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Home , 2014 Ibb bombing, Aden, Ahmed Saleh, Ali Raymi, Al Bayda Governorate, Ataq

A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in

Katherine Zimmerman September 2015 A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in Yemen

KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN

SEPTEMBER 2015

A REPORT BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary...... 1

Introduction...... 3

Part I: Al Qaeda and the Situation in Yemen...... 5

A Broken Model in Yemen...... 5

The Collapse of America’s Counterterrorism Partnership...... 6

The Military Situation in Yemen...... 10

Yemen, , and Regional Dynamics...... 15

The Expansion of AQAP and the Emergence of ISIS in Yemen...... 18

Part II: A New Strategy for Yemen...... 29

Defeating the Enemy in Yemen...... 29

Developing a New Yemen Model...... 36

A Strategy to Defeat AQAP...... 36

Potential Enemy Responses to the First Phase...... 45

Strategic Mistakes to Avoid...... 46

Conclusion...... 48

Glossary of Relevant Individuals, Groups, and Concepts...... 49

Notes...... 53

Acknowledgments...... 65

About Us...... 66

Tables

Table 1. Al Qaeda’s Yemen Objectives and Strategy...... 19

Table 2. AQAP’s Elements of Strategic Power...... 30

Table 3. Potential US Courses of Action in Yemen...... 38

iii A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figures

Figure 1. Al Houthi Activity in Yemen, 2011–13...... 6

Figure 2. Al Houthi Activity in Yemen, 2014–15...... 8

Figure 3. Yemen Governorate Maps...... 11–13

Figure 4. Frontline of Yemen Conflict, August 2015...... 14

Figure 5. Operations Decisive Storm and Restoring Hope...... 16

Figure 6. Kouachis’ Timeline before Charlie Hebdo...... 20

Figure 7. AQAP Leaders Killed in 2015...... 21

Figure 8. AQAP Attacks, January–September 2014...... 22

Figure 9. Coalition and AQAP Activity...... 23

Figure 10. Al Bayda Tribal Map...... 24

Figure 11. Support for AQAP in al Bayda...... 25

Figure 12. Hadramawt Nonstate Actors...... 26

Figure 13. ISIS’s Expansion in Yemen...... 27

Figure 14. Attacking AQAP’s Centers of Gravity...... 35

Figure 15. Effect of Lines of Effort...... 41

iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

he terrorist threat from Yemen is growing. Al experience is that the terrorist threat from Yemen is not TQaeda in the (AQAP), still susceptible to a kinetic solution. As daunting a task as it likely the most potent al Qaeda terrorist threat to the is, no strategy against AQAP will be successful if it does US homeland, has expanded and strengthened as the not address underlying factors key to AQAP’s contin- Yemeni state has collapsed. AQAP’s success buttresses ued prosperity. the global al Qaeda network, which remains cohe- Complicating matters, the Kingdom of Saudi Ara- sive despite the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al bia and the Islamic Republic of Iran have pulled Yemen Sham (ISIS). into their expanding regional proxy war, a growing AQAP’s capabilities to conduct transnational challenge for any Yemen strategy. Even more problem- attacks—for example, to design bombs that can travel atic for the , both and Riyadh have undetected—remain. The question is when, not picked sides in Yemen’s civil war, and neither is fighting if, AQAP will strike next. ISIS also now has a foot- AQAP. Perceptions of the US role from both Riyadh, hold inside Yemen that will only increase under cur- an important ally in the region, and Tehran, a linchpin rent conditions. ISIS may not be plotting an attack of the new Iran deal, mean that most decisions made against the West from Yemen, but its expansion into by Washington will appear to be tipping the regional Yemen builds the ISIS narrative and will only serve to balance to one or the other player. strengthen ISIS globally. The US must identify a way forward and lead a The current US approach to Yemen, christened coordinated regional response in Yemen. Specifically, the “Yemen model,” has failed alongside the Yemeni Washington must work with both regional and local state.1 America’s counterterrorism partnership ran partners to defeat AQAP and to negotiate a political through the Yemeni government and relied on Yemeni solution to the current crisis by military forces to fight AQAP on the ground. In the wake of the collapse of that partnership, the US is now • Engaging in a multitiered effort to negotiate a backing a Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen political settlement among Yemeni stakeholders in hopes of returning that government, or some iter- to end the national-level conflict and signal clearly ation of it, to power in order to pick up where the that the Zaydi Shi’a al must be partnership left off. But the Yemeni military forces are a part of Yemen’s future; so degraded today that they will not be able to fight AQAP effectively once the current conflict ends, and • Supporting subnational actors to stabilize local this effort to resuscitate the Yemen model does not dynamics and understand and address underlying appreciate that the US approach was not working in grievances; the first place. The American strategy to fight AQAP in Yemen pri- • Leading a ground offensive against AQAP by oritized a military response to AQAP’s threat. American coordinating and supporting partnered local air strikes targeted AQAP leadership, and Yemeni forces forces and conducting direct-action operations disrupted AQAP ground movements. Nonetheless, to destroy the direct and imminent threat from AQAP reemerged after a major offensive against it in AQAP; and 2012 and again in 2014. Part of its resilience has come from AQAP’s ability to exploit local popular grievances, • Managing and mitigating a humanitarian crisis which the Yemeni government has avoided addressing by addressing the immediate needs of the popu- for decades and which afford the group the operational lation, prioritizing aid delivery to key terrain, and and territorial latitude so vital to its success. delivering targeted aid through US Agency for These local grievances are driving Yemen’s own International Development channels similar to instability. The fundamental and clear lesson from past those run in Iraq or Afghanistan.

1 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

These efforts, particularly the ground offensive A win against al Qaeda in Yemen will last only if it against AQAP, will generate a reaction. US personnel is part of a global strategy to operate against al Qaeda, deployed to Yemen will be in harm’s way, although ISIS, and like-minded groups. The proposed approach there are steps to take to minimize that risk. AQAP should not be taken as a model for such a global fight, and ISIS will both probably seize the opportunity to as experience shows that there is no single answer to kill Americans, and we must prepare ourselves for this complex problem. Instead, similar concepts must casualties. It may be much more appetizing to fight be developed for all the theaters in which al Qaeda from the sky, but the only way to win will be on the and ISIS operate today, which together will comprise ground. a comprehensive strategy to defeat al Qaeda and ISIS.

2 INTRODUCTION

he United States needs a new strategy in Yemen. al Qaeda contagion throughout the region. Ongoing TIts current approach to combating al Qaeda there mediation efforts among key stakeholders show few has collapsed as the country has slid deeper into civil signs of real progress. A rapid resolution to the conflict war. Yet the al Qaeda threat is growing, fed by regional in Yemen is improbable. dynamics that are driving radicalism and sectarian- The Yemeni state no longer exists. The al Houthi ism. Yemen has become a third battleground for the movement controls northern Yemen, including the Iran– proxy war. Al Qaeda and the Islamic capital, Sana’a, and , one of three major State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) are already dominating port cities. The al Houthis are allied with a former forces in Iraq and , and the global jihadist move- nemesis, longtime president and US partner Abdul- ment, in which the two compete, is on the rise. So also lah Saleh, with whom Saudi Arabia refuses to negotiate. in Yemen both the al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the The nominal Yemeni government, led by recent coun- Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and an ISIS franchise are terterrorism partner Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, has growing. US strategy in Yemen must be robust enough cobbled together a factionalized resistance force to roll to not only defeat both groups, but also de-escalate the back al Houthi gains. That force, which includes Saudi conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, at least in the and Emirati components, now controls Yemen’s south- Yemen theater. ern port city of and is pushing northward. Current US strategy seeks to defeat the threat to But the supporting factions include southern seces- American interests from AQAP through a counter- sionists, who may see an alliance with Hadi as only partnership and drone strikes. Drone strikes temporary. It depends on the quiescence of the south- alone have never defeated an al Qaeda group. Further- ern tribes, among some of which AQAP has embed- more, the Yemeni military forces on which US strat- ded itself. And al Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate controls the egy relied to fight al Qaeda on the ground are divided, third major port city, al , in the country’s east degraded, and fighting one another. In fact, none of where it has expanded its safe haven. Even should the the ground forces in Yemen are fighting al Qaeda. The al Houthis, Saleh, and Hadi find a compromise, they government that was the US counterterrorism partner are unlikely to focus on AQAP or be able to control its fled the country in March 2015. The Yemeni state has current sanctuaries any time soon. fractured, and the US, among other countries, is trying AQAP has expanded and strengthened without to put it back together to salvage what is left of a coun- opposition and is growing stronger ties to an insur- terterrorism strategy. gency in Yemen. It is adept at exploiting local griev- The prospects are grim. Yemen has been in a slow ances for its own gains. Similar to al Qaeda’s growth in downward spiral since at least September 2014, and Syria, AQAP is integrating into local governance struc- external factors are accelerating its demise. A coup d’état tures and, in some places, has gained support as the de by the Zaydi Shi’a al Houthi movement, openly backed facto military power. It will be much more difficult to by Iran, ended in January 2015 with the resignation of separate AQAP from the population today than it was Yemen’s executive branch. Local militia forces resisted in 2012, when AQAP last controlled terrain in Yemen. the al Houthis’ expansion from their northern strong- This time, there is no Yemeni military to speak of hold into central and southern Yemen. A Saudi-led to prosecute a offensive in Yemen, a military intervention only recently broke a six-month key component of the US strategy. AQAP also remains stalemate but in the process destroyed critical infra- focused on transnational attacks, a capability that shot structure, including parts of the Yemeni military. It also it to the top of the terrorism threat list. Targeted strikes exacerbated a growing humanitarian crisis that could and intelligence of whatever quality the US maintains become a mass , potentially spreading the in Yemen may be able to disrupt AQAP’s efforts, but

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they will not defeat them. There will be another AQAP have been fundamentally altered. The effective change attack against American interests. in American strategy in Iraq in 2007 resulted from a The endurance of AQAP in Yemen is crucial for the paradigm shift. The new approach not only focused on global al Qaeda network. AQAP preserves al Qaeda’s­ providing security to the Iraqi population, but also rec- Yemen sanctuary, which has supported al Qaeda ognized that the sectarian nature of Iraq’s government operations for more than two decades. That sanctu- and security forces was a central part of the problem cre- ary overlaps with a major smuggling network that ating space for al Qaeda in Iraq to flourish. runs northward into the heart of the Arabian Penin- A new strategy for Yemen requires a similar, suitably sula and westward into . Recently, al Qaeda modified paradigm shift that begins by recognizing that has run its transnational attacks through AQAP, prob- the political and military struggle among the al Houthis, ably in recognition of AQAP’s attack capabilities but Saleh’s forces, the Saudis and their allies, the Iranians, also because of the ability to move through the region. and local Yemeni tribes and groups is central to the chal- AQAP has supported al Qaeda’s primary fight in Syria, lenge of coping with AQAP. This report therefore con- too. Senior members within al Qaeda’s hierarchy have siders those struggles in considerable detail. also been leaders within AQAP as the senior al Qaeda The paper additionally presents a modified imple- leadership has become increasingly decentralized. mentation of the military decision-making process A strategy to defeat the AQAP threat will also deal a used by the US armed forces to develop concepts and significant blow to the al Qaeda network if that strat- plans. It evaluates AQAP according to four key charac- egy is nested in a global effort. The past 14 years have teristics of any armed forces: Critical Capabilities, Crit- proven that the US counterterrorism strategies are not ical Requirements, Critical Vulnerabilities, and Centers working. A full-scale military invasion risks worsening of Gravity. The purpose of this analysis is to identify the the problem and generating an insurgency that empow- key tasks and objectives that US and allied forces must ers al Qaeda. Delegating the fight to local proxies, such achieve to defeat the enemy, preferably in the most effi- as the George W. Bush administration did in cient manner possible. in 2006, can have the same effect. The analysis of enemy characteristics then considers A counterterrorism partnership that runs through five possible courses of action (COAs) the US could the central government, which the Obama administra- adopt, evaluating each based on its strengths and weak- tion prefers, has generally been ineffective, as in Yemen, nesses. This analysis produces a recommended COA or counterproductive, as in Nigeria, at least until and enables the consideration of the key tasks and recently. There is no cookie-cutter approach. Instead, some of the military and nonmilitary requirements for there must be a theater-by-theater approach of tailored accomplishing them. The analysis concludes by consid- strategies that work in synergy globally. Until then, the ering possible enemy courses of action in response to al Qaeda threat will remain. this strategy and, finally, by identifying key planning Developing such a strategy requires understanding assumptions that must remain true for this strategic the situation in Yemen objectively and in detail. AQAP concept to remain valid. is growing because of Yemen’s internal political and The result is an initial strategic/operational con- military crises, which spring from deep-rooted griev- cept, not a military or political-military campaign plan. ances among the population. No meaningful strategy Only professional staffs in the US military, intelligence to defeat AQAP can ignore those crises or grievances, community, and US Department of State can produce however superficially appealing it might be to focus meaningful and executable plans that specify exactly only on killing terrorists. how many forces, people, dollars, and other resources Therefore, this report starts by considering the current will be required to execute them. The aim of this paper crises in Yemen and the state of play on Yemen’s many is more restricted: simply to describe the problem in a battlefields. The situation is fluid and will certainly have way that facilitates the evolution of a new approach to changed by the time of publication, but it is not likely to solving it.

4 PART I: AL QAEDA AND THE SITUATION IN YEMEN

A Broken Model in Yemen superficial assessment of the strategy showed it to be working again through 2013. AQAP no longer out- The United States has never fully taken on the chal- right governed or controlled territory, and it did not lenge that Yemen presents. American strategic interests follow through on an August 2013 threat against US in Yemen remain limited: prevent al Qaeda in the Ara- diplomatic posts in the region.5 bian Peninsula (AQAP) or any other group from tar- But there were also warnings by the end of 2013 that geting the American homeland, people, and regional the strategy could collapse because of growing socio- infrastructure, and prevent regional instability. These economic and political problems driving instability and interests have shaped American engagement in Yemen creating conditions conducive to AQAP’s resurgence. over the past two decades, which has fluctuated largely These problems convulsed Yemen in 2014, fractur- in correlation with the al Qaeda threat, punctuated ing the state and wrecking the Yemen model, probably by attacks that trace back to the country, such as the for good. The US nevertheless did not respond to the October 2000 USS Cole bombing and the Decem- deteriorating situation in any meaningful way, nor did ber 2009 attempt by the underwear bomber. Yemen’s it even, apparently, recognize the end of its strategy. It fractious nature, its government’s restricted capabilities instead relied on Saudi Arabia to manage the problem and capacity to operate, and its systemic problems have as it has so often before. deterred American involvement beyond what has been Saudi Arabia’s historical relationship with Yemen deemed necessary to mitigate imminent threats. has long served as a crutch for American approaches The strategy that has emerged from this pattern— to this problem. The US has repeatedly outsourced its the so-called “Yemen model”—is the combination of Yemen policy to Saudi Arabia, rightly, perhaps, recog- US direct-action operations, such as drone strikes, and nizing the Saudis’ superior knowledge of their neighbor a Yemeni ground effort to combat AQAP.2 This strat- and greater interest in Yemen’s stability, but also overes- egy has relied on the Yemeni government as the US timating Saudi abilities to manage a complex problem. counterterrorism partner. America’s efforts to support Yemenis, along with the rest of the Arab world, security sector reform and training were aimed at help- looked to the US for leadership during the 2011 Arab ing construct and build the military forces that would Spring. The US, in turn, looked to Saudi Arabia to sta- deploy against AQAP, without addressing any of the bilize Yemen under its long-time dictator Ali Abdullah larger problems that have helped create an environment Saleh rather than supporting the Yemeni protest move- conducive to AQAP’s presence or that have since led to ment that ultimately unseated him.6 The Saudi solu- Yemen’s collapse as a state. tion for Yemen was a negotiated transition of power Even the limited US goal of sustaining counterter- from Saleh to his deputy, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, rorism operations with a local partner was failing in which was encompassed in the Gulf Cooperation the post– environment. The tools of that Council (GCC) Initiative. strategy—the Yemeni military in particular—had been The GCC Initiative was a way for the Yemeni elite to severely degraded over the course of 2011, even while mollify the protesters and to rapidly reestablish a facade the threat from AQAP grew and changed.3 AQAP was of stability in Yemen. It provided a framework within an insurgent group, not a terrorist cell, by the end of which an interim government would oversee Yemen’s 2011, resilient in the face of leadership attrition and transition away from Saleh, but it did not resolve the able to field limited irregular military forces.4 issues that drove the masses to the streets. Yet the US strategy to counter AQAP remained The allure of the GCC Initiative for the US was based on counterterrorism tactics: disrupting ongo- that it would keep Yemen stable enough to continue ing plots and operations and degrading the leader- pursuing its preferred counterterrorism strategy. It also ship to prevent it from planning attacks on the US. A promised to create the National Dialogue Conference

5 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

(NDC), which would address the more fundamen- Figure 1. Al Houthi Activity in Yemen, tal problems that had driven the crisis. But the veneer 2011–13 of the Saudi solution began to fade at the conclusion of the NDC in January 2014, as it became apparent that it would not resolve the most important political disputes.7 The NDC was supposed to be the mechanism through which longstanding grievances between the Yemeni government and opposition groups would be aired and addressed. Opposition groups generally saw Yemen’s federalization and decentralization as the way forward, but the question of how to pursue that approach proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to progress within the NDC. Hadi pushed a “solution” through in what many perceived to be an elite backroom deal. Some oppo- sition groups, such as the secessionist Southern Move- ment, signed the final NDC document since it was the only solution presented. Others, such as the al Houthis, deemed the outcome of the NDC illegitimate. The al Houthis opted out of the process, setting in motion the events that led to the current state collapse and ­foreign-supported civil war in Yemen.

The Collapse of America’s Counterterrorism Partnership Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project The success of the NDC and the GCC Initiative depended on the continued cooperation of Yemen’s conferring governing legitimacy only on descendants of various opposition groups. The al Houthi decision to the Prophet’s family (sayyids), making them a theoreti- withdraw should thus have been a clear sign that the cally unchallengeable elite.9 process was breaking down and taking the Yemen But increased education and mobility came to chal- model along with it. And the decision was not surpris- lenge them, especially when powerful non-sayyid fam- ing, considering the history of the al Houthis in Yemen, ilies started converting to as a way around although neither the US nor the international commu- the traditional power structures. The Zaydi revivalist nity seems to have been prepared for it. movement, known as the Believing Youth (shabaab al mu’mineen), began as a network to reassert the Zaydi The al Houthi Movement. The al Houthi movement identity and sociopolitical predominance. Among the was founded in 1992 and has since developed into a founders were the sons of prominent Zaydi Badr al Din militarized movement.8 It began as a reaction to socio- al Houthi, including Hussein Badr al Din al Houthi.10 political changes in Yemen that challenged traditional Hussein was a parliamentarian who posed a grow- Zaydi hierarchies and to growing Wahhabi religious ing threat to ’s regime. He openly influence in northern Yemen, which threatened the criticized the government from mosques in Sa’ada and, predominant Zaydi Shi’ism. Zaydism orders society by by 2003, had begun questioning Saleh’s legitimacy.

6 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

(Saleh is not a sayyid.) The al Houthi slogan—“Death January 2013 interdiction of an Iranian weapons ship- to America, Death to , Curse upon the , Vic- ment to Yemen, allegedly destined for the al Houthis, tory for ”—spread among Hussein’s followers.11 carried heavy weapons and explosives, for example.13 Moreover, Hussein may have been discouraging his fol- lowers from paying taxes to the state, collecting them The September 2014 Coup and Collapse of Hadi’s Gov- himself.12 Saleh sent security forces to arrest Hussein in ernment. Hadi proposed a six-region federalization plan Sa’ada in June 2004, violating tribal customs. Hussein in the NDC that would have divided al Houthi lands and his followers fought the security forces, starting the and prevented the al Houthis from creating a semi- first of the six Sa’ada wars. autonomous statelet as they desired. The al Houthis The al Houthis became increasingly militant thereupon abandoned the political channels that they between 2004 and 2010. The Sa’ada wars empowered felt had failed them and turned back to violence. Al the military commanders within the movement and Houthi military forces seized control of Amran gover- marginalized some of the more moderate voices. The norate, just north of the capital, in the beginning of Yemeni military’s tactics drove popular support for the July 2014.14 They then laid siege to Sana’a, forcing al Houthis as indiscriminate shelling destroyed homes, Hadi to capitulate to their demands and sign the Peace and infrastructure remained damaged for years. The al and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) on Sep- Houthis’ demands for reparation and representation in tember 21, 2014.15 the government did not shift during this time, nor did The PNPA reallocated decision making in Sana’a Saleh offer to meet them. from the Hadi government to the al Houthis, depriv- Saleh’s style of rule—building a patronage net- ing the American counterterrorism partner of any real work around his government—fueled support for the power. But Washington did not adjust its approach: al Houthis among those outside this network. Saleh’s the US-Yemen relationship ostensibly continued unaf- government empowered the tribal confedera- fected by the change in authority, although the absence tion, one of Yemen’s main tribal confederations, and, of direct communication between US diplomats and especially, his own Sanhan tribe. Marginalized tribes in al Houthi officials generated distrust.16 On Novem- Sa’ada, such as members of the Bakil tribal confedera- ber 7, 2014, the (UN) sanctioned two tion, thus sided with the al Houthis in the fight. al Houthi leaders and Saleh, who had allied with al Houthis in a bid to return to power, for their role in Political Dialogue and Return to Force. Al Houthi leader- destabilizing the country.17 ship appears to have made a decision in 2011 to pursue The al Houthi coup culminated at the end of Jan- the movement’s objectives through political channels uary 2015 with the resignation and flight of Hadi and rather than military force, although the al Houthis most of his government. Hadi had attempted to move still sought to preserve their military capabilities. The forward with a constitution draft codifying the out- al Houthis founded a new political party, Ansar Allah, comes of the NDC, despite al Houthi military control which opened offices and grew its membership base of the capital, an effort that the al Houthis thwarted. beyond the historical al Houthi strongholds, such as in Hadi and the executive branch resigned, leaving the al city. (See figure 1.) Houthis largely in control with Saleh’s cronies heading Ansar Allah had fairly strong support even beyond the judicial and legislative branches. the Zaydi community because it continued to press The al Houthis, backed by Saleh loyalists, quickly for real change in Yemen’s political system. Ansar Allah moved to consolidate Yemen’s state infrastructure— members participated in the NDC in 2013 and tended including Yemen’s intelligence and security appara- to ally with southerners over shared grievances regard- tuses—more firmly under their control and placed the ing historical, political, and economic marginalization. former executive branch under house arrest.18 (See fig- Yet there is evidence that the al Houthis were prepar- ure 2.) Local militia forces stood against the al Houthis ing to achieve their objective by force if necessary. A as they pushed south, preventing their full takeover of

7 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 2. Al Houthi Activity in Yemen, 2014–15

YEMEN alJULY Houthi 2014 Areas of In uence YEMEN JANUARYal Houthi Areas 2015 of In uence MAY 2015

July 2014 current as of January 15, 2015

Sana’a

Al Hudaydah Dhamar

LEGEND LEGEND LEGEND Control Control Control Ta’izz Influence Influence Influence Presence Presence Presence Assessed freedom Assessed freedom Assessed freedom Aden of movement of movement of movement

LEGEND Control Influence The al Houthis receive support from certain Yemeni military units and General Presence People’s Congress (GPC) supporters through Saleh, which also helps to account Assessed freedom for the rapid al Houthi expansion throughout central Yemen. of movement

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

the country. Hadi escaped to Aden city at the end of involved in the fight against the and February 2015 and then fled with other members of al Sham (ISIS).21 his government to Saudi Arabia at the end of March Saudi Arabia also deployed troops to in 2015.19 Saudi Arabia launched an air campaign against March 2011 to quell a Shi’a challenge to the ruling the al Houthis in Yemen on March 26 with the aim of Sunni monarchy, which the Saudis and Bahrainis attri- restoring Hadi to power.20 bute to Iranian sponsorship.22 Iran’s open support for the al Houthis and their reciprocal support for Iran Saudi Military Intervention. Saudi Arabia’s decision to drove fears of another state bordering Saudi Arabia fall- intervene militarily in Yemen was based primarily on ing under the Iranian sphere of influence. the Saudi perception of the al Houthis as an Iranian Saudi Arabia also saw the beginnings of a Lebanese proxy force. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are competing –like element to the al Houthis, as it observed for regional hegemony, and Iran’s influence has grown both the al Houthis quickly becoming a military and dramatically over the past few years. Some elements of governing force within Yemen and their acknowledg- Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have ment of Iran’s political and rhetorical support.23 The deployed to Syria, to support the Bashar al Assad regime September 2014 PNPA bore marked similarities to the against which Saudi-supported opposition forces are May 2008 Doha Agreement that gave the Lebanese fighting, and to Iraq, where Iranian proxy militias are opposition, dominated by Hezbollah, veto power in

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the Lebanese government. The al Houthis announced of Iran yet, despite some of the clear Iranian influences the formation of “revolutionary committees” in all of within the movement. Very likely, there are elements Yemen’s governorates to monitor the performance of within the al Houthi movement that would readily state institutions in October 2014.24 abandon Iran for US support. The al Houthis fight- Iranian officials’ explicit comparisons of the al ing for political power, for example, would probably Houthis to groups like Hezbollah only confirmed be amenable to a negotiated political settlement that Saudi Arabia’s fears.25 By early March 2015, there guaranteed their voice in national politics. Washing- were rumors of al Houthi members training under the ton must be discriminating about how it characterizes IRGC in Syria before returning to Yemen.26 Hezbol- the al Houthis and should be open to those willing to lah directly supports Iranian interests in the region— engage with the US. it deployed thousands of troops to Syria to fight for The direct-action part of the American counterter- Assad—and the Saudis feared having a similar Iranian rorism campaign has continued despite the collapse of militant proxy group on its borders. the Yemeni state. US airstrikes have killed at least four top AQAP leaders in Yemen since the end of March. Muted American Response. The US stood by its coun- NSC spokesperson Ned Price confirmed the death of terterrorism partner in Yemen’s exiled government AQAP leader and al Qaeda general manager Nasser al and its strategy to counter AQAP. In March 2015, US Wahayshi on June 16.30 US airstrikes have also killed National Security Council (NSC) spokesperson Berna- Ibrahim al Rubaish, AQAP’s spiritual leader and a for- dette Meehan explained the US position, saying that a mer Guantanamo detainee; judge Ma’moun Abdulha- US Joint Planning Cell would coordinate military and mid Hatem; shari’a official Nasser bin Ali al Ansi; and intelligence support for the Saudi-led military interven- AQAP member Muhannad Ghallab.31 tion in Yemen and that the US “will continue to take Yet, degrading leadership has never been effective action as necessary to disrupt continuing, imminent alone at defeating al Qaeda groups and was always threats” to America and its citizens.27 Meehan reiter- only part of the US strategy in Yemen.32 Worse still, ated this approach at the end of April 2015 but under- the continuation of the Yemen model ignores the dra- scored that the US did not believe there was a military matic increase in support for AQAP and the emergence solution to Yemen’s conflict.28 of ISIS cells in Yemen resulting from the al Houthi Washington did not have much choice regard- advance and the perception among many Sunni tribes ing whether to support Riyadh in this campaign, to that Iran is backing a quasi–Shi’a sectarian group to be sure. The US has no relations with the al Houthis, establish dominance over them. who have steadily adopted strong anti-American rheto- The US nevertheless continues to push for a negoti- ric suitable for potential Iranian partners, and certainly ated political solution in Yemen to end the current con- could not have established them quickly enough to side flict and restore a government in Sana’a. The return of a confidently with the al Houthis. Yemeni government would ostensibly permit the US to It was immediately clear, moreover, that the al continue relying on its strategy of partnering with the Houthi push beyond their stronghold was generating Yemeni military and security forces to conduct coun- backlash among tribes and driving support for AQAP. terterrorism operations. Tensions between the US and the Kingdom because of But a couple of key assumptions undergirding that the Iran nuclear deal negotiations also placed enormous strategy are no longer valid. The strategy requires, first, pressure on the White House to demonstrate its sup- that the Yemeni government continue to be a coun- port for the Saudi effort. Even more unfortunate was terterrorism partner and that it be able to prioritize the fact that the Saudi campaign was poorly thought that fight over other demands. Second, it assumes that out and initially made things worse rather than better.29 the Yemeni military and security forces will be success- The US missed an opportunity in Yemen, however. ful, or at least not fail, in their efforts. This assump- The al Houthis are by no means a direct proxy group tion was problematic even before the recent disorder,

9 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

as past examples show that areas cleared by these forces maintain these positions with the support of Saleh loy- returned to the enemy shortly thereafter.33 alists. The latter include Yemeni military commanders But the al Houthi coup and subsequent civil war and security force units in Saleh’s informal patronage have, in fact, destroyed both assumptions. The al network, and local fighters who are members of Saleh’s Houthis are currently the only thing that might be party, the General People’s Congress (GPC).34 called a “government” in Yemen, yet they do not control The GPC, which Saleh essentially constructed much of the country, are hostile to the US, and inflame around his patronage network, has enabled the al support for AQAP and ISIS. Hadi cannot prioritize the Houthis to push their own fighting forces farther south fight against AQAP while he is desperately trying to without having to control central Yemen directly. The win back Sana’a, particularly since he must depend on Saudi-led air campaign has disrupted military move- the support of southern tribes, some of which support ments and destroyed key infrastructure, such as the AQAP and some of which seek secession. road network, but has only just begun to support local Nor is the Yemeni military in any condition to offensives against the al Houthis and their partners. resume a counterinsurgency or even counterterrorism But the al Houthi–Saleh partnership is also a critical campaign against AQAP and ISIS. The security forces vulnerability for the al Houthis. They rely on Saleh’s are fractured, badly damaged (in part by the Saudi air forces to sustain their current deployment throughout campaign), and preoccupied with fighting each other. Yemen, and if Saleh cut a deal with the GCC states The entire basis of the US strategy in Yemen hitherto for something in exchange for his withdrawal from the has been utterly destroyed. fight, the al Houthis would be overextended and unable to maintain their current expansion. A faction of Saleh’s GPC is already peeling away, which is diminishing sup- The Military Situation in Yemen port for the al Houthis. The al Houthis have exhausted the support they had developed outside of their imme- Yemen is a failed and fractured state. Hadi’s interna- diate power base in post–Arab Spring Yemen. tionally recognized government controls little territory Initially seen as agents to continue Yemen’s revolu- in Yemen and lacks broad popular support. The Yemeni tion and bring about real change for the people, today military is divided and degraded. No one faction is the al Houthis are a divisive group forcing factions to strong enough to take over the country, and few fac- align with or against them in a struggle for power.35 tions have a vision beyond their immediate geographic They have cracked down on opposition in areas under power base, apart from a vague concept of some decen- their control, particularly against members of Yemen’s tralized and federalized Yemeni state. and the Salafist community, fur- The militias that have re-formed over the past eight ther pushing these and other factions away.36 months are unlikely to fight outside of their territories The al Houthis have used their relatively secure for a “Yemeni cause” without significant reassurances of stronghold along the Saudi border to attack the King- a reward for their efforts. Resolving the national-level dom.37 Shortly before the start of the Saudi military conflict will not reunify Yemen, nor will local cease- intervention the al Houthis conducted a military train- fires translate to a statewide resolution. This is the envi- ing exercise alongside a regular Yemeni military unit in ronment in which AQAP has once again expanded its al Buqa, Sa’ada.38 They have since conducted minor operations and in which ISIS has begun to establish a attacks on Saudi border guard posts and fired rockets foothold. at Saudi towns. The al Houthi movement still controls most of The most dramatic attacks were two Yemen’s state infrastructure. This control extends to launches aimed at Saudi military targets, one on June Sana’a, to the various government organs based there, 6 and the next on June 30, 2015.39 The al Houthis and to a primary seaport, al Hudaydah, and the goods appear to be trying to expand the into that transit through it. The al Houthis are fighting to an interstate fight as the Saudis increase their military

10 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

commitment inside Yemen. The Saudi leadership momentum shifts away from the al Houthis: some of seemed to include this possibility in its planning, tar- the larger tribes in Dhamar took a stance against the al geting suspected Scud depots in Sana’a early in the air Houthis in early August.40 It is unlikely, however, that campaign. But the al Houthis could still open a more the al Houthis will lose control of Sana’a and Dhamar active front along the Saudi border should they choose without a hard fight. or should Tehran encourage them to do so. The most heavily contested territory extends south Figure 3a. Sana’a and Dhamar of Sana’a and west to the . The al Houthis have Governorates used forceful means to control the population where they have been challenged, including arrests and intim- idation. The fighting is localized, though, and forces resisting the al Houthis do not have a unified com- mand or means for coordination. They are generally

drawn from populations that have mobilized to defend SANA'A their lands against the perceived al Houthi threat. SANA‘A DHAMAR There are nevertheless some general systems within the opposition, despite its localized nature. (See figures 3a–g.) These include:

• Sana’a and Dhamar, just to the south; Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project • along the Red Sea coast;

• Ma’rib to the east of Sana’a; Al Hudaydah. Al Hudaydah is vital for the al Houthis • , Taiz, and Dhaleh in the central highlands; for two reasons: first, it is the chokepoint for supplies entering northern Yemen, and second, the terminal • Aden and in Yemen’s south; of Yemen’s main oil export pipeline is in Ras Isa. The Yemeni state—and, now, the al Houthis—depends on • Al Bayda in south-central Yemen; the production and export of oil to generate revenues, • Tribal areas in Abyan and Shabwah in the south; and Figure 3b. Al Hudaydah Governorate

• Hadramawt governorate in the east.

The al Houthis faced opposition from popular resis- tance forces linked to Yemen’s in Aden, Dhaleh, and Lahij, and from AQAP in al Bayda,

Abyan, and Shabwah. They have not been able to make AL HUDAYDAH headway in remote Hadramawt. SANA‘A

Sana’a and Dhamar. The al Houthis remain in con- trol of Sana’a and Dhamar, courtesy of GPC forces and local authorities. There has been little popular resistance to the al Houthis in this area through Sum- Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project mer 2015, but the situation may be changing as the

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although production peaked in 2001, and the declin- Figure 3d. Taiz, Ibb, and Dhaleh ing oil prices will further devastate Yemen’s economy.41 Governorates The al Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee, a body established to oversee the Yemeni government, decided to pursue an oil port in al Hudaydah city’s Salif district in the near future.42

Ma’rib. The presence of Yemen’s main oil field makes Ma’rib governorate important for the al Houthis as well, SANA‘A although they have been far less successful in getting control of it. The tribesmen there, who were a thorn IBB AL DHALEH TAIZ in Saleh’s side during his presidency and continued to pester Hadi, have been able to limit the al Houthis’ gains. They seek to secure the profits from the petro-

leum resources in Ma’rib and stop them from flowing Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project into the coffers of the Yemeni government and Saleh’s associates.43 The oil revenue is a key point of conten- tion between the tribesmen and any form of Yemeni The al Houthis had expanded into Taiz by the end central state, which depends on the oil money to pay of March 2015, holding Mocha, fighting for control of part of its budget. Taiz city, and holding the main roads through Ibb and Dhaleh.44 Saleh’s assistance in Dhaleh helped quash Figure 3c. Ma’rib Governorate any resistance—the commander of the 33rd Armored Brigade stationed there was the same commander who put down the uprising against Saleh in Taiz in 2011.45 The fighting in Ibb, Dhaleh, and Taiz had stag- nated, however, until Saudi and Emirati military sup- port arrived in July 2015. A new Council of Resistance that unifies the popular resistance leadership across the MA'RIB SANA‘A three governorates should unify the anti–al Houthi forces’ command, which will sustain momentum against them, making al Houthi control of this vital area unlikely for the present.46

Aden and Lahij. The next objective after Taiz was con- Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project trol of Aden port city in , which would have completed the al Houthis’ control of the major infrastructure in Yemen, except for the oil infrastruc- Taiz, Ibb, and Dhaleh. The al Houthis have also ture in the remote eastern Hadramawt governorate. tried to gain control of Taiz, the third-largest city in The al Houthis amassed troops north of Lahij in late Yemen, which sits along the main road between Sana’a March 2015. The US withdrew its military advisers and Aden and an important road that runs west to the from al Anad, the military base that served as counter- Red Sea port of Mocha. To accomplish this goal, the al terrorism headquarters for the US, and the al Houthis Houthis needed to secure Ibb, a populous central gov- then pushed south to Aden.47 ernorate just north of Taiz, and Dhaleh, a governorate Al Houthi militants secured the Aden airport and that controls a branch of the road from Sana’a to Aden. began fighting determined southern resistance forces for

12 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 3e. Aden and Lahij Governorates Figure 3f. Abyan and Shabwah Governorates

SANA‘A

SANA‘A SHABWAH

LAHIJ ABYAN

ADEN

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

control of the city. This fight bogged down and was stale- The change in momentum occasioned by the mated by July, when the Saudis and Emiratis deployed increased Gulfi military involvement caused the al armored vehicles to Aden and retook the city alongside Houthis to begin to withdraw from Shabwah in July, newly trained Yemeni forces.48 The anti–al Houthi coa- allowing coalition forces to move through Abyan in lition forces pushed north from Aden to liberate Lahij.49 early August. AQAP again moved behind the coalition The Saudi plan appears to be to reinstall the Hadi- and seized control of , Abyan.51 AQAP had led government in Aden, but the Adenis, who bore the used Zinjibar as its base when it had controlled Abyan brunt of the Saudi air campaign that Hadi had sup- in 2011.52 ported, may be less enthusiastic about this idea. Aden may be free of al Houthis, but Hadi’s government does Al Bayda. The fight for control or influence over al not control it. Moreover, it appears that AQAP is mov- Bayda governorate has pitted AQAP directly against ing into towns behind the coalition forces.50 the al Houthis. The fighting began in Fall 2014, when the al Houthis expanded into al Bayda under the cloak Abyan and Shabwah. Abyan and Shabwah, two of government forces. Al Houthi militiamen and southern governorates with a strong AQAP presence and support for the Southern Movement, remain con- Figure 3g. tested. The al Houthis seized three key cities in Abyan in March: its capital, Zinjibar; Lawder; and Shaqra, which control the main roads that run through the gov- ernorate. The al Houthis moved through Abyan into Shabwah, where they pushed back on AQAP’s newly expanded presence. AQAP had seized the 19th Infantry Brigade base in SANA‘A

Bayhan, Shabwah, in mid-February 2015 and looted the AL BAYDA base. It held public meetings there until the al Houthis arrived. Then, AQAP backed the local popular resis- tance forces in combatting the al Houthi presence. The al Houthis also struggled to hold Abyan, however, and could Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project not advance farther than , the capital of Shabwah.

13 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 4. Frontline Frontlineof Yemen ofConflict, Con ict, August August 2015 2015

SA'ADA

AL JAWF

HAJJAH AMRAN

MA'RIB SANA’A HADRAMAWT

AL HUDAYDAH SHABWAH al Hudaydah Bayhan AL RAYMAH al Shihr DHAMAR Ataq al Mukalla AL BAYDA IBB al Bayda Ibb AL DHALEH Lawder LEGEND Taiz ABYAN AQAP Area of Operations Mocha TAIZ AQAP Insurgent Activity

Lahij Zinjibar AQAP Movement and Position LAHIJ Al Houthi Movement and Position Aden Coalition Movement and Position

ADEN 0 50 km Heavily Contested 0 50 mi Assessed Frontline

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Yemeni Strategic Reserve Forces, units formerly from larger ground force to Yemen, can the Gulfis and Hadi the and probably still loyal to Saleh, hope to retake Sana’a and reestablish Hadi or his suc- took control of Rada’a city in northwestern al Bayda at cessor in Yemen’s historical capital. the end of October.53 The fighting, meanwhile, has largely moved away Some tribal elements in Rada’a openly support from the areas with the most significant AQAP pres- AQAP, however, and the city had been under AQAP ence, apart from al Bayda. (See figure 4.) The al Houthis control in early 2012.54 Tribal support in al Bayda has and Saleh are thus no longer in a position to challenge shifted over time as tribesmen are killed in the cross- AQAP, even if that were their priority, which it most fire. Al Bayda tribesmen blame the al Houthis, creating assuredly is not. additional support for AQAP.55 Al Bayda governorate The strength of the al Houthi and Saleh resis- remains contested. tance, on the other hand, makes it most unlikely that The military situation between the al Houthis and Hadi, his southern allies, or the Gulf states will focus local resistance forces supported by the Saudis and their on AQAP, especially when doing so risks antagonizing Gulf allies is likely to oscillate between periods of rela- populations that they must keep quiescent to continue tive mobility and stalemate unless the Gulfis can peel pushing their combat forces forward into al Houthi– Saleh and his forces away from the al Houthis. Only in held territory. None of the organized and relatively the latter case, or with the deployment of a significantly centrally directed antagonists now fighting in Yemen,

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therefore, have either good reason or the ability to be its outreach to Yemenis in 2011 and 2012 and allegedly effective counterterrorism partners for the US. There is smuggled small and medium arms to the al Houthis little likelihood that this parlous situation will improve during that time.58 any time soon. Today, the al Houthis are within the Iranian sphere of influence and have benefited from Iranian fund- ing, weapons, training, and, probably, advice.59 But Yemen, Iran, and Regional Dynamics the depth of the ties between Iran and the al Houthis remains unclear, as the alliance certainly benefits both Yemen has become embroiled in the Saudi-Iranian parties pragmatically in the short run. competition for power and influence in the Middle Saudi Arabia cut off its funding to Yemen in Decem- East. Yemen was historically a low priority for both ber 2014 when it became obvious that the al Houthis sides in that struggle, but today, Iran and Saudi Arabia intended to remain in power, because the Saudis saw cast the Yemen conflict, which at its heart is a power them as Iranian proxies.60 The Yemeni government had contest between various political factions, in terms of been wholly reliant on Saudi Arabia’s direct budget sup- their violent regional rivalry. port to run the country, which included $2 billion in Yemen is now the third front in that conflict, fol- cash in July 2014.61 The al Houthis were not fazed by lowing Iraq and Syria, however improbable that might the economic pressure and isolation, however. seem. Yemen’s Zaydi Shi’ism differs significantly from The al Houthis held meetings on trade and eco- Iran’s prevailing Shi’ism, while Yemen’s Sunnis nomic agreements with and Iran in December have historically been much more tribal and regional and early January 2015, probably in search of addi- than sectarian in their self-identification. But the King- tional funding sources.62 Saudi Arabia and the Gulf dom is trying to ally with Sunni tribes while Tehran states’ economic isolation of Yemen may have pushed insinuates itself among al Houthis. Both countries the al Houthis closer to Iran instead of pressuring them are primarily concerned with the regional power play to return power to the Hadi government. It does not in which they are engaged rather than with religious yet seem to be seriously imperiling their hold on power. dynamics. The Yemeni conflict is not yet a sectar- Iran seized the opportunity to champion the al ian war. Rather, it is in part a proxy war between two Houthis’ cause in Yemen from the outset of the current regional powers that generally align allies along sectar- crisis. Iranian officials publicly praised the September ian lines. 2014 PNPA, which the al Houthis imposed on Hadi The Iranian nuclear negotiations and subsequent by force.63 The al Houthis were open to Iran’s outreach agreement have intensified this dynamic. GCC states and subsequently released at least three suspected mem- see the potential for Iran to increase its activities in bers of the IRGC who had been imprisoned in con- Yemen with the sanctions relief it will now receive nection with an Iranian arms shipment to Yemen.64 under the terms of the deal.56 Iran, meanwhile, under- Iranian officials continued to increase rhetorical sup- stood that the American calculus, particularly in Spring port for the al Houthis and began including Yemen in 2015, weighted Iran’s continued participation in the lists of where the Islamic Revolution—cast as a con- nuclear talks more heavily than US interests in Yemen tinuation of the 1979 —is ongo- and took that as license to test American red lines in ing, such as in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and as part of Yemen and the .57 the regional “resistance” that defines Iran’s notion of its Saudi officials have alleged Iranian meddling in coalition.65 Yemen since at least 2009, when Saudis accused Iran Iran’s Mahan Air, sanctioned by the US since 2011 of backing the al Houthis in their sixth war against the for facilitating IRGC movement (and not on the list of Yemeni state, as noted previously. Iranian direct sup- companies to be desanctioned under the nuclear agree- port of the al Houthis before the Arab Spring is not ment), opened direct flights between Tehran and Sana’a well documented, but Iran included the al Houthis in in partnership with Airways on February 28,

15 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 5. Operations Decisive Storm and Restoring Hope

March 26–April 21, 2015 April 22–July 25, 2015

March 26–April 21, 2015

least dense density (percentile) most dense

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

2015.66 Its first flight purportedly landed with 12 tons the al Houthis against perceived foreign intervention, of medical supplies for Yemen.67 The strengthening decreased Yemeni support for Hadi because of his role bilateral relationship between Iran and Yemen was of in calling for the air campaign, and exacerbated a deep- increasing concern for Saudi Arabia and was probably ening humanitarian crisis. The airstrikes prevented reg- a factor in its decision to intervene militarily in Yemen. ular shipments of fuel, food, and medical supplies from Saudi officials announced the start of Operation entering the country, destroyed the bridges and roads Decisive Storm in Yemen on March 26, 2015, following needed to deliver the supplies inland, and discouraged a request from Hadi for military intervention two days commercial truckers from distributing commodities.70 before.68 All members of the GCC except sup- The Saudis tried to adjust, announcing the end of ported the operation, as did , , , Decisive Storm and the start of Operation Restoring , and the US. The air campaign initially set the Hope in April 2015, which was supposed to include al Houthis back somewhat, but they adapted on the the objectives of protecting civilians, fighting terrorism, ground and continued their territorial expansion in and facilitating humanitarian relief efforts.71 Data from Yemen until recently, as we have seen.69 the air campaign shows no significant shift in the fre- The air campaign has had various unintended con- quency or target selection of airstrikes, however. (See sequences in Yemen, however. It drove local support for figure 5.)

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The start of the military intervention in Yemen dra- Security Council Resolution 2216, it imposed an arms matically shifted the dialogue surrounding the conflict embargo on the al Houthis’ and Saleh’s forces.77 The from one about Yemeni stakeholders to one about the al Houthis reject the requirements of Resolution 2216, Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy war. The air campaign did which calls for their complete disarmament, whereas not change Iranian officials’ stance on support for the al the actors aligned against the al Houthis call for them Houthis, but Tehran added a call for a political resolution to abide by those requirements before any talks begin. to the country’s problems to its normal statements.72 An The UN negotiation efforts have thus unsurpris- open letter from Mohsen Rezai, head of Iran’s Expedi- ingly fallen flat. Former UN envoy to Yemen Jamal ency Council and former commander of the IRGC, Benomar, who shepherded Yemen through its 2011 praised the al Houthis but also discussed the need to use and 2012 power transition, resigned from his post in military power in support of successful diplomacy.73 April 2015 amid increasing criticism of his inability to The IRGC tested US redlines in the Gulf of Aden resolve the issues at hand. Benomar blamed the Saudi region by ostentatiously transporting arms by sea to the military intervention in Yemen for scuttling a deal in al Houthis in Yemen.74 Tehran backed down in the March.78 His successor, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, face of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet but then pushed to has not been more effective. A delayed UN-led dia- deliver humanitarian assistance to Yemen directly. The logue in Geneva collapsed without any signs of prog- UN insisted that the cargo be inspected in Djibouti, ress in June 2015.79 Furthermore, a UN-negotiated and Iran eventually acquiesced in mid-May.75 A July humanitarian ceasefire broke down hours after it began 2015 press conference revealed that Brigadier General in July.80 It does not seem likely that a UN-led peace Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, head of Iran’s Headquar- process will resolve the conflict any time soon. ters to Support the Yemeni People, is a former IRGC Omani officials’ proximity to both sides of the commander and police chief who is sanctioned by the Yemen conflict may offer a better channel. Oman US for severe human rights violations, including the floated aseven-point ­ plan in April after a series of suppression of the 2009 Iranian protests and helping meetings with interested parties, including Iranian offi- Assad’s regime in Syria.76 The Saudi-Iranian contest in cials.81 An al Houthi delegation met with US officials Yemen appears to be escalating slowly. in Muscat, Oman, at the end of May 2015 to secure the The full scope of Iranian motivations in Yemen is release of American freelance journalist Casey Coombs, too broad for this paper but must factor into consid- whom the al Houthis had arrested on charges of espio- erations. Yemen is not the same as Syria for Iran and nage on May 17 in Sana’a.82 probably not a high-stakes issue, which decreases the The al Houthi delegation, which included spokes- likelihood that Iran will devote as much energy and man Mohamed Abdul Salam and head of the political resources to Yemen as it has to supporting the Assad council Saleh al Samad, arrived in Oman on May 23.83 regime. It also creates an opportunity to limit the influ- Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was ence of the Saudi-Iranian conflict on Yemen, reducing in Oman on May 26 to discuss Yemen with Omani some of the peripheral challenges to the conflict. The counterparts, and it is not a stretch to assume that Zarif question is whether the Iranians will back down should also met with the al Houthi delegates.84 the cost of involvement in Yemen increase, and subse- Another round of reported negotiations emerged at quently how to effect that change. the end of June, in which al Houthis may have been in discussions with southern Yemeni leaders in Oman Mediation Attempts. External actors, including to broker a local ceasefire.85 The Omani government Omani officials and the UN envoy to Yemen, are still has insisted that any negotiations inside of the country attempting to mediate the Yemeni conflict. Under UN are occurring within the UN framework, although that Security Council Resolution 2140, the UN Security does not seem to always be the case. Council passed a series of resolutions imposing sanc- Interestingly, the (UAE) tions on Saleh and two al Houthi leaders; under UN began to emerge in July and August as a potential

17 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

vector for change. There were rumors in early . Even Saleh, a pragmatist who aligned with that the UAE was negotiating with the Saleh family to a group that he had fought for six years, noted that the drive a wedge between Saleh and the al Houthis, a tac- US has a role to play.93 The US can help shape the out- tic Saudi Arabia did not pursue because of its intense come of the current crisis in Yemen and facilitate an end hatred for Saleh. Saleh’s eldest son, , was to a conflict that is detracting from the key fight for the then Yemen’s ambassador to the UAE, and the rumor US—the one against AQAP—but only if it adopts a ran that the former Yemeni president would stop sup- strategy that makes Yemeni internal stability a priority. porting the al Houthis in exchange for backing for his son’s bid for the presidency.86 The military intervention in Yemen, which the The Expansion of AQAP and Emiratis joined, eliminated the possibility of a sepa- the Emergence of ISIS in Yemen rate Emirati-negotiated resolution, at least for the time being. The UAE stripped Ahmed Saleh of his diplo- Yemen’s collapse is a direct national security problem for matic immunity in early April 2015, and its military the US because of the presence of AQAP. AQAP is the played a key support role in the July and August Oper- vanguard for al Qaeda affiliates and a key node within ation Golden Arrow offensive that secured Aden city the al Qaeda network. Its leadership plans for both al and pushed northward into Taiz, Lahij, and Abyan.87 Qaeda’s global and local objectives. For al Qaeda global, Yemeni government officials, including Vice President Yemen is not the main effort, which is, rather, winning , shuttled back and forth to in Syria. Al Qaeda’s mission in Yemen is to maintain in early August.88 the safe haven there and to support the front in Syria. A new round of talks began in August that may yield As part of the al Qaeda network, AQAP coordi- results as the tide turns for the al Houthis in Yemen. nates with and supports other al Qaeda nodes, partic- The UN envoy met with Arab League representatives ularly Syria’s extremely dangerous Jabhat al Nusra.94 and then with the al Houthis and Saleh in Muscat on AQAP also continues to balance the “near war” against August 8 and 9, respectively.89 The al Houthis may the Yemeni and Saudi governments with the “far war” have conceded to abide by the terms in UN Security aimed at attacking the US homeland. It has pursued far Council Resolution 2216, which includes the with- and near objectives concurrently and will continue to drawal from seized cities.90 target the US, West, and regional partners. (See table Iranian Arab and African Affairs Deputy to the For- 1.) Thus, AQAP’s decision making must be read in eign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian announced both the al Qaeda global and local Yemeni contexts. So that GCC representatives will meet with Iranian offi- far, it has clearly been achieving its core objective. cials in late September and that Yemen will be on the The death of AQAP emir Nasser al Wahayshi, who agenda.91 But there is now a legitimate fear that Saudi also served as al Qaeda’s general manager, does not Arabia will abandon a negotiated solution for a deci- appear to have affected the leadership’s decision cal- sive military victory against the al Houthis. The Saudis culus. Wahayshi’s successor as leader, Qasim al Raymi, have inserted Saudi-trained Yemeni troops into north- had served as the group’s military commander and was ern Yemen through the Wadia border crossing toward part of the core AQAP leadership. Raymi pledged alle- Ma’rib city.92 The position sets coalition forces up to giance (bay’a) to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri, advance on Sana’a from the south and east. reaffirming AQAP’s subscription to al Qaeda’s ideology The US has lost legitimacy and credibility by sup- and strategy (as opposed, for example, to that of ISIS). porting Saudi Arabia’s actions in Yemen, yet Yemenis The global strategy employs terrorist attacks against still turn to the US because of its superpower status. the West as a tactic to force the West to retreat from Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran is a welcome external the Muslim-majority world by driving up the cost of influencer, and the UN’s influence is marginal. The US the West’s involvement. Locally, the strategy is one must play a positive role in helping resolve the conflict of stages that begins with a call (dawa) to al Qaeda’s

18 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Table 1. Al Qaeda’s Yemen Objectives and Strategy

Objectives:

• Create conditions through terrorist attacks to force the US and West to cede influence in Yemen and termi- nate support for the Yemeni government.

• Near term: Maintain sanctuary in Yemen to facilitate support to global al Qaeda front.

• Near term: Defeat Yemeni military by breaking the will of the Yemeni soldiers to fight and mobilize a ­Sunni-based insurgency against the state.

• Long term: Establish shari’a-based government in Yemen (and expand conflict into Saudi Arabia).

Strategy:

• Prepare the population through dawa to establish a community of believers to mobilize against “apostate” government.

• Build legitimacy by using tools of governance without declaring a government.

• Establish control of territory outside of the Yemeni government’s reach.

• Utilize insurgency to expand influence and control in Yemen.

Source: Author

interpretation of Islam and advances toward insur- The group has used the safe haven that it has in gency within a country. AQAP is actively engaged in Yemen to plan and direct plots targeting Ameri- an insurgent fight in Yemen and is focused on winning can interests within the US and abroad. The case of over the population. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber, shows how valuable AQAP’s safe haven is: AQAP was AQAP’s Threat to the US. AQAP continues to pose able to vet Abdulmutallab through a series of stages a serious threat to the American homeland. AQAP has before deciding to operationalize him.99 The imagi- been the most active and effective al Qaeda node in tar- native bomb maker, Ibrahim al Asiri, who developed geting US interests and will probably continue to be. the underwear bomb and printer cartridge, remains AQAP has attempted to attack the American homeland at large and has shown the ability to innovate and at least three times since 2009 and has also targeted US improve on previous designs.100 Asiri has also trained diplomatic posts abroad. The first attack nearly suc- others, some of whom have been connected to plots.101 ceeded; AQAP smuggled a bomb concealed in under- AQAP’s development of expertise has limited wear on a plane on Christmas Day 2009.95 The device the effect that Asiri’s death or capture would have on itself failed. The second attack was only thwarted by the AQAP’s capabilities. help of Saudi intelligence, which provided investigators AQAP’s threat to the US no longer emanates from with the package tracking numbers of bombs disguised Yemen alone. AQAP has attempted to coordinate as printer cartridges shipped to the US in October with other groups to conduct attacks. The rising chaos 2010.96 The third attack, an improvement on the 2009 in the increases opportunities for these underwear bomb, was again thwarted by Saudi intel- groups to maneuver undetected. Al Qaeda’s growth in ligence assistance in 2012.97 Finally, an AQAP threat Syria with Jabhat al Nusra and the volume of foreign closed more than 20 diplomatic posts in the Middle fighters within the provides another East and North Africa region in August 2013.98 channel through which AQAP can operate.102 Jabhat

19 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 6. Kouachis’ Timeline before Charlie Hebdo

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

al Nusra has members who hold passports to Western 2015 may only be a harbinger of what could come.105 countries. The attack was efficient and effective, a far cry from a It is not beyond the pale that at least one of these pass- lone-wolf attack. At least one of the Kouachi brothers port holders could return with a sophisticated explosive trained in Yemen.106 (See figure 6.) device and attempt another mass-casualty attack.103 A AQAP has been training foreign fighters in Yemen cell of al Qaeda veterans operating alongside Jabhat al for years, and many individuals cycled through there Nusra, the so-called , may serve as an before such travel raised red flags for intelligence offi- operational link to AQAP to coordinate attacks against cials. Even those known to authorities may be able to the West even as the Khorasan Group provides training operate under the radar as the volume of foreign fighters and expertise to the Syrian al Qaeda affiliate.104 from Iraq and Syria overwhelms Western intelligence Individuals who trained in AQAP camps also pose agencies. The threat is that AQAP-trained individuals a latent threat to the West. The Kouachi brothers’ may return to the West and conduct small-scale attacks. AQAP-linked Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January This risk is increasing as the growing radicalism in

20 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

the Middle East inspires individuals to attempt attacks. Figure 7. AQAP Leaders Killed in 2015 Thus, AQAP remains a significant threat to the US homeland despite years of the implementation of the Yemen model. AQAP’s expansion and the collapse of HARITH BIN GHAZI AL NADHARI the bases of that model are likely to create conditions (d. January 31, 2015) conducive to a dramatic expansion of that threat. AKA: al Murshidi Nationality: Yemeni An Assessment of AQAP in Yemen. AQAP has exploited Position: AQAP scholar the conditions on the ground to expand and recruit in Yemen. The group still seeks to establish a shari’a-based government there and will attempt to utilize popular dis- content with both the al Houthi and Hadi governments IBRAHIM AL RUBAISH to prevent the reestablishment of a strong central Yemeni (d. April 12, 2015) government. AQAP’s messaging to the Yemeni pop- Nationality: Saudi ulation is generally a call to arms against both govern- Position: AQAP spiritual leader ments, citing the first as run by apostates and the latter Former Guantanamo detainee (#192) as a stooge of the West. The turmoil within Yemen has worked to AQAP’s advantage, creating additional space within which the group can operate. AQAP’s capabilities do not match those of its coun- NASSER BIN ALI AL ANSI (d. April 22, 2015) terpart in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra, and it does not appear AKA: Abdul Jalil, Abu Ziyad as though it has the capabilities to support a high- Nationality: Yemeni tempo campaign of asymmetrical attacks. The group Position: AQAP shari’a official, runs a robust counterintelligence network, and the al Qaeda deputy general manager public execution of spies is a key deterrent tactic.107 Its on-the-ground presence enables it to respond to the local dynamics in its messaging and recruitment. MA’MOUN ABDULHAMID HATEM AQAP is in a better position for success today than (d. May 11, 2015) it was in 2011 when the Yemeni state collapsed. The AKA: Abdul Jalil, Abu Ziyad ongoing civil war between the al Houthis and the forces Nationality: Yemeni aligned against them has already accomplished many Position: AQAP judge of AQAP’s objectives. The Yemeni military, further fractured and weakened, is no longer fighting AQAP. The Yemeni government is fragmented, and the major- ity of the Yemeni state is outside any sort of govern- NASSER AL WAHAYSHI ment control. And there is an insurgency that has some (d. June 9, 2015) grounding among Sunni populations that has risen out AKA: Abu Basir of the chaos. AQAP may not have brought about these Nationality: Yemeni changes, but it certainly benefits from them. Position: AQAP emir, al Qaeda general manager Targeted airstrikes by the US have removed key lead- ers from the battlefield in 2015, although the group will probably be able to recover from those losses. (See fig- ure 7.) The rapid announcement that Qasim al Raymi would succeed Nasser al Wahayshi indicated that the Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project group was prepared for the loss of its leader, as most al

21 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 8. AQAP Attacks, January–September 2014

SA'ADA

AL JAWF HADRAMAWT

HAJJAH AMRAN

MA'RIB

AL MAHWIT SANA’A SHABWAH AL HUDAYDAH al Hudaydah AL RAYMAH DHAMAR Ataq AL BAYDA al Mukalla

IBB al Bayda Ibb AL DHALEH Taiz ABYAN

TAIZ LEGEND

Lahij Zinjibar LAHIJ Area of Operations ERITREA Aden Assassination

0 50 km ADEN Bombing DJIBOUTI 0 50 mi Clash

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Qaeda franchises are. AQAP has already shown itself who will replace them. Khaled Batarfi, a senior AQAP to be resilient when facing the loss of midlevel com- commander, appears to be taking on a more public role manders on the battlefield and continues to develop and gave the eulogies for both al Ansi and Wahayshi. new leaders.108 It still has individuals who trained in AQAP adapted nimbly to the changing situation al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before 2001 among its in Yemen. It had been conducting campaigns against ranks. These individuals are part of core al Qaeda— the Yemeni military in Aden, Lahij, Abyan, Shabwah, the group of individuals in the immediate vicinity of Hadramawt, and Sana’a and against the al Houthis in before the 2001 US invasion of northern Yemen as of Summer 2014. (See figure 8.) Afghanistan—and they guide the organization at the The campaign against the Yemeni military and secu- strategic level and provide direct connections through rity forces had taken on a familiar shape: AQAP used relationships built in Afghanistan to al Qaeda core spectacular attacks, such as a vehicle-borne improvised members dispersed globally.109 explosive device (VBIED) combined with small-arms AQAP may suffer more from the loss of its religious fire to target military bases in planned operations, and leaders, however. Three key individuals—Ibrahim al individual members targeted security and intelligence Rubaish, Nasser bin Ali al Ansi, and Ma’moun Abdul- officials for assassination.110 hamid Hatem—who constituted the core of AQAP’s These military operations closely mirrored what religious leadership have been killed, and it is not clear AQAP was doing in Summer 2010 before the Arab

22 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 9. Coalition and AQAP Activity

March 26–August 13, 2015

LEGEND Coalition activity AQAP activity

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

Spring.111 Smaller-scale attacks against Yemeni army resigned defense minister while others recognized the al checkpoints on key transit routes also occurred. AQAP Houthi–appointed defense minister. continued its campaign against the al Houthis, whom There was an opportunity here to strike the Yemeni it labeled apostates (rafidhah) by Fall 2010, targeting military hard, and AQAP seized upon it. The expan- al Houthi leadership and significant events or loca- sion of AQAP’s operations against the al Houthis did tions.112 The campaign against the al Houthis was lim- not have a noticeable effect on AQAP’s campaign ited to terrorist attacks and did not involve a ground against the Yemeni military. AQAP attacked Yemeni offensive in this period. military bases, and some Yemeni units stood down, Today, AQAP is fighting as part of the ground resis- which gave AQAP access to the weaponry on the tance to the al Houthis. AQAP opened this line of effort base.113 Any ground offensive against AQAP ended in September 2014 after the signing of the PNPA. with the effective dissolution of the Yemeni military AQAP began conducting small-scale attacks against al into isolated units, and the Saudi-led coalition oper- Houthi members in such places as Sana’a and al Bayda. ations focused on areas where the al Houthis rather Its operations escalated as the conflict expanded, partic- than AQAP were present. (See figure 9.) Most active ularly after the January 2015 resignation of the Yemeni pressure on AQAP was relieved, except for the con- cabinet. The uncertainty in Sana’a created disorder tinuation of a small number of targeted airstrikes by within the Yemeni military: some units recognized the the US.

23 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 10. Al Bayda Tribal Map

WALD RABI

DHAHAB HATTA’IMAH

AWADH SARHAN

TAHIF RASAS SHARA’AI AWABIL GHANIM MALAJIM MONASAR SAWAD

RAYASHI

QAYFA* ABDULLAH AMER HUYASH *QAYFA SUBTRIBES HATTA’IMAH RAMAH DHAHAB MAHDI HAMIQAN BANI ALI MONASAR Al AWADHIL SARHAN WALD RABI

MASHADIL

YEMEN Sana’a

al Bayda

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

The frontline of the anti–al Houthi fight has also of AQAP developing relations among tribal militia been an opportunity for AQAP to earn de facto accep- forces.114 The group had a stronghold in Rada’a dis- tance because of the capabilities it can bring to bear trict under the Dhahab tribe, a component of the Qayfa against the al Houthis. AQAP’s insurgent force, operat- tribe in al Bayda.115 It also probably had some level of ing under the name Ansar al Sharia, conducts asymmet- support with the Hamiqan tribe, of which a prominent rical attacks against al Houthi positions. It also appears Salafist sheikh with ties to AQAP is a member, in al to be more aware of the local tribal dynamics than the Zahar district in southern al Bayda.116 (See figure 10.) al Houthis, who have lost support among some tribes AQAP militants now appear to be at least coordi- after killing fellow tribesmen. nating, if not cooperating, with Yemeni tribal militias Al Bayda governorate is the most prominent example in districts surrounding Rada’a in northern al Bayda

24 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 11. Support for AQAP in al Bayda

LEGEND Wald Rabi’a Active Support for AQAP Passive Support for AQAP al Quraishya al Sawadiyah Hostile to AQAP

Wald Rabi’a Na’man

Wald Rabi’a Radman Nati’ al Awad

al A’rsh Maswarah Rada’a al Sharyah al Malajim Sabah al Sawadiyah al Ryashiyah

al Sawma al Taffah Dhi Na’im

al Bayda al Zahir YEMEN Sana’a

al Bayda

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

and in districts surrounding al Zahar, particularly Dhi to the north of Wadi Hadramawt assessed to be an Na’im, in southern al Bayda. (See figure 11.) The risk is AQAP sanctuary.118 that as the conflict protracts, AQAP will integrate fur- The signature of AQAP activity changed dramati- ther into the local militias, which will make it increas- cally in mid-March 2015, when the conflict with the al ingly difficult to separate the tribal population from Houthis was well underway to the west. AQAP shifted AQAP. This approach is similar to the one Jabhat al its offensive activity from Wadi Hadramawt and con- Nusra has used to great effect in Syria. centrated instead on al Mukalla. The objective appeared AQAP took a completely different approach in to be to govern territory in Hadramawt, starting with al areas away from the anti–al Houthi frontline. The Mukalla city. group had been conducting regular attacks, includ- AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia militants seized control of ing VBIEDs, against military targets in Hadramawt. al Mukalla city on April 2, 2015.119 (See figure 12.) These attacks concentrated on al Qatan and Sayun The Yemeni military unit based near al Mukalla did not in Wadi Hadramawt, a dry river valley that provides fight AQAP as it moved into the city. A powerful anti- east-west access to Yemen’s Masila block oil infrastruc- AQAP tribal coalition, the Hadramawt Tribal Confed- ture, and in al Mukalla, a key port city.117 AQAP may eracy (helf qaba’il hadhramawt), called on tribesmen to have been seeking to control access to Wadi Hadra- resecure al Mukalla from AQAP and deployed fighters mawt, which would have better protected an area to the city, but these forces clashed with a Yemeni army

25 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 12. Hadramawt Nonstate Actors The Sons of Hadramawt turned over governing author- ities to the new Hadhrami Hadramawt Tribal Confederacy Domestic Council (al maj- The Hadramawt Tribal Confederacy (HTC) is a military and security lis al ahli al hadhrami), estab- alliance established on July 4, 2013, between prominent Hadhrami lished on April 13, 2015.122 tribes. It seeks to provide security for the governorate and for the oil infrastructure. It is antigovernment and anti-AQAP and has publicly The Hadramawt Tribal Con- rejected both the Sons of Hadramawt and the Council of Sunni federacy (HTC) subsequently Scholars and al Jama’a in Hadramawt, which are seen as a threat began negotiations with the to the security of Hadramawt governorate. Hadhrami Domestic Council (HDC), attempting to regain Hadhrami Domestic Council control of the city without 123 The Hadhrami Domestic Council is a pro-AQAP group established violence. on April 13, 2015, to govern al Mukalla. It is linked to the Sons of Local tribal leaders popu- Hadramawt. The council is comprised of various tribal chiefs, late the AQAP-linked HDC, theologians, academics, engineers, and other members of civil society within the city. It provides domestic services such as the which oversees governing com- payment of salaries and the distribution of fuel to its citizens. mittees inside al Mukalla.124 The HDC oversees the pay- ment of government salaries Sons of Hadramawt in al Mukalla and provides The Sons of Hadramawt is an AQAP-linked group that seized control of al Mukalla, Hadramawt, on April 2, 2015. It maintains security. An AQAP com- control over the city of al Mukalla and runs a religious police unit. mander who was freed from It has delegated governance and the provision of civil services to al Mukalla’s prison on April the Hadhrami Domestic Council. 2, Khaled Batarfi, appeared in public first in the governor’s Council of Sunni Scholars and al Jama’a in Hadramawt palace in al Mukalla, a sign of The Council of Sunni Scholars and al Jama’a in Hadramawt is AQAP’s control over the city, comprised of Sunni theologians and prominent tribesmen. It seems and in April discussed what to be amenable to working with AQAP. The council sought to exercise the HDC is doing.125 AQAP’s governance over the entirety of Hadramawt governorate after the withdrawal of Yemeni troops from Hadramawt and after the April 2, presence began to grow in al 2015, seizure of al Mukalla by the Sons of Hadramawt. Mukalla, as the presence of top leaders indicates.126 The HDC began facing popular resistance to the number of airstrikes— Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project at least eight airstrikes in three months—that its presence unit based outside al Mukalla.120 Ansar al Sharia mil- attracted toward the end of July.127 itants did not immediately institute strict rules to gov- But AQAP remains in control of al Mukalla through ern the population or even raise the tell-tale al Qaeda its proxy groups—the Sons of Hadramawt pub- black flag with the shahada on it, a change from what licly flogged individuals at the end of July—although Ansar al Sharia had done in 2011.121 the HTC has indicated that it might again attempt Instead, it formed a second body, the Sons of to secure the city.128 The HTC has avoided a direct Hadramawt, and reached out to local Salafist sheikhs, engagement with AQAP forces in al Mukalla to date the Council of Sunni Scholars and al Jama’a in Hadra- and probably seeks military support to enter negotia- mawt, to negotiate terms for a transition of power. tions with the stronger force.

26 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

AQAP remains strong in Yemen and is set to Figure 13. ISIS’s Expansion in Yemen expand. There will not be a force capable of defeating

AQAP, even should the Yemen civil war end and Hadi’s Declared ISIS Wilayat in Yemen or an interim government come to power. The anti– al Houthi coalition’s offensive through Aden, Lahij, FEBRUARY 2015 and Abyan has not installed local authorities capable of SANA’A-DHAMAR* | SHABWAH | ADEN denying AQAP access to the territory. AQAP also has the opportunity to move in behind the coalition forces and attempt to take control of recently liberated towns

throughout south Yemen. SANA’A The HTC could secure al Mukalla, or even Hadra- DHAMAR SHABWAH mawt governorate, without seriously knocking AQAP back. AQAP would just shift positions toward safe

havens in Shabwah, regroup, and reset. The recent deaths ADEN *See endnote 131. of AQAP leaders will not permanently reduce the group’s threat, and its threat node remains intact. The question MARCH–APRIL 2015 remains not if AQAP will attack the US, but when. IBB | LAHIJ | AL BAYDA | HADRAMAWT

ISIS’s Challenge to AQAP in Yemen. ISIS presents a

unique challenge to the al Qaeda network and to the HADRAMAWT US and its allies. For the first time since its inception, al Qaeda is no longer the preeminent group within the

AL BAYDA global jihadist movement and is in direct competition IBB with ISIS for leadership of the movement.129 ISIS- LAHIJ linked groups first appeared in Yemen in November 2014, although they appeared to be marginalized at that time. AQAP was and remains the dominant - MAY–AUGUST 2015 ist group in Yemen, and AQAP leadership has rejected MA’RIB ISIS’s legitimacy. A prominent AQAP figure outwardly sympathized with ISIS, though, and the late AQAP judge Ma’moun Abdulhamid Hatem probably helped jumpstart ISIS’s presence in Yemen.130 It is also pos- MA’RIB sible that a small ISIS cell from Iraq and Syria entered Yemen to provide guidance and perhaps expertise. ISIS began to organize into provinces (wilayat) toward the end of February 2015 and had eight active cells in Yemen by the end of July 2015. (See figure 13.) ISIS probably views the potential for a sectarian war as Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project an opportunity for it in Yemen and will pursue a strat- egy there to inflame sectarian tensions. of its spectacular attacks are against hardened targets, ISIS in Yemen is still emerging, and its capabilities such as Yemeni military bases or intelligence headquar- remain basic. ISIS’s Wilayat Sana’a claimed credit for ters. ISIS suicide attacks are not common, however, the March 20, 2015, deadliest terrorist attack in Yemen: and have only occurred in Sana’a and al Bayda, which coordinated suicide bombings at mosques in the capi- may be an indicator of the size of ISIS’s recruiting pool tal. AQAP has not attacked mosques, and the majority or its ability to operate outside of a limited area.

27 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

The first ISIS-linked VBIED attacks began on and appears to favor the Yemeni tradition of using June 17, 2015, the first day of Ramadan, and ISIS has demonstrations of force to win negotiations for local claimed VBIED attacks in Sana’a and Ibb.131 Wilayat control rather than to dominate a population by vio- Sana’a is the most advanced and active ISIS cell in lence, as ISIS has in Iraq and Syria. Yemen. It averages just over an attack a week and has ISIS has not yet been successful in changing how only struck targets it identifies as being used by the Yemenis see the current conflict, which is still based on al Houthis. The first signs of governance activity—a local power dynamics rather than . But the trademark of ISIS in Iraq and Syria—emerged in late protraction of the conflict will enable ISIS to continue July in Aden.132 to attempt to influence the shape of the conflict. ISIS The growing presence of ISIS in Yemen tests will probably be able to expand and at least maintain its AQAP’s staying power and requires AQAP to continue current footprint in Yemen as long as the fight against to demonstrate success. ISIS remains weak in AQAP’s the al Houthis continues. It is far from clear whether strongholds in east Yemen and strongest where AQAP ISIS would have been able to gain ground in Yemen has historically run recruiting or finance networks. without the current conflict, but it will remain there AQAP has opted to work within Yemen’s tribal system even after the conflict is resolved.

28 PART II: A NEW STRATEGY FOR YEMEN

Defeating the Enemy in Yemen also to address the conditions that allow ISIS to persist as a threat. AQAP’s expansion over the past year demonstrates Such a strategy must be based on an analysis of the the failure of the American strategy to counter it. This sources of AQAP’s strength, which in turn requires counterterrorism strategy, which relied on degrading examining AQAP through its strategic role in the global leadership and disrupting operations, was based on al Qaeda network and through how AQAP is operat- the assumption that AQAP is fundamentally a ter- ing on the ground in Yemen. Such an analysis must rorist group. It focused on defeating the components focus on identifying AQAP’s Critical Capabilities, Crit- supporting AQAP’s external operations cell—the ical Requirements, Critical Vulnerabilities, and Centers cell plotting imminent attacks against the US, or the of Gravity as the basis for developing an approach to AQAP threat node. The objective was to defeat the defeating the group in the context of the overall situa- threat to the US homeland from AQAP, not to defeat tion in Yemen. (See table 2.) the organization itself. This distinction is key because it permitted AQAP to grow as an insurgent organi- AQAP’s Critical Capabilities. A Critical Capability zation in Yemen and downplayed the ways in which enables the group to use its strengths and is required the AQAP insurgency supports the AQAP threat to accomplish its objectives.134 AQAP must maintain node.133 its critical capabilities or face defeat. The group derives ISIS has emerged in Yemen because the proxy war some of its capabilities from the global al Qaeda net- and state collapse have created space for it. The princi- work, while others are unique to the Yemen theater. pal ISIS operatives in Yemen were very likely disaffected AQAP’s capabilities at the strategic level include its AQAP members attracted to the new brand and the ideology and methodology (minhaj), its role in the al promise of less-constrained violence. ISIS in Yemen is a Qaeda network, its threat node, its leadership qualities, group of terrorist cells operating in distinct geographic and its narrative and media. Its capabilities at the oper- regions, and there is no strong indication that these ational level are its operational command functions and cells are coordinating very well. ISIS will most likely its popular support and recruiting capabilities. continue to attempt to develop its presence in Yemen and will probably continue to grow as long as the cur- Ideology and Methodology. Al Qaeda bases itself on a rent conflict continues. central idea that it is realizing a divine vision for the ISIS cells in Yemen are unlikely to be plotting to ordering of human society through implementing its attack the US directly any time soon, but that could interpretation of shari’a.135 Al Qaeda’s senior leaders change if the group is able to significantly expand its also developed a specific ideology and methodology areas of control and operations. The continuation of that has guided the group’s actions. AQAP fully sub- Yemen’s civil war, the further collapse of the Yemeni scribes to both, and its actions on the global and local military, the deepening of the proxy war, and competi- stage fit within al Qaeda’s framework. tion between AQAP and ISIS for legitimacy within the Al Qaeda’s ideology and methodology provide global jihadist movement are all factors that could facil- the vision and the roadmap for AQAP, including a itate the continued growth of ISIS. means to fundraise and recruit for the cause. ISIS is At this time, however, the threat from ISIS in Yemen already attacking that ideology and methodology, and remains secondary to the threat from AQAP. It is not al Qaeda must win the argument that its approach is necessarily the case that a strategy to defeat AQAP right. ISIS’s successes on the ground make this more would inevitably defeat ISIS in Yemen, but a sound difficult. Denying both groups success will begin to strategy that addresses the drivers of instability and con- deny them the ability to argue for their ideology and flict and the sources of AQAP’s strength is very likely methodology.

29 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Table 2. AQAP’s Elements of Strategic Power

Definition AQAP Elements

Center of Gravity The source of power that provides • Sanctuary in Yemen moral or physical strength, freedom of • Reputation action, or will to act • Link between local insurgencies and AQAP threat node

Critical Capability A means that is considered a cru- • Ideology and methodology (minhaj) cial enabler for a Center of Gravity to • Role in al Qaeda network function as such and is essential to • AQAP threat node the accomplishment of the specified or • Leadership qualities assumed objective(s) • Narrative and media • Popular support and recruitment

Critical Requirement An essential condition, resource, and • Long-term safe havens means for a Critical Capability to be • Ability to develop and execute complex fully operational operational and strategic plans • Funding • Recruiting and training • Mobility and communications • Collaborators and enablers

Critical Vulnerability An aspect of a Critical Requirement • Ability to develop and execute complex that is deficient or vulnerable to direct operational and strategic plans or indirect attack that will create deci- • Popular support sive or significant effects • Narrative and media

Source: US Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” June 15, 2015, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf; and the author.

Role in al Qaeda Network. AQAP is a force multiplier for AQAP Threat Node. AQAP’s external operations cell, the global al Qaeda network and functions as the prin- its threat node, is highly advanced and is a Strategic cipal al Qaeda threat to the US homeland and as a core Capability that AQAP has developed to conduct mass- facilitator, which is a Strategic Capability. It shares al casualty spectacular attacks against the US homeland Qaeda’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), has and interests. The cell plans transnational attacks spe- financed other groups, and has helped coordinate attacks cifically designed to evade the various security proto- against the West.136 The role AQAP plays improves its cols the US and other states have put in place to detect reputation within the global jihadist movement. explosive devices. This role is a key asset for AQAP because of how The cell conducts research and development, evi- it positions the group within the al Qaeda network. denced by improvements on its explosive devices and It magnifies AQAP’s impact and has given it access to experiments with biological weapons.138 It trains oper- additional resources.137 Denying AQAP this capability atives on the devices and prepares them for missions. relegates the group to being a small al Qaeda cell with AQAP’s threat node directly contributes to AQAP’s little clout to threaten the US. AQAP has parlayed its global standing. Without it, AQAP would be just position in the al Qaeda network into something that another local militant Islamist group. gives it influence out of proportion to its power.

30 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Leadership Qualities. AQAP’s leadership is experienced The narrative in Yemen has shifted over time to and adaptive, a Strategic Capability for AQAP that is match current events. It has attempted to build on essential to its longevity in Yemen. The leaders are part local tribal and political concepts—directly addressing of al Qaeda’s global human network, with relationships southerners, for instance—and painted former Yemeni that span different al Qaeda groups. Many of AQAP’s President Saleh and current President Hadi as Ameri- senior leaders fought in Afghanistan, Bosnia, or other can puppets. AQAP’s Yemeni leaders took on the cause fronts of jihad or trained at al Qaeda–run camps of the Yemeni people, highlighting many of the broad- in Afghanistan. Some of these senior leaders are also based grievances against the government, and called members of al Qaeda core, the group of senior al Qaeda for a revolution. The group’s Saudi leaders called for leadership that directs the global al Qaeda network. the overthrow of the House of Saud, which had devi- The late emir Nasser al Wahayshi was Osama bin ated from true Islam, according to AQAP. A cause Laden’s personal aide for four years in Afghanistan before célèbre was the plight of the women imprisoned from the 2001 US invasion and was appointed al Qaeda’s Buraidah, Saudi Arabia.143 general manager in 2013, for example. The late shari’a AQAP’s media arm, al Malahem Media Foundation, official Nasser bin Ali al Ansi also served as al Qaeda’s releases branded statements and videos. These include deputy general manager since before 2011.139 AQAP leadership statements, reports on local activities, and also boasted former Guantanamo detainees among the serial productions, such as ones focusing on martyrs or ranks of its leaders. The late spiritual leader Ibrahim al lessons on Islam. Al Malahem Media Foundation also Rubaish was a former Guantanamo detainee, one of produced AQAP’s -language magazine, Sada al many among AQAP’s senior operatives. Malahem (Echo of the Epics), and produces AQAP’s AQAP leadership is also regenerating, and district- English-language magazine, Inspire. level insurgent commanders are moving into higher- AQAP’s insurgent arm, Ansar al Sharia, established level command positions within the organization.140 Madad News Agency in 2011, a second media outlet The leadership has proven itself to be adaptive: Wahayshi that focused on Ansar al Sharia’s activities, particularly wrote of lessons AQAP learned from its experience in places where it undertook governance. AQAP’s media south Yemen in 2011 and 2012, for example.141 A senior raises its profile on the global stage and helps attract US official also described AQAP in 2011 as the “fastest- assets such as foreign fighters. The group must be able learning enemy we have.”142 The ability to adjust to to promote its narrative of success to continue attract- on-the-ground conditions increases AQAP’s resiliency ing new recruits and funding. to change over time. AQAP leadership brings strategic depth and expertise to the al Qaeda group and a certain Popular Support and Recruitment. AQAP is able to gravitas that distinguishes it from newer upstart groups, maintain a level of popular support in Yemen generally such as the ISIS cells forming in Yemen. through a projected understanding of the disaffected populations. It has rarely turned to force or violence Narrative and Media. Al Qaeda’s narrative rests on the to coerce popular support, although the group has foundation of its ideology and methodology; it is one used those techniques on occasion.144 AQAP’s sup- of growing success over the long term that will be resil- port is largely one of aligned interests rather than one ient to Western attempts to undermine it. The al Qaeda of support for AQAP’s vision for Yemen. Tribesmen narrative derives its legitimacy from the idea of a divine and local populations will permit AQAP operatives mandate. AQAP constructs its narrative to fit within al to transit their land because of a common enemy or Qaeda’s ideology but also focuses specifically on devel- lack of incentive to prevent AQAP access. This in turn oping a narrative for the Yemeni and Saudi people. The enables AQAP operatives to enjoy a general freedom of local narrative that AQAP produces and disseminates is movement in Yemen. AQAP envisions itself as part of crucial to AQAP’s ability to fundraise, recruit, and jus- a global insurgency against the West, and its ability to tify its actions. mobilize within Yemen’s insurgencies feeds its narrative.

31 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Recruitment is another core operational capability. with their deputies and with AQAP midlevel com- AQAP recruits Yemeni members through a network of mand because of concerns for their own safety, creating Salafist mosques in which imams effectively pass forward a leadership deficit. referred recruits. These members fully believe in AQAP’s vision. Other recruits join AQAP or Ansar al Sharia as Planning and Executing Complex Operational and Stra- foot soldiers, motivated for many of the same reasons tegic Plans. AQAP relies on its ability to plan at an oper- that AQAP has been able to sustain general popular sup- ational level, known as its military decision-making port. Ansar al Sharia is a fighting force that is combatting process (MDMP). AQAP’s ability to plan for, prepare a common enemy, either the al Houthis or the gov- for, and execute operations, both offensive and defen- ernment, and is therefore a means to an end. Denying sive, has enabled it to endure and expand in Yemen. AQAP the ability to recruit and garner popular support AQAP has conducted tactical retreats from key terrain defeats its ability to regenerate and disrupts its resiliency. in the face of a Yemeni military offensive, for example, avoiding pitched battles that would have resulted in a AQAP’s Critical Requirements. A Critical Require- significant loss of numbers for AQAP. ment is an essential condition, resource, and means for Successful attacks and operations help support a Critical Capability to be fully operational. A strate- AQAP’s narrative, boost funding, and bolster recruit- gic requirement for AQAP is that it maintain its long- ment efforts. AQAP requires an MDMP capability term safe havens. The operational-level requirements to operate as an organized, effective insurgent group are the continued ability to develop and execute com- working toward an objective. Removing this capability plex plans, funding, recruitment, training, mobility, reduces AQAP to a disruptive group that might desta- and communications, and access to collaborators and bilize Yemen but would not have an overall effect on enablers. Denying AQAP one of these Critical Require- the trajectory of events. ments will disrupt its ability to operate according to its current strategy. Funding. A continued source of funding is another required capability for AQAP to operate. AQAP has Long-Term Safe Havens. AQAP depends on its long- long-developed funding streams, although it has had term safe havens to support its operations. The safe to adapt as Gulf donations shifted to Syria and the havens support key capabilities such as the AQAP kidnapping-for-ransom racket became less profit- threat node, AQAP’s role within the al Qaeda network, able as foreigners left Yemen due to the insecurity. and its leadership. The AQAP threat node uses the safe Today, AQAP derives some of its funding from foreign havens for such activities as research and development donors; local criminal activities, such as robbing bank for IEDs and vetting and training future operatives.145 cash transfers; or from the reserves at the banks in al Such activities require a protected physical space Mukalla, which is now under AQAP control. in which they can occur. The safe havens also permit AQAP’s financial demands include funding for AQAP to communicate with other al Qaeda nodes, basic supplies, weapons, and munitions for fight- enabling it to continue to play a strategic role within ers; external operations funding; funding for charity the al Qaeda network. Additionally, they host the train- work; and payments to the families of killed opera- ing camps that have developed operatives and leaders. tives. AQAP has financed other radical Islamist groups Denying AQAP its safe havens would significantly in the past, so there may be some general direction disrupt its ability to plan and prepare transnational from senior al Qaeda leadership advising the sharing attacks. AQAP would not be able to run training of finances among affiliated groups. Past analysis of al camps, which would not only reduce its own domestic Qaeda group financing shows that this requirement is capabilities, but would also inhibit a crucial role AQAP not a vulnerability for groups on the ground because has played in sharing its TTPs with other groups.146 they are usually able to find new sources for income AQAP’s leaders would not be able to interact as much generation.147

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Recruiting and Training. AQAP needs insurgent fighters AQAP activity. They include individuals within gov- and foreign operatives. It recruits among locals, nonlocal ernment or military positions that provide AQAP with Sunni Arabs, and radicalized Westerners. These recruits key intelligence, criminal and smuggling networks that fill AQAP’s ranks, and the radicalized Westerners provide move resources, and locals who conduct business trans- a vector into Europe or the US. AQAP must therefore actions with AQAP or support local AQAP operations maintain its recruitment capability in order to continue as a means to an end. AQAP depends on other illicit to regenerate. Foreign operatives are a strategic resource networks to move personnel and resources. Without that AQAP deploys in support of its threat node. these, it would be fairly isolated in Yemen. New members must go through indoctrination and training, meaning AQAP must maintain train- AQAP’s Critical Vulnerabilities. A Critical Vulnera- ing facilities and personnel numbers. The training bility is an aspect of a Critical Requirement that is defi- process, including indoctrination, builds a new gen- cient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will eration of hardline al Qaeda members to carry on al create decisive or significant effects. AQAP must sus- Qaeda’s vision and AQAP’s mission in Yemen. Deny- tain its planning or MDMP capability, it must have ing AQAP the ability to recruit and train new individu- popular support, and it must sustain and disseminate als will disrupt AQAP’s insurgent capabilities—it must its narrative. The weakening or disruption of any of have fighters on the ground—and its ability to conduct these capabilities will affect AQAP’s ability to operate. transnational attacks. Planning and Executing Complex Operations. AQAP’s Mobility and Communications. AQAP depends on planning capabilities, which are adaptive and reactive to its freedom of movement and mobility to operate in the situation at hand, are a considerable asset. As noted Yemen: it must be able to deploy forces and operatives previously, AQAP’s planners are adaptive to on-the- to the frontlines of the battlefield, relay commands, ground situations, which increases the likelihood of suc- and communicate efficiently to distribute resources cessful operations. AQAP would be vulnerable should and information. Yemen’s terrain makes full denial its MDMP capability be disrupted or weakened. AQAP of AQAP’s mobility difficult, since there are many must continue to demonstrate success on the battlefield secondary routes off the main roads. The group has in order to uphold its own narrative, and planning is an rapidly changed its communications tactics to adjust essential component to this success. to new conditions. For example, AQAP altered how Its MDMP is a vulnerability because AQAP will not it reached out to its operatives following the 2013 be able to defend its safe havens or sustain a narrative Edward Snowden leaks.148 of success without operational-level planning, which Fully denying AQAP’s communications may be dif- has resounding effects on AQAP’s ability to recruit ficult, but even disrupting leadership’s ability to pass and fundraise. This capability can be degraded when orders to the frontlines or to contact operatives would key nodes of the human network are attacked or safe begin to break down AQAP’s overall ability to oper- havens disrupted, forcing the planners to disperse and ate. Disrupting AQAP’s ability to move freely through keep moving. Disrupting AQAP’s mobility and means the battlespace would degrade its combat efficiency and of communication would also damage this capability, its ability to assign and shift resources in response to possibly severely. opportunities and threats. Popular Support. Part of AQAP’s strength rests on Collaborators and Enablers. AQAP benefits extensively the popular support that it enjoys in Yemen, which from and has grown to rely on collaborators and enablers means that the group would be particularly vulnera- within Yemen. These are individuals who may not fully ble if this began to erode. The majority of the support subscribe to AQAP’s values or vision for the country is not ideologically based, which reduces the overall but derive some immediate benefit from facilitating effect of efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE).

33 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Instead, support is primarily generated through com- AQAP’s Centers of Gravity. A Center of Gravity is a mon cause or through transactional relationships. group’s source of power that provides moral or physi- Common causes currently include preventing al cal strength, freedom of action, or will to act; it is the Houthis from controlling or entering tribal territory, source of strength.149 AQAP’s Centers of Gravity are harassing or attacking Yemeni government personnel primarily at the strategic level, because of AQAP’s cen- or infrastructure, and ensuring access to basic goods tral role to the al Qaeda network. Denying AQAP its and services. Transactional relationships include those Centers of Gravity will have an asymmetric effect on criminal or smuggling networks that help facilitate the organization’s strength and will have second-or- AQAP operations. der effects on the global al Qaeda network. (See fig- Should the Yemeni government successfully address ure 14.) local grievances, support for AQAP would likely decline. As an al Qaeda node, AQAP fulfills many of al Qae- Similarly, should the cost of transacting with AQAP da’s critical requirements, which are not discussed in increase, such relationships would likely decrease. A depth here. Al Qaeda currently relies on the AQAP loss of popular support would weaken AQAP, reduc- threat node as part of al Qaeda’s war with the West ing its freedom of movement and access to resources. and uses AQAP’s sanctuary in Yemen as a rear area for AQAP has not demonstrated a willingness or ability to the global network. AQAP derives its strength from maintain itself among hostile populations through ter- its sanctuary in Yemen, its reputation and leadership ror and force, as al Qaeda in Iraq and its successor, ISIS, messaging, and the relationship between AQAP and have done. It is not clear that AQAP has the ability to Yemen’s insurgencies. maintain itself should current levels of popular support and toleration collapse. Sanctuary within Yemen. AQAP has maintained a sanc- tuary within Yemen since its establishment in Janu- Narrative and Media. The strength of AQAP’s narra- ary 2009, and its predecessor, al Qaeda in Yemen, had tive hinges on its ability to deliver continued victories. sanctuary there as well. It is a Center of Gravity at both ISIS’s narrative introduces an alternative that has had the strategic and operational level because the sanctuary demonstrated success in Iraq and Syria and growing has been a source of strength for the group, enabling success in Libya and the Sinai. AQAP must deliver on AQAP to develop its unique capabilities and to pre- the ground in order to back its own narrative and must serve its crucial role within the al Qaeda network. ensure that its narrative matches reality, at least super- AQAP’s sanctuary has been a key contributor to ficially. It must also be able to distribute reports of its its long-term resilience at an operational level. AQAP success, promote its leaders’ voices, propagate material members are able to retreat into safe havens when on its vision for society, and maintain a presence within pressed militarily by Yemeni security forces, preserving the public sphere. core strength. They also complete paramilitary and mil- The disruption of AQAP’s media production has itary command skill training at the Yemen sanctuary had an impact on AQAP’s strength. A separate chal- and go through indoctrination courses. AQAP uses its lenge for AQAP has been the volume and quality of sanctuary to regenerate force. Denying AQAP its sanc- ISIS’s media outputs. AQAP, like the rest of the al tuary in Yemen will disrupt its threat node, reduce its Qaeda network, has not yet harnessed the potential role within the al Qaeda network, and deny it a narra- behind social media and has suffered in terms of over- tive of success, making AQAP a militant group on the all stature and recruitment. AQAP and al Qaeda risk run instead of an al Qaeda force multiplier. being drowned out of the debate by ISIS supporters. This capability can be attacked either directly, by dis- Reputation. AQAP’s reputation within the al Qaeda rupting media centers and other means whereby AQAP network generates power, particularly at the strategic communicates, or indirectly, by imposing clear defeats level. AQAP’s reputation drives its ability to support on AQAP, undermining its narrative of success. its narrative, raised it to a leading position among al

34 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Figure 14. Attacking AQAP’s Centers of Gravity

Attack a Critical Vulnerability to have CRITICAL CRITICAL CRITICAL CENTER OF second-order effects VULNERABILITY REQUIREMENT CAPABILITY GRAVITY

Dependent Dependent

• Long-term safe havens • AQAP threat node • Recruiting and training • Sanctuary in Yemen • Popular support and • Collaborators and • Link between local Address local grievances • Popular Support recruitment enablers insurgencies and • Role in al Qaeda AQAP threat node • Mobility and network communications

• Ideology and methodology Disrupt media centers • Funding • Narrative and media and undermine • Narrative and Media • Recruiting and training • Popular support and • Reputation narrative of success • Collaborators and recruitment enablers • Role in al Qaeda network

• Long-term safe havens • Ability to develop and • AQAP threat node • Ability to develop execute complex Attack key nodes of the human network and/or and execute complex operational and • Role in al Qaeda • Reputation strategic plans disrupt safe havens operational and network • Sanctuary in Yemen strategic plans • Recruiting and training • Leadership qualities • Mobility and communications

ThisThis graphic graphic shows theshows relaonships the relationships between a Crical among Vulnerabilit a y,Critical Crical R Vulnerability,equirement, Crical Critical Capability Requirement, and Center of Gra pCriticalhic. Acng Capability, on a Crical V ulnerandability Center produces of effects on the Center of Gravity. Aacking AQAP’s Crical Vulnerabilies (popular support, narrave and media, and ability to develop and execute complex operaonal and straGravity.tegic plans) Acting will aff ecton its a Cen Criticalters of Gr Vulnerabilityavity (Yemen sanctuar producesy, link between effects the on local the insur Centergencies andof Gravity.the AQAP threat Attacking node, and AQAP’s its reputaon). Critical Vulnerabilities Source:(popular AEI’s Crical support, Threats Projec narrativet and media, and ability to develop and execute complex operational and strategic plans) will affect its Centers of Gravity (Yemen sanctuary, link between the local insurgencies and the AQAP threat node, and its reputation).

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

­Qaeda’s various nodes, and directly contributes to the recovered during the May 2011 Abbottabad raid.151 further development of its threat node. AQAP’s messages are not just to Yemenis or Sau- The group has headed al Qaeda’s efforts to attack the dis. Late AQAP spiritual leader Ibrahim al Rubaish, West and remains the al Qaeda network’s greatest direct for example, called on all to fight against the threat to the US.150 AQAP’s reputation may begin to US-led coalition in Iraq and Syria in October 2014.152 fade should the AQAP threat node not continue to Raymi will probably take on this mantle, but there are pose as great a threat to the US. Another component of already signs that Syria’s leader is taking a greater role in AQAP’s reputation is its leadership’s messaging, which messaging on the global platform.153 occurs on a global platform. Well-respected al Qaeda AQAP’s reputation continues to allow it to oper- veterans compose its leadership, although the senior ate at a level far beyond that of a group protecting the leadership was rapidly degraded in 2015. Current emir rear area. Losing this reputation would strip AQAP of Qasim al Raymi was in direct contact with Osama bin its ability to recruit and fundraise, diminish the global Laden and other senior al Qaeda leaders, though, as resonance of its leadership’s messaging, and demote it shown in the few declassified documents from those within al Qaeda’s network.

35 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Link between Local Insurgencies and the AQAP Threat mobilized factions against the Yemeni government. Node. The relationship between Yemen’s local insurgen- Changing the conditions on the ground will begin to cies and AQAP’s threat node enables the threat node to deny AQAP its sanctuary and will start to break the continue to regenerate and to operate away from mil- link between AQAP and Yemen’s insurgencies. itary pressure. It provides AQAP with a support net- work, which has strengthened and empowered the group in Yemen. Disaggregating AQAP—particularly A Strategy to Defeat AQAP the threat node—from local insurgencies would sap AQAP of the momentum behind the insurgencies and The US strategy to defeat AQAP must be a compo- the capabilities that they support. nent of a comprehensive strategy to defeat al Qaeda, Longstanding antigovernment grievances and, now, ISIS, and like-minded groups. Such a US grand strat- a mobilization against the al Houthi movement cre- egy will not only need to defeat the current groups ated conditions on the ground for a broad-based insur- that are operative today, but will also need to set the gency. That insurgency is not monolithic, but is instead conditions to prevent their return. It will be impos- divided into hyperlocal actors and interests. AQAP sible to defeat these groups’ ideology, but it is con- has been able to navigate the complicated dynamics of ceivable to discredit its leading exponents by defeating the insurgency and leverage it to AQAP’s own advan- them, to deny that ideology space within the public tage, however. The insurgency has permitted AQAP sphere, to re-empower the voices in Islam that rep- to expand its area of operations and recruit from a resent the majority, and to prevent the spread of sec- wider pool. AQAP is attempting to integrate fully with tarianism that polarizes and radicalizes. A strategy to the insurgency, which would fortify the link between defeat AQAP must work to achieve these broader, AQAP’s threat node and the insurgency. grand strategic objectives. Breaking this link would diminish the overall The mission in Yemen is to defeat AQAP while pro- strength of the AQAP threat node and might reduce viding security from attacks against the US homeland AQAP to a terrorist cell. AQAP would start to resem- and advancing US interests in Yemen. These interests ble the rag-tag al Qaeda cells in Yemen from the 1990s, include preventing other radical Islamic groups, such although it would preserve its ability to conduct trans- as ISIS, from establishing a safe haven; supporting a national attacks, which is the group’s primary threat to resolution to the current political crisis that leads to a the US. central government that is perceived to be legitimate, responsive, and capable; and minimizing the risk that the al Houthi movement develops into an Iranian Developing a New Yemen Model proxy group or a spoiler undermining the future stabil- ity of any Yemeni political settlement. A new model for defeating AQAP must abandon the The desired end state is a country in which the reliance on state-based partners, who have repeatedly threat to American interests is defeated, the Yemeni proved to be unreliable for a variety of reasons, and government is perceived as legitimate and adopts a must prioritize changing the environment that has form of governance that does not generate violence or allowed AQAP to expand despite the military cam- create conditions conducive to the reestablishment of paign against it. It is time to recognize that the drivers terrorist safe havens, and the US maintains its ability of instability in Yemen are not just Yemeni domestic to work with Yemeni partners. A partitioned Yemen issues but are also critical opportunities that AQAP and has proven to be inherently unstable, as shown by the like-minded groups, such as ISIS, exploit. de facto partitioning of the Yemeni state today, and The US need not rebuild Yemen or address every therefore it is within US interests to support a uni- grievance, but it must recognize how these grievances tary, although possibly highly decentralized or federal, have abetted AQAP’s growth in the country and have Yemeni state.

36 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Strategic Objectives in the Campaign against AQAP. • Effective at taking out senior AQAP The US must accomplish four strategic objectives to leadership; defeat AQAP: • Able to prevent the reestablishment of an AQAP safe haven; and 1. Permanently degrade and disrupt the AQAP organization, leadership, fighting forces, and safe • Able to protect state infrastructure and secure havens in order to destroy the direct threat and to Yemeni territory. end AQAP’s role as an important al Qaeda net- work node. Potential Courses of Action (COAs). There are mul- tiple potential courses of action that the US could take 2. Stabilize Yemen as a unified state under a govern- to pursue its strategic objectives. The US could work ment that is perceived as legitimate. unilaterally or through partners. It could rely solely on 3. Contain the growing Saudi Arabia–Iran conflict either military power to defeat the threat from AQAP or in Yemen that is adding to regional insecurity. diplomatic power to leverage US partners to defeat the threat from AQAP. It could favor a certain side of the 4. Prevent a humanitarion crisis in Yemen, particu- political crisis or ignore it altogether. Or it could pur- larly one that generates a significant Yemeni refu- sue some combination of the aforementioned actions. gee flow from the country. These COAs must each be examined independently for their potential advantages and accompanying risks. Strategic Key Tasks in the Campaign against AQAP. The tasks at hand derive from the key objectives. These COA #1: US Invasion of Yemen. The US could rely on its translate the objectives into actions that US and part- own military forces and instruments of power to defeat nered forces should undertake and are listed here in AQAP. The military campaign would be a straightfor- order of priority: ward counterinsurgency campaign that begins with the insertion of US forces in Aden. The main effort would 1. Destroy the AQAP threat node, which is the be the US military securing the major road from Aden external operations cell that plans and directs to al Mukalla, including the surrounding area, and then attacks against the US and the West. the road that runs from Shabwah through Ma’rib. US military units would also need to contain AQAP 2. Prevent AQAP from co-opting local insurgencies. inside of al Bayda, Lahij, Ma’rib, and al Jawf governor- 3. Identify and address widespread antigovernment ates for a future phase. The first supporting effort would grievances that drive insecurity in Yemen. be the provision of logistical, intelligence, training, and weapons to support partnered Yemeni tribal militias; 4. Support a negotiated political settlement that the second would entail the disruption of AQAP ter- leads to a central government perceived to be rorist cells. legitimate and that does not drive further conflict The US military is experienced at conducting these through its actions. sorts of operations and would likely be capable of accomplishing the mission. A major force presence on 5. Enable the development of central and local secu- the ground removes a key challenge in Yemen: reliance rity structures that can accomplish key objectives on partnered forces. This COA imposes a high cost with ongoing external support and that can sus- for the US, however, especially in military resources, tain operations with these minimum capabilities: and poses the significant risk of the US getting bogged down in Yemen. Yemen’s terrain moves from rugged • Able to conduct counterinsurgency opera- mountains to desert with deep dry river valleys (wadis), tions without alienating the population; difficult for any military force to navigate.

37 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Table 3. Potential US Courses of Action in Yemen

Pros Cons

COA #1: US Invasion • US not reliant on partners to • High cost to US in terms of military resources execute • Risk of getting bogged down in Yemen in the long term • Very likely to strengthen enemy initially

COA #2: US Direct • Light-footprint approach • AQAP resiliency increases and threat Action • Avoids entanglement in regional persists power struggles • US remains vulnerable to attack

COA #3: Support al • Recognizes and partners with de • Unlikely to advance beyond former border of Houthis facto Yemeni state apparatus South Yemen • May discourage further al Houthi • AQAP strengthened along with anti–al alignment with Iran Houthi insurgency • Appearance of siding with Iran against Saudi Arabia after Iranian nuclear deal

COA #4: Support • Supports GCC efforts already • Current efforts worsening conflict and indi- Saudi Arabia–led underway rectly strengthening AQAP Coalition • Partners with internationally recog- • Risk of empowering Saudi maximalist solu- nized Yemeni government tion that will be unstable

COA #5: Support • Works through local structures in • Risks strengthening actors outside of the Local Partners place state system • Works to de-escalate Saudi-Iranian • Requires US to walk a tightrope between conflict in Yemen Iran and Saudi Arabia

Source: Author

A US invasion of Yemen would also very likely gener- The benefit of a US direct-action approach is that ate hostility toward the US inside the country and would it is a light-footprint approach. It also avoids entan- mobilize some powerful tribal forces, such as the Awalek glement in local and regional power struggles, since tribe in Shabwah, against the US. This would initially the US investment in Yemen is limited and not likely strengthen AQAP and also increases the likelihood of the to empower local groups excessively. The approach is US fighting an expanded insurgency in Yemen. unlikely to defeat AQAP, however, and will probably have the reverse effect of increasing AQAP’s resiliency. COA #2: US Direct-Action Operations. The US could The US drone campaign globally has increased al pursue an expanded direct-action campaign in Yemen. Qaeda’s resilience to leadership deaths and has also had US special operations force (SOF) units would con- the interesting effect of strengthening the leadership duct operations to neutralize the AQAP threat to US cadre that remains. Those who remain follow strong interests. A drone strike program would complement operational security procedures and adapt to the US the light ground presence. The main effort would be threat. AQAP’s support network and the insurgencies SOF direct-action operations to disrupt AQAP plan- in Yemen that strengthen the group also remain intact. ning operations and degrade the AQAP threat node. It is likewise unclear that the US could develop action- The supporting effort would extend direct-action oper- able intelligence at a high enough rate to support a sig- ations against the AQAP support network in Yemen. nificantly expanded direct-action effort without putting

38 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

additional forces on the ground. This factor is particu- the Hadi-led government and resuming counterterror- larly important considering the collapse and reorienta- ism operations against AQAP. The US military would tion of the partner on which US forces had been relying: provide additional enabling support for Operation the Yemeni military. Finally, the approach leaves the US Restoring Hope, throwing its weight behind the Arab vulnerable to surprise attacks over the long term. coalition, to ensure the operation is successful. The main effort would be to provide logistical, intelligence, COA #3: Support the al Houthis. The US could support training, and weapons to both the coalition forces and the al Houthi–led government and partner with it to partnered Yemeni resistance forces and tribal militias. defeat AQAP. The US military would provide enabling The supporting effort, identical to the previous COA, support for al Houthi militia and Yemeni military units would be a direct-action operations campaign to dis- to secure Yemen and combat AQAP, working from west rupt the direct threat to the US. to east and north to south. The main effort would be This COA would lend additional US support to the providing logistical, intelligence, trains, and weapons Sunni Arab coalition efforts that are already underway support to the al Houthi–run Yemeni government and and backs the internationally recognized government military for counterinsurgency operations. The sup- of Yemen. The US would show that it still supports its porting effort would be a direct-action operations cam- Sunni Arab partners and could attempt to influence the paign to disrupt the direct threat to the US from the shape of their operations in Yemen. AQAP threat node. The momentum in Yemen has shifted in favor of The al Houthis control a good percentage of Yemen’s Operation Restoring Hope, a sign that the al Houthis state infrastructure—most importantly, the capital and do not have sufficient popular support to maintain the ministries and agencies based there. Supporting the their current force posture. The prospect of return- al Houthis recognizes the de facto Yemeni state apparatus ing Yemen to the state where it was before the current and works through already-established channels. The US crisis is low, however, and even should the coalition and the al Houthis have a shared interest in combatting succeed, the challenge of defeating AQAP remains. AQAP, since the group has named both as legitimate tar- Current coalition actions are indirectly strengthen- gets. Moreover, supporting the al Houthis may serve to ing AQAP, which means that a future AQAP will be discourage them from further aligning themselves with harder to defeat. There is also a high risk that Saudi Iran, which reduces the risk that the al Houthis develop triumphalism would preclude a negotiated settlement along a trend line similar to Lebanese Hezbollah. with the al Houthis, ensuring continued instability Even with US support, however, the al Houthis and potentially undermining any temporary settle- and Yemeni military would likely remain fixed along a ment of the conflict. frontline that was the border of former South Yemen. The anti–al Houthi insurgency would probably grow, COA #5: Support Local Partners. The US could work which would strengthen AQAP on the ground. The with both regional and local partners to defeat AQAP presence of Gulfi ground forces supporting Hadi and negotiate a political solution to the current crisis. against the Houthis risks putting the US in the posi- The US would take on a leadership role in Yemen, and tion of directly supporting operations against Saudi its main effort would be to coordinate and enable the and Emirati troops. Finally, there would be blowback local fight against AQAP, support political negotiations in the region over the perception that the US is again to end the crisis, and work through international chan- siding with Iran against Saudi Arabia and the Sunni nels to address local grievances. The supporting effort Arab states following the nuclear deal with Iran. would be a direct-action operations campaign to neu- tralize the AQAP threat. COA #4: Support the Saudi-Led Coalition. The US This COA is a hybrid of other options. It is US-led, could instead choose to support fully the Saudi-led which increases the likelihood that US objectives and coalition in Yemen, with the objective of reinstalling interests will be met. It is formally neutral on the

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Iran-Saudi Arabia question, which may encourage and its most important underlying grievances is both the Sunni Arab states and Iran to accept a nego- the key to de-escalating the conflict. tiated settlement in Yemen. It also works through many of the local structures in place, which have • Subnational: The expansion of the al Houthis proven to be robust in Yemen and many times more throughout central Yemen and their offensive into effective than the central government. The local part- south Yemen mobilized an insurgency. AQAP nerships would enable the US to identify and begin exploited the opportunity to forge new relation- addressing some of the grievances that drive inse- ships with Yemeni insurgent forces that would curity in Yemen. US support for these actors also otherwise have been immune to AQAP overtures. increases US leverage over them, which could facili- These forces need to be identified and supported tate the reunification of Yemen under some form of a in their efforts. central government. There is an inherent risk of strengthening local • Counteroffensive: AQAP will probably remain actors outside of the state system, however, which on the offensive, so there should be a military must be kept in mind when developing the plan offensive against AQAP. for action. It will also be difficult to persuade the al Houthis and their Iranian backers that the US is • Humanitarian/stabilization: The conflict in not simply helping impose a maximalist Saudi posi- Yemen has exacerbated poor humanitarian con- tion while simultaneously assuring the Saudis that the ditions to the point where there is a growing US is committed to finding a solution in Yemen that humanitarian crisis, which international aid orga- secures Saudi interests. nizations must begin addressing before it deepens further. Recommended COA. The US can neither rely on foreign forces—including Yemeni, Saudi Arabian, The lines of effort, in order of priority, are: or other military units—to fight AQAP effectively, nor can it fight AQAP unilaterally without incur- 1. Negotiate a political solution: US diplomatic ring significant risk of worsening the Yemeni conflict. personnel support and pursue multitiered engage- The current political crisis is a contributing factor to ment to compel the Sunni Arab states, particularly local Yemeni insurgencies, from which AQAP derives Saudi Arabia, to accept al Houthi representation strength. Therefore, the US must pursue a COA that within the Yemeni government and to negotiate simultaneously addresses the political crisis, de-escalates a political settlement among Yemeni stakehold- the current military conflict, and contains AQAP with ers in order to end the national-level conflict. The the ultimate objective of isolating it from the popula- US must signal clearly that it believes that the al tion and defeating it. (See table 3.) The recommended Houthis should have a voice in Yemen’s future COA is, consequently, the fifth COA: to lead multiple as long as they are willing to work within the lines of effort, working with regional and local partners, state system and abjure Iranian control. It is far to defeat AQAP and negotiate a political solution to the from clear whether Saudi Arabia would currently Yemen crisis. (See figure 15.) accept an al Houthi voice in the Yemeni govern- ment, and Saudi Arabia is the primary supporter Campaign Plan in Yemen: Phase One. The first phase of of the Hadi-led government involved in Yemeni the campaign can be broken down into four synergistic peace talks. lines of effort: Therefore, the US must ensure that both Yemeni and regional stakeholders accept the • Political: Yemeni power politics caused the cur- future role of the al Houthis in Yemen. Specifi- rent conflict, therefore resolving the political crisis cally, the US would:

40 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015 Effect of lines of efforts Figure 15. Effect of Lines of Effort

STARTING CONDITIONS END STATE Information Operations AQAP SANCTUARY POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS

SUPPORT FOR SUBNATIONAL ACTORS

POPULAR SUPPORT

COMBAT OPERATIONS AGAINST AQAP

LEGITIMATE, EFFECTIVE MANAGE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS GOVERNANCE

Source: AEI’s Critical Threats Project

• Apply diplomatic levers to build acceptance • Engage Yemeni stakeholders in support of for the al Houthi component in the Yemeni UN-led efforts, or those of another country government and to increase pressure to perceived to be neutral, to negotiate a polit- remove former Yemeni President Saleh from ical resolution. There appears to be a level of political power in Yemen. Saleh’s continued distrust on the part of some stakeholders such role in politics is now detrimental to Yemen’s as the al Houthis when entering into negoti- long-term stability. ations, because they face international sanc- • Pressure the Saudi-led coalition to end the tions and are opposed by a US-backed Sunni general air campaign in Yemen. The air cam- Arab coalition. The US must push for talks paign, apart from limited efforts directly in in a neutral setting and must show openness support of Yemeni military forces and Saudi to bounded outcomes from the talks. allies, is now doing more damage to popu- • Support the renegotiation of terms within the lar support for Yemen’s internationally rec- NDC framework agreement in order to pro- ognized central government than it is to al duce a legitimate and acceptable path forward Houthi capabilities. for Yemen. The US must publicly recognize • Support and encourage locally negotiated that the Hadi government has lost legitimacy ceasefires. De-escalating the Yemeni conflict and that it is now serving as an interim gov- on the local level reduces the opportunities ernment. It must therefore reject the Saudi for AQAP to embed itself within the local maximalist view of the current conflict. The population and may create a more stable US must also avoid basing acceptable condi- situation from which parties can negotiate tions for an outcome on the observance of national terms. the terms of the NDC’s output, because key

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players, including the al Houthis and some • Identify and address local grievances, includ- southern factions, view the NDC as an ille- ing providing military assistance to protect gitimate process. the population from perceived outsiders • Empower moderates within the al Houthi or occupiers, such as the al Houthis, and movement. A more radical, militant stream humanitarian or development assistance. appears to be in power within the movement, AQAP has been successful among certain which is likely perpetuated by the current local populations because it is able to iden- conflict. There is a faction of the movement tify, understand, and address local grievances. that is inherently motivated along politi- The US and its partners must attempt to do cal lines, and this is the faction that the US the same when possible. should seek to empower. • Coordinate and direct international— particularly Gulf—assistance to US- 2. Support subnational actors: US military or identified and US-prioritized projects. The clandestine personnel lead efforts to coordi- US must work with international donors to nate support for subnational tribal or governing ensure that aid is directed to prioritized projects authorities in order to stabilize local dynamics and that it is not delivered at cross-purposes. and prevent and ultimately reverse AQAP or ISIS • Provide the means by which grievances expansion.154 AQAP has developed popular sup- against the Yemeni central state can be recog- port by providing military force to subnational nized and incorporated into a future recon- actors, particularly in the current fight against the ciliation effort. Not all grievances can or will al Houthis. Preventing these populations from be addressed through assistance, but the US turning to AQAP, or removing their reliance on can help to develop future channels through AQAP, will reduce the group’s operating space. which these grievances can be voiced and This effort is in nature and must be defensive addressed and should provide guarantees to coordinated with negotiating an overall solution that effect as possible. so that they are mutually supporting. It will prob- ably also require messaging that it is not a fight against the al Houthis, but rather a fight against 3. Lead offensive against AQAP: US military or AQAP’s presence that will also allow the local clandestine personnel lead an effort to coordinate population to secure themselves against all out- and support a ground offensive against AQAP. siders. Specifically, the US would: This effort is offensive in nature and seeks to defeat AQAP in its safe havens by partnering with local • Develop and engage local relationships forces. It risks strengthening current forces, such directly or through effective intermediaries as the al Houthis, and empowering radical forces in Ma’rib, Shabwah, Hadramawt, al Bayda, that are opposed to AQAP. These risks must be and Abyan governorates. Potential interme- mitigated to the greatest possible extent by careful diaries include tribal or local powerbrokers, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) or other Arab military or clandestine person- and patient and thoughtful planning. The general nel working on the ground. These relation- procedures and timelines of the Village Stabil- ships should be developed outside of the al ity Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan are a good Houthi– or Hadi-led government in order model to seek to emulate, suitably modified for to develop strong local relationships and pre- Yemen’s different culture. vent local sentiments toward either govern- The final decision to partner with local forces ment from affecting willingness to engage must also take into consideration the current with the US. dynamics on the ground and the long-term

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objectives of the forces in order to mitigate the • Deliver targeted aid through USAID chan- risk of strengthening actors outside of the state nels similar to programs run in Afghani- system. Specifically, the US would: stan, such as the Commander’s Emergency • Provide intelligence, logistics, weapons, and Response Program (CERP). Deliver general training support to partnered forces on the aid, such as food distribution, through UN ground—particularly in Hadramawt but also or international aid agencies. in Ma’rib, Shabwah, al Bayda, and Abyan— to secure AQAP safe havens and prevent Projections for Future Phases. The first phase simultane- their reestablishment. Partnered forces could ously addresses both the political crisis that underpins include Yemeni military units and local mili- much of the conflict in south-central Yemen and the tia forces that (1) are not subordinated to an threat from AQAP in east Yemen. The political solu- actor that seeks to expand power through ter- tion does not necessarily need to be a permanent one, ritorial conquest; (2) subordinate themselves but must be sufficient to defuse the situation and must to a US-led command structure, relinquish- be at least an interim agreement that will lead to a last- ing some independence of operation; and ing power-sharing agreement. It effectively negotiates (3) are not opposed to the idea of a unified a détente at the national level and sets conditions for a Yemeni state under some form of secular cen- subnational dialogue and framework. tral government. Any military support given to subnational actors must be conditioned on their acceptance of the ongo- • Conduct direct-action operations to destroy ing political negotiations. Those who refuse to accept the AQAP threat node. The intent is to iso- a unitary state or the possibility of groups such as the late the AQAP threat node from its popular al Houthis having a voice in the central government support networks so that direct-action oper- must be convinced that this is the best way to have their ations can destroy the node and prevent its interests realized and that they cannot be empowered regeneration. until they do accept the unitary state. Those who seek to expand their influence beyond their historical sphere 4. Manage and mitigate humanitarian crisis: of influence must also be contained. The US Agency for International Development The national-level interim government that comes (USAID) mobilizes and helps direct the inter- from the first phase of negotiations will probably have national humanitarian assistance community in little authority at the subnational level and will need to order to address the immediate needs of the pop- build its legitimacy among those actors who were not ulation and to prevent a full-scale humanitarian involved in the initial discussions. This involves reach- crisis. Specifically, USAID would: ing out to local authorities and developing a decentral- ized framework to incorporate them into a national • Prioritize assistance to key terrain. Aid will structure. It also involves the US and others leveraging likely be insufficient to address all Yemen’s relationships developed with subnational actors, includ- humanitarian needs and therefore should be ing conditioning continued support for those actors on scaled to address those that are critical. Its their buy-in to a decentralized national framework. basic components should include fuel, food, There is also a decision to be made about the future water, and medical supplies; development of the forces fighting on the local level. One possi- programming is a future task. The assistance bility is to integrate them into a decentralized but must also not appear to marginalize parts of nationalized police organization, as has been under- the population, such as those in Sa’ada where taken to some extent in Iraq and Afghanistan, albeit AQAP is inactive, to mitigate the risk of fur- with mixed results. Such a structure would codify and ther instability. support preexisting local capabilities. These forces

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are already best positioned to identify local threats, should be prioritized against immediate needs and such as AQAP operatives, and would then be given future development objectives. the authority to disrupt AQAP activities in their areas of responsibility. Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, Key Assumptions. The campaign plan would be inval- however, makes clear that the success of such integra- idated should any of the key assumptions behind it tion heavily depends on the acceptance by all parties prove to be false. of a political resolution and some agreement about power sharing. Absence of IRGC Ground Presence in Yemen. An The offensive against AQAP may continue beyond assumption behind the campaign plan is that there is the first phase, as it is far from certain that it will culmi- no IRGC ground presence in Yemen, which would sig- nate at the same time as the national-level political crisis. nificantly alter Iran’s role in the current conflict and Yet, requirements begin to fall into place shortly after a the predicted Sunni Arab response. An IRGC ground national interim government comes into power. These presence would also be an indicator that the al Houthis include reparations to local communities for damage have not preserved their full independence for deci- done to infrastructure during the counter-AQAP offen- sion making and are an Iranian proxy group. The plan sive. A timely response will go a long way in building assumes that the al Houthi movement has been driven the local legitimacy of the central government. toward Iranian support because of previous isolation The discussion about what to do with the forces that under the Saleh regime, Iranian outreach, and Saudi have been fighting AQAP must also begin. Immediate Arabian military actions. reintegration of Yemeni military units into the Yemeni military will be a challenge because the military itself Presence of Willing and Able Local Partners in Yemen. The must go through a rebuilding phase, although even- campaign plan assumes that the US will be able to iden- tual reintegration should probably be an objective tify and work with local partners in Yemen, that the for these units. The local militias deserve significant damage to the US reputation in Yemen through sup- attention. Demobilization is a possibility for tribal lev- port for the coalition air campaign is reparable, and that ies that have historically mobilized and then returned local partners will cooperate with the right incentives. home, but there must be a process to collect medium and heavy weaponry. No Basis for a Full-Blown Sectarian Conflict in Yemen. Demobilization might also create a security vac- The analysis of the situation in Yemen views the cur- uum should there be no alternative security force, and rent conflict as one over the distribution of wealth and therefore integrating the militias into a national or local power. A key assumption is that only a select few of the structure may be a best option. There is an argument more radical actors are motivated along sectarian lines. to be made for integrating these militias into the mil- Indicators that the situation has become a real sectarian itary—they will have been tried and they will have conflict include a significant and rapid increase in the already cooperated with Yemeni military units—but targeting of civilians based on faith rather than another preserving the militias as a unit is likely to cause prob- identity, incorporation of sectarianism into politics and lems down the line, as it undercuts a core concept of a demands, or the voluntary disaggregation of mixed national military. Zaydi-Shafi’i populations. Finally, Yemen requires a long-term commitment to development projects once conditions have gener- AQAP Subscribes to al Qaeda’s Doctrine. The campaign ally stabilized in the country. A key initiative must be plan assumes that AQAP will not pursue a sectarian repairing the damage to Yemen’s road networks, espe- strategy similar to the one that ISIS pursued in Iraq. cially bombed-out bridges in northern and central AQAP has labeled al Houthis as rafidhah and sees Iran Yemen. Other major infrastructure projects, such as as an enemy, but has not included the full Yemeni those focused on Yemen’s liquefied national gas sector, Zaydi population as a target set.

44 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Saudi Arabia and Its Coalition Partners Do Not Attempt risk becoming embroiled in the local fight should the to Seize Northern Yemen. There is an assumption that the frontline advance south again. Taiz would also need to Saudi Arabia–led coalition recognizes the high likelihood be secured fully before it became a good option, for that an attempt to seize territory in northern Yemen the same reasons. Ma’rib, which is centrally located, is would mobilize a strong resistance force against it and another possible location, but this positioning must be would bog down coalition efforts in Yemen. There are negotiated with local tribal powerbrokers, or the local strong anti-Saudi sentiments in northern Yemen, espe- groups might disrupt operations. Decisions about the cially in regions victimized by the air campaign, that locations of such facilities will dictate the scale of US will generate popular resistance to a Saudi presence. The forces required in Yemen itself. terrain itself is also difficult, leveling the playing field This proposed plan aims to keep US forces deployed between the guerilla fighter and equipped soldier. An to Yemen at the lowest possible levels consistent with attempt to seize northern Yemen is also an indicator that mission success and their ability to protect themselves. Saudi Arabia intends to defeat or destroy the al Houthi This is a situation that seems very likely to run a serious movement, which would likely prolong the conflict. risk of inflaming the population against a significant American deployment. Direct access from the sea and US Forces Required. The US must have operators on from Saudi Arabia can mitigate the requirements for a the ground for the plan to succeed, as the campaign large support presence in Yemen, although only a pro- plan requires US personnel to be operating on the fessional military planning staff can determine precisely ground outside of the chief of mission authority. The to what extent that is true. only unilateral actions envisioned for US personnel are direct-action operations against individual AQAP leaders or small groups. Otherwise, US personnel are Potential Enemy Responses to the First Phase to serve in advising and enabling functions alongside local forces. There is effectively no ground resistance to AQAP US Special Forces or clandestine services should be and ISIS at the time of writing, and they have been able to fulfill this role and maintain a low profile on the able to seize the various opportunities that the coun- ground. The estimated number of personnel depends try’s widespread conflict has given them. Putting directly on whether regional partners are able to com- American personnel on the ground introduces the mit personnel to assist in these roles, but is likely to be very present risk that the US will take casualties. in the low thousands. Both AQAP and ISIS will likely take advantage of The US had maintained a presence of about 125 the opportunity to kill or capture and then kill Amer- military trainers and advisers in al Anad military base icans in Yemen. These attacks could be designed to in until March 2015. These military raise the cost of involvement in Yemen for the US trainers worked to build Yemeni army unit capacity or to further embroil the US in Yemen. They could and to assist in crucial maintenance of Yemen’s Huey-II also be designed to create distrust between American helicopters. The mission laid out within the campaign personnel and partnered forces, as have the Taliban plan requires a more significant training presence, attacks in Afghanistan. likely on site or in proximity to many of the local mili- tia forces that are potential partners. This also requires Potential AQAP Responses. The launch of a counter- the US to maintain the capability to rapidly evacuate offensive against AQAP would significantly change the injured personnel should they come under fire, which ground dynamics and would prompt a reaction from calls for either an offshore US presence, say in southern AQAP. AQAP might consolidate its resources within Saudi Arabia, or at a Yemeni military base. its historical safe havens to fight for them, might go If the US were to establish a military headquar- on the offensive against groups collaborating with the ters inside of Yemen in Aden or al Anad, it would US, or might revert to focusing on the far war against

45 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

the West, which would probably demobilize potential attacks to undermine the political negotiations or tar- US partners. get those cooperating with the US, could attempt to spin the narrative to its own advantage, or could go to COA #1: Consolidate and Fight. AQAP could consol- ground to build strength during the counter-AQAP idate its resources within historical safe havens and campaign. fight for continued control. It would probably need to withdraw from positions in al Bayda, Lahij, and Aden COA #1: Conduct Strategic Attacks. ISIS could con- into strongholds in northeast and duct strategic attacks designed to undermine the , where it would probably be able political negotiations or to target those cooperating to work with the Awalek tribe. It could withdraw from with the US. It will probably continue to pursue its al Mukalla into remote locations in Hadramawt, to the bombing campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, north of Wadi Hadramawt. but there are opportunities to target political figures The terrain at these locations is fairly difficult, and on various sides of the negotiations whose removal the tribesmen in these locations within Abyan and would be a significant setback—Vice President Khaled Shabwah governorates would probably be hostile to for- Bahah or al Houthi leader Abdul Malik al Houthi, for eign forces. AQAP could make the fight against it a very example—and to stall talks. Like AQAP, ISIS could costly one, probably with the assessment that the US also opt to target collaborators with the US, although would not be willing to pay too high a cost for victory. ISIS would probably pursue a campaign of collective punishment against the communities from which col- COA #2: Campaign against Collaborators. AQAP could laborators are drawn rather than a targeted assassina- pursue a targeted campaign against individuals or tion campaign. groups who have partnered or collaborated with the US or US partners. The objective of this campaign would COA #2: Build the ISIS Narrative. ISIS could begin a be to break down support for the counter-AQAP fight. major media effort to brand its methods and strategy as A successful campaign by AQAP would significantly being on the path to success and to cast AQAP as hav- limit ability to prosecute the campaign plan, which ing failed. This media campaign would nest within the relies heavily on local forces for support. The campaign global campaign against al Qaeda that ISIS is currently could also be conducted in tandem with COA #1. running, which paints al Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al Zawahiri as having strayed from the true path. ISIS COA #3: Focus Only on the West. AQAP could shift to would be able to capitalize on AQAP setbacks to attract focusing its attacks exclusively on the West, reverting to recruits and to build its footprint in Yemen. the group that it was in 2007–08. Such a strategic de-es- calation with the Yemeni state and people would signifi- COA #3: Go to Ground. ISIS could also decide to go cantly increase the cost for the US to mobilize partnered to ground, a tactic that it has used successfully in Iraq forces against AQAP. It would also, however, divert before. This decision would give ISIS time to build its much of the AQAP-affiliated insurgency away from strength and to wait out the US-led military campaign. AQAP, accomplishing one of the main objectives of this strategy. It is unlikely that AQAP will pursue this COA. Strategic Mistakes to Avoid Potential ISIS Responses. The military aspects of the campaign plan focus on AQAP due to the threat and The US is caught in a trap in Yemen where it pri- maturity level of the group with the assumption that oritizes over all else the military fight against AQAP ISIS will increasingly become a law enforcement and and is willing to overlook a counterterrorism partner’s counterterrorism problem. This presents ISIS with shortfalls as long as that partner prosecutes that fight. opportunities that it might seize. ISIS could conduct Former Yemeni President Saleh ignored long-term

46 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

structural problems and legitimate popular grievances Investing in changing the conditions in Yemen will against him, with backing from the US, because he also reduce the risk that ISIS-linked cells develop and claimed to provide stability in Yemen. A popular upris- increase ISIS’s foothold. In addition to creating long- ing forced him to dedicate limited security resources term resiliency against jihadist groups in Yemen, the toward protecting his regime, which allowed AQAP US should ensure that its focus on the immediate to expand in 2011 and 2012. President Hadi came to threat from AQAP does not permit ISIS to grow. If left power and rolled back AQAP’s gains, but was incapa- unchecked, ISIS will absorb the remnants of AQAP ble of addressing those same grievances that led to the and could radically change Yemen’s trajectory by driv- current crisis today. ing sectarian war. The US must defeat both AQAP and The US risks falling into the same trap again. A ISIS to achieve success in Yemen. brokered settlement that resolves the current political Working through subnational actors would intro- crisis but does not include concrete plans to address duce a line of decision making that affects local dynam- the underlying structural grievances leaves the US ics, as the US and regional partners would strengthen vulnerable to a third collapsed partnership at a time forces and must be vigilant against strengthening rad- when the threat from both al Qaeda and ISIS is rising. ical elements. There is a concern in Yemen, however, The US must continue to push for structural reform that some of the subnational actors have been misla- in Yemen in order to begin changing the conditions beled. The Yemeni government was sometimes quick that allowed AQAP to grow in the first place. Chang- to call antigovernment actors AQAP supporters. The ing the man on top has only traded long-term gains US must take care not to conflate antigovernment against AQAP for short-term certainty about the exis- activity with support for AQAP and must also ensure tence of a partner on the ground. that its local partners are not radical elements.

47 CONCLUSION

here is no easy solution in Yemen. Al Qaeda in US policy decisions have also sacrificed potential Tthe Arabian Peninsula remains a threat to the US medium-to-long-term gains for short-term certainties. despite the group’s leadership losses. AQAP’s resiliency The decision to back the GCC Initiative that transi- comes from support networks it has developed within tioned Yemen into a post–Arab Spring is one such Yemen’s insurgency, and it is not possible to defeat AQAP example. The GCC Initiative secured the immediate through attrition. There is no government with which stability of the country and the preservation of a US to partner, nor is there an army to fight AQAP on the counterterrorism partnership over implementing fun- ground. Longstanding grievances that remained unad- damental changes to address the very grievances that dressed were the force that led to Yemen’s collapse and drove protesters to the streets in 2011 and that led to will continue to drive instability. The US must abandon Yemen’s collapse in 2015. its strategy predicated on a counterterrorism partnership The Yemen strategy and concept of operations and instead develop one that will address the underlying described in this report do include the risk of Ameri- grievances among the Yemini population. can casualties. The concept calls for Americans to be This report proposes an initial concept of how to pur- on the ground in some of the most dangerous parts sue US interests in Yemen after the country’s collapse. of Yemen at a time when both AQAP and ISIS are on American strategic interests remain limited: defeat AQAP the rise. But options that preclude American boots and create conditions to prevent the rise of like-minded on the ground are more likely to fail, and some may groups, de-escalate the growing Saudi-Iranian conflict in be more dangerous for the US in the long term. Yemen, and mitigate a humanitarian crisis. The concept The current strategy will not defeat AQAP or recognizes the role that Yemen’s political and military cri- ISIS, and the conditions that have allowed both to ses play in facilitating AQAP’s growth there and AQAP’s expand will remain. Full support for the Saudi-led role in the global al Qaeda network. It therefore calls for military intervention or switching to support the al a fundamental change in the US approach in Yemen— Houthis risks strengthening AQAP and plays into specifically, taking on the governance challenges as a core tense regional dynamics between Saudi Arabia and component to defeating AQAP. Iran. The recommendation offered here includes Such a paradigm shift requires changes in overall US US personnel deployed to Yemen, alongside part- policy and leadership decision making. There is gen- ner nations, to work directly with the aggrieved eral risk aversion in planning that seeks to maximize populations. the security of US government personnel abroad at all The efforts behind this report cannot duplicate or costs. These planning restrictions can limit US diplo- replace the efforts of the professional staffs needed to mats’ ability to engage with the Yemeni population and produce such strategies. But it is a call to action for identify causes of grievances. The US should once again the US to devote the resources required to produce a engage in expeditionary diplomacy, for which former political-military campaign plan in Yemen. The Yemen US ambassadors have voiced their support.155 model is broken. It is time to fix it.

48 GLOSSARY OF RELEVANT INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS, AND CONCEPTS

he following is a glossary of select individuals, bombing in Sana’a during Yemen’s Arab Spring and Tgroups, and concepts mentioned in the report. went to Saudi Arabia for treatment. Saleh returned to They are listed in alphabetical order. Yemen in September 2011 against Riyadh’s wishes and clung to power. The November 2011 GCC Initiative Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi transitioned power from Saleh to his deputy, Hadi, but Saleh maintained his informal influence and remained He is the internationally recognized president of the head of the ruling party. Saleh’s partnership with Yemen. Although a southerner born in Abyan gover- the al Houthis in 2014 and 2015 helped destabilize the norate, he was on the losing side of the 1986 civil war country.158 in the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and escaped to exile in northern Yemen. Hadi was a mili- Ansar Allah tary officer fighting against the south during Yemen’s 1994 civil war, after which he became President Ali See “Al Houthi Movement” entry. Abdullah Saleh’s vice president. Hadi came to power in November 2011 under the GCC Initiative and Ansar al Sharia was the sole candidate in a February 2012 presiden- tial election. Yemenis perceive Hadi as someone who See “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” entry. has pandered to the West and the GCC above fix- ing the multitude of social and economic problems Council of Sunni Scholars and al Jama’a in in Yemen. Hadi and his government are currently in Hadramawt exile in Riyadh.156 The council is comprised of Sunni theologians as well Abdul Malik al Houthi as prominent tribesmen. It seems to be amenable to working with AQAP. The council sought to exercise He is the leader of the al Houthi movement and is cur- governance over the entirety of Hadramawt governor- rently sanctioned by the US and the UN for engaging ate after the withdrawal of Yemeni troops from Hadra- in acts that threaten Yemen’s stability. Abdul Malik, a mawt and after the April 2, 2015, seizure of al Mukalla Zaydi, assumed leadership of the al Houthi movement by the Sons of Hadramawt. Sheikh Ahmed bin Hassan after the death of his brother, Hussein, in 2004. He is a bin Sudan al Mu’alim chairs the council.159 Zaydi Shi’a and a descendant of the Prophet Moham- med’s family (sayyid). He was born in the early 1980s General People’s Congress Party and little is known about his personal life.157 The GPC is the largest and most influential politi- Ali Abdullah Saleh cal party within Yemeni politics. Ali Abdullah Saleh founded the party in 1982, and it has served as a He is the former and is currently patronage mechanism for Saleh and a means for poli- sanctioned by the US and the UN for engaging in acts ticians to access power and resources. The GPC holds that threaten Yemen’s stability. Saleh, also known by a majority in the Yemeni legislature. Members orig- the monikers Affash and Little Saddam, is a Zaydi but inally backed Saleh in his support for the al Houthi not a sayyid. Saleh’s leadership style was one of man- movement in 2014–15, but a faction is now seeking aging Yemen’s tribal leaders and developing a personal to negotiate a political settlement with British, Amer- patronage network that ran through the main func- ican, and Emirati officials to withdraw support from tions of the state. He was the target of a June 2011 the al Houthis.160

49 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its leading members are prominent individuals within Yemen’s business and political elite. Saleh mobi- The GCC facilitated negotiations between Yemeni lized Hashidi tribes in Sa’ada to fight the al Houthis, stakeholders in 2011 to agree on a transition of power who had support among the larger but less power- from Saleh to Hadi. Saleh agreed to step down in ful Bakil tribal confederation, during the Sa’ada wars. November 2011, and stakeholders signed a two-year The al Ahmar family leads the Hashids but has been transition plan that called for a national dialogue (the significantly weakened since 2011. The Hashid tribal NDC), a referendum on a new constitution, presi- confederation stands in opposition to the al Houthi dential elections, and security sector reforms. Delays movement.164 plagued the process, and there were concerns among the opposition groups that the deal was fully managed Al Houthi Movement by Yemen’s political elite.161 The al Houthis are the de facto ruling faction in Hadhrami Domestic Council Yemen’s central government and are now widely per- ceived as having substantial Iranian backing. The The group, also known as the Hadramawt National group’s political party, Ansar Allah, was established in Council and the Hadramawt People’s Council, is a pro- the post–Arab Spring environment. The movement AQAP group established on April 13, 2015, to govern traces its roots to a Zaydi revivalist movement in the al Mukalla. It is linked to the Sons of Hadramawt. The 1990s. It is led by the al Houthi family, from which the council is comprised of various tribal chiefs, theolo- movement’s name came, and militarized increasingly gians, academics, engineers, and other members of civil between 2004 and 2010 during the Sa’ada wars. Stated society within the city. It provides domestic services al Houthi objectives include reparations for the damage such as the payment of salaries and the distribution of during the Sa’ada wars, representation within the cen- fuel to its citizens.162 tral government, and guarantees that the group will be protected from future political and economic marginal- Hadramawt Tribal Confederacy ization. Not all Zaydi Shi’a in Yemen identify with the al Houthi movement.165 The group, also known as the Hadramawt Tribal Alli- ance, is a military and security alliance established on Islah Party July 4, 2013, between prominent Hadhrami tribes. It seeks to provide security for the governorate and for the The Yemeni Congregation for Reform party, com- oil infrastructure. It is antigovernment and anti-AQAP monly referred to as Islah (Reform), is the second- and has publicly rejected both the Sons of Hadramawt largest political party in Yemen after the GPC. The and the Council of Sunni Scholars and al Jama’a in late Hashid tribal confederation leader Sheikh Abdul- Hadramawt, which are seen as a threat to the security lah bin Hussein al Ahmar founded the party in 1990 of Hadramawt governorate.163 and chaired it until his death in 2007. The party united Yemen’s Salafists under Sheikh Abdul Majid al Zin- Hashid Tribal Confederation dani, the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood branch, and the Hashid tribal confederation. Islah was empowered Yemeni tribal confederations are loose groupings, and after the 2011 Arab Spring in Yemen but lost influence member tribal interests supersede those of the confed- as the Hashid Tribal Confederation weakened. It orig- eration. The Hashid tribal confederation is the most inally attempted to appease the al Houthis and now powerful of three major tribal confederations in Yemen stands in opposition to the group.166

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Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham regions, which was rejected immediately by certain parties.169 This group—also known as the Islamic State, ISIS, and Daesh—is the successor organization of al Qaeda in Iraq, Operations Decisive Storm, Restoring Hope, an al Qaeda affiliate that pursued a brutal and sectarian and Golden Arrow strategy during the 2003 . ISIS seized control of western Iraq and eastern Syria and proclaimed an Saudi Arabia led a coalition of nine Arab states in a Islamic caliphate on June 29, 2014, naming its leader, military intervention in Yemen, supported by the US. Abu Bakr Baghdadi, as caliph and “commander of the Operation Decisive Storm began on March 26, 2015, faithful” (emir al mu’mineen). ISIS pursues a strategy with airstrikes targeting al Houthi positions. The coali- of simultaneous military victory and governance that tion also ran naval patrols to interdict arms shipments to builds the infrastructure of the state while expanding the al Houthis. The Saudi Defense Ministry announced on the ground. ISIS calls for all Muslims to swear alle- the start of Operation Restoring Hope on April 21, giance to the caliph and has been actively expanding 2015, announcing the elimination of the threat from al throughout Muslim-majority lands.167 Houthi access to ballistic and heavy weaponry. Opera- tion Restoring Hope was framed in a humanitarian con- Nasser al Wahayshi text, although the contours of the military operations changed little. Operation Golden Arrow is a joint Sau- He is the late emir of AQAP and general manager for al di-UAE ground offensive that began in mid-July along- Qaeda global. Wahayshi, also known as Abu Basir Abdul side newly trained Yemeni militia forces. The UAE Karim al Wahayshi, served as Osama bin Laden’s personal deployed a brigade to Yemen with a battalion-sized con- secretary from 1998 until 2001, when he was arrested in tingent of tanks and armored vehicles alongside Saudi Iran after fleeing Afghanistan. Iran extradited Wahayshi special forces and the Yemeni troops.170 to Yemen in 2003. Wahayshi escaped a Sana’a prison in February 2006 along with 22 other al Qaeda members, Peace and National Partnership Agreement including Qasim al Raymi, and was named the head of al Qaeda in Yemen in June 2007. Wahayshi became al The Hadi government signed this agreement with the Qaeda’s general manager in 2013. He was killed by a US al Houthis and the Southern Movement on Septem- airstrike on June 9, 2015, in al Mukalla.168 ber 21, 2014, after the al Houthis besieged Sana’a. The PNPA called for a new caretaker government within National Dialogue Conference a month and obligated the government to expand the Shura Council, the upper body of Parliament, to The 2011 GCC Initiative mandated that Yemen hold include additional representatives from opposition the NDC, which was to be the forum for opposition parties. The al Houthis refused to sign the annex that groups to voice and address their grievances. The 2013 called for the normalization of activities in Amran, al NDC included 565 delegates from across Yemen’s Jawf, and Ma’rib governorates. The international com- political spectrum, including the al Houthis and the munity originally backed the PNPA, seeing it as a way Southern Movement. The hardest issues to resolve— forward in Yemen, but is now calling for a return to the how to decentralize and federalize the state—caused GCC Initiative and the NDC outcomes.171 NDC progress to stall. Hadi established special com- mittees, such as the North-South committee (the Popular Resistance Movement “8+8”), to hash out an agreement known as the Just Solution. That document did not face full review by Local Yemeni populations mobilized against the al the NDC. A second special committee, hand-picked Houthi–Saleh alliance in 2015. These forces became by Hadi, passed a proposal for a federal state with six known as the popular resistance movement. They do not

51 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

operate under a unified command and do not fight for Sons of Hadramawt the same objectives. Some simply fight to prevent outsid- ers from gaining control of their territory. Others seek the The AQAP-linked group seized control of al Mukalla reinstatement of Hadi’s government. The Saudi-led­ coa- on April 2, 2015. It maintains control over the city of lition is backing the local popular resistance militias.172 al Mukalla and runs a religious police unit. It has dele- gated governance and the provision of civil services to 176 Al Qaeda Core the HDC.

Al Qaeda’s current emir, Ayman al Zawahiri, directly Southern Movement commands al Qaeda core, based in Pakistan, and the al Qaeda senior leaders dispersed throughout the This is a movement within the territory of the former Muslim-majority world that report to Zawahiri or his People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen that began in deputies. The rise of ISIS has challenged al Qaeda glob- 2007. The Southern Movement, also known as al Hirak ally, and it must now compete for continued relevance and al Harakat al Janubiyya, has never been unified within the global jihadist movement.173 and began with demands for reparations following the destruction of southern Yemen during Yemen’s 1994 Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula civil war. The idea of secession from northern Yemen is growing in popularity. Member groups vary in charac- Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen has attempted multiple ter from political to militant. The movement is currently attacks against American interests. Al Qaeda’s branches in fighting alongside Saudi-led coalition forces, but may Yemen and Saudi Arabia merged in 2009 to form AQAP, not support the Hadi government over the long term.177 bringing together a deep bench of veteran al Qaeda oper- atives. In addition to attacks against the US, AQAP tar- UN Resolutions on Yemen geted Saudi government officials and members of the Yemeni military and government. It fielded an insur- The UN passed UNSCR 2140 on February 26, 2014, gent force, Ansar al Sharia, in 2011, which seized con- which established a sanctions regime against individ- trol of parts of south Yemen and is reconstituting control uals or entities designated as having engaged in or over some of the same territory during the current crisis. supported “acts that threaten the peace, security or sta- AQAP controls territory in Hadramawt and has ties to bility of Yemen.” As of April 14, 2015, five individuals local groups such as the Sons of Hadramawt.174 were sanctioned under UNSCR 2140. UNSCR 2216, passed on April 14, 2015, imposed an arms embargo Qasim al Raymi on the designated individuals and entities and called for the al Houthis to withdraw from seized territory, He was appointed AQAP emir on June 16, 2015, and including Yemen’s capital, and disarm.178 was previously AQAP’s military commander. Raymi, also known as Abu Hurayrah al Sana’ani and Abu Zaydi Shi’ism Ammar, trained at the al Qaeda–run al Farouq camp in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and reportedly met About 35 percent of Yemen’s population is Zaydi, con- bin Laden there. Yemeni security forces arrested him on centrated in Yemen’s northwest. Zaydis, also known as terrorism charges in 2002. Raymi escaped in February Fivers, are among the closest Shi’a to the Sunni sect. 2006, along with Nasser al Wahayshi and 21 other al They believe that the only legitimate rulers are those Qaeda members. Raymi appeared in AQAP’s founding who are sayyids. The last Zaydi imamate was the Mut- video in January 2009 alongside Wahayshi. Raymi is awakkilite Kingdom in Yemen, which existed between known for his ability to recruit new operatives and is a 1918 and 1962 and extended briefly into parts of what member of AQAP’s senior leadership.175 is now southwestern Saudi Arabia.179

52 NOTES

1. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by Press, 2012), 217; and Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, Regime the President on the Situation in Iraq,” press release, June 19, and Periphery in Northern Yemen. 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/19/ 13. Thom Shanker and Robert F. Worth, “Yemen Seizes Sail- remarks-president-situation-iraq. boat Filled with Weapons, and U.S. Points to Iran,” New York 2. Katherine Zimmerman, “The Yemen Model Won’t Times, January 29, 2013. Work in Iraq, Syria,” Washington Post, July 17, 2014. 14. See Alexis Knutsen, “Yemen’s Counter-Terrorism Quan- 3. Katherine Zimmerman, “Recipe for Failure: American dary,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, June 26, 2014, www. Strategy toward Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Penin- criticalthreats.org/yemen/knutsen-houthi-counterterrorism- sula,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, February 17, 2012, www. quandary-june-26-2014; and Alexis Knutsen, “The al Houthi criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-recipe-for-failure- Victory in Amran,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, July 9, american-strategy-february-17-2012. 2014, www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/knutsen-al-houthi- 4. Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda in Yemen: Counter victory-amran-july-09-2014. the Threat from the Arabian Peninsula,” AEI’s Critical Threats 15. Alexis Knutsen, “Sana’a under Siege: Yemen’s Uncertain Project, October 19, 2012, www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/ Future,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, September 25, 2014, zimmerman-qaeda-yemen-countering-threat-arabian- www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/knutsen-sanaa-under- peninsula-october-19-2012. siege-yemens-uncertain-future-september-25-2014. 5. Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda Threat to American 16. This information derives from conversations between the Interests,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, August 5, 2013, author and American officials about the US relationship with www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/zimmerman/al-qaeda- the al Houthis. threat-to-american-interests-august-5-2013. 17. UN Security Council, “Security Council 2140 Sanctions 6. Katherine Zimmerman, “Yemen Protests: U.S. Policy in Committee Designates Three Individuals as Subject to Assets Crisis,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, March 23, 2011, www. Freeze, Travel Ban,” press release, November 7, 2014, www. criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-protests-us-policy- un.org/press/en/2014/sc11636.doc.htm. crisis-march-23-2011. 18. The al Houthis seized al Hudaydah port city and then 7. For analysis of what the conclusion of the NDC meant at pushed south in an attempt to secure Taiz city, Yemen’s the time, see Katherine Zimmerman, “Yemen’s Pivotal third-largest city, and east in an attempt to secure Ma’rib, Moment,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, February 12, 2014, which hosts key petroleum infrastructure. See Katherine Zim- www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-yemens- merman, “Al Houthi Areas of Influence,” AEI’s Critical pivotal-moment-february-12-2014. Threats Project, January 27, 2015, www.criticalthreats.org/ 8. Katherine Zimmerman and Chris Harnisch, “Profile: Al yemen/al-houthi-areas-influence. Houthi Movement,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, January 19. Alexis Knutsen, “2015 Yemen Crisis Situation Report: 28, 2010, www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/profile-al-houthi- February 23,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, February 23, movement. 2015, www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-situation- 9. Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the reports-february-23-2015; and Alexis Knutsen and Daniel Mountains of Yemen (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007). O’Keefe, “2015 Yemen Crisis Situation Report: March 25,” 10. Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, AEI’s Critical Threats Project, March 25, 2015, www. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phe- criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-situation-reports- nomenon (RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010), march-25-2015. www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/ 20. Alexis Knutsen, “2015 Yemen Crisis Situation Report: RAND_MG962.pdf. March 27,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, March 27, 2015, 11. Ibid. www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-situation- 12. Stephen W. Day, and Rebellion in Yemen: A reports-march-27-2015. Troubled National Union (New York: Cambridge University 21. Frederick W. Kagan, “Beyond Nuclear: The Increasing

53 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

Threat from Iran,” testimony before the House Committee on for-yemen. Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonprolifera- 30. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement tion, and Trade, February 11, 2015, www.aei.org/publication/ by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on the Death of Al-Qa’ida in beyond-nuclear-increasing-threat-iran. the Arabian Peninsula Leader Nasir al-Wahishi,” press release, 22. Ethan Bronner and Michael Slackman, “Saudi Troops June 16, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/ Enter Bahrain to Help Put Down Unrest,” New York Times, 06/16/statement-nsc-spokesperson-ned-price-death-al March 14, 2011. -qa%E2%80%99ida-arabian-peninsula. 23. Adam Baron, “Yemen: Fragility Underlies UN-Backed 31. “AQAP Announces Death of High-Ranking Official Peace Deal,” BBC, September 22, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/ Ibrahim al-Rubeish,” SITE Intelligence Group, April 14, world-middle-east-29311728. 2015; “AQAP Announces Killing of Senior Official Nasser bin 24. “Houthi Group Announced the Formation of ‘Revolu- Ali al-Ansi in Airstrike,” SITE Intelligence Group, May 7, tionary Committees’ in Yemeni Governorates (Text of State- 2015; “Jihadists Report AQAP Capturing Spy, Former Mem- ment),” Al Masdar Online, October 31, 2014, http:// ber of Pro-IS Group,” SITE Intelligence Group, May 29, almasdaronline.com/article/63489. 2015; and Iona Craig, “The Life and Death of an al Qaeda 25. On December 8, 2014, IRGC Deputy Commander Spokesman,” The Intercept, April 29, 2015, http://firstlook. Brigadier General Hossein Salami said of the al Houthis that org/theintercept/2015/04/29/life-death-al-qaeda-spokesman/. “The forces of Ansar Allah that have been formed in Yemen 32. Katherine Zimmerman, “One-Two Punch of al . . . shows the potential the Islamic Revolution has to re-take Wahayshi and Belmokhtar Will Have Little Effect on Muslim lands from Western powers.” See “Ansar Allah of Defeating al Qaeda,” AEIdeas, June 16, 2015, www.aei.org/ Yemen is Similar to the Hezbollah of Lebanon/There Is No publication/one-two-punch-of-al-wahayshi-and-belmokhtar- Threatening Look toward Iran Even in the Dreams of Military will-have-little-effect-on-defeating-al-qaeda/. Powers,” Defa Press, December 6, 2014, www.defapress.ir/Fa/ 33. Katherine Zimmerman, “The Next Chapter in Yemen’s News/35605. Military Offensive,” AEIdeas, May 9, 2014, www.aei.org/ 26. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier Gen- publication/the-next-chapter-in-yemens-military-offensive/. eral Esmail Ghani stated that “defenders of Yemen,” likely a 34. Saleh’s forces probably facilitated the al Houthi takeover direct reference to the al Houthis, had been trained by Iranian of Sana’a in September 2014, although there was no real fight forces. See “Iran News Round Up May 26, 2015,” AEI’s for control of the city then. IranTracker, May 26, 2015, www.irantracker.org/iran-news- 35. See Shuaib Almosawa and Ben Hubbard, “Saudi Bomb- round-may-26-2015; and “Houthis Receiving Syria Training,” ing Only Fans Yemen Flames,” New York Times, June 24, Now Media, March 9, 2015, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/ 2015. NewsReports/564939-houthis-receiving-syria-training. 36. Amnesty International has documented some of the al 27. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement Houthi activity targeting Islahis. See “Yemen: Opposition Tar- by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in geted, Detained Arbitrarily and Kidnapped by Huthis and Yemen,” press release, March 25, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/ Saleh-Loyalists,” Amnesty International, May 18, 2015, www. the-press-office/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson- amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/1686/2015/en/. bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen. 37. Information on al Houthi military activities in Sa’ada 28. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement and northern Yemen is limited; the area has never had good by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Conclusion formal or informal media penetration, and the al Houthis gen- of Operation Decisive Storm,” press release, April 22, 2015, erally control access into their heartland. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/22/ 38. Bassam al Khameri, “Houthi Military Exercises Con- statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-conclusion- tinue Near Saudi Border,” Yemen Times, March 16, 2015, operation-decisi. www.yementimes.com/en/1868/news/4972/Houthi-mili- 29. Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP Jailbreak Is Just Another tary-exercises-continue-near-Saudi-border.htm. Problem for Yemen,” AEIdeas, April 2, 2015, www.aei.org/ 39. “Yemeni Forces Fire Scud Missile at Saudi Arabia,” Reu- publication/aqap-jailbreak-is-just-another-problem- ters, June 6, 2015, www..com/article/2015/06/06/

54 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

yemen-security-saudi-idUSKBN0OM06120150606; and Hobbled in Terror Fight,” New York Times, March 23, 2015; “Yemeni Forces Launch Scud Missile at Saudi Arabia: Yemen and “US Evacuates Troops from South Yemen Base: Military Military Spokesman,” Reuters, June 30, 2015, www.reuters. Source,” Agence France-Presse, March 21, 2015, http://news. com/article/2015/06/29/us-yemen-security-missile- yahoo.com/us-evacuates-troops-south-yemen-military- idUSKCN0P92T620150629. source-165916275.html. 40. The momentum may be shifting as key tribes, including 48. Katherine Zimmerman, “2015 Yemen Crisis Situation the Ans and Anisi, rise up against the al Houthis. See Moham- Report: July 15,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, July 15, 2015, med al Muntasir, Twitter, August 4, 2014, https://twitter.com/ www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-situation- arabianofelix/status/628673553727135744. reports-july-15-2015. 41. Peter Salisbury, “Yemen’s Economy: Oil, Imports and 49. Joshua Koontz, “Yemen Crisis Situation Report: August Elites,” Chatham House, October 2011, www.chathamhouse. 10,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, August 10, 2015, www. org/sites/files/chathamhouse/1011pp_yemeneconomy.pdf; criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-situation-reports- and Jeremy Sharp, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations august-10-2015. (Congressional Research Service, February 11, 2015), www. 50. Ibid. fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf. 51. “Gulf of Aden Security Review—August 14, 2015,” 42. The ability to distribute oil from Salif port would enable AEI’s Critical Threats Project, August 14, 2015, www. the al Houthis to use the pipeline that runs from Ma’rib to criticalthreats.org/gulf-aden-security-review/gulf-aden- Hudaydah and to avoid reliance on southern distribution cen- security-review-august-14-2015. ters, such as Aden or Belhaf. See “President of the Supreme 52. Katherine Zimmerman, “Insurgency in Yemen: The Revolutionary Committee Chaired a Meeting on the Work of New Challenge to American Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” the Ministries,” SABA News Agency, August 1, 2015, www. AEI’s Critical Threats Project, March 19, 2012, www. sabanews.net/ar/news400829.htm. criticalthreats.org/yemen/insurgency-yemen-american-counter- 43. Salisbury, “Yemen’s Economy.” terrorism-strategy-march-19-2012. 44. Knutsen and O’Keefe, “2015 Yemen Crisis Situation 53. Ali Ibrahim al Moshki, “Ongoing Houthi-AQAP Report”; and Zimmerman, “Al Houthi Areas of Influence.” Fighting in Rada’a,” Yemen Times, October 21, 2014, www. 45. See Sasha Gordon, “Taiz: The Heart of Yemen’s Revolu- yementimes.com/en/1826/news/4463/Ongoing-Houthi- tion,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, January 12, 2012, www. AQAP-fighting-in-Rada%E2%80%99a.htm. criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-taiz-heart-yemen-revolu- 54. Sasha Gordon, “Tribal Militias in Yemen: Al Bayda and tion-january-12-2012; and Charles Caris, “Yemen Order of Shabwah,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, February 7, 2013, Battle,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, February 23, 2015, www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-tribal-militias-yemen- www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/caris-yemen-order- al-bayda-and-shabwah-february-7-2013. battle-february-23-2015. 55. Information derives from a forthcoming report from 46. “Central Areas Announce the Formation of a Council of Joshua Koontz of AEI’s Critical Threats Project. Resistance and Choose al Da’am as Head and Leader of It,” Al 56. Taimur Khan, “Kerry Reassures GCC over Iran Nuclear Masdar Online, August 6, 2015, http://almasdaronline.net/ Deal,” The National, March 5, 2015, www.thenational.ae/ article/74099. world/kerry-reassures-gcc-over-iran-nuclear-deal. 47. There were about 125 US military advisers based in al 57. J. Matthew McInnis, “Iran Tracker Blog: Iran’s Danger- Anad at the time. They were there in a training and advising ous Calculations on the Sea,” AEIdeas, April 28, 2015, www. capacity for the Yemeni military forces. The withdrawal aei.org/publication/irans-dangerous-calculations-on-the-sea. occurred on the same day as the first ISIS attack in Yemen, 58. Eric Schmitt and Robert F. Worth, “With Arms for which may have been a contributing factor. The author’s con- Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mideast Role,” New York versations with US defense personnel revealed that the Special Times, March 15, 2011; and Andrew Hammond, “South Operations Forces advisers were not able to meet their mission Yemen Separatists See New Chance After Saleh’s Demise,” in Yemen because of the fractured nature of the Yemeni armed Reuters, October 11, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/ forces by that time. See Eric Schmitt, “Out of Yemen, U.S. is 11/us-yemen-south--idUSBRE89A14M20121011.

55 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

59. Yara Bayoumy and Mohammed Ghobari, “Iranian Sup- wishes. Yemen’s strategic location in the region and influence is port Seen Crucial for Yemen’s Houthis,” Reuters, December necessary for the promotion and enhancement of the condi- 15, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/15/us-yemen- tion of the region.” See “Iran’s Welcoming of the Agreement in houthis-iran-insight-idUSKBN0JT17A20141215. Yemen,” Alef, September 22, 2014, http://alef.ir/ 60. Danya Greenfield, “Reading the Saudi Tea Leaves in vdcjy8e8ouqexmz.fsfu.html?242608; and “The Oppressed Yemen,” MENASource, December 10, 2014, www. and Learned People Are the Main Victors in Yemen/ atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/reading-saudi-tea- Appreciating the Role of the United Nations in Convincing leaves-in-yemen. the Government to Accept the Demands of the People,” Mehr 61. Salisbury, “Yemen’s Astonishing Financial Meltdown,” News Agency, September 23, 2014, www.mehrnews.com/ Foreign Policy, December 11, 2014, http://foreignpolicy. news/2375920/. com/2014/12/11/yemens-astonishing-financial-meltdown/. 64. Mohammed Ghobari, “Yemen Frees Members of Iran 62. On December 11, 2014, Yemen’s minister of electricity Revolutionary Guards—Sources,” Reuters, September 25, discussed with the Russian ambassador to Yemen the possibil- 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/25/uk-yemen-iran- ity of establishing a power station in Aden to be run by a Rus- idUKKCN0HK1K320140925. sian company. Yemen Prime Minster Khaled al Bahah also met 65. IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali with a Russian delegation to discuss improving economic ties Jafari was discussing the Islamic Revolution at a memorial ser- between the two countries on December 11, 2014. Bahah met vice for the Iran-Iraq war and said: “If the Islamic Revolution’s with Iran’s ambassador to Sana’a, Sayed Ali, to discuss future thoughts of resistance were not exported to Iraq, Syria, and cooperation in political, economic, and commercial fields on Lebanon, the destiny of these countries would be unclear. The January 2, 2015, and Iran’s ambassador to Yemen, Hossein would not have succeeded without this Niknam, met with the Aden governor to discuss investment thought.” See “Qassem Soleimani Has Become a Thorn in the opportunities in Aden port on January 1, 2015. Iran and Rus- Enemy’s Eye and Everyone Acknowledges the Role of this sia continued to discuss Yemen’s economic situation through- Mujahid in Iraq and Syria,” Tasnim News Agency, November out Spring 2015. Iranian Arab and African Affairs Deputy to 26, 2014. the Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed 66. “Yemen, Iran Sign MoU in Air Transport Field,” SABA Yemen in a May 2015 phone call with his Russian counterpart. News Agency, February 28, 2015, www.sabanews.net/en/ See “Power Plant To Be Established in Aden,” SABA News news389716.htm. Agency, December 11, 2014, www.sabanews.net/en/ 67. Brian Rohan and Ahmed al Haj, “Rival Yemeni Camps news379590.htm; “Yemen, Russia Discuss Improving Eco-� Entrench as Iran Flights Arrive,” , March 1, nomic Relations,” SABA News Agency, December 12, 2014, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/first-iran-flight-arrives-rebel- www.sabanews.net/en/news379608.htm; “Yemen, Iran Dis-� held-yemeni-capital-112941975.html. cuss Mutual Relations Improvement,” SABA News Agency, 68. Michelle Nichols, “Yemen Asks U.N. to Back Military January 2, 2015, www.sabanews.net/en/news382694.htm; Action by ‘Willing Countries,’” Reuters, March 24, 2015, “Yemen, Iran Review Available Investments in Aden,” SABA www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/24/us-yemen-security-un- News Agency, January 1, 2015, www.sabanews.net/en/ idUSKBN0MK2OP20150324; “Brigadier General Ahmed al news382546.htm; and “Iran, Russia Discuss Yemen Develop�- Asiri: ‘Decisive Storm’ Achieved the Objectives of the First ment,” SABA News Agency, May 8, 2015, www.sabanews. Phase of Operations,” Saudi Press Agency, March 26, 2015, net/en/news395317.htm. www.spa.gov.sa/viewphotonews.php?id=1342779&pic=; and 63. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marziyeh “Statement of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bah- Afkham welcomed the PNPA on September 22, 2014, as did rain, , and ,” Website of the Cooperation Council Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani for the Arab States of the Gulf, March 26, 2015, www.gcc- on September 23, 2014. Shamkhani called the PNPA a path sg.org/indexce3b.html?action=News&Sub=ShowOne& toward reconciliation, saying, “Military cooperation and gov- ID=3753&T=A. ernance reforms in the public interest has created hope. This 69. The initial objective of the air campaign appeared to be country continues to move in the direction of fulfilling its to force the al Houthis into a position of weakness to bring

56 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

them to the negotiating table. It is not clear whether there was Abdulmalik al Houthi,” press release, April 14, 2015, www. a contingency plan should the primary plan fail to meet this un.org/sc/committees/2140/YEi004.shtml; UN Security objective. Council, “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Yei.005 70. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh,” press release, April 14, 2015, Affairs, “Yemen: Escalating Conflict Situation Report No. 3 www.un.org/sc/committees/2140/YEi005.shtml; and UN (as of 10 April 2015),” Relief Web, April 10, 2015, www. Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015), April 14, 2015, reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-escalating-conflict- www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B- situation-report-no-3-10-april-2015. 6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2216.pdf. 71. “Leader of the Coalition Countries: In Response to a 78. Joe Lauria and Margaret Coker, “Former U.N. Envoy Request from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the Mil- Says Yemen Political Deal Was Close before Saudi Airstrikes itary Operation ‘Decisive Storm’ Concludes at the End of the Began,” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2015, www.wsj.com/ Day and the Second and Final Operation ‘Restoring Hope’ articles/former-u-n-envoy-says-yemen-political-deal-was- Begins,” Saudi Arabia Press Agency, April 20, 2015, www.spa. close-before-saudi-airstrikes-began-1430081791. gov.sa/details.php?id=1352508. 79. Nina Larson and Abhik Chanda, “‘No Agreement’ as 72. J. Matthew McInnis, “Iran Tracker Blog: What Does Yemen Peace Talks End in Geneva,” Agence France-Presse, Iran Really Want in Yemen?” AEIdeas, April 14, 2015, www. June 19, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/un-appeals-1-6bn- aei.org/publication/what-does-iran-really-want-in-yemen. war-ravaged-yemen-133253287.html. 73. Mehrdad Moarefian, “Iran’s Mohsen Rezai Writes Open 80. United Nations, “Statement Attributable to the Letter to Yemen’s Abdul Malik al Houthi,” AEI’s Critical Spokesman for the Secretary-General on Yemen,” July 9, Threats Project, March 30, 2015, www.criticalthreats.org/ 2015, www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8814; Som-� yemen/moarefian-mohsen-rezaei-writes-letter-to-abdul- ini Sengupta, “Yemen Truce Deal is Reached, U.N. Says,” malik-al-houthi-march-30-2015. New York Times, July 9, 2015; and Michelle Nichols, “U.N. 74. McInnis, “Iran Tracker Blog: Iran’s Dangerous Calcula- Chief Disappointed Yemen Humanitarian Pause in Fighting tions on the Sea.” Didn’t Take Hold,” Reuters, July 13, 2015, www.reuters. 75. Jonathan Saul, “Iran’s Yemen-Bound Aid Ship Docks in com/article/2015/07/13/us-yemen-security-un- Djibouti, WFP to Deliver Aid Cargo,” Reuters, May 22, 2015, idUSKCN0PN20220150713. www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/22/us-iran-ship-djibouti- 81. “Oman Offers Seven-Point Peace Plan for Yemen,” Al idUSKBN0O72BG20150522. Araby, April 24, 2015, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/ 76. Mehrdad Moarefian, “Why Is Iran’s Former Police Chief 4/24/oman-offers-seven-point-peace-plan-for-yemen. Heading a Humanitarian Mission in Yemen?” AEIdeas, July 82. Jay Solomon and Asa Fitch, “U.S. Met Secretly with 17, 2015, www.aei.org/publication/why-is-irans-former- Yemen Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2015, www.wsj. police-chief-heading-a-humanitarian-mission-in-yemen. com/articles/u-s-citizen-held-hostage-in-yemen-released-by- 77. UN Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014), February houthi-rebels-1433178829. 26, 2015, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/ 83. Fahad al Mukrashi, “Al Houthi Delegation ‘Arrives in RES/2140%20(2014); UN Security Council, “Narrative Oman to Discuss Yemen Crisis,’” Gulf News, May 24, 2015, Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Yei.001 Abd al-Khaliq al http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/oman/al-houthi- Huthi,” press release, November 7, 2014, www.un.org/ delegation-arrives-in-oman-to-discuss-yemen-crisis- sc/committees/2140/YEi001.shtml; UN Security Council, 1.1520864. “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Yei.002 Abdul- 84. Sam Wilkin and Fatma Alarimi, “Iran, Oman Discuss lah Yahya al Hakim,” press release, November 7, 2014, www. Yemen War, Settle Maritime Borders,” Reuters, May 26, 2015, un.org/sc/committees/2140/YEi002.shtml; UN Security www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/26/us-yemen-security- Council, “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Yei.003 iran-oman-idUSKBN0OB1SF20150526. Ali Abdullah Saleh,” press release, November 7, 2014, www. 85. “Muscat is Sponsoring Talks between the al Houthis and un.org/sc/committees/2140/YEi003.shtml; UN Security Southern Leaders,” Barakish.net, June 24, 2015, http:// Council, “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Yei.004 barakish.net/news02.aspx?cat=12&sub=23&id=324989.

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86. There is little evidence of UAE officials discussing this Rebels Willing to Withdraw from Key Yemen Cities,” VICE course of action with Ahmed Saleh. The Saleh family was agi- News, August 12, 2015, https://news.vice.com/article/ tating for power in Yemen in Winter 2015, though. See “UAE exclusive-un-source-says-houthi-rebels-willing-to-withdraw- Website: Son of Deposed President Saleh Will Assume Yemen’s from-key-yemen-cities. Presidency,” , February 2, 2015, www. 91. “Iran to Hold Direct Talks with Gulf Countries ‘In Sep- middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/16716-uae- tember,’” Gulf News, August 14, 2015, http://gulfnews.com/ website-son-of-deposed-president-saleh-will-assume-yemens- news//iran/iran-to-hold-direct-talks-with-gulf- presidency; and Ali Aboluhom, “Supporters of Ahmed Saleh countries-in-september-1.1566472. Call on Him to Run for President,” Yemen Times, March 92. “The Saudi-Led Coalition Exploits Success,” Stratfor, 11, 2015, www.yementimes.com/en/1867/photoessay/4958/ August 11, 2015, www.stratfor.com/analysis/saudi-led- Supporters-of-Ahmed-Saleh-call-on-him-to-run-for-president. coalition-exploits-success. htm. 93. Zakaria al Kamali and Sufian Jubran, “Abdullah Saleh 87. Ali Ibrahim al Moshki, “UAE Revokes Ahmed Ali Saleh’s for ‘Huffington Post Arabic’: All My Enemies are in Saudi Diplomatic Immunity,” Yemen Times, April 8, 2015, www. Arabia,” Huffington Post Arabic, August 3, 2015,www. yementimes.com/en/1875/news/5044/UAE-revokes- huffpostarabi.com/2015/08/03/story_n_7922106.html. Ahmed-Ali-Saleh%E2%80%99s-diplomatic-immunity.htm; 94. Katherine Zimmerman, “Testimony: AQAP’s Role in Katherine Zimmerman, “2015 Yemen Crisis Situation Report: the al Qaeda Network,” testimony before the House Commit- August 3,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, August 3, 2015, tee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterror- www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-situation- ism and Intelligence, September 18, 2013, www.criticalthreats. reports-august-3-2015; Peter Salisbury and Simeon Kerr, org/al-qaeda/zimmerman-testimony-aqaps-role-al-qaeda- “UAE Flexes Military Muscle alongside Saudis in Yemen,” network-september-18-2013. Financial Times, August 11, 2015, www.ft.com/cms/s/ 95. Chris Harnisch, “Christmas Day Attack: Manifestation 0/145e180c-3d04-11e5-8613-07d16aad2152.html; and of AQAP Shift Targeting America,” AEI’s Critical Threats Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello, “The Saudi-UAE Project, December 29, 2009, www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/ War Effort in Yemen (Part 1): Operation Golden Arrow in christmas-day-attack-manifestation-aqap-shift-targeting- Aden,” Washington Institute, August 10, 2015, www. america. washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-saudi-uae- 96. Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP and the ‘Parcel Plot’: war-effort-in-yemen-part-1-operation-golden-arrow-in-aden. Assessing this Critical Threats,” AEIdeas, November 5, 2010, 88. “Arab Coalition Will Continue to Back Yemen,” Emir- www.aei.org/publication/aqap-and-the-parcel-plot-assessing- ates 24/7, August 3, 2015, www.emirates247.com/news/ this-critical-threat/. government/arab-coalition-will-continue-to-back- 97. Sudarsan Raghavan, Peter Finn, and Greg Miller, “In yemen-2015-08-03-1.599038; and “UAE Reiterates Support Foiled Bomb Plot, AQAP Took Bait Dangled by Saudi Infor- to Yemen,” Khaleej Times, August 4, 2015, www.khaleejtimes. mant,” Washington Post, May 9, 2012. com/nation/government/arab-coalition-will-work-to- 98. Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda Threat to American Interests.” help-yemeni-people-mohammed-bin-zayed. 99. See Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian 89. “UN Envoy to Meet Representatives of Ousted Yemeni Peninsula: Leaders and their Networks,” AEI’s Critical Threats President, Houthis in Muscat,” Middle East Monitor, August Project, September 27, 2012, slides 11–12, www. 8, 2015, www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/ criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-aqap-leaders- 20301-un-envoy-to-meet-representatives-of-ousted-yemeni- and-networks-september-27-2012. president-houthis-in-muscat; and “Yemen Alert: Seize the 100. Michael Crowley, “Beware ‘Underwear 2’: TSA Chief Chance to End the Conflict,” International Crisis Group, Offers Rare al Qaeda Bomb Details,” TIME, July 19, 2013, August 12, 2015, www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/ http://swampland.time.com/2013/07/19/beware-underwear- alerts/2015/yemen-alert-seize-the-chance-to-end-the-conflict. 2-tsa-chief-offers-rare-al-qaeda-bomb-details/. aspx. 101. AQAP’s bomb maker, Ibrahim al Asiri, probably trained 90. Samuel Oakford, “Exclusive: UN Source Says Houthi Anders Dale, for example. Dale is a Norwegian who trained

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with AQAP from 2008 to December 2011. Dale also remains bridge with a sign that read, “The House of Saud directs Amer- at large and was linked to a July 2014 threat stream. See UN ican planes to bomb the holy warriors.” See Mohammed Security Council Committee, “Narrative Summaries of Rea- Mukhashaf, “Al Qaeda Kills Two Saudis Accused of Spying for sons for Listing: QDi.331. Anders Cameroon Ostensvig America: Residents,” Reuters, June 17, 2015, www.reuters. Dale,” September 23, 2014, www.un.org/sc/committees/ com/article/2015/06/17/us-yemen-qaeda- 1267/NSQDi331E.shtml; US Department of State, “Terrorist idUSKBN0OX11Q20150617. Designation of Anders Cameroon Ostensvig Dale,” July 15, 108. Joshua Koontz, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Mid- 2014, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229277.htm; Mike Level Leadership,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, June 3, 2015, Levine and Pierre Thomas, “Syria Threat Could Prompt www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/koontz-aqap-mid-level-leadership- Changes at Airports,” ABC News, June 29, 2014, http:// june-3-2015. abcnews.go.com/US/syria-threat-prompt-airports/ 109. Katherine Zimmerman “The al Qaeda Network: A New story?id=24351979; and Catherine Herridge, “Norwegian Framework for Defining the Enemy,” AEI’s Critical Threats Citizen Linked to Increased Airport Security Screening, Con- Project, September 10, 2013, www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/ gressional Sources Say,” Fox News, July 22, 2014, www. zimmerman-al-qaeda-network-new-framework-defining- foxnews.com/politics/2014/07/22/norwegian-citizen-linked- enemy-september-10-2013. to-increased-airport-security-screening-congressional. 110. Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP’s Campaign against the 102. See Zimmerman, “Testimony: AQAP’s Role in the al Yemeni Military,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, July 7, 2014, Qaeda Network.” www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-aqap- 103. Jabhat al Nusra leader Mohammed al Julani recently drone-campaign-yemen-military-july-7-2014. pledged that his group was not pursuing attacks against the 111. James Gallagher, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in West. The statement was likely a correct reading of the US and 2010: The Intensification of the Near War,” AEI’s Critical European political scene, which characterizes the al Qaeda Threats Project, March 8, 2011, www.criticalthreats.org/ affiliate as a local Syrian group. A terrorist attack would proba- yemen/aqap-2010-intensification-near-war-march-8-2011. bly prompt some level of intervention. The swearing off of 112. An AQAP member drove a VBIED into an al Houthi attacks today does not guarantee that Jabhat al Nusra will not checkpoint in al Ghayl in on May 23, attempt terrorist attacks in the future, however. 2014, which was reportedly not the intended target. Reuters 104. Katherine Zimmerman, “The Khorasan Group: Syr- reported that the attacker detonated his device when he was ia’s al Qaeda Threat,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, September stopped at the checkpoint, but that the intended target was an 23, 2014, www.criticalthreats.org/alqaeda/zimmerman- al Houthi cultural center. See “At Least Three Killed in Suicide khorasan-group-syrias-al-qaeda-threat-september-23-2014. Attack on Shi’ites in Yemen,” Reuters, May 25, 2014, www. 105. Katherine Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda’s Role in Paris Attacks reuters.com/article/2014/05/23/us-yemen-blast- Underscores Failings of Counterterrorism Strategy,” AEIdeas, idUSBREA4M0EQ20140523. January 14, 2015, www.aei.org/publication/al-qaedas-role- 113. AQAP seized control of the 19th Infantry Brigade base in paris-attacks-underscore-failings-counterterrorism-strategy. Bayhan, Shabwah, in mid-February 2015, as noted earlier. 106. Compare the Kouachi brothers’ attack on the Charlie Militants looted the base’s weapons and then held public gath- Hebdo office building with that of associate Amedy Coulibaly, erings in the vicinity of the base until the al Houthis took con- who killed hostages at a Jewish deli in Paris. The Kouachi trol of it in late March 2015. brothers intended to survive their attack and were only identi- 114. Joshua Koontz has forthcoming research with AEI’s Crit- fied because of an identification card that had fallen out in ical Threats Project on AQAP’s relations with the tribes in al their getaway car. Bayda and how they have shifted over the course of the 107. AQAP executed two alleged spies by gunfire on June 17, conflict. 2015, in al Mukalla, Hadramawt. The Saudi men were accused 115. Gordon, “Tribal Militias in Yemen: Al Bayda and of providing information to the US that led to the targeted air- Shabwah.” strike on June 9, 2015, which killed AQAP leader Nasser al 116. Sheikh Abdulwahhab Muhammed Abdulrahman al Wahayshi. The bodies of the men were then displayed on a Humayqani is from the Hamiqan tribe. He is sanctioned by

59 A NEW MODEL FOR DEFEATING AL QAEDA IN YEMEN | KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN | SEPTEMBER 2015

the US for his role as an AQAP recruiter and financer. Humay- alhelf.com/?p=2418; and “Hadramawt Tribal Confederacy qani remains active on Yemen’s national-level political scene; Withdrew from al Mukalla after Commander of the 27th he was photographed shaking hands with UN Secretary- Mechanized Brigade Refused to Handover Headquarters,” General Ban Ki-moon during the June 2015 Yemen Geneva alestethmar.net, April 6, 2015, www.alestethmar.net/news- talks. See US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Desig- 26036.html. nates al-Qa’ida Supporters in Qatar and Yemen,” December 121. The shahada is an Islamic creed declaring belief in the 18, 2013, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ oneness of Allah and acceptance of Mohammed as Allah’s jl2249.aspx; and David Weinberg, “Ban Ki-Moon Shakes prophet. It reads: la ilaha illa-llah, muhammadur rasulu-llah Hands with Alleged al Qaeda Emir,” Long War Journal, June (There is no god but Allah. Mohammed is the messenger of 23, 2015, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/ban-ki- Allah.) See Saeed al Batati, “When al Qaeda Stormed My City: moon-shakes-hands-with-alleged-al-qaeda-emir.php. Reporter’s Notebook,” New York Times, April 10, 2015; and 117. Alexis Knutsen and Katherine Zimmerman, “Warning: Sasha Gordon, “Abyani Tribes and al Qaeda in the Arabian AQAP’s Looming Threat in Yemen,” AEI’s Critical Threats Peninsula,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, July 25, 2012, www. Project, August 14, 2014, www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/ criticalthreats.org/yemen/gordon-abyani-tribes-and-al-qaeda- knutsen-zimmerman-warning-aqap-looming-threat-yemen- arabian-peninsula-july-25-2012. august-14-2014. 122. “Tribes of Hadramawt Form Popular Militia from Fight- 118. I assessed the area as an AQAP sanctuary based on the ers,” News al Yom, April 11, 2015, www.newsalyoum.com/ pattern of activity and requirements for a sanctuary as of yemen/41978.html; and “Agreement at Presidential Palace on November 20, 2014, in a Yemen working group session. There Delivery of al Mukalla to Council,” Al Mukalla Star, April 13, had been evidence of AQAP senior leadership presence in the 2015, http://mukallastar.com/news/2015/208179.html. area, based on a 2012 airstrike targeting the late deputy leader 123. “Commission Named,” Website of the Hadramawt Said al Shihri. Additionally, AQAP attack patterns appeared to Tribal Confederacy, April 14, 2015, www.alhelf.com/?p=2448. be defensive in maintaining freedom of movement in the area, 124. The HDC is also referred to as the Hadramawt People’s disrupting military convoys and attacking checkpoints, for Council in media reporting. It is distinct from the Hadramawt example. The location was also close enough to infrastructure Tribal Confederacy (Hadramawt Tribal Alliance). The HDC to maintain basic supplies such as food and water. The Novem- runs a website (www.mjlees.net) and a Facebook page (www. ber 25, 2014, US SOF raid to recover US hostage Luke Somers facebook.com/HadhramiDomesticCouncil) describing itself from AQAP occurred in Hajr al Sayar, a location just north of and providing news reports on its activities. Wadi Hadramawt. The presence of hostages is an indicator of 125. Umberto Bacchi, “Yemen: Al-Qaeda Operative Khalid a sanctuary, confirming the initial assessment. See “High Secu- Batarfi Takes Selfies Inside Mukalla Government,” Interna- rity: 6 Yemenis, One Saudi and Ethiopian Freed from Grip of tional Business Times, April 4, 2015, www.ibtimes.co.uk/ Terrorists in al Sair, Hadramawt,” 26Sep.net, November yemen-al-qaeda-operative-khalid-batarfi-takes-selfies-inside- 25, 2014, www.26sep.net/news_details.php?lng=arabic& mukalla-government-1494971; and “Al Qaeda Announces sid=108727. Payment of Salaries in April Except for Military,” Khabar 119. Alexis Knutsen, “2015 Yemen Crisis Situation Report: Agency, April 28, 2015, www.khabaragency.net/news24903. April 3,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, April 3, 2015, www. html. criticalthreats.org/yemen/yemen-crisis-situation-reports- 126. Top AQAP leaders killed by a US airstrike in the vicinity april-3-2015. of al Mukalla include Ibrahim al Rubaish (April 12, 2015), 120. The Hadramawt Tribal Confederacy is often referred to Nasser bin Ali al Ansi (April 22, 2015), Ma’moun Abdulhamid as the Hadramawt Tribal Alliance in media reporting, but al Hatem (May 11, 2015), and Nasser al Wahayshi (June 9, translates its own name as “confederacy” on its website (www. 2015). alhelf.com) and on its Facebook page (www.facebook.com/ 127. “Al Qaeda Considering Withdrawal from al Mukalla,” al Hadramout.Tribes.Confederacy). See “Important Announce�- Araby al Jadid, July 18, 2015, www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/201 ment . . . HTA Decides to Advance on al Mukalla,” Website of 5/7/17/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86- the Hadramawt Tribal Confederacy, April 3, 2015, www. %D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%

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AF%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9% 137. A declassified document recovered during the May 2011 D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8% Abbottabad raid was a letter from Osama bin Laden to Atiyah B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D8%AF% Abd al Rahman that included a note for al Qaeda in the D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AC%D9%8A-%D9%85% Islamic Maghreb to provide AQAP emir Nasser al Wahayshi D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%83%D9% with the funds he requested. See the Combating Terrorism 84%D8%A7. Center’s English-language translation of a July 7, 2010, letter: 128. This information derives from a conversation between www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Letter- the author and a journalist on developments in Yemen in early from-UBL-to-Atiyatullah-Al-Libi-4-Translation.pdf. Or, see August 2015. See “Fighters from Hadramawt Preparing to the original Arabic language document: www.ctc.usma.edu/ Expel al Qaeda from al Mukalla,” al Mashhad al Yemeni, posts/letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-4-original- August 4, 2015, www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/news57389. language-2. html; and Urgent Arabian Peninsula (@AJ_AR_PE), Twitter, 138. A declassified document recovered during the May 2011 July 31, 2015, https://twitter.com/AJ_AR_PE/status/ Abbottabad raid disclosed that Osama bin Laden cautioned 627095001458151424. AQAP against pursuing a ricin attack. See the Combating Ter- 129. Katherine Zimmerman, “Competing Jihad: The Islamic rorism Center’s English-language translation of an April 26, State and al Qaeda,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, Septem- 2011, letter from bin Laden: www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp- ber 1, 2014, www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/zimmerman- content/uploads/2013/10/Letter-from-UBL-to-Atiyatullah- competing-jihad-islamic-state-iraq-syria-al-qaeda-september- Al-Libi-2-Translation.pdf. Or, see the original Arabic- 1-2014. language document: www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from- 130. Katherine Zimmerman, “Exploring ISIS in Yemen,” ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-2-original-language-2. Also, see Eric AEI’s Critical Threats Project, July 24, 2015, www. Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Qaeda Trying to Harness Toxin criticalthreats.org/yemen/exploring-isis-yemen- for Bombs, U.S. Officials Fear,”New York Times, August zimmerman-july-24-2015. 12, 2011. 131. I assess that ISIS Wilayat Sana’a operates in both Sana’a 139. Thomas Joscelyn, “Osama bin Laden’s Files: Al Qaeda’s and Dhamar governorates. Ibb neighbors Dhamar. Therefore, Deputy General Manager in Yemen,” Long War Journal, the VBIED capability moved from Wilayat Sana’a to Wilayat March 1, 2015, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/03/ Green Brigade (Ibb). osama-bin-ladens-files-al-qaedas-deputy-general-manager- 132. A photo set from ISIS Wilayat Aden provides images of in-yemen.php. the interior of a health care facility with the ISIS flag hung in 140. Koontz, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Mid-Level the background. It was posted on pro-ISIS Twitter accounts Leadership.” and is marked with branding consistent with other ISIS photo 141. Rukmini Callimachi, “Yemen Terror Boss Left Blueprint sets. for Waging Jihad,” Associated Press, August 9, 2013, www. 133. Zimmerman, “Recipe for Failure: American Strategy ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2013/Yemen-terror-boss- toward Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”; and left-blueprint-for-waging-jihad. Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda in Yemen: Countering the Threat 142. Schmitt and Shanker, “Qaeda Trying to Harness Toxin from the Arabian Peninsula.” for Bombs, U.S. Officials Fear.” 134. US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: 143. Saudi Arabian authorities accuse these women of being Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated financiers, facilitators, and recruiters for al Qaeda. Terms (June 15, 2015), www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/ 144. AQAP reportedly executed tribesmen in Ma’rib who had jp1_02.pdf. collaborated with the Yemeni military, for example, and left 135. This information derives from a forthcoming report by notes on their bodies as warnings to other collaborators. Mary Habeck of AEI on a grand strategy to combat al Qaeda See “Yemeni Qaeda Beheads Three Men for Spying on and ISIS. Operations,” Reuters, October 9, 2012, www.reuters. 136. Zimmerman, “The al Qaeda Network: A New Frame- com/article/2012/10/09/us-yemen-qaeda-beheading- work for Defining the Enemy.” idUSBRE8980D820121009.

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145. Zimmerman, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Lead- Institute for the Study of War, June 30, 2015, www.under-� ers and their Networks,” slides 11–12. standingwar.org/backgrounder/threat-new-al-qaeda- 146. AQAP shared its explosives expertise with al Shabaab leadership-case-syrias-abu-mohammed-al-joulani. member Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, who was to share his 154. The US personnel must be operating in Yemen outside newfound knowledge with al Shabaab members back in Soma- of the chief of mission authority and, therefore, the regional lia, for example. See United States of America v. Ahmed security officer restrictions. They must also have a means of Abdulkadir Warsame, US District Court, Southern District of self-defense. New York, July 5, 2011, www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 155. Ryan Crocker et al., “Why We Need to Keep Our usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/Warsame,%20Ahmed%20 Ambassador in Yemen,” The Hill, February 6, 2015, http:// Indictment.pdf. thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/ 147. US Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelli- 231891-why-we-need-to-keep-our-ambassador-in-yemen. gence David S. Cohen’s remarks at the Carnegie Endowment 156. “Biography,” Presidenthadi-gov-ye.info, https:// for International Peace explained how ISIS has been able to presidenthadi-gov-ye.info/en/the-president/bio/. exploit local populations for finances. AQAP is beginning to 157. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions show such adaptability in terms of financing, particularly as it Instigators of the Violent Takeover of Yemen,” press release, came under increasing financial strain as Gulfi donors shifted April 14, 2015, www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ largely to financing Jabhat al Nusra in Syria. See “Attacking Pages/jl10021.aspx; UN Security Council, “Narrative Sum�- ISIL’s Financial Foundation,” October 23, 2014, www. maries of Reasons for Listing: Yei.004 Abdulmalik al Houthi”; treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2672.aspx. and Katherine Zimmerman and Chris Harnisch, “Profile: al 148. Kimberly Dozier, “Al Qaeda Changing Tactics After Houthi Movement.” NSA Leaks,” Associated Press, June 27, 2013, www. 158. Laura Kasinof and Robert F. Worth, “After Four Months, huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/al-qaeda-nsa-leaks- Saleh is Back,” New York Times, September 23, 2011; UN changing-tactics_n_3509871.html. Security Council Committee, “Listing: Yei.003 Ali Abdullah 149. US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Saleh”; and US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanc- Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated tions Instigators of the Violent Takeover of Yemen.” Terms. 159. “AQAP recognizes Council of Sunni Scholars,” al Quds 150. The threat to the US from ISIS and al Qaeda is funda- al Arabi, May 10, 2015, www.alquds.co.uk/?p=339287; and mentally different. The ISIS threat is its ability to inspire mass- “Biography of Ahmed Mu’alim,” mualm.com, www.mualm. scale, low-level attacks. Al Qaeda has not been able to harness com/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article that level of inspiration among would-be Western recruits, &id=187&Itemid=225. although it is trying. Al Qaeda still seeks a high-casualty spec- 160. “General People’s Congress,” Yemen Parliament Watch, tacular attack against American or Western targets. www.ypwatch.org/page.php?id=980; and “Yemen’s Ex- 151. A declassified document recovered during the May 2011 President in Talks to Resolve War-Party Official,” Reuters, July Abbottabad raid mentioned a letter from Qasim al Raymi 23, 2015, www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/23/us-yemen- (Abu Hurayrah al Sana’ani) to Osama bin Laden, which security-saleh-idUSKCN0PX1AQ20150723. appears to have been a field report from Yemen. See the Com- 161. A full UN translation of the implementing mechanisms bating Terrorism Center’s English-language translation of the is available here: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker. letter from Osama bin Laden or Atiyah Abd al Rahman: www. un.org/files/YE_111205_Agreement%20on%20the% ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-to-nasir-al-wuhayshi- 20implementation%20mechanism%20for%20the%20 original-language-2. transition.pdf. Also see Katherine Zimmerman, “Yemen’s Piv-� 152. “AQAP Official Ibrahim al-Rubeish Calls Muslims to otal Moment.” Fight U.S.-Led Coalition,” SITE Intelligence Group, October 162. “About the Hadramawt Domestic Council,” Mjlees.net, 19, 2014. August 19, 2015, www.mjlees.net/about-us. 153. Jennifer Cafarella, “The Threat of New al-Qaeda Leader- 163. “Statement on the First Anniversary of the Founding of ship: The Case of Syria’s Abu Mohammed al-Joulani,” Hadramawt Tribal Confederacy,” alhelf.com, July 5, 2014,

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www.alhelf.com/?p=1234; “Statement on Ansar al Sharia,” Request from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the End alhelf.com, April 5, 2015, www.alhelf.com/?p=2421; and of ‘Decisive Storm’ at the End of the Day and the Start of the “Statement on Security Agreement,” alhelf.com, May 4, 2015, Second and Final Operation ‘Restoring Hope,’” Saudi Press www.alhelf.com/?p=2508. Agency, April 21, 2015, www.spa.gov.sa/details.php?id= 164. “Yemen’s Tribal Confederations,” The National, Febru- 1352508; Katherine Zimmerman, “2015 Yemen Crisis ary 27, 2012, www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/ ­Situation Report: July 15”; and Michael Knights and Alexan- yemens-tribal-confederations; and “Al-Ahmar Clan Loses dre Mello, “The Saudi-UAE War Effort in Yemen (Part 1): Leadership of Hashid in Ceasefire Deal with Huthis,” Middle Operation Golden Arrow in Aden.” East Online, February 4, 2014, www.middle-east-online.com/ 171. Full text of the PNPA is available through the European english/?id=64034. Union Parliament: www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_ 165. Katherine Zimmerman and Chris Harnisch, “Profile: al 2019/documents/darp/dv/darp20141204_05_/ Houthi Movement”; “Yemen’s Houthis Form Own Govern- darp20141204_05_en.pdf. Also see Ali Ibrahim al Moshki, ment in Sana’a,” English, February 6, 2015, www. “Peace and National Partnership Agreement Signed,” Yemen aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/02/yemen-houthi- Times, September 23, 2014, www.yementimes.com/en/1818/ rebels-announce-presidential-council-150206122736448. news/4365/Peace-and-National-Partnership-Agreement- html; and Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells, “Regime and Periphery­ signed.htm; United Nations, “Secretary-General Welcomes in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon.” Signing of Peace, National Partnership Agreement in Yemen, 166. “Yemeni Congregation for Reform,” Yemen Parliament Expects its Implementation without Delay,” press release, Watch, www.ypwatch.org/page.php?id=981; and Ashraf al September 21, 2014, www.un.org/press/en/2014/sgsm16168. Falahi, “Islah’s Houthi Gamble,” Sada Journal, January 30, doc.htm; Mareike Transfeld, “Houthis on the Rise in Yemen,” 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show Sada Journal, October 31, 2014, http://carnegieendowment. &article=58887&solr_hilite. org/sada/index.cfm?fa=show&article=57087&solr_hilite=. 167. Jessica Lewis McFate, “The Islamic State: A Count- 172. See “Exiled Yemen VP Says Aden ‘Liberated,’” al Ara- er-Strategy for a Counter-State,” Institute for the Study of War, biya, July 17, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/ July 2014, www.understandingwar.org/report/islamic-state- middle-east/2015/07/16/Yemen-troops-push-Houthis- counter-strategy-counter-state; and Katherine Zimmerman, out-of-Aden-areas.html; “Vice President Announces Libera- “Competing Jihad: The Islamic State and al Qaeda.” tion of Aden after the Retaking of ,” al Masdar, July 17, 168. Gregory D. Johnsen, “Tracking Yemen’s 23 Escaped 2015, http://almasdaronline.net/article/73535; and “President Jihadi Operatives—Part 2,” Jamestown Foundation, October Hadi Approves the Integration of Southern Popular Resistance 24, 2007, www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ into Yemeni Army,” Yemen Now, July 28, 2015, http:// ttnews[tt_news]=4466#.Ufu1QnewXCQ; Eli Lake, “Meet al yemennow.net/news670834.html. Qaeda’s New General Manager: Nasser al-Wuhayshi,” The 173. Katherine Zimmerman, “The al Qaeda Network: A New Daily Beast, August 9, 2013, www.thedailybeast.com/ Framework for Defining the Enemy”; and Zimmerman, articles/2013/08/09/meet-al-qaeda-s-new-general-manager- “Competing Jihad: The Islamic State and al Qaeda.” nasser-al-wuhayshi.html; and Maggie Michael, “Al Qaeda 174. National Counterterrorism Center, “Al-Qa’ida in the Confirms Nasir Al-Wuhayshi, Leader of Yemen Affiliate, Has Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),” Counterterrorism Guide, www. Been Killed,” Associated Press, June 15, 2015, www. nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html. huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/15/nasir-al-wuhayshi-drone- 175. Katherine Zimmerman, “January 15th Strike: Targeting strike_n_7591190.html. al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Leaders and Impli- 169. Erica Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s cations,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, January 16, 2010, National Dialogue,” United States Institute of Peace, February www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/january-15th-striketargeting 3, 2014, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR342_Process- -al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap-leaders-andimplications; Lessons-Learned-in-Yemens-National-Dialogue.pdf. Robert F. Worth, “Senior Qaeda Figures Killed in Attack, 170. Knutsen, “2015 Yemen Crisis Situation Report: March Yemen Says,” New York Times, January 16, 2010; UN Security 27”; “Leadership of the Coalition Countries: In Response to a Council, “Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing QI.A.

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282.10. Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi,” press release, May 11, Background on the Rising Threat of Secessionism,” AEI’s Crit- 2010, www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28210E.shtml; ical Threats Project, November 5, 2009, www.criticalthreats. and “AQAP Confirms Killing of Leader Abu Baseer al- org/yemen/yemens-southern-challenge-background- Wuhayshi in U.S. Strike,” SITE Intelligence Group, June 16, rising-threat-secessionism. 2015. 178. UN Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014); UN 176. Mohammed Ghobari and Noah Browning, “Al Qaeda 2140 Committee, “2140 Sanctions List,” April 14, 2015, Seen Assuming Policing Role in Eastern Yemen,” Reuters, www.un.org/sc/committees/2140/2140.htm; and UN May 14, 2015, www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/14/us- Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015). yemen-security-qaeda-idUSKBN0NZ1PP20150514; Saeed al 179. Weir, A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains Batati and Kareem al Fahim, “War in Yemen Is Allowing of Yemen; and Central Intelligence Agency, “World Factbook: Qaeda Group to Expand,” New York Times, April 16, 2015 Yemen,” August 14, 2015, www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 177. Katherine Zimmerman, “Yemen’s Southern Challenge: the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html.

64 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

he conclusions in this paper were derived from and implementation, Joshua Koontz for his detailed Trefined over countless conversations. They would research and insights, and the CTP Iran analysts. not have been possible without the support of a num- The paper also draws heavily from ideas gener- ber of people. Many of the insights came from various ated during working group discussions led by Mary working group sessions on Yemen held at AEI over the Habeck on the global al Qaeda strategic framework, past year. I am very grateful to those who took the time and it would not have been possible without guidance to participate and for the high level of discussions held. on military analysis and planning from Daniel Dwyer. The Yemen team within AEI’s Critical Threats Thank you to Danielle Pletka for her continued guid- Project (CTP) is exemplary, and its work remains an ance and insights. I deeply appreciate the support of invaluable asset. I thank Alexis Knutsen and all of our Heather Malacaria, the CTP program manager, in brilliant CTP interns, especially those who contrib- seeing this project through to fruition. I would also uted research on Yemen over the past year: Jared Fer- especially like to thank Frederick W. Kagan for his ris, Joseph Hughes, Kais Makhlouf, Daniel O’Keefe, constant and patient mentorship and his support in and Greg Schroeder. I give particular thanks to Charles bringing this work to full maturity. Although credit Caris from Praescient Analytics for his research on the belongs to many, the opinions and findings of the Yemeni military and assistance with our technology paper are mine alone.

65 ABOUT US

About the Author Katherine Zimmerman is a research fellow at AEI and the lead al Qaeda analyst for AEI’s Critical Threats Project. Her work focuses on the al Qaeda network, particularly al Qaeda’s affiliates in the Gulf of Aden region, and other associated groups in western and northern Africa. She specializes in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen- based al Qaeda faction, and in al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia. Zimmerman has testified before Congress on the national security threats emanating from al Qaeda and its network and has briefed members of Congress, their staff, and members of the defense community. She has been published in outlets such as CNN.com, Huffing- ton Post, the Wall Street Journal, and .

About AEI’s Critical Threats Project AEI’s Critical Threats Project equips policymakers, opinion leaders, and the military and intelligence communities with detailed and objective open-source analysis of America’s current and emerging national security challenges. Through daily monitoring, in-depth studies, graphic presentations, private briefings, and public events, the project is a unique resource for those who need to fully understand the nuance and scale of threats to America’s security to effectively develop and execute policy.

About Our Technology Partners The conclusions and assessments in this report do not reflect the positions of our technology partners.

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Praescient Analytics is a veteran-owned small business based in Alexandria, Virginia. Its aim is to revolutionize how the world understands information by empowering its customers with the latest analytic tools and methodologies. Currently, Praescient provides several critical services to the US government and commercial clients.

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