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A New Model for Defeating Al Qaeda in Yemen

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A New Model for Defeating Al Qaeda in Yemen A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in Yemen Katherine Zimmerman September 2015 A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in Yemen KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2015 A REPORT BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 3 Part I: Al Qaeda and the Situation in Yemen ................................................................................................. 5 A Broken Model in Yemen ...................................................................................................................... 5 The Collapse of America’s Counterterrorism Partnership ........................................................................ 6 The Military Situation in Yemen ........................................................................................................... 10 Yemen, Iran, and Regional Dynamics ................................................................................................... 15 The Expansion of AQAP and the Emergence of ISIS in Yemen ............................................................ 18 Part II: A New Strategy for Yemen ............................................................................................................. 29 Defeating the Enemy in Yemen ............................................................................................................. 29 Developing a New Yemen Model ......................................................................................................... 36 A Strategy to Defeat AQAP .................................................................................................................. 36 Potential Enemy Responses to the First Phase ....................................................................................... 45 Strategic Mistakes to Avoid .................................................................................................................... 46 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 48 Glossary of Relevant Individuals, Groups, and Concepts ............................................................................ 49 Notes ........................................................................................................................................................... 53 Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................................... 65 About Us .................................................................................................................................................... 66 Tables Table 1. Al Qaeda’s Yemen Objectives and Strategy ..................................................................................... 19 Table 2. AQAP’s Elements of Strategic Power ............................................................................................. 30 Table 3. Potential US Courses of Action in Yemen...................................................................................... 38 iii A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015 Figures Figure 1. Al Houthi Activity in Yemen, 2011–13.......................................................................................... 6 Figure 2. Al Houthi Activity in Yemen, 2014–15.......................................................................................... 8 Figure 3. Yemen Governorate Maps ......................................................................................................11–13 Figure 4. Frontline of Yemen Conflict, August 2015................................................................................... 14 Figure 5. Operations Decisive Storm and Restoring Hope .......................................................................... 16 Figure 6. Kouachis’ Timeline before Charlie Hebdo ..................................................................................... 20 Figure 7. AQAP Leaders Killed in 2015 ...................................................................................................... 21 Figure 8. AQAP Attacks, January–September 2014 .................................................................................... 22 Figure 9. Coalition and AQAP Activity ....................................................................................................... 23 Figure 10. Al Bayda Tribal Map ................................................................................................................... 24 Figure 11. Support for AQAP in al Bayda ................................................................................................... 25 Figure 12. Hadramawt Nonstate Actors ...................................................................................................... 26 Figure 13. ISIS’s Expansion in Yemen ......................................................................................................... 27 Figure 14. Attacking AQAP’s Centers of Gravity ........................................................................................ 35 Figure 15. Effect of Lines of Effort .............................................................................................................. 41 iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY he terrorist threat from Yemen is growing. Al experience is that the terrorist threat from Yemen is not TQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), still susceptible to a kinetic solution. As daunting a task as it likely the most potent al Qaeda terrorist threat to the is, no strategy against AQAP will be successful if it does US homeland, has expanded and strengthened as the not address underlying factors key to AQAP’s contin- Yemeni state has collapsed. AQAP’s success buttresses ued prosperity. the global al Qaeda network, which remains cohe- Complicating matters, the Kingdom of Saudi Ara- sive despite the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al bia and the Islamic Republic of Iran have pulled Yemen Sham (ISIS). into their expanding regional proxy war, a growing AQAP’s capabilities to conduct transnational challenge for any Yemen strategy. Even more problem- attacks—for example, to design bombs that can travel atic for the United States, both Tehran and Riyadh have undetected—remain. The question is when, not picked sides in Yemen’s civil war, and neither is fighting if, AQAP will strike next. ISIS also now has a foot- AQAP. Perceptions of the US role from both Riyadh, hold inside Yemen that will only increase under cur- an important ally in the region, and Tehran, a linchpin rent conditions. ISIS may not be plotting an attack of the new Iran deal, mean that most decisions made against the West from Yemen, but its expansion into by Washington will appear to be tipping the regional Yemen builds the ISIS narrative and will only serve to balance to one or the other player. strengthen ISIS globally. The US must identify a way forward and lead a The current US approach to Yemen, christened coordinated regional response in Yemen. Specifically, the “Yemen model,” has failed alongside the Yemeni Washington must work with both regional and local state.1 America’s counterterrorism partnership ran partners to defeat AQAP and to negotiate a political through the Yemeni government and relied on Yemeni solution to the current crisis by military forces to fight AQAP on the ground. In the wake of the collapse of that partnership, the US is now • Engaging in a multitiered effort to negotiate a backing a Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen political settlement among Yemeni stakeholders in hopes of returning that government, or some iter- to end the national-level conflict and signal clearly ation of it, to power in order to pick up where the that the Zaydi Shi’a al Houthi movement must be partnership left off. But the Yemeni military forces are a part of Yemen’s future; so degraded today that they will not be able to fight AQAP effectively once the current conflict ends, and • Supporting subnational actors to stabilize local this effort to resuscitate the Yemen model does not dynamics and understand and address underlying appreciate that the US approach was not working in grievances; the first place. The American strategy to fight AQAP in Yemen pri- • Leading a ground offensive against AQAP by oritized a military response to AQAP’s threat. American coordinating and supporting partnered local air strikes targeted AQAP leadership, and Yemeni forces forces and conducting direct-action operations disrupted AQAP ground movements. Nonetheless, to destroy the direct and imminent threat from AQAP reemerged after a major offensive against it in AQAP; and 2012 and again in 2014. Part of its resilience has come from AQAP’s ability to exploit local popular grievances, • Managing and mitigating a humanitarian crisis which the Yemeni government has avoided addressing by addressing the immediate needs of the popu- for decades and which afford the group the operational lation, prioritizing aid delivery to key terrain, and and territorial latitude so vital to its success. delivering targeted aid through US Agency for These local grievances are driving Yemen’s own International Development channels similar to
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