IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix|DTM Round 16, Abyan Governorate Monitoring Sheet February - 2017
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A New Model for Defeating Al Qaeda in Yemen
A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in Yemen Katherine Zimmerman September 2015 A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in Yemen KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2015 A REPORT BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 3 Part I: Al Qaeda and the Situation in Yemen ................................................................................................. 5 A Broken Model in Yemen ...................................................................................................................... 5 The Collapse of America’s Counterterrorism Partnership ........................................................................ 6 The Military Situation in Yemen ........................................................................................................... 10 Yemen, Iran, and Regional Dynamics ................................................................................................... 15 The Expansion of AQAP and the Emergence of ISIS in Yemen ............................................................ 18 Part II: A New Strategy for Yemen ............................................................................................................. 29 Defeating the Enemy in Yemen ............................................................................................................ -
Aid Security and COVID-19 Latest Available Information on COVID-19 Developments Impacting the Security of Aid Work and Operations
Aid Security and COVID-19 Latest available information on COVID-19 developments impacting the security of aid work and operations. Access the COVID-19 Bulletin 6 Aid Security Overview Data on HDX to see the events referred to in this bulletin. 22 May 2020 This bulletin from the Aid The Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas Security and COVID-19 The effect of airstrikes, shelling and IEDs on health care and the COVID-19 health response in March and series highlights the use of April 2020. explosive weapons in populated areas in Syria, Yemen, and Libya during On 23 March 2020, UN Secretary General António Guterres called for a global ceasefire amid the COVID-19 March and April 2020. pandemic. Reminding the world that in war-ravaged countries health systems have often collapsed and that health professionals have been targeted, he called on warring parties to cease hostilities, silence guns, stop the It is based on publicly available reports of incidents that injured artillery, and end airstrikes on civilians. or killed workers, damaged health facilities or health Turkey and Russia had already agreed to a ceasefire in Syria’s Idlib province on 05 March after violence transport at the time of the escalated that left scores of Turkish and Syrian soldier’s dead. The Houthi rebels, Yemeni government, and COVID-19 response. Saudi Arabia, which leads the military campaign in support of the Yemeni government. initially responded Event descriptions have not positively to the UN appeal for a ceasefire. In Libya, the main protagonists in the conflict also initially welcomed been independently verified. -
Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen January 2018 Contents
POMEPS STUDIES 29 Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen January 2018 Contents Introduction . .. 3 Collapse of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and the future of Yemen’s war . 9 April Longley Alley, International Crisis Group In Yemen, 2018 looks like it will be another grim year . 15 Peter Salisbury, Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme Popular revolution advances towards state building in Southern Yemen . 17 Susanne Dahlgren, University of Tampere/National University of Singapore Sunni Islamist dynamics in context of war: What happened to al-Islah and the Salafis? . 23 Laurent Bonnefoy, Sciences Po/CERI Impact of the Yemen war on militant jihad . 27 Elisabeth Kendall, Pembroke College, University of Oxford Endgames for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Yemen . 31 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy Yemen’s war as seen from the local level . 34 Marie-Christine Heinze, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) and Hafez Albukari, Yemen Polling Center (YPC) Yemen’s education system at a tipping point: Youth between their future and present survival . 39 Mareike Transfeld, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin Graduate School of Muslim Cultures and Societies Gasping for hope: Yemeni youth struggle for their future . 43 Ala Qasem, Resonate! Yemen Supporting and failing Yemen’s transition: Critical perspectives on development agencies . 46 Ala’a Jarban, Concordia University The rise and fall and necessity of Yemen’s youth movements . 51 Silvana Toska, Davidson College A diaspora denied: Impediments to Yemeni mobilization for relief and reconstruction at home . 55 Dana M. Moss, University of Pittsburgh War and De-Development . -
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): an Al-Qaeda Affiliate Case Study David Knoll
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): An Al-Qaeda Affiliate Case Study David Knoll With contributions from Alexander Thurston and Pamela G. Faber October 2017 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. This document contains the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the sponsor. Distribution DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. SPECIFIC AUTHORITY: N00014-16-D-5003 10/27/2017 Photography Credit: Michael Markowitz, CNA. Approved by: October 2017 Dr. Jonathan Schroden, Director Center for Stability and Development Center for Strategic Studies This work was performed under Federal Government Contract No. N00014-16-D-5003. Copyright © 2017 CNA Abstract Section 1228 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) states: “The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide for the conduct of an independent assessment of the effectiveness of the United States’ efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al- Qaeda, including its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents since September 11, 2001.” The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)) asked CNA to conduct this independent assessment, which was completed in August 2017. In order to conduct this assessment, CNA used a comparative methodology that included eight case studies on groups affiliated or associated with Al-Qaeda. These case studies were then used as a dataset for cross-case comparison. This document is a stand-alone version of the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) case study used in the Independent Assessment. -
A/HRC/45/CRP.7 29 September 2020
1 0 A/HRC/45/CRP.7 29 September 2020 English Arabic and English only Human Rights Council Forty-fifth session 14 September–2 October 2020 Agenda item 2 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014 Detailed findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen* Summary Submitted as a supplement to A/HRC/45/6, this paper sets out the detailed findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen mandated to investigate violations by parties to the conflict since September 2014. During this year, the Group of Eminent Experts prioritised for investigation violations occurring since mid-2019, while taking a longer temporal scope for some categories of violations not fully addressed during our previous reports. The Group of Eminent Experts found reasonable grounds to believe that the parties to the conflict in Yemen are responsible for pervasive and incessant international human rights law and international humanitarian law violations, many of which may amount to war crimes. The summary of these findings is included in A/HRC/45/6. In addition to highlighting the parties to the conflict responsible for violations, the Group of Eminent Experts identified, where possible, potential perpetrators of crimes that may have been committed. A list of names of such individuals has been submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on a strictly confidential basis to assist with future accountability efforts. -
Report on Cooperation and Coordination Between the Houthi Militia and Terrorist Organizations
Republic of Yemen Central Agency for Political Security National Security Service Report on cooperation and coordination between the Houthi militia and terrorist organizations 1 Contents Executive summary:………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 Introduction: …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………7 First: The goals of Houthi fallacies and allegations. ………………………………………………………………………5 Second: Evidence that refutes the fallacies and claims of the Houthi militia: ………………………………………….. 6 Multiple photos of the Al-Farouq School building (primary, secondary) (Al-Farouq Institute) in Karry - Marib Governorate. …………………….………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 Third: The relationship of the Houthi militia with terrorist organizations. …………………………………………11 A- Intelligence security cooperation: …………………………………………………………………………………… 11 B- The release of the organization’s operatives through premeditated escape operations: ……………………………13 Fourth: Some Evidence of the Relationship between the Houthi Militia and Al-Qaeda Terrorist Organization: ….19 Fifth: Smuggling of Weapons and Drugs: ……………………………………………………………………………… 19 Sixth: Military Cooperation ………………………………………………………………………………………………20 Seventh: Examples of the legitimate security services ’achievements in combating al-Qaeda and ISIS terrorism in their areas of control: …………………………………………………………………………………………………22 Conclusion: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23 2 on 30 Dec 2020 on 30 Dec Airport Aden Houthi militia in targeting the international the militia Houthi in targeting Photos of terrorist attack byPhotos -
Marib: a Yemeni Government Stronghold Increasingly Vulnerable to Houthi Advances
MARIB: A YEMENI GOVERNMENT STRONGHOLD INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO HOUTHI ADVANCES By: Ali Al-Sakani Casey Coombs October 22, 2020 MARIB: A YEMENI GOVERNMENT STRONGHOLD INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO HOUTHI ADVANCES By: Ali Al-Sakani Casey Coombs October 22, 2020 COVER PHOTO: Armed tribesmen and Yemeni army forces keep watch at the frontline area of Al-Jadafer, Marib, near the border with Al-Jawf governorate, on September 6, 2020 // Sana’a Center photo by Ali Owidha The Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies is an independent think-tank that seeks to foster change through knowledge production with a focus on Yemen and the surrounding region. The Center’s publications and programs, offered in both Arabic and English, cover political, social, economic and security related developments, aiming to impact policy locally, regionally, and internationally. Oxford Research Group (ORG) is an independent organization that has been influential for nearly four decades in pioneering new, more strategic approaches to security and peacebuilding. Founded in 1982, ORG continues to pursue cutting-edge research and advocacy in the United Kingdom and abroad while managing innovative peacebuilding projects in several Middle Eastern countries. © COPYRIGHT SANA´A CENTER 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ......................................................................... 4 Introduction .................................................................................... 6 Historical and Cultural Background ................................................ 9 -
The Armed Conflict in Yemen: a Complicated Mosaic
THE WAR REPORT 2017 THE ARMED CONFLICT IN YEMEN: A COMPLICATED MOSAIC © ICRC OCTOBER 2017 I SARI ARRAF THE GENEVA ACADEMY A JOINT CENTER OF Although the conflict in Yemen is widely presented as organized and directed by a coalition of Yemeni opposition being between two distinct blocs – a Houthi–Saleh alliance parties (the Joint Meeting Parties, or JMP).4 Saleh was against forces loyal to the internationally recognized pushed to make several economic concessions and political president of Yemen, Abdrabbo Mansour promises, yet his moves did not succeed Hadi, backed by a Saudi-led coalition Neither camp is cohesive in placating the protests. Several – this description can be misleading. as both feature armed casualties were reported as the security Neither camp is cohesive as both feature groups or regional forces’ response to the protests was armed groups or regional players with players with divergent heavy-handed. divergent ideologies and political goals. ideologies and political On 18 March 2011, at least 45 From secessionists in the south, to goals. persons were killed after Saleh loyalists Salafists in Taiz and Aden and tribal dressed as civilians fired on an anti- leaders in the north, there are smaller groups in Yemen government rally in Sana’a. This episode marked a shifting who are not necessarily under the control of Hadi or the point in the protests as it prompted General Ali Mohsin Houthi–Saleh alliance.1 Even states participating in the al-Ahmar, commander of the First Armoured Division Saudi-led coalition seem to have different agendas in Yemen, and commander of the northwestern military zone, to as evidenced recently in mounting tensions between Hadi break away from Saleh two days later, and announce his and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the latter’s alleged support for the opposition and vow to defend protesters.5 In support for secessionist groups in South Yemen who operate effect, Mohsin’s announcement split the military–security quite independently from Hadi.2 In addition, the presence apparatus. -
26 August 2019 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
Res. 1267/1989/2253 List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1267/1989/2253 Generated on: 26 August 2019 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals QDi.400 Name: 1: IYAD 2: NAZMI 3: SALIH 4: KHALIL إﻳﺎد ﻧﻈﻤﻲ ﺻﺎﻟﺢ ﺧﻠﻴﻞ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1974 POB: Syrian Arab Republic Good quality a.k.a.: a) Ayyad Nazmi Salih Khalil b) Eyad Nazmi Saleh Khalil Low quality a.k.a.: a) Iyad al-Toubasi b) Iyad al-Tubasi c) Abu al-Darda' d) Abu-Julaybib al-Urduni e) Abu-Julaybib Nationality: Jordan Passport no: a) Jordan 654781 (approximately issued in 2009) b) Jordan 286062 (issued on 5 April 1999 at Zarqa, Jordan, expired on 4 April 2004) National identification no: na Address: Syrian Arab Republic (Coastal area of. Location as of April 2016) Listed on: 22 Feb. 2017 Other information: Leader of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (QDe.137) for coastal area of Syrian Arab Republic since March 2016. -
Marib Urban Profile «A Precarious Model of Peaceful Co-Existence Under Threat»
Marib Urban Profile «a precarious model of peaceful co-existence under threat» March 2021 3 DISCLAIMER ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FUNDING The designations employed and the presentation of This document presents the Marib Urban Profile. It has This project was generously funded by the UN material in this publication do not imply the expression been prepared by UN-Habitat. Data collection and data Development Account (11th tranche). The project would of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat analysis has been conducted in end 2019-2020. Some not have been possible without the in-kind support from of the United Nations concerning the legal status of of the data related to population figures may be slightly the UN-Habitat Yemen Office. any county, territory, city or area or its authorities, or outdated at time of publication. concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries regarding its economic system or degree of development. This project was implemented under the supervision of: Ivan Thung, Regional Office for Arab States, UN-Habitat Copyright: © United Nations Human Settlements Programme, unless indicated otherwise. Lead authors: Cameron Middleton, Aseel Saria, Ivan United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN- Thung Habitat), www.unhabitat.org. Other contributors from UN-Habitat are Dr. Samira Excerpts may be reproduced without authorization, on Alshawesh, Elaf Raslan, Nathalie Garner. condition that the source is indicated. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the United Nations and its member states. For all images used in this report, we have tried to retrieve and acknowledge the original source. -
Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) First Reserve Allocation 2019
Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) First Reserve Allocation 2019 1. Scope: The 1st YHF Reserve Allocation (RA) was launched on 5 April with the objective of mitigating the impact of the recent cholera outbreak, reduce its transmission and prevent the loss of lives. A maximum of USD 28.5 million was available for health and WASH projects for this round. The deadline to submit proposals was on 9 April. 2. Advisory Board: On 4 April, the AB met to consider the scope and scale of the allocation strategy and estimated funding gaps for emergency health and wash cholera prevention interventions. The AB agreed to make USD 15 million available for WASH partners and USD 13.5 million for health partners. 3. Review of Proposals: Cluster Coordinators representatives, with support from OCHA’s Humanitarian Financing Unit (HFU), conducted Strategic and Technical Reviews (STRC) on 11 April. The STRC used a score card to determine the strategic, programmatic and financial relevance of the submitted proposals. 50 per cent of recommended proposals scored above 75/100, with the average scores of all thirteen recommended proposals reaching 74/100. 4. Approved Projects: Thirteen (13) have been approved. The recommended projects cover 8 out of 22 governorates where priority interventions were pre-identified. Overall, 16 projects amounting to USD 28 million were screened by the STRCs. One (1) was excluded due to poor quality and two (2) due to lack of prior coordination with the clusters. Almost 1.8 million Yemenis will cumulatively benefit from this 1st RA. 5. Budget: The overall budget of the 13 selected projects is USD 26.06 million. -
Qat Yemen.Pdf
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants. This publication was made possible through support provided by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands under a project within the scope of the Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen, and a project through IOM’s Development Fund. The opinions expressed herein by the author(s) do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands or IOM, and neither does the mention of trade names, commercial practices or other organizations imply endorsement by the said agencies. Publisher: International Organization for Migration P.O. Box 16335 Sana’a, Yemen E-mail: [email protected] Internet: www.iom.int © 2014 International Organization for Migration (IOM) Cover Photo: © Bushra Al-Fusail. “Qat leaves being washed.” Cover Map: © www.wpmap.org Graphic Design: © Yemen Modern Printing Press _________________ All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher. Coverpage [Document subtitle] The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.