Qa`ida and Taliban militants rely on logistical and other support the Applied Physics are using Karachi to recruit university- from Karachi’s assortment of militant, department at Karachi educated youth as well as finance religious and sectarian groups.7 The their operations against Pakistan and capture of several high-profile al-Qa`ida University told a reporter neighboring Afghanistan. and Taliban leaders from Karachi shows in May 2011 that the that both organizations are operating in A Brief Profile of Karachi City the city.8 material learned in certain Karachi is Pakistan’s financial hub courses could be used with an estimated population of 18 Security experts argue that al-Qa`ida million.2 It accounts for the lion’s share has successfully merged with Karachi- by students for militant of Pakistan’s gross domestic product based local militant groups in Pakistan, purposes.” and generates at least 60% of national and is in the process of shifting its revenue.3 It is home to Pakistan’s central base from the tribal areas to urban bank and its stock exchange. Karachi areas, especially Karachi, to avoid drone is where national and multinational strikes.9 These local militant groups a project with my students to remotely corporations—such as international include Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Jundullah, control a device, but then stopped banks and real estate companies—have Jaysh-i-Muhammad, Jamaat-ul-Furqan, when I learnt that one of them hailed established their Pakistan operations. Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, from Waziristan,” the professor said.12 Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, and Harkat-ul- The professor clarified that he was Karachi is a key port city strategically Jihad-i-Islami.10 not profiling students from Pakistan’s located on the shores of the Indian tribal areas, but he did worry that the Ocean, serving as a major shipping and material learned in university courses maritime hub. It is the primary entry- could be applied in terrorist attacks. point for U.S. and NATO supplies for

Afghanistan. The majority of NATO 5 Zia Ur Rehman, “Demographic Divide,” Friday Times, Recruitment from universities was supplies arrive at Karachi port where July 15-21, 2011. highlighted after the arrests of Dr. they are trucked through Pakistan to 6 Personal interview, ChaudryAslam Khan, head of the Akmal Waheed and Dr. Arshad 4 two entry points into Afghanistan. Anti-Extremism Cell (AEC), Karachi Police, Karachi, Waheed in April 2004, two Pakistani Pakistan, June 2, 2012. brothers. The men were accused of 7 Zia Ur Rehman, “Karachi’s New Terrorist Groups,” having links to al-Qa`ida, attacking a Friday Times, January 6-12, 2012. Karachi corps commander’s convoy and 1 Personal interview, militant linked to the TTP in Kara- 8 In the past decade, a number of high-profile al-Qa`ida aiding financially as well as harboring chi, Pakistan, January 5, 2012. and Taliban leaders have been arrested in Karachi. These activists of the banned Jundullah 2 Pamela Constable, “Bombing and Fire Disrupt a Frag- include, but are not limited to, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abdu militant group. The brothers, who ile Peace in Karachi, Pakistan,” Washington Post, January Ali Sharqawi, Ammar al-Balochi, Walid Mohammad were former leaders of the Pakistan 4, 2010. Salih bin Attash, Jack Thomas, Majid Khan and Mullah Islamic Medical Association (PIMA), 3 “Karachi Contributes 60-70pc of Revenue,” The Nation, Abdul Ghani Baradar. See Rehman, “Karachi’s New Ter- an affiliate organization of Jamaat- July 25, 2010. rorist Groups.” i-Islami (JI), reportedly inspired a 4 Personal interview, Khan Dil Khan Niazi, a leader of 9 Personal interview, senior police official who runs an- Karachi’s truck association, Karachi, Pakistan, May 10, ti-militancy operations, Karachi, Pakistan, June 15, 2012. 11 Salman Siddiqui, “After KU Student Arrested on Ter- 2012. After a NATO airstrike killed 24 Pakistani soldiers 10 “Profiling the Violence in Karachi,” Pakistan Institute ror Suspicion, Time for an Examination on Campus,” in November 2011,Pakistan blocked NATO’s road-bound for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, Pakistan, July-Sep- Express Tribune, May 14, 2011. supply routes into Afghanistan. tember 2009. 12 Ibid.

9 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 number of students through their Mujahidin” after a disagreement with Observers argue that JI, and especially lectures and jihadist literature. Many the JI leadership over jihad in Pakistan its student wing Islami Jamiat Talaba of these students joined the so-called and after being inspired by the Waheed (IJT), has faced internal dissent Punjabi Taliban and later lost their brothers.17 They claimed to have ever since the U.S.-led invasion of lives in U.S. drone strikes.13 In 2006, recruited 150 activists, and their goal Afghanistan in 2001. JI’s decision the brothers were exonerated from was to fight against Pakistan’s security not to take a clear stand against the all charges and released by Pakistani forces as well as support the TTP.18 authorities. Yet in March 2008, Arshad Waheed was killed by a U.S. drone in In another incident, on May 12, 2011, “Taliban groups distribute Wana, South Waziristan Agency, while local police announced the arrests of four jihadist literature among his brother, Akmal, was sentenced to Karachi University students, who were three years in prison in the United Arab accused of being members of Tehrik-i- college and university Emirates in 2011 for running a jihadist Taliban Pakistan. The students were students in Karachi in an organization in the country and having in possession of weapons and suicide direct communications with a senior bomber jackets, and planning to attack effort to recruit them into al-Qa`ida member.14 Interestingly, major government installations in the militancy.” al-Qa`ida’s media wing, al-Sahab, city.19 The men were studying Applied released a 40-minute compilation video Physics and Computer Science at the university.20 After the arrests, various “Various professors at professors at the university reportedly intervention in Afghanistan upset many worried that students with a “jihadist of the party’s more radical members, the university reportedly bent of mind” were more inclined to especially among the youth. There is worried that students with study at departments such as Chemical evidence that radical members within Engineering, Applied Physics and the party have joined or supported a ‘jihadist bent of mind’ Computer Science—all subject areas militant activities in Pakistan.23 were more inclined to that could be used to further jihadist violence.21 It is also reported that Jundullah, a study at departments such banned militant outfit linked with al- as Chemical Engineering, Al-Qa`ida and the Taliban’s move Qa`ida and the TTP, was also formed to penetrate academic institutions by former IJT activist Attaur Rehman, Applied Physics and is strategic, said police officials who a student of the statistics department Computer Science.” run anti-militancy operations in the at Karachi University.24 Rehman was city, adding that military groups have arrested in June 2004 on charges of successfully gained sympathizers at masterminding a series of terrorist not only Karachi University, but also attacks in Karachi and targeting security commemorating Arshad Waheed in the at NED University of Engineering forces and government installations.25 third part of a series of videos entitled and Technology, Dawood College “The Protectors of the Sanctuary,” of Engineering and Technology, the Shahid Khan (also known as Qari which was also reportedly the first time Institute of Chartered Accountants and Shahid), the alleged mastermind of that al-Qa`ida used Urdu in a video other prestigious institutions. the Mehran Naval Base attack in May instead of Arabic.15 2011, was also a former member of the Taliban groups distribute jihadist IJT and a key leader of the Punjabi Three militants, all drop-outs of Karachi literature among college and university Taliban.26 He reportedly had a master’s University, inspired by the Waheed students in Karachi in an effort to degree in Political Science from brothers were arrested on January 13, recruit them into militancy, and also Karachi University and was a working 2011. In that case, Karachi Police said disseminate guidelines for making journalist.27 the three former students bombed Shi`a bombs and thwarting explosive students on the university’s campus detection equipment to potential Taliban groups also run recruiting on December 28, 2010. According to recruits, according to media.22 activities at religious madrasas, the police reports, the three men received only schooling available to many military training in the Miran Shah underprivileged children. During area of North Waziristan Agency.16 The General Zia-ul-Haq’s 11-year rule, accused told interrogators that in 2007 17 Ibid. Karachi experienced the tremendous they created a group called the “Punjabi 18 Ibid. growth of madrasa networks, and these 19 Siddiqui. schools have trained and dispatched 13 “Punjabi Muhahideen Involved in KU Blast Held,” 20 Ibid. The News International, January 14, 2011. 21 Ibid. 23 Kalbe Ali, “Jamaat Factor in Saga of the Missing,” 14 Tahir Siddique, “Dr Akmal Facing Trial in UAE, High 22 Javed Mahmood, “Jihadi Literature Distributed in Ka- Dawn, February 24, 2012. Court Told,” Dawn, August 20, 2011. rachi Universities,” Central Asia Online, December 13, 24 Chishti. 15 Ali K. Chishti, “Jundullah, the New al-Qaeda,” Daily 2010; Javed Mahmood, “Al-Qaeda Distributes Thumb 25 Ibid. Times, September 7, 2010. Drives to Teach Bomb Making,” Central Asia Online, 26 Ali. 16 “Punjabi Muhahideen Involved in KU Blast Held.” December 13, 2010. 27 Ibid.

10 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 fighters to Afghanistan and Indian- In 2011, there were more than 100 demands range from about $10,000 to administered Kashmir. According to recorded kidnap-for-ransom cases in $50,000.36 government estimates, out of a total of Karachi, a record high.31 A government 1,248 madrasas in Sindh Province, at least adviser in Sindh Province told the BBC, In an interview with the BBC, one 869 exist in Karachi alone.28 Taliban “With local criminals, kidnaps can take purported member of the Taliban groups manipulate deprived youth six weeks to resolve. With the Taliban in Karachi said that the group gets through jihadist literature and lectures it can take six months, or a year. They financial help from “university students into believing they can go from a state demand payment in foreign currency and college students. Big businessmen of dispossession to one of exaltation and they do their homework quite also support us and help us. We cannot through jihad. well.”32 mention their names. People give freely.”37 The Taliban member, who The sectarian, jihadist content of the In October 2008, prominent Pakistani claimed to be in the group’s finance madrasa curriculum is untouched, and filmmaker Satish Anand was kidnapped department, said “donations” amount there is no meaningful control over in Karachi. He was eventually released to $80,000 per month in the Karachi money flow into and through madrasas and in the Miran Shah area of North area.38 The BBC report suggested that other religious institutions. According Waziristan Agency after his family what the Taliban call “donations,” to one sociologist, the madrasa landscape others call “bhatta,” or protection money in Pakistan is still frightening not “Truck drivers who to prevent Taliban attacks.39 Truck because some are directly involved in drivers who transport NATO supplies creating terrorists, but because they all transport NATO supplies from Karachi to the border regularly foster a particular mindset in which— from Karachi to the border pay protection money to the Taliban under certain circumstances—terrorism to prevent attacks on their convoys or can easily take root. The umbilical link regularly pay protection families. of banned militant groups, especially money to the Taliban to Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), with Conclusion Karachi’s jihadist madrasas remains prevent attacks on their Karachi’s role as a shelter for al- intact, their teachers and students convoys or families.” Qa`ida and Taliban militants is clear. its main strength. All SSP leaders, Yet the extent of the Taliban’s support including Haq Nawaz Jhangvi and network in the city, and its attempts Azam Tariq, have been Karachi madrasa to recruit educated students from the graduates. paid approximately $169,000 for his city’s many universities, is deeper release—down from an initial ransom than commonly reported. Recruits who Funding demand of $530,000.33 In 2011, three receive university level training in Karachi, with its affluent residents Punjabi militants kidnapped local Applied Physics and similar disciplines and big business, has proved fertile Karachi industrialist Riaz Chinoy and likely pose a bigger threat than other ground for financing Taliban activities. demanded approximately $740,000. new fighters. Separately, Karachi’s role Police say that Taliban generate funds Although they eventually lowered their as Pakistan’s financial hub is also at in Karachi through bank robberies, demands to $211,000, all three militants risk should al-Qa`ida and the Taliban protection rackets and kidnappings.29 were killed after the police raided escalate their fundraising attempts— The police claim that the TTP has the home in which they were holding such as kidnap-for-ransom and other robbed Karachi banks of $18 million Chinoy.34 extortion schemes—in the city. since 2009.30 Similarly, kidnappings of high-profile figures and businessmen Prominent figures are not the only Zia Ur Rehman is a journalist and for ransom is a major source of funding. targets in kidnap-for-ransom researcher and covers the militancy in Kidnap-for-ransom schemes are common schemes. A tribal elder based in Pakistan. He has written for several among criminal groups in Karachi, yet Karachi explained that dozens of international and national publications there are signs that Taliban-affiliated truck drivers working in the city have including The Friday Times, Central Asia groups are escalating their kidnap- paid billions of rupees in ransom Online, The Jamestown Foundation, Himal for-ransom activities in the city as money after militants kidnapped South Asian and The News International, well. Many cases of kidnapping are not their family members who were living and contributed to the New York Times. reported to police, and families decide in South Waziristan and Mohmand to pay the ransom money quietly due to tribal areas.35 In these cases, ransom fear of repercussions from militants. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Faraz Khan, “Satish Anand Released from Captivity After 6 Months,” Daily Times, April 13, 2009. 28 “Karachi: 11,000 Foreigners in Sindh Madaris,” Dawn, 34 “Three Alleged Taliban Militants Killed in Karachi January 16, 2003. Encounter,” The News International, December 6, 2011. 36 Ibid. 29 “Taliban’s Brisk Trade of Kidnapping in Karachi,” 35 Personal interview, Karachi-based political activist 37 “Taliban’s Brisk Trade of Kidnapping in Karachi.” BBC, March 23, 2012. belonging to South Waziristan Agency, Karachi, Paki- 38 Ibid. 30 Central Asia Online, May 21, 2012. stan, July 18, 2012. 39 Ibid.

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A Biography of Rashid from that part of Pakistan to the United support in the wake of the October 2005 Kingdom. Living in the Alum Rock earthquake in Kashmir (although it is Rauf: Al-Qa`ida’s British part of Birmingham, the Rauf family not clear Abdul Rauf was still involved Operative settled quickly into a normal life within then). The family’s mother apparently the fiercely nationalistic Kashmiri used a garden shed as a makeshift By Raffaello Pantucci immigrant community. In 1984, a group school in which she would give free of men from the community calling Islamic classes to local children.7 like a ghost in the machine, the figure themselves members of the Jammu Rashid Rauf’s childhood home was near of British jihadist Rashid Rauf is Kashmir Liberation Army (a previously an Ahl-e-Hadith mosque,8 the strict one that continues to emerge on the unknown group, they named the Jammu religious sect that has historically gone fringes of terrorist plots. A Kashmiri Kashmir Liberation Front, a known hand-in-hand with Lashkar-i-Tayyiba Briton whose life story epitomizes group, as their mediators) kidnapped to provide religious indoctrination to the Pakistani connection to Britain’s Birmingham-based Indian Deputy their fighters. jihadist community, Rauf was a young Consul General Ravindra Mhatre and man who left the United Kingdom demanded the release of imprisoned Rauf attended Washwood Heath High after the 9/11 attacks to connect with leaders in India and £1 million sterling. School that became infamous in 1996 extremist networks in Pakistan. Having When their demands were not met, they (while Rauf was a student) when a joined Kashmiri oriented networks executed Mhatre and dumped his body teacher, Israr Khan, leapt up after a that increasingly became intertwined outside a farm near the city.2 While rendition of carol-singing shouting “Who with al-Qa`ida, he rose up the ranks, the murder was a shock to many, it is your God? Why are you saying Jesus featuring in the background of a highlighted the strength of pro-Kashmiri and Jesus Christ? God is not your God— number of different plots—from the feeling among the community. it is Allah.”9 Another teacher expressed July 7, 2005, attacks in London to the little surprise at the revelation that Rauf 2006 liquid explosives plot targeting Throughout the 1990s, jihadist leaders had been to the school, saying, “I’m not transatlantic airliners. After a brief from Kashmir would travel through at all surprised that someone from the period in Pakistani custody, Rauf Birmingham and other British Pakistani school has been implicated. There were escaped and once again played a role in communities raising money. One such some very influential radical elements a number of serious al-Qa`ida attempts individual who made this journey was there.”10 In 1999, he was awarded a place against the West, including the 2009 Maulana Masood Azhar, who in 1992- at Portsmouth University, although it plot by Najibullah Zazi to attack New 1993 was reported to have given fiery remains unclear what he was studying.11 York City’s subway system. speeches in Birmingham at mosques Alongside him at the university was near where Rauf was being brought up another Birmingham-Pakistani named His exact role in al-Qa`ida, however, raising money for Kashmiri fighters.3 Mohammed Gulzar, who while from has not been carefully explored An apparently impressive speaker, an the same background as Rauf appears publicly, in particular to try to assess attendee told local journalist Amardeep to have come from a family far less how important the Briton was within Bassey that they saw women taking involved in local politics.12 A student at the organization and to see whether he off their jewelry after conferences a nearby school in Birmingham, Gulzar was merely a point of contact or a more and handing it over to the preacher in lived a few streets away from Rauf operational leader. Given the fact that support of Kashmir.4 and the two were apparently close as plots connected to him continued to be children.13 The two are believed to have uncovered almost two years after his The Rauf family was not atypical in been involved in Islamic societies at the reported death in a U.S. drone strike its activity support of the Kashmiri university and it is thought that this in Waziristan in November 2008, cause, and came from a long line of may have been at the root of why they confusion continues to dominate his distinguished religious leadership.5 never completed their studies. Gulzar narrative. In an attempt to try to pry Reports have stated Abdul Rauf was and Rauf were reported to have started apart the man from the myth, this a religious judge back in Kashmir, a attending Tablighi Jama`at sessions article provides a detailed assessment role he continued in Birmingham.6 He in 2000,14 and a childhood friend of of what is known about Rashid Rauf also helped found Crescent Relief, a before drawing some conclusions about charitable organization that sent many 7 Cahal Milmo, Ian Herbert, Jason Bennetto and Justin his position in al-Qa`ida. thousands of British pounds to provide Huggler, “From Birmingham Bakery to Pakistani Pris- on, The Mystery of Rashid Rauf,” Independent, August Birmingham Youth 2 Regina v. Abdul Quayyum Raja, Royal Courts of Justice, 19, 2006. Rashid Rauf was born in Mirpur, 2004. 8 Personal interview, Amardeep Bassey, June 2012. Pakistan, in 1981 and moved to 3 Personal interview, Amardeep Bassey, June 2012. A 9 “Muslim Teacher in Carol Concert Tirade is Made Of- 1 Birmingham as a child. His father, West Midlands based journalist, Bassey has done a lot sted Inspector,” Daily Mail, September 30, 2006. Abdul, moved with his family in the early of work among Birmingham’s Muslim and gang com- 10 Daily Mirror, August 15, 2006. 1980s as part of the chain of migrations munity. 11 Dominic Casciani, “Profile: Rashid Rauf,” BBC, No- 4 Ibid. vember 22, 2008. 1 “Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture,” House of 5 Ibid. 12 Unpublished “Special Investigation” into Gulzar for Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Hu- 6 Cole Morton and Andrew Buncombe, “The Life and the Sunday Mercury by Ben Goldby. man Rights, 23rd Report of Session 2008-2009, July 21, Death of Rashid Rauf,” Independent on Sunday, Novem- 13 Ibid. 2009, p. 109. ber 23, 2008. 14 Mitchell D. Silber, The Al Qaeda Factor (Philadelphia:

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Gulzar’s reported that after returning Gulzar and Rauf were reportedly spotted operations, who was reportedly in from a trip to Pakistan that year, Gulzar at an internet cafe in Portsmouth where regular contact with operatives in the “was much more devout. He had grown they researched a U.S. aviation firm United Kingdom. Other Britons al-Libi a long beard and seemed a lot quieter and purchased a GPS map receiver is believed to have been in contact with and more focused.”15 and “various compass/map CDs” using include Mohammed al-Ghabra, a Syrian fraudulent credit cards.24 It is unclear still living in East London who has been During breaks in school, Rauf was if they were traveling together, but this identified in British court documents as reported to have been assisting his equipment would have proved useful having stayed with al-Libi for a week in father’s bakery business delivering to Rauf who by the middle of 2002 had 2002.32 Al-Ghabra was later accused of cakes to local shops.16 He was also reached Bahawalpur, Pakistan. Gulzar being involved in the 2006 transatlantic seen at the local gym, played football was ultimately acquitted of all charges airliners plot (although no specific with other locals and prayed relatively against him. charges were laid against him) and is regularly at the mosque.17 At the time, listed on the UN sanctions list as being Birmingham had a number of gangs Linking to Al-Qa`ida associated with al-Qa`ida and al-Libi in involved in defending local minority Once Rauf reached Bahawalpur, his particular.33 communities from right-wing attacks, links to the Kashmiri jihad became and while it is not clear that Rauf was clearer. Soon after arriving, he By 2004, Rauf was still a relatively low- a member, he was reportedly close to married the daughter of Ghulam level player within the organization, as one of the key members of the Aston Mustafa, the founder of the Darul he does not appear much in secondary Panthers.18 He is also understood to Uloom Madina, a famous local reporting. For example, in the large have been close to an uncle living in Deobandi madrasa. 25 According to Operation Crevice plot (which was East London who was involved in the one report, Rauf knew Mustafa from disrupted by authorities in March Kashmiri struggle.19 It is uncertain when the preacher had stayed at the 2004)—the first large-scale British plot whether this uncle was involved in the family home in Birmingham.26 Another in which a group of mostly second- East London charity “Crescent Relief” of Mustafa’s daughters is married to generation Pakistani-Britons from that Rauf’s father had helped establish Masood Azhar,27 the jihadist leader London’s environs planned to explode and that was reported by neighbors in who visited Birmingham and who had a large fertilizer device at a shopping 2005 (after Rauf’s father had stepped since 1992 risen to establish his own mall—Rashid Rauf does not feature. down from his role) to have started to Kashmir oriented jihadist group, Jaysh- Behind the scenes, however, it seems it distribute flyers highlighting the plight i-Muhammad. was around this time that Rauf’s first of Kashmiris.20 major plot came together. According to Rauf’s confessions to In April 2002, Rauf and Gulzar abruptly Pakistani interrogators in 2006, his Operationalizing left the country to go to Pakistan, intention in 2002 was to go and fight According to a post-operation report wanted for questioning in the murder the United States in Afghanistan.28 that European and U.S. security of an uncle of Rauf’s named Mohammed Arriving in Pakistan, Rauf claimed services believe was written by Rauf,34 Saeed.21 The exact causes of the “frenzied he connected with Amjad Hussein stabbing” are unclear, with speculation Farooqi, a senior Pakistani member of 32 Secretary of State for the Home Department and AY, Roy- 22 that jihadist politics or an arranged Jaysh-i-Muhammad with close links al Courts of Justice, July 26, 2010. 23 29 marriage may have been causes. A to al-Qa`ida. Rauf claimed that he 33 “Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions couple of months prior to the murder, first went to Afghanistan with Farooqi 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and in mid-2002 and from there was able Associated Individuals and Entities,” United Nations, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), p. 42. to establish a close connection with a October 2009. 30 15 Unpublished “Special Investigation” into Gulzar for number of core al-Qa`ida members. 34 The documents in question were found on German the Sunday Mercury by Ben Goldby. When Farooqi was killed in a police suspects believed linked to al-Qa`ida. They provide a 16 Morton and Buncombe. raid in 2004, Rauf’s connection within post-operational assessment from al-Qa`ida’s perspec- 17 Ibid. al-Qa`ida seems to have shifted to Abu tive of what happened in the July 7, 2005, and July 21, 31 18 Personal interview, Amardeep Bassey, June 2012. Faraj al-Libi, a senior member of al- 2005, plots to attack London and the 2006 transatlantic More famous to readers than the Panthers in Birming- Qa`ida described as head of external airliners plot. They were first reported by Yassin Mush- ham was the Lynx gang of which Guantanamo detainee arbash, “In ihren eigenen worten,” Die Zeit, March 15, Moazzam Begg was a member. A number of individuals 24 Secretary of State for the Home Department and AY, 2012. Subsequent quotes attributed to Rauf are drawn from these groups ended up involved in jihadist activity. Royal Courts of Justice, July 26, 2010. from author read-outs, and the following news pieces: 19 Personal interview, Amardeep Bassey, June 2012. 25 “The Radical with Perfect Cover,” Sunday Times, Au- Nic Robertson, Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Doc- 20 Ian Fisher and Serge Kovaleski, “In British Inquiry, a gust 20, 2006. ument Shows Origins of 2006 Plot for Liquid Bombs Family Caught in Two Worlds,” New York Times, August 26 “Rashid Rauf,” Guardian, November 22, 2008. on Planes,” CNN, April 30, 2012; Nic Robertson, Paul 20, 2006. 27 The Radical with Perfect Cover.” Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Documents Give New De- 21 Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank and Chris Han- 28 Asif Farooqi, Carol Grisanti and Robert Windrem, tails on al Qaeda’s London Bombings,” CNN, April 30, sen, “Inside the Terror Plot that ‘Rivaled 9/11,’” Dateline “Sources: UK Terror Plot Suspect Forced to Talk,” NBC 2012; Duncan Gardham, “7/7 bombers Planned Attack NBC, September 14, 2009. News, August 18, 2006. on Bank of England,” Telegraph, April 30, 2012; Duncan 22 Andrew Alderson, “Rashid Rauf: Profile of a Terror 29 Ibid. Gardham, “Al Qaeda Commander’s Guide to Beating Mastermind,” Daily Telegraph, November 22, 2008. 30 Ibid. MI5,” Telegraph, May 1, 2012. Heretofore, all these articles 23 Milmo et al. 31 Silber, p. 50. are referred to as the “Rauf documents.”

13 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 at around this time a young Pakistani- Majid and Shakeel Ismail (though they senior members of al-Qa`ida who Briton known as Umar made his way were all using cover names).42 Ibrahim trained and persuaded them to become to Waziristan and connected with an boasted to his roommate as he left that willing suicide bombers back in the individual identified in documents as he was off to “do jihad” and that “maybe United Kingdom. He also helped the Haji, but believed to be Abu Ubaydah [he] wouldn’t see [Ibrahim] again, plotters record their martyrdom videos al-Masri.35 According to Rauf, Haji maybe [they] were going to see each and arranged their communication persuaded Umar to train for a other in heaven.”43 Having waited a methods.48 Clearly a key figure in the martyrdom operation back in Europe couple of weeks, Rauf made contact and plots, he was nevertheless a middleman, and was sent to the United Kingdom spent some time with the men assessing and one who to some degree must have in June 2004 once he had been trained their credentials and their potential use in how to use hydrogen peroxide as an as plotters. He then dispatched them explosive.36 The connection, however, to meet with Haji who took them to be “From an al-Qa`ida seems to have been through Haji, with trained in explosives.44 Likely more perspective, Rauf’s Rauf playing a supportive role. focused on the eventual July 7, 2005, plotters, Rauf spent less time with the escape from custody was While Umar failed to carry out his men, reporting that while they were a blessing, and he almost attack, Rauf reported that he did pass receiving their explosives training there on the contacts for Mohammed Siddique was an accident during which Majid and immediately started to Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, two men Ismail were killed. When he met Ibrahim feature in reports from Umar knew and whom he trusted. Rauf again, it was in Islamabad and the two waited a couple of weeks before making had a short period in which to record foreign fighters who joined contact with the two men and assessed his suicide video, arrange his return al-Qa`ida.” whether they seemed dedicated enough flight, organize codes and methods of to the cause.37 Having concluded the communication and ensure that Ibrahim men were committed, he traveled with was ready for his operation.45 them into the tribal areas putting them been viewed as expendable given the fact in direct contact with Haji. Leaving them The shortened timeline was due to the that he claimed to have attempted to go with the leader for a couple of days, by need to get Ibrahim out of the country back to operate alongside the plotters in the time he returned Haji had persuaded before his visa expired. Rauf reported the United Kingdom, an operationally them to carry out attacks in the United that everything came together and he risky move. Furthermore, the fact that Kingdom.38 Rauf then chaperoned the received a note from Ibrahim saying he played a different role with the July two men around the tribal regions to he had arrived safely in the United 21, 2005, plotters (spending less time get explosives training, record their Kingdom.46 After this, however, there with them) suggests that he was not the suicide videos, and instruct them on the was silence with no responses using the only operator shepherding cells around targets they should aim for once back in predetermined methods. Through other at the time. the United Kingdom. At a certain point, contacts, Rauf was able to reach out to he reported planning to travel back Ibrahim, but all he heard back was that Rising in the Ranks with the two to help them with their the operation was proceeding.47 The success of the July 7, 2005, operation, but that he was unable to get operation in London—in which 52 a clean passport in time.39 In any event, In the end, the first plot succeeded and people died on London’s public by February 8, 2005, Khan and Tanweer the second did not. Rauf ascribed the transportation system—is likely to moved back to the United Kingdom.40 fact that he was able to keep contact have raised Rauf’s profile within al- Rauf continued to manage the plot from with Khan as the key behind success, Qa`ida. By the time he came to the afar, using Yahoo messenger, e-mails since he could manage the operation transatlantic airliners plot in his and mobile phones to help them decide and help Khan work through the post-operation report, Rauf referred on targeting and helping them when technical difficulties with the hydrogen to himself and Haji as peers and co- they encountered problems, for example peroxide. Based on Rauf’s assessments, plotters. While it is clear that Haji in the concentration of the hydrogen it is possible to see that with both cells was still the senior organizer, Rauf peroxide.41 he acted as the first point of contact for had taken on a far more hands-on the fighters having been passed their leadership role in the plot. He described In December 2004, Rauf reported details, vetted them for suitability and the technical details of how they decided receiving information that a new group then helped them connect with more to come to use liquid explosives on of three Britons had arrived in the tribal planes and other particular aspects of areas—Muktar Said Ibrahim, Rizwan 42 Ibid. “Terror: How a String of Blunders Left Bomb- the chemical composition of the devices, ers Free to Cause Carnage,” Daily Mail, July 10, 2007; suggesting deep involvement in this 49 35 Rauf documents. Secretary of State for the Home Department and AH, Royal aspect. 36 Ibid. Courts of Justice, May 9, 2008. 37 Ibid. 43 “Profile: Muktar Said Ibrahim,”BBC , July 11, 2007. 38 Ibid. 44 Rauf documents. 39 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 40 “7 July Bombings,” BBC, July 8, 2008. 46 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 41 Rauf documents. 47 Ibid. 49 Ibid.

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Rauf provided a lot less detail about individuals in his report who were belt to join the fighting in Afghanistan shepherding the key figures in the plot not detected, as well as highlighting in September 2007, claimed to have met around the tribal regions, and instead the purpose of Assad Sarwar to act as Rauf and senior al-Qa`ida ideologue wrote about the individuals like pawns bombmaker and to stay undetected for Abu Yahya al-Libi at some point in in an operation.50 He described using use after the plot.58 2008.64 In November 2008, a few methods of communication similar to days before Rauf was allegedly killed those he deployed in the earlier plots, While this plot has clear evidence of in a drone strike, Vinas was captured but instead this time had a set of mobile Rauf having moved up the value chain in Peshawar by Pakistani forces. He numbers he was using for the operation, in al-Qa`ida—working to establish claimed to have met senior al-Qa`ida one for each contact. He described how networks in Europe for future attacks, leaders and to have plotted with them to he had three numbers for contacts in the coordinating the plot seemingly on the attack the Long Island Rail Road in the United Kingdom and one for Pakistan.51 same level as a senior al-Qa`ida leader, United States.65 Whether it was Rauf Court evidence of his control over the involved in most aspects from managing who directed him is unclear, but security plot was provided in the form of e-mails the individuals to the technical aspects services in the United Kingdom believe that were supposedly from him (using of the bomb—it ended up with him that during 2008 Rauf devised a plan to the nickname “Paps”) or someone being arrested in Pakistan. Largely use a group of local Pashtuns who were linked to him showing Rauf directing kept from talking to the press, when he to infiltrate the United Kingdom using key figures on the ground. The language was brought before a court in December student visas and allegedly carry out an deployed was colloquial British slang, 2006 he declared, “I have done nothing attack in a northern British city.66 The and clearly delivered by someone with wrong but I have been framed. I am specifics of his involvement in the plot good command of the language.52 not optimistic that I will be cleared… are uncertain given the fact that no one everything against me is based on has been convicted of the plot and one In a separate case linked to the plot, Rauf lies, lies.”59 Oddly, however, for an of the key alleged figures is currently instructed via e-mail Adam Khatib, one innocent man, he did not appear to fighting extradition to the United States, of the younger members of the network, ask for consular assistance.60 In fact, obstructing the release of information. to behave himself after he was arrested the Pakistani courts were forgiving for driving illegally.53 Furthermore, and a judge declared the charges Rauf’s hand was more prominently authorities alleged that he dispatched against him “flimsy” and with “no visible in another plot linked to this his old Birmingham friend Mohammed substance,” dropping all the charges.61 group: the cell led by Najibullah Zazi Gulzar back to the United Kingdom to Less than a year later, he had still not that was intercepted in September act as his man on the ground.54 During been extradited to the United Kingdom, 2009 during an attempt to carry out a the time since Gulzar had fled from the and in September 2007 was ordered suicide bombing on the New York City United Kingdom, the only substantial released by a Pakistani court.62 Before subway system. According to Zazi’s activities he is identified as doing is any of this could take place, however, co-conspirator Zarein Ahmedzay, traveling back and forth to South Africa in December that year he managed to having made contact with al-Qa`ida in to obtain a passport and a wife, and escape from custody in very questionable Peshawar in September 2008 they were meeting with Mohammed al-Ghabra circumstances.63 taken by “Ahmad” to Miran Shah in (which he admitted to in court).55 Later the tribal belt where one day a convoy court documents identified Gulzar as Returning to the Fight of vehicles came to meet them bearing being “in contact with Rauf and with Whether anything can be read into his Salah al-Somali and Rashid Rauf. Rauf one of the convicted plotters, Assad escape and Pakistani unwillingness to is reported to have told the men that Sarwar.”56 As well as being in touch extradite him to the United Kingdom is “they would be presented with a serious with at least one key figure on the unclear. From an al-Qa`ida perspective, decision” and had to decide whether they ground in the United Kingdom linked however, Rauf’s escape from custody was wanted to become suicide bombers.67 A to the airliners plot, authorities alleged a blessing, and he almost immediately third cell, connected through an e-mail that Gulzar was in touch with at least started to feature in reports from account that was managed by “Ahmad” one other potential cell in the United foreign fighters who joined al-Qa`ida. who was in touch with individuals Kingdom.57 Rauf referred to two other For example, Bryant Neal Vinas, a from all three groups, was uncovered young American who came to the tribal in Oslo. It is unclear whether Rauf met with the key plotters, although on the 50 Ibid. presumption that he was indeed killed 51 Ibid. Royal Courts of Justice, December 21, 2009. during a drone strike on November 22, 52 “Explosive Emails,” Wall Street Journal, September 7, 58 Rauf documents. 2008, it would have been difficult for 2009. 59 David Williams, “It’s All Lies, Protests Suspected Air him to meet with the lead plotter Mikael 53 Duncan Gardham, “Teenager Sentenced to 18 Years Bomber,” Daily Mail, December 22, 2006. after Being Groomed as Suicide Bomber in Trans-Atlan- 60 “UK Request Being Considered: FO: Extradition of tic Airlines Plot,” Telegraph, December 10, 2009. Rashid Rauf,” Dawn, August 28, 2006. 64 Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “A Young Ameri- 54 Greenberg et al. 61 CNN, December 13, 2006. can’s Journey into Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, July 24, 55 Secretary of State for the Home Department and AY, Roy- 62 “Release of Two Britons including Rashid Rauf 2009. al Courts of Justice, July 26, 2010; Silber, p. 42. Sought,” Daily Times, September 1, 2007. 65 USA v. John Doe, Eastern District of New York, 2009. 56 Secretary of State for the Home Department and AM, Roy- 63 Massoud Ansari and Miles Erwin, “London Airline 66 “Arrest of ‘Easter Bombers’ Led to International al al Courts of Justice, July 6, 2012. Bomb Plot Suspect Escapes,” Daily Telegraph, December Qaeda Network,” Daily Telegraph, May 18, 2010. 57 Ibid. Secretary of State for the Home Department and AM, 16, 2007. 67 Silber, p. 160.

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Davud since it was only November 20, plots. His ascension was no doubt Mexican DTO Influence 2008, that Davud left Turkey for Iran to accelerated by his Kashmiri jihadist make his journey to the tribal belt.68 pedigree and his ability to develop close Extends Deep into United relationships with numerous senior States What is clear is that Rauf was no longer al-Qa`ida figures. Having gained their the contact man reaching out and vetting trust, he was then used as a friendly By Sylvia Longmire recruits or shuttling them around. In foreign face who was able to vet and both Vinas’ and Ahmedzay’s accounts, meet foreign fighters who arrived in the drug war in Mexico has been raging he was a figure brought in to talk to the the tribal belt seeking to connect with for almost a decade and news headlines aspirant plotters and then left them to al-Qa`ida. For these foreigners, the suggest violence is only getting worse. be trained and prepared by others. In contact with al-Qa`ida was likely made Half a dozen Mexican drug trafficking this set of cells, it appears as though easier by the presence of someone like organizations (DTOs) are vying for it was “Ahmad” acting as the courier, Rauf—a Westernized foreigner who control of lucrative drug smuggling bringing the aspirant warriors around, could understand their backgrounds and corridors, both along the border with acting as their first point of contact their psychological journey. His death, the United States and within Mexico, with al-Qa`ida and then later managing if true, would have clearly been a loss to while dozens of smaller “mini cartels” the e-mail account through which they the group, although it does not seem as and criminal groups are fighting for the could communicate with the al-Qa`ida though it has necessarily stopped their leftovers. leaders—roles that Rauf played with capacity to train and dispatch fighters the July 7 plotters. His elevation to back to plot attacks. As a result, the United States has the core of al-Qa`ida seemed complete, allocated more resources to its with him now only appearing to talk Rauf’s trajectory from a Birmingham southwest border to prevent a spillover to foreign recruits alongside senior Pakistani involved in Kashmiri politics of violence. Nevertheless, an increasing al-Qa`ida members and presumably and Islamism to an al-Qa`ida militant number of incidents show that some acting as an English-speaking figure of is one that is typical of the British spillover is already occurring, and that importance who could talk to foreigners jihadist narrative, and one that echoes DTO-related violence is occurring well in their own terms. Having met them, he a number of other narratives. Where beyond the U.S.-Mexico border.1 This seemed to slip into the background from Rauf distinguished himself is in having article argues that it is important for where he directed the men immediately survived within al-Qa`ida in the tribal U.S. law enforcement agencies across handling the plotters—in this case belt for so long, slowly rising up to a the country—not just those located on “Ahmad” who acted as the go-between rank of some importance within the the U.S.-Mexico border—to understand to the various cells. Once established, group and not ultimately returning to the DTO threat to the United States, and the plots were seemingly able to run the United Kingdom to attempt to carry to prepare accordingly. without Rauf’s leadership, something out an attack. Instead, from his perch in necessary given his reported death on the tribal belt he acted as a puppeteer to a DTOs’ Expanding U.S. Operations November 22, 2008. It was another five series of plots that while only successful DTOs are a known threat along the months before the plotters in northern once, were able to strike fear and terror U.S.-Mexico border. Their penetration, England were uncovered, and almost a right into the heart of the West. The however, extends much deeper into the year before Najibullah Zazi and his cell 2006 transatlantic airliners plot, with United States than is commonly known were detected in New York. its innovative use of liquid explosives, among the public. Law enforcement led to the still current ban on liquids on officers who work in states far from Conclusion airplanes. Rashid Rauf, dead or alive, the U.S.-Mexico border—and especially Rashid Rauf’s body was never found, al- clearly succeeded in making his mark those who do not routinely work Qa`ida never officially recognized his on the world as a key al-Qa`ida figure. drug cases—do not have a working death and plots with links to him were knowledge of the main Mexican DTOs, still being uncovered almost two years Raffaello Pantucci is an Associate Fellow or in what type of activities they are after his reported demise. His family is at the International Center for the Study involved. One could argue that this convinced he is alive and in the custody of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King’s College, lack of understanding is concerning of Pakistani intelligence services,69 and the author of the forthcoming We since, according to the National Drug while senior American sources are Love Death As You Love Life: Britain’s Intelligence Center (NDIC), Mexican certain he is dead.70 Whatever the case, Suburban Mujahedeen (Hurst/Columbia DTOs are operating (either directly or it seems clear that Rashid Rauf was by University Press). his death a serious player in al-Qa`ida 1 The National Drug Intelligence Center at the U.S. De- who had risen up the ranks from a partment of Justice released an annual National Drug British-Pakistani fixer and foot soldier Threat Assessment. In the 2008 assessment, it stated to the key hub for a number of terrorist that “Mexican DTOs maintain drug distribution net- works or supply drugs to distributors in at least 230 U.S. 68 “Den offentlege patalemakta mot Mikael Davud, Sha- cities.” In the 2011 assessment, it stated that “Mexican- wan Sadek Saeed Bujak Bujak, David Jakobsen,” Oslo based TCOs were operating in more than a thousand U.S. City Court, January 30, 2012. cities during 2009 and 2010.” See National Drug Intel- 69 Personal interview, Amardeep Bassey, June 2012. ligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice, available at 70 Greenberg et al. www.justice.gov/archive/ndic.

16 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 by proxy) in more than 1,000 U.S. cities into an informant. In a U.S. court, the scheme, the suspects used “corrupt (up from 230 in its 2008 report) and informant explained how he ran a direct drivers” from a California trucking are responsible for roughly 90% of the distribution route through Little Rock, company to move methamphetamine illegal drugs sold and consumed in the Wisconsin, Chicago, Philadelphia, New and money between California and United States.2 Jersey, Delaware, and Atlanta:6 Colorado.12 The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Denver said that “in one instance, Several different counterdrug driving across the country in the money was hidden in a truck load of operations, investigations, and arrests a mobile home packed with milk...[the gang] also used other means in recent years illustrate the breadth millions of dollars’ worth of to send money back to California, of the DTOs’ reach. In October 2009, cocaine. Testifying through an including one instance where a minor U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder interpreter...he discussed staying had cash strapped to his body as he was announced the arrests of nearly in fancy hotels and dining at fine being driven to California.”13 restaurants to set up contacts, and outlined how drugs are smuggled DTO Blood Spilled on U.S. Soil “Tractor-trailers are ideal into the country by boat, personal Although many Americans are familiar places to move illegal watercraft and tractor-trailer, with news of drug smuggling and cocaine directed from Mexico by cartel rings, what is more surprising is the drugs from Mexico in members with two-way radios.7 number of violent incidents committed hidden compartments for by members of Mexican DTOs in cities DTOs have targeted unassuming, non- and small communities hundreds, and transport across the United Hispanic U.S. citizens willing and able sometimes more than a thousand, miles States, often without the to assist with their drug operations. away from the U.S.-Mexico border. In January 2010, for example, the knowledge of the truck U.S. Attorney’s Office in Denver, Shelby County in northern Alabama driver.” Colorado, announced that 35 people, might see a handful of murders in including a retired Denver firefighter an entire year.14 Yet in August 2008 and an assistant baseball coach at several deputies stumbled upon a grisly Regis University, were part of a gang- sight: five dead men on the floor of 1,200 individuals on narcotics- affiliated network that distributed 20 an apartment living room. According related charges and the seizure of kilograms of Mexican cocaine a week in to press reports, the bodies showed more than 11.7 tons of narcotics as the metro area.8 part of a 44-month multiagency law enforcement investigation known In one of the more interesting finds in “Having a clear as “Project Coronado.”3 In just the recent U.S. drug raids, a federal drug understanding of DTO two days prior to the announcement, trafficking investigation in May 2012 303 people in 19 states were arrested led to six arrests in the Chicago area, methods of operation and during the operation, which targeted as well as the seizure of heroin, cash, U.S. presence allows law the distribution network of the Mexican weapons, and a Green Bay Packers DTO La Familia Michoacana.4 Super Bowl ring reported stolen from enforcement officers to a team executive.9 Authorities said better prepare for future The primary DTOs tend to have large the individuals arrested were part drug operations running in major U.S. of an organization with direct ties to confrontations with drug cities due to the higher local demand and Mexico.10 traffickers.” ability to move drugs in and out of cities with ease. In April 2009, agents from In another example from May 2012, a the Drug Enforcement Administration federal grand jury in Denver indicted 22 arrested a Gulf Cartel associate in a people in four states for drug trafficking signs of torture. “Burns seared into hotel room at Baltimore’s Inner Harbor and money laundering following an their earlobes revealed where modified with more than $600,000 in alleged 18-month investigation into smugglers jumper cables had been clamped as an drug proceeds.5 The Gulf Cartel sent using “corrupt drivers” from a California improvised electrocution device,” said an operative to Baltimore to find out trucking company to transport drugs the Associated Press. “Adhesive from what happened to the money, but he and illegal proceeds.11 As part of the duct tape used to bind the victims still was arrested by the FBI and turned clung to wrists and faces, from mouths 15 6 Ibid. to noses.” The throats of the five men 2 Ibid. 7 Ibid. had also been slashed open after they 3 “More Than 300 Alleged La Familia Cartel Members 8 Joey Bunch, “Firefighter, Coach Among Arrested in Al- and Associates Arrested in Two-Day Nationwide Take- leged Cocaine Ring,” Denver Post, November 8, 2010. Mexican Drug Cartel,” Chicago Tribune, May 31, 2012. down,” press release, U.S. Department of Justice, Octo- 9 Annie Sweeney, “Feds Make 6 Drug Arrests, Seize 12 Ibid. ber 22, 2009. Heroin, Weapons, Super Bowl Ring,” Chicago Tribune, 13 Ibid. 4 Ibid. June 4, 2012. 14 Pauline Arrillaga, “Grisly Slayings Brings Mexican 5 Justin Fenton, “Mexican Cartel on Trial in Baltimore 10 Ibid. Drug War to US,” Associated Press, April 18, 2009. Drug Case,” Baltimore Sun, February 2, 2011. 11 Keith Coffman, “Feds Say Bust Drug Ring with Ties to 15 Ibid.

17 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 were murdered.16 The murders were Difficulty in Attributing Violence to Mexican dealers—most commonly the people who the result of the loss by the victims of DTOs are busted for drug distribution—know $500,000 belonging to the Gulf Cartel.17 One of the problems for law enforcement even less than the gang leaders.22 “We became a [drug trafficking] hub with these types of cases is how to without knowing it,” Shelby County capture the Mexican DTO connection—if Individuals who work directly for the Sheriff Chris Curry told a reporter. it is even possible, or desirable. Most, if DTOs in the United States operate in “We’ve got to wake people up because not all, state and local law enforcement a cell structure, much like terrorist we’re seeing it all over the place. It is agencies that investigate drug-related organizations.23 Members of the Sinaloa now firmly located throughout this crimes do not have a specific manner Cartel working in Chicago will probably country.”18 of recording a crime’s connection to not know members of the same DTO a Mexican DTO. Suspects may have working a couple of hours south in How did this come to happen in a small easily identifiable gang tattoos, or—if Peoria, although one cell leader might community so far from the southwest the officer is lucky—he or she will be know the other. This type of organization border? Due to the routes of the wearing clothing or driving a vehicle allows a DTO to further insulate itself highways in Alabama, Shelby County with a DTO-associated logo. There are from U.S. law enforcement.24 is a huge throughway for commercial many police departments whose officers trucks, with highways 65, 20, 59 and are unaware of these logo associations, Conclusion 459 running east to Atlanta, north to however, and a gang tattoo identification The lack of clarity on DTO activity in Nashville, south to New Orleans, west to the United States makes it difficult for Dallas. Tractor-trailers are ideal places law enforcement agencies—especially to move illegal drugs from Mexico in “The more DTO those located far from the southwest hidden compartments for transport connections that can be border—to prepare themselves for across the United States, often without potential confrontations. the knowledge of the truck driver. made by law enforcement at the local level across the It is important to understand that part Just a few months later and 1,800 of this challenge is political. Elected miles away, three masked and armed country, the better that officials and law enforcement leaders men stormed into six-year-old Cole analysts can identify shifts in the four southwest border states Puffinburger’s home in Las Vegas. often cannot agree on the definition The men tied up Cole’s mother and her and trends in national drug and existence of border violence boyfriend, ransacked the house, and trafficking routes.” “spillover,” and that is with good then kidnapped Cole at gunpoint. Cole reason—a standardized definition does was found wandering the streets four not exist. As a result, spillover becomes days later unharmed. The reason for the politicized; some public officials want incident was because Cole’s grandfather will likely only lead to speculation more attention and resources directed had scammed millions of dollars from about a DTO affiliation. There is also no to their part of the border, which they one of the men—suspected enforcers “checkbox” on a police report or field argue is being overrun with violent for the Gulf Cartel—and they came to in an electronic database to be filled drug smugglers and illegal immigrants, collect on his debt.19 in with the name of a DTO that might while other officials tout their city’s have been provided by a drug dealing or or community’s low violent crime In just the first half of 2008, police in using suspect. statistics and capability of their police Gwinnett County, Georgia, had to deal and sheriff departments, intent on not with nine kidnapping cases related to It is typically difficult to ascertain losing tourists, investments, and future the Mexican drug trade.20 Today, drug- a solid DTO connection because of elections. related kidnappings have continued the way these cartels operate in the in the United States, and reports of United States. DTOs try to disassociate Despite this, most agencies in the confrontations between traffickers and themselves as much as possible from southwest have at least a fundamental U.S. law enforcement officers—most the ultimate purveyors of their product understanding—and often well beyond often in south Texas—have increased.21 on the street to reduce the chances of that—of how DTOs operate and the identification and prosecution. They threats their people could pose to police coopt U.S.-based gangs in cities and 16 Ibid. communities across the country to buy 22 “2011 National Gang Threat Assessment: Emerging 17 Ibid. drugs from them at wholesale prices, Trends,” National Gang Intelligence Center, U.S. Federal 18 Ibid. then turn around and sell them on the Bureau of Investigation, 2011. 19 Nicholas Riccardi, “Kidnapped Boy is Safe,” Los Ange- streets. Gang leaders know few details 23 According to one report, “Some of the DTOs have ad- les Times, October 20, 2008. about the individuals from which they opted a more decentralized and networked model with 20 Mary Lou Pickel, “‘Flood’ of Drugs from Mexico buy their wholesale drug quantities, and independent cell-like structures that make it harder for Linked to Area Abductions,” Atlanta Journal-Constitu- probably do not always know the exact law enforcement to dismantle.” For details, see June tion, July 20, 2008. DTO affiliation—although this may S. Beittel, “Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: 21 Anthony Kimery, “Drug, Human Smuggling, Cartel sometimes be useful for gang leaders so Source and Scope of the Rising Violence,” Congressional Shootouts With Police Escalate In Rio Grande Valley,” that they do not betray one particular Research Service, June 8, 2012, p. 31. Homeland Security Today, December 6, 2011. DTO by dealing with a rival. Street 24 Ibid.

18 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 officers. Move away from the border, Information Wars: National Council (SNC),2 National however, and that knowledge becomes Coordination Committee for Democratic sparser—as do the implications of crime Assessing the Social Media Change (NCC),3 and the numerous connections to Mexican DTOs, and Battlefield in Syria Local Coordination Committees of where their local incidents fit in with Syria (LCCs),4 all operate a network of the national criminal threat picture. By Chris Zambelis professionally-designed and maintained websites and social media platforms to Having a clear understanding of DTO efforts to understand the nuances broadcast information. The UK-based methods of operation and U.S. presence inherent to the political turmoil in Syria Syrian Observatory for Human Rights allows law enforcement officers to present daunting challenges. While the (SOHR), a body closely tied to the SNC, better prepare for future confrontations numerous insurgent factions and the is also widely active on social media. The with drug traffickers. They can identify Syrian security forces engage each other SOHR publicizes alleged casualty counts certain logos on clothing or markings in combat in towns and cities to secure and human rights abuses it blames on on drug packages that can connect their tangible battlefield gains, the warring the Ba`athist regime’s security services activities to a Mexican DTO operating parties are also waging a contentious and irregular paramilitary forces.5 in the area. It helps them ask better information war in cyberspace, questions to elicit more useful answers specifically within the virtual arena of Led by the FSA and the numerous about the local drug trade, and possibly online social media. The various strands insurgent groups that claim to be ties of their higher-ups to larger, of the opposition in Syria—political and fighting under its umbrella, the violent national and international trafficking violent—have taken to social media strain of the Syrian opposition is also organizations. since the earliest stages of the uprising well represented on social media.6 The to advance their agendas. Analogous to Omawi News Live7 network and Ugarit As such, the more DTO connections their role in facilitating communication News8 are two of the most prominent that can be made by law enforcement at and information exchange during the among a host of outlets that serve as the local level across the country, the wave of revolts that have been sweeping better that analysts can identify shifts the Arab world since 2011, new media 2 For the official website of the Syrian National Council and trends in national drug trafficking platforms such as the array of social (SNC), see http://ar.syriancouncil.org. routes. It can also help predict future media websites and related technologies 3 For the official website of the National Coordination shifts based on arrests or enforcement that are available to the public at Committee for Democratic Change (NCC), see http:// efforts, which aids both police officers virtually little or no cost have become www.ncsyria.com. on the streets and policymakers who crucial to shaping how the crisis in 4 For the official website of the Local Coordination Com- 1 need to determine required resources Syria is portrayed and perceived. mittees of Syria (LCCs), see http://www.lccsyria.org. for their departments. DTO members 5 These details are located on the official website of the and their associates in the United States This article examines the social media Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), available excel at hiding in plain sight in all parts battlefield in the Syrian uprising with at http://www.syriahr.com. of the country, and the better educated specific attention on the Free Syrian 6 A number of websites broadcast official statements, and prepared U.S. law enforcement Army’s (FSA) online activities. It also video footage, and related material on behalf of the Free officers are about them, the more addresses the relative impact of the Syrian Army (FSA). See the FSA’s self-declared official effective they will be at stopping their social media battlefield on dictating the website at http://www.free-syrian-army.com. Similarly, illegal activities. course of events in Syria. the regularly updated http://www.syrianarmyfree.com and the less frequently updated http://www.freesyri- Sylvia Longmire is a medically retired The Social Media Landscape anarmy1.com also provide an extensive sampling of Air Force captain and former Special Every serious political or militant actor FSA discourse and material. Also see the FSA’s official Agent with the Air Force Office of Special with a stake in what is happening in Twitter and YouTube pages, available at: http://twitter. Investigations. She is also a former Senior Syria has a presence on social media com/FreeSyrianArmy and http://www.youtube.com/ Intelligence Analyst for the California through some combination of officially user/MrFSA01?ob=0&feature=results_main, respec- State Fusion Center, where she focused hosted websites and blogs, as well as tively. In addition to the FSA, the numerous insurgent almost exclusively on Mexican DTOs and Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, YouTube, groups operating autonomously, but which at the same border violence issues. Ms. Longmire is Flickr, online chat room forums, Short time also claim to be affiliated with the FSA, have also es- currently a consultant, correspondent for Message Service (SMS) platforms, and tablished a presence on social media. The FSA-affiliated Homeland Security Today magazine, and other venues. The leading political al-Farouq Battalion posts video footage of its attacks and author of Cartel: The Coming Invasion opposition factions, namely the Syrian other items on its official YouTube channel, available at of Mexico’s Drug Wars. https://www.youtube.com/user/ktaebalfaroq/videos and Twitter page, available at https://twitter.com/ktae- 1 For the purposes of this article, the author identifies balfarooq. a broad typology of social media that includes a variety 7 See the official YouTube channel of Omawi News of internet-based communication technologies, namely, Live, available at: http://www.youtube.com/user/ conventional websites, official and independent blogs, omawitv?feature=results_main. Also see the official chat room forums, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, You- Twitter page of Omawi News Live, available at: https:// Tube, Google+, Flickr, and similar venues, as well as twitter.com/OmawiLive. Short-Message Service (SMS) and Voice over Internet 8 See the official YouTube channel of Ugarit News, avail- Protocol (VoIP) platforms such as Skype. able at: http://www.youtube.com/user/UgaritNews.

19 july 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 7 quasi-official information platforms outlines its mission to defend Syria and Despite securing varying degrees of broadcasting a wide range of material on is reminiscent of the videos issued by financial, diplomatic, materiel, and behalf of the Syrian opposition on social the hacktivist group Anonymous in its logistical support from Saudi Arabia, media. Both networks air amateur video presentation and tone.14 In doing so, the Qatar, Turkey, and the United States, footage of alleged attacks by Syrian SEA relies on a nationalistic discourse the FSA’s ability to defeat the far better security forces and insurgent operations, that emphasizes Syrian unity and trained and equipped Syrian security reports documenting purported loyalty among Syrians to their country. forces remains in question.19 Nevertheless, defections of members of the Syrian Social media platforms associated the FSA appears keen to compensate for military, alleged evidence of human with the Ba`athist regime reflect the its tactical and operational inadequacies rights abuses and atrocities perpetrated narrative presented by Damascus: Syria by the Ba`athist regime, and other items portrays the crisis as an effort by its that cast Damascus in a negative light. primary enemies—the United States, “The FSA appears keen The growing radical Islamist current Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel—and to compensate for its within the Syrian opposition, including their regional allies to undermine and Jabhat al-Nusra and other extremist destroy Syria by way of proxy war tactical and operational movements that appear to be motivated and encouraging sectarianism, violent inadequacies by exploiting by al-Qa`ida’s style of radicalism are insurrection, and radical Islamist also active on social media.9 Jabhat al- militancy.15 A range of social media social media as a force Nusra announced its formation and outlets operated by supporters of the multiplier.” claimed responsibility for a series of Ba`athist regime inside Syria and terrorist attacks across Syria through abroad also helps sustain this effort to official declarations and video features counter the opposition.16 produced by its al-Manara al-Bayda by exploiting social media as a force Foundation for Media Production and The Free Syrian Army Online multiplier. The circulation of amateur issued on radical Islamist websites and The FSA, the amorphous insurgent video footage of dead or captured chat room forums.10 Jabhat al-Nusra movement that has emerged as the Syrian forces undergoing interrogation has since carved out its own place on armed wing of the Syrian opposition by the FSA20 or a smoldering Syrian social media through the creation of a faction directed by the SNC, along with military vehicle21 relayed on social dedicated website and affiliated online its many armed affiliates are prolific on media can have a multiplier effect on outlets.11 social media. The inaugural statement domestic and international perceptions declaring the establishment of the FSA regarding the military prowess of the The importance of winning the by defected Syrian Air Force colonel insurgents. This is the case even as the information war on social media has not and subsequent FSA commander insurgents continue to sustain heavy been lost to the Ba`athist regime and its Riyad Musa al-Asa’d and seven fellow losses in direct engagements with Syrian supporters. Official Syrian media and members of the Syrian military was security forces. The proliferation of information outlets such as the Syrian uploaded to YouTube and other social videotaped statements and other items Arab News Agency (SANA) are active media outlets.17 The numerous other issued by defected members of the Syrian online.12 The creation of the Syrian militant groups that have proclaimed security forces on social media can also Electronic Army (SEA) and a host of their allegiance to the FSA and intention work as an effective psychological tool associated outlets, however, reflects a to violently resist the Ba`athist regime to illustrate declining unity and morale greater effort by the Ba`athist regime have likewise taken to social media to among the ranks of Ba`athist forces to combat the opposition’s struggle to announce their motives.18 even as the numbers of defected forces monopolize the information war.13 In remain marginal. addition to encouraging supporters of 14 See “Syrian Electronic Army – Recruitment Video,” the Ba`athist regime to engage in online available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_cy- activism, the SEA is also involved in qJHa3hQ. 19 Roula Khalaf, “Arms Deliveries to Syria Rebels De- cyber warfare and hacking operations. 15 “Assad Says US Working to ‘Destabilize’ Syria,” al- layed,” Financial Times, July 11, 2012; Anne Barnard, The SEA has produced a recruitment Jazira, July 9, 2012; Dalal Mawad and Rick Gladstone, “U.S. and Turkey to Step Up ‘Nonlethal’ Aid to Rebels in video in Arabic and English that “Russia Prods Syria’s President Assad With Message of Syria,” New York Times, March 25, 2012. Growing Impatience,” New York Times, July 9, 2012. 20 See amateur video footage posted to YouTube that 9 Brian Fishman, “The Evidence of Jihadist Activity in 16 For example, see the Friends of Syria website, avail- shows what the narrator described as 13 detained Syria,” CTC Sentinel 5:5 (2012). able at http://friendsofsyria.wordpress.com. Also see the members of the irregular pro-Ba`athist paramilitary 10 Zeina Karam, “Iraq Warns al-Qaeda Flowing into Syria Tube YouTube channel, available at http://www. forces known as Shabiha (ghosts) in Idlib Province, on Syria,” Associated Press, July 5, 2012. youtube.com/user/1SyrianTube. December 15, 2011, titled “The Free Syrian Army Cap- 11 See the official Jabhat al-Nusra website, available at 17 See the inaugural videotaped statement is- tured 13 of al-Assad’s Thugs in Idlib Province in Syria http://alnusraa.blogspot.com. sued by the FSA declaring the establishment of the 15.12.2011,” available at http://www.youtube.com/ 12 See the official website of the Syrian Arab News Agen- movement, available at http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=RnGpA5md6O8. cy (SANA), available at: http://www.sana.sy. Also see watch?v=Rk7Ze5jVCj4. 21 See amateur video footage posted to YouTube of the official SANA Twitter page, available at https://twit- 18 For example, see the videotaped statement issued by what is described as the remains of Syrian tanks follow- ter.com/SANASyria. FSA-aligned insurgents declaring the establishment of ing an attack by the FSA titled “The Free Syrian Army 13 See the official website of the Syrian Electronic Army the Yazid bin Muawiyah Battalion, available at http:// Destroyed 2 Government Tanks!!!” available at http:// (SEA), available at http://syrian-es.org. www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN5QAAb_7go&feature=. www.youtube.com/watch?v=iHPCcPXiCCw.

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Overall, the accessibility of social media SNC, the FSA accuses Syrian allies Hizb reports, such as amateur video footage enables the insurgents to participate Allah and Iran of actively assisting the and photography of events such as a on a leveled information playing field Ba`athist regime to violently suppress public protest organized by opposition that was previously the exclusive the uprising. Alleged Shabiha members activists or a funeral procession for a domain of state actors or institutions captured in Idlib Province admitted Syrian who is believed to have perished closely aligned with ruling authorities. on a video that was circulated across at the hands of the Syrian security Similarly, the advent of social media cyberspace to receiving orders and forces, make an impact on social media enables individuals and organizations support from Hizb Allah leader Hassan in such a way that is impossible to with little or no formal association with Nasrallah and Iran, among other claims, emulate through traditional print or the factions currently operating inside in spite of a lack of concrete evidence.24 second-hand news reportage. Amateur Syria to project their influence into video footage of the funeral of Hamza Ali the events on the ground. Extremist The FSA has also worked hard to refute al-Khateeb, a 13-year-old boy who was accusations that radical Islamists and allegedly tortured and killed by Syrian “The virtual arena has other extremists motivated by sectarian security forces after being detained in a agendas or mercenaries acting on behalf protest in his native Dera`a, spawned emerged as a crucial of Syria’s enemies make up their ranks. a wave of outrage in Syria and around battlefield for the warring The dissemination of a video showing the world that helped embolden the an alleged Syrian Christian military already simmering opposition against factions, political and officer announcing his defection from the Ba`athist regime.27 violent, operating on the Syrian army—the first Christian member of the Syrian security forces to At this juncture, it is impossible to Syrian soil and outside of do so, according to the video’s title—and determine the precise effect social its borders.” decision to join the Sham Eagles Brigade media is having on shaping the course of the FSA is another example of the of developments in Syria. It is clear, insurgency’s resort to social media as a however, that the virtual arena has force multiplier.25 emerged as a crucial battlefield for the ideologues such as Shaykh Adnan al- warring factions, political and violent, Arour, for instance, a Syrian Salafist Conclusion operating on Syrian soil and outside cleric who currently resides in exile in Effective messaging allows for the of its borders. At the very least, Saudi Arabia, is among the most vocal contesting parties in Syria to present the sheer volume of social media supporters of the FSA on social media unadulterated versions of their platforms operating independently and traditional media outlets, including respective narratives and positions to and in unison by all sides suggests satellite television.22 supporters, opponents, and neutral an interest to secure both tactical and parties alike in Syria and beyond. A strategic gains through victories in The FSA and its associates are also successful information campaign also the virtual battlefield. exploiting the virtual domain of social helps sway target foreign audiences media to disseminate propaganda and that may have little or no stake in what Chris Zambelis is an analyst and researcher disinformation to bolster their causes, is happening in Syria to choose sides. In specializing in Middle East affairs with with an eye toward capitalizing on its this context, the competing factions in Helios Global, Inc., a risk management inherent multiplier effects. Evidence Syria are waging a virtual campaign to group based in the Washington, D.C. that activists sympathetic to the FSA win over international public opinion.26 area. The opinions expressed here are have broadcast doctored amateur videos In today’s information climate, an the author’s alone and do not necessarily showing alleged battlefield successes item posted to YouTube or Twitter by reflect the position of Helios Global, Inc. executed by the insurgents against individual users or activists can easily Syrian forces, desertions of Syrian compete with and often may supersede troops from their posts, and massacres a breaking dispatch from reputable of civilians and other atrocities blamed international media conglomerates on Syrian security forces in the absence in terms of the number of consumers of concrete proof implicating the it reaches in the public domain. Raw Ba`athist regime is a case in point.23 Members of the Syrian security forces 24 See “The Free Syrian Army Captured 13 of al-Assad’s who undergo questioning by the FSA on Thugs in Idlib Province in Syria 15.12.2011,” available at video also often appear to recite claims http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnGpA5md6O8. frequently made by the insurgents to 25 See the videotaped statement titled “First Christian validate their positions. Along with the Officer Announcing His Defection and His Joining to the Free Syrian Army,” available at http://www.youtube. 22 Shaykh Adnan al-Arour’s numerous public declara- com/watch?v=AB3gUhOxMPk. tions regarding the uprising in Syria are catalogued on 26 As a result, much if not the majority of the informa- his official YouTube channel, available at http://www. tion that is being broadcast on social media is translated youtube.com/AdnanAlarour. into English and sometimes other major languages, in 23 Mike Giglio, “Syrian Rebels Caught Embellishing on addition to Arabic, in order to reach as wide an audience 27 See “Funeral of Tortured Syrian Child Hamza al- Tape,” Daily Beast, March 27, 2012. as possible. Khatib (Video),” Jadaliyya, May 31, 2011.

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killing at least 23 people. According to admitted to giving approximately $550 Recent Highlights in Reuters, the attack, which targeted the to Ilyas Kashmiri. He pleaded guilty in Terrorist Activity Shi`a Endowment, “comes at a sensitive February 2012. – Reuters, June 8 time, with the country’s fractious June 1, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Shi’ite, Sunni and Kurdish blocs locked June 8, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suicide Militants attacked a U.S.-led coalition in a crisis that threatens to unravel bomber in a vehicle attacked the police base three miles outside Khost city in their power-sharing deal and spill into headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno eastern Afghanistan. Approximately sectarian tension.” – Reuters, June 4 State. At least five people were killed in 14 Taliban fighters were killed in the the blast. Authorities suspect the Boko assault, which included the use of a June 4, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. Haram group was responsible. – AFP, suicide bomber in an explosives-laden drone killed Abu Yahya al-Libi, one June 8 vehicle. NATO officials later linked the of al-Qa`ida’s most senior operatives. Haqqani network to the attack. – AP, The strike, which occurred in Mir Ali, June 9, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A June 1; al-Jazira, June 1; Reuters, June 26 North Waziristan Agency, killed at suicide bomber disguised as a woman least 15 people. Al-Libi was considered wearing a burqa detonated explosives June 2, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. drone al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command. – New at a market in Kapisa Province, killing killed at least three suspected militants York Times, June 4 four French soldiers. As reported in Khawashi Khel village, near Wana, by Reuters, “The French forces were South Waziristan Agency. – New York June 4, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide responding to a report of a bomb planted Daily News, June 2 bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle under a bridge in the main market area attacked a checkpoint in southern of Kapisa Province’s Nijrab district June 3, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida Abyan Province, killing four pro-army when the bomber walked up to them and leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released militiamen. – AFP, June 4 detonated his explosives.” – AP, June 9 a new video, in which he recounted his memories with Usama bin Ladin. June 6, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Two June 10, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida “He spent all his money on jihad,” al- suicide bombers killed at least 22 people chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a new Zawahiri said. “He was known for at a bazaar in Kandahar. – BBC, June 6 audio recording, calling on Tunisians to his generosity with guests. He would rise up against the country’s Islamist slaughter livestock for them and give June 7, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A ruling party for accepting a constitution them tasty food.” – Reuters, June 3 group of at least 20 prisoners, most not based on Shari`a. “It is strange to of them Taliban members, escaped see a leadership party that claims to be June 3, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. drone from a jail in Sar-e-Pul Province in associated with moderate Islam and at killed 10 suspected militants in South northern Afghanistan. The men used an the same time it says it does not call for Waziristan Agency of the Federally improvised explosive device to destroy ruling by Islam,” al-Zawahiri said. – AP, Administered Tribal Areas. According part of the jail, allowing them to escape. June 11 to Voice of America, the “suspected – Reuters, June 8 militants were gathered to offer June 10, 2012 (NIGERIA): Militants condolences to the brother of a militant June 7, 2012 (SOMALIA): The U.S. attacked two separate churches in commander killed during another government announced $33 million in Nigeria. In one attack, the church’s American unmanned drone strike on rewards for information leading to the congregation was sprayed with bullets. Saturday [June 2].” – AP, June 3 locations of top al-Shabab leaders in In the second attack on a different Somalia. – New York Times, June 7 church, a suicide bomber in a vehicle June 3, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suicide detonated explosives. At least one bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle June 8, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida person was killed in the attacks. Boko targeted a church on the outskirts of the leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s wife Haram claimed responsibility. – Reuters, northern city of Bauchi, killing at least released a rare message on Islamist June 10; Deutsche Welle, June 11 12 people. Boko Haram later claimed web forums praising Muslim women for responsibility. – Voice of America, June 3; The their role in the Arab Spring uprisings. June 12, 2012 (UNITED STATES): A News International, June 3; al-Arabiya, June 4 “I congratulate all females of the world U.S. court sentenced Haji Bagcho to for these blessed revolutions and I life in prison after being convicted of June 4, 2012 (UNITED STATES): salute every mother who sacrificed her conspiracy, distribution of heroin to Sabirhan Hasanoff, a dual U.S. and loved ones in the revolutions,” the letter the United States and narcoterrorism. Australian citizen, pleaded guilty to said. “It is really an Arab Spring and Bagcho, an Afghan national, had links to supporting al-Qa`ida. The New York will soon become an Islamic spring.” the Taliban and conspired to distribute accountant was accused of helping al- – Reuters, June 8 heroin in the United States to help fund Qa`ida with computer systems. He faces the Taliban. He was extradited to the up to 20 years in a U.S. prison. – Reuters, June 8, 2012 (UNITED STATES): A U.S. United States from Afghanistan in May June 4 federal judge sentenced Raja Lahrasib 2009. – Reuters, June 12; AFP, June 12 Khan to seven and a half years in jail June 4, 2012 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber for attempting to financially support al- June 12, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide in an explosives-laden vehicle targeted a Qa`ida’s operations against India. Khan, bomber tried to assassinate an anti- Shi`a Muslim office in central Baghdad, a Pakistan-born Chicago taxi driver, Taliban tribal elder on the outskirts of

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Peshawar, killing two of the leader’s June 16, 2012 (SOMALIA): A suicide killed both assailants. A group calling security guards. – AFP, June 12 bomber drove a vehicle into the gate of itself the Mujahidin Shura Council a government base in Afgoye, outside of Jerusalem claimed responsibility. June 12, 2012 (YEMEN): Yemen’s military Mogadishu, killing two Somali soldiers. – CNN, June 19 pushed Ansar al-Shari`a fighters out of Al-Shabab claimed responsibility. their two main strongholds in Zinjibar – Reuters, June 16; AFP, June 16 June 19, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A group and Jaar. Ansar al-Shari`a is linked to of Taliban fighters attacked a NATO al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. June 16, 2012 (SAUDI ARABIA): Saudi camp on the outskirts of Kandahar in – Reuters, June 12 Arabia’s interior minister, Crown southern Afghanistan. The assault, Prince Nayif bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, which involved suicide bombers, left June 13, 2012 (IRAQ): A series of died in Geneva at 78-years-old. Prince seven militants dead. – Washington Post, explosions mostly targeting Shi`a Nayif was in charge of the country’s June 19 Muslims tore through Iraq, killing fight against al-Qa`ida and domestic at least 70 people. The Islamic State militants. Although the cause of death June 20, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani of Iraq claimed responsibility. The was not immediately known, he was security forces announced the arrest of a bombings marked the deadliest day in believed to have had recent heart bypass French national suspected of being a key Iraq since the withdrawal of U.S. troops surgery. – New York Times, June 16 al-Qa`ida operative. The man, identified in December 2011. – New York Times, June as Naamen Meziche, was apprehended 13; Reuters, June 13; Voice of America, June 16 June 17, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida outside Quetta in Baluchistan Province. chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a – Los Angeles Times, June 20 June 14, 2012 (SYRIA): A suicide bomber new audio recording calling on Egypt to detonated an explosives-laden vehicle cancel its peace treaty with Israel and to June 20, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A in a Damascus suburb, wounding 10 establish Islamic rule. – AP, June 17 suicide bomber on a motorbike targeted people. – AP, June 14 an Afghan-NATO checkpoint in Khost June 17, 2012 (NIGERIA): Boko Haram city, killing 18 Afghans and three U.S. June 15, 2012 (UNITED STATES): killed at least 50 people after attacking soldiers. – Washington Post, June 20 U.S. President Barack Obama publicly three Christian churches in Zaria and acknowledged for the first time that the Kaduna. – CNN, June 18 June 20-21, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S. military had taken “direct action” Insurgents armed with weapons and against al-Qa`ida affiliated groups in June 18, 2012 (UNITED STATES): suicide vests attacked the Spozhmai Yemen and Somalia. In the past, U.S. Wesam El-Hanafi pleaded guilty to one Hotel on the outskirts of Kabul, killing officials would not confirm publicly count of providing material support at least 20 people. The militants arrived that U.S. forces were involved in the to a terrorist group and one count of at the hotel in a minivan disguised fight in Yemen or Somalia. – New York conspiracy in a Manhattan courtroom. as women by wearing burqas, then Times, June 15 The New York-born man admitted to proceeded to shoot their way through helping al-Qa`ida. – Reuters, June 18 the building. All of the militants June 15, 2012 (YEMEN): Yemen’s eventually died. The Taliban claimed military retook the port town of Shaqra, June 18, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A responsibility. – New York Times, June 22 Abyan Province, from Ansar al-Shari`a, Taliban roadside bomb killed eight an insurgent group linked to al-Qa`ida civilians, including women and children, June 21, 2012 (NIGERIA): The United in the Arabian Peninsula. On June in Musa Qala, Helmand Province. – AFP, States officially designated three 12, the Yemeni military also regained June 18 members of Boko Haram as “foreign control of Zinjibar and Jaar. – Voice of terrorists”—Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar America, June 15 June 18, 2012 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Adam Kambar and Khalid al-Barnawi. killed 22 people at a Shi`a gathering in – Voice of America, June 21 June 16, 2012 (IRAQ): Two separate Ba`quba, Diyala Province. - al-Arabiya, car bombs targeted Shi`a Muslims in June 29 June 22, 2012 (UNITED STATES): Baghdad. One bomb exploded near Amine El Khalifi, an illegal immigrant a bus station, where dozens of Shi`a June 18, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide from Morocco living in Virginia, pilgrims were standing, killing at least bomber assassinated Yemen’s army pleaded guilty to attempting a suicide 14 people. A second bomb exploded in general leading the fight against al- bomb attack on the U.S. Capitol. He Sanaa Square, killing 18 people. – CNN, Qa`ida-affiliated militants in southern faces up to 30 years in prison. – Voice of June 16 Yemen. The general, Salem Ali Qatan, America, June 22 was killed on his way to work in Aden June 16, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A truck despite driving in a three-car convoy. June 22, 2012 (NIGERIA): A bomb bomb ripped through a busy market in Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula exploded outside a nightclub in Nigeria’s Landi Kotal of Khyber Agency in the later claimed responsibility. – AP, June capital of Abuja. No one was injured. Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 18; Reuters, June 21 – Voice of America, June 23 killing at least 20 people. Authorities suspect that the bomb targeted tribesmen June 18, 2012 (ISRAEL): Two militants June 24, 2012 (GLOBAL): U.S. General who have been fighting against local crossed into Israel from Egypt and killed Carter Ham, the head of the U.S. militants. – Los Angeles Times, June 16 an Israeli civilian. Israeli security forces military’s Africa Command, said that

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al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al- a cell linked to al-Qa`ida that plotted CTC Sentinel Staff Shabab and Boko Haram are seeking to attack U.S. troops in Kuwait as well to “coordinate and synchronize” their as state-owned Saudi Aramco. – Reuters, Editor-in-Chief operations. – Bloomberg, June 25 June 27 Erich Marquardt Senior Editor, CTC June 24, 2012 (PAKISTAN): More June 27, 2012 (MALI): Militants than 100 Taliban fighters crossed belonging to the Movement for Unity Editorial Board into Pakistan from Afghanistan and and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. killed at least 17 Pakistani soldiers. took complete control of Gao from the Department Head The men, reportedly loyal to Pakistani National Movement for the Liberation Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Taliban commander Maulana Fazlullah, of Azawad (MNLA) in northern Mali. then released a video showing the The MUJAO is considered a Salafi- COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. dismembered heads of the 17 ambushed jihadi group, whereas the MNLA is Deputy Department Head troops, as well as their identification an ethno-nationalist insurgent group. Department of Social Sciences (West Point) cards. – CNN, June 25; New York Times, June MUJAO has direct ties to al-Qa`ida in 25; AP, June 25; Reuters, June 28 the Islamic Maghreb. – Voice of America, LTC Liam Collins June 28 Director, CTC June 24, 2012 (KENYA): An explosion tore through a nightclub in Mombasa, June 29, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): killing three people. The cause of the Hundreds of Taliban fighters attacked blast was not immediately known, but the remote Kamdish district of Nuristan Kenya has been targeted by a series Province, although Afghan security of blasts since it sent troops into forces eventually pushed the militants neighboring Somalia to fight al-Shabab. back with the support of NATO – Reuters, June 24; Reuters, June 25 airstrikes. – AFP, June 29 Contact Combating Terrorism Center June 24, 2012 (NIGERIA): Boko June 29, 2012 (ALGERIA): A suicide U.S. Military Academy Haram militants broke into a prison in bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Damaturu in northern Nigeria, freeing attacked a paramilitary police base in West Point, NY 10996 40 inmates. – Reuters, June 24 Ouargla, killing at least one person. – Phone: (845) 667-6383 Reuters, June 29 Email: [email protected] June 25, 2012 (GLOBAL): Officials from Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ three European security agencies told June 30, 2012 (MALI): Islamist militants reporters that a Norwegian man had who control northern Mali destroyed * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 received terrorist training from al- ancient tombs of Muslim saints in Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula and Timbuktu, creating an international was awaiting orders to execute an attack outcry. – AFP, June 30 in the West. The officials said that the man had gone “operational.” The man is apparently a convert to Islam with support no immigrant background, and he has The Combating Terrorism Center would no criminal record. He spent “some like to express its gratitude to its financial months” in Yemen where he received supporters, for without their support and terrorist training. – AP, June 25 shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you June 25, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): NATO are interested in learning more about how officials said that insurgent attacks to support the Combating Terrorism Center, in Afghanistan increased in April please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call and May, indicating a rise in Taliban Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association activity after months of declines. – Wall of Graduates at 845-446-1561. Street Journal, June 25

June 25, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Taliban militants attacked the private Aaj television station in Karachi, injuring two people. The Taliban said that the station was overly critical of The views expressed in this report are those of the Taliban. – BBC, June 26 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency June 26, 2012 (SAUDI ARABIA): A of the U.S. Government. Saudi court sentenced 11 men to jail terms up to 15 years for membership in

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