Arabian Peninsula Background Notes APBN-007 December 2008

Tribes and Politics in

Yemen’s government is not a tribal regime. The Tribal Nature of Yemen Yet tribalism pervades Yemeni society and influences and limits Yemeni politics. The ‘ Yemen, perhaps more than any other state ‘Abdullah Salih regime depends essentially on in the Arab world, is fundamentally a tribal only two tribes, although it can expect to rely society and nation. To a very large degree, on the tribally dominated military and security social standing in Yemen is defined by tribal forces in general. But tribesmen in these membership. The tribesman is the norm of institutions are likely to be motivated by career society. Other Yemenis either hold a roughly considerations as much or more than tribal equal status to the tribesman, for example, the identity. Some shaykhs also serve as officers sayyids and the qadi families, or they are but their control over their own tribes is often inferior, such as the muzayyins and the suspect. Many tribes oppose the government akhdam. The tribes in Yemen hold far greater in general on grounds of autonomy and self- importance vis-à-vis the state than elsewhere interest. The Republic of Yemen (ROY) and continue to challenge the state on various government can expect to face tribal resistance levels. At the same time, a broad swath of to its authority if it moves aggressively or central Yemen below the Zaydi-Shafi‘i divide – inappropriately in both north and south. But including the highlands north and south of it should be stressed that tribal attitudes do Ta‘izz and in the Tihamah coastal plain – not differ fundamentally from the attitudes of consists of a more peasantized society where other Yemenis and that tribes often seek to tribal ties and reliance is muted. Nevertheless, operate within ROY politics as other the “detribalized” peasantry still possess tribal constituencies and political parties do. names. Tribalism is a strong force but not a The emphasis on tribes in Yemen is monolithic one with a universal point of view. socially and politically important because it forms the fundamental reference point for a great majority of Yemenis. Tribalism,

This is an Arabian Peninsula Background Note (APBN) written by J.E. Peterson N.B. This background note is a preliminary attempt to present in summary form the essential details of a particular set of circumstances or event in Arabian Peninsula history. It lays no claim to being comprehensive or fully accurate. Although considerable effort has been made to assure the reliability of the information it contains, its accuracy is limited to the information contained in the sources listed in the note. The contents of this note may be freely quoted and cited provided both the author and source are given. A complete listing of APBNs is contained on www.JEPeterson.net. Please cite in the following manner: Peterson, J.E. “Tribes and Politics in Yemen.” Arabian Peninsula Background Note, No. APBN-007. Published on www.JEPeterson.net, December 2008. © J.E. Peterson, 2008 APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 2

qabaliyah, not only assures membership in a authority coincident with a section or tribe; so collective unit but defines the tribesman in the relation is problematic between the sets of relation to the world and provides protection men defined by shared ‘ancestors’ and the and assistance whenever necessary. The family, groups of men who actually form on a given the clan, the tribe, the confederation all occasion.”2 comprise stages in the definition of the It is tempting to regard shaykhs of tribes as individual and the delineation of the political wielders of considerable power. This may be landscape. While tribes putatively consist of true in some cases, due to either the strength common descent groups, the genealogy is far of personality of the individual shaykh or the less important than the existence and workings dominant position of the shaykhly family, or of the interlaced web. This not only defines both. Yet it is far more common that shaykhs membership and status, but also territory since are less potentates or even chairmen than they much of the country is finely detailed into a are simply notable figures who have been complex tribal geography. In tribal terms, entrusted with certain authorities on specific their territory has always been the same. occasions and in limited ways. Therefore, tribal identity is also territorial The tribe in Yemen retains much of its identity.1 essential social and cultural role. The tribe is The tribesman enjoys rights and benefits a corporate unit. In the absence of strong from tribal membership but also bears central authority, an adequate national responsibilities, among them answering economy, and countrywide socialization of “summons” when the position or territory of Yemenis as citizenry, tribal identification and the tribe is threatened. The fluidity of allegiance remains paramount for tribal tribalism should also be kept in mind. While members. The tribe provides protection for its territorial lines have been fixed for centuries, members and requires the assistance of its the alliances between tribes and between members for the tribe’s protection. The tribe, components of tribes may change with great especially through its shaykh, may provide rapidity. Much depends on the situation, the something of a welfare system for members in proximity of a particular tribe to the crisis need. Tribes have traditionally organized their situation, and on the leadership of the tribal own affairs, both individually and collectively, unit. Tribal units who respond in one way to with minimal interference from the state. a particular situation may well respond in a While the shari‘ah and secular authority played different or even diametrically opposite way in varying roles in shaping behavior, the a subsequent similar one. “There is no combination of qabaliyah (tribalism, i.e. a code convention of solidarity, however, no of ethical behavior) and ‘urf (common or tribal permanent coercive structure, and no standing law) “provided both ethical codes and mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of

1. Paul Dresch, “The Tribes of wa-Bakil as Historical and Geographical Entities,” in Alan Jones, ed., Arabicus Felix: Luminosus Britannicus; Essays in Honour of A.F.L. Beeston on his Eightieth Birthday (Oxford: Ithaca Press for Oxford 2. Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History in University, Board of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Yemen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1991), p. 11. p. 88. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 3

disputes.”3 supervised by the tribal shaykh, who served as The tribe also serves as an economic unit. well as the focal point of interaction with It has been estimated that about three-quarters other tribes and vis-à-vis the government. For of Yemenis were originally tribal and engaged the most part, shaykhs emerge from established in cereal- and livestock-based agriculture. shaykhly families although it is not required. Households were not self-sufficient but banded Within the family, there is no hard and fast together in tribal communities to organize and rule of succession, which largely depends on share common use of water supplies and personal qualities. But the position of shaykh irrigation, harvesting requirements, and generally gives little or no authority over grazing lands, as well as disaster relief and tribesmen. It often denotes less a rank than a providing labor for local “public works.” Even function: the shaykh is the one who carries where the population has been “detribalized” out the wishes of the tribe, who solves internal into peasantry, it acts collectively to meet disputes, and who speaks for the tribe in emergencies and some maintain common dealings with other tribes or the outside property.4 world.6 In more recent times, individual tribes There are some exceptions, which are created more extensive common self-help generally the paramount shaykhs who often schemes, the ta‘awun or cooperative (more wield great influence within their tribe and frequently called a local development their confederation and whose power is association, LDA). Increased expectations, low enhanced by their wealth and ownership of government capability to provide assistance, land in areas outside tribal territory. Their and the remittances sent or brought back by position and status has been augmented by tribesmen who had gone to work in Saudi their incorporation into the state system and Arabia and farther afield, spurred the resultant opportunities to acquire more wealth widespread adoption of LDAs throughout and influence. Prominent examples include northern Yemen in the 1970s. Typically these the Bayt al-Ahmar of Hashid, Bayt Abu Ra’s of cooperatives built schools, roads, drinking- Dhu , and Bayt al-Shayif of Dhu water systems, and other locally required Husayn.7 Nevertheless, improvements.5 Government assistance was “The few great shaykhs are exceptional. minimal, consisting for example of arranging The influence of such men can rise and for a foreign development agency to loan a fall freely without changes in the bulldozer for a road mainly built by local tribes’ formal structure and without labor. major changes in group alignments, Many of these economic activities were while their own position is made more difficult by the fact that in all but the smallest unit there are numerous 3. Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The shaykhs, not arranged in a hierarchy or Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Cambridge Middle East Studies, No. 9), p. 64. 6. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, pp. 89 4. Carapico, Civil Society, p. 64. and 102.

5. Carapico, Civil Society, p. 109. 7. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, p. 102. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 4

even in order of precedence. Indeed, hands of Imam Ahmad in 1959. Husayn’s son the number of shaykhly families is ‘Abdullah then took up the position, which he indeterminately large. At any given exploited as his power base to play a time, the extent of the unit with which significant role on the national scene until his each is identified seems arbitrary, and death at the end of 2007. An important figure as we have already seen, it is not the in the republican cause during the 1960s civil rule for a higher-order section or for a war in North Yemen, he subsequently served as tribe to recongize a single shaykh. speaker of the legislature and a founder of al- Where one is recognized he is referred Islah Party and it could be said that he was the to as ‘the shaykh of shaykhs’ (shaykh al- only player to remain a force nationally from mashāyikh), a title which for the early 1960s until 2007. It can also be convenience we can gloss as paramount assumed that one reason that Hashid – shaykh. His position is expressed in a particularly the tribes of al-‘Usaymat, Kharif, document which his brother shaykhs and Bani Suraym – remained such a cohesive in the tribe all sign.”8 unit was the steady leadership of Shaykh Traditionally there were four main and ‘Abdullah. permanent tribal confederations in Yemen. The other confederation, Bakil, has not The most important of these are the Hashid enjoyed the same cohesion and its shaykhs and the Bakil. The Madhhaj lost importance have paled in comparison with the Bayt al- in the twentieth century (in part because Ahmar. It was noted in the 1980s that the elements were absorbed by the Bakil) and the paramount shaykh of the Bakil at that time, fourth confederation has disintegrated. Naji b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Shayif (from the Dhu Technically, Hashid and Bakil are tribes, both Husayn) was unable to command much deriving from the Hamdan,Yemen’s influence over his own tribe, let alone allied preeminent tribe of the medieval period. Both ones, and consequently ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar occupy much of northern Yemen to the north possessed the ability to summon Bakili tribes and east of Sanaa and both are constituted by to war.10 Nevertheless, the Abu Luhum family a large number of subsidiary tribes. Their total has been prominent on the national scene population has been estimated at more than since the 1962 revolution, as described below. 500,000.9 As in most other countries of the Middle Part of the reason for the ascendancy of East, the cohesion and influence of tribes has Hashid has been the long-time effective weakened in Yemen over the last few decades – leadership provided by Bayt al-Ahmar, of the although perhaps not to as great an extent as Humran section of al-‘Usaymat tribe. Nasir al- Ahmar served as paramount shaykh in the th early 20 century, his son Husayn succeeded 10. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, pp. him and remained head of the 103-105. Dresch also notes as an example of the tribe/confederation until his death at the difference between the two confederations that “identity cards and army pay-books used to have a space to record the man’s tribe (qabilah) and, while Bakilis would usually put Arhab or Nihm or whatever 8. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, p. 102. was apt, men from at least the three Hashid tribes mentioned would almost always put simply Hashid.” 9. Dresch, Tribes, Government, and History, p. 24. Ibid., pp. 104-105. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 5

elsewhere, in part because of the weakness of sayyid families have continued to play a the government. There are a number of political role. Examples of prominent sayyids reasons behind this. Amongst the northern in the previous Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) tribes, the effect of decades of labor migration and the present ROY would include the to Saudi Arabia has upset the traditional following. Yahya b. Muhammad al- pecking order, as tribesmen come back with Mutawakkil (Bayt al-Mutawakkil of Shaharah), their savings and less inclination to follow an army officer during the 1960s civil war, established shaykhs. At the same time, many member of the Revolutionary Command shaykhly families have taken up residence in Council that seized power in 1974, and the towns, loosening their ties to the tribes and subsequently an ambassador and government thus their influence. This has made a potential minister. ‘Ali b. Qasim al-Mu’ayyad (Bayt al- opening for the government to interfere in Mu’ayyad of Sa‘dah) was an ambassador and what used to be regarded as tribal matters. member of the Consultative Council. Ibrahim While the tribe serves as the “norm” of al-Kibsi (Bayt al-Kibs of al-Kibs in Khawlan al- Yemeni society and the shaykhs animate and Tiyal) ran the royalists’ office in Jiddah during sometimes guide the tribes, note should also be the 1960s civil war and later served as Deputy made of the importance of families from two Foreign Minister. Members of the Sharaf al- other sectors of Yemeni society. The sayyid Din family (of Kawkaban) have served in lesser families constitute the descendants of the government positions. Prophet Muhammad and thus membership is The Bayt al-Wazir (of Wadi Sirr in Bani hereditary. Historically, the sayyids played a Hushaysh) sought to overthrow the Hamid al- key role in Yemeni politics, particularly in the Din imam in 1948 and named their own north. The Zaydi imams had to be of sayyid imam. Later, they formed a “Third Force” descent and they generally appointed members between royalists and republicans during the of other sayyid families as their lieutenants and 1960s civil war. Isma‘il b. Ahmad al-Wazir provincial governors. More generally, sayyids served as the longtime YAR and ROY minister served as neutral arbiters between tribes and of justice and legal affairs. Ibrahim b. ‘Ali, religious scholars. Their villages were mostly based in the United States and married considered hijrah, i.e. protected places. The into the Abu Ra’s shaykhly family, has revolution of 1962 and demise of the royalist continued to be a thorn in the side of Yemeni cause during the ensuing civil war severely governments, frequently accused of forming impacted the status and role of the sayyids. political/religious groups seeking to advance The Hamid al-Din family, from whose ranks Zaydi and family causes. He was a primary the last four imams came, was banned from founder and head of the Union of Popular the country. Many other sayyids were killed in Forces. the 1960s and their property confiscated. In the south, the sayyid families saw their Their position among the tribes suffered as position imperilled by independence and many well, an effect exacerbated by the ouster of fled the country. Their subsequent role in sayyids from their countryside homes and ROY politics largely has been one of emigration to the cities where they entered opposition to the Sanaa government. The al- commerce and government administration. Jifri family provides a good example. Nevertheless, a number of prominent Muhammad al-Jifri played a traditional APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 6

mediatory role in ‘Awlaqi from the 1930s but civil war (which named him the DRY Prime is better remembered as president of the South Minister). Mention might also be made of Bu Arabian League, formed in 1951. His son Bakr al-Kaf, a Hadrami sayyid who made a Yahya served as the minister of trade and fortune in Singapore but spent all of it on industry in the short-lived Democratic public and charitable works in the Republic of Yemen (DRY) government. Just as impoverished Kathiri State during the 1930s prominent as Muhammad is ‘Abd al-Rahman and 1940s.11 b. ‘Ali al-Jifri, who moved to Saudi Arabia after Similarly, the qadi families have played Aden’s independence and allegedly gained significant historical roles in northern Yemen. Saudi citizenship. After unity, he founded the Unlike the sayyids who form a hereditary caste, Sons of Yemen League in Yemen, an small anyone can become a qadi through personal independent conservative party, and became a merit and religious studies. More often, member of parliament. Not surprisingly, ‘Abd however, qadi status is passed down through al-Rahman threw his lot in with the southern particular families. Furthermore, the qadi secessionists and was rewarded with the families did not suffer the fate of many sayyids position of vice-president of DRY. Escaping after the revolution, in part because they had into exile, he took advantage of a 2006 tended to oppose the Hamid al-Din imams amnesty to return to Yemen. ‘Ali b. Zayn al- well before 1962. ‘Abdin al-Jifri has attracted attention as a strict Perhaps the most prominent qadi family is Islamist and supporter of al-Islah. Another that of al-Iryani. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani Jifri, ‘Adnan b. ‘Umar, serves as the ROY served as President of the YAR from 1967 until minister of justice. 1974 and his cousin ‘Abd al-Karim was the The sayyids of the Hadramawt played more longtime Prime Minister during much of of a regional role during the Protectorate President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih’s tenure. period and their families were well represented Muhammad, from another branch of the in the Hadrami diaspora across the Indian family, served as ambassador to the United Ocean. In the absence of powerful tribal States and provincial governor. Other Iryanis leaders, the British supported Hadrami sayyid have been YAR and ROY ministers. The families in their quest for “state-building” in widespread al-‘Ansi family has also provided the region, who worked in alliance with the government officials and ministers, both Qu‘ayti ruler. The ‘Attas family not only during the time of the imams and in the YAR provided a descendant who served as and ROY governments. Because they have Indonesia’s foreign minister but Haydar b. been unable to protect their qadi status Abu Bakr al-‘Attas, an engineer, was elected to adequately, the family has made an the Politburo of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) of South Yemen. In the aftermath of the January 1986 bloody infighting for control of 11. It might also be mentioned that some Hadrami the YSP, Haydar was selected as President of sayyid families migrated over the centuries across the South Yemen because of his neutral, border into the Dhufar region of Oman and from there to the eastern Omani port of Sur. The present Omani technocratic status. He also served as the first foreign minister, Yusuf b. ‘Alawi b. ‘Abdullah, and Prime Minister of the united ROY until former minister of trade and commerce Salim al- joining the secessionist south during the 1994 Ghazzali are contemporary representatives of these families. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 7

arrangement with the Ahmad b. Kūl faction of played contentious roles vis-à-vis four states in the Dhu Muhammad tribe, which has Yemen over the past century, resisting the effectively made them tribesmen.12 (Al-‘Ansi expansion of state control over their domain should not be confused with al-Anisi, i.e. from and, seemingly paradoxically, being the prominent tribe of al-Anis.) instrumental in the overthrow or support of Another long-important family is al- recent state systems. ‘Arashi. The best-known family member in The Hashid and Bakil tribes were known as recent times was ‘Abd al-Karim b. ‘Abdullah the “wings of the imamate” in pre-1962 North whose father represented Imam Yahya in Aden. Yemen. Without a standing army until the ‘Abd al-Karim became a trusted subordinate of 1950s, imams were forced to call upon tribal Ibrahim al-Hamdi and then Ahmad al- levies to defend the region, defeat rivals, and Ghashmi. Upon the latter’s assassination, impose order. To ensure compliance of the ‘Abd al-Karim served as acting President and tribes, the Imams kept sons of shaykhs hostage many felt that he should assume the office in Sanaa, where they received their education. permanently since he was in the mold of Thus, when Imam Yahya was assassinated in former president ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani. 1948, his son Ahmad was forced to travel Although ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih managed to throughout the northern countryside to rally snare the presidency, ‘Abd al-Karim continued the tribes behind him. As a result, he was able in public service as speaker of the Majlis al- to regain control of Sanaa but the price paid Shura, vice-president of the YAR, and member was giving the tribes leave to sack the capital. of the ROY presidential council at unity. This was one reason why Imam Ahmad chose Other members of the family included to reside in Ta‘izz and why Sanaa backed the Mahmud b. ‘Abdullah and Yahya b. Husayn, republicans during the 1960s civil war. both of whom served as ROY ministers of Tribes were also important in the south. tourism. In the end, it could perhaps be Britain occupied the port of Aden in 1839 and concluded that qadi families, although still declared it a crown colony in 1932. To protect important in rural areas, now play only a Aden, Britain gradually forged treaties of relatively marginal role on the national scene. protection with petty rulers and shaykhs in the hinterland. The resultant Aden Protectorate was a patchwork system of indigenous control Tribe vs. State in Yemen: and British supervision. While some areas, particularly in the Western Aden Protectorate, Background easily accepted protected status, less control was exercised over the east and the area of the Tribes and states have co-existed uneasily in Radfan mountains, north of Aden and Yemen for innumerable centuries. Tribes abutting North Yemen, was continually challenging British authority. The Royal Air Force (RAF) was entrusted with responsibility for security in Aden and the Protectorate and 12. Gerd-R. Puin, “The Yemeni Hijrah Concept of Tribal Protection,” in Tarif Khalidi, ed., Land Tenure employed air power to keep what were and Social Transformation in the Middle East regarded as recalcitrant tribes and rulers in (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984), p. line. Thus action was taken between 1919 and 488. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 8

1949 against the Subayhi tribe, the Mansuri (a during the civil war. The opposition to the section of Subayhi), and the Qutaybi on at Imamate of these shaykhs cost them least five occasions each.13 considerable standing within their tribes. Again, tribes in the north and south were Many of the shaykhs and sultans who had instrumental in the replacement of these two enjoyed treaty relations with the British joined regimes. The failure of the assassination of in the attempts to create the South Arabian new Imam Muhammad al-Badr in September Federation and/or joined the conservative 1962 provoked a long civil war between South Arabian League seeking British republicans and royalists. Despite the direct withdrawal. As the struggle against the British involvement of Egyptian troops in support of intensified during the mid-1960s, they were the republicans and the strong indirect support increasingly relegated to the sidelines. Those of Saudi Arabia for the royalists, the ebb and who did not flee in the 1966-1967 period were flow of the war on the battlefields depended killed by the National Liberation Front (NLF) heavily on the shifting allegiances of the tribes. and by the Front for the Liberation of Hashid’s support for the Republic was the Occupied Southern Yemen (FLOSY). Many consequence of Imam Ahmad’s dispute with retired to comfortable lives in Jiddah and only Bayt al-Ahmar. Shaykh Nasir b. Mabkhut al- a few continued to intrigue against the new Ahmar, the paramount shaykh of Hashid, was government in Aden. significant in the election of Yahya Hamid al- Strenuous efforts were made to paint the Din as Imam in the early 20th century. But resistance to the PDRY as a broad anti- Shaykh Nasir’s son Husayn, who had Communist front. But the very nature of the succeeded him as paramount shaykh, ran afoul resistance movement militated against tribal of Imam Ahmad in 1959. In anger, the Imam solidarity. Nationality was promoted as the ordered the execution of Shaykh Husayn and common identifier, not tribalism. Those tribes his son even though they were under his that did oppose the PDRY en masse tended to protection. As a consequence, the Bayt al- be the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes from Ahmar and the Hashid supported the the interior fringe of the country, the marginal republicans against Ahmad’s son Muhammad region that shaded into al-Rub‘ al-Khali. They al-Badr. included elements of Sa‘ar, al-Manahil, and al- The Bakil also tended to side with the Mahrah, many members of which moved to republicans. The execution by Imam Ahmad the Gulf. The anti-PDRY movement survived of a number of the Abu Ra’s, the shaykhly on donations and recruitment from tribesmen family of the Dhu Muhammad, resulted in working in the Gulf and on largely Saudi their support for the republicans for the same subsistence. While a few significant raids were reasons as Bayt al-Ahmar. Another prominent made in the first few years after Aden’s Bakili shaykh, Sinan Abu Luhum of the Nihm independence, they gradually faded into tribe, had fled to Aden to escape Imam Ahmad insignificance. Tribal support for the and returned north to support the republicans secessionist DRY in 1994 was of only marginal importance. Officially and in many ways practically, the 13. J.E. Peterson, Defending Arabia (London: new regime in Aden was anti-tribal. Tribes, Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), along with religion and “feudalism,” were seen pp. 35 and 82. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 9

as part of the old order that had been anything to do with the widespread destruction eliminated. Nevertheless, the NLF party of mosques and tombs. Bakil tribes, leadership and the ranks of the officer corps presumably desirous of acting against Sanaa and civil servants not surprisingly included a and loosely allied with the Yemeni Socialist high proportion of tribespeople. As the NLF’s Party (YSP, descended from the NLF) stayed solidarity dissolved into internecine struggles, out of the fray as did those of al-Madhhaj. tribal members rallied to the defense (or the avenging) of fellow tribesmen in leading positions. The ‘Awaliq, who had been heavily Tribes in the ROY State recruited for the army and the police, were caught in the middle of this. Many senior The ROY government faces a paradoxical officers and policemen were ‘Awlaqis but were dilemma. On the one hand, it wishes to purged in the early days of independence. The extend central authority throughout the preponderance of ‘Awlaqis in the ranks country, through such measures as assuming continued for years. responsibility for law and order, the provision Although tribalism had little to do with of social services, and enhancement of tax the circumstances that produced the 1994 civil collection. On the other hand, much of war, it did play diametrically opposing roles Yemen is a very tribal society with a strong on the two sides. The energy of tribalism in history of self-reliance and autonomy. Any the south seems to have been sapped during government presence is problematic in certain the PDRY period. Although the ex-southern areas of the country – either because of army included many tribesmen in its ranks, formidable tribal resistance to outside tribes as such played little role in the actual interference (particularly in the north or west) fighting. The tribes in the line of fire, notably or because of resentment over government al-‘Awaliq, Yafi‘, and the tribes of Radfan, policy – especially in the south as a result of simply exercised prudence and stayed out of the 1994 war and economic dissatisfaction. the fighting. Efforts to engage the tribes of the Considerable swatches therefore maintain Hadramawt and east just fizzled. strong resistance to ROYG presence. This is Northern tribes, however, were opportuned nothing new. The imams confronted by the Sanaa government to provide assistance. considerable and stubborn resistance to their While no tribes as collective units took place control, as did the Ottomans, the British, and in the fighting, a large number of tribesmen, the Egyptians. using their own rifles and vehicles, turned out In dealing with tribes, the government has along the battle front and poured into the a choice of directions to take. It can actively south. Northern victory provided them with work to reduce tribal independence, through an age-old tribal privilege: looting. In force (reducing autonomy or crushing addition, there seems to have been some tribal resistance), blandishment (providing direct mingling with Islamists and Afghans in the financial or development assistance), or destruction of property in the south including encouragement (extolling the benefits of closer the brewery and the domestic trading integration into a national community). corporation. It is rather unlikely that Alternatively, the narrowly based regime could tribesmen who were not also Islamists had chose to rely on the tribes for tangible support APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 10

against a skeptical and growing urban call it? – urbanization, nationalization, population, southern discontent, and/or al- globalization of major shaykhs. Many of these Qa`idah and like-minded religiopolitical-based now live in Sanaa, some have positions in the opposition. government or military, and most are engaged In truth, the regime has chosen elements of in commerce. both strategies. The growing reach of the state ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih’s authority rests most has reduced tribal freedom of action in many fundamentally on three concentric rings of areas. Government supervision/presence has support.14 The first is that of immediate been strengthened through southern Yemen to relatives. These would include his brother pacify the region. At the same time, the Muhammad as head of Central Security, his general (and especially economic) weakness of half-brother ‘Ali Salih as head of the the state requires it to co-opt shaykhs, Republican Guard, his nephew Yahya including incorporating their participation in Muhammad ‘Abdullah Salih as head of the system as well as securing through them Central Security, and most importantly his son the cooperation of their tribal units. The Ahmad, who most Yemenis believe is being regime also has a history of relying upon groomed to replace his father in the manner individual and corporate units of tribesmen to that Bashshar al-As`ad replaced his father back up the armed forces. This was clear in Hafiz. The inner circle also includes the the 1994 war and the strategy has resurfaced in president’s eldest daughter Bilqis, who enjoys fighting against the Huthi group in the far considerable influence despite not having any north. significant position, and his son-in-law It is obvious that President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Muhammad Duwayd, head of the Presidential Salih has a tribal background. It is also Palace. The web is commercial as well as obvious that he has created an inner web of political: the president assumed a partnership support from members of his family, his clan, role in Hayl Sa‘id Enterprises, Yemen’s largest and his fellow Sanhani tribesmen. company, his nephew Tawfiq took over the Furthermore, he has co-opted some prominent tobacco and matches company, his maternal non-Sanhani Hashidis, as well as the Hashidi cousin ‘Abdullah al-Qadi began running the tribe of Hamdan San‘a’. pharmaceutical monopoly, and a son-in-law, But it should not be assumed from this ‘Abd al-Khaliq al-Qadi, headed the national that Salih’s rule is tribally based. The idea that airline. the regime is a condominium of Zaydi and The second circle consists of members of Hashidi interests is misleading. While tribes as the president’s Bayt al-Ahmar clan. Perhaps a whole and certain tribes – or sections of the most prominent of the broader clan is ‘Ali tribes – have some affinity with the present Muhsin al-Ahmar, commander of military regime, they are just as likely to jostle for forces in the northwest of the country and the advantage within a larger set of political actors prosecutor (many say the instigator) of the war and chafe at or resent government and against the Huthi group in Sa‘dah province. particularly regime actions and policies. In part, this set of circumstances derives from both socioeconomic changes in the country 14. A good exposition of the relationships, ties, and over the past several decades and the – what to offices is given in Dresch, Modern Yemen, pp. 189 and 201-203. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 11

The third circle involves two tribes, the the structure of Saddam Husayn’s Iraq in president’s own Sanhan and the allied Hashidi terms of concentric circles of trust and support tribe, Hamdan San‘a’. Members of these two from immediate family, clan, and tribe. tribes occupy key positions throughout the Because tribes were a more powerful civil government and the military/security component of politics in Yemen than they apparatus. A good number have married into were in Iraq, ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih has been far the president’s family. The president’s more careful regarding the impact of his tendency to rely on fellow Sanhanis is obvious. policies and actions on tribes than Saddam The connection of Hamdan San‘a’ with the needed to be. At the same time, it can be regime derives from it being the tribe of noted that with the deterioration of his control President Ahmad al-Ghashmi, who succeeded over events in the 1990s, Saddam took and may have ordered the killing of President increasing steps to bring tribes – or at least Ibrahim al-Hamdi. During Ghashmi’s brief tribal shaykhs – into the system. Salih relies presidency (1977-1978), ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih upon tribes for armed manpower at times and served as his right-hand man and, in the eyes major shaykhs have been co-opted into the of many Yemenis, was the actual assassin of the system through payments, government and Hamdi brothers. officer positions, seats in parliament, and Before and after the assassinations, the two commercial opportunities. But Salih does not worked hand in hand, using members of their exert the same level of control across the state two tribes, to diminish the influence of Hamdi that Saddam did. The tribes of Yemen have and his fellow, relatively reformist, officer, not been integrated into the political system colleagues in the Revolutionary Command under Salih’s control. Instead, they constitute Council – as well as to consolidate their own one sector of players or constituencies in the positions by enlisting and promoting Sanhani grand game of Yemeni politics. Salih does not and Hamdani tribesmen in the officer ranks of control them: he deals with them, he prods the military. Although the two tribes them, he contests them. historically were small and unimportant, their Rather than there existing another level of rise to ascendancy at this time was probably allied tribes supporting the regime – even helped as well by their proximity to Sanaa and amongst Hashid – Salih has cultivated allied therefore their ability to defend the capital shaykhs. The most important of these was against internal threats. Yemenis and in Shaykh ‘Abdullah Husayn al-Ahmar. Shaykh particular tribal members have been more apt ‘Abdullah played various roles on the national to characterize this structure of ruling as scene since the civil war of the 1960s, His mahsubiyah (patronage) than as qabaliyah original power base was as paramount shaykh (tribalism).15 of the Hashid, which served him well during Rather than being a tribally based system the 1960s war and the early years of the of rule, the Yemeni regime seems to resemble reconciled YAR. But eventually he transformed into a Sanaa politician. To be sure, he still was highly influential among the 15. Paul K. Dresch, “The Tribal Factor in the Hashid, the leading tribal shaykh in the Yemeni Crisis,” in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, ed., The country, and one of the most important Yemeni War of 1994: Causes and Consequences arbiters or mediators in tribal affairs large and (London: Saqi Books, 1995), pp. 41-42. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 12

small. Mujahid’s prominence and standing derived as But, more importantly, he and his sons much, if not more, from his military career took up residence in Sanaa and they became and participation in the 1974 coup that put involved in lucrative commercial enterprises. the Command Council in charge with Ibrahim He struck an early alliance with ‘Ali ‘Abdullah al-Hamdi at its head. Salih, which won him the position of speaker Another larger-than-life figure from the of parliament and he served as the regime’s time of the 1960s civil war was Sinan b. point man in relations with Saudi Arabia. ‘Abdullah Abu Luhum, shaykh of the Nihm Supporters in Saudi Arabia encouraged and tribe and sometime paramount shaykh of the perhaps assisted him in the founding of the Bakil. Intriguer against Imam Ahmad, Yemeni Reform Grouping or al-Islah (discussed republican defender and even briefly a member below). Al-Islah was used at first to bolster of the presidential council and a minister in Salih against the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) the new YAR, he opposed President ‘Abdullah of the south, becoming junior partner in an al-Sallal and supported the “third force” alliance with Salih’s General People’s Congress leading to the Iryani government. His reward (GPC). When Salih determined that he could was long-time governorship of al-Hudaydah, do without the alliance, al-Islah was jettisoned which he ran as a virtual fiefdom. Sinan was into the opposition. This does not indicate a regarded as a maker and breaker of break between Salih and ‘Abdullah, however, governments. Although decidedly although there may have been friction. The conservative, his daughter was married to shaykh was instrumental in rallying the frequent prime minister Muhsin al-‘Ayni, a northern tribes behind the regime during the self-described Ba‘thist, and Sinan often 1994 civil war and he remained an important supported his son-in-law in the government. liaison between the Saudis and Salih, with Yet his leadership of the Bakil was whom Riyadh has frosty relations and a major compromised by his support of the republic in reason why Saudi Arabia quietly supported the the 1960s while much of the confederation south in the 1994 war. remained royalist. Two brothers, Dirham and Other shaykhs have been co-opted into the ‘Ali, both army officers and cousins of Sinan, Sanaa web, both in politics and in commerce. became members of the Command Council in Some have served as ministers in various 1974, although they were soon purged. Indeed, governments. Mujahid Abu Shawarib of the a number of Bayt Abu Luhum pursued Kharif tribe, a relative (and rival) of ‘Abdullah military careers, including two of Sinan’s Husayn al-Ahmar, rose from a minor tribal brothers. But from the beginning of the Salih position answering to Shaykh ‘Abdullah to a presidency, the family seemed to fade into the prominent military career and head of the background. Another family member, Yemeni Ba‘thi Party. Although he had some Muhammad ‘Ali Abu Luhum, took an active support from Hashid for the presidency part in the creation of the United Bakil following the 1978 assassination of Ahmad al- Council in the early 1990s. Ghashmi, he failed in his quest and had to Firm leadership of the Bakil has long been settle for the relatively empty title of deputy a problem. The Al al-Shayif family have prime minister and later personal adviser to provided the shaykhs of Dhu Husayn for the president. While a tribal shaykh, generations and several shaykhs in the last APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 13

century or two have died opposing the businessmen who supported the system, and Ottomans and the imams. Shaykh Naji b. weapons dealers and smugglers. In that ‘Abd al-‘Aziz was elected paramount shaykh of context, he proposed postponing presidential the Bakil about 1981 but he was soon elections for two years and the formation of an suborned by ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih into leading interim government to carry out constitutional a quiet life in Sanaa. Another al-Shayif, reforms and bring the JMP into a coalition Muhammad, subsequently claimed leadership government. of the confederation. Husayn is a former GPC member of The Abu Ra’s family of the Dhu parliament, who hinted at creating an Muhammad have been equally prominent in alternative party in 2005 when he was not Bakili and national contexts. Shaykh Amin elected to the GPC’s General Secretariat. This rallied the Bakil to the republican cause in the idea evolved into the National Solidarity 1950s and then was an influential figure in the Council (NSC), created in 2007, consisting of “third force” that helped engineer the Iryani shaykhs (largely Hashid?), businessmen, and government. He served as a minister of state academics, with Husayn as its chairman. Not until his death in 1978. His son Sadiq used a real party, the NSC claimed it would utilize his work with the local development the organs of civil society to bring about associations as a stepping stone to ministerial development that the regime is unwilling or portfolios of agriculture, civil service, and local unable to do. Another son, Sadiq, has stayed administration, but never figured highly in the away from state institutions and was elected national political scene or amongst the Bakil. head of Hashid upon his father’s death. In The most important of all these shaykhs, addition, Himyar, a GPC MP, is Deputy ‘Abdullah b. Husayn al-Ahmar, died on 29 Speaker of Parl. and Midhaj is a members of December 2007. Shaykh ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar’s parliament under the Islah banner. death prompts several key questions. First, can The temptation to answer the question of his position and influence within the regime whether Shaykh ‘Abdullah can be replaced is be replicated by someone else, most notably no, that he was sui generis. ‘Abdullah arose to one of more of his sons? Four of ‘Abdullah’s prominence when the tribes were paramount sons have held parliamentary positions (two and victory in the 1960s civil war depended on with the GPC and two with al-Islah) and are which way the tribal winds were blowing. Now well-known and powerful in Sanaa. In Yemen, the tribes form just one of a number of as elsewhere in the Middle East, it is not constituencies in Yemeni national politics. unknown for sons to take up their fathers’ Furthermore, ‘Abdullah made his reputation mantle upon the latters’ deaths. during critical and unique periods in Yemen’s One of the best known of them is Hamid, evolution: the early years of the reconciled who has been prominent in al-Islah and the YAR, the Hamdi period of consolidation, and Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). In recent years, the 1994 civil war. Such opportune he has become increasingly critical of the circumstances for another self-made individual president and the GPC. In June 2006, he may never reappear. predicted a peaceful popular revolution would His sons may have the ambitions but not overthrow the military-family alliance the opportunities. Both Hamid and Husayn dominating the regime, as well as the have chosen to oppose the government and APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 14

presumably could achieve greater influence or Jibran and Yahya b. Muhammad Abu position only if the government fell or they Shawarib, Saba b. Sinan Abu Luhum, and were co-opted. Sadiq may be head of Hashid Muhammad b. Naji al-Shayif, have found it but, as pointed out elsewhere in this paper, the difficult to follow in their father’s foodsteps title of shaykh al-mashayikh does not carry the because of changed circumstances from the same resonance that it did in times past, even early years of the independent states. The when ‘Abdullah b. Husayn was still the shaykh. tribes remain vitally important in Yemen but More broadly, factors mitigating against a tribalism no longer means the same thing. As smooth continuation of strong al-Ahmar one observer put it at the turn of the 21st influence in the present regime are (a) the century, variable qualities of the sons (who have been Shaykh ‘Abdullah used to be referred involved in at least several shoot-outs with to as shaykh mashiykh al-yaman security personnel in Sanaa), (b) the president’s (paramount shaykh of Yemen). That is declining need for a figure of ‘Abdullah’s not a phrase that is heard any more. A unique status, and (c) the decreased importance decade ago, within that form of of tribal blocs to underpin the regime. common knowledge, Hashidis used to It could be argued that Yemeni boast that their tribes, unlike others, circumstances remain fluid enough for were united ‘like an army unit’. That someone else to rise to prominence. But from is not a boast I have heard from a where? Secular, “liberal,” politicians in Sanaa Hashid tribesman for a long time: have insignificant power bases and the army indeed many of them seem has been molded to serve ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih’s demoralized. Although it is hard to purpose. Mujahid Abu Shawarib, ‘Abdullah’s imagine tribes ever acting against the fellow Hashidi and brother-in-law, would have Shaykh – he is held in great respect, dearly liked to supplant ‘Abdullah and even and rightly – it is just as hard to ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih but never succeeded and, imagine tribes (Hashid included) in addition, he had the misfortune to pass acting with him in the way they used from the scene before ‘Abdullah. His son to even twenty years ago. The Shaykh’s Jubran, although now head of Kharif, does not undoubted influence has little to do have the standing of his father. ‘Abd al-Majid with traditional ‘asabiyyah (solidarity al-Zindani undoubtedly would like to exert the based on tribe).”16 same level of influence but his side of al-Islah, At this point, succession to ‘Ali ‘Abdullah i.e., the radical Islamist party, never controlled Salih would most likely be from someone al-Islah and Zindani does not have the natural within the clique he has established. Most standing with the tribes. No one can notably, he has been pushing his son Ahmad command a pan-tribal leadership, least of all a to succeed him but it could well be someone non-Hashidi (i.e. no Bakilis need apply). else close to him. The name of ‘Ali Muhsin al- The second question is there any other Ahmar has been advanced but it may well be figure with a shaykhly background who can that ‘Ali Muhsin is too confrontational, too rally the tribes either in support of or in Islamist, and too tainted by his imbroglios in opposition to the regime? The sons of other key shaykhs from an older generation, such as 16. Dresch, “Tribal Factor,” p. 40. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 15

the war against the Huthis. The essential point of GPC seats in parliament. But, after all, for the purposes of this paper is that tribespeople constitute a significant number, if succession is most likely to lie within the not a majority, of Yemen’s population and so narrow base fashioned over the past thirty it is no surprise that a member of a particular years. While that base has a very strong tribal tribe should be elected to parliament in his component, “tribal” in this context means the tribal district. Furthermore, it is not superior position of just two tribes, Salih’s own surprising that ambitious individuals, whether Sanhan and the allied Hamdan San‘a’, not tribal or not, should ally themselves with the even the rest of Hashid and certainly not the GPC, the most powerful party in Yemen and Bakil. In addition, while the armed forces and the party of the president. security apparatus provide a vital bulwark for The tribal aspect of al-Islah has been more the regime, they are really only tribal in the strongly stressed. But to say it is the organ of above sense. That is, while most of the soldiers tribalism is as inaccurate as contending that it and many of the officers belong to tribes, their is the Islamist party. In many respects, its identification with and loyalty to the ROY genesis and continuation owes much to a government and socialization into a wider partnership of two men, ‘Abdullah b. Husayn Yemeni context makes their tribal affiliation al-Ahmar and ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani. almost incidental in a political context. ‘Abdullah had played a role in the formation While tribal shaykhs may entertain lofty of the Islamic Front in 1979, which emerged as ambitions and tribespeople chafe paradoxically an armed force supporting the government in at the intrusion and the weakness of the its efforts to extinguish the National central government, it seems clear that the Democratic Front in southern North Yemen. capability – or unity – of the tribes en masse to Not long after that, ‘Abd al-Majid began alter the course of Yemeni politics has become flexing his muscles as (briefly) minister of severely limited. This is not to say that tribes education and by creating multitudes of are unimportant but just that they create religious institutes, allegedly financed with nuisances for the government and are no Ministry of Education and Saudi money. longer corporate actors beyond the local level. While the two men, and their respective It is wide of the mark to assert that there is followers, had some interests in common (for a collective tribal political consciousness. example, their opposition to ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Instead, the tribes and tribespeople constitute Salih), their cooperation in formation of al- constituencies within broader political Islah seemed to be principally a marriage of aggregations. In this respect, they are perhaps convenience. The merged network and analogous to “working class white men” or resources was stronger and more able to “evangelical Christians” in US politics. contend with Salih’s GPC. Certainly tribal interests are represented in the Paradoxically, however, the relegation of al- General People’s Congress (GPC) but much in Islah to ineffectual opposition in electoral the same way as tribal interests are represented terms perhaps has been the reason behind its in the security forces. Tribesmen pursue longevity: if al-Islah had been swept into political or military careers the same as other power, divisions between the tribal and Yemenis. As pointed out above, prominent Islamist camps would have quickly deepened shaykhs and sons of shaykhs occupy a number and doomed the alliance. While both wings APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 16

tend to be conservative in social and political supporters of it, especially since southerners in terms, the tribes are less accepting of a strict the army have been said to have been used as Islamist state than they are of a weak and cannon fodder in the Huthi fighting outside corrupt secular state. Furthermore, the generic, Sa‘dah. Sunni, salafi/Wahhabi emphasis of the Islamist A striking effect of changes in the ‘Ali wing directly threatens the Zaydi tribes of the ‘Abdullah Salih period has been the north. This seems to be a contributing factor transformation of many major shaykhs away to the Huthi rebellion and the government’s from their traditional role as heads or response. chairmen of their own and allied tribes and as It is perhaps paradoxical to speak on the the spokesmen for their tribes in their dealings one hand of President Salih’s reliance on with other tribes or the state. Increasingly, fellow and allied tribesmen in the military for these shaykhs no longer reside in their tribal the maintenance of his position while, on the territories but in the capital. Their interests other, refuting the notion that the security are geared toward business and political forces are tribal in nature. To repeat from concerns are often to secure and defend a seat above, the construction of Salih’s power in parliament, often as a member of the GPC. depends on the loyalty of a clique, not tribal One of the early prompts for this Yemen. The fact that tribesmen are sprinkled transformation was the emergence of so-called liberally throughout the security forces and at “youth shaykhs.” They, along with fellow all ranks is not because Salih and his associates tribesmen, had gone abroad to work and have inserted them there so much as the army returned with wealth and newfound standing has long served as a positive avenue of amongst those who had had their horizons employment and advancement. Only the two broadened. Many of these used the tribes in alliance with Salih can be said to have cooperatives (also known as local development benefitted from close political relationships. associations or LDAs). Indeed, ‘Abdullah al- Even most Hashidi tribes have not been Ahmar and Mujahid Abu Shawarib together favored, although Kharif and Bani Suraym are founded the Hashid cooperative. Even said to have done fairly well. It perhaps can Ibrahim al-Hamdi saw involvement with and even be said that the domination of Sanhan promotion of LDAs as a route to and Hamdan San‘a’ in the army has provoked advancement. resentment and even coup attempts by other The most prominent example of this sea- tribes, even Hashidi ones. Tribesmen in the change undoubtedly was ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar. armed forces, rather than being tribal Details of his transformation and of his career supporters of the president, are more likely to are given above. While his death has left a be Islamists and therefore closer to Zindani vacuum in national affairs and in effective and perhaps other even more extremist leadership of al-‘Usaymat as well as Hashid, his figures.17 It almost goes without saying that emergent role and status as part of the Sanaa southern tribes play no significant role in the scene probably will mean that his son Sadiq military or security services. They are more will not replace him as a paramount shaykh in likely to pose a threat to the regime than be the same way. Another alternative for the ambitions of “youth shaykhs” was a career as an army 17. Dresch, “Tribal Factor,” pp. 41 and 107n22. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 17

officer. Mujahid Abu Shawarib provides a mythical tribal past.18 The formation of the good example, as do a number of the Abu National Solidarity Council in 2007 may be Luhum from the Bakil. seen in a similar light: although a coalition The foregoing should demonstrate that the mostly of tribes and shaykhs, the council tribal role in Yemeni politics has been expressed its commitment to using instruments impacted by a number of social and economic of civil society to reform Yemeni politics held developments. The LDAs provide an example captive by a bad regime and to advance of how improvements in tribespeople’s development. standard of living can be achieved outside of, Given the factors outlined above, it is or at least in parallel with, traditional tribal problematic to think of a tribal cadre ways. Furthermore, tribal loyalties face supporting the regime or forming a unified competition from emerging political parties “loyal opposition.” In the first place, the and both pan-Arab and Islamist ideologies. collective power of the tribes in former North None of this has passed unnoticed to Yemen has ebbed markedly over the past either the average tribesperson or his or her quarter century while the tribes in the former shaykh. Numerous attempts were made to South Yemen were neutralized, if not rally groups of tribes behind banners of marginalized, during the period 1967-1990. common or confederal interests. During the Any previously existing tribal power base has 1960s civil war, important conferences at become more restricted and more fragmented. ‘Amran and Khamir were held to try to resolve Secondly, the tribal bloc that long the divisions created by the war. ‘Abdullah al- provided the “natural” backing of and Ahmar sought to form a tribal conference for influence within Yemeni governments, i.e. all Yemen and there were several subsequent Hashid and to a lesser extent Bakil, has conferences aimed at restoring the Bakil to disintegrated as a bloc. In addition to being their rightful prominence. subjected to socioeconomic and political At least four conferences were held during change that has occurred during the Salih era, the years between unity in 1990 and the the Hashid have also seen their paramount outbreak of civil war in 1994. Matters shaykh, ‘Abdullah b. Husayn al-Ahmar discussed at these conferences included the transformed from a leader and representative Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the expulsion of of the Hashid party to a government insider Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia, the with his political and financial interests protection and preservation of ‘urf (tribal law), centered in Sanaa and less with his tribesmen. and, in one case, another attempt to frame His own al-‘Usaymat tribe has not benefitted larger tribal concerns within a Bakili materially from his presence on the national framework. As one observer has put it, the scene. In general, individual tribes are on their wide-ranging, and not necessarily tribal, nature own, resulting in severe limitations of of concerns expressed at these conferences led influence or power, and attempts to resurrect to other national conferences and together alliances or confederations do not produce these constitute expressions of civil society much. instead of narrow attempts to preserve a

18. Dresch, “Tribal Factor,” pp. 49-54. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 18

Tribes vs. the ROY State as well as forcing the government to release tribesmen in official custody. Nearly all these kidnappings have been brief and hostages have Some observers have postulated that there been released unharmed, often after the alleged has been a major change in the nature of tribes payment of ransoms. Notably, the and tribalism in Yemen since the 1990s, driven tribe has carried out the kidnapping of in part by the distancing of shaykhs from their foreigners, in part to get financing for local tribes – i.e. the shaykhs have been drawn to the development projects, and the Murad took center, leaving their constituents to fend for 19 action against government forces to secure the themselves economically and psychologically. removal of the corrupt head of a military At the same time, the greater mobility of battalion stationed in the region. The Jahm tribespeople, including labor migration tribe has also been involved in the kidnapping abroad, reduced tribal loyalty. of foreigners and other tribesmen – notably This has produced at least three effects. from Sanhan during a dispute. The first has been a growing atmosphere of But a third effect has involved the “lawlessness.” Severe damage has been development of alliances with – and/or sustained by the system and code of tribalism. conversions of tribesmen by – Islamist Incidents of theft and banditry have extremists on either practical or ideological mushroomed. Shaykh Sadiq b. ‘Abdullah al- grounds. This has produced violent outcomes Ahmar, at the ceremony investing him with to kidnappings. The Bani Dabyan were leadership of Hashid after his father’s death, implicated, at least at first, in the kidnapping felt compelled to beseech tribesmen to stop of 16 tourists by the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army committing revenge killings, highway robberies in December 1998 and the subsequent deaths and wars that he regarded as creating incurable of four of the tourists. Sinan al-Harithi and crises, weakening the national economy, and his associates, killed by an American Hellfire destroying development. missile, had been enjoying refuge with the A second effect has been a tendency to rely tribes of al-Jawf. The ‘Abidah tribe has a on one’s own means to deal with or pressure thorough history of kidnappings, the the government. This can be seen most clearly smuggling of drugs, and providing sanctuary in the emergence and spread of kidnapping of to extremist groups. Special forces searching foreigners. Formerly strictly off-limits, this for extremists in ‘Abidah tribal territory in practice has become almost routine, December 2001 clashed with tribesmen, particularly by tribes of al-Jawf and Ma’rib resulting in deaths on both sides. About the who have boldly snatched foreign hostages off same time, eighty foreign students and teachers the streets of Sanaa as well as relying on at the Dar al-Hadith religious institute in tourists that have strayed into their territory. ‘Abidah territory were expelled from Yemen. Many of these kidnappings, as well as a related Tribal connivance would have been necessary practice of sabotaging the oil pipeline, have in the extremist operation at Ma’rib in July been directed at gaining more employment for 2007 when seven Spanish tourists and tribes in whose territory oil is being extracted, accompanying Yemeni drivers and guards were murdered. There must have been tribal knowledge of at least the possibility of a 19. Dresch, “Tribal Factor,” pp. 35 and 38. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 19

similar operation at Shibam in January 2008 in of the north and east. These activities have which a number of Belgians were killed or been supplemented by hijackings and wounded. It is probably impossible to tell to kidnappings for ransom. In addition, money what degree tribal involvement was for reasons flows into the tribes through the shaykhs from of practical alliance or was the result of the neighboring regimes while well-heeled Islamists conversion of individual tribesmen to in the Gulf fund religious institutes and extremism. charities, fueling a growth in Islamist One seemingly paradoxical reaction to the sentiment in the countryside. Sanhani/Hamdani (and by extension Hashidi) Tribal unrest in the south most likely will domination of the ROY state was the re- grow for two almost inevitable reasons. First, emergence of two weakened tribal northern domination of the south will confederations. A number of attempts had continue, stoking resentment amongst most been made at resurrecting Bakili cohesion, southerners, the tribes included. Second, including by various competing shaykhs. economic deprivation will also continue, More intriguing has been the reappearance of especially as oil production begins to run the nearly moribund al-Madhhaj in the down. The amount of water available for southern part of the ex-YAR. An al- cultivation and animal husbandry is expected Madhhaj/Bakil alliance was actively sought by to decline rapidly and tribe-against-tribe and some, even in conjunction with the sayyid- tribe-against-government fighting is almost organized Union of Popular Forces or the YSP. inevitable. The south has seen some growth in tribal Given the relative strength of the ROY expression as well, not in opposition to the government (as demonstrated in 1994), it state but for bargaining power with the state. seems unlikely that southern tribes will unite Certainly, one reason for these developments against it. Should insurrection break out, has been to challenge Hashidi dominance. In tribes may take part or sit aside as they did in addition, the reappearance of al-Madhhaj owed 1994. However, since the 1994 secession something to unity and the restoration of attempt broke the back of southern Yemen’s traditional ties with tribes south of the existing leadership – both the YSP and the previous border.20 broader coalition of exiles that were recruited Given the weakness of the state and its – it is difficult to see where leadership for inability to improve the standard of living of another attempt will emerge. Perhaps the only its people, tribes and tribespeople have become possibility will be through Islamist movements. increasing exasperated with the government At present, however, there are deep divisions and the now-urban-based officer and between the existing, essentially status quo businessman shaykhs. Accordingly, they have Muslim leadership, as represented by state resorted to pursuing alternative means of imams and sayyids, and more extremist earning money. Smuggling of narcotics, tendencies. Neither al-Qa‘idah nor the Aden- currencies, and weapons across the border with Abyan Islamic Army has seemed to garner Saudi Arabia has proven lucrative for the tribes extensive public support. Tribes provide many of the foot soldiers for Islamist opposition in Yemen but few 20. Carapico, Civil Society, pp. 203-204; Dresch, leaders or ideologues. Tribal connection with “Tribal Factor,” pp. 45-56. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 20

Islamist figures and movements tends to be clear that the group was singled out for attack based on factors other than zealotry, such as by the government and specifically by ‘Ali common dissatisfaction with government Muhsin al-Ahmar, allegedly because of corruption and direction. For example, it has Wahhabi/salafi zeal. There are no reliable been said that ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani has estimates of the numbers of committed little standing – and thus little appeal – members of the group but a series of summer amongst the tribes. The involvement of camps centered on Zaydi traditions exposed tribesmen in the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, thousands of young men to al-Huthi beliefs. which kidnapped a group of Western tourists It is reasonable to assume that many Huthis in 1998, some of whom were subsequently belonged to local tribes and as government killed in a shootout with the army, seems to be operations killed local tribespeople, their tribes for the same reasons that apply to urban and joined the Huthis in resistance. peasant individuals. The ranks of the Afghans, The extent to which the affair, particularly not surprisingly, include tribesmen. the heavyhanded actions and the incompetence Of course, appeals to tribal honor may of the government, has engendered sympathy cause a tribe to provide assistance to an throughout the country cannot be gauged Islamist tribal member and some shaykhs, such accurately. However, the ability of this group as Tariq al-Fadli, may use their position or to continue the fight in Sa‘dah province status to rally tribespeople around them. But against sustained military action, supported by Tariq’s commitment to the Islamist cause has pro-government tribes, indicates that it has been questioned in recent years as he has managed to gather additional support. More drawn closer to the GPC, allegedly to advance puzzling is its ability to engage in heavy his chances of regaining family property and fighting against troops at ‘Amran and his own prosperity. It also may well be that especially in Bani Hushaysh territory on the supporting Islamists is seen as being counter- outskirts of Sanaa. Whether Bani Hushaysh productive. If a tribe wants representation in tribesmen joined Huthi forces is unknown, as parliament, for instance, its chances are much is the relevance of Bani Hushaysh being the better with a GPC candidate than one from al- seat of al-Wazir sayyid family, itself involved in Islah.21 peripatetic anti-government agitation. The operations against the Believing Youth The Huthi affair points to possible, even group in Sa‘dah, better known as al-Huthi likely, ramifications for the broader Yemeni group, have magnified the attention, appeal, situation. The ability and effectiveness of and tenacity of this group. The government Huthi indoctrination in rural summer camps has charged the group with seeking to leads to the possibility of similar activities in overthrow the government and to restore the other areas, whether Zaydi or especially Sunni. Zaydi imamate. But it also seems reasonably Disaffection with the government – its corruption, its domination by a small clique, and its inability to carry out necessary development and social services – is widespread 21. Elizabeth Mechelle Langston, “The Islamist Movement and Tribal Networks: Islamist Party and is accentuated by the country’s dismal Mobilization Amongst the Tribes of Jordan and economic situation, endemic poverty, and lack Yemen” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kentucky, of opportunities for young Yemenis. These 2005), pp. 203-204. APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 21

grievances can easily be played upon by Imam Yahya. The Hashidi Hamdan and Bakili extremist groups in the same way as al-Huthi. Wa’ilah tribes also straddle the border. While the regime may feel that it needs to Over the last thirty or forty years, literally keep Islamists such as ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani millions of Yemeni men have emigrated to at least partly placated, it is unlikely to have Saudi Arabia to work and of course many were any influence with extremist groups. These expelled because of their government’s stance regard the government as being beyond the after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Cross- pale and seek take advantage of Sanaa’s border ties between tribes have strengthened unpopular connection to the United States. It because of cooperation in smuggling. This would take little to recruit significantly among presents a serious problem for the Yemeni disaffected youth. It may be surmised that government because it erodes what little urban youth are more susceptible to this type control it has in peripheral areas. It is even of recruitment but as the Huthi affair and the more serious for Riyadh because of the inter-connection of extremists with tribes in al- imports of arms and covert entry by Islamist Jawf, Ma’rib, and Shabwah indicate, rural extremists. youth are also recruitable. In fact, the ties and While government-to-government relations tribal codes that constrained aberrant behavior have often been strained, Saudi relations with amongst tribespeople have deteriorated in the Yemeni tribes have often been very close. It last decade or two, leaving the door wide open has been a Saudi policy since 1962 to keep for alienation and recruitment. Yemeni states weak and providing largesse to the tribes was welcomed by the tribes and their shaykhs. Shaykh ‘Abdullah Husayn al-Ahmar Tribal Aspects of Yemen’s was always regarded as the Saudis’ man in Sanaa (or at least one of them). At the same International Relations time, Salafi proselytization has quickened in tribal areas throughout Yemen but particularly The connections of Yemeni tribes to Saudi in the north. Whether facilitated by the Saudi Arabia are long and complex. Yemenis nearly secular administration (in contrast to its unanimously hold the opinion that the Islamist foreign-policy apparatus) or not, the provinces of Najran, ‘Asir, and Jizan were perception in Yemen is that the Saudis are stolen by the Saudis in the 1934 war. Tribal, deliberately spreading Wahhabism across the sectarian, and cultural linkages still abound. country. The populations of those lost provinces may At the same time, however, Saudi Arabia be overtly Sunni but many appear to harbor has long cultivated a penchant for shooting Zaydi backgrounds. There is a very close itself in the foot when it comes to Yemen. In connection between the Isma‘ilis of Najran and 2000, poverty amongst the Isma‘ilis, those of Yemen. The Najrani tribe of Yam, an resentment of Al Sa‘ud greed in the region, Isma‘ili tribe, has maintained close relations and the invasion of a mosque by mutawwi‘in with Yemeni Isma‘ilis. The Yam asserted their in Najran set off a major disturbance resulting control over the Isma‘ili Jabal Haraz region in dozens of Isma‘ili deaths at the hands of west of Sanaa in the eighteenth century, and Saudi police. The government accused those more recently served as soldiers in the army of arrested of practicing witchcraft and sentenced APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 22

seventeen of them to death (their sentences criminal problem without political were later reduced). Another incident in 2008 consequences. Almost paradoxically, Oman’s stoked Yemeni anger more strongly. Eighteen history of hostility with South Yemen Yemenis who had illegally entered the kingdom dissipated after Yemeni unity and in the 1994 near Khamis al-Mushayt were captured by Yemeni civil war, Oman tilted carefully Saudi border guards and set on fire. After towards the secessionist south. A prominent interrogation and medical treatment, they were businessman in Oman, Ahmad Farid al- deported to Yemen. The Saudi government ‘Awlaqi, pleaded the southern case to the denied the reports and claimed that they had sultan and after joining the fighting was been rescued from a fire in a garbage dump. named DRY governor of Shabwah. He Additionally, the Saudi decision a few years returned to Oman afterwards to resume ago to build a large-scale barrier wall between concentration on his business empire. In the the kingdom and Yemen not only aroused the following 14 years, there were few issues to mar ire of Yemeni nationalists but in particular Yemeni-Omani relations and no serious issues incensed the Wa’ilah since it threatened to arose with tribes from either state’s border split the tribe completely in two. regions. Although the Dhufar war of the 1960s and There are at least two different reasons why 1970s was an internal rebellion, the Popular Yemeni tribes may have a broader impact on Front received sanctuary and material Yemeni foreign policy. The first is their innate assistance from South Yemen. While Dhufari conservatism. On the local level, this translate tribes naturally were in the thick of the war on to suspicion of the government and its local both sides, Yemeni tribes were only marginally representatives, as well as foreigners connected involved in the fighting. However, the to the government. On a more national level, territory of the Mahrah nation spans the perceptions of government are ambivalent. present border between Yemen and Oman. A The government can provide benefits but also number of Mahri tribes or sections of tribes it can restrict freedom and, especially through defected from Yemen to Oman, in large part the corruption of local and national officials, because life on the Omani side was more can act capriciously. Encouragement by promising than poor austere PDRY. There are foreign powers, including or especially the also several Mahri and other South Arabian United States, of more government intrusion tribes residing astride the border. in tribal areas and affairs in furtherance of Furthermore, since the three main clans of counter-terrorism activities may well provoke Salalah, one mountain tribe, and the largest of a tribal backlash and, given the proliferation of the badu tribes inland are Kathiri, there are arms in the country, violence. ties to the Yemeni Kathiri although these are The second reason derives from the impact not thought to be close. of international media. While newspapers and The reaching of a border agreement satellite television may be restricted to the between Yemen and Oman in the mid-1990s better educated and more prosperous sectors of opened the border up to freer crossings and the population, radio broadcasts and word of trade. One unanticipated effect was a certain mouth keeps people in remote areas abreast of amount of banditry by Yemeni tribesmen news regarding their country, the Arab world, inside Oman. This, however, has remained a and the West. As long ago as the 1930s and APBN-007 (December 2008) Tribes and Politics in Yemen J.E. Peterson p. 23

1940s, Western visitors to Yemen were attitudes can be observed throughout Yemen frequently quizzed over events in Palestine, society. It can be reliably postulated that Communism, and the progress of World War collective tribal action against a foreign threat II. In a more globalized world, it should not is possible only in the event of foreign/ROY be surprising that Yemenis of all varieties, action against the tribe, its allies, or its including the average tribesperson in Razih or members. Radfan, will be aware of American activity in Iraq and support for Israel. But the consequent hostility to the United States it provokes is not a “tribal” phenomenon as such